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1Dialectics of Emergence*
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3Lucien Seve
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5One of the central paradoxes with which we are confronted in non-linear thinking is that of emergence. It can be formulated as follows: while a whole is generally thought of as a sum of its parts, a spontaneous generation of properties that do not belong to the parts seems to occur in the non-linear passage of the parts to the whole. This compels us to re-examine with greater philosophical care the seemingly simple categorical couple of whole/parts, where the whole - to para phrase Kant - is any kind of multiplicity taken as a unity.
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8 From the whole to totality
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10According to the traditional view, whole and part are two opposed determinations, each taken as external to the other, that can be related in two different ways: either through disjunction or through conjunction. In the first way, the whole is a prior unity capable of division into parts, or, depending on the case, into fragments, segments and so on. These parts are homogenous with the whole from which they originate, like the portions of a cake or pieces from a crumbling rock. The very word "part" itself (from the Latin "parterre", to divide) expresses the logic ally secondary character of what has been separated from an already existing whole. In the second way, parts are prior entities capable of forming a whole - like a construction of some sort combining pieces that, depending on the context, can be called "elements", "components", "ingredients" and so on. Such a whole is not necessarily homogenous with the parts that make it up, but is more like a molecule in respect to its atoms. Here, the whole is presented as logically secondary in relation to its parts.
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12Although they differ in one significant respect, these two logics share a fundamental feature: they suggest that both whole and part are conceivable without the other. The whole can remain undivided, and thus without parts. Likewise, the elements can remain independent, so that they never form a whole. Whole and part are conceived, there fore, as two aspects of a pair while remaining more or less autonomous, that is "without a necessary internal connection". The same whole can be divided into various kinds of parts, and the same parts can be recomposed into different wholes - so that neither the whole nor the parts can be said to contribute anything essential to the sense of the other. The possible non-homogeneity of the whole and the parts in the second of these logics, therefore, cannot be rationally accounted for. It is impossible to understand the new properties of the whole on the basis of its prior parts or from anything that occurs in the whole itself. Thus, the emergence of these new properties must remain a mystery.
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14Mechanical and dialectical relationships
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16In some typically difficult pages devoted to these two categories in his Science of Logic, Hegel reformulates the problem before us in a dialectical manner. The approach to understanding that pretends to be able to think of the whole prior to its parts and of the parts prior to the whole is simply nonsense. Treated independently of the whole, parts cannot be "parts". Likewise, taken independently of the parts, the whole cannot be a whole. To say of atoms that exist in a free state that they are "parts" would be absurd. They become parts only when they enter into the composition of a whole, that is only in relation to a molecule. And the atoms in turn are only wholes in relation to the nucleuses and electrons (or parts) into which they can be broken down. "Whole" and "part", therefore, are not really concepts that refer to two "different" kinds of things. As Hegel points out regarding other categorical couples (like cause and effect), whole and part form but one and the same concept:1 that of the whole/part relationship.
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18This dialectical view finds corroboration in every area of contemporary science where - at the deepest level - what we find are not things but relations. In quantum physics, for example, in contrast to what is suggested by the inaccurate expression "elementary particles", it is not the particle that is elementary but the fundamental interaction in which it participates. 2 One can easily draw examples of this sort from the other sciences. The whole, therefore, is in its essence a totalization of parts, which in their turn are constitutive elements of a whole. What we have here is a typical dialectical unity of opposites -- there is no top without a bottom, or identity without a difference (a formal difference that becomes real in human beings, where it can remain identical to itself only by constantly differing from itself through metabolic exchanges, cellular renewal, immunitary adaptations, etc.). Whole and part always mutually presuppose and imply each other.
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20This attempt to rethink the whole/part relation in a dialectical manner, however, encounters a limit in the very form of its object. The basis of dialectics is the unity of opposites, a unity that encompasses their concrete identity, which is to say, includes their differences. But whole and part cannot be thought of as a typical example of this unity. As Hegel points out, "the whole is equal to the parts", but - he adds - "it is not equal to them as parts."3 The whole is equal to the parts only insofar as they are "taken together", and taken "together" they are precisely nothing but the whole. To claim that the whole is equal to the parts is thus a mere tautology: the whole is equal to itself. This is equally true as regards the parts. They are equal to the whole insofar as it is an ensemble of parts - they are therefore equal to themselves. Even when it is conceived dialectically, however, the relation of the whole to the parts remains haunted by the abstract understanding; it still seems to be an external relation in which the diversity of the parts and the unity of the whole are to a certain extent alien to each other. If the pieces of a building set, for example, have shapes that seem to prescribe how the set should be assembled, they still don’t predetermine the whole that one can construct with them. Furthermore, a given whole can be constructed in more or less the same way with different pieces.
