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4UK-US Trade & Investment
5Working Group
613-14 November 2017
7Full Readout
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11Agenda and Table of Contents
12Original scheduled time/date* Meeting title Page Number
13Day 1 - Monday 13 November
1410:00-11:00 Coordination meeting
1511:000-12:15 Plenary session
16-Overview
17-UK & US Updates
183
1912:15-13.00 Stakeholder engagement and
20communications
218
2213:00-14:30 - Lunch 10
2314:30-17:00 SMEs
2414:30-15:30 Sustainability / Labour and
25environmental standards
2615
2715:30-16:30 Goods: Agricultural market
28access
2919
3016:30-17:30 IP Enforcement 22
31Day 2 - Tuesday 14 November
328:30-9:00 Coordination Meeting
339:00-12:00 Services 27
349:00-11:00 SPS – US presentation on current
35international work
3641
379:00-11:00 Intellectual property (esp. in
38relation to SMEs)
3944
4011:00-12:00 (ad hoc) SME session 52
4112:00-2:00 - Lunch
4214:30-16:15 Regulatory dialogue follow-up 55
4316:15-16:45 Internal meetings
4416:45-17:45 Final review and coordination
45meeting
4661
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50Title of Meeting: Plenary Session
51Date: 13th November 2017
52Time: 11:00 – 12:45
53Participants
54Name Department/Directorate
55Oliver Griffiths UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT (Lead)
56Richard Salt UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
57Tom Josephs Policy Directorate, DIT
58Julian Farrell Policy Directorate, DIT
59Neil Feinson Policy Directorate, DIT
60Ada Igboemeka and Maryam Teschke-Panah Policy Directorate, DIT
61Sophie Brice UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
62Katie Waring UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
63Cordelia Jonathan UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
64George Radice UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
65Rebecca Schneider UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
66Mike Bartling DIT Legal
67Edward Barker DIT
68Sarah Clegg FCO
69Paul Bedford HMT
70Hannah Young DEXEU
71Emma Coppack DEXEU
72Rhys Bowen DEXEU
73Tim Holmes DEXEU
74Jacques Sheehan DEXEU
75Ceri Morgan DEFRA
76Harry Lee DCMS
77Elizabeth Chatterjee BEIS
78Dan Mullaney United States Trade Representative
79Tim Wedding United States Trade Representative
80Katherine Kalutkiewicz United States Trade Representative
81Christine Peterson United States Trade Representative
82Thomas Fine United States Trade Representative
83Casey Mace US State Department
84Jessica Simonoff US State Department
85Whitney Baird US State Department
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89Joseph Burke US Embassy London
90Gregory Burton US Embassy London
91Jeffery Seigel US Treasury
92Rosalyn Steward US Small Business Administration
93Sarah Bonner US Small Business Administration
94Susan Wilson US Patent and Trademark Office
95Rachel Salzman Department of Commerce
96Andrew Lorenz National Security Council
97Key Points to Note
98 All participants to continue engaging outside of formal TIWG and to be open to opportunities for short
99term outcomes.
100 UK DIT and US USTR Legal Advisers to set up a call to discuss guidance document for TIWG participants
101on the arrangements for sharing information.
102 US USTR and UK DIT to discuss creation of secure web portal with permissions for UK TIWG
103participants to facilitate sharing of documents.
104Report of Discussions and Outcome
1051. Oliver Griffiths (UK - DIT) opened the meeting by referencing the already strong bilateral relationship
106between the UK and US and setting out the objectives for the second UK-US Trade and Investment
107Working Group (TIWG). These were two-fold: 1. Deepening engagement (including in areas such as
108sustainability where leads were meeting for the first time), and building knowledge of each others’
109systems and processes, for example by discussing constitutional frameworks. On this occasion the UK’s
110devolution settlements and the balance between London and the Devolved Administrations and
111hopefully picking up the US’ state/federal split in future WGs; and 2. Driving forward discussions on
112Continuity Agreements and Short Term Outcomes, with a view to an announcement on progress at the
113end of the TIWG. In all discussions, participants should bear in mind the 4 pillars of the TIWG:
114Continuity Agreements, Short Term Outcomes, laying the foundations for a potential future UK-US FTA
115and cooperation on strategic trade issues.
1162. Dan Mullaney (US - USTR) responded by commenting that the substance of, and attendance at, the
117TIWG demonstrated the importance that the current US Administration the US-UK relationship.
118Discussions would build on shared values and the already deeply integrated trade and investment
119relationship. He agreed with the overarching objectives set out by Oliver Griffiths (above), emphasising
120that discussion and action shouldn’t be confined to the formal TIWG – there should be continuous
121engagement, including on new opportunities to deepen the relationship. Continuity Agreements were
122also critically important to provide certainty for US and UK stakeholders and to deliver the message
123that the current trading relationship would continue. The TIWG would help lay the groundwork for the
124future – post-Brexit - relationship, by identifying where priorities lie and how we do things differently.
125We should also use the discussions to agree how we can work together on shared global concerns/
126strategic trade issues.
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130Updates since last TIWG
1313. Ceri Morgan (UK – DEFRA) updated on the Spirits, Wine and Organics Continuity Agreements, which
132had been discussed in a productive VTC between DEFRA and US Department for Agriculture last week.
133Parties were close to an agreement on Spirits (subject to a couple of outstanding questions) and the UK
134was now in a position to present text on Organics – to which we weren’t expecting an immediate
135response from the US. On Wine, the UK had responses to US questions and we would hopefully reach
136agreement on text in the New Year.
1374. Julian Farrell (UK – DIT) updated on Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRSs) and the Conformity
138Assessment on Marine Equipment, which fall within the Continuity Agreement basket. Jeremy
139Heywood and Gary Cohn had agreed that this technical replication exercise should be completed by
140August 2018, meaning that text had to be agreed by April to allow lawyers to complete a legal scrub. In
141the TIWG, leads would run through the key issues which would need technical adjustment and share
142thoughts on how to achieve this, with the aim of having text agreed in the New Year.
1435. Tim Wedding (US-USTR) agreed with the assessments (above) and highlighted that a broader
144conversation on technical rectification was needed to iron-out some key issues, which would hopefully
145lead to resolution by the summer.
1466. Alexandra Whittaker (US – USTR Legal Counsel) briefed the group on recently agreed information
147handling arrangements, which allowed both sides to share documents without them being disclosed via
148the US Freedom of Information Act. The protective marking on the documents circulated for the TIWG
149(‘UK OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE – UK/US official use only/U.S.-U.K. CONFIDENTIAL, modified handing
150authorized’) should be used on all documents and emails shared between US and UK counterparts. She
151recommended the creation of a secure site to facilitate the exchange of documents and to enable US
152inter-agency circulation. This was also a good way of managing information. Alexander reassured
153participants that if they inadvertently omitted the protective marking on a document, they would not
154automatically lose protection privileges but that including the markings was best practice. Tim
155Wedding (US -USTR) confirmed that he would speak to DIT about the creation of a secure document
156site. Oliver Griffiths commented that it would be useful to have a guidance document on the process
157for protecting documents. Alexandra Whittaker suggested a call between USTR and DIT lawyers to take
158forward.
159UK Context
1607. Rhys Bowen (UK-DEXEU) updated on Brexit. The focus was now on the December European Council (15
161December), where the UK had three objectives: 1. Progress on the separation talks; 2. Agreeing an
162implementation period; and 3.Agreeing guidelines on the U’s future relationship with the EU. In turn:
163i. Separation. The UK and EU needed to agree on three key issues: i) citizens’ rights, where there had
164been progress last week in Brussels; ii) Northern Ireland, in particular the border and Common
165Travel Area and citizens’ rights with regard to the Good Friday Agreement – the area of separation
166talks most closely tied to the UK’s future relationship with the EU; and iii). Money, on which the
167Prime Minister had made clear that she didn’t want to leave other Member States worse off, but
168that this was a negotiation. The UK was hoping to wrap these issues-up by December.
169ii. Implementation period. In her Florence speech, the Prime Minister had set out her strong belief
170that an implementation period was in the interests of both sides. Any implementation period
171would likely be very similar to the current arrangement with the EU to provide certainty and it 
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175should last as long needed, but we were expecting it to be for around two years. The Prime
176Minister has also been clear that the UK should be able to take forward trade negotiations with
177third countries during an implementation period. EU Member States are conducting their own
178discussions on an implementation period for discussion in December. The UK was hoping for a
179clear signal to be sent at the December Council Meeting.
180iii. Future UK/EU Economic Partnership. This was also referenced in the Prime Minister’s Florence
181speech. The UK was not intending on having an EFTA or EEA model, rather a bespoke arrangement.
182Options were being left open at this stage.
183iv. Domestically, the key piece of legislation was the EU Withdrawal Bill. The Committee stages of the
184Bill would start in the House of Commons tomorrow: in total, there would be eight days of eight
185hour debates. The main objective of the Bill was to create certainty and continuity on day one after
186Brexit.
1878. Tim Wedding (US – USTR) asked whether there was a relationship between an implementation period
188and discussions on the UK’s future relationship with the EU. Hannah Young (UK – DEXEU) responded by
189explaining that the concept of an implementation period was a depreciating asset and for this reason
190the Prime Minister wanted agreement on the concept as soon as possible. An implementation period
191would provide a “glide path” for the future relationship, but it would also be important for certainty
192and continuity should agreement not be reached.
1939. Alexandra Whittaker (US –USTR Legal Counsel) asked whether there was a distinction between the
194term “transition” and “implementation”. Rhys Bowen (UK – DEXEU) explained that the Prime Minister
195had chosen the term “implementation period”, because the UK would be taking actions forward on
196future economic relationship with the EU. The Prime Minister had been clear that she wanted the UK
197to be able to negotiate (but not agree) trade agreements with third countries during an
198implementation period.
19910. Rhys Bowen (UK – DEXEU) also briefed on the UK’s “Future Partnership Paper”. Discussions with the
200EU needed to be guided by what was in the UK’s best interests, including: i) the future relationship with
201the EU being as frictionless as possible; ii) there being no hard border with Northern Ireland; and iii) an
202ability to negotiate our own trade deals and have an independent UK trade policy.
20311. Dan Mullaney (US- USTR) asked whether the UK was considering a “tracing programme” to distinguish
204products for/ from EU and whether there would be a link to the EU Single Market. In response Paul
205Bedford (HMT) explained that there were two potential options regarding goods to/ from the EU: i) a
206tracking method; or ii) a re-payment method (high tariff initially with ability to reclaim). All of this was
207tied to the critical issue of the Northern Ireland border and the UK was thinking through options. The
208Customs Bill, to be introduced later this year, would be the framework for this – followed by a large
209amount of secondary legislation setting out the detail.
21012. UK Edward Barker (UK – DIT) briefed participants on the development of the UK’s independent trade
211policy. The Trade White Paper laid the ground work for the Trade Bill (recently introduced into
212Parliament) and set out a first pitch on how the UK proposed to use its independence when it left the
213EU, which were: i). Strong support for the rules based system; ii) An ability to enforce rules and
214achieve a level playing field; and iii) Maintaining existing and developing new trading relationships.
215Over the coming months, the UK would be working through strategic choices.
21613. Amanda Brooks (UK- DIT) set out the legislative programme of work to enable the UK to have an
217independent trade policy. The Trade Bill was introduced into the House of Commons last week. This 
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221would enable the UK to: implement the Government Procurement Act; make non-tariff related changes
222to existing EU trade agreements with third countries; set up a Trade Remedies Authority ( an
223independent arm’s length body making recommendations to the Secretary of State for International
224Trade) ; and to share trade related data amongst agencies. The Trade Bill would link into the Customs
225Bill, which would enable the UK to set tariffs, impose retaliatory measures through the WTO and set up
226GSPs. Together the two Bills would provide the framework for the UK’s independent trade policy.
227US Context
22814. Dan Mullaney (US – USTR) updated on US trade policy. The current Administration had been clear that
229multilateral and plurilateral agreements had not been kind to the US and were therefore focussed on
230bilateral trade agreements. Within this there was recognition that TTIP was a bilateral agreement (the
231President did make a decision to pull out of TPP, but not TTIP) and the Administration remained
232favourably minded when the time was right. However, the Administration wanted to revisit a number
233of bilateral agreements, as there was a sense they were not working for US in the way they should.
234What might be done differently to rectify deep and continuing trade deficits was the focal point. USTR
235were therefore engaged in discussions with Korea on how to amend the Korea-US Trade Agreement
236(KORUS) and a renegotiation of the North America Free Trade Agreement was taking place. On NAFTA,
237there had been four rounds so far and all text had been tabled. The fifth round would start on
238November 15th and negotiations would continue through the first quarter of 2018. Everybody was
239looking at the NAFTA renegotiation as a barometer of the Administration’s trade policy. Dan indicated
240that he had no particular insights on where the negotiations would end up. He explained that the
241challenges with Mexico and Canada – high trade deficits, huge integrated borders etc. – were not
242necessarily relevant to a UK-US FTA.
24315. Another priority for the Administration was dealing with common global problems, particularly China.
244The US had commenced an investigation on overcapacity of steel and aluminium vis-a-vis China, the
245outcome of which would be a standard through which to protect other industry (semiconductors, solar
246panels etc.). An important element of positive agendas with the UK and the EU would be shared action
247on China. On the Trade in Service Agreement (TISA) the Administration recognised the potential to
248come back to table, but no decision had been made to date.
24916. Richard Salt (UK – DIT) asked how much the UK should read into NAFTA renegotiation objectives as
250priorities for KORUS and other bilateral FTAs. Dan Mullaney responded by saying that the focus was on
251“free, fair and reciprocal trade”. Rules of Origin and dispute mechanisms were important issues and
252USTR Robert Lighthizer had been clear that he wanted to look at dispute such as ISDS to see if they
253were working for the US and to move more control back home. 
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257Title of Meeting: Stakeholder Engagement & Communications
258Date: 13th November 2017
259Time: 12:15-1:00
260Participants
261Name Department/Directorate
262Oliver Griffiths UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT (Lead)
263Richard Salt UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
264Katie Waring UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
265Sophie Brice UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
266Jack Kennedy UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
267Magdalena Ruda UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
268Timothy Wedding United States Trade Representative
269Alexandra Whittaker United States Trade Representative
270Key Points to Note
271 The US provides updates on the trade dialogue with the UK to meetings of its cleared external
272stakeholders and Congressional staff, but there is no document sharing, and no confidentiality
273requirements at this stage.
274 The DIT and USTR agreed to form a small stakeholder engagement group (with delegated responsibility
275from the TIWG) to continue discussion about stakeholder engagement and coordination.
276Report of Discussions and Outcome
2771. The UK (Waring) inquired about the US plans to engage with external stakeholders in relation to the
278UK-US trade policy dialogue, and the applicable rules, including possible requirements imposed by the
279Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation.
2802. The US (Wedding) explained they inform external (cleared) stakeholders about the trade policy
281dialogue with the UK; however, the intention was to share only publicly available information and no
282documents at this stage. Until the start of the formal trade negotiations, the rules set out in the
283legislation (including in TPA) will not apply.
2843. The UK (Waring) asked if the USTR would also provide information to the Congress.
2854. The US (Wedding) confirmed that oral information sessions are held for Congressional staff (on
286committees with oversight responsibilities for trade) both before and after the UK-US TIWG meeting.
287USTR does not have to inform Congress ‘publicly’ unless asked to appear before a committee - USTR
288raised the prospect of questions arising from a forthcoming congressional inquiry on Brexit.
2895. The UK (Waring) provided information about the planned DIT engagement with external stakeholders,
290including public request for comments (to be uploaded on gov.uk), quarterly briefing meetings with a
291wide range of stakeholder groups, bilateral meetings, and sector specific workshops. Public request for
292comments may be coordinated with a similar US initiative or done unilaterally by the UK.
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2966. Responding a question from the US, the UK explained quarterly meetings will initially focus on the UKUS TIWG but may expand to include other UK dialogues with partner countries.
2977. The UK stated that stakeholder engagement initiatives following presentation of Trade White Paper
298and Trade Bill may encourage contributions related to transparency, sustainability, and the role of the
299Parliament in trade policy development and implementation, including in trade negotiations.
3008. The US (Wedding) suggested staying in touch over plans for a UK ‘request for comment. The US did not
301plan a similar engagement at present, and would like to receive more details on the information that
302would be sought and how it would be used (both internally and externally). In case the US wished to
303launch a public request for comments, there would be a need for the USTR to justify it.
3049. The UK and the US agreed that TIWG should delegate responsibility for UK and US to have a continued
305and regular dialogue on stakeholder engagement. Moreover, conversation should continue on
306stakeholder engagement throughout the remainder of this TIWG in other sessions.
307Action Items
308 For UK and US to remain in contact over plans for a UK ‘request for comment.’ US not necessarily
309opposed to running a similar channel of engagement but would like more details on the information
310that would be sought and how it would be used (both internally and externally).
311 Agreed that there should be delegated responsibility given from the TIWG for UK and US to have a
312continued and regular dialogue on stakeholder engagement. This might entail the planning of
313‘stakeholder days’ in the margins of future meetings of the TIWG. If it was decided that if something
314along these lines was to take place at the next TIWG, planning would need to start soon.
315 Conversation should continue on stakeholder engagement throughout the remainder of this TIWG in
316other sessions.
317 For UK to make relevant contacts with US Public Relations team.
318FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
319Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
320 Useful session. Different levels of experience and stakeholder framework on each side mean
321coordination (but not joint initiatives) are important so need to keep it on the agenda, even if covered
322briefly.
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32510
326Title of Meeting: SME
327Date: 13th November 2017
328Time: 14:30-17:00 pm
329Participants
330Name Department/Directorate
331Julian Farrel Policy Directorate, DIT (Lead)
332Kate Maxwell Policy Directorate, DIT
333Daniel Harrison BEIS (Co-Lead)
334Andrei Murariu BEIS
335Huw Parker BEIS
336Oliver Nash DCMS
337Sophie Brice UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
338George Radice UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
339Bob Collier ITI, DIT
340Rebecca Schneider UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
341Lawrence Key DIT
342Nick Morgan Better Regulation Executive, BEIS
343Ellen Duffy Better Regulation Executive, BEIS
344Ben Leich Better Regulation Executive, BEIS
345Muhammad Abbas Policy Directorate, DIT
346Christina Sevilla United States Trade Representative
347Lori Cooper US Department of Commerce (by phone)
348Richard Fergusson State Department
349Tricia Van Orden Department of Commerce
350Sarah Bonner US Small Business Administration
351Rosalyn Steward US Small Business Administration
352Additional officials United States Trade Representative
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356Key Points to Note
357Good atmosphere and energy in the room. Clear sense that this was a positive area for engagement both
358pre- and post-Brexit, in particular given alignment with POTUS’ interest in supporting SMEs and supporting
359parts of the US that are less economically vibrant.
