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1OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
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4UK-US Trade & Investment
5Working Group
624-25 July 2017
7Full Readout
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11Agenda and Table of Contents
12Original scheduled time/date* Meeting title and objectives Page Number
13Day 1 - Monday 24th July
149:30-10:15 Coordination Team meeting
15(USTR/UK coordination)
163
1710:15-10:45 Trade Strategy/WTO 5
1810:45-11:15 Goods/Textiles & Apparel 7
1911:15-12:30 Informal discussion on
20Regulatory Issues
21(USTR/DIT/BEIS)
2210
2312:30-14:00 - Lunch
2414:00-15:15 Lighthizer-Fox meetings
25Suggested running order was:
2614:00 - 14:15: Fox/Lighthizer
27bilateral
2814:15 - 15:15: Main plenary
29session
3013
3115:30-17:00 SMEs 15
32Day 2 - Tuesday 25th July
339:00-11:30 Services, Data, FS
34Running order:
359:00 - 10:15: Services, including
36Financial Services
3710:15 - 11:30: Data, digital and
38e-commerce issues
3918
4011:30-15:00 Goods (Part 1 and Part 2) 28
4115:00-16:00 IPR & Gis 40
4216:00-17:00 Coordination Team meeting
43(USTR/UK coordination)
4444
45*Session times may have varied from the schedule for actual meetings
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49Title of Meeting: Opening Coordination Meeting
50Date: 24 July
51Time: 09.30
52Participants
53Name Department/Directorate
54Dan Mullaney USTR
55Tim Wedding USTR
56David Weiner USTR
57Ram Rizzo USTR
58Alexandra Whittaker Assistant General Counsel USTR
59Oliver Griffiths DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
60Richard Salt DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
61Mark Kent British Embassy Washington
62Key Points to Note
63 UK explained seven short term outcomes. US supports concept of STOs but reserves its position
64pending inter-agency review.
65 US question whether Trade Working Group is the right forum for consideration of some of these
66STOs. UK notes that Economic Working Group only focused on continuity.
67 US requests STO proposals remain internal to US and UK Government at this stage.
68Report of Discussions and Outcome
691. USTR (Wedding) set out their expectations for the agenda of the 2-day meetings running through the
70individual sessions and representatives on the side. UK (Griffiths) agreed. The UK asked about the
71treatment of procurement continuity issues, given US sensitivities prevented its addition to the
72agenda. The US (Wedding) offered to introduce Scott Pietan, USTR lead on procurement who would be
73able to discuss. But he cautioned that US policy was in flux given the ‘Buy America, Hire America’
74report which was under discussion. The US would not have a policy position at this stage, but this was
75likely a “temporal issue”.
762. The UK introduced discussion of the 7 short term outcomes (STOs) which did not fit within the separate
77sessions:
78a. Defence Technology Transfer. The UK (Gadd) presented. Significant existing dialogue at
79working level with Dept of Defence and State Dept. There is an opportunity to overcome
80hurdles on both sides given largely homogenous defence industry. Improving the ability to 
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84move technology back and forth would reduce cost and increase capability of both our
85militaries. The Defence and Foreign Secretaries had already raised with their US counterparts.
86b. Defence Market Access and Governance. The UK (Gadd) presented. This proposal would build
87on the Reciprocal Defence Procurement MoU which provides relief from Buy America
88provisions. The goal would be to expand the scope of coverage.
89c. Science and Technology Agreement. The UK (Colley) presented. Negotiations to secure this
90agreement are ongoing between BEIS and the State Dept. This would provide a straightforward
91deliverable.
92d. Offshore Wind Collaboration. The UK (Colley) presented. The UK is a world leader in offshore
93wind. The US is taking increasing interest, including at the sub-Federal level. Our goal would
94be enhanced policy dialogue and provide Govt blessing to primarily private sector engagement.
95e. PPP Expertise Sharing. The UK (Colley) presented. In the context of President Trump’s
96infrastructure initiative, the proposal represents a UK offer to share expertise and best practice
97in PPP. A joint conference could be a useful mechanism to bring together public and private
98sectors.
99f. Mobile Roaming. The UK (Connolly) presented. The EU agreement to eliminate roaming
100charges has gone down well with the public. This proposal could do so between the UK and
101US. This could increase digital trade and generate long-term net benefits. UK telcos already
102have agreements with US providers, some of which already eliminate roaming charges. There
103may be mechanisms to do this jointly.
104g. Sports collaboration. The UK (Connolly) presented. There is a significant UK appetite for US
105sports franchises. American Football has begun exhibition matches and a formal franchise is
106under consideration. Additional US sports would be welcome.
1073. The US (Wedding) welcomed the explanations and endorsed the concept of seeking short term
108outcomes. Given the outlines had only been received just prior to the Working Group, the US would
109reserve its position on the specific proposals. The US would need to do some thinking on an interagency basis to consider the proposals and may revert with questions. US leads would share their own
110proposals during the specific sessions. Wedding noted the potential trade policy angle was obvious in
111some proposals, providing a clear USTR locus, whereas in others the lead would be clearly with other
112agencies. The US questioned whether the trade working group was the best forum for discussion and
113recommended an additional discussion with Clete Willems (NSC, Chair of Economic Working Group)
114regarding the proposals. The UK (Phillipson) noted the Economic Working Group was only mandated at
115present to look at continuity issues, not the future relationship. The US (Mullaney) recommended
116experts digging into the detail (e.g. Rob Tanner on roaming). Wedding raised comms around the STOs,
117noting press reporting of “24” proposals but no specifics, and requested that they remain internal at
118this stage.
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1215
122Title of Meeting: Trade Strategy / WTO
123Date: 24 July
124Time: 10.15
125Participants
126Name Department/Directorate
127Dawn Shackleford Assistant USTR for the WTO and Multilateral Affairs
128Mary Thornton Counsellor, US Mission to the WTO, Geneva
129Oliver Griffiths DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
130Richard Salt DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
131Antony Phillipson DExEU
132Anne Collett British Embassy Washington
133Key Points to Note
134 US sceptical about chance of substantive deliverables at WTO Ministerial
135 US remains concerned about operation of WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), but no substantive
136discussion.
137 US seeking improved compliance with existing notification obligations from WTO membership,
138important in the context of overcapacity.
139 US keen to see conversation about special and differential treatment for developing countries that
140recognises difference between advanced developing and low income countries.
141Report of Discussions and Outcome
1421. Shackleford set out three current US issues: preparations for the WTO Ministerial; the WTO Dispute
143Settlement Body; and, the approach to developing countries in the WTO.
144a. WTO Ministerial. The US was approaching this in a different way to the EU. The US is sceptical
145that concrete outcomes would coalesce in time for the Ministerial. At this stage ahead of Bali,
146the process was further ahead. Lighthizer dislikes the ‘housekeeping’ characterisation of the
147Ministerial, seeing instead an opportunity to reinvigorate the WTO.
148b. Dispute Settlement Body. There is an important issue around the operation of the DSB, but this
149is managed by the Monitoring and Enforcement Office of USTR.
150c. Development in the WTO. A significant issue is emerging with Developing countries regarding
151transparency and notifications, which is emblematic of a wider problem regarding the 
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155treatment of development at the WTO. This is especially relevant to China and overcapacity
156issues, where a lack of information is a fundamental problem, but is true for other countries
157too. Indonesia is woefully behind in notifications. This is not an issue of new rules, but of how
158to get the existing rules followed. Unfortunately, at present India, Cameroon and Uganda in
159particular were causing chaos, arguing that there is no mandate to discuss transparency. This is
160especially challenging, given Argentina and Brazil were both supportive. Navigating this desire
161for more advanced developing countries to discuss new issues, whilst the backmarkers did not,
162would be important. The US was looking for ways to begin talking about development
163differently, particularly for countries like Korea and Mexico still asserting their ‘developing’
164status, whilst not “freaking out” genuinely developing countries.
1652. Shackleford noted the importance the US attaches to the OECD as a forum for discussion and caucusing
166amongst likeminded WTO members on trade issues. She typically engages DG Trade but would
167welcome more discussion with UK counterparts.
1683. The UK (Griffiths) responded. The WTO exists to do deals. Working out how to encourage this is in
169everyone’s interests. The UK would be interested in a conversation about special and differentiated
170treatment whilst remaining committed to the role that trade plays in development. The UK views
171dispute settlement as a component of the WTO that currently works well, but we are open to ideas for
172ways to improve it. Transparency is an important theme which overcapacity is bringing into sharp
173focus. Ensuring proper notification in accordance with WTO rules is an important issue.
1744. The UK (Philippson) highlighted the UK’s goals regarding transition of existing and potential future
175plurilateral agreements negotiated with the EU. It was important in the context of exiting the EU that
176the UK and US are active in building global rules which can guide our trade.
177Action Items
178N/A
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1817
182Title of Meeting: Textiles
183Date: 24 July 2017
184Time: 10.45
185Participants
186Name Department/Directorate
187Elizabeth Branson Deputy Assistant USTR for Textiles
188Janet Heinzen Director Office of Textiles, International Trade
189Administration, Dept of Commerce
190Representatives from State Department EU and
191Multilateral divisions
192Oliver Griffiths DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
193Richard Salt DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
194Neil Feinson DIT, Trade in Goods, Trade Policy Group
195Tim Colley BEIS, International Trade
196Mark Kent British Embassy Washington
197Key Points to Note
198 Textiles is a sensitive and important issue for the US, typically handled separately from other goods
199sectors with its own FTA chapter.
200 The US approach to rules of origin for textiles supports production in, and economic integration
201between, the signatories to an FTA but tightly limits third country supply chains and inputs. They were
202critical of more liberal EU rules which allowed simple finishing processes such as dyeing and printing to
203confer origin for apparel.
204 Given the complexity of the rules of origin and relatively high MFN tariff rates, there is significant
205customs fraud in the sector. The US emphasised the need for enhanced customs collaboration in the
206sector, including inspections of producers in the country of export, the latter of which proved
207particularly problematic in the TTIP negotiations.
208Report of Discussions and Outcome
2091. The US (Branson) used the session to set out the typical US approach to textiles in trade
210agreements. UK-US trade in textiles and apparel is notable. The US imports $432m and exports
211$659m. 25% of US exports to the UK are fabric. Imports are 1/3 apparel and 1/3 fabric. The US
212typically structures dialogue on textiles as a separate negotiating area, which dates back to quota
213arrangements. It is a key issue for stakeholders. The US definition of textiles encompasses Chapter 50-
21463 of the HS, along with elements of Chapters 42, 66, 70, 94 and 96. That means the inclusion of some
215travel goods, umbrellas, comforters etc.
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2192. The key elements of US textiles FTA chapter include: trade rules and market access; rules of origin;
220customs cooperation and enforcement; and safeguards.
221a. Trade rules and market access. In TTIP, the US sought fully reciprocal tariff
222liberalisation. Average EU tariffs are 6.5% for textiles and 11.4% for apparel, whereas in the US
223they are 7.9% for textiles and 11.6% for apparel. This creates scope to reduce cost. TTIP had
224reached 97% tariff elimination and both sides were on a path to eliminate the remaining
2253%. The US typically includes safeguard measures in case of trade surges, but these are rarely
226used (once in CAFTA) and are unlikely in a UK-US context given mature industries and similar
227competition.