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22The idea of an organic whole
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24If we follow the development of this problem in Hegel"s Science of Logic, the relation of the whole to the parts, which was initially understood as "external and mechanical", gets transformed into a dialectical relation in which the parts and the whole are not "indifferent" to each other. Now, each component of the relation entirely internalizes the other - they have become identical in their difference: whole of parts and parts of the whole.4 When one passes from the mechanical and from the physical to the chemical, to the biological and to anything that manifests a "spiritual life", the simple whole gets transformed by degrees into something quite different: an authentic "totality" that we would qualify as "organic". At this point, we are not in the presence of a haphazard assemblage of pieces but of a synthetic unity made up of "limbs and organs" that belong to it, and can only revert to being parts in the hands of an anatomist who deals not with living bodies but with corpses.5 The organic totality is thus the dialectically achieved form of the whole/part relation.
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26It is by such means that the ordinary logico-philosophical view of the relation between part and whole is overturned. For if the parts are integral to the whole, they can no longer be viewed as preexisting it as pieces in a construction game that enable the whole to be put together. Rather, in an organic totality, the whole forms its parts and is simultaneously formed by them through embryological or historical processes. Playing in this way an active role in the production of its parts, the whole also leaves its imprint on them. Hence a paradox that is inconceivable from a non-dialectical point of view: in a certain sense, the whole is present in each of its parts, which can then be said to belong to the whole in a very unusual way. Thus, in quantum cosmology, the history as well as the present state of the universe can be read out of every particle; the cellular program that permitted the birth of the cloned ewe Dolly from a mammal tissue also shows the extent to which the entire biological individual is present in each of his cells and so on. Marx, whose analysis of a social formation presupposes its nature as an organic totality, pointed out that in urban societies a town is not a "simple multiplicity of individual houses. Here, the whole is not constituted by its parts. It is a kind of autonomous organism.... The economic totality is, in a fundamental way, present in each individual house."6 The categorical vocabulary itself must change, for this totality is not, properly speaking, composed of parts but organically formed of limbs, organs and functions. Put in still another way, rather than the simple addition of homogenous parts, the whole here is, before all else, a new emergent reality.
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29 From totality to emergence
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31It is time to attack the question head-on: Doesn’t the term "emergence" designate, more or less judiciously, a category that is in its essence dialectical? This suggestion is all the more plausible since even the best non-dialectical works on emergence never come to grips with what they purport to explain.
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33The limits to explaining the superior by the inferior
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35An outstanding article by the Danish philosopher Claus Emmeche and his scientific co-authors Simo Koppe and Frederic Stjernfelt, "Explaining Emergence: Towards an Ontology of Levels", is a case in point (Emmeche et al., 1997). Drawing on C. Lloyd Morgan’s (1923) definition of "emergence" as a "creation of new properties", they carefully analyze each of these terms in order to bring out the relation between emergence and determinism, making no concessions to either vitalistic irrationalism or to the simplifications inherent in a mechanical determinism. The aim of the article is to achieve a "final devitalization of emergence". It seeks to expunge the concept of emergence, in other words, from all its finalist and theological connotations, so that it can become part of a scientific view of reality that has been expanded to include all that we’ve learned from the dynamics of non-linear systems. The research program is admirable, and we want to underline how interested we are in what they have presented. However, the conclusions they come to are very disappointing.
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37For example, after a long and interesting study of the relationship between the levels and sub-levels of reality, Emmeche and his co-authors assert that if the laws of a lower level cannot explain the specific laws of a higher one, the latter, in turn, "cannot alter the laws of the lower level". Thus, "biological phenomena cannot alter physical laws", nor can psychical phenomena alter biological laws. This claim in undeniably true - that "natural laws cannot be abolished" is a crucial materialist thesis for Marx.7 While undeniable, this claim would result in an indefensible fatalism if it were not completed. For, as Marx pointed out, if the laws of nature cannot be abolished, the form under which they manifest themselves can change. Every law expresses a certain necessity, but it is a universal necessity that doesn’t prescribe by what singular processes and under what unique conditions it will be realized. In other words, the law only circumscribes a range of both formal possibilities and real impossibilities. This is why a given level of organization of matter, while respecting the laws of the lower level(s) on which it rests, will nonetheless superimpose its own logic on the lower level (s) and select what actually takes place out of the formal possibilities that are available.