360 US tabled a one-pager summarising the main “trade issues” for SMEs, some that could be addressed
361now and others in an FTA – UK thanked US for tabling this and noted similarities with areas outlined in
362UK slides on the same subject.
363 US mentioned that TTIP chapter on SMEs was 4 square brackets away from being finalised
364 Digital is seen as the single biggest game changer for SME exporters – likely they will push for
365provisions (e.g. zero tax on digital sales) in other FTA chapters
366 Both sides outlined their approach to Trade Promotion, noting many similarities
367 Areas for potential collaboration that were discussed:
368- UK highlighted that exchanges between entrepreneurs would be highly beneficial, possibly by
369building on existing Start Up Exchange programme (between Newcastle, Atlanta and Toulouse) –
370likely will be wrapped into SME Dialogue.
371- US highlighted a joint brochure on support measures for SMEs as a first deliverable for the group –
372US to share draft with UK.
373- US outlined its Best Practice Workshops with EU, which were seen as a short term deliverable that
374UK and US could replicate as an SME Dialogue bringing together officials and SMEs to discuss trade
375issues for SMEs – UK provisionally agreed.
376- US outlined its MoU relating to SMEs with the EU as something that could be replicated between
377US and UK in longer time, building on the work of the SME Dialogue
378Report of Discussions and Outcome
3791. Daniel Harrison (UK – BEIS) explained UK’s approach to SME policy. Whilst SME policy was spread
380across government, BEIS ensured that there was an effective framework for departments to work
381within and for SMEs to be successful. This included economy-wide issues such as flexible labour laws
382and specific policies like targets on government procurement. The UK also had an SME help line and 38
383growth hubs across the country. In addition, sector teams (digital, agriculture etc.) all had an SME
384focus. The UK had a supportive framework for SMEs: reduced corporation tax (17% by 2020),
385increased employment allowance and innovation and R&D tax credits (18,000 SMEs claimed tax credits
386in 2016). 60% of Innovate UK’s core budget went to SMEs. Access to finance was an important part of
387SME growth. By the end of 2014, the UK government had provided 60,000 SMEs with start-up loans
388worth £350m in total. BEIS had 5 priorities for SMEs: 1. Simplification and access to information; 2.
389Accelerating growth for the highest ambition actors; 3. Celebrating success and inspiring; 4. Growing
390future sectors (e.g. artificial intelligence) and capturing opportunities for the UK to become a leader in
391new areas; and 5. Engagement.
3922. The key challenge was making sure all information was readily available and in one place. Many SMEs
393were not aware of the barriers to trade and didn’t know where to get information from. A Federation
394of Small Business report in 2017 identified the US as a priority market for 50% of SMEs, most of whom
395would want an SME Chapter in a future FTA.
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3993. Christina Sevilla (US – USTR) confirmed that the US had many of the same priorities for SMEs. There
400had been an increasing focus on SMEs in recent years. Most people tended to think that international
401trade was just for big multinationals. However, out of 300,000 firms which export from US, 298,000
402were SMEs (Comment: US definition of SME is up to 500 staff: UK goes by the OECD definition up to
403250 staff). If SMEs engaged in international trade, they grew faster than those just staying in domestic
404markets. The US was No. 1 destination for UK SMEs (96% UK firms exporting were SMEs by US
405definition). UK was the 3rd largest SME market for US firms after Canada and Mexico. UK-US
406relationship was therefore already very important. Christina also mentioned that a focus on newdisruptive technology was also considered as an important area for USTR.
4074. Christina Sevilla (US – USTR) then set out the standard US instruments in SME Chapters of FTAs,
408designed to support SMEs trade internationally [final 4 bullets of US handout]: reduction of customs
409tariffs; reduction of unnecessary duplication of regulation; reduction of regulatory barriers; automation
410of documentation; advanced classification of documents; expedited release of goods. Digital trade had
411been the single biggest change factor for SMEs in terms of exporting; therefore keeping digital products
412duty free, promoting free flow of information (e.g. not requiring a server in every single market) and
413better protection of IPR, were all very important. In terms of US-UK cooperation, there was also
414potential for short-term outcomes such as cooperation dialogues. Cooperation within the
415Transatlantic Economic Council workshops informed much of the discussion on the TTIP SME chapter.
4165. Lori Cooper (US – Department of Commerce, Brussels) explained how the US and EU cooperated to
417help SMEs access the transatlantic market. Talks started in 2008 and signed in 2012 Commerce and
418(then) DG Enterprise concluded an SME MOU – a very simple document, the basic framework of which
419was to provide a foundation to build cooperation. The MOU was renewed in 2015 and runs to end
4202019. The overarching goal continues to be job creation and promoting innovation, investment and
421export. Under these SME cooperation arrangements the US and EU have shared resources, including
422joint trade shows, joint match-making and information sharing. Information sharing commenced with
423both sides becoming familiar with systems and resources: Enterprise Europe Network and US
424Commercial Service. The focus had since been honed to enhance business to business contact between
425US and EU SMEs. There has been particular success with match making at trade shows and the US took
426advantage of the MoU to bring 100 US entities to a trade show in Hannover resulting in 400 meetings/
427leads. Now cooperation is being focussed at a more grass roots level (Industry Offices and Bilateral
428Trade Desks). There has been a history of cooperation between UK and US Commercial Service, and
429Commerce’s Office of Finance and Insurance Industries has expressed interest in working on US/UK
430SMEs in Fintech.
4316. Christina Sevilla (US – USTR) then briefed on the US-EU SME Best Practices Workshops, initiated with
432EU prior to TTIP. The format was for SMEs on both sides of Atlantic to meet with officials. There was
433an opportunity to go further with UK/US cooperation and best practice discussions, which would fall
434outside purview of an FTA. Agendas were jointly developed by both sides. Workshops led to deeper
435engagement and could potentially lead to an MoU. Output was usually a one page joint statement and
436some concrete initiatives. It was written into the US-EU MoU that all work would be carried-out within
437existing resources. By sharing information and sharing programmes both sides were essentially doing
438more within existing resources. 
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4427. Bob Collier (UK – DIT) agreed that this was a good way of cooperating and we would need to involve
443Innovate UK. The Enterprise Network was a good way to do this as it reaches directly into business. He
444then explained the UK model. There were 5.5 million business enterprises in the UK, a significant
445proportion of which were in the services sector. Economic development activity in the UK was
446devolved and Devolved Administrations organised export activity in their own territories, but when
447SMEs go global they liaised with DIT’s international team. DIT’s network was nationally controlled but
448regionally managed via a strong regional structure of 250 International Trade Advisers (trade advisers
449with business experience, not civil servants). The government wanted to drive more exports and get
450more business and more value exported. This was potentially scalable within the current model but
451resources would be a challenge. 90% of UK exporters were SMEs, around 40% of UK export value: DIT
452reached out to around 30-40,000 businesses every year. There was a strong link between exports and
453innovation.
4548. DIT was rolling out a new strategy, looking at how many businesses could be engaged, to save on
455resources. There are three arms of the UK’s model which had the most impact for SMEs: 1. Global
456Network; 2. Strong sector focus (campaign related activity around specific sectors globally); and 3.
457Supporting current exporters to extend their global reach. “Gov.UK” was a “one stop shop” which
458encouraged businesses to self-serve. The government was also looking at how to best help exporters in
459other regions (North and East and West Midlands). DIT were also trying to formalise/ build up support
460networks via Chambers of Commerce (overseas delivery partners in around 30 markets around the
461world). This would free up international staff (at post) to focus on more high value work. In terms of
462preparing small businesses to export, the idea was to start with a diagnostic process, analysing business
463strengths and development needs, followed with workshops and master classes (e.g. IP protection,
464trade finance - UKEF).
4659. Trisha Van Orden (US – Department for Commerce) delivered a presentation on the US Federal Trade
466Promotion Service
46710. Sarah Bonner (US - US Small Business Administration) delivered a presentation on the work of the US
468Office International Trade. A Cabinet level agency representing small businesses at cabinet level and
469the first place small businesses go for one-on-one help. Small Business Development Centres (SBDCs)
470consisting of 3000 business counsellors offer advice designed to provide an international soft landing
471for SMEs – UK subsidiaries were welcome to drop in. Enterprise Centres usually located in universities
472and colleges helped small business with research – counselling was free, with small charges ($40) for
473services. The SBDC network engaged regularly and worked on trade missions. The Small Business
474Association was co-located with Commerce in export assistance centres and had finance staff to help
475SMEs build business cases for export loans. They also provided Women’s Business Centres, designed to
476help diaspora women and under-serviced communities by offering child care and weekend and evening
477classes. The Small Business Administration gave trade loan guarantees - not loans unless it’s for
478disaster relief.
47911. The group then discussed ideas for potential cooperation: exchanges between UK and US
480entrepreneurs (peer to peer support); sharing of best practice in developing business to get SMEs
481“export ready”; enabling conversations between Growth hubs in UK and Small Business Administration
482counsellors; bringing networks of entrepreneurs together – how to build on this to reach those
483business that might not seek support (e.g. small business in US having a peer relationship with small
484business in UK so when they were ready to export they already had access to a network); bringing two 
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488groups of entrepreneurs from UK and US together; using the current support infrastructure to link
489entrepreneurs even before they are ready for export.
49012. The group agreed that the ideas would fit well with the general framework of SME workshops and a
491potential MoU. A UK-US SME workshop could be vehicle to start pilots such as this. There was lots of
492potential to connect government institutions, state service providers and SMEs. One outcome of the
493UK/US working group could be to announce launch of best practice workshops with a focus on
494entrepreneurship. There was also the potential to launch a joint “Doing Business In” brochure – a one
495pager on doing business in UK and US with links to available resources for SMEs - joint document.
496Action Items
497 US – USTR to draft the initial (US side) text for “Doing Business in UK/US” brochure and send to UK for
498comment/ contributions.
499 First SME workshop to be planned for March 2018, likely in the margins of the next TIWG in
500Washington DC.
501FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
502Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
503 High degree of common interest in establishing an SME dialogue to pursue exchanges of information
504on support measures for SMEs, and to produce a short brochure to assist UK and US SMEs to do
505business in the other country. Wording agreed on this for the joint press statement. A successful Short
506Term Outcome.
507 
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51015
511Title of meeting: Sustainability / Labor and Environment
512Date: 13th November 2017
513Time: 14:30-15:30
514Participants
515Name Department / Directorate
516Maryam Teschke-Panah Policy Directorate, DIT (Lead)
517Magdalena Ruda UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
518Sohail Ismail Policy Directorate, DIT
519Joanne Lawson Policy Directorate, DIT
520Elie Howe Policy Directorate, DIT
521Sophie Hale Analysis Directorate, DIT
522Peter Gysin BEIS
523Trevor Salmon DEFRA
524Rebecca Lavery DWP
525Oliver Griffiths UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
526Katie Waring UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
527Timothy Wedding United States Trade Representative
528Alexandra Whittaker United States Trade Representative
529Carlos Romero United States Trade Representative, Labour
530Sarah Stewart United States Trade Representative,
531Environment
532Mark Palermo US Department of State
533Emma Laury US Department of Labor
534Anne Zollner US Department of Labor
535Brooke Hobbie US Department of Interior
536Key Points to Note
537 UK and the US agreed that the objective for the first discussion should be to develop a better
538understanding of each side’s institutional set-up (range of institutions involved in discussion and work
539on sustainability / labor and environment), current approaches (e.g. to scope, enforcement
540mechanism and stakeholder engagement), and elements which may be included into the sustainability
541/ labor and environment chapters.
542 US indicated there may be some room for manoeuvre to extend the scope of labor and environment
543chapters by including issues which are not covered by TPA, but these would be rather limited.
544 US firm on dispute settlement mechanism based on sanctions, as well as main elements covered by
545labor and environment chapters (e.g. core labour standards, a list of Multilateral Environmental
546Agreements, and the obligation of domestic compliance and enforcement). These are enshrined in the
547US legislation, and as such guide the US team in the way it conducts negotiations with partner
548countries, and impose limits on what can be discussed and agreed upon in an FTA (both, concerning
549the scope, and the level of ambition). The FTA provisions are not seen as a right vehicle to force
550changes in the US legislation.
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554 US see merits in having sanctions-based dispute settlement mechanism, even if it is rarely used (its
555presence encourages partner countries to improve their legislation and practice in the areas of labour
556and environment). The mechanism is supported by financial and technical assistance, as well as
557capacity building.
558 US indicated climate change and greenhouse gas emissions are very sensitive in the US, and have not
559been included in the recent trade agreements (and tested yet with the current Administration), as
560there was no Congressional approval for it.
561Reports of Discussions and Outcome
5621. The meeting opened on a discussion of intent for the meeting. UK opened with comments indicating a
563desire to discuss the institutional set-up of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), and their
564cooperation with other US departments and agencies, so as to compare with UK set-up, as well as
565enquiries as to dispute settlement mechanisms pertaining to labour and the environment. Additionally
566highlighted was that these would be exploratory discussions for setting up future dialogues.
5672. UK provided a brief outline of the UK’s institutional framework; Department for International Trade
568(DIT) has a sustainability team who work closely with colleagues from other departments (such as
569DEFRA, DWP for labour interest and BEIS).
5703. Intent for the UK was outlined in the context of the UK’s departure from the European Union (EU); that
571the UK cannot actively pursue trade policy measures (such as negotiations of a trade agreement) while
572a member-state of the EU but has interest in scoping possible action for the future.
5734. US responded with a description of institutional makeup around USTR: the US Constitution allocates
574power for negotiation of trade agreements to Congress; however in 1974 the US Congress passed the
575Trade Act which established the ‘Trade Promotion Authority’ (TPA) for the office of the President (ex-
576‘Fast Track Authority’). As long as the administration of the President conducts trade negotiations
577along certain principles (outlined in the Trade Act 1974 and subsequent amendments, and the
578renewed TPA) Congress will expedite the legislative process, though USTR still maintains constant
579interaction with Congress pre-negotiation, during negotiation and afterwards. The TPA has evolved
580over time, and most recent version was adopted in 2015.
5815. US highlighted the importance of the legislative component in their work (guiding USTR in negotiating
582the scope and level of ambition of trade agreements), as well as the extent to which the role played by
583labour and environment in US trade agreements has evolved over time. This was stressed multiple
584times during the meeting. US further commented that they felt that other countries consistently
585underestimated the role that US Congress played in negotiations.
5866. Further comments described the interwoven nature of work between USTR and relevant departments
587for sustainability (environment and labour) issues (such as Department of Labor, Department of
588Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, Forest Service and Commerce and Oceanic
589Agency) as well work with border agencies.
5907. The most recent amendment of the TPA was adopted in 2015, which set out key negotiation objectives
591for USTR. In the field of sustainability (environment and labour) this included to seek commitments
592that parties to the agreement adopt and enforce domestic labour and environmental laws (consistent
593with their international obligations), and do not disregard them for the purposes of attracting trade or
594FDI; as well as that labour and environment chapters need to have the same dispute resolution
595mechanisms (based on sanctions) as other chapters. 
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5998. US also mentioned that as of the latest TPA, the US should seek inclusion into trade agreements of
600commitments consistent with 7 multilaterals on the environment that the US has ratified. In addition
601there are two new post-2015 objectives relating to sustainable management of natural resources,
602notably fisheries: clauses to prohibit harmful fishing subsidies that lead to overfishing, and against
603illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
6049. UK response mirrored sentiments of US: regarding reliance on other departments. UK also pointed out
605the ongoing process of transposition of EU law through the EU Withdrawal Bill.
60610. Climate Change. UK (Gysin) inquired about the possibility of including reference to climate change in a
607future UK-US trade agreement given that the UK has a strong historical stance on climate change and
608pushed strongly for the Paris Agreement. UK also highlighted the pressure for this that would come
609from civil society and NGOs. US (Stewart) responded emphatically that climate change is the most
610political (sensitive) question for the US, stating it is a ‘lightning rod issue’, mentioning that as of 2015,
611USTR are bound by Congress not to include mention of greenhouse gas emission reductions in trade
612agreements. US (Stewart) stated this ban would not be lifted anytime soon.
61311. Stakeholders. UK (Teschke-Panah) also wanted to know which role stakeholders play within labour and
614environmental issues in the US. US (Stewart) provided a description of the institutional role that
615stakeholders play within USTR; there is the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations
616(ACTPN), containing 20-25 members, being drawn from NGOs, industry and academia. These
617stakeholders are given security clearance and allowed to offer candid input on trade agreement texts.
618USTR does engage with other stakeholders that operate outside ACTPN. These had been happy in
619recent years due to the inclusion of enforceability mechanisms (for environment) in trade agreements.
620For labour, US (Romero) said that there had been dissatisfaction among some stakeholders in recent
621years due to the fact since 2007, there has been no expansion of labour provisions in the TPA; there is
622a feeling that NAFTA affects jobs and working conditions and other countries should address these
623issues (the current administration echoes these sentiments).
62412. TPA and labour. UK (Lawson) queried the nature of the TPA and its expanding scope with regards to
625labour. US (Romero) replied stating that the labour provisions of the TPA are the product of a political
626compromise within the US: when Democrats took Congress in the 2006 mid-term elections there was
627compromise to include a commitment from parties to the agreement to adhere to the core labour
628standards (1998 ILO Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work), and to adopt and
629effectively enforce domestic labour laws compliant with those standards.
63013. Dispute resolution. UK (Teschke-Panah) enquired about analytical work that had been conducted on
631the US side around effectiveness of the sanctions-based dispute resolution for these issues (labour and
632environment). US answer was brief but stated that there had been no analytical work conducted on
633this issue by the US Government, but claimed that there were some robust studies carried out by
634research institutes. Additionally the US agreed to potentially discuss with the UK in detail the USGuatemala labour dispute case brought about in 2010.
63514. Dispute resolution. Another point that US (Romero and Stewart) raised were that the benefits of
636dispute resolution can be achieved without using it. US stated that dispute settlement and the use of
637sanctions is for the US a matter of last resort; most work is conducted through diplomatic and policy
638dialogue, as well as financial and technical assistance, and capacity building. The latter is the ‘engine of
639progress’ in the sense that partner countries are encouraged to improve their legislation and practice
640in line with the commitments enshrined in trade agreements. 
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64415. Joint-action. US (Stewart) stated that they felt joint UK-US leadership on sustainability (environment
645and labour) with regard to third countries was a possible way forward given the UK’s prominence on
646these issues historically. UK noted the need for further and deeper discussions in future and
647responded positively to the idea for joint cooperation.