228b. Rules of origin. This was more difficult in TTIP. The US wants to see producers in the region of
229an FTA benefit based on a principle that significant production and economic integration occurs
230within a free trade region. This is through the “Yarn-Forward Rule”, meaning everything from
231the yarn spinning forward needs to take place within an FTA region. The US seeks to deliver
232this through tariff shift rules which traders prefer as more predictable and transparent, not
233subject to shifting cost calculations and complexity. With the EU there was similarity of
234approach with respect to yarn and fabric but apparel was more problematic as the EU
235recognised fabric dyeing, printing and finishing as transformation. The US doesn’t recognise this
236as it provides “minimal value to the region”. The EU also has a framework tariff preference
237levels for areas where there is no domestic supply. Neither Congress nor US industry likes this
238approach. The US used this approach temporarily in the past but found it didn’t support
239domestic production. So the US seeks to address through short supply lists.
240c. Customs cooperation. No surprise, given complex ROO and high tariffs, that considerable fraud
241exists. The US goal is for FTA countries to benefit which creates the need for enforcement and
242clear penalties for fraud. An issue in TTIP had been the US desire to inspect exporters in the
243country of export to prevent fraud. This involves US Customs and Border Protection inspectors
244visiting. It is a key enforcement tool which industry and Congress have grown to expect. CBP
245typically visits 10 countries per year.
2463. The UK (Feinson) asked where to find additional information on the US policy approach, where US
247industry was based and how textiles are treated in the US preferential trade arrangements. The US
248(Branson) highlighted the Commerce Department’s Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA) website
249(www.otexa.trade.gov). TPP includes a relevant chapter on textiles which includes much of these
250provisions. The US domestic textiles industry is concentrated in an arc from Virginia to Alabama with
251substantial pockets of production in New York and California. Textiles are excluded by US statute from
252the Generalised System of Preferences, but USTR recently added some specific travel goods.
253Action Items
254N/A
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2579
258FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
259Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
260The meeting was a US ask and it was business-like with the US setting out their well-rehearsed positions on
261textiles, the political significance of the sector to the US and some of the issues that arose during TTIP.
262Considerable further sectoral analysis is necessary by the UK to understand whether we can accommodate
263the US positions or will need to push back.
264A potential area of difficulty for the UK could be UK exporters with third country (esp GSP) inputs. The
265extent and reality of this issue needs further investigation before any FTA discussions. 
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26810
269Title of Meeting: Informal discussion on Regulatory Issues (USTR/UK Team only)
270Date: Monday 24th July
271Time: 10.30
272Participants
273Name Department/Directorate
274Oliver Griffiths DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
275Richard Salt DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
276Julian Farrel DIT, Policy Directorate
277Re Hobley DIT, Policy Directorate
278Antony Phillipson DExEU, Trade and Partnerships
279Tim Colley BEIS, International Trade
280Mark Kent British Embassy
281Jim Sanford USTR, Assistant USTR for Market Access and
282Industrial Competitiveness
283Rachel Shub USTR, Senior Director for European Regulatory
284Affairs
285Kent Shigetomi USTR, Director for Multilateral Non-Tariff Barriers
286Ashley Miller USTR, Director for Industrial Goods Market Access
287Key Points to Note
288 Significant US interest in the degree of regulatory flexibility the UK currently has, and will be
289seeking in future, from our relationship with the EU.
290 US has significant objectives for a future FTA around national treatment for standards development
291and conformity assessment.
292 The US also has important objectives around good regulatory practice, including transparency and
293stakeholder input, in all trade discussions.
294Report of Discussions and Outcome
2951. The US (Sanford) set out current US thinking on regulatory issues in a US-UK context. The key
296question for the US is to better understand the policy space available to choose regulatory
297approaches and outcomes. Primarily that creates an interest in UK-EU discussions. The US also has a
298range of stakeholder engagement frameworks which Sanford’s team works closely in and the US is
299interested in how the UK plans to engage its business community.
3002. The UK (Griffiths) highlighted that how we engage stakeholders is a live policy discussion in the
301UK. We are thinking hard about Parliamentary as well as other stakeholder input in the process in 
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305the context of preparations for a Trade Bill. The UK’s internal government structures are a matter for
306us. The UK (Phillipson) responded on the EU negotiation. UK objectives remain as articulated in the
307Prime Minster’s January speech at Lancaster House and in the Article 50 letter. We will be seeking as
308seamless and frictionless trade as possible with the EU. But we also want an independent
309international trade policy that allows divergence from the EU. We are beginning from a point of
310harmonisation. In future we will need to manage both convergence with the EU in some areas and
311divergence in others. The EU currently lacks a mandate to discuss the future relationship with the
312UK, but we hope they develop one in November. Phillipson noted the live discussion of an
313implementation period following our exit. The Secretary of State for Exiting the EU accepts the logic
314of the need for an implementation period and to send an early signal to business regarding it to help
315planning.
3163. The US (Sanford) noted the need for continuity of existing agreements and characterised the
317transition of the MRAs as a relatively easy “drafting exercise”. He returned to the issue of policy
318space, highlighting an example from medical devices regulation. In this case, the UK and Ireland
319attend IMDRF (International Medical Devices Regulators Forum) meetings. This is relevant because
320this is where the single audit standard has been developed, an important issue for US
321stakeholders. Does this mean the UK has some policy flexibility here? If so, are there other similar
322examples which might allow policy change consistent with EU obligations? The US would not be
323seeking to lower standards. Shub noted the frequent comment from the Commission in TTIP that
324some areas were Member State competence. Miller raised the issue of e-labelling. There has been
325global uptake and piloting in much of the world except Europe. Is there policy space for the UK to do
326something on e-labelling on a pilot basis?
3274. The US (Shigetomi) highlighted typical issues in Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) discussions. The US
328typically has a TBT chapter (with one exception). But the EU doesn’t always (e.g. EUMexico). Typically, US text reaffirms WTO TBT commitments whereas the EU incorporates those
329commitments. The difference amounts to a legal question about whether dispute settlement
330mechanism applies (it does not in US TBT chapters). The US tends to build on the WTO TBT text,
331TBT+. It has the following features (summarised in a 2014 USTR Report:
332https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20TBT%20Report.pdf) :
333i. It allows persons of other countries to participate in the standards setting process through
334national treatment.
335ii. It requires national treatment of conformity assessment bodies. It requires non-discrimination
336on where you are based or whether operating for profit or not for profit basis.
337iii. It requires transparency in the rulemaking process. This means transparent timelines for
338publication and before finalisation and entry into force, including comment mechanisms and a
339requirement to respond substantively to comments.
3405. The US (Shigetomi) set out US concerns highlighted in a TTIP context. The US feels it faces
341discrimination in the EU. The US view is that the EU does not use international standards, but rather
342regional standards developed in the EU through a process closed to outsiders. By contrast, the EU 
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346does not face discrimination in the US system. US law requires the use of international standards
347wherever developed. Nor does the EU face discrimination of conformity assessment bodies in the
348US, whereas in the EU only EU based bodies can test in the EU market. In TTIP, the US had sought for
349an EU body to recognise US conformity assessment bodies. The US had understood that this
350authority was there, and that precedent exists, but that the political will was lacking. In response to
351a question, the US promised to circulate the referenced paper and US text.
3526. The US (Shub) set out typical objectives around good regulatory practice (GRP). This exists to identify
353domestic administrative requirements in a more seamless way. It is easier to change a regulation
354before it is finalised. There is a preference for performance-based (e.g. mph) rather than design
355based objectives. The UK puts out regulatory proposals for comment and supports evidence-based
356decision-making through the better regulation programme. The US asked about current UK process
357for scrutinising directives emanating from Brussels. The UK (Farrel) summarised briefly that the
358same process applies to domestic and EU regulation, especially given typical implementation
359flexibility in directives.
3607. The UK (Salt) summarised the rich seam of issues which merit greater discussion and the importance
361of building a shared understanding of our respective regulatory approaches.
362Action Items
363N/A
364FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
365Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
366N/A
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36913
370Title of Meeting: Lighthizer-Fox bi-lateral meeting and Plenary Session
371Date: 24 July
372Time: 14.00
373Participants
374Name Department/Directorate
375Amb. Robert Lighthizer USTR
376Dr Liam Fox Secretary of State, DIT
377Oliver Griffiths DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
378Richard Salt DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
379David Gloss DIT, Ministerial
380George Thompson DIT, Ministerial
381Niken Wresniwiro DIT, Ministerial
382Antony Phillipson DExEU
383Emma Coppack DExEU
384Freya Jackson British Embassy Washington
385Meghan Ormerod British Embassy Washington
386Report of Discussions and Outcome from Bi-Lat
3871. SoS noted the importance of services to the UK and US economies, and emphasised the importance
388of TiSA which he said could be an important route for the UK to lock in EU services commitments.
389Lighthizer noted that the US was looking at ‘all these agreements’ and would decide which to
390prioritise.
3912. Lighthizer noted his interest in working together with the UK on the Trade Secrets case. He made it
392clear that the US was planning to press ahead fairly soon.
3933. On the WTO, Lighthizer set out his belief that the system cannot deal with a large economic player
394which is not structured as an open economy. He cited a Chinese ambition to build up capacity
395sector by sector to wipe out established industries in liberal economies. SoS reported on his
396positive conversations with Azevedo, where SoS had floated the idea of a small number of leading
397countries moving ahead on a plurilateral basis on issues such as data. Lighthizer was interested but
398wondered how the proposal would deter MFN free-riding.
3994. SoS set out his ambitions for the Working Group: a technical exercise on continuity agreements; to
400move forward on a list of short term outcomes; to prepare for a future FTA; to co-ordinate on WTO.
401Lighthizer underlined his personal support – and that of the President – “Trade is not always a
402happy area; this is.”
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4065. SoS concluded by pressing Lighthizer on three points: (i) support for technical rectification in
407Geneva (ii) support for the UK re-joining GPA and (iii) the importance the UK places on the s232
408report, noting the defence interface. Lighthizer noted all three points, including saying that GPA
409was another of the agreements that the US Administration was looking at.
410Report of Discussions from Plenary
4111. In the Plenary session with USTR Amb Lighthizer, SoS Fox discussed broader trade issues including
412WTO, Services, steel and IP.
4132. On WTO, Lighthizer looked forward to the time when the UK would be able to operate “in a more
414innovative capacity” in the WTO. There was much the US and UK could do together.
4153. SoS Fox agreed on the need for a rules-based system that was effectively enforced: “free trade did
416not mean free-for-all trade.”
4174. Lighthizer said the US were putting recommendations to the President on aspects of TISA. The
418difficulty was that the President did not accept we were in a post-industrial period. So the main
419focus would be on bringing back some manufacturing jobs.
4205. The US were also drawing up options for tackling barriers in countries that were preventing
421efficient markets.
4226. On steel, Lighthizer asked for alternatives to their S232 idea on how to tackle over-capacity. He also
423looked forward to working with the UK to tackle IP theft, which SoS Fox highlighted as a serious
424issue between China and the UK.
425Action Items
426N/A
427FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
428Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
429N/A 
430OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
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43215
433Title of Meeting: SME Working Group
434Date: 24 July
435Time: 15.30
436Participants
437Name Department/Directorate
438Christina Sevilla USTR
439Tim Wedding USTR
440Peter Cazamias Small Business Administration (SBA)
441Bryan O’Byrne Small Business Administration (SBA)
442Charles Maresca SBA Office of Advocacy
443Rosalyn Steward SBA Office of Advocacy
444Patrick Kirwan Commerce
445Oliver Griffiths DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
446Richard Salt DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
447Julian Farrel DIT, Policy Directorate
448Tim Colley BEIS, International Trade
449Key Points to Note
450 US (Sevilla) set out extent of US and UK SME bilateral trade. US (Sevilla and O’Byrne) and UK (Colley
451and Farrel) explained their respective governments’ approaches to supporting small and medium
452sized business. The UK noted that it didn’t have an exact counterpart to the SBA.
453 US suggested examining EU-US experience (e.g. EU-US SME Best Practices Workshop) as possible
454way to move forward on SME work stream before launch of formal talks.
