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1Prior to clinical trials, consumers specify on a crowdfunding kickstarter style website what they would be willing to pay for units of a drug that wouldn't otherwise be developed.
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3If the minimum price a number of enough people willing to pay never exceeds the anticipated cost of drug development divided by that number of people (and any greater number available), then the initial payment never happens and the drug is never financed.
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5The initial numbers chosen by backers will never be too high to be rational looking backward since they pay the same cost as everyone anyway, with some caveats. This backwards looking rationality is maintained as long as a) the drug succeeds and b) we can assume generics won't be able to be functional at all in this system... except and until some kind of "open sourcing" of the drug is triggered at 3 year expiry or "the price fell below $1" expiry decided by a regulator at which point it was not necessarily backwards rational. The purpose of this is that it induces a fuzzy feeling in some of our backers and society which compensates for mildly irrational behavior of losing something like $1.
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7So regardless of what they said they were willing to pay originally, all backers will have all actually paid the same cost initially.
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9As clinical trials proceed and the drug's future is still uncertain, new customers will pay old customers such that the price they all pay continues to be the average cost of development for the units they have purchased, and therefore they will all pay the same cost in the future as well.
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11If the drug fails catastrophically in some way before, and certainly after, clinical trials, the company must report that fact and stop accepting further payments.
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13If the drug succeeds, then some federal agency replacing the patent office may declare that a new drug exists whose crowdfunding campaign will be compensated for any losses owing to competition both foreign and domestic. This creates a schedule of drugs that is internationally useful in deciding which drugs are too big to compete with.
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15If the drug succeeds wildly, there may have been some wealthier backers who would elect to only start having their price of the drug reduced at this later time.
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17- if you say "X bars generics" i will deny that i'm barring generics at any time from any country
18- if you say "generics will be able to function at all" that is not a special problem for me, but is moreso a problem for the current system because of foreign generics
19- if you say "generics will be able to function domestically" i'll use a federal agency for open source incentives to compensate the original company's investors and/or rebates to match or exceed customers' expectations until this is not true or not a problem for financing new drug development. this could fix how foreign companies aren't subject to US patent law anyway, because the TPP creates a worse set of winners and losers than this
20- if you say "the transaction costs of having individuals get a fuzzy feeling from 'race for the cure' crowdfunding are too high" i'll shift the responsibility to doctors and HMOs who are the ostensibly informed particular and mass consumers of drugs in our current system anyway and the "fuzzy feeling" will come from not being awful in the press 
21- if you say the company isn't making enough of a profit i can split the refunds that go to creditor/customers with the company and this ratio can change (or not) over time according to some rule. this will compensate the company at the expense of increasing the cost people pay (which are still declining over time) and make backing the project less rational. these ratios may be chosen by the backers themselves if that makes the glow warmer
22- if you say particular drug ventures fail all the time, well that should be up to informed consumers who continue to pay the decreasing average cost of development and rich backers who optionally elect to have their own costs reduced later as opposed to now. information should be encouraged to be open and the FDA already mandates some disclosures. it's not a problem for my system that some drug ventures will ultimately fail utterly as long as any payments after this fact is known stop being accepted. otherwise lawsuits may ensue etc.
23- if you say orphan drugs won't be financed i can put free government money on the table early in funding like the orphan drug act but inside the kickstarter. patents were already insufficient for these so you probably won't say this
24- if you say this is a permanent "monopoly" (although how is it a monopoly i.e. patent if i don't bar generics?) i can create rules like 3 year expiry or "the price fell under $1" expiry and these can be decided by the regulator at any time (more fairly than an exclusionary patent granted in advance) as long as lobbying in this industry is not too lucrative to induce regulatory capture. this is already better than actual kickstarter for projects that would like to finance excludable yet naturally public goods which may have high initial costs.
25- if you say industry lobbying will induce regulatory capture then obviously you can't say the originators of drugs aren't well compensated for new drug development. so presumably you won't say this as it presents a bigger problem for the current FDA and patents generally