648Action Items
649UK and US agreed to continue discussion about the sustainability (labour and environment). Future
650discussions could focus on (but will not be limited to):
651 The aspects of interest to the UK and the US which go beyond the basic provisions, and which may be
652covered by sustainability (labour and environment) chapters of future trade agreements (these could
653include e.g. anti-corruption, forced labour, modern slavery, sustainable management of natural
654resources, including fisheries and forestry, and others).
655 The enforcement mechanism (US proposed to present more in detail the case of Guatemala, the
656reasoning behind including the labour and environment chapters into the general dispute settlement
657mechanism, and the benefits of having the sanctions based mechanism even if it is perceived as a “last
658resort” measure and rarely used).
659 The opportunities for the UK-US leadership on sustainability related aspects worldwide and in relations
660with developing countries (this could include exchange of views about impacts of trade agreements on
661developing countries, and addressing development-related aspects in trade agreements).
662 Sharing wider analysis and evidence of impact of sustainability (labour/environment) provisions in
663trade agreements
664FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
665Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
666 A useful introductory meeting, although limited by length of session and the VTC format. It confirmed
667that the US continues to see labour and environment chapters being subject to dispute resolution
668mechanisms of the agreement /sanctionable. There are some restrictions on extending the scope of
669issues with climate change being considered out with, but the possible flexibility on labour provisions
670e.g. forced labour, modern slavery, could be an area to explore in the next dialogue. It would be
671preferable to have face to face engagement with USTR (and possibly agency) counterparts in a next
672dialogue.
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67519
676Title of Meeting: Goods: Agriculture Market Access
677Date: 13th November 2017
678Time: 15:30 - 16:30
679Participants
680Name Department/Directorate
681Ceri Morgan DEFRA (Lead)
682Oliver Griffiths UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
683Katie Waring UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
684Emma Coppack DExEU
685Jack Kennedy UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
686Jack Moreton-Burt Policy Directorate, DIT
687Neil Feinson Policy Directorate, DIT
688Edwin Mangheni UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
689James Dunn DEFRA
690Jonathan Hoare DEFRA
691Sinjini Mukherjee DEFRA
692Natalie Roberts DEFRA
693Russell Stokes DEFRA
694Roger Wentzel United States Trade Representative (VTC)
695Dana DuBovis United States Trade Representative
696Tim Wedding United States Trade Representative
697Alexandra Whittaker United States Trade Representative
698Sam Russo United States Trade Representative
699Julie Callahan United States Trade Representative
700Cheri Courtney US National Organic Program
701Stan Phillips US Embassy London
702Key Points to Note
703 For Organics, Spirits and Wine: Ahead of technical VTCs, Defra is looking to share operability
704summaries as well as relevant draft continuity texts.
705 Defra to provide response to US suggestion for formally launching an Equivalence Determination
706Procedure. US will also consider what informal processes can be utilised.
707 US to highlight their priority annexes in order to inform our ongoing analysis of the VEA, and for Defra
708to consider whether we anticipate a future audit of US processes.
709 Defra and US to facilitate regulator to regulator discussion on VEA. 
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713Report of Discussions and Outcome
714Each of the four continuity agreements were discussed in turn:
7151. Spirits agreement
716The UK provided a summary of US questions, taken away from the recent VTC, with associated answers:
717Q: The rationale for the inclusion of paragraph 3 in the proposed UK text.
718A: Taken from the original text
719US: No issues going forward
720Q: More information sought on the proposed ratification processes
721A: Should be discussed in relation to all continuity agreements; to be put on hold for now
722US: Agreed legal discussion in the future
723Q: References in the proposed UK text to the Republic of Ireland
724A: Still a matter for EU negotiations, but in terms of GIs, if they are trans-border, the GIs will still be
725protected
726US: Sounds fine, but should discuss further once had time to look at it
727On operation of the agreement, the UK suggested sharing a summary of the operability assessment with
728the US and proposed future technical VTCs following a similar approach. The US agreed to this proposal.
7292. Wine agreement
730At the last working group the US asked a question on certification requirements and labelling. Here the UK
731stated that EU negotiations and the likely implementation period would need to be considered, however
732starting a discussion now on simplification of these requirements beyond the period of continuity would be
733welcome in order to give businesses lead time for changes, if they were to occur. The US welcomed this
734suggestion. The UK proposed to share draft continuity text on the agreement ahead of a January VTC, and
735to start discussions on potential future changes at the VTC.
736The UK asked the US for their thoughts on the World Wine Trade Group. The US said this is something the
737UK should think about as the issues being addressed through this group are similar to those they would like
738to see addressed in a future agreement with the UK.
7393. Organics Arrangement
740The UK stated they are in a position to share draft continuity text on organics. The US stated that whilst
741they do not want to disrupt trade on day one, there are other aspects to consider, other than the
742agreement text. The US invited the UK to begin the formal process of applying for mutual recognition via
743the National Organic Program. The US also wanted to know if the UK were thinking of making the
744agreement more formally binding, in-line with the EU’s thoughts, and if the UK plans to audit the US.
745The UK wanted to make sure that this did not mean they were starting from scratch, and that common
746elements of the agreement would roll over, with the US focusing on how the UK will deal with changes. 
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750It was uncertain whether a formal request for recognition could be made while the UK is still part of the EU.
751This is something the UK will explore. In the meantime the US agreed to explore options for informal
752progress on recognition to be achieved.
7534. Veterinary equivalence agreement (VEA)
754The US explained that the original VEA was produced to take account of the complexity in evaluating
755Member States, therefore a new UK-US VEA could be simplified and tailored to the UK-US relationship. The
756UK agreed there were opportunities to look at simplification, and have started by assessing the annexes.
757The UK would like to share information on this work as soon as possible. Both the US and UK agreed it
758would be helpful to include the regulators in this discussion.
759 On the US question of what recognition would look like, the UK agreed work on this should take
760place in parallel with the annex work.
761 The US asked if the UK would anticipate an audit sometime next year, and if so, they would need to
762make sure this was on their regulators agenda. The UK said they would get back to the US on this as
763soon as possible.
764 On legislation, the US does not anticipate legislative fixes, but SIS will need to make rules, and this
765should not hold back VEA discussions.
766Action Items
767Key actions:
7681. For Organics, Spirits and Wine: Ahead of technical VTCs, Defra looking to share operability summaries
769as well as relevant draft continuity texts.
7702. Defra to provide response to US suggestion for formally launching Equivalence Determination
771Procedure. US will also consider what informal processes can be utilised.
7723. US to highlight their priority annexes in order to inform our ongoing analysis of the VEA, and for Defra
773to consider whether we anticipate a future audit of US processes.
7744. Defra and US to facilitate regulator to regulator discussion on VEA.
775Other actions:
776 Defra to clarify language on Irish Whiskey/whisky in the spirits agreement taking into account border
777sensitivities.
778 Agreed to run twin track discussions on wine, ensuring continuity for businesses in one track whilst
779also understanding US approach to simplification and challenges of current EU arrangement.
780 US to come back on Defra's request for more information on the World Wine Trade Group.
781 Defra to share the Organics draft text ahead of Dec VTC.
782FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
783Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
784 Objectives were largely achieved. The session demonstrated positive progress on all four of the
785continuity agreement texts. On Spirits in particular, resolution is close, aided by a technical VTC ahead
786of the Working Group. The US also responded well to the suggestion of maintaining the Wine
787agreement text while developing a twin track to discuss possible future changes. The situation is more
788complex with Organics and VEA, as the US’ stated regulatory approach is likely to result in disruption
789to trade on Day One. 
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793Title of Meeting: Intellectual Property Enforcement
794Date: 13th November 2017
795Time: 16:30 – 17:30
796Participants
797Name Department/Directorate
798Ada Igboemeka Policy Directorate, DIT (Lead)
799Mark Prince Policy Directorate, DIT
800Dara Beaulieu Policy Directorate, DIT
801Minh Tri Le Policy Directorate, DIT
802Ben Richie Policy Directorate, DIT
803Adam Williams Intellectual Property Office
804Megan Heap Intellectual Property Office
805Peter Cade Intellectual Property Office
806Will Steele Intellectual Property Office
807Tom Walkden Intellectual Property Office
808Katie Waring UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
809Edwin Mangheni UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
810Christina Sevilla Office of the United States Trade Representative
811Christine Peterson Office of the United States Trade Representative
812Susan Wilson United States Patent and Trademark Office
813Rachel Salzman US Department of Commerce
814Samuel Rizzo United States Trade Representative
815Alexandra Whitaker Office of the United States Trade Representative
816Timothy Wedding United States Trade Representative (Europe Office)
817Jessica Simonoff Department of State
818Joseph Babb Department of State
819Joseph Burke US Embassy London
820Julie Callahan United States Trade Representative
821Casey Mace Department of State
822Andrew Lorenz National Security Council
823Steven Shapiro (VTC) Federal Bureau of Investigation
824Steve Aiken (VTC) US Intellectual Property Enforcement
825Richard Miller (VTC) US Trade and Patents Office
826Additional officials Head of Trademark and Enforcement
827M.D (VTC) US Patent and Trademark Office
828Additional officials from Office of Regional Affairs,
829Department of State and United States Trade
830Representative
831Via VTC
832Key Points to Note
833 Joint Economic Study on IP enforcement and global trade: US have no funding for commissioning the
834work – they will produce the content in house. Outcomes will be split into short-term and long-term
835initiatives.
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839 Agreed to coordinate with the SME Group to coordinate activity and outreach.
840 Work plan for STOs agreed with outputs and approximate timelines.
841 Agreed that discussion on Illicit Streaming Devices would focus on 4 areas: public campaigns, role of
842intermediaries, sharing approaches to enforcement, approaches to tackling streaming. The discussion
843will be followed up via the US IPEC and IPO Copyright and Enforcement Director conversation taking
844place on 24th November 2017 as well as further discussions between UK IPO officials and counterparts
845in the US PTO and FBI.
846 US suggested that both sides map out third countries where we have common interests to work. This
847work to be done through each side’s respective IP attaché networks.
848 The US proposed to share their list of nominations for their Notorious Markets List and requested
849access to PIPCU’s List of Infringing Websites. UK (IPO) clarifying that IPO does not own the list but
850could request this from PIPCU.
851 The US was pushing for Joint Investigation Operations related to illicit streaming devices. UK clarified
852that operations involve a range of UK agencies - HMRC, Border Force, PICPU, etc. who are not
853currently involved in the discussion. UK only able to commit at this point to focus on learning lessons
854from each other.
855Report of Discussions and Outcome
856Joint Economic Study
8571. The UK (Igboemeka) suggested that the Joint Economic Study (JES) on IP enforcement and global trade
858could have outcomes such as: producing new knowledge on common global challenges in IP, building
859on and developing the existing evidence, sharing data and improving methodologies to strengthen the
860quality of analysis. The UK suggests discussing in the session: potential topics for the Joint Economic
861Study (JES), and agreeing forward processes.
8622. The UK (Williams) stated it does not have the capacity internally to produce the analysis and is looking
863to commission this work out to independent institutions and asked for the US’s view on this. The US
864(Peterson) states it does not have the budget for this type of project. They have in-house resources that
865can work on the data. The US can split the work between in-house and external tender. The UK
866(Williams) highlighted that the IPO budget for this Financial Year (FY) has already been committed and
867the work could only start from March next year. The US (Peterson) pressed as to whether there could
868be something we could deliver in the shorter term, within the next 6 to 8 months. The UK suggests that
869we split the work into short-term deliverables based on developing existing analysis and longer-term
870work. The UK (Igboemeka) suggested both sides to jointly come up with a specification and a joint
871decision to be made if we go out to third parties. The UK (Williams) also suggested that the work can be
872split depending on what both sides want to achieve and we could fill that out with tendering?
8733. The US (Peterson) stated that the US has a lot of existing work that can be used again for the JES such
874as the 2016 Report from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) which refers to the
875Intellectual Property Office’s (IPO) own work. The report is a granular report on counterfeiting, cease
876and desist orders, however it does not do a UK-EU comparison. A lot of goods that get counterfeited
877are sold locally. There have been private sector attempts to measure copyright loss, but the findings
878were never definitive and were controversial.
8794. The UK (Igboemeka) suggested looking at the economic impact of counterfeiting and piracy following
880the 2017 OECD report and the UK’s follow up report. The UK (Steele) pointed out that the IPO are 
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884currently looking internally at: online copyright infringement, counterfeiting in social media, and
885valuing IP Intensive industries. The UK (Williams) suggested that both sides share methodologies.
886Currently, the UK struggles to get data on the value of IP in trade within the EU because of the
887complexity of the extraction process. It will be useful to us if the US has good data on this.
8885. The UK (Igboemeka) summarised that both sides agreed for a short-term deliverable within 6 to 8
889months and another long-term deliverable in the next FY 2018, and that both parties should bring their
890economists together, US (Peterson) concurring. US (Peterson) asking that the questions for both short
891term and long term be mapped out together.
892Illicit Streaming Devices
8936. The US (Peterson) explained potential areas of interest, especially in the creative industries area, are
894films, sport, TV and video games as they constitute significant trade and investment relationships, and
895there is much cross investment by both countries. Online platforms generated $2billion US dollars’
896revenue in streaming content. A challenge to this is the pirated streaming sites and the devices that
897make these sites accessible. The US’ notorious markets analysis identified some issues relating to illegal
898streaming platforms.
8997. US (Shapiro) added that the FBI are aware of this problem and are going after these devices by focusing
900on the advertising network as an example. Their focus is to target distributors of these set-top boxes.
901The FBI are currently moving into the sporting events arena to try to shut down these boxes. They work
902with businesses such as Apple’s ITunes to combat illicit streaming. The US highlighted that industry
903need to target these problems more effectively.
9048. The UK (Walkden) agreed with what the US said, highlighting that the UK has done a lot of
905enforcement work. However, there is a need to consider the effectiveness of legislative change in
906this area. Industry are keen to tackle these boxes at source but there is an issue to see how possible
907it might be to outlaw these boxes, as legislative change can also capture devices used in a legal way
908such as laptops and mobile phones. This is a relatively new problem; therefore, the UK is happy to
909test prosecution under Fraud Act, Copyright Act, conspiracy to defraud (common law). We already
910have had some successful prosecutions. The UK have two financial investigators working in the IPO
911to assist law enforcement bodies and this was proving very useful in these cases in pursuing
912significant sums through Proceeds of Crime Orders. The UK have also published a guidance
913document for enforcement bodies to explain the enforcement technical side so we provide clear
914advice to clarify when and how we can go after people. There have been lots of seizure operations
915going on and this is an international problem, so the UK is happy to discuss this with the US. The
916plain or “vanilla” boxes are not illegal. The boxes when they come into the country are often in their
917legal vanilla form. The boxes become illegal when they receive modifications which turn them into
918illicit streaming devices. The scale is huge. The UK works closely with industry and have close links
919with US industry.
9209. The UK (Williams) noted by saying it would be useful to collaborate on techniques to combat this.
921Such as communicating this effectively to the public. The UK (Walkden) highlighted we need to
922identify what resonates with the public such as the issue of identity theft, stealing of bank accounts,
923lack of child protection. The UK (Igboemeka) asked if there are areas for cooperation. The US
924(Peterson) said that National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR) has done public
925campaign awareness. The UK (Walkden) said a joint government/industry outreach campaign would 
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929be launched in the UK in the run-up to Christmas and the IPO would share details with US colleagues
930when available. The UK said that working with intermediaries such as Facebook, Amazon, Alibaba,
931Ebay is key. Some of them had made changes to their global policies on ISDs, and processes for
932removing illegal content were seen by industry to be improving, but there was still a way to go.
93310. The US (Wilson) noted that this phenomenon came to their attention two years ago. Companies
934began doing one-off ligation strategies against individuals. IPR, FBI, PTO have talked to stakeholders
935to steer them towards a different strategy. The US asked stakeholders for multi-jurisdictional
936strategies instead of individual litigation. Due to the breadth and depth of this kind of phenomenon,
937it also has an international reach because of the vast supply chains. There is a lot to do about talking
938to stakeholders but no real dialogue to work closely with enforcement. The US and UK cannot
939sequence this in old fashioned piracy way, so both sides need to work with stakeholders in the
940private sector. The UK engages with intermediaries such as Alibaba, Amazon. The UK highlighted the
941need for joint pressure on intermediaries and work on public awareness, as the devices are sold
942through channels that look legitimate. Both sides need to share details to amplify the message to
943the public.
94411. The UK (Walkden) pointed out that both sides needed to look at actual streaming. Additionally, he
945highlighted that website blocking orders have been very effective in the UK. The US (Aitken) asked if
946the US and UK can work on joint cross operations? The UK (Williams) stated it agrees to a high-level
947conversation on this.
948Notorious Markets List
94912. The US (Peterson) explained that they are currently in the process of reviewing the Notorious Markets
950List submissions. The US are consolidating all the nominations. The US thinks it would be helpful to
951share the list with the UK for UK Operations. The US would like access to the UK Infringement Websites
952List
95313. The UK (Williams) stated that the IPO does not hold the Infringement Websites List, another agency –
954the Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU) holds that list. The IPO can ask PIPCU for the list and
955IPO can thereafter send it to the US.
956Work Plan
95714. The UK (Igboemeka) suggested going through the Work Plan by headings. On the SMEs toolkit and SME
958roundtable the UK (Igboemeka) said the UK will work with our export promotion side to target the right
959SMEs who want to or are exporting to the US. The US (Peterson) said that this STO should coordinate
960with the SME group who are working on outreach events.
96115. UK (Igboemeka): Global Leadership in IP Enforcement. US (Peterson) said that for the next Working
962Group, both sides should identify their shared interests in third country markets. The US said that both
963sides should ensure respective attachés are coordinating on the ground. The UK (Williams) noted that
964the attaché programme can be done before Christmas if the UK has shared contact information. The US
965(Wilson) stated they have quarterly meetings with attachés with one coming up in the 1st week of
966December. The US invited Adam (Williams) or someone from the UK to these meetings.
96716. UK (Igboemeka): Joint Economic Study. The US (Peterson) said there is agreement that there are two
968tracks for the JES. Two different deadlines for the short and long term deliverables. In the meantime,
969both sides should identify any additional viable short term deliverables.
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973Action Items
974Joint Economic Study
975 Bring US and UK economists together for a future meeting to plan the short (6-8 months) and long
976term deliverables of the Joint Economic Study, with both parties mapping out the questions that need
977to be answered for both the short term and long term deliverables.
978Illicit Streaming Devices
979 IPO Enforcement Director and IPEC’s Director to follow up on key issues from illicit streaming devices
980discussion including: to work jointly on public awareness raising initiatives; working with
981intermediaries; sharing approaches to law enforcement; lessons on tackling illicit streaming.