455 Follow-up: each side to identify areas of immediate engagement/commonality, including an
456inventory of agencies who do SME work, and to follow-up with a VTC at a date tbd.
457Report of Discussions and Outcome
4581. USTR (Sevilla) said that UK is the third top destination for US SME exports, totalling $19 billion. It was
459her understanding that 44% of UK SME exports go to the US. The US explained that the bulk of the SME
460work was handled by the Small Business Administration with some work by the Commerce Department
461and USTR. The SBA supports SMEs by providing capital, grants, counselling, and match-making
462opportunities. SBA Advocacy (a division within the SBA) advocates for SME interests in the US interagency process to minimize the impact of regulations on these companies. DOC manages trade zones,
463provides counselling to SMEs subject to a/d cases, helps identify global markets for US SMEs (e.g., the
464Foreign and Commercial Service hosts joint DOC and SBA offices in 26 locations to support SMEs), and 
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468also provides analytical services. USTR’s role in SMEs was mandated by the Trade Promotion Act to
469ensure that the interests of small business are considered in all trade talks.
4702. The UK (Colley and Farrel) said that SMEs were an exciting part of the agenda and linked to the UK’s
471industrial strategy. In the UK, SME issues were covered by numerous government agencies as they
472didn’t have a dedicated SBA-like entity. Issues addressed included access to finance, support to SMEs
473to navigate regulation, and access to skills and technology. The UK Better Regulation Executive
474oversees the operation of the ‘SAMBA’ (small and micro business assessment) in UK impact
475assessments to help address SME needs in new regulation. The UK was keenly interested in helping
476SMEs via an SME chapter in a future FTA.
4773. The US (Sevilla) thanked the UK for their explanation and said that USTR’s role in supporting SMEs was
478focused on chapters in FTAs that, for example, lowered tariffs, reduced NTBs (e.g. inspection
479requirements and making it easier for SMEs to comment on proposed regulations), as well as
480addressing de minimis requirements (eg the $800 de minimis threshold for customs). The SBA
481(O’Byrne) explained that 22 out of the 24 Korea-US FTA chapters addressed NTBs.
4824. USTR (Sevilla) outlined the Best Practice Workshops that were held under the auspices of the
483Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC). The US and EU had hosted 7 sessions thus far with attendees
484including Member States, business, and trade associations. Topics included finance, start-ups and
485training. DOC noted that the EU had also signed a Cooperation Agreement with the US to share
486information on SMEs, provide for SME networking opportunities and promote international trade and
487business cooperation between US and EU SMEs. SBA suggested that an MOU might also be an
488option. The US (Sevilla) noted that an MOU with the UK at this time could run the risk of treading into
489FTA competence but could be an option for later. The UK (Griffiths) said that they needed to bring UK
490SMEs into this conversation and suggested that DIT (trade promotion arm) should participate in future
491discussions, particularly in light of the mention of match-making and trade fairs.
4925. The UK (Colley) noted that IPR could also be a focus of cooperation. The US (Sevilla) agreed and said
493that the Trade Policy Staff Committee typically identified areas of cooperation that could potentially be
494included in an FTA chapter. Typically the US sought to include three kinds of provisions for SMEs in
495FTAs: generic provisions which were helpful to SMEs (eg testing and certification); an SME Chapter; and
496SME-specific provisions in individual chapters. The SBA (O’Byrne) said that they could also bring in the
497countries’ respective patent offices to identify common approaches.
4986. The UK (Farrel) asked about how the US sold FTAs to SMEs. The US (Sevilla) said that they mainly
499worked with trade associations but also did outreach in the US (e.g. USTR visited Peoria, Illinois) to
500educate SMEs about the benefits of free trade.
501Action Items
5021. The US (Wedding) said that next steps could include having each side identify areas of immediate
503engagement/commonality and to follow-up with a VTC at a date tbd. The US (Sevilla) said some initial
504thoughts could include scoping out which agencies on both sides do what and then to identify
505sectors/priorities for future cooperation (e.g. the workshops).
506OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
507
50817
509FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
510Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
511N/A
512OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
513
51418
515Title of Meeting: Services/Data/FS
516Date: 25 July
517Time: 9.00
518Participants
519Name Department/Directorate
520Re Hobley DIT, International Trade in Services Policy
521Sarah Connolly DCMS
522Oliver Griffiths DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
523Richard Salt DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
524Rob Ward HMT
525Tim Colley BEIS, International Trade
526Benedict Wagner-Rundell British Embassy Washington
527Meghan Ormerod British Embassy Washington
528Maryam Teschke-Panah DIT, Trade Policy Group
529Adam Williams IPO
530Tom Fine USTR
531Rob Tanner USTR
532Dan Mullaney USTR
533Tim Wedding USTR
534Jeff Segal US Treasury
535David Weiner USTR
536Michael Corbin Commerce
537Mary Thornton Counsellor, US Mission to the WTO, Geneva
538Alexandra Whittaker Assistant General Counsel, USTR
539Sarah Sybilla Commerce
540Jackie Vergis USTR
541Blake Murray Commerce
542Rebecca Nolins
543Key Points to Note
544 The previous Administration had been surprised by how difficult the services discussions in TTIP
545had been. The US has a clear template for dealing with services in the context of a Free Trade
546Agreement.
547 There is a high degree of appetite to work with the UK on services in the context of the trade
548dialogue and in the future. 
549OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
550
55119
552 There are two questions that the US is particularly interested in with respect to the UK’s future
553relationship with the EU and the impact of this on the future UK/US relationship. Will the UK adopt
554a negative list approach to services (like the US) or a positive list approach (like the EU)? Will the UK
555adopt current EU wide reservations on services – if so how many will the UK adopt?
556 The US understands the UK’s technical rectification approach to tariffs at the WTO. However, it
557considers a similar approach to services schedules a mistake as the EU has a ‘least common
558denominator’ approach and this is what the UK will adopt. It would be a negative signal for
559another entity in the WTO to do this.
560 It is early in this Administration’s thinking on TISA. They suggested the UK should look at the
561agreement in further detail to inform its position on the agreement.
562 On e-commerce there are good existing relationships between regulators. There is interest from the US in
563discussing data flows, data privacy and data localisation issues further with the UK.
564 On short term outcomes:
565o There is willingness to take forward work on a financial dialogue HM Treasury to US Treasury,
566further work will be needed to decide on a format that works for this. There was an express ask that
567this work be Treasury to Treasury led.
568o There is potential for the UK and US to work together on mutual recognition of auditor professional
569qualifications, the US outlined appetite from other professions (legal, nursing and architects) the UK
570will take away to consider.
571o There was no substantive discussion on Earth observation regulations. The US will put the UK in
572contact with the relevant people in the US Government.
573Report of Discussions and Outcome
5741. USTR (Fine) explained that the US would set out their historic approach to services in trade agreements
575to help set UK expectations about where the conversation would be going. He set out five points to
576shape the discussion on services.
577a) The US is used to looking at the UK through the TTIP lens. As the UK would be having conversations
578with the Commission about services the US could offer some lessons from TTIP.
579b) The US wanted to relay concerns the US has about the WTO and services, touching on TISA. The US
580noted that the Administration had not made up its mind on what is going on with TISA yet. They
581were aware there was UK interest in continuing the TISA talks and it would be good to explore UK
582expectations.
583c) Short term wins. There was a lot of interest in doing something ahead of Brexit. US (Fine) noted the
584UK proposals; the US would have ideas too.
585d) On continuity agreements there were some conversations underway already and not so many
586continuity agreements in the services space. 
587OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
588
58920
5902. The UK (Griffiths) set out that there were three short term outcomes in the services space:
591a) Financial Services Dialogue
592b) MRPQ issue/audit
593c) Earth Observation Regulation
5943. On continuity agreements the UK (Griffiths) noted that the division of responsibility tended to sit with
595the Economics Working Group. He asked the US to let the UK know if any of the Short Term Outcomes
596were of interest.
5974. The US (Fine) then set out the US approach to services in an FTA. He noted, for the avoidance of doubt
598that the group was not meeting in the context of negotiating an FTA. He set out that not all countries
599do FTAs in the same way as the US. He asked the UK what it meant when it said that it was not
600prepared to discuss a trade agreement yet. The US did not want to cross any lines.
6015. The US (Fine) explained that the US divides up services into five chapters: Cross Border Services,
602Investment, Financial Services, Telecoms and E-Commerce. This format had been born out of NAFTA.
603Internally the USTR was organised along this model. It may be revised in the future, but this was the
604model for now. The chapters on Telecoms and E-commerce could evolve into a chapter on digital trade.
6056. For the purposes of the conversation here the US would set aside the investment point as the UK did
606not have the experts in the room. The US noted the investment component of the Financial Services
607Chapter.
6087. The US explained that their key approach to services was that of a negative list. The Commission’s
609approach was different. It appeared that there might be a movement towards the US approach – for
610example in CETA and TISA. But for now the two were different. In TTIP this had been a challenge. There
611was a basic distinction between positive and negative. The US approach was that everything in services
612should be open unless there was a very good reason not to. The positive list approach was different. It
613tried to be more strategic. Where should be open and where should not be? The US argued that
614economies were much better open than closed.
6158. The US (Fine) noted that the Obama administration had been quite surprised by how difficult the
616services discussion in TTIP had been. They had predicted that Agriculture would be difficult but late in
617the TTIP process it became clear that services would be. Much of the problem flowed from the positive,
618negative approach. The US had done a lot of work with Member States including the UK to understand
619individual positions. There had been US frustration. The EU had reserved the right to introduce new
620discriminatory measures after the FTA was in place. They found this “horrifying”. It was not something
621they had encountered with other trading partners. There was sympathy for the Commission’s position,
622particularly as they had worked through and better understood the political sensitivities of different
623Member States but the US had to think about whether they could sell a deal to Congress.
6249. The US (Fine) said that the Commission had a good services regime in place on the ground. They knew
625there was no difficulty in doing business. But this is why they had been surprised by how difficult it was. 
626OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
627
62821
629The political problems were with the Member States. The UK was not the problem during these
630negotiations, but other Member States had been pressuring the Commission for reservations in the
631services schedules. The US knew where their allies were and they had been trying to help negotiate a
632deal that was better and stronger.
63310. The US explained that they had told Lighthizer that services was an area the UK and US could work
634together on when it was having an FTA style conversation. The US (Fine) explained that they had a lot
635of respect for the Commission and the way the EU had liberalised services on the ground, but they bore
636the scars from the experience of TTIP. They appreciated that the Commission had political challenges to
637face. The US explained that the conversation on services could be positive and the success of a UK-US
638conversation on services could be an example to other Member States and other non-EU countries.
639They could fly the good flag of services liberalisation.
64011. The US (Tanner) explained that the negative list approach was very important to the US. There could
641not be carve outs for future innovation. He asked what the UK’s current thinking was on approach.
64212. The UK (Griffiths) explained that it was too early for that specific conversation. He set out that the UK
643saw the services elements of a future relationship as very important. The UK had a very open system
644already and the US should expect the UK to be a liberalising influence. The UK (Hobley) thanked the US
645for their helpful explanation of the US approach. She agreed with Griffiths comments on timing and the
646importance of services elements and was interested in the US approach to listing. The UK wanted to
647focus on outcomes rather than the list structure and asked the US to expand on how the negative list
648system fitted in with its regulatory system. What were stakeholder views on it? She was keen for the
649UK to learn from US experiences. The UK (Hobley) suggested an offline conversation and that the group
650continue to talk about outcomes. On the US assessment of the TTIP negotiations it was good to hear
651the UK approach then had not been too problematic.