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39An important dialectical reversal occurs here in which the general determination of the superior by the inferior has to accommodate itself to a particular determination of the inferior by the superior. It is precisely the understanding of this reversal that takes us from a simple materialism, closed within a one-sided view of things, to a complex materialism that has a place for all the dialectics of reciprocal action. A quick example illustrates this point: in general, the evolution of biological species depends on conditions in the natural environment. But with historically developed humanity, as much as people try to create a particular way of life, various social logics impose themselves, for better or worse, on the underlying natural conditions. In this way, industrial activities that aim to increase the return of private capital end up polluting the environment to such an extent that they have altered the world’s climate; in the developed societies, various conditions and social practices have also affected the average height, life expectancy, brain functions and more of many individuals. This indicates something of the exceptional range of application of Hegel"s - and also Marx and Engels" - analysis of the important, though often confused, distinction between "base" and "support" (in German, Grund and Grundlage). The support of anything is the condition of its possibility, while the base is what gives it its funda mental character. For example, if a territory provides a nation with a support, it is its history that gives it a base and explains what it has become.
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41In the various levels of organization found in matter, one must expect that the initial base of whatever process is being considered (e.g., the natural conditions required for the appearance of our species) tends to get reduced to a mere supporting function once the specific qualities of the higher level begin to develop (in this case, the socially and historic ally formed capacities of human beings). This specificity does not emerge any longer from its support (though the latter remains a determining condition of its possibility), but in the logic of its own internal relations, which also becomes the explanatory base of this new level. One can measure here the extent to which the claim, in a sense undeniable, that the higher level cannot "alter" the laws of the lower level still fails (through lack of dialectics) to capture a crucial aspect of reality. And it is just this missing aspect that is decisive for dispelling the obscurity that surrounds the logico-philosophical question of emergence.
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43For if the phenomenon of emergence results in the creation of new properties, what is the origin of such properties? The question appears insoluble. Two possibilities suggest themselves. The first is that these properties originate in preconditions located at an inferior level or in a previous situation. In other words, the new properties were already in existence somewhere and somehow, but this explanation seems to say that there really was no emergence. The second view starts by rejecting the idea that new properties originate from any initial conditions, but this amounts to asserting that these new properties have been created ex nihilo. Both of these positions are equally absurd.
44Confronted with an irreducible paradox of this sort, our only option is to start to think dialectically. This is what Hegel does in a long section of the first book of his Science of Logic when he reflects on the dialectics of quality and quantity. At the center of this reflection is the category of "qualitative jump", and it is here that we find the key to our problem.
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46Quantity and quality
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48Is it necessary to resort to dialectics to capture such a notion? If a lot of scientists are still cautious or even hostile to the very idea of non linearity, many are led in their own work to make use of such notions as limited value, threshold effect, transition phase... Should one claim that, unless they have studied the Science of Logic, these scientists don"t know what they are doing? Doubtless, they know what they are doing, but, philosophically speaking, they often do not know what they know, and beyond a certain point this limitation cannot but have a regret table influence on their work. It is this second order knowledge of the dialectics of quality and quantity that we will rely on now to arrive at a plausible explanation of the concept of emergence and an account of the processes it designates. This is a difficult task, for we have to express in a few paragraphs some of the complex thoughts that takes up about 70 pages in the first book of the Science of Logic. At best, we can only hope to provide a very simplified overview, and it should be taken as such if we are to avoid countless misunderstandings and as many irrelevant objections.
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50A thing is only what it is in so far as it is not something else. This negation establishes an internal as well as external limit that constitutes the difference between one thing and another, and at the same time determines its identity. The determinateness of the thing (its identity difference) is its quality, which in turn manifests itself in a particular set of properties. In this way, quality forms a body with the thing as determined by its limits; it cannot change without changing it, without making it "different". In contrast, quantity is what Hegel calls the "suppressed (aufgehobene) quality", that is the indifferent change, the change that does not make a thing differ from itself. A house is a house, whether it is bigger or smaller; the color red remains red, whether it is paler or deeper.