982Notorious Markets List
983 US to share Notorious Markets List with the UK.
984 UK IPO to ask PIPCU for the Infringement Websites List for IPO to send to the US.
985Work Plan
986 Christine Peterson (USTR) to send over full list of contact details to the UK so that the UK can liaise
987with the US.
988FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
989Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
990 Very good atmosphere with both sides involved in an engaging discussion on illicit streaming devices
991and joint economic work. Session was in fact too short to allow for substantive discussion of all the
992issues. While there was a good brainstorm on potential topics for the joint economic study on IP
993enforcement and trade, the US was clearly hesitant around our proposal to commission out the work
994to an independent party - explaining that they did not have the budget and would conduct the analysis
995internally. This will impact on the perceived impartiality of any published work and we will need to
996take this into consideration as we agree on topics. US pushed hard for agreement to joint operations
997between enforcement agencies tackling illicit streaming devices and on third country cooperation. UK
998was non-committal but we can expect they will continue to do so. Meeting was successful in that there
999are concrete topics for follow up on illicit streaming and commitment to producing short term and
1000longer term products for the economic work. Short-term outcome work plan agreed along with
1001outputs and timelines. Progress on the work plan with a focus on the joint economic work are
1002potential topics for the next Working Group. 
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1006Title of Meeting: Services Plenary Session
1007Date: 14th November 2017
1008Time: 9:00-12:00
1009Participants
1010Name Department/Directorate
1011Tom Josephs Policy Directorate, DIT (Lead)
1012Graham Floater DCMS
1013Gila Sacks DCMS
1014Rob Ward HMT
1015Henry Shennan DCMS
1016Chris Woodward Policy Directorate, DIT
1017Ben Rake Policy Directorate, DIT
1018Alessandro Fusco Policy Directorate, DIT
1019Ben Aldred Policy Directorate, DIT
1020Richard Salt UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
1021Cordelia Jonathan UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
1022Johanna Michael Policy Directorate, DIT
1023Tamsin Morgan DIT
1024Eva Smith Leggatt Policy Directorate, DIT
1025Jaya Choraria HMT
1026Sukhmani Khatkar DIT
1027Additional officials BEIS
1028Matt Mueller HMT
1029Dan Rusbridge HMT
1030Casey Mason United States Trade Representative
1031Robert Tanner United States Trade Representative
1032Jai Motwane United States Trade Representative
1033Daniel Bahar United States Trade Representative
1034Thomas Fine United States Trade Representative
1035Jeffrey Seigel US Department of the Treasury
1036Tim Wedding United States Trade Representative
1037Alexandra Whittaker United States Trade Representative
1038Andrew Lorenz US National Security Council
1039Casey Mace Department of State
1040*Bold = lead/contributed to the discussion
1041Key Points to Note
1042Summary of discussions on the four pillars:
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1046 STOs: Good progress has been made by the regulators on the Audit STO, but we are not in a position to
1047make any announcement yet. Language on the Financial Dialogue STO will be ready.
1048 Continuity Agreements: Further work needs to be done on Insurance, but both sides are keen to take
1049this forward.
1050 FTA prep: Informative presentations from the US on their approach to services chapters,
1051digital/telecomms, investment, PBS and FS, where the UK was in listening mode.
1052 Wider trade: US repeated that, while sensitive to the UK’s position on technical rectification of our
1053WTO schedules, they do still have concerns about this approach.
1054General Summary:
1055Both sides agreed that there are a large number of areas of mutual interest, including, but not limited to,
1056PBS, FS and digital and that we should be working towards an ambitious agreement in areas where we have
1057common ground.
1058 The US re-iterated their pitch for a negative list approach, arguing that the rest of the world was
1059gradually adopting this way forward.
1060 The US requested that we refer to discussions on financial services as “US – UK financial regulatory
1061cooperation”.
1062 The US described TISA as “the universe of good ideas” in the PBS space, and specifically suggested the
1063UK mine it for further ideas.
1064 US re-iterated the importance of giving businesses a clear signal on the proposed Financial Services
1065regulatory framework post Brexit as soon as possible, warning that companies will shortly be forced to
1066set up subsidiaries overseas (something that they are already preparing to do) if further clarity is not
1067provided in the near future.
1068Actions:
1069 UK/US data experts to arrange follow up discussion, with particular emphasis on privacy protection
1070issues and continuity discussion.
1071 UK/US telecoms policy leads to arrange follow up discussion
1072 On PBS, UK/US to arrange follow up discussions, probably in early 2018, once they have received
1073feedback from the negotiating bodies, to discuss applicability to other institutions.
1074 General action point for all teams to arrange follow up discussions.
1075Report of Discussions and Outcome
10761. The UK welcomed the US to the discussions and set out that the focus of the discussions would be on
1077three key sectors: digital, professional and business services, and financial services. The US agreed and
1078suggested beginning with a general update on the four buckets: continuity agreements; STOs; the
1079scoping of elements of possible future agreements; and global cooperation within fora such as the WTO
1080and G20. The US also offered a general overview of the US’ approach across Services and Investment.
1081DIT agreed that this would fit with the overall objectives outlined the previous day of trying to gain an
1082understanding of each other’s approaches towards future FTAs.
10832. Continuity of existing agreements: The US highlighted that the main issue in Services and Investment is
1084that of the US/EU covered agreement on insurance and re-insurance measures, noting that there was
1085already an understanding of the kind of information exchange needed for the US to understand where
1086the UK should be going.
10873. The US wanted to re-emphasise their stance on WTO Services commitments. They acknowledged that
1088the UK had already signalled interest in taking updated versions of the EU schedule and undertaking a
1089technical rectification process. The US is aware of the complexities the UK faces in determining our 
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1093approach but they do have concerns - there are many exceptions in the EU schedule that clearly do not
1094reflect the more open nature of the UK’s services market. He suggested there would be value in the UK
1095taking these points into account before we put our final proposed schedule on the table,
1096notwithstanding the fact that our relationship with the EU is a key consideration.
10974. DIT said that the UK has already set out our approach to GATS schedules. We have commitments in the
1098WTO currently set out in EU schedules, which we want to maintain. Following the technical
1099rectification approach is the way to give reassurance to businesses and consumers, which is the UK’s
1100priority. There is a process clearly set out in the GATS that accounts for the different views of WTO
1101members in a formal setting. The UK wants to be transparent and to engage in open discussions with
1102others. We hope to start the formal process towards the end of 2018.
11035. The US explained their method of structuring FTA chapters. All sectors are covered by the cross-border
1104trade in services and the investment chapters, other than financial services, which have a separate
1105chapter. The cross-border chapter covers modes 1 and 2, while the investment chapter covers mode 3
1106issues. The investment chapter covers all services- and non-services-related investment. There are
1107also rules on specific areas such as digital and telecoms on top of the basic, general disciplines. The US
1108negotiates market access related commitments on a negative list basis. From the their perspective, this
1109means that for key obligations in the services, investment and financial services chapters, each party
1110can propose to negotiate exceptions, e.g. MFN or performance requirements in investment.
1111Discussions on market access are generally carried out in the context of this negative list negotiation.
1112Generally, the US has very open markets, but has significant offensive interests in foreign markets that
1113are less open. The US encourages the UK to seek the highest level of openness to help create a global
1114template for further negotiations.
11156. Negative vs positive listing: The UK said that we are still in the early stages of developing our approach,
1116and it was very useful to hear the US’ perspective. The US said that negative listing has lots of benefits
1117as it allows for high transparency and the ability to push for greater openness. A negative list approach
1118doesn’t prejudge a particular level of liberalisation. Some of these debates are not centred on the
1119overall negative list approach, but on whether governments are willing to tie their hands in certain
1120sensitive sectors. There is also a ‘messaging gain’ to be had with the negative list approach.
1121Governments always have the right to regulate the domestic market, even if foreign service suppliers
1122are given access. The US said that it was not a question of sensitivities, but the assumptions being
1123made about everything else that is not sensitive. The US said that Canada had largely switched to a
1124negative list approach (although this is not widely advertised), and that the EU was the last to hold out
1125for positive listing. With CETA things entirely shifted gears, and China decided to pursue a negative list
1126approach in 2013/14 – this is relevant to future templates and to the UK’s potential future agreements.
1127DIGITAL
11287. The US explained their 5 Chapter model. The E-Commerce chapter - increasingly referred-to as ‘digital’
1129– is not sector-specific, but essentially an ‘overlay’. It applies to all the services and investment areas,
1130with disciplines that have been developed to address issues emerging from the development of the
1131internet and the changing way that businesses provide services, as well as new advances such as the
1132Internet of Things and the increasing prevalence of sensors and connectivity. E-Commerce chapters, as
1133in the original TPP, would include: substantive cross-cutting rules; more technical articles e.g. on SPAM 
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1137or e-signatures; and more policy-oriented articles on issues such as consumer protection and cyber
1138security.
11398. The highest priorities for the US are the articles dealing with cloud services and the interconnectedness
1140of businesses, cross-border data flows and provisions for preventing computer facility localisation
1141requirements. Many companies across numerous sectors, including agriculture, retail and financial
1142services, are using equipment increasingly reliant on cloud services and Artificial Intelligence. The key
1143issue regarding cross-border data flows is to create a level playing field for businesses; decisions about
1144localisations of computer facilities should be driven by costs and climate requirements involved, not by
1145regulations. The scale of interconnection means that costs are driven down dramatically; the US is
1146‘passionate’ about advocating this, and about bringing together a first group of countries in agreement
1147on this area. There needs to be a balance between gaining certainty from regulations, and other policy
1148concerns.
11499. The US formalise the WTO customs moratorium on E-Commerce (preventing tariffs on electronic
1150transmissions) as a permanent commitment in their FTAs and ask trading partners to do the same. The
1151US also strongly advocate against any rules that discriminate against digital products in terms of
1152location of production or consumption. They aim to create a global norm. The app-based economy
1153allows small businesses to become very successful very quickly thanks to the internet platform, but this
1154depends on countries not putting up barriers that favour or protect domestic producers. The tariff
1155moratorium on electronic transmissions and the principle of non-discrimination of digital products are
1156the most important issues in terms of economic impact.
115710. The US has also begun to pursue an additional article on source code, first developed in their work on
1158TPP. There are other countries supporting this, namely Japan. This is recognition that the value in many
1159companies’ development is resident in source code work. It is not appropriate to demand that
1160companies give source code as a condition of market participation. There was also recognition that this
1161can evolve – from purely proprietary source code issues to the proprietary algorithms that support
1162software.
116311. Due to interest from stakeholders and trading partners, the US have had articles that address SPAM
1164(unsolicited email), which tries to create standards allowing consumers to opt in or out; and esignatures and e-authentication. The US has a federal law and similar state-level laws that prohibit
1165discrimination on the basis of something being electronic, and thereby allows companies to do business
1166using electronic means. The EU has a more regulatory approach.
116712. There are also articles addressing broader policy concerns, including: articles requiring the US and their
1168trade partners to secure consumer protection for online activities; those requiring parties to have a
1169system of data protection for personal information; and one outlining principles around consumers’
1170ability to access the internet (‘open internet’). The US highlighted that some countries, perhaps
1171including the UK, contemplate very detailed rules about what carriers can or cannot do, while the US
1172takes a consumer-focused perspective, geared towards the pure trade issue. The US said that trade
1173deals can facilitate cooperation on cyber security, but it depends on the specific trading partner.
117413. The US has spent a long time looking at intermediary liabilities for platforms. This is a large part of the
1175US economy, with many US companies relying on the ability to provide internet platform services on a
1176large scale. US domestic law has provided these firms with immunity from liability for the behaviour of
1177their users. The Commission has a similar approach in the e-commerce directive, but differs from the
1178US in terms of the legal practicalities. The US feels this is an appropriate discussion to have around the 
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1182digital chapters of FTAs, but it is still an area for development. The US is interested in talking with
1183global partners about where there may be a potential need in future trade agreements; they are keen
1184to create meaningful provisions that can solve problems, rather than merely drafting language or
1185creating regulations.
118614. The US has spent time talking to non-government stakeholders about the perceived challenges for
1187telecoms and the Internet of Things, and where there may be barriers. Turning these discussions into
1188discrete commitments is a work in progress but they said there are few new problems emerging that
1189are not already under consideration.
119015. DCMS highlighted that broadly, the US and the UK clearly have a lot of common interests in this area,
1191and that this will be a fruitful area of future discussion. The US said that the most problematic area
1192within the data localization issue is health information and the HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and
1193Accountability Act, 1996), which dictates that cross-border data flows are allowed as long as certain
1194standards are met. The US Treasury said that in recent TPP negotiations, financial services were carved
1195out of the data localisation prohibition. The obligation on the location of computing facilities is new to
1196the e-commerce/digital trade chapter. After TPP was signed, there were further discussions with
1197regulators, stakeholders and Congress. They confirmed that it was now clear US policy that financial
1198services are covered in data localisation, but within the financial services chapter. This difference in
1199drafting, as seen for example in TiSA, is based on the different way in which financial services are
1200regulated, and the fact that regulators often need access to data, sometimes on a minute-by-minute
1201basis – as witnessed in the recent financial crisis. The US tries to balance the interest in creating a
1202broad, ambitious prohibition against localisation with respect for the fact that regulators need access to
1203data.
120416. DCMS then asked what the UK could learn from the US’ discussions with the EU on TiSA. The US
1205responded that the US had had simultaneous discussions on TiSA and TTIP with the EU Commission.
1206The issue was that the Commission had yet to establish its position on data flows. The US had
1207encouraged the EU to consider Member States’ offensive interests. They said that the issue of data
1208localisation, e.g. regarding HIPAA, can be a heated debate, but the US does care about privacy and has
1209a fairly robust system. It is different in the EU; the two parties had a lot of debates about the strengths
1210and weaknesses of both systems. The US said they do need to exercise the laws they have and give
1211space to the Federal Trade Commission. In their models, FTAs incorporate the language of the GATS
1212general exception as they find this sufficient. In taking measures to protect privacy, he said, you should
1213have comfort that there is coverage in terms of general exceptions, and focus on making sure that
1214systems are adopted that encourage that. It is important to ensure that there is legal accountability of
1215the enterprises that hold the data. Until the Commission resolves its view, it will be hard to resolve the
1216TiSA issue.
121717. DCMS noted that, having seen the evolution of the US digital trade policy in FTAs, it is clear that there
1218have been developments and that there is now a solid e-commerce chapter in TPP, for instance. He
1219asked if the US thought it would be moving further ahead, perhaps integrating telecoms into the digital
1220chapter. Could there be something more ambitious than TPP in the future? The US responded that the
1221US would continue to look at whether or not they needed to add additional tools. The structure would
1222not be changed, as telecoms remains useful as a sector-specific set of disciplines. E-Commerce is an
1223over-lying area, and it is useful to maintain this distinction. The US will not be changing the current 5-
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1227chapter structure for the foreseeable future. Cross-references and overlaps between chapters are
1228resolved by having a collaborative nature.
122918. On future-proofing in particular, DCMS asked, given the fast-changing nature of the digital world, which
1230aspects of the content the US see as more fixed and which could be subject to change. The US are
1231confident that they have a solid set of articles and that there would be no immediate move to change
1232what was already accomplished in TPP. It may be worth considering whether or not to add things. This
1233conversation is informed by learning from industry stakeholders, who witness first-hand the effects of
1234barriers in foreign markets. One example is the source code provision (as set out above).
123519. DCMS asked if there could be further provisions for different platforms. The US responded that much
1236of this is driven by industry concerns. Their model already has 27 or 28 chapters; they are already
1237addressing a lot of the platform issues, so are not inclined to draft any additional rules. The US said
1238that telecoms provisions are much more established. Telecoms chapters try to do 3 things: continue
1239the GATS practice of having a strong article allowing access and usage of telecoms suppliers in US
1240markets, without national discrimination; provide for suppliers competing in each other’s markets, e.g.
1241interconnection; establish a series of good government practices, e.g. on transparency in licensing and
1242rulemaking – in a sector that is heavily regulated by other governments.
124320. On value added services in particular, the US asks that trading partners take a lighter touch approach,
1244and in particular not to treat them like public Telecoms providers, e.g. with requirements to make their
1245services generally available, or to require cost model/rate review that public telecoms providers must
1246do. DCMS asked about the differing approach the US took between landline and mobile Suppliers in a
1247telecoms chapter. US responded that in terms of suppliers competing with each other, historically the
1248US hasn’t applied these to mobile operators, partly because a number of the provisions in the Telecoms
1249chapter are directed towards ‘Major Suppliers’, and few US mobile suppliers qualify for this
1250designation. Part of the explanation is that the US has always had a very competitive global market.
1251They started with 6 national suppliers, and now have 4, and still numerous regional players. This
1252scenario, in which they have never had one government supplier become privatised and remain
1253dominant, is different from that of other countries. The mobile question is something they are looking
1254at in discussions. DCMS asked if the US sees that as changing in terms of fixed vs mobile offerings. The
1255US responded again that companies had to be in the fixed line business, with point-to-point lines, for
1256provisions like interconnection to be a major issue. He confirmed that major supplier obligations don’t
1257really have mobile-specific obligations.
125821. DCMS asked which countries the US see as being relatively open in terms of telecoms access, and
1259where the common interests lie. The US responded that different stakeholders have different
1260interests. There are numerous industries in which the primary interest is serving larger
1261companies/customers, and focusing on supplementing their existing network(s). In some markets there
1262are US companies competing on a global basis. The challenge with telecoms is that it is hard to
1263compare and contrast levels of market openness. Generally, the US felt Europe has a good model;
1264European countries are generally very open. In terms of the rest of the world, the US must work on a
1265case-by-case basis.
126622. DIT said that UK Ministers have made it clear that digital is indeed an area in which we want to be
1267ambitious, with plenty of common ground in the future. There was agreement to follow up on this
1268discussion with further detailed conversations in order to build up a deeper understanding of the 
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1272specific issues raised, including organising further conversations around data, (including privacy
1273protection aspects), and more generally on digital, including DSM issues and telecoms.
127423. The US asked the UK how we see our internal policy formulation developing, and at what point we
1275might be able to share options with the US. DIT reiterated that as an EUMS, we are not in a position to
1276open up negotiations at this stage. We will be in this situation for some time and we will be using the
1277time to develop our thinking and to learn from others as we build up our position. DCMS added that
1278there would need to be a cross-government consensus on the sequencing of any talks with the US and
1279with the EU. He also said that, in the meantime, there are lots of detailed discussions to be had to
1280allow the UK and US to get to know each other’s markets and regulatory environments, which will help
1281inform future negotiations.
1282PBS
128324. DIT began by presenting an update on the status of the PBS audit STO. ICAS and NASBA/AICPA have
1284signed an MOU to take forward a recognition agreement. There is a process we need to go through; the
1285Financial Reporting Council needs to sign it off to make sure it’s compliant with UK legislation. The UK
1286are quite hopeful that there is a will to move it forward, but we must respect the process they need to
1287go through. It is too soon to make an announcement but we hope that is something that will happen
1288before the next working group, and that it will serve as a case study or model for the future. ICAEW will
1289hopefully follow.