65213. The US (Fine) raised that there were EU wide future reservations in TTIP. There had also been 6 UK
653specific future reservations. The US said that they understood that those 6 UK specific reservations
654were politically sensitive. Setting aside those 6 they asked which of the EU wide reservations the UK
655anticipated keeping. Would the UK keep audio visual for example? The US assumption was that for
656many of the EU wide reservations the EU would want the UK to keep them. The EU had tried to get
657other countries to adopt them, in order to demonstrate that it was normal to do so. Which would the
658UK keep? The US also asked what the UK would do in the WTO. Would the UK be trying to simply do
659something quickly? Would the UK just pick up the EU approach? The US appreciated that it made sense
660to do so on tariffs, but less so on services. Were there EU reservations the UK did not care about?
66114. The UK (Hobley) explained that the UK was starting to look at technical rectification of all EU-3
662rd
663country FTAs. This was primarily about ensuring continuity on Day 1 of EU exit. On GATS the UK would
664propose to the WTO that they transfer over all of the existing arrangements. The UK explained that
665they realised this was not what the US would want to hear, but that to do otherwise would take too
666long and we would not wish to enter into a full blown negotiation with other countries. Our primary
667objective was to ensure our businesses did not fall off a cliff edge on day 1 of exit.
668OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
669
67022
67115. The UK (Griffiths) explained that there were 40 existing FTAs to transition and a trade remedy regime to
672create. The UK wanted to make sure that the UK and its trading partners were not in a worse position
673on leaving. To ensure this the UK needed to transition to a baseline.
67416. The US (Fine) understood this “baseline” position on tariffs. Continuity was important and it could be
675based on the premise that the EU had a good tariff schedule. He said that the assumption did not apply
676on services. The EU services schedule was the lowest common denominator and the worst of what
677every Member State wanted put together. The US had a sense of how the UK would function on
678services in practice and asked why the UK would take all the dirty laundry from the EU. They
679understood the workload issue and that this meant that the UK could not rework all schedules. But it
680would be a negative signal to have another party in addition to the EU that wouldn’t take competition
681for audio visual and that took a future reservation in this area. The US asked how they could accept the
682UK not taking a single step forward, under Article 21 at the WTO.
68317. The UK (Hobley) explained that the UK wanted to avoid the transposition exercise at the WTO
684becoming a negotiation under WTO rules. The US (Fine) understood, but said that no Article 21 process
685has ever concluded. The US asked again if the UK had to take on all the EU’s “dirty laundry” in services
686reservations? Could there be any middle ground? The UK (Hobley) said that the UK had to stick within
687WTO rules. Griffiths said that the point had been noted.
68818. The US (Fine) said that the bigger issue was how far the UK wanted to be like the EU in the long run and
689how far it wanted to be something different. He explained that the US sees some small countries – for
690example Switzerland – as “satellites of the EU”. They did not want the UK to be that. The US wanted to
691know what kind of TISA member the UK would be. Ligthhizer hadn’t settled the US approach yet. But
692want to know more on the UK attitude.
69319. The UK (Griffiths) said that in principle, the UK was enormously supportive. Ministers were not looking
694at it in detail though as TISA talks were currently suspended. The UK (Hobley) explained that they were
695interested in where the US was going. She emphasised that the UK had a very liberal services market
696and wanted TISA negotiations to continue. The UK had offered a lot on services in TISA and wanted to
697know how this had landed with the US. What did US stakeholders think and want?
69820. The US (Fine) explained that there was a distinction between TTIP and TISA. The US had placed a very
699different emphasis on each. TTIP was about Market Access. TISA was about the rules. In some cases the
700reverse was true, but the emphasis had been entirely different in each agreement. TISA had been about
701granular rules. The detailed conversation on content was in TTIP.
70221. The US (Fine) asked if the UK had seen the full text of TISA. The UK (Hobley) explained that the UK saw
703less now from the EU than it once did. Stakeholders had been enthusiastic about TISA. The US (Fine)
704said, that the UK said they were interested in TISA but if the UK had not seen the text there might be
705things in the agreement that the UK did not like. The UK (Hobley) clarified that as it had been many
706months since TISA was last discussed there had not been text since then. The UK (Griffiths) said that the
707UK would need to find the right legal vehicle for TISA if it was agreed. The US (Fine) noted that the UK
708would need to negotiate with the EU, US and others on this. 
709OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
710
71123
712Short Term Outcomes – Financial Services
71322. The US (Fine) noted that the US had seen the UK list of proposed short term outcomes. He noted that
714US Treasury (Segal) would lead on the Financial Services Dialogue discussion and that a lot of this would
715take place US Treasury (UST) to HM Treasury (HMT).
71623. The UK (Ward) noted that the covered agreement on insurance was among the continuity agreements
717that mattered from a financial services perspective. There were a number of other issues dealt with
718under the equivalence regime including the central counter-parts agreements and EMIR legislation.
719Noted that these would be dealt with in the Economic Working Group.
72024. The UK noted that they were keen to address a dialogue on a UST/HMT and regulator to regulator
721basis. The UK said that the principles they were guided by were stability in financial services, the scope
722for alignment on regulation, support for market efficiency and ways the UK and US could co-operate to
723make these happen. There were several dimensions to why this would be useful. Firstly, continuity and
724rectification issues. The UK was conscious that as EU negotiations developed there may be issues to
725consider regulator to regulator. The UK was also interested in US future financial services regulation.
726How would the US approach international fora and seek to avoid market fragmentation? Were there
727areas of common interest before the UK left the EU? Beyond Brexit what would the relationship look
728like?
72925. The UK (Ward) was keen to involve regulators in any discussion. The UK took the same position as the
730US regarding independence of regulators. They thought a financial dialogue would report into the
731Trade Working Group, the Economic Working Group and to the Chancellor and Secretary Mnuchin.
73226. The US (Fine) thought that the UK was talking to the right people about the dialogue, with the majority
733of the conversation occurring UST-HMT. They said there was a complex relationship between what
734went into the regulatory box and what went into the trade box. On trade issues USTR shared the chair
735with UST; the covered agreement on insurance was an example of an issue that fell within this space.
736Issues that fell squarely within the regulatory box fell outside of the trade purview (and out of USTR’s
737area). The US explained that the line between them was not always clear and that it was important to
738approach issues through both avenues.
73927. The US (Segal) passed on his thanks to HMT for their visit to UST and discussions with Susan Baker’s
740team. The US (Segal) said that every time they discussed the UK-US relationship with the Fed and other
741regulators the relationship with the UK was held up as the gold standard. They considered the UK a
742bedrock of the international system on financial regulation. The US set out that they were in a period of
743political transition too and they wanted to approach this in a thoughtful way. They wanted to figure out
744a way and format for the dialogue that would work and fit alongside the EU negotiations. They looked
745forward to working with the UK on this, but needed to do so in the right way. The US emphasised that it
746was important to keep conversations UST to HMT. 
747OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
748
74924
750Short Term Outcomes - Audit
75128. The UK (Colley) set out BEIS’ role in managing HMG’s relationship with industry, including on
752professional services. The UK would be looking to maintain its relationship with the EU and the Brexit
753negotiations were very important. But mutual recognition of audit seemed like an area in which the UK
754and US could move forward. The UK was conscious there would be challenges for the US – in particular
755where professional qualifications and licensing were done at the State rather than federal level. The UK
756was interested in whether we could give political impetus to this area, perhaps encouraging regulators
757to speak to one another. The UK understood that the US had made progress on this area with Mexico
758and Canada and wanted to explore this further.
75929. The US (Fine) explained that there had been discussion on this issue in the context of TTIP. The US had
760been ready to talk about the who but not the what. Each country should be allowed to adopt their own
761standards, (the what) but if someone was qualified in a profession, travelled to the other country and
762gained qualification in the other country they should be able to practice (the who). The UK agreed that
763both were talking about the who. The US (Fine) thought that the UK and US could move forward on this
764topic. They wondered why we should be constrained to auditing but noted that it was where the US
765had been particularly successful in the past.
76630. The US had previously played a co-ordination role between the 50 states on this issue. In some
767professions the states were more united (e.g. had similar standards) and Auditing was the “pinnacle” of
768this. It was particularly easy for an auditor in one state to move and practice in another. The US noted
769that they had a lot of international agreements on this, for example with Australia, New Zealand, Hong
770Kong, Canada and Mexico. This enabled people to take a simplified exam when they moved to the US.
771There was enthusiasm from firms. It was a profession dominated by a few firms and they were
772invariably keen to move their people around.
77331. The US noted that they had had problems with the Commission approach. There was an ‘all for one and
774one for all’ approach adopted by the EU and the Commission had insisted that all Member States were
775the same. The US commented that they were not. US regulators might know a lot about standards in
776the UK, but very little about those in Cyprus for example. TTIP had stumbled in this area as a result. The
777US also noted that there were other professions who were also interested in progressing work in this
778area. Architects had expressed an interest – there were agreements with Australia and New Zealand.
779Under those agreements a new board had been established. Architects from Australia and NZ could
780approach the board, take a simplified exam and practice in most states.
78132. Nursing was the other profession that the US was interested in. Nursing in the US was very closely coordinated with Canada and Ireland. The relationship with Canada was particularly close and Canada had
782adopted the US exam. A compact between 25-30 states meant that nurses were able to move between
783those states. The US were interested to know if it would be really problematic for the UK to act in this
784area – they were sensitive to the particular sensitivities with the health sector in the UK.
78533. The US also noted potential in Legal services. The profession was keen to “work together” on what
786might be possible. The US thought that the UK and US could establish a group to talk about this further, 
787OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
788
78925
790determine which professions to cover and begin to look at the state level regulators that would be
791involved.
79234. The UK (Salt) noted that there was a big sensitivity for the UK around areas that were currently EU
793competence. Audit was very nice because there was a specific carve out for mutually recognised
794qualifications in this field. There was an established track record on this. The UK would need to look at
795the situation for any other professions. The US (Fine) said that they were highly sceptical about the EU’s
796position on EU competencies. Surely, he asked each member state still retained the competence to
797decide who would be qualified in a particular profession. The US said they understood that part of the
798conversation was about the political relationship with the Commission.
79935. The UK (Griffiths) said that they needed to make sure they were confident in questions around EU
800competence. The UK (Salt) were interested to hear there was a relationship with Ireland on nursing.
801The US (Fine) explained that Ireland had adopted the US exam. Each state had their own approach to
802how they treated foreign lawyers. Mullaney noted that there was a more liberal approach in some EU
803Member States than others in the way foreign lawyers were treated. The UK (Hobley) liked the idea of a
804group to consider this issue further and asked if we could consider this an outcome of the discussion.
805The US (Fine) agreed that it could be. The US was ready to bring regulators in to have this discussion
806and could do so relatively quickly. If there was greater ease for the UK in just looking at auditors then
807they could do this.
808E-Commerce/Telecoms
80936. The US (Tapper) set out that after NAFTA mutual recognition had incrementally improved upon the
810GATS approach. The US had a package of disciplines that they sought in telecoms. TPP was the most
811recent example of this in an FTA. The US regulator had no formal MOU with OFCOM but did have lots of
812conversations with them – the relationship was quite good already. They considered the UK and US to
813be very much aligned. While regulators may sometimes have taken different decisions they generally
814had a similar approach. For example, on transparency and impartiality of the regulator. The US always
815asked that there were no restriction of foreign investment in telecoms. They noted that a number of
816countries had restrictions on this.
81737. The US said that the EU approach was much more concerned with setting laws on telecoms/ecommerce whereas the US approach was to take a path to agree an outcome. The EU had a strong
818preference for regulation to solve problems whereas the US did not endorse this as the only solution
819and were outcomes focused. The US preferred to set obligations around outcomes and for each party
820to work out how to reach those outcomes. The UK (Hobley) asked how this type of approach could be
821enforced. The US (Tapper) explained that if a party felt that the outcomes had not been observed then
822in practice the first step would be discussion between the parties about this and then an assessment
823based on the facts of the case. 
824OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
825
82626
827E-Commerce
82838. The US (Tapper) explained that electronic commerce was a buzz word currently, but that it had meant
829transformation across the economy with the movement of data and digitisation transforming the way
830we trade. It was important to build out disciplines to deal with actual problems and look ahead to
831potential problems. The US chapter on e-commerce was not limited to services, but it did not apply to
832government procurement. There were a lot of disciplines in an e-commerce trade discussion or
833agreement, for example around source codes. It also touched on things on the customs side, for
834example de minimis – all were connected to e-commerce. The UK (Connolly) asked if the US could
835share a list of everything the US thought was involved in an e-commerce chapter. The US (Tapper) said
836that they did not have a list but could talk to the UK about this to give the UK some sense of what
837would be involved.
83839. The US (Tapper) set out that the latest example of an e-commerce chapter that the UK could look at
839was TPP. On moving data and cloud services the US had tried to craft rules and put discipline around
840something. It raised big issues, for example on privacy. A model had developed in TPP designed to allow
841exceptions for privacy and some guidelines around it. The US (Tapper) said they would be interested in
842discussing developing (UK) thinking on EU data flows. The UK (Connolly) explained that the UK were
843strong supporters of the free flow of data and data protection. The UK was bound to bring in the GDPR
844and would be bringing forward legislation. There were a different set of interdependencies around
845data. Data protection was right in the right set of circumstances. The US (Tapper) said that knowing the
846UK would have the GDPR but would not be in the EU meant it was unclear what that would look like in
847practice. The US (Segal) explained they were committed to preventing data localisation issues. They
848looked forward to talking about this with the UK. TTIP had worked on a different approach for FS than
849on other areas for this. The UK (Connolly) explained that they were very aware of this issue.
85040. The US (Tapper) explained that the FTC had an MOU with the UK on consumer protection. Beyond
851cloud services there were also rules on data services. Most countries had been supportive of GATS. The
852US was interested in talking to the UK about this when we were ready. In TPP the US had agreed to a
853number of provisions that were slightly less relevant to trade, but were instead about providing a good
854environment for trade. For example consumer protection, rules around spam emails, online protection,
855privacy. The US set out that they remained open to discussing these issues in the context of trade
856discussions. They had begun to see some problems in this area, for example on divulging sharing source
857codes. There could be some future work to look at how to address this.
85841. The UK (Williams) explained that there were quite a lot of Intellectual Property connections with source
859code elements. The UK (Hobley) commented on consumer policy - the UK had a high appetite for
860ensuring that any agreements benefit consumers and not just businesses. The US (Tapper) wondered if
861the group should discuss sporting events. The UK (Connolly) suggested not. 
862OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
863
86427
865Observation regulation
86642. The UK (Colley) introduced the short term outcome on Eartch observation regulation. He explained that
867the UK was in the process of building significant capacity on satellite/space. It was a challenging area
868due to the use of observation data. They did not want to end up in a situation where problems were
869caused for businesses. The US (Fine) indicated that the right people were not in the room, but that
870USTR would find the right people for the UK to talk to about this.
871Action Items
8721. To continue to keep in touch with a possibility of a phone call in mid-September once both US and UK
873have revisited their TiSA offers.
874FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
875Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
876 The atmosphere of the meeting was jovial and relaxed, however it was obvious that the US really
877did not like the EU Commission and their approach to Services negotiations. There was much talk
878which painted the EU Commission as the bad guys.
879 The UK should continue to push for an understanding of how any outcomes would work in practice
880given that different rules could apply at State level compared to Federal level.
881 In future dialogue, the US will continue to ask the UK about agreeing to a negative listing structure.
882We will need to seek policy clearance on the approach and detailed analysis will need to be
883undertaken to support this, however, in terms of sequencing of discussions, it is possible to talk
884about various issues/chapters in Services first and then discuss structure later on during the
885process.
886 This was a good initial meeting which reaffirmed that the US were keen to work with the UK on
887those short term outcomes in the services policy area which were discussed.
888 
889OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
890
89128
892Title of Meeting: Goods (Part 1, Part 2)
893Date: 25 July
894Time: 11.30; 13.00
895Participants
896Name Department/Directorate
897Oliver Griffiths DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
898Richard Salt DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
899Neil Feinson DIT, Trade in Goods, Trade Policy Group
900Julian Farrel DIT, Policy Directorate
901Tim Colley BEIS, International Trade
902Ceri Morgan DEFRA
903Tom Surrey DEFRA
904Adam Williams IPO
905Antony Phillipson DExEU
906Emma Coppack DExEU
907Meghan Ormerod British Embassy Washington
908Sushan Demirjian, Deputy Assistant USTR for Market Access and
909Industrial Competitiveness
910Roger Wentzel Deputy Assistant USTR for Agricultural Affairs
911Jim Sandford Assistant USTR for Market Access and Industrial
912Competitiveness
913Ashley Miller Director for Industrial Goods Market Access
914Rachel Shub Senior Director for European Regulatory Affairs
915Alexandra Whittaker Assistant General Counsel, USTR
916Julie Callahan Senior Director for Agricultural Affairs
917Dan Mullaney Assistant USTR for Europe and the Middle East
918Tim Wedding Deputy Assistant USTR for Europe
919David Weiner Deputy Assistant USTR for Europe
920Alex Hunt Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
921Richard Kaufman Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
922Jessica Simonoff USTR Legal
923Alexander Mc... EPA
924Kristin Nadji Commerce Department
925Elizabeth Wewerka State Department
926Mary Thorne US Delegation to the WTO, Geneva
927Brian O’Byrne Small Business Administration
928OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
929
93029
931Jonathan Coleman USITC
932Emma Lawries
933Jonathan Coleman USITC
934Karen Welch USTR
935Chuck Burch USDA
936Becky Resler
937Key Points to Note
938Part 1:
939 US outlined their standard approach to goods in trade talks and FTAs.
940 There will need to be future discussions around Rules of Origin.
941 On Conformity Agreements there is a strong desire from the US to only rollover those agreements
942and sectors that are currently in use.
943 Continuity Agreements in this space do not require legislation to be passed through Congress.
944 There will be a future discussion to determine the right forum (e.g. Trade Working Group/Economic
945Working Group) in which to take forward work on each STO.
946Part 2
947 Agreements on Wine and Spirits matter to both parties. Certification and names of origin are
948particularly important elements of both to ensure continuity in the wine and spirits trade.
949 The UK committed to look into whether transferring over the acquis through the Repeal Bill would
950include transferring over commitments under international (e.g. EU-US) agreements.
951 The UK committed to look into how far they could take rolling over agreements ahead of Brexit. For
952example, could the agreement be worked up and agreed in advance and then signed and dated on
953the day of exit?
954 There would need to be more direct lawyer/lawyer discussions as part of the continuity agreement
955process.
956 There was agreement that rolling over commitments on organics should be relatively
957straightforward. In due course the UK and US should consider a future vision for post-Brexit and
958work out how to articulate this to interested stakeholders.
959 There is strong US interest in the UK’s approach to adopting EU Regulation 1107/2009.
960 The US is unwilling to discuss UK exports of beef to the US separately to the question of access for
961US beef to the UK market. 
962OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
963
96430
965 The way in which the UK seeks to rectify its position on TRQs is of significant interest and concern
966for the US.
967Report of Discussions and Outcome - Part 1
9681. The US (Demirjian) explained that Chapter 2 of US FTAs cover Goods. Commitments on import and
969export restrictions had evolved in recent years. Remanufactured goods tended to be a sensitive
970subject. They sought to prohibit use of domestic content to get a reduction on customs duty. Their
971FTAs (including TPP) incorporated WTO notification obligations for import licensing, and similar
972obligations for export licensing. None of the commitments the US generally included in FTAs were
973new or challenging for developed countries but they were fundamentally important.
9742. The UK (Feinson) expressed interest in understanding the relationship vertical chapters (e.g.
975textiles) in FTAs and horizontal chapters (e.g. goods). The US (Demirjian) explained that everything
976in the “Market Access for Goods” chapter applied to all goods. The Agriculture and Textiles
977chapters were supplemental lists that added to the Market Access chapter in those areas.
9783. The UK (Feinson) asked which parts of the “Market Access for Goods” chapter industry was most
979interested in. The US (Demirjian) explained that the customs community was most interested in
980elements around the resale of repaired/temporary conditioned goods. The US is not a signatory to
981the Istanbul Convention (1990). Elements of the chapter focused on remanufactured goods were
982the main point of interest for industry. Industry also paid a lot of attention to the annex to this
983chapter - the tariff schedule. The UK (Feinson) explained that engagement with UK industry was a
984work in progress.
9854. The US explained that within some industrial sectors there was a lot of interest in the whole
986chapter. Sometimes different personnel within the same industry or even same company had
987different interests. For example, those tasked with moving goods around were particularly
988interested in rules around the movement of goods.
9895. The UK (Feinson) asked about the interaction between FTAs and Foreign Trade Zones (FTZs). The US
990explained that NAFTA had influenced the way the US deals with FTZs. The administration of FTZ’s is
991not really a part of FTAs. A regulator in an FTZ can export anything they like and then pay duty
992coming into the US. The US doesn’t address the issue specifically in FTAs.
9936. The US (Demirjian) explained that Rules of Origin (ROO) would need to be a topic for a future
994discussion. The UK (Colley) commented that ROO was clearly a big issue and that the sooner the UK
995was able to get its head around the US approach the better. The US (Wedding) explained that there
996had been a lot of EU-US discussion on ROO. The US proposed a VTC on the issue with experts; Kent
997Shigatomi (USTR) is the lead.
998Continuity Agreements
9991. The UK (Phillipson) opened on Continuity Agreements. The UK preference is for a technical rollover
1000of EU-US agreements to UK-US agreements. This is preferred for reasons of efficiency and the UK’s
1001relationship with the Commission. If there is an opportunity to enhance agreements the UK is open 
1002OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1003
100431
1005to this, but it cannot risk the timetable, and would need to work through whether any amendments
1006were sensitive with the Commission.
10072. On next steps and actions the UK is keen to work back from the time it needs to have the
1008agreements in force. One option would be to bring agreements up to the point of signing by a set
1009date, for example by March 2018, and then actually sign the agreements on the day the UK leaves
1010the EU. This might allow the UK and third country to signal to stakeholders in advance that
1011agreements would be operable upon the UK exiting the EU.
10123. The UK (Phillipson) explained that DExEU’s role is to make sure that across all agreements experts
1013are talking to their foreign counterparts. If there are concerns about how well this is working these
1014should surface up through the Economic working Group and Trade Working Group. Phillipson had
1015discussed this with Clete Willems on Monday afternoon.
1016Mutual Recognition Agreements/Marine Equipment Agreement
10174. The UK (Farrel) explained that their main interests were in the Mutual Recognition Agreements on
1018Conformity Assessment (1998) and Marine Equipment (2004). The UK wanted to avoid a cliff edge
1019so that UK-US trade affected by these agreements could continue. DIT wanted to start drafting
1020amended agreements in these areas. On Conformity Assessment they were conscious that there
1021would need to be the creation of new national mechanisms.
10225. The UK (Farrel) questioned sectoral coverage in relation to the Conformity Assessment Agreement.
1023Only two out of the six sectors in the agreement were operational, with a third due to come into
1024force later in the year. The UK was interested in what this meant in practice for a continuity
1025agreement. The UK asked if the US had any idea of the level of use of the Agreements. Was there
1026pent up demand in the sectors that were not operational? Does updating the list of designated
1027bodies currently work or is it problematic?