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52Thus, quality and quantity are dialectical opposites, and not - as most people view them - two dimensions of being that are more or less foreign to one another, which would make it inconceivable that a quantitative change could trigger a qualitative change. It is because they form a couple of opposites that there is a dialectics of quantity and quality, a dialectic in which their concrete unity is the measure.Hegel under stands "measure" not as the subjective activity of measuring, but as an objective determinate mode of being, as qualitative quantum, such as the specific weights or fusion points of substances, the proportions of the solar system or of living organisms.8 In this way, the whole of nature can be said to be "measured". And when the quantum inherent in each measure "develops beyond a certain limit", the corresponding quality that is enclosed in this limit is also suppressed by a "jump to a different quality". As this gets repeated again and again, the relation ship involved takes on the form of "a nodal line connecting differences", like the scale of harmonic sounds or the ordered series of chemical compounds. According to this analysis, the threshold effect and the qualitative jump only exist because there is an inseparable union of the two opposites, quantity and quality, such that a definite quality belongs to the same body as a given "quanta" (which is itself bounded by certain limits).
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54Let us advance now to the heart of the analysis. Hegel does not say that qualitative change is always sudden. This interpretation does not do justice to his meaning, and only makes his position easier to contest. Instead, Hegel holds that qualitative change is punctuated, that is to say, always occurs at a definite point in quantitative change, or when the latter reaches the threshold beyond which the conditions for the existence of a particular quality can no longer be maintained.9 Thus, one can think of continuity and rupture together, or, better still, one can only think of them together as aspects of the same movement of passage or of change in which one quality becomes another. When considered from the angle of quantity, this passage or process is in fact "gradual" but "this gradualness only applies to the exterior facet of change and not to its qualitative side". From the vantage point of quality, however, change is a jump, since it only occurs when the quantum arrives at a new measure.10 Thus, the change in anything is like a medal with two faces that the ordinary understanding over looks in obstinately sticking to one side or the other without investigating the relation between the two, and hence not noticing that a continuous variation of the quantity results in a punctuated mutation of the quality.
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56Let’s examine more closely what the Hegelian text - at once so speculative and at the same time so profound - actually says: what brings on a qualitative difference (the passage to another quality) is a quantitative change, one that is foreign to the qualitative aspect of the thing. Consequently, the two qualities, the one that exists before the change and the one that comes into existence after it, are in different to each other. And here then is the really crucial point: the one is not born out of the other. In other words, all that the "new thing" shares with the thing that existed before is "the external difference of the quantum: it did not emerge out of the previous thing but immediately out of itself." 11
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58Where do the novel properties of a new quality come from?
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60Let us recall that the central question posed by emergence is, УWhere do the novel properties of a new quality come from?Ф and that this question appeared insoluble because they can’t come from either what preceded it - without appearing to deny that there is any emergence - or from the novel properties themselves - without falling into the nonsense of seeming to explain a thing by itself. Yet, most of the philosophically minded scholars who have examined the enigma of emergence have consistently overlooked that for almost two centuries a sketch of a third option can be found in Hegel’s Science of Logic. Hegel’s answer, which is fundamentally different from the two examined earlier, would appear to resolve our problem.
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62The novel properties of a new quality do not originate in the preceding quality, either logically or chronologically. Taking direct aim at the dogma that claims "there is no jump in nature", Hegel mocks the conventional view according to which the novel properties of a new quality are already contained in whatever it was that preceded it but are unnoticed "because they are too small". As Hegel points out, in a chemical series illustrating Dalton’s law of multiple proportions, each substance exhibits "particular qualities" that are completely absent in the preceding stage; they are linked solely to the "particular points" of the scale at which they emerge. To those who think it is possible to account for the change in quality by singling out the progressive character of the transformation, Hegel responds that progressive change is "just the opposite of qualitative change". We can add to Hegel’s analysis, of course, that in so far as the new quality does not alter the thing entirely (the vaporization of water does not change its chemical composition) or severe its ties with what in the preceding form has become its support (the construction of an architect doesn’t do away with the affect of gravity on his materials), some determinations of the former subsist in the latter as common properties. But, contrary to what ordinary understanding seems to suggest, it is important to acknowledge that the novel properties of a new quality, which is the only aspect of the problem that interests us here, can never be accounted for by starting from either anterior or posterior forms. A key merit of the dialectical category of "jump" is that it completely rejects any attempt to dismiss or trivialize the newness of the new. At the same time, it takes full account of the disturbing fact that, while the acquisition of new properties by the new quality is necessary and there fore foreseeable from a quantitative point of view, it may nonetheless be qualitatively unpredictable. One can see how this aspect of dialectical analysis also illuminates another fundamental paradox of non-linearity, which is the disconcerting coincidence it gives rise to between determinism and unpredictability.