129025. The US team welcomed this and agreed that they were hopeful that a recognition agreement would
1291take place, and also that it could be a case study for future work. It was also noted that there have
1292already been discussions between architects. The US have been keen to encourage agreements like
1293these for some time, including in TTIP, but had met a number of challenges at MS level – not least the
1294EU’s insistence on agreements they were party to being for all MS, or none. DIT welcomed this
1295positivity. The UK was clear that we want to ensure our relationship with the Commission is right and
1296that we are respectful of our obligations while we are in the EU. We said that this should be an area
1297where progress can be made and that it would be useful to continue talking to industry to see where
1298there can be future progress.
129926. Both sides agreed that we should think about what communications can be done around the ICAS work
1300– if there is an agreement. US noted that there will be a limited degree to which they can try and take
1301credit, given it will not be the work of the federal Government – ‘credit must be given where it’s due’.
1302Nonetheless, signs point to a concrete trade-related outcome well in advance of Brexit and both sides
1303agree we should try and do communications to promote this as a positive step.
130427. More generally, the US explained their approach to professional services. The US explained that, as
1305jurisdiction over most professional services is in the hands of their States, it is difficult for them to
1306commit to anything in an FTA on mutual recognition of professional qualifications that goes beyond
1307‘best endeavour’ language or commitments to try and help facilitate agreements through working
1308groups.
130928. The US picked up on the morning’s conversation by bringing discussion back to the ‘5-chapter model’.
1310They said that their standard services chapter is very similar to a GATS chapter, with a few differences;
1311the main difference is the fact that investment is put into a separate chapter – covering the whole life
1312cycle of an investment (i.e. including investment liberalisation and establishment – mode 3). For the
1313CBTS chapter they also think they go beyond GATS on transparency and domestic regulation. They see 
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1317this, in effect, as a residual chapter in the sense that it covers trade in services where it’s not covered
1318elsewhere.
131929. They described e-commerce and telecoms chapters as an overlay on the basic disciplines: those
1320chapters take the market access commitments undertaken by FTA parties and lay sector-specific rules
1321on top. The UK asked why they had taken the approach of taking some areas – like PBS or delivery
1322services – forward through annexes to the CBTS rather than as specific chapters (though that doesn’t
1323mean they can’t cover investment too). The US felt annexes were usually the most appropriate way of
1324doing it but that e-commerce and telecoms had become so detailed that they need their own chapters.
132530. The US were open to ideas for annexes with new rules and disciplines for specific sectors but felt most
1326were reasonably covered by CBTS/Investment chapters. On PBS, the US responded that it is demanddriven, as they aim to serve their clients. The US does not generally push for a professional services
1327annex, but they are often as a result of trading partners wanting more refined procedures, particularly
1328post-agreement. They thought TiSA was an area ripe for harvest if we did want to look at doing
1329anything – a ‘universe of good ideas’ worth mining. Financial services are a little different, as their
1330chapter is a combination of market access commitments and specific rules. US then subject their ‘5-
1331chapter model’ to a negative list and ratchet.
133231. The US noted a lot of discussion in Geneva and elsewhere around the ‘wonders’ of mutual recognition;
1333the US agrees with this, but sees it as a ‘limited universe’. The US has been as forward-leaning as any
1334country about where they will do mutual recognition agreements (a misleading term, they said) –
1335probably less than two dozen – but they tend to be with very specific countries with sophisticated
1336regulatory regimes that US regulators are comfortable with. That is why they look to the UK with such
1337interest. It doesn’t mean that other service suppliers cannot access the US market, merely that they are
1338not offered an accelerated pathway. There is a limit to what they can actually do, however, in an FTA
1339because PBS is generally regulated at state level – hence their annexes in this area tend to be about
1340encouraging regulators and facilitating through establishing working groups.
134132. The US said they would be happy to talk us through the complexities of how the chapters link up with
1342each other. They reiterated that digital is an area where the US wants to be ambitious, but that it is
1343impossible to look at digital commitments without looking at all the other chapters. It is necessary,
1344they said, to look at all the commitments with respect to cross-border and investment as a baseline. A
1345lot of the rules that impact a service supplier are not in the digital chapter but the cross-border chapter.
1346It can be difficult to ensure everything is aligned – you need to think about what kind of commitment
1347you are taking in the CBTS chapter.
134833. The UK asked if the US had any advice about engaging industry stakeholders. The US offered for their
1349Europe office to brief us more generally on their structure for stakeholder engagement. In terms of a
1350services-specific approach, he said that sometimes they become gradually aware of stakeholder issues,
1351often related to market access problems, and that eventually they realise it must be dealt with
1352horizontally. There is also a more formalised structure for dealing with stakeholder engagement:
1353formal groups made up of environmental groups, labour groups, NGOs and others, whom they consult.
1354These are broken down sector by sector. The issues raised may be within or outside FTAs. In the
1355context of an FTA itself, there is a very formalised approach towards obtaining comments from
1356stakeholders through hearings etc. Thanks to all of these strategies, stakeholders both inside and
1357outside industry are not shy about expressing their views and their concerns about the direction of
1358trade agreements.
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136234. The US said that they are conscious of trying to figure out the policy solutions that make the most sense
1363in these negotiations. They need to understand the different concessions that might be made, or the
1364policy process that might be taken to develop a negotiating position. On the informal side of processes,
1365they are both proactive and reactive. It is often helpful to have a team who knows the issues well
1366enough that they can bring them in to help frame the debate, and help policy makers to get ahead of a
1367particular problem. The US added that in their formal system of stakeholder consultation, the different
1368groups are each co-chaired by the agency heads and the USTR. They sign non-disclosure agreements to
1369allow these group representatives access to some of the texts and confidential information.
137035. The UK mentioned that business stakeholders often show concern about the extent to which
1371businesses are regulated at state level, and asked how far agreements can go in terms of domestic
1372regulation and PBS annexes. The US responded that all their commitments apply to the states, most
1373importantly the national treatment commitment. The states are not free to discriminate. They believe
1374that this satisfies one of the key desires of businesses and that it was rare to see another country
1375causing problems for their industry. They said that, contrary to a misconception by the European
1376Commission, many US states are forward-leaning and compete with each other for foreign investment,
1377as well as being focused on ensuring they provide high quality services for their consumers. The main
1378concern for regulators is consumer protection. In PBS there is no discrimination on the basis of
1379nationality in terms of who can apply for access – you have to go through what any American from
1380another state goes through. The OECD has concluded that there are few state-level barriers. The US
1381said it would be open to hearing any thoughts to the contrary.
138236. Continuing the discussion on state-level measures, they said that when the US moves forward with any
1383FTA proposals, there is input from representatives of the state governors’ offices, representatives of
1384the Attorney-Generals’ offices of the states, and sometimes also representatives of regulatory bodies.
1385The states, he said, are not as fractured as often perceived. They feel they have a solid approach to
1386consulting them and engaging them in what is going on in an FTA.
138737. To sum up, the UK and the US agreed that PBS is one area in which the US and UK should be able to
1388find common ground in the future. The US said that work should be able to go forward after the end of
1389this year, after receiving feedback from the FRC and negotiating bodies.
1390INVESTMENT
139138. Although UK investment experts were not present in the room, the US said that they were already in
1392close touch with their counterparts in DIT.
139339. The US said that the inclusion of investment as a component of trade is becoming the norm, and that
1394the EU had also adopted this approach post-Lisbon. The investment chapter itself is neutral; it touches
1395on Mode 3 (with reference made to the fact that this also applies to services). There are 3 sets of
1396provisions: those that focus on measures that might distort competition or economic decision-making,
1397or make nationality-based preferences; those that focus on protecting property and the rights of
1398investments; and those settling investment disputes. The second of these sets of provisions gives
1399assurance of fair compensation in the case of expropriation, or minimal-standard treatment, and
1400safeguards against denials of justice. The most interesting provisions are those relating to competition,
1401MFN and the national treatment obligation.
140240. There is also a discipline in Mode 3 against discrimination of any company manager or board director
1403based on nationality. This is not an agreement to allow immigration – that’s a separate issue - but 
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1407about freedom for the companies to choose who they want from the choice already available within
1408the market. There are also disciplines against performance requirements discrimination, and against
1409the imposition of local content requirements or technology transfer, which are all very important in the
1410Mode 3 context. There are other disciplines put forward in TiSA, e.g. regarding performance
1411management. For cross-border trade in services and investment together, the US has one set of
1412annexes (financial services have their own). It is possible to negotiate exceptions and there are areas in
1413which space is preserved for future developments.
141441. DIT said that they are familiar with this sort of division. The UK would be interested in hearing more
1415about the main advantages of this approach as opposed to one in which there is an establishment
1416chapter, for example. DIT asked if, regarding the discussion around Mode 3 and investment, there are
1417any other provisions in the investment chapter that the US sees as particularly important. The US
1418responded that they take a more common approach, with investment seen as one subject area.
141942. The Commission’s approach is to have establishment for services, so it therefore makes sense to have
1420the same for non-services. The EU had foresight in keeping them segregated. The EU approach is fairly
1421unique but it derives from a particular history and some internal EU law issues related to the sharing of
1422competencies.
142343. DIT asked about the US’ latest thinking on dispute resolution in investment chapters. The US were
1424unable to divulge much, but said that USTR had publicly made points about how US sovereignty might
1425be subject to international view. The US is trying to swing the balance in favour of giving states a bit
1426more flexibility or ‘sovereignty’. This applies to the notion of dispute settlement more generally. The
1427US reiterated that the ISDS conversation applies more generally to dispute settlement of other types. In
1428NAFTA discussions the US is starting to think about the scope and mechanism for consent, which
1429relates to ISDS. This is different from looking at what the procedures themselves should look like.
1430Based on their experience, the best path is to have an ad hoc, transparent approach with numerous
1431safeguards and mechanisms to ensure the state retains a certain amount of control. The US underlined
1432that, even as they are changing their approach, what is not changing is their fundamental commitment
1433to ad hoc arbitration.
1434FINANCIAL SERVICES
143544. To start the discussion on Financial Services (FS), DIT recalled that earlier in the working group,
1436attendees had mentioned the importance of considering continuity for the covered insurance
1437agreement. The US had also raised data localisation as a potential challenge for FS firms. HMT laid out
1438the agenda, and gave an overview of the recent developments regarding EU Exit and financial services
1439issues. The first phase of EU Exit discussions have focused on other things, but financial services will be
1440covered in Phase 2 as/when it is unlocked. The UK want to have a comprehensive agreement, as the
1441PM set out in her speech when Article 50 was triggered, and in a number of subsequent public
1442statements. The UK wants to achieve a high level of mutual access between the UK and the US, which
1443implies high levels of supervisory cooperation; we want an agreement that is symmetrical, reciprocal
1444and reliable in terms of financial stability. The implementation period is very important for the future of
1445financial services firms from many different countries, including the US. The UK is confident we will be
1446able to reach a form of agreement on that. HMT is keen to ensure continuity for the FS sector as much
1447as possible. To this end they are working to on-shore the EU acquis and statutory instruments will be
1448brought forward to give legal form to regulation currently applying to the UK through its membership 
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1452of the EU. The sequencing of the onshoring process vis-à-vis other ongoing processes is sensitive, but
1453HMG will attempt to keep the US administration appraised of all relevant developments.
145445. UST recognised that much of what is possible to agree within a US-UK FTA on Financial Services
1455depends on the post-Brexit arrangement between the UK and the EU and the UK’s ability to continue to
1456passport financial services into the EU. They acknowledged the sensitive political concerns about the
1457sequencing of talks and the internal UK government sensitivities. Nevertheless, they wanted to take the
1458opportunity to raise the concerns of industry on both sides of the Atlantic: the desire for continuity is
1459great not just in the Financial Services space, but in all sectors. The US wants to make sure that
1460continuity is as smooth as possible, and encourages the UK to consider expediting the framework of the
1461implementation period. Any kind of explanation or insight into the nature of the transition period
1462would be very welcome and encouraged. Many Financial Services firms will soon have to start setting
1463up subsidiaries on the continent (and many already have), which is an expensive process. The UST said
1464that the UK is undoubtedly already aware of these issues, but he wanted to raise the concern while
1465being respectful of the PM’s difficult political position.
146646. HMT said that we had established good channels of communication between our governments on
1467financial services which we should seek to maintain. Over the past few months, the UK has made good
1468progress on financial dialogue and continuity agreements. HMT had provided UST with a scoping note
1469on a proposal for a financial regulatory dialogue, and this is still under consideration from the
1470US. Ahead of this meeting, both sides had agreed some language for public use, which HMT regarded
1471as a positive step. HMT said both sides would need to keep in touch regarding financial regulatory
1472dialogue. UST said that they are working through the scoping paper and look forward to continuing
1473discussions about this, their initial comments were that they would prefer to focus on “coordination”,
1474rather than “dialogue”. A call had already been set up tentatively for the 22nd November, which would
1475hopefully be an opportunity to move forward on this. US regulators work very closely with the PRA and
1476FCA.
147747. The UK said that on continuity of the covered agreement on insurance, there had been a preliminary
1478exchange of views. The UK perhaps owes some more clarity about what the future UK regime will look
1479like but progress will be made over the coming months. The UST is looking forward to seeing a more
1480detailed outline of what the insurance regime in the UK will look like in the future. UST recently
1481released a report on regulation of the asset management and insurance industries pursuant to
1482President Trump’s February Executive Order regarding his “Core Principles” for financial regulation. It
1483says the US should consider a covered agreement with the UK. This was created as a vehicle through
1484the legislation that created the insurance office in UST. HMT said that they had interpreted the
1485language in the executive order positively, and that it would be good to keep working together to make
1486sure things move forward within the appropriate time frame. The US echoed this by urging for action
1487‘as expeditiously as possible’.
148848. On the US approach to FS chapters in FTAs, UST explained that USTR and US Treasury co-lead on
1489financial services chapters in FTAs. Insurance doesn’t have a federal regulator in the US so they
1490maintain joint oversight for the covered agreement and insurance issues.
149149. UST set out an explanation of their specific treatment of financial services. Stakeholders, Congress,
1492industry and the US Administration are all interested in having a highly ambitious Financial Services
1493chapter between US and UK, which are two of the world’s preeminent capitals for this sector. He noted
1494that both the US and the UK markets are already very open and there is already a lot of cross border 
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1498activity between London and New York in particular. The US would like the financial services text to be
1499a model for how countries around the world can raise the standard of standard financial services
1500commitments. The US said they already have quite an ambitious text (from NAFTA negotiations etc.)
1501but they want to think about a text that makes sense for the UK and US. They encouraged HMG to
1502approach the talks creatively.
150350. UST recognised that FS are different from other sectors because it is such a highly regulated industry
1504that often demands emergency action from regulation e.g. in recent the financial crisis. It’s a sector in
1505which problems can have extremely damaging spill over effects on the economy, so regulators need to
1506be able to take the necessary action. The US has included financial services in agreements since NAFTA
1507(1994), but they have become increasingly ambitious over the years, reflecting market developments.
1508This ties into an issue raised earlier on data localisation, which is a key priority.
150951. Two of the most recent obligations the US has added to the financial services text and which are part of
1510their model text for all trade agreements are: a provision that relates to transfer of information (data);
1511and another one on location of computing facilities (prohibition of data localisation measures). Their
1512approach to financial services differs from their data localisation approach in the core text, which
1513reflects the different way in which financial services are regulated, and the need the industry has for
1514data. The US obligation for data localisation is framed in a way that dictates that a country cannot
1515impose arbitrary data localisation, while ensuring that the scope each regulator has in requesting data
1516is protected. The UST works closely with regulators, going through practices and laws to make sure they
1517fit within that structure. The default position is to allow no data localisation, providing regulator access
1518is protected. The data localisation measures are proliferating around the world and pose a challenge
1519not just for industry in terms of cost/operational complexity, but also from a regulatory perspective,
1520e.g. cyber risks emerging from increased regulatory footprints; and it is harder to manage laundering
1521issues for financial terrorism management. The US has had active discussions with regulators, who
1522have become convinced that this prohibition would help them to regulate better. In the cross-border
1523provision, like in PBS agreements, there is a caveat for the protection of personal data.
152452. Transparency is another priority for the US; financial regulators have an open system that allows
1525stakeholders to weigh in on how these regulations should be shaped. The US is committed to
1526transparency in financial services.
152753. Another key aspect of a financial services chapter is the prudential exception. The language has
1528remained broad over the course of many agreements and the US tries to maintain this. It provides the
1529space for financial regulators to do what they do on a day to day basis, as long as the measure in
1530question is for a legitimate prudential reason and not for protectionism.
153154. The US took the opportunity to flag a few changes from resulting from recent discussions, most of
1532which are technical. In TiSA, they laid out the various market access provision requirements, but
1533thought it better for financial services to lay them out in a specific way. They made changes regarding
1534transparency that reflect the discussions they had had in the TiSA context, which added new provisions
1535not previously included in FTAs, such as accepting electronic document authentication.
153655. By far the biggest change is in data localisation. The US has an annex covering cross border financial
1537services, specific to this chapter. The US is also seeking commitments for collective investment
1538schemes, portfolio management services, mutual advisory services and electronic credit payment
1539services. Given the level of openness that exists in financial services in cross border areas between the
1540UK and US, this could be an area in which we could raise ambition in a way that protects the ability of 
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1544regulators to supervise market entry. There is concern about the right to regulate – this is why the US
1545are insistent in maintaining the breadth of prudential exception in a financial services chapter.
154656. The US is actively thinking through things and seeking feedback about where they could take new
1547commitments. They have already moved forward significantly since GATS. USTR advised that this was
1548a snapshot of something that was in motion, and likely to change further. The question of transparency
1549is very close to the conversation about domestic regulation. There is an overlap in the case of some
1550service suppliers between the general digital sphere and the general financial services sphere in terms
1551of data. Some companies are financial services suppliers but do not see the rules as applying to them;
1552we must keep thinking about where to draw the line. Much of this would depend on how a “public
1553person” and a “financial institution” are defined in the text of an FTA. Companies defined as a financial
1554institution should be covered under the data localisation obligation in the FS chapter. Others should be
1555covered under the digital trade chapter.