10286. On legislative process, the UK explained that HMG needs to lay legislation 21 days before it comes
1029into force, but the upcoming Trade bill might make an amendment to this process for the purposes
1030of continuity agreements. The UK asked about the US legislative process. The US (Sandford)
1031explained that the agreements were executive actions and that replicating them would not require
1032the involvement of Congress. There was an inter-agency process and there would be consultation
1033with cleared advisors but the US didn’t expect lots of comments to be provided. It would likely be a
1034light lift from the US side.
10357. The US (Sandford) said that it would be good to understand more about the UK process. The US
1036experience was that the EU tended to take longer to ratify this type of agreement than the US. The
1037US often found they were often sitting around waiting for the EU – for example on the pharma
1038agreement which Commissioner Malmstrom had signed three months after Ambassador Froman.
1039The US didn’t see delays (caused by the US) as being a major issue.
10408. The US underlined that they were keen to focus on replicating existing agreements that work. If
1041annexes were not operational they should not be replicated. The UK asked if the US was aware of a
1042decision not to operationalise certain annexes under the 1998 MRA. The US explained that there 
1043OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1044
104532
1046had not been a decision per se. They were not sure how much the agreement was being used.
1047Regulators were not interested in renegotiating the scope. The UK (Farrel) asked if a lawyer reading
1048the agreement would know which parts were operational and which parts were not. Was there a
1049legal document to this effect? The US didn’t think so. The medical devices annex had never been
1050operational. The pharma annex had been renegotiated and was in the process of being
1051implemented – it was an ongoing process.
10529. The US had gone through a similar process with the EEA/EFTA states (as it would now go through
1053with the UK) and negotiated a similar agreement with Norway in 2005. The US asked what kind of a
1054relationship the UK would have with the EMA and MSA (on marine equipment). Both had played an
1055important role in implementation of the agreements. Proposals under the conformity agreements
1056had come through the EU. The FCC signs off on UK labs. Where would proposals come from if not
1057the EU?
105810. The US reiterated that they didn’t see the sense in replicating everything – it only made sense to
1059replicate what works and then use this time to work through technical questions on
1060implementation.
106111. The UK (Phillipson) understood the interdependency between the EU negotiations and talks on
1062trade with the US but said that the likelihood was that the UK would end up with a transitional
1063arrangement. There was a question about what the implications of a longer transition time would
1064be. Would it affect the timeline for all agreements? For example meaning that not all of them
1065needed to be ready for March 2019? It was important that this remain a dynamic part of the
1066discussion.
106712. The US wanted to know to what extent the UK had discussed its plans for this type of discussion
1068with the EU (i.e. Trade Working Group discussions). The UK explained that it had told the
1069Commission it would be having conversations on all sectors with all trading partners. There had
1070already been discussions on aviation. The US asked if the UK had already had discussions of this
1071kind with other countries. The UK explained that it was further ahead with the US than most other
1072partners with the exception of Switzerland. The assumption was that discussions of this kind were
1073part of the rectification process. The US explained that this was their starting point too.
107413. The UK (Farrel) touched upon inoperative sectors in the 1998 Mutual Recognition Agreement. The
1075UK wondered if medical devices were different to other inoperative sectors. Was there greater
1076potential for the UK and US to do something on this? The US said that they wouldn’t want to right
1077now. It was not currently an operational area; they had tried to make it so a few years ago and not
1078succeeded. This could perhaps be part of a future relationship negotiation. The US turned to single
1079audit (IMDRF). Maybe steps could be taken to get this working. Maybe this was something for
1080constructive discussion going forward. This could go beyond continuity.
108114. The US set out their key points for taking this conversation forward. The US argued that exploring
1082these points in a discussion was the best way to proceed rather than a drafting exercise. The US
1083would need answers to these questions in order to proceed with inter-agency and stakeholder
1084consultation:
1085OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1086
108733
1088a) What are the technical issues at hand for these continuity agreements, eg who would
1089be the UK designating authorities?
1090b) How is the UK aligning with the EU, specifically what relationship would the UK have
1091with relevant EU regulators?
1092c) To what extent would the UK seek other kinds of regulatory co-operation?
1093d) What were the views of regulators?
1094Satellites
10951. The US (Wedding) raised satellites. There is a big market for small satellites in Europe. The US
1096wanted to ensure that US technology could be used in the UK. The USTR didn’t work on export
1097control issues so would have to defer to partners elsewhere in government on this. The US
1098(Wedding) explained that there were some issues in the STO list outside trade – would these be
1099better situated in the Economic Working Group? There was an architecture issue that the parties
1100would need to consider the best way to address.
11012. The UK (Phillipson) had discussed these issues with Clete Willems on Monday. The guide should be
1102substance rather than architecture. The US (Wedding) said that both parties should look at whether
1103there was interest in any of the STOs and then work on where they should sit.
1104Goods Part II
1105Detail
11061. The US (Wentzel) asked the UK for an update on Brexit, suggested that they start the discussion on
1107continuity agreements, discuss Agricultural TRQs and SPS.
11082. The UK (Phillipson) explained that formal Brexit negotiations started on the 19 June. The second
1109round had taken place w/c 17 July. The initial focus was on withdrawal issues including EU citizens
1110in the UK. Agriculture would be an important part of the EU-UK relationship. In the first instance
1111the UK would be looking to replicate rather than enhance or upgrade the relationship. This was for
1112the sake of efficiency. It was intended to send a signal to stakeholders ahead of exit – there would
1113be replication. The UK was not against enhancement but this could not be the central goal.
11143. The UK recognised that it was not operating in a normal world. The UK has told the Commission
1115that it will be talking to other countries. There is interdependency between UK/EU and UK/3rd
1116country relationships.
11174. The UK (Morgan) opened discussion on agricultural continuity agreements. The UK’s focus was to
1118get to Day 1 but also to smooth the road beyond.
11195. The US explained that the Wine and Spirits agreements would be important. The US wanted to
1120know if the UK would continue to recognise UK names of origin in the agreement. What kind of
1121certification requirements would there be for US wine in the UK market? What would the labelling
1122requirements be? For example, would terms “Bream” and “Classic” still be recognised? What were 
1123OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1124
112534
1126the plans for certification of UK wine in the US market? The UK was currently exempt from some
1127labelling and certification requirements.
11286. The US (Welch) was interested in natural wine certification. It applied to all countries and there was
1129an exemption where a country had a wine agreement with the US. The UK (Morgan) said that given
1130that the overarching conversation was about continuity we would need to think about issues to
1131prioritise. What were the US’ key interests in the wine and spirits agreement?
11327. The US set out that certification was their main interest. It worked both ways. Was there a
1133simplification that could be achieved? The Wine agreement provided certainty around labelling.
1134They wanted to ensure there wouldn’t be uncertainty about what producers would need to do
1135once the UK left the EU. For example on labelling relating to the appellation origin and grape
1136variety.
11378. The US (Wedding) asked if the UK was clear on the legislative route for the UK on exit. The UK
1138(Phillipson) explained that the Withdrawal Bill would be the main legislative vehicle. It had been
1139introduced into Parliament and was expected to complete passage by March 2018. It would repeal
1140the EC Act and import the whole EU acquis. This would give the UK the time to work out what to
1141keep and what to amend. This could be used as the base case assumption.
11429. The US (Wentzel) asked what the relationship between adopted regulations and agreements on
1143wine would be if the UK brought in all EU wine regulations. Currently the wine agreement makes it
1144easier for the US to send wine to the UK. The UK (Phillipson) explained that this was exactly why it
1145was important to have this discussion. The US (Mullaney) asked if the acquis included international
1146agreements. The UK (Phillipson) said that the UK would need to look into this. The implications
1147were different for EU directives/regulations and agreements made by the EU. The UK did not want
1148to default to less good terms of trade with any of its trading partners. If the UK and third country
1149decided to enhance any of the agreements then that should happen, but the focus had to be on
1150replication. The UK (Morgan) explained that the range of issues here fell into a few buckets. There
1151may be things that couldn’t be improved in time for exit but that could be improved later.
1152Distilled Spirits
11531. The US explained that the EU recognised certain labels, for example Kentucky Bourbon, and the US
1154recognised others, for example, Scotch Whiskey. The USTR said that the US would continue to
1155recognise Scotch. Would the UK continue to recognise Tennessee Whiskey and bourbon?
11562. The US wanted assurance on the process for rolling over this agreement. Industry wanted a quick
1157answer. They could see opportunity for changes later, but certainty on Day 1 was the priority.
1158There were a number of multinational players in this area. The UK (Morgan) explained that it was
1159certainly the UK’s intention to have this in place by Brexit. The UK (Surrey) asked what the US
1160legislative requirements were to reach that stage. The US (Wentzel) explained that they didn’t see
1161the need for the US to have new legislation on this.
11623. The UK (Phillipson) explained that they would need to think about the UK’s legal ability to bring
1163decisions and agreements into force before exit. The UK may want to have the agreement ready to 
1164OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1165
116635
1167go ahead of Brexit, perhaps by March 2018. The UK (Griffiths) wondered if there was a crosscutting theme here for HMG to look at – the extent to which agreements could be taken to the
1168point of signing by a particular date ahead of Brexit – e.g. March 2018 and then simply date and
1169sign them on the day of exit to ensure continuity. The UK (Phillipson) said that from the centre
1170DExEU needed to think of this as a cross-cutting theme but that they would want individual policy
1171leads to be thinking about what would work best in their individual areas.
11724. The US (Mullaney) suggested that this demonstrated a need to bring in the lawyers. There would
1173be a suite where we would need executive orders signed ready to come into force when they’re
1174notified the UK has left the EU. What would happen in a default situation if no new legislation were
1175enacted? They would need lawyers to look at the logistics for each transition to ensure it was as
1176seamless as possible. The US (Whittaker) said that there were a lot of legally creative ways to
1177approach this.
11785. The US (Callahan) said that the UK independently had some agreements with the FDA. The US
1179(Wentzel) didn’t see anything changing from a US perspective; the question would be the UK’s
1180approach. The UK (Surrey) suggested that the parties should agree how best to take forward, the
1181parties should speak directly.
1182Organics
11831. The US (Callahan) said that on organics both sides could see the value in continuing to trade as
1184currently. There were preliminary discussions of a plurilateral agreement on organics but it seemed
1185unlikely that this would conclude pre-Brexit. The US recalled that prior to the 2012 organics
1186agreement between the EU and US there had already been a UK-US agreement. The US was
1187interested in whether the UK would continue to treat organics in the same way as it does now;
1188would anything change?
11892. The US suggested that this did not feel complicated. The UK (Morgan) felt similarly, this would be
1190quite straightforward. The UK thought that the countries should think about a shared future vision
1191for the longer term on organics. The language that both parties shared with stakeholders would be
1192important, both on continuity and the future vision. The UK (Morgan) noted that there were a
1193committed group of stakeholders in this area.
11943. The UK (Surrey) suggested that the parties look at the pre-2012 agreement. The US was interested
1195in whether the UK had to change their organics programme in 2012 to fit in with the EU-US
1196agreement. The UK (Morgan) explained that on the trade operations and systems side there was
1197some work for the UK to dust off.
11984. The UK (Morgan) noted that during an earlier discussion the US had raised a Cheese Agreement
1199and a Tinned Fruit agreement. Had the US found out any more about these in the interim? The US
1200thought that they had been wrapped into WTO agreements and so did not require any further
1201action from this group.
1202OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1203
120436
1205Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
12065. The US (Callahan) explained that agricultural chemicals give the US the most “angst”. The EU used
1207EU Regulation 1107/2009 to characterise substances based on hazard rather than looking at
1208exposure. The US saw a growing number of substances that had formerly been approved by the EU
1209“taken off the books”. Producers were worried. There was a risk that there would be no sweet
1210potato exports from next year. This was a cause of consternation. A second, earlier piece of EU
1211legislation required the EU to conduct risk assessments.