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64This is the first negation contained in Hegel"s response to the question that we posed. The second is as follows: to claim that the new thing emerges "immediately from itself" does not amount to getting trapped in the logical mystery that would treat the thing as its own explanation, or, even worse, in the irrational belief of a creation ex nihilo. What does the expression "from itself" mean then? If we understand it in a resolutely materialist manner, it means that the novel properties of the qualities considered arose out of the new quantum at which the qualitative leap occurred, this quantum carrying with it a new measure in the Hegelian sense of the term, that is to say a new unity of quantity and quality. It is the passage to a new quantum that generates whatever is distinctive of the new whole. One should not try to make sense of a qualitatively new whole, therefore, by calling up the old one, but by analyzing the new one.
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66And what needs to be analyzed there? What exactly is the thing in the whole that has to be discerned that is not the simple sum of its parts and yet is not so foreign to them that it suggests a deus ex machina? This something is its organization as a whole, the overall connection of its elements and its logic, which together constitute precisely what is novel about the new measure that has emerged at the tipping point.
67As indicated by the double negation, this is, in the last analysis, the dialectical affirmation to which we are led by Hegel: the new thing cannot be accounted for either by its elements or without them. It can only be explained by its relations, which are the real basis of the qualities that mutate according to the level of quantity involved.12 Another important insight associated with the above is that not only does the organization of the new whole not derive from the old one, but the disorganization of the latter is a prerequisite for its reorganization on a new basis. Isn’t it this essentially dialectical logic that assumes such spectacular forms in such non-linear phenomena as chaos, bifurcation and auto-organization?
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69Various contemporary forms of knowledge as well as the analyses of some scientists who possess an authentic logico-philosophical culture, one that includes dialectics, show that these are not merely hypothetical philosophical considerations. A case in point is the great biologist and Nobel Prize winner Francois Jacob in his old but still extremely stimulating work The Logic of Life (Jacob, 1970). Expounding "the architecture in stages" of the cell, an "articulation of structures subordinated to each other", he presents the general principle as follows: "new properties and logics appear with every level of organization". Thus, one understands that "what evolves is not matter... it is the organization itself." The properties of a given level of organization remain dependent on its parts, and yet they cannot merely be deduced from them (1970, 323, 328, 344). This theoretical approach partakes of a lineage that goes back to Hegel, and belongs squarely within the culture of dialectics, "a dialectics in which opposites interpenetrate and quality emerges out of quantity" (1970, 170). Anterior to what we learned from the discovery of the intrinsic non-linearity of reality, however, these theses - as relevant as they are even today - could not offer an adequate explanation for the paradox that preoccupies us in this essay, the paradox which the great majority of living scientists try to make sense of using the concept of "emergence".
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73Dialectics and emergence
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75The meaning of the very notion of "emergence" remains very controversial. Neither etymology nor common usage provides much support for the analysis made above. Instead, they suggest two common but equally untenable interpretations of the origins of what is novel in the new situation. In one case, to speak of emergence - as in the emergent part of an iceberg, for example - merely refers to the extension of a pre-existing reality; here, the term seems to exclude any authentic newness in what is new. In the other - as in the case of something that surges out of nothing - the notion implies that the result is completely separate from whatever came before. Taken in this sense, the emergent reality appears to be embedded in an irrational vitalism that eschews any organic link to its previous form. The choice, then, seems to be between the impossible occurrence of anything that is authentically new on one hand, and an unthinkable creation ex nihilo on the other. If scientific and philosophical reticence to accept the importance of the idea of emergence remains as strong as ever, therefore, the unfortunate resonance of the term itself must bear some of the responsibility for this state of affairs. But if the interpretation given to the process of emergence by non-linear thinking really succeeds in bypassing these criticisms, the meaning of "emergence" for which we have been arguing may yet acquire wide acceptance. And this new meaning will place it squarely within the culture of dialectics.
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77Notes
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79 * This is an abridged and edited version of a work that appeared in Seve 2005.
80 1. Hegel, 1981b, vol. II, "La Logique du concept", section I, chap. 1, B.
81 2. In their overview of the particule universe, the physicists Gilles Cohen-Tannoudji and Jean-Pierre Baton wrote, "The smallest entity of matter is no longer an object. It is a relation, an interaction, what we call a quantum of action" (1989, 9). And these authors in their book make explicit use of the vocabulary of dialectics.