155657. HMT agreed with the US about taking an ambitious approach, and thanked the US for the detail on data
1557localisation. The UK prides itself on our commitment to making sure regulations work for industry,
1558which is similar to the US’ approach. HMT asked the US about their thinking on the effectiveness of
1559financial services committee structures, e.g. in NAFTA and KORUS, who participated from the UST and
1560how their thinking had evolved (e.g. in the NAFTA renegotiation). The US responded that the Financial
1561Services Committee was really about implementation of the trade agreement, and about having a
1562vehicle for discussing (rather than resolving) issues and concerns around regulatory
1563developments. UST’s International Banking Office participated. They have changed the language in the
1564NAFTA renegotiation proposals to better reflect what the committee actually does. HMT asked whether
1565TPP provisions or US TiSA proposals for cross-border portfolio management services and electronic
1566payment services (which differed in substance, e.g. TPP not including NT commitments – and form)
1567reflected the US model. The US said that their approach was most ambitious in TiSA. HMT asked about
1568reported US proposals for sunset clauses. UST responded that senior officials need an option to review
1569the effectiveness of trade agreements more generally, e.g. to see if a single disputes mechanism serves
1570the broader purpose and to ensure that agreements are effective. The US did not have a mandate to
1571say anything more at this stage, given the confidential nature of the ongoing NAFTA renegotiations.
1572Summary
157358. The UK summed up the key points form the discussion. Good progress has already been made by
1574regulators to advance the STO on audit, although it was too soon for a specific announcement. There
1575would be language on financial dialogue in the statement after this working group. Both sides were
1576keen to take forward discussions on the continuity agreement on insurance. The UK said that both
1577sides seemed to be keen to be ambitious in the digital sphere, as well as on financial services, and to
1578continue close dialogues in these areas. The UK welcomed hearing US views on the WTO and gaining
1579more of an understanding about the US’ approaches to trade agreements generally, and chapters on
1580digital, investment, PBS and financial services. The US said that there was a clear sense of the large
1581number of areas in which the UK and US had shared interests and approaches, especially on digital and
1582financial services. They expressed interest in having a detailed discussion about their approach to
1583these areas within an FTA, which could also help inform the UK’s approach to other relationships.
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1587FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
1588Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
1589 This was a positive and constructive meeting. There was agreement on the status and next steps on the
1590STOs and continuity agreements. The US provided informative and open presentations on their
1591approaches to services and investment generally, and digital, PBS and financial services specifically. The
1592UK was largely in listening mode during these sessions, indicating that policy is still under development
1593but that these are important sectors for the UK and ones where our Ministers have indicated their
1594preference for ambitious agenda once we have left the EU, so that there should be common ground for
1595a future agreement with the US.
1596 We agreed to follow-up with more detailed discussions between relevant experts, in particular on
1597digital and telecoms. We will need to consider how we frame the discussions at the next WG, if we are
1598still in listening mode, now that the US has set out its overall approach in some detail. We could
1599consider more thematic discussions, for example on state vs federal in US, in these areas.
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1603Title of Meeting: US SPS Presentation
1604Date: 14th November 2017
1605Time: 9:00-11:00
1606Participants
1607Name Department/Directorate
1608Tom Surrey DEFRA (Lead)
1609Jonathan Hoare DEFRA
1610James Dunn DEFRA
1611Neil Feinson Policy Directorate, DIT
1612Jack Kennedy Policy Directorate, DIT
1613Jack Moreton-Burt Policy Directorate, DIT
1614Tom Aitchison Policy Directorate, DIT
1615Gareth Evans Policy Directorate, DIT
1616Oliver Griffiths UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
1617Katie Waring UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
1618Julie Callahan United States Trade Representative
1619Jo Babb State Department
1620Sam Russo United States Trade Representative
1621Stan Phillips US Embassy London
1622Key Points to Note
1623 The US repeatedly emphasised their view that the UK should seek regulatory autonomy following EU
1624Exit to allow us to evaluate methods/products independently. The US suggested this would be
1625beneficial for the UK not only in terms of trade, but in relation to productivity, competitiveness and
1626driving innovation from our agricultural and bio-tech markets.
1627 The US saw their difference in approach from the EU as a `philosophical difference` between a riskbased approach (US) and an increasingly hazard-based approach (EU). They expressed concern about
1628the process by which decisions were reached on SPS matters, critiquing the comitology process for
1629perceived politicisation when member states are consulted. The EU aims to reduce chemicals on
1630food; the US aims to reduce pathogens, and these two systems are not easily compatible. The
1631illustrative example cited was the struggle to reapprove glyphosate in the EU.
1632 There was recognition from the US of the sensitivity of SPS issues in the UK in terms of attention from
1633the media and consumer groups. They are also sensitive to the likely push from the EU for
1634harmonisation during EU Exit.
1635 The US view the introduction of warning labels as harmful rather than as a step to public health. 
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1639Report of Discussions and Outcome
16401. The UK (Surrey) opened the session, welcoming the US presentation and explaining our position as
1641being in listening mode.
16422. The US (Callahan) opened with acknowledging the consumer interest in these issues on both sides of
1643the Atlantic. The US considers their food safety system to be the gold standard, and offered to share
1644their experiences and perspectives on how the SPS chapter of TTIP developed. In particular, there are
1645differing approaches to science and risk between the US and EU.
16463. Callahan highlighted a particular area of contention: the US is committed to reducing pathogens in
1647food, and the EU is committed to reducing chemicals in food production. These two positions often
1648conflict with one another; the US maintain use of pathogen reduction treatments (PRT) as a final
1649double check to remove any traces of pathogens. Callahan used this opportunity to affirm that US
1650industry uses PRTs other than chlorine. They offered to share information on this after the Working
1651Group.
16524. US (Russo) explained concerns with a secondary scrutiny process following regulatory approval.
1653Glyphosate was used as an example; following relevant Committee approval in the EU, the media
1654speculation resulted in the European Parliament over-ruling the Committee. The US does not believe
1655that this secondary process is helpful, since it can overrule the verified science and risk analyses.
16565. US (Callahan) highlighted the EU’s increasing move to a hazard-based approach (from risk-based) as a
1657cause for concern. An application that triggers a hazard automatically fails, whilst risk-based allows
1658flexibility to address concerns.
16596. Callahan explained that the US is aware of the pressure that the UK will be under to harmonise with the
1660EU during EU Exit. She recommended that the UK maintains regulatory autonomy. The US maintains
1661their own autonomy, and believe that they have been able to make great strides in productivity and
1662competiveness (particularly in bio-tech).
16637. The UK (Surrey) thanked the US for the presentation. He asked if Callahan could elaborate on pathogen
1664reduction treatments, approval of new technology, pesticides, and the shift from risk-based to hazardbased. Consumers have a strong voice in the trade sphere, but is that replicated in the US domestic
1665regulatory sphere?
16668. The US (Callahan) indicated that every regulator has to go through substantial public engagement on
1667any new rules. The US also receive a substantial number of petitions. The US cited an example of public
1668petitioning triggering a review of rules around BPA (a plastic) in food packaging. The rule did not
1669change, which was disappointing to campaigners, but the process for triggering reviews acted as a
1670buffer between the regulator and campaign pressure.
16719. The UK (Feinson) asked how accountable regulatory institutions are to their departments, and what
1672freedom they have to make decisions in their respective spheres. The US (Callahan) responded that it
1673depends on the nature of the rule being proposed. Major rules go through an interagency process.
1674There is significant regulatory scrutiny in the US.
167510. The UK (Surrey) asked how differing pathogen reduction treatment approach had been managed with
1676the EU. US (Callahan) responded that some positive applications had been agreed, such as the use of
1677lactic acid on beef. The US cited an obligation in US law to follow up strong hygiene standards with a
1678chemical wash to remove any final pathogens. The US understood that the UK used PRTs until 2003,
1679and wondered if there would be an interest in bringing them back post-EU Exit. 
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168311. The US (Callahan) discussed Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points regulations. These regulations
1684are important. If the US export to a country that bans certain PRTs (individually or on a wholesale basis)
1685then the regulations ensure that producers use the correct processes (example cited was strawberry
1686crop destined for Japan).
168712. The US (Phillips) referenced the Secretary Sonny Perdue interview on Farming Today during his visit to
1688the UK. Callahan spoke to the comments made regarding labelling for GM; notably, that the US is keen
1689in making sure labels are useful and will be trusted by consumers without playing to fears.
169013. The UK (Surrey) asked how new technology was received during TTIP discussions. The US (Callahan)
1691were concerned that this was an area where the EU was moving away from science towards politics.
1692She was also concerned at the pace of GM approvals.
169314. The UK (Hoare) asked how new forms of biotech are processed under existing regulations. The US
1694(Callahan) suggested that this was an area of intense interest at the moment, and wondered if the UK
1695had any suggestions on our future approach to regulating biotech. The UK (Surrey) suggested that this
1696was linked to EU Exit and could not be discussed.
169715. The UK (Surrey) asked how the US works with international standards-setting organisations. The US
1698(Callahan) spoke particularly positively about the relationship with Codex, but was concerned at the
1699lengthy lead-in times for standards. Often, the standards are implemented before they are finalised
1700because of how long it can take. She also referenced a NAFTA technical Working Group on MRLs.
170116. The UK (Surrey) asked how public health, and broader issues like sugar content, fat, anti-microbial
1702resistance fit into the regulatory system. Callahan acknowledged that these are important global issues.
1703Whilst they follow the guidance set by WHO, they are concerned that labelling food with high sugar
1704content (as has been done with tobacco) is not particularly useful in changing consumer behaviour.
170517. The US (Russo) suggested that a future conversation on SPS, potentially ahead of the next Working
1706Group, might be of us. The UK (Surrey) thanked the US for their presentation and the discussion and
1707closed the session.
1708Action Items
1709 US to share their public lines on chlorine-washed chicken to help inform the media narrative around
1710the issue.
1711 UK to look for where we have specific SPS interests and to explore this through engagement ahead of
1712the next TIWG. The US suggested a regulator to regulator dialogue.
1713FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
1714Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
1715 The atmosphere, on all sides, was very positive. The UK delegation emphasised our position as being in
1716listening mode, and the US respected that; there seemed to be good intent on all sides. There were
1717repeated offers to initiate a regulator to regulator conversation (here and in other sessions). 
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1721Title of Meeting: Intellectual Property Trade Agenda
1722Date: 14th November 2017
1723Time: 9:00 – 11:00
1724Participants
1725Name Department/Directorate
1726Ada Igboemeka Policy Directorate, DIT (Lead)
1727Mark Prince Policy Directorate, DIT
1728Dara Beaulieu Policy Directorate, DIT
1729Minh Tri Le Policy Directorate, DIT
1730Ben Richie Policy Directorate, DIT
1731Adam Williams Intellectual Property Office
1732Megan Heap Intellectual Property Office
1733Sarah Whitehead Intellectual Property Office
1734Peter Cade Intellectual Property Office
1735Thomas Walkden Intellectual Property Office
1736Ceri Morgan DEFRA
1737Bilal Sameja DEFRA
1738Andrew Gregory MHRA
1739Jane Casterby DCMS
1740Edwin Mangheni UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
1741Christina Sevilla Office of the United States Trade Representative
1742Christine Peterson Office of the United States Trade Representative
1743Rachel Salzman Department of Commerce
1744Tricia Van Orden Department of Commerce
1745Sarah Bonner Small Business Administration
1746Rosalyn Steward Office of Advocacy
1747Rachel Salzman Department of Commerce
1748Ray Pavlovskis Office of the United States Trade Representative
1749(Europe Office)
1750Key Points to Note
1751 Both sides agreed to finalise Joint Statement
1752 US focus was on explaining their legislation and approach in FTAs on trade secrets
1753 US proposed several objectives for the UK to consider going forward in its approach to Geographical
1754Indications (GIs)
1755 More limited discussion on pharmaceutical protection than planned given sensitivities in this area
1756related to the NAFTA negotiations
1757 Both sides agreed to continue to discussions on GIs, Trade Secrets and Innovative Pharmaceutical
1758protection at future Working Groups
1759 Agreed that topics for next Working Group could include: building a stronger understanding of each
1760other’s current IP system; understanding each other’s governance procedures and processes for trade
1761policy and negotiations; approaches to stakeholder engagement in the IP area
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1765 Agreed to produce a shared brochure for the SMEs Toolkit with guidance on how to do business in
1766both markets by first quarter of 2018 in Washington DC
1767 Agreed to coordinate our efforts with the wider SME group.
1768Report of Discussions and Outcome
1769Introduction
17701. The US (Peterson) introduced their IP and trade policy agenda, outlining that they would focus on Trade
1771Secrets and Geographical Indications. The UK (Igboemeka) asked whether the US would cover
1772pharmaceutical protection as previously discussed. The US (Peterson) responded that they could
1773currently only have a limited discussion of this issue given sensitivities regarding the on-going NAFTA
1774negotiations and due to development of US policy in this area.
17752. The US (Peterson) explained their agenda on General Provisions. The US sought commitments for
1776international treaties such as accession to the Madrid Protocol and The Hague Agreement. The US
1777seeks full national treatment and commitments on transparency for all IP users for example, electronic
1778databased for registration of rights.
17793. The US (Peterson) explained their agenda on Trademarks. The US seeks provisions for not only visual,
1780but for non-visual representation – holographic works, sounds and the protection of similar signs. The
1781US highlighted they seek commitments on electronic trade mark systems and seeks provisions for
1782cybersquatting as well as expanding the wider definition of protection to cover similar signs. The US
1783seeks to promote the protection of GIs through Trademark systems and looks for transparency and due
1784process safeguards.
17854. The US (Peterson) provided an overview of their approach to patents in FTAs. The US also typically
1786seeks provisions for grace periods, data exclusivity, patent linkage, and patent term extension related
1787to the market approval process.
17885. The US (Peterson) provided an outline of their priorities for Enforcement, both civil and criminal
1789enforcement. The US wants to tackle through its trade agenda issues such as trade secrets theft, cable
1790and satellite theft, cyber theft and unauthorised camera recording. The US noted that new issues and
1791challenges in IP enforcement are emerging and the US is working with sister agencies to work out
1792responses.
17936. The UK (Igboemeka) asked for the US to explain the evolution of their IP chapter within US FTAs and
1794what have been the prominent issues over time. The US (Peterson) explained that some of the more
1795prominent features in their current FTAs were around state-owned enterprises and issues on how to
1796address trade secrets.
1797Trade Secrets
17987. The US (Peterson) explained that Trade Secrets was an emerging focus in the Administration’s 2013
1799strategy. There have been recent changes to domestic law and an increasing focus on the Office of the
1800US Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC). Businesses, especially SMEs are the
1801innovators of IP which can lead to other forms of IP down the road, so where there are risks of
1802infringements, the US tries to protect them by strengthening trade secrets laws. The US highlighted
1803other companies and countries try to steal trade secrets to impede the US Trade Agenda. The US have
1804statues in place to deal with this. The 1996 Economic Espionage Act (which focuses more on criminal
1805penalties), Section 18, Code 1831 and Section 18, Code 1832 criminalises the misappropriation of trade 
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1809secrets. The US encourages civil and criminal procedures to protect trade secrets. Criminal prosecution
1810demonstrates that the US will not tolerate trade secrets theft. The US views all parties involved in the
1811chain of trade secrets as liable. For example, breaches of computer systems can constitute as cyber
1812theft and count as trade secret theft.
18138. The US (Peterson) explained that in May 2016, the US introduced the Defend Trade Secrets Act (a
1814Federal law that allows that allows an owner of a trade secret to sue in federal court when its trade
1815secrets have been misappropriated). This act brings actions into the Federal arena but does not
1816displace State Laws. The act can work in co-existence with State Laws. The Federal Law allows for
1817broader scope beyond the 1996 Economic Espionage Act, allows for a greater scope of witnesses and
1818allows coverage in International Trade; which opens new possibilities and allows the US to advance
1819more aggressively. This demonstrates that the domestic and international planes do not exist
1820separately. The US said it raised this point as it is timely given the EU Directive on Trade Secrets.
18219. The UK (Walkden) said that they are in process of transposing the EU Directive by its June 2018
1822deadline. The UK does not envisage significant changes. The UK enquired how many civil cases the US
1823have seen in Federal Courts under the May 2016 Defend of Trade Secrets Act. The UK (Williams) also
1824asked whether the US has seen Cross Border cases under the May 2016 Act. The UK (Walkden) also
1825asked what the US considered to be the particular barriers to market access in relation to international
1826Trade Secret protection.
182710. The US (Peterson) responded they would come back with a little more detail on which industries were
1828affected, including some specific examples. The US explained that the Special 301 Report Review tasks
1829embassies to answer a set of questions about the host country’s IP regime and whether the country has
1830any practical IP enforcement in place. The US do not hear back about a lot of problems, however the US
1831highlights that this can be due to companies not reporting back to avoid negative press attention that
1832could impact their stock prices. This is a challenge to the US as US policy makers find it difficult to
1833identify where the problems are. The US highlighted that China is a concern and there is work to be
1834done with India as India’s Trade Secret Laws are not harmonised across the country. The US has heard
1835about some issues in Austria but those are specific cases. The US stated that their criminal measures
1836pre-date civil measures. The Special 301 Report is due to be released which contains data reflecting the
1837number of successful prosecutions made under the 2016 Defend of Trade Secrets Act. The US
1838Department of Justice also publishes summaries of Trade Secrets cases that the US can provide the UK
1839with in addition to the Special 301 report.
184011. The UK side (Walkden) said that the UK does have criminal remedies available where Trade Secrets are
1841misappropriated through illegal activities, for example offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.
1842The UK (Igboemeka) then asked what would be the US’s ideal provision in an FTA?
184312. The (US) responded that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) had a dedicated section for Trade Secrets
1844which detailed what misappropriation meant, obligation for criminal enforcement, defined what
1845criminal procedures meant and classification of the lawful use of confidential information. The US
1846encourages the UK to look at the TTP text.
184713. The UK (Prince) asked whether the US-Korea FTA (KORUS) and the US-Singapore FTA were a significant
1848shift to TPP.
184914. US (Peterson) confirmed that KORUS and the US-Singapore FTA were a significant shift.
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1853Geographical Indications
185415. The US (Peterson) explained that they were seeking greater transparency, fairness and due process
1855when it comes to Geographical Indications (GIs) and international trade. The US have concerns about
1856the EU’s approach of including lists of GI names to be protected within trade agreements which can
1857have the effect of preventing US producers from using the name of the EU GI on their products. The US
1858(Peterson) highlighted that recent trade negotiations between the EU and third countries on GIs, such
1859as with Japan, Mercosur and Mexico, have raised concerns among their political leadership.
186016. The US (Peterson) suggested several potential objectives for the UK to consider as it develops its future
1861approach to GIs and international trade:
1862i. Implement due process for the recognition of new GIs. This would include opportunities for all
1863interested parties to be consulted and to make oppositions. The US (Peterson) also noted that
1864in the EU system there is no recourse for opposing parties to appeal against decisions to award
1865new GI protection, and that cancellation procedures for GIs could also be considered as part of
1866the due process.
1867ii. Distinguish GI names from terms that have become customary in common language. The US
1868(Peterson) noted that the Consortium for Common Food Names regards the UK’s approach to
1869‘cheddar’ cheese as an example of best practice here. The UK has specific GIs for ‘West Country
1870Farmhouse Cheddar’ and ‘Isle of Orkney Cheddar,’ but the term ‘cheddar’ itself remains a
1871customary term that any cheese producer can use. The US (Peterson) suggested that the UK
1872could consider publishing guidance clarifying which terms it considers as customary in common
1873language.
1874iii. The UK could favour recognition of new GIs through domestic application and examination
1875procedures, rather than the EU’s favoured approach of exchanging lists of GIs for inclusion in
1876international trade agreements. The US (Peterson) stated that although there are over 4,500
1877GIs on the EU Register, only 28 GIs from outside the bloc have been accepted through direct
1878applications (as opposed to via an exchange of lists in a trade deal).
1879iv. Infringement of GIs should be based on “likelihood of confusion” and the EU’s interpretation of
1880the evocation principle should be narrowed.
1881v. GIs should be officially examined, like patents and trademarks, informed through international
1882norms/standards on examination processes.
1883vi. The UK should consider whether some of the EU GIs still meet British consumer expectations,
1884or whether the consumer now regards some EU GIs as customary common language.
188517. In response, the UK (Morgan) welcomed the US’ thoughts on GI objectives, and would welcome
1886ongoing engagement. The UK highlighted that the Government supports the appropriate use of GIs to
1887protect UK food and drink names, but currently only has 84 GIs in the EU’s GI register. The UK
1888highlighted that GIs is a big issue for the EU, and will be a subject for negotiation in the UK-EU
1889negotiation.
189018. The UK (Morgan) stated that the UK is working on Transitional Adoption (TA) of existing EU FTAs as well
1891as new FTAs.
189219. The US (Peterson) enquired whether GIs will feature in the transitionally adopted FTAs.
189320. The UK (Morgan) responded that it is too early to comment on the transitional adoption process for the
1894GI elements. The aim is to transition as much of the agreements as possible as the UK does not want to
1895disrupt trade flows. 
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1899Innovative Pharmaceutical Protections
19001. The UK (Gregory) enquired why the US have different data exclusivity periods for chemicals and
1901biologics.
19022. The US (Peterson) responded that there is data protection for big and small molecules. The US started
1903with small molecule protection which is set as five years. The passage of the American Health Care Act
1904extended protection to Biologics products as there was a need to incentivise R&D for Biologic products.
1905The US highlighted that there are patent vulnerabilities as Biosimilars are not replicas of small
1906molecules, therefore there is more of a need to have a longer-term protection for Biologic products
1907which is current set as 12 years of protection; eight years of data protection plus four years of market
1908protection.
19093. The UK (Gregory) stated the EU and UK have eight years of data protection plus two years of market
1910protection for all pharmaceuticals.
19114. The US (Peterson) stated that 12 years was a compromise. The initial proposal was 15 years with
1912possibilities for extensions to protect orphan drugs.
19135. The UK (Gregory) stated in addition to the eight plus two years, there is an extra 6 months to a year
1914protection for paediatric drugs. The UK enquired if there was a demand for a minimum level of
1915protection.
19166. The US (Peterson) responded that TTP did not get into the specifics of data and market protection
1917timelines, it was all encompassing. The US negotiated to look at market realities and dynamics. Most
1918countries approved Biosimilars after it was first approved in the US. Therefore, other countries have a
1919de facto market protection for at least 10 years.
19207. The UK (Gregory) enquired about pricing. The UK said that the longer you protect, the longer higher
1921prices are maintained and asked if there is a trade off? How does this work in the US?
19228. The US (Peterson) stated that pricing plays out domestically. The US said there is a lot of conversation
1923on drug prices and looking at what other countries pay and this is causing angst. There are worries that
1924the US is not getting a good deal in pharmaceutical industries.
19259. The UK (Whitehead) added that the UK has Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) regimes to
1926extend terms of protection for pharmaceutical products. The UK noted that it would be useful to look
1927at each other’s systems and learn from them. The UK asked whether the US Patent Term Extension
1928(PTE) is only for pharmaceuticals and not plant protection products?
192910. The US (Peterson) responded there are patent term adjustments (for office delays) which are available
1930for any products. There are patent term extensions for pharmaceuticals but not for agriculture
1931products. There is also 10 years data protection for chemicals.
193211. The UK (Whitehead) stated the EU is looking at the balance achieved by the existing SPC regime in the
1933EU. The UK asked whether the US had done any research on the balance between health systems and
1934rights holders?
193512. The US (Peterson) stated that it believes there was some done in TPP and the US can look into this for
1936the UK.
193713. The UK (Igboemeka) asked since grace periods are typical in US FTA provisions, has the US seen a trend
1938in companies making use of grace periods?
193914. The US (Peterson) said it would look into that for the UK. SMEs are not aware that grace periods differ,
1940so they assume around the world they have a one year grace period. This will prevent them getting 
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1944patents protection in countries which do not have such a system, by then it will be too late.
1945Harmonisation in this space will be useful.
194615. The UK (Williams) added that the UK has similar issues with academics publishing their articles and
1947disclosing their inventions.
194816. The US (Peterson) stated as the US is undergoing North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), this
1949can be shifted in their trade policy and can go through what was considered in the past.
1950Conclusion
195117. The US (Peterson) said for the next Working Group, it would like to understand the UK’s trade and IP
1952agenda and its IP system so both sides can discuss and identify similarities and differences. The UK
1953(Igboemeka) responded that the UK is still at an early stage in developing their overall IP and Trade
1954Policy. The UK stated that they can talk about their own IP Trade Policy in future sessions but offered a
1955focus on the UK’s current IP system as a useful start. This would focus on the status quo without
1956prejudice to any changes post-Brexit.
195718. The US (Peterson) said another fruitful topic for the next Working Group could be to understand each
1958other’s governance processes and procedures for trade policy and negotiations. The UK (Igboemeka)
1959suggested a discussion on approaches to stakeholder engagement in the IP area could be another topic.
1960Both sides agreed to continue discussions on specific issues at the next Working Group.
1961SME Toolkit
19621. The US (Sevilla) stated that there is public misconception that international trade only affects big
1963companies, however international trade has a major impact on SMEs. The UK is the US’ third largest
1964export destination for US SMEs after Canada and Mexico. The US highlighted that there needs to be
1965joint information and publication to educate SMEs about IP as many SMEs do not understand how to
1966protect their IP. Publications like the proposed SME toolkit would be useful for SMEs. This STO would
1967also demonstrate an early outcomes of UK/US talks and demonstrates leadership for both sides. The US
1968(Peterson) added that it is important to continue to coordinate to evaluate the work of both sides.
1969SMEs are disproportionately innovators. One study concluded that SMEs outperform larger
1970corporations. SMEs are 2.5 times more innovative and produce 15 times as many patents. The US
1971(Salzman) highlighted no matter how good the intention, the benefits of our trade policy will not be
1972effective unless SMEs are educated. SMEs lacked awareness and education usually around costs,
1973perceived benefits and lack of information. The Department of Commerce aims to tackle this through
1974establishing a website: stopfakes.gov, IT audit tools to identify IP and training modules in English,
1975Spanish and French, Stop Fix roadshows to innovative hubs to help them export. The US reports that
1976Select USA states that the UK has large trade investment in R&D worth 7.9 billion dollars in 2015 in US
1977affiliates. There were 22 UK participants at the USA summit. The US and UK are Select USA’s best
1978customers in E-commerce. The US would hope that the SME Toolkit would bring more SMEs into the
1979bilateral relationship. The US asked whether/how a web version could exist?
19802. The UK (Williams) responded that this topic is very cross cutting and that the UK is entirely supportive
1981with what the US said. The UK also recognises the statistics that the US outlines. The UK sees SMEs
1982being its innovation backbones. SMEs spot the business opportunity first and (as demonstrated on his
1983(Williams’) recent visit to China, many UK businesses have not had their trademarks protected while
1984focusing on gaining market access. The UK has a suite of tools; Country Guides detailing how to protect 
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1988their IP abroad, YouTube channels. The UK would welcome collaboration with the US in this area. The
1989UK stated that it wanted to bring SMEs into the wider dialogue to draw their attention to the
1990importance of IP. The UK (Cade) wanted to highlight the differences of rights between the UK and US.
1991The UK (Williams) highlighted that a lot of this will include links to webpages. SMEs can then see if they
1992have IP via a list which needs to be simple enough to capture the eye. The UK highlighted that it is the
1993promotion of information which may be sitting elsewhere that is important.
19943. The US (Peterson) enquired whether to address Brexit in the product for SMEs so that US SMEs have
1995continued confidence that their rights will be protected in the UK market.
19964. The UK (Williams) replied yes, but highlighted as the negotiations were fast moving that the content
1997can be outdated and suggested giving a link to the IPO website which will contain updated information.
1998The UK suggested hosting a soft copy and a webpage. The UK highlighted that UK Digital Service has
1999strict rules on term of webpage design which must be consistent with the wider .GOV layout.
20005. The US (Salzman) responded that a hardcopy would be useful as well as a web link. The US (Sevilla)
2001enquired whether there is a reduction in fees for registering rights such as trademarks, patents for
2002SMEs.
20036. The UK (Williams) replied that there is no reduction of fees for SMES; however the registration fee is
2004low. The private legal fees are the most expensive part which usually stop patent protection
2005applications. The UK (Whitehead) added that there are reductions on fees for electronic filings. The UK
2006(Williams) noted that on the design side, the UK has rebuilt its digital platform where you can file
2007multiple designs. Thus, the UK’s designs registration has tripled.
20087. The US (Peterson) agreed to have the web version of the brochure to state fees while the hard copy
2009publication refers to the applicable website link for businesses to go to for updated fees. The US
2010(Sevilla) agreed to create a brochure before the next Trade and Investment Working Group in the first
2011quarter of 2018. The US (Peterson) agreed for the US and UK to exchange questions regarding materials
2012that should be included in the brochure. The US (Sevilla) suggested a joint trade SME roadshow as there
2013was interest from the US in the London fancy food trade shows and the Farnborough air show which
2014would be places to hand out the brochures and have joint cooperative activities.
20158. The UK (Williams) suggested for the IPO (Cade) and the USPTO (Salzman) to lead on this project. The UK
2016(Igboemeka) suggested an idea of workshops with SMEs.
20179. The US (Sevilla) suggested inviting the Chamber of Commerce and said that the workshops can happen
2018in London or elsewhere. The US (Peterson) added that US Ministers are saying that IP is an area is not
2019just for multilateral cooperation but it also beneficial for SMEs.
202010. The UK (Igboemeka) actioned to follow up in the following weeks.
2021Action Items
2022 Agreed that topics for next Working Group could include: building a stronger understanding of each
2023other’s current IP system; understanding each other’s governance procedures and processes for trade
2024policy and negotiations; approaches to stakeholder engagement in the IP area.
2025 Agreed to produce a shared brochure for the SMEs Toolkit with guidance on how to do business in
2026both markets by first quarter of 2018 in Washington DC.
2027 Agreed to coordinate our efforts on the SME Dialogue with the wider SME group. 
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2031FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
2032Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
2033 Very good atmosphere with strong discussion on substantive IP issues. The US made a strong pitch on
2034geographical indicators, proposing six objectives for the UK in this area. Provided a useful insight into
2035the offensive areas the US is likely to pursue in an FTA. Trade secrets discussion was insightful,
2036indicating this will be a key priority for the US. Unclear how far apart we are on this at present. A more
2037limited discussion on pharmaceuticals. The US stated up front that they were unable to have an indepth conversation given there are difficulties in NAFTA in this area. The US also said that the current
2038Administration may want a shift in some areas of policy here so they were unable to answer some of
2039the questions we posed. It was nevertheless a very helpful exposition on the key areas we can expect
2040the US to push in an FTA and for us to start to determine the areas where we may find ourselves in
2041difficult territory. The impact of some patent issues raised on NHS access to generic drugs (i.e. cheaper
2042drugs) will be a key consideration going forward. Biologics were hugely contentious under TPP so one
2043we were interested in discussing but unclear how far apart we are in this area. Agreed that for the next
2044Working Group we would discuss: getting a better understanding of each other’s IP systems; our
2045respective governance processes and procedures in trade negotiations; stakeholder engagement in IP.
2046We also agreed to come back to some of the specific issues such as GIs and pharma patents. Good
2047progress on the SME work stream within the STO work plan with agreement to complete product first
2048quarter of next year and to join up with the wider SME (regulation) group. 
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2052Title of Meeting: SMEs Side Meeting
2053Date: 14th November 2017
2054Time: 11:00-12:00
2055Participants
2056Name Department/Directorate
2057Julian Farrel Policy Directorate, DIT (Lead)
2058Kate Maxwell Policy Directorate, DIT
2059Muhammad Abbas Abdulla Policy Directorate, DIT
2060Minh Tri Le Policy Directorate, DIT
2061Edwin Mangheni UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2062Huw Parker BEIS
2063Ellen Duffy Better Regulation Executive (BRE)
2064Christina Sevilla United States Trade Representative
2065Tricia Van Orden US Department of Commerce
2066Rosalyn Steward US Office of Advocacy, Small Business
2067Administration
2068Sarah Bonner US Small Business Administration
2069Key Points to Note
2070 Each side listened to each other’s presentations on approach to reducing regulatory burden to SMEs in
2071both markets, with the US kicking off proceedings followed by the UK presentation. They had
2072commonalities in their respective approaches albeit the processes were different.
2073 The UK’s presentation included an offer to share guidance on BRE framework due to be published in
2074December 2017.
2075Report of Discussions and Outcomes
20761. The US (Steward) presented on the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA). The US introduced the Small
2077Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy (OA) as the voice of small businesses. The US’ definition of
2078an SME or small business is considered to be 500 employees or less. Executive Order 13272 addressed a
2079number of concerns about RFA compliance and mandated that the OA train all regulatory agencies in
2080compliance issues. The OA’s aim is to help US Federal Agencies improve their RFA compliance.
20812. The US (Steward) went on to present that RFA compliance has real benefits to the agency and its
2082regulatory development team. It minimises legal problems and challenges regulations which do not
2083comply. The OA now has authority to file a brief as a Friend of the Court. Compliant regulations can
2084avoid litigation and unintended delay. RFA compliance avoids delays. Beyond the delays represented by
2085the legal system, reworking the rule to comply will take more time at the later stages of development,
2086and can hold up your regulation at a key time. RFA compliance improves compliance with the
2087regulation. Small entities are more likely to follow regulations they can understand and which do not
2088impose an unreasonable burden. RFA compliance provides a more level playing field. Cost of regulation
2089per employee is often less for larger entities. Not all entities even of the same size will be affected in
2090the same way, e.g. some accounting or manufacturing systems might accommodate a regulation better
2091than others. RFA Compliance supports the largest and most vital segment of the American economy.
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2095RFA compliance supports the growth and vitality of American small businesses in an increasingly
2096competitive world economy.
20973. The US (Steward) explained that there are two points at which the process might terminate without
2098completing the whole RFA process. The first is Applicability; if the RFA does not apply no further
2099analysis is required. The US highlighted that there was an exemption for foreign affairs and the military.
2100The other is Threshold Analysis. A threshold analysis is performed to determine if there will be a
2101“significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” If no, a certification statement
2102can be placed in the rule and no further analysis is required. The US pointed out that most regulations
2103should be assumed to fall under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and RFA unless there is specific
2104reason to believe otherwise. The US emphasised that “significant” and “substantial” are not defined in
2105the RFA, but in general must be interpreted in light of the universe of regulated small entities. A
2106regulation may be exempt from the RFA altogether under the applicability decision. A regulation that is
2107not exempt must undergo a Threshold Analysis to see whether it has a significant economic impact on a
2108substantial number of small entities. If the analysis shows that there is no such impact, the Certification
2109step completes RFA compliance.
21104. The UK (Farrel) asked for the US’ definition of “significant” and “substantial” economic impact
21115. The US (Steward) replied that 1 to 3% of gross revenue – not profit – of SMEs is defined as
2112“substantial”. 10 to 30% of gross revenue is counted as “significant”
21136. The US (Steward) explained that if the threshold analysis indicates there will not be a significant
2114economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, the head of the agency may so certify. The
2115US explained that the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) is a critical step that represents the
2116OA’s best information about the impact of the regulation on small entities. IRFAs can sometimes be
2117waived or delayed such as if it is an emergency regulation or compliance is impractical. However, the
2118Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) is still required, usually in 180 days. Both prongs have to be
2119satisfied. It is not defined by Congress, rather case-by-case by business. Agencies calculate the direct
2120effect but don’t have to assess the indirect effect. Under the IRFA there are considerations of
2121alternatives.
21227. The US (Steward) explained compliance costs to consider are implementation costs, capital and
2123equipment costs and operation and maintenance costs. The US went on to explain that an IRFA
2124represents a major investment of time and effort as it provides greater transparency, and is available to
2125the public for comment. However, the US highlighted there are data gaps, with the missing data of
2126costs being revealed only when it is published.
21278. The UK (Duffy) presented, firstly stating there is primary and secondary legislation in place. The Small
2128Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 sets out a target to reduce burdens on industry. The
2129Government prepares an impact assessment which is then published alongside their consultation. The
2130UK highlighted currently there is not a 2017 Parliament target. Last Parliament saved approximately £2
2131to £3 Billion in two years. SMEs matter as they are engines, incubators and accelerators to growth. The
2132UK explained that the Small and Micro Business Assessment (SaMBA) is part of the impact assessment
2133which measures the equivalent annual net costs to business of all measures exceeding £5 million a
2134year. This impact assessment is subject to external scrutiny to decide whether the impact assessment
2135has sufficient information. This is to ensure there has been a correct assessment to ensure it is not
2136disproportionate. The UK seeks to ensure that no policy is introduced that unnecessarily burdens
2137microbusinesses, and wherever possible microbusinesses should be exempt from new regulatory 
2138OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK Official Use Only)
2139
214054
2141burdens. However, Health and Safety and Environmental areas cannot be exempt. Different sectors
2142may have different approaches which may work better. The UK highlighted the charge for plastic bags
2143as a case study. The UK explained that it introduced a mandatory 5p charge for plastic bags, which goes
2144to charity. Most plastic bags were provided by big high street stores. Local corner shops were therefore
2145exempted from the law, hence not burdening them in any way.
21469. The UK (Farrel) explained that Minsters will not proceed with regulations unless the Regulatory Policy
2147Committee is happy with the impact assessment. Public consultations and impact assessments are
2148carried out on draft legislation before it becomes law. The Better Regulation Executive (BRE) in the
2149Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) monitors the measurement of
2150regulatory burdens and coordinate efforts to ensure that the regulation which remains is smarter,
2151better targeted and less costly to business
215210. The US (Steward) asked if the UK keeps track of the impact of these policies.
215311. The UK (Farrel) replied explaining that there are post-implementation reviews of legislation. After five
2154years, there is an assessment of regulations. The UK offered to share the next update of the Better
2155Regulation Framework Manual, which is due to be published before Christmas, which is a regulation
2156framework for all civil servants who are drafting legislation. The UK (Farrel) asked for the US reactions
2157to the proposal on MSMEs and good regulatory practice which had been tabled for the World Trade
2158Organisation’s (WTO) Ministerial Conference 11 in Buenos Aires.
215912. The US (Sevilla) replied that the US share an interest in SMEs and want to reduce barriers affecting
2160them. The US highlighted that there are appropriate SME committees that deal with these issues in the
2161WTO.
2162Action Items
2163 The UK is to share guidance on BRE framework with the US.
2164FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
2165Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
2166 See the main SME session. Again, the atmosphere for this session was very positive with both sides
2167interested in learning from each other’s practices.
2168 
2169OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK Official Use Only)
2170
217155
2172Title of Meeting: Regulatory Dialogue Follow-Up
2173Date: 14th November 2017
2174Time: 14:30-16:25
2175Participants
2176Name Department/Directorate
2177Julian Farrel Policy Directorate, DIT (Lead)
2178Peter Lee UK Cabinet Office
2179Tom Surrey UK DEFRA
2180Henry Alexander Policy Directorate, DIT
2181Kate Maxwell Policy Directorate, DIT
2182Motsabi Rooper Policy Directorate, DIT
2183Richard Salt UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2184George Radice UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2185Sophie Brice UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2186Tim Colley BEIS
2187Cynthia Morgan DIT Legal
2188James Dunn DEFRA
2189Haroona Chughtai DfT
2190Andy Wibroe DfT
2191Jim Sanford United States Trade Representative
2192Rachel Shub United States Trade Representative
2193Kent Shigetomi United States Trade Representative
2194Tim Wedding United States Trade Representative
2195Alexandra Whittaker United States Trade Representative (legal)
2196Nataliya Langburd Council of Economic Advisors
2197Erik Puskar National Institute of Standards and Technology
2198Ashley Miller United States Trade Representative
2199Brian Trick United States Trade Representative
2200Sam Rizzo United States Trade Representative
2201Head of Multilateral Affairs United States Trade Representative
2202Casey Mace State Department
2203Additional official State Department
2204Elizabeth W. State Department
2205Emma Lloyd Department for Labor
2206Wendy Liberante US Office for Regulatory Affairs
2207OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK Official Use Only)
2208
220956
2210Key Points to Note
2211Atmospherics: positive and inquisitive on both sides
2212Devolved Administrations
2213 UK presented on Devolution, including a short history of devolution of powers and stressing the
2214political attention on the return of powers from the EU.
2215 Outlined approach of Withdrawal Bill – and how constitutionally there is ambiguity around DA
2216involvement in how this is approved in the UK.
2217 A number of US questions around current devolved powers, including around Agriculture (AMS) and
2218Economic Development (EU structural funds).
2219 UK expressed interest to hear about State/federal split at a later meeting
2220MRA
2221 1998 MRA: UK set out 10 categories of generic issues for discussion going forward: legal form for the
2222agreement; inactive sectors; references to EU law; entry into force provisions; updated list of CABs,
2223updated list of designating authorities; Joint Committees and Joint Sectoral Committees; translation of
2224text; references to the EU; and the GMP annex.
2225 ACTION: UK to send list of issues via email to US for reflection and use in their inter-agency
2226engagement.
2227 US question around UK engagement with regulators – initial UK engagement to raise understanding,
2228next step to focus on details. US suggest regulator-regulator discussions to discuss operation of MRA.
2229 ACTION: UK and US to consider facilitating regulator-to-regulator discussions.
2230 Marine Equipment MRA: a lot of work ongoing to possibly amend product scope between the US and
2231the EU – with the UK feeding in as appropriate; UK suggest keeping current product scope for TA.
2232 ACTION: US to facilitate contact at technical level for discussion of the marine agreement.
2233 General: US question around need for secondary legislation to enact MRAs into UK law or to set up
2234bodies.
2235 Beyond MRA, US would encourage exploration of policy space for further cooperation.
2236 US see particular opportunities in medical devices single audit (MDSAP)–– UK made clear that it is only
2237an observer to MDSAP and this is unlikely to change whilst we remain in the EU, but will relay point to
2238experts.
2239GRP
2240 UK keen to know where US looking to be ambitious in relation to GRP:
2241 US highlighted that TPP was not ambitious, TTIP was a good template, if not 100% clear in all areas;
2242 Guidance provided at federal level concerning development of regulations that contain standards (e.g.
2243A119) – could be a useful area with UK, although not included in NAFTA template
2244 US highlighted that transparency and public input were most important to make the rest of the
2245measures work.
2246 US interest in ways that stakeholders can “tickle” the system (i.e. change regulations), e.g. through a
2247petition system.
2248 The US persuaded the EU to include a GRP chapter in TTIP, and GRP will continue to be a priority in any
2249future US trade deals.
2250 UK highlighted the transparency of the UK consultation system on new regulation
2251 ACTION: US suggested that both sides exchange practices or guidance on how to develop regulations
2252and policies that help trade.
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225557
2256Report of Discussions and Outcome
2257UK presentation on devolved administrations
22581. Peter Lee (UK- Cabinet Office) gave a presentation on the relationship between the UK Government
2259and the Devolved Administrations (DAs). There were three DAs and all were different: Wales did not
2260have a separate legal system; Scotland had maintained its own legal and education systems: and
2261Northern Ireland had had a relatively homogenous system with England for the past 200 years. In 1972
2262when the European Communities Act had passed, wide-scale devolution was not envisaged. In 1997,
2263different devolution settlements were agreed for each DA: in Northern Ireland, the terms were driven
2264by the Good Friday Agreement. The devolution settlements were slightly different in the 3 countries
2265(e.g. justice and policing was not devolved in Wales). The “Reserved Model” meant that Foreign Policy,
2266Trade, Defence and Security and Constitutional powers were not devolved. Until now, the UK had not
2267had to consider having separate rules to govern its own internal market, as this had been covered by
2268EU regulations. Due to Brexit, the government was now having to look at this. The plan set out in EU
2269Withdrawal Bill, took those powers currently held at EU level which set market conditions in UK and
2270brought them back to UK. At the moment, we were in a “holding pattern” whilst we considered what
2271this meant for DAs. This would likely mean significant further devolved powers for the DAs, with
2272central government retaining some powers (e.g. to negotiate trade agreements).
22732. This was a very political space at the moment. A Joint Ministerial Committee involving the DAs was
2274discussing. Trade interests were not homogenous across the DAs: food and drink and oil and gas were
2275particularly important in Scotland; Northern Ireland had a joint food and drink economy with the
2276Republic; and in Wales manufacturing was key. Agriculture was one of the main issues being discussed,
2277as it was deeply important to all four nations. UK agricultural policy had been set at EU level for 50
2278years: setting this up in the UK, whilst respecting devolution settlements and managing an internal
2279market was very sensitive/ complex. England was not a separate constitutional entity and the key
2280difficulty would be how to differentiate discussions between England as a nation and as central
2281government. Under the constitution, UK parliamentary legislation on devolution issues could only be
2282agreed with approval of DAs, It is very clear that Brexit legislation will touch on devolution, and DAs
2283were not currently content to recommend that their Parliaments give consent. Central government was
2284working with DAs to try to get consent (heart of challenge).
22853. The US delegation explained that in the US internal market products must be able to ship across state
2286lines or federal govt/ courts get involved. They would be happy to share experience of how to retain an
2287internal market whilst ensuring that states don’t create barriers
2288Mutual Recognition Agreements
22894. The UK (Julian Farrel) explained that both parties had already agreed the importance of the technical
2290replication exercise (via JJH and GC exchange). The overarching principle was absolute replication and
2291to change only what was essential. On conformity assessments, the ambition was to discuss generic
2292issues today, share texts early in the New Year and to have final texts ready for a legal scrub in April
22932018. This would allow for completion by the deadline of August 2018 as agreed by JJH and GC.
22945. The US (Sanford) added two questions for discussion:
2295i. What relationship the UK planned to have with EU regulators such as the European
2296Medicines Agency and the European Maritime Safety Agency going forward; and
2297ii. What policy space the UK may have to explore cooperation on regulation beyond MRAs
2298with the US, for example on the medical devices single audit.
22996. Henry Alexander (UK) gave a summary of the outstanding issues needing attention in the 1998 MRA.
2300The ten categories were:
2301OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK Official Use Only)
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230358
2304i. Legal form: The legal form for transition agreements could be: i) a full mark up of text
2305(change EU for UK in text); or ii) an exchange of letters (with a mutatis mutandis
2306mechanism). The aim is to have as simple a process as possible. The US (Sanford) pointed
2307out that in a similar exercise with the EFTA-EEA states, a separate textual form was used.
2308ii. Inactive sectors. The TA guiding principle is to make as few changes as technically possible.
2309Therefore the UK aims to bring across all sectors, including those which were inactive, but
2310not operationalise inactive sectors. This is the line the UK is taking with all partners. The
2311priority is to get this done as quickly to avoid a “cliff edge”. The US (Sanford) questioned
2312the utility in covering inactive sectors in TA whilst they had no interest in making them
2313active.
2314iii. References to EU legislation: The UK explained that the intention of the EU Withdrawal Bill
2315was to bring across all EU legislation into UK law and not diverge. A discussion is needed on
2316how to refer to this in the MRAs.
2317iv. Entry into force issues (such as provisions on transition periods): The UK approach is to
2318ensure continuity on day one. Therefore the text should reflect where transitional
2319provisions have expired and where they remain operational (keeping to the schedule in the
2320latter). The US delegation indicated they were broadly content with this approach and are
2321not looking to extend transitional periods. Both sides agreed that the agreement should
2322enter into force on a date that ensures continuity on day 1 of Exit.
2323v. List of conformity assessment bodies: The UK would want to update the list to reflect
2324designated conformity bodies in the UK and US that are currently approved. The US asked
2325if the UK was envisaging a re-designation process, to which the UK said it was not. The US
2326delegation agreed that this made sense and that no re-designation would be needed.
2327vi. Updating designating authorities The UK would want to: i) remove EU-27 bodies from the
2328list; and ii) update the names of UK and US designating authorities e.g. to replace DTI. The
2329US agreed to this technical change.
2330vii. Establishment of joint committees and joint sectoral committees. The UK would want a
2331joint UK-US Committee and to establish Joint Sectoral Committees where indicated. Both
2332parties agreed that this should be as simple as possible. The US (Sanford) emphasised that
2333in a recent exercise with EFTA, these committees were established but were less active in
2334practice.
2335viii. Requirement to translate into EU languages. Both parties agreed that the text should just
2336be in English.
2337ix. Generic references to EU. The general principle is to replace all references to “EU” with
2338“UK” whilst ensuring the same effect.
2339x. GMP Annex. This was very recently updated and specific tweaks may be needed to ensure
2340continuity with regards to the transitional provisions.
23417. The aim of the UK is to attempt to share texts in the New Year.
23428. In response, the US delegation:
2343i. Agreed to the UK timetable of attempting to conclude the drafting exercise by April 2018;
2344ii. Emphasised the importance of resolving technical issues before attempting to share text;
2345iii. Asked that the UK send via email a list of the ten categories outlined today for review;
2346OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK Official Use Only)
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234859
2349iv. Questioned how the UK could transition inactive sectors which include an old GMPS annex,
2350when a new GMPs annex now exists. The UK (Farrel) explained that the principle is to
2351transition the agreement as it currently stands, i.e. the updated GMPS annex replaced the
2352old one;
2353v. Asked how much the UK had engaged in technical discussions with regulators and how
2354transition would work in practice. US regulators were already asking questions and there
2355might therefore be merit in a regulator to regulator discussion, as MRAs could be difficult
2356to implement. Julian Farrel (UK – DIT) confirmed that there had been initial discussions
2357with BEIS and the MHRA and that detailed discussions would soon follow. The UK would be
2358happy to facilitate bilateral discussions between regulators.
2359vi. Emphasised that particular ‘opportunities for reflection’ exist in the medical devices single
2360audit and electronic labelling.
2361vii. Suggested that both sides exchange practices or guidance on how to develop regulations
2362and policies that help trade.
2363Marine Equipment MRA:
23649. The US (Sanford) emphasised that the US Coast Guard is looking to amend the product scope of this
2365agreement and that it remains a work-in-progress with changes in the pipeline.
236610. Haroona Chughtai (UK – DFT) gave an update on the Marine Equipment MRA. DfT have been
2367contributing to the discussions on the product scope of the agreement with the EU and are aware of
2368the upcoming changes. Meanwhile, DFT has been marking up the MRA for transitioning and would be
2369happy to share this with USTR or the US Coast Guard accordingly. As with the 98 MRA, the priority is
2370continuity.
237111. EMSA managed the relationship on behalf of the Csion under the Marine Equipment Directive. The UK
2372would look to replicate this and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency would become the regulator for
2373this requirement. A discussion between the MCA and US Coast Guard would be needed. The US
2374agreed that the technicalities needed to worked out ASAP and agreed to facilitate contact at technical
2375level for this agreement.
237612. In response to a question from USTR Legal Counsel, Julian Farrel (UK – DIT) confirmed that the UK
2377would not need secondary legislation to transitionally adopt the MRAs. Royal Prerogative gave the
2378Government the ability to conclude trade agreements. The UK already had domestic regulators in
2379these areas so there should be no need to create new bodies.
2380Good Regulatory Practice (GRP)
238113. Julian Farrel (UK- DIT) and Kate Maxwell (UK - DIT) updated on work in this area. The UK had looked at
2382the text in TTIP and TPP on good regulatory practice: we would aspire to have ambitious provisions in
2383any FTA. The US delegation expressed an interest in understanding how GRP applied in the context of
2384EU regulation being transposed into UK law. The UK confirmed that our better regulation requirements,
2385including consultation and impact assessment, applied equally to domestic and EU-derived legislation.
2386The US did not think TPP was a high water mark of ambition on GRP: TTIP was more ambitious, but
2387UK/US could go further. To the US, transparency and public input are the most important areas of GRP.
2388The US did not prepare impact assessments for every regulation; they relied on evidence-based
2389decision making. It was also important to enable stake holders to petition government to make changes
2390to regulations, as this helped produce a regulatory regime more responsive to the market. It was
2391agreed that the UK and US had a lot in common in this area. There was a difference in the US/EU 
2392OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK Official Use Only)
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2395approach: the US thought the EU focused on cooperation and one regulation common to all; whereas
2396the US aimed for inter-operability in markets, which sometimes resulted in measures focused on
2397outcomes (e.g. auto emissions rather than engine size). It would be important for UK and US regulators
2398to discuss issues during the early stages of preparing regulation. The US had persuaded the EU to
2399include a GRP chapter in TTIP, and GRP will continue to be a priority in any future US trade deals.
2400Action Items
2401 98 MRA: UK to send list to US of 10 issues raised via email to US.
2402 Subsequent aim is to share a text in the New Year.
2403 UK and US to consider facilitating regulator-to-regulator discussions.
2404 Marine Equipment: US to facilitate contacts for DfT technical discussions.
2405 General: UK to relay US comments on medical devices single audit to MHRA.
2406FOR INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY
2407Lead Negotiator Analysis/Comments
2408 The atmosphere of the meeting was inquisitive and largely collaborative. It included several offers from
2409the US for ‘exchanges’ over UK regulation and policy development.
2410 On MRAs, the US made clear where that they would only want active sectors of the 1998 MRA to be
2411transitioned – this would exclude 3 inactive sectors (electrical safety, recreational craft, and medical
2412devices) that the US insist have no chance of being made active anyway. The UK stuck to the line that
2413TA means transitioning agreements as they currently stand.
2414 There were several questions on the implementation of the MRAs and what UK secondary legislation
2415would be needed, reflecting the US emphasis on operability.
2416 UK objectives of the meeting were generally met – the main categories for discussion have been set out
2417ready for future discussion and agreement was confirmed on the overall timeline for MRA transition.
2418The US has also agreed to facilitate technical level contact for the Marine Equipment MRA.
2419 The UK will be ready to share a list of MRA issues in a couple of weeks.
2420 On GRP, confirmation of shared UK-US aspiration to see an ambitious GRP chapter in any UK-US FTA,
2421and we succeeded in providing further reassurance to the US on the extent of UK domestic GRP
2422disciplines.
2423OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK Official Use Only)
2424
242561
2426Title of Meeting: Final Review and Coordination Meeting
2427Date: 14th November 2017
2428Time: 16:45-17:45
2429Participants
2430Name Department/Directorate
2431Oliver Griffiths, UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2432Richard Salt, UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2433Katie Waring, UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2434Sophie Brice, UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2435Cordelia Jonathan, UK-US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2436Mike Bartling, Legal, DIT
2437Tom Josephs, Policy Directorate, DIT
2438Neil Feinson, Policy Directorate, DIT
2439Julian Farrell, Policy Directorate, DIT
2440Dan Lihou, US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2441Jack Kennedy US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2442Mark Prince Policy Directorate, DIT
2443Henry Alexander Policy Directorate, DIT
2444Edwin Mangheni US Team, Trade Policy Group, DIT
2445Sarah Clegg FCO
2446Emma Coppack, DExEU
2447Tim Colley BEIS
2448Harry Lee DCMS
2449Ceri Morgan DEFRA
2450Jaya Choraria HMT
2451Dan Mullaney USTR
2452Timothy Wedding USTR
2453Raimonds Pavlovskis USTR
2454Sam Rizzo USTR
2455Katherine Kalutkiewicz USTR
2456Alexandra Whittaker USTR
2457Andrew Lorenz US National Security Council
2458Whitney Baird US Dep. Of State
2459Mitchell Ferguson US Dep. Of State
2460Casey Mace US Dep. Of State
2461Jessica Simonoff US Dep. Of State
2462OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE (UK Official Use Only)
2463
246462
2465Gregory Burton US Embassy to UK
2466Joseph Burke US Embassy to UK
2467John Simmons US Embassy to UK
2468Key Points to Note
2469 This meeting summarised the proceedings and take-away points from all the sessions of the Working
2470Group. There were no new key points to note.
2471Report of Discussions and Outcome
24721. Dan Mullaney thanked the UK for hosting the US delegation. Good progress was made on three of
2473the pillars of the Working Group: STOs, Continuity Agreements, and laying the groundwork for a
2474future FTA. On STOs he was