12126. The US considered the two pieces of legislation (EU Regulation 1107/2009 and this second one) to
1213be in conflict. The Commission had a plan to modify the second piece of legislation allowing the EU
1214to set standards based on hazard alone. EU Regulation 1107/2009 was quite prescriptive. It set the
1215limit to the level of detection. There was a cross-cutting concern across agricultural commodities.
1216The US had raised concerns about the EU’s approach at the WTO SPS Committee. 30 other
1217countries had supported the US. The EU said it realised this was against its WTO commitments. The
1218US wanted to know if the UK could look at this.
12197. The US was interested to know if the UK had heard from its own producers. The UK (Morgan)
1220explained that it was part of an interesting triangle. The UK was simultaneously a part of the EU,
1221negotiating with the EU, and then working closely with UK stakeholders. The UK explained that it
1222routinely “banged the table” about scientific based assessment.
12238. The UK (Phillipson) explained that discussion had touched on this point in the context of regulatory
1224co-operation. The Agrifood sector was going to be an important part of what the UK was trying to
1225achieve with new opportunities for trade. The UK would want to make sure that its relationship
1226with the EU did not cut off all opportunities for trade with third countries. It would be important to
1227keep the dialogue going. There were global rules and global standards and Agriculture and Food
1228were an important part of that discussion. The UK (Phillipson) recognised that there might be a
1229point at which the UK can no longer participate in discussions between the EU as part of the EU.
1230The US (Mullaney) wanted to know if the UK could push for an outcome on EU Regulation
12311107/2009 that would work. If that failed the UK would obviously have the challenge of working
1232out how it could face both ways (towards the EU and US).
12339. The US (Callahan) asked the UK what timeline it would be ready to discuss SPS specifics with the US
1234on. The UK (Morgan) explained that it wasn’t ready yet. Conversations in Brussels had only just
1235started, but they would take an action to get back to the US on this timing question. It was very
1236helpful to understand what was important to the US.
1237Equivalence determinations
12381. The US (Callahan) noted that complex agreements underpinned equivalence determinations. In the
1239context of the EU the US had to make judgements about different Member States. The US was
1240interested in the UK perspective on whether the UK and US needed an agreement on this. Could
1241the UK and US not just make equivalence determinations between individual regulators? The UK
1242(Morgan) said that it understood and took the US’ point on this one. 
1243OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1244
124537
12462. The US explained that their understanding was that without a new agreement in this area existing
1247trade wouldn’t fall off a cliff. The UK (Morgan) agreed. The question really was about having a
1248mechanism to approve new (regulators?). The US (Callaghan) was interested in whether the UK
1249intended to establish a national mechanism or process for equivalence determinations. The UK
1250(Morgan) explained that this was dependent on the transition. The UK would be working its way
1251through the different issues. It was important to have experts involved.
12523. The US set out that one evaluation (on Shellfish) was coming to a close. The US had been surprised
1253by the UK decision to drop out of the shellfish equivalence programme. The UK explained that they
1254had done so partly as a result of resourcing and party following stakeholder input. The US was
1255interested in UK intentions moving forward. Would the UK allow the EU inspection of the US to
1256read across to the UK? The UK (Surrey) said that they would take this away to policy leads.
1257Lamb/Beef
12581. The UK (Surrey) set out the STOs on both Lamb and Beef. The process for securing approval to
1259export Lamb and Beef to the US was underway. This was ongoing business as usual. The UK had
1260provided material to the US. They were awaiting a visit from inspectors. The US (Callahan) said that
1261the FISA was taking this forwards. There was no timeline.
12622. The US was interested in whether the UK would receive US imports of beef and lamb. Could the UK
1263and US establish a two-way evaluation? The US set out that on Lamb all the rulemaking had been
1264going through review by the Administration. The US was “really interested” to have a UK evaluation
1265of the US for equivalence in this area.
1266TRQs
12671. The US set out that on beef the US saw the UK’s exit from the EU as an opportunity to reset the
1268market access relationship. The EU had hundreds of TRQs covering agricultural products. Not all
1269were of interest to the UK – for example almonds. The US was interested to know if the UK planned
1270to maintain EU TRQs when a TRQ didn’t serve a real purpose for the UK.
12712. The UK (Philipson) noted that there were some general questions around TRQs. There had been a
1272few discussions with the Commission and conversations in Geneva too. The UK had met with the
1273EU’s Deputy Chief Negotiator on Agriculture. The UK had always been clear in dealing with its
1274status at the WTO that this was not a negotiation it was having with the EU. This negotiation would
1275be related to Brexit, but not a negotiation with the EU. The UK wanted to be able to lay down
1276schedules.
12773. The UK wanted to be transparent with the Commission. Some areas were quite straightforward to
1278adopt the EU version of – for example, tariffs. TRQs on the other hand were very complex. The UK
1279wanted to be co-ordinated with the EU on its outward position to the rest of the world on this so
1280the rest of the world didn’t find its trade impeded by the UK’s exit from the EU. It would be
1281important for the UK and EU to have a discussion about a methodology to split the TRQs. The UK
1282and EU were at the start of this process. In April there had been a constructive conversation with 
1283OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1284
128538
1286the Commission. In early June there had been a more constructive one. The UK was going to be
1287going its own way in the world.
12884. The UK (Morgan) explained that there was a team in DEFRA working on technical rectification. If
1289the US didn’t feel they were getting enough attention they should feel free to tell the UK. The US
1290(Wentzel) explained that their biggest concern was that the process of rectification around TRQs
1291would result in reduced market access for the US in either the EU or the UK market. One of their
1292concerns was on data.
12935. Lots of trade passes through Rotterdam. It was difficult to look at the export data and know where
1294a good ended up once in the EU. For example, a lot of rice entered the EU through Rotterdam, but
1295a fair percentage of it went to the UK. Short of talking to exporters the US wasn’t sure how to work
1296out what proportion. The UK (Surrey) explained that everyone was thinking about the same
1297“Rotterdam” issue. Economists at DEFRA and USDA should talk. There might be some data that
1298could be shared. There should be a VTC to discuss further. The US (Thorne) explained that the lack
1299of data was why discussions at the WTO had focused on this not being a data driven process.
13006. The UK (Phillipson) said that the aim was not to have trading partners being denied or having
1301reduced access. The UK appreciated the complexities of this, but the EU negotiations would have
1302an impact on this discussion. What if rice entering Rotterdam could still go to the UK without
1303tariffs? The UK intended to have discussions on intra-EU trade as part of the discussion on TRQs.
1304The US (Wentzel) explained that this is what made it difficult for the US. The US was worried. Did
1305the UK have any intra-EU data? The UK (Surrey) explained that it had some but not a total picture.
1306The UK (Morgan) explained that there were statistics for some intra-EU trade, on products that had
1307to be tracked; some other information was available via regulators and trade associations.
13087. The US (Wentzel) asked what the next steps were on TRQs. The UK (Phillipson) said that it would
1309take this conversation away and find out where conversations had reached. The UK thought that
1310there could be an ambition to have a meeting in Geneva in the margins of the October Agriculture
1311Week. The UK (Phillipson) explained that for each agricultural issues there needed to be a critical
1312path by the next meeting setting out what legislation would be needed, and the outstanding
1313questions related to the issue.
1314Additional Action Items
1315 Action Item: Inform lead Departments that we need a steer on US questions on how we propose to
1316replace EU references in transitionally adopted MRAs in advance of next Working Group meeting
1317(done).
1318FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
1319Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
1320 USTR have no problems in principle, but want to know our intentions for replacing references to EU
1321agencies, and our plans for UK designation authorities, before considering draft text. On the 1998 
1322OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1323
132439
1325MRA, they were clear that they were only interested in transitionally adopting the three active (or
1326shortly to be active) annexes.
1327 Atmospherics: Just to reinforce that USTR were perfectly content with the principle of transitional
1328adoption of the MRAs, but were clear there was no point in looking at text until we had answered
1329the questions on replacing EU references, and also that they had no interest in transitionally
1330adopting inoperative annexes to the 1998 MRA.
1331OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1332
133340
1334Title of Meeting: Intellectual Property Rights
1335Date: 25 July
1336Time: 15.00
1337UK Participants
1338Name Department/Directorate
1339Maryam Teschke-Panah Policy Directorate, DIT
1340Oliver Griffiths DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
1341Richard Salt DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
1342Mark Kent British Embassy Washington
1343Adam Williams IPO
1344Tom Surrey DEFRA
1345Ceri Morgan DEFRA
1346Christine Peterson Director for Innovation & Intellectual Property, USTR
1347Shira Perlmutter Chief Policy Officer and International Director US
1348PTO
1349Robert E Copyak US Customs and Border Protection
1350Kevin Amer US Copyright Office
1351Key Points to Note
1352 At US request, UK explains structure of IP policy in UK and IP policy issues raised by Brexit.
1353 UK sets out proposal for short-term outcome around IP enforcement collaboration.
1354 US proposes short term outcome to produce an SME toolkit on IP protection. The goal would be to
1355explain to SMEs how to protect and enforce their rights and (for the UK) how this will continue,
1356after Brexit.
1357 Agreement to follow up by phone/VTC. US offers to share representative text of IP chapter.
1358 [FROM SIDE MEETING WITH USTR]: USG intend to appoint “IPR Chief Negotiator”.
1359Report of Discussions and Outcome
13601. The US highlighted significant levels of interest in IPR issues. In addition to USTR, US Dept of
1361Agriculture (USDA), the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) , the US Copyright Office and US
1362Customs and Border Protection were in attendance. Other US agencies also had an interest. US
1363(Peterson) asked how UK IP policy was developing and how HMG was structured on IP issues. UK
1364(Teschke-Panah) gave a brief overview. DIT SoS recognises mutual interest in innovative sectors
1365and the creative industries. The UK was looking to build confidence where possible and support 
1366OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1367
136841
1369the trading relationship. One possible short-term outcome could be around enforcement
1370collaboration. DIT had a trade and IP coordinating function, working closely with IPO, Defra,
1371DCMS, HMRC and other interested departments.
13722. The US (Peterson) asked how Brexit affected IP policy. The UK reiterated the general approach to
1373Brexit, including the Repeal Bill. The UK IPO (Williams) set out eight areas of IP policy affected by
1374Brexit. Patent law is largely delivered via the European Patent Office (EPO) which is unaffected by
1375Brexit. Copyright policy contains more EU touchpoints, with simplification procedures currently in
1376place. There will need to be decision on the legal approach to ‘exhaustion’ of copyright. The more
1377significant issue surrounds trademarks which currently operate in a largely harmonised regime.
1378The overall approach will be to reinforce IP rights and the Repeal Bill will deliver the necessary
1379transition of legal rights. Future opportunities to diverge from EU law would depend on the
1380negotiation, but IPO is beginning to look at current policy areas which don’t work as well as they
1381could.
13823. The US raised geographical indications (GIs). The US has an interest in how the UK continues to
1383assess and recognise GI rights upon Brexit. The UK (IPO and Defra) highlighted that agriculture GI
1384policy sits with Defra whilst non-agriculture GIs are led by the IPO. On day 1, the current legislation
1385would be moved across as is. UK and US industry is stressing the need for continuity and we need
1386to continue to recognise our TRIPS obligations. Precisely how the UK delivers that remains to be
1387seen, including contingent on the EU negotiation. We have heard US concerns loud and clear,
1388including from stakeholders. The US (Peterson) encouraged HMG to be open to hearing
1389stakeholder concerns as these are central to US policy. The US (PTO) highlighted the US belief in
1390transparency and due process. The current EU approach is flawed. Prior rights, coexistence and the
1391removal of generic rights from the marketplace are current issues. The important goal should be
1392the ability to challenge rights before they were granted. The US would welcome the chance to
1393discuss further. The PTO would be happy to share stakeholder experiences. The UK (Defra) shared
1394the importance of transparency. The UK was currently considering UK usage of GIs relative to other
1395countries. For instance, there were no UK GIs in CETA.