82 3. Hegel, 1981b, vol. II, "La Logique de l"essence", section II, chap. 3,A.
83 4. Hegel, 1981a, Encyclopedie des Sciences philosophiques, vol. I: "La Science dela logique", Addition to І 135.
84 5. Ibid.
85 6. Marx, Manuscrits de 1857-1858, the chapter on capital, V, I.
86 7. See letter of July 11, 1868, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Letters to Kugelmann,
87Editions sociales, Paris, 1971.
88 8. The idea of a non-accidental "measure" of living matter has had a great career in contemporary science without, it would seem, any input from Hegel. See, for example, Erwin Schrodinger, Qu’est-ce que la vie?, or Stephen Jay Gould, Darwin etles grandes enigmes de la vie, chap. 21.
89 9. Hegel, it is true, mentions water here as an example of a substance that becomes "solid all at once when it freezes". But, if cases of more or less sudden qualitative change in nature are plentiful, numerous examples to the contrary could be mentioned. Furthermore, the suddenness of the qualitative jump, for Hegel, is only a consequence of its punctuality (he does not say whether he considers it necessary). It is punctuality alone that constitutes its basic truth: a qualitative change spread over time does not contradict it as long as it takes place at a determined threshold. The so-called "dialectical law" according to which qualitative change has to be sudden - as if, to take a trivial example, water could not evaporate very slowly at ordinary temperature but only at boiling point. This "law", which belongs to Stalin"s 1937 vulgarization of dialectical Marxism, is nothing but ideological support for the belief that "to avoid being wrong in politics, one must be a revolutionary and not a reformist", an assertion all the more groundless since it mistakenly assimilates suddenness with the revolutionary essence of social transformations.
90 10. In what contemporary physics refers to as phase transitions "of the second order" - such as boiling water under very high pressure - the clear distinction between phases (between the liquid and the vapor state) fades away, giving rise to "critical states" where the two forms interpenetrate on every scale (water bubbles containing liquid droplets that in turn contain vapor bubbles, and so on). The Hegelian notion of "nodal point", therefore, cannot be credited with absolute validity. Nevertheless, at the same time, thresholds are omnipresent, since, for example, the erasure of clear-cut limits between the phases of a second order transition takes place at a precise point - inthe case of water, at a pressure of 218.3 atmospheres. This should make clear the great importance of Hegel’s analysis as well as the error of taking it as the last word in a closed theoretical system. All categorical (categoriel) know ledge, no matter how advanced it is for a given time, may still have surprises in store for us. We must be willing to dialectize dialectics without limits.
91Thus, because he only considered isolated contradictions, for example, Hegel ended up ignoring the statistical dimension of things, whose importance is fundamental for understanding the complexity of transitions from one phase to the next.
92 11. Hegel, 1981b, Science of logique, vol. I, section III, chap. 2, B.
93 12. Physicists who work on phase transitions have raised the question - Can we explain the discontinuities observed on the macroscopic scale, as in the vaporization of a liquid, from its microscopic structure? Does a quick transformation at the atomic level take place at the temperature of transition, making the change of phase no more than its "reflection"? According to the physicist Roger Balian, this question has now been answered: "On the atomic scale, nothing distinguishes water from vapor or ice; their mutual transformations correspond to a change in the organisation of the total structure that is controlled by two macroscopic parameters, temperature and pressure."
94(See Klein and Spiro, 1995, 177-8.)
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96References
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98Cohen-Tannoudji, Gilles and Jean-Pierre Baton. 1989. L’Horizon des particules. Paris: Gallimard.
99Emmeche, C., S. Koppe and F. Stjernfelt. 1997. "Explaining Emergence: Towards an Ontology of Levels", Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 28: 83-119.
100Hegel, G.W.F. 1981a. Encyclopedie des Sciences philosophiques, vol. I: "La Sciencede la logique". Addition to І 135. Paris: Aubier Montaigne.
101Hegel, G.W.F. 1981b. Science dela logique, vol. I, II. Paris: Aubier Montaigne.
102Jacob, F. 1970. La Logique du vivant. Paris: Gallimard.
103Klein, Etienne and Michel Spiro. 1995. Le Temps et sa fleche. Paris: Flammarion.
104Marx, Karl. 1980. Manuscrit de 1857-1858. Paris: Editions socials.
105Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1971. Letters to Kugelmann. Paris: Editions socials.
106Seve, Lucien. (ed.) 2005. Dynamics and Dialectics of Non-Linear Systems. Paris: Odile Jacob Editions.