13964. The UK (Teschke-Panah and Williams) presented on the short term outcome proposal on IP
1397collaboration and enforcement. The US Special 301 Report highlights UK enforcement efforts as
1398best practice, like the US. Given this gold-standard, would be good to share our respective
1399experience. The specific proposals follow a discussion between then White House IP Enforcement
1400Coordinator Dani Marti and Baroness Neville-Rolfe and their exchange of letters. The UK proposal
1401for a dialogue on IP collaboration and enforcement comprises five areas:
14025. Working with rights holders. Government has a role facilitating the enforcement of private rights.
1403Could share best practice of collaboration with private rights holders.
14046. SME engagement. SMEs are a huge source of innovation, but IP rights protection seldom a top
1405priority. Could share best practice of engaging SMEs. Are there institutional ways to facilitate
1406access to justice for SME rights being infringed? The UK has a fasttrack claims system.
1407OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1408
140942
14107. E-Commerce platforms. How can we work with e-commerce platforms in support of accidental
1411exporters in protecting their rights? The UK has facilitated an MoU with Alibaba for instance.
14128. Education. The UK does a considerable amount working with students, both young and postgraduate, to highlight the economic detriment of IP theft and to encourage the use of IP protection.
1413We could share ideas.
14149. Third country collaboration. How can we collaborate on third country IP enforcement. The UK’s
1415PIPCU has been a model for several countries. What more can we do together?
141610. The US proposed a short-term outcome around the development of a joint SME toolkit on
1417protecting IP rights in our respective markets. This could explain how the UK framework will
1418remain strong post-Brexit and how some processes might change. The UK noted the proposal and
1419asked how the US engages SMEs. The US highlighted collaborative working between agencies,
1420webinars (which might be done jointly) and a range of best practice for assistance and capacity
1421programs.
142211. There was a discussion of possible collaboration in multilateral and third country issues. The UK
1423suggested closer collaboration between IP attaches in markets where appropriate. The US noted
1424this was certainly desirable, but a lot of this already took place – what might be helpful was greater
1425coordination of activity and programmes to deconflict and maximise the impact. The US also
1426suggested greater collaboration in international fora. WIPO was an obvious one, where
1427collaboration already existed. The US hoped the UK might have more freedom of operation in
1428future, given currently operating within an EU bloc. The US also raised the OECD as an area that
1429coordination might be welcome. The US was concerned about some of what was being discussed
1430on IP, especially in the absence of an IP committee, a situation the US attributed to secretariat
1431inertia and member state capacity. But IP issues arose in an accession context. The US supported a
1432data and evidence driven approach to policy development and so had been supportive of OECD
1433studies on the scope of illicit trade and reported some good studies on trade secrets. The US noted
1434that the WHO also had some IP related initiatives. The US also noted ongoing collaboration
1435between UK and US economists on the importance and impact of IP in the world trading system.
1436The UK noted constrained UK capacity to do more in this space.
143712. The US proposed a separate follow-up discussion on the typical US approach to IP issues in an FTA
1438context by phone/VTC. The US (Mullaney) encouraged this approach and invited US IP leads to
1439share a good representative text of a US IP chapter. The UK noted the need for prioritisation and
1440agreed to a follow-up discussion.
1441Action Items
1442 Agreement to follow up by phone/VTC on Short term outcomes.
1443 US offers to share representative text of IP chapter.
1444OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1445
144643
1447FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
1448Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
1449Good engagement on proposed short term outcomes on intellectual property enforcement.
1450Broad consensus that this can help build confidence of business and support trade and help establish good
1451practice models for third countries. There were good atmospherics around the potential for US/UK
1452collaboration, though we should tread carefully here given the more heavy-handed approach to
1453enforcement in third countries taken by the US.
1454Cooperation on IP enforcement and support for SMEs emerged as potential focus area with establishment
1455of a toolkit a possible concrete deliverable. There was agreement to explore this and possible other
1456priorities further in bilateral dialogue ahead of a second working group.
1457The US were keen to move quickly towards sharing of ‘representative IP chapter text’ in a next meeting.
1458Again, we should be cautious in moving too quickly towards any substantive discussion before sufficient
1459analysis of UK policy positions and need to be clear that we would be listening mode only in any early
1460discussion.
1461US raised expected concerns with EU's system for Geographical Indications and pressed the UK to move
1462away from current EU approach on generic terms. GIs are likely to emerge as a contentious issue as we
1463seek a balance between a UK-EU and UK-US free trade deal. DIT, DEFRA and IPO policy teams will be
1464discussing policy over the coming weeks and will seek DEXEU input given EU/UK dependencies.
1465The US did not raise other expected asks on, for example, grace periods or patent linkage issues in this first
1466meeting. This may have reflected their desire to minimise areas of contention to a focus on GIs, which was
1467a major dispute in the TTIP negotiations. It may also have reflected a lack of preparation across agencies,
1468so we should be prepared for other areas to be raised in a second working group discussion and particularly
1469so if the US plan to present ‘template text’.
1470Finally, the wide range of US agencies and departments with an interest in IP is notable. The main
1471attendees are listed below, but there were several others including from agriculture (GIs), Council of
1472Economic Advisers, State, Commerce etc.
1473 Christine Peterson, Director for Innovation & Intellectual Property, USTR
1474 Shira Perlmutter, Chief Policy Officer and International Director US PTO
1475 Robert E Copyak, US Customs and Border Protection
1476 Kevin Amer, US Copyright Office
1477Informal bilateral side meeting: Maryam Teschke-Panah/Christine Peterson
1478 USTR team of 7 people working on IPR; wide range of US agencies (including a range on
1479enforcement)
1480 GIs major issue of interest (note TTIP history); US interested only in agricultural GIs.
1481 USTR intention to appoint a Chief Negotiator on IP; candidate and timing tbc
1482 
1483OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1484
148544
1486Title of Meeting: Closing Coordination Meeting
1487Date: 25 July
1488Time: 16.00
1489Participants
1490Name Department/Directorate
1491Dan Mullaney USTR
1492Tim Wedding USTR
1493David Weiner USTR
1494Ram Rizzo USTR
1495Alexandra Whittaker Assistant General Counsel USTR
1496Oliver Griffiths DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
1497Richard Salt DIT, UK-US Trade Policy Group
1498Mark Kent British Embassy Washington
1499Key Points to Note
1500 Agreement to set up UK-US phone call during w/c 31 July to agree actions following the working
1501group.
1502 Agreement that both sides would continue to search for short term outcomes.
1503 Tentative agreement to structure dialogue as quarterly meetings of key coordinators, rather than
1504as a full ‘round’ with all agencies represented. This format could receive reports from experts, but
1505only discuss issues which were ripe or merited a deep dive
1506Report of Discussions and Outcome
15071. Continuity Agreements. The UK noted great engagement, with clear evidence of a few months of
1508thinking. UK was optimistic on MRAs, a good process was in train on wines/spirits. Broadly, our
1509approach should be to make sure both sides were talking but to devolve the detail to them. The US
1510(Wedding) noted that they wanted to coordinate with all leads on agreed actions and next steps.
1511The US recommended a UK-US phone call during w/c 31 July to agree actions bilaterally. Mullaney
1512noted some clear assignments for policy leads on the mechanics of agreements, what are they,
1513when are they needed, what internal process needs following. The more precise we can be about
1514options, the more comfort we can give stakeholders. The UK noted separate EWG agreement that
1515now was a good time to be specific about the plan. Each agreement needed to consider a checklist
1516– internal ratification, dependence on ultimate UK-EU goal, legal form etc. The US (Whittaker)
1517noted discussion with UK legal directors and would join up with DexEU lawyers. Whittaker noted
1518that giving stakeholder certainty might affects dates and legal form.
1519OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1520
152145
15222. Short Term Outcomes. The UK noted a rich discussion, albeit the delay in sending had limited some
1523dialogue. A range of reflections, from a well-established dialogue on IP to other issues on which
1524more time to reflect would be needed. The US (Mullaney) noted the need to reflect further on how
1525to involve relevant agencies where USTR equities were limited or non-existent. The US wanted to
1526delve deeper into the specific proposals and on broader trade deepening initiatives. The discussion
1527had uncovered potential areas of UK policy flexibility that the US might not have known about.
1528Medical devices might be one. Auditors could be another. Services in particular could be fruitful.
1529The US planned to encourage deeper consideration and suggested there might be areas where EU
1530competence was incomplete or contested which might also be fruitful to explore, including
1531potentially investment. The UK noted potential EU sensitivities around mutual recognition of
1532professional qualifications which we needed to be mindful of. The UK (Salt) noted that the UK was
1533still thinking about potential STOs and suggested both sides remained open to new ideas emerging.
1534The US (Mullaney) agreed, and hoped the US could come up with more ideas. Both sides also
1535needed to ensure outcomes were politically attractive. 10 dialogues would appear like “weak tea”
1536to our political masters. The UK (Griffiths) noted the need to reflect again on architecture and
1537whether it made sense for some of these to move across to the EWG and Clete Willems had shown
1538tentative interest in this.
15393. Trade Strategy and WTO. The UK (Griffiths) welcomed the discussion with Dawn Shackleford. He
1540would connect her to Chris Barton in DIT. UK noted on the three themes of deals, architecture
1541(including the DSB) and transparency the UK and US would not be perfectly aligned, but there were
1542certainly strong overlaps.
15434. Future FTA. The UK (Griiffiths) noted the need to reflect hard on how, at this early stage, it made
1544sense to think through a future FTA. What exactly would be constructive to lay the groundwork?
1545The US suggested we try to figure out what a deal ultimately looked like given the huge value of the
1546bilateral relationship. The Exit negotiators in DExEU need to know more about what that looked
1547like, to avoid unnecessarily giving away the store to the EU. One example could be around data
1548transfers and the need (or not) for an adequacy finding from the EU. If we submitted to have one,
1549this might preclude or affect data transfers between the UK and EU. The UK suggested a need to
1550think hard about the terminology of this, but there was merit in understanding what mattered to
1551the US.
15525. Process and Next Steps. The UK (Griffiths) suggested a quarterly rhythm and invited the US to the
1553UK for the next round. The US was thinking about next steps in two distinct phases. First,
1554immediate contact. We should encourage experts to have phone calls, VTCs and where appropriate
1555meetings and visits bilaterally across all groups and all issues. The Second, was the role of the
1556bigger group. Should we structure it as a large round bringing everyone together? This could be
1557challenging to schedule and burdensome in logistical terms. Or would it be better to stick to
1558coordination teams and have experts report back to a smaller group that could meet. The US
1559preference was the latter – a smaller group meeting, focusing on issues which were ripe for
1560discussion rather than everything, having deep dives on one or two issues (e.g. regulation) that
1561merited deeper engagement.
1562OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK eyes only)
1563
156446
1565Action Items
1566 Set up UK-US phone call during w/c 31 July to agree actions following the working group.
1567 Continue to search for short term outcomes.
1568 Gain formal agreement on dialogue structure – whether as quarterly meetings of key coordinators,
1569or as a full ‘round’ with all agencies represented. The former format could receive reports from
1570experts, but only discuss issues which were ripe or merited a deep dive.
1571FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
1572Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
1573N/A
1574
1575For any queries about the contents of this dossier or the Trade Working Group meetings, please contact:
1576Richard Salt
1577Deputy Director, UK-US Trade Policy Group
1578Department for International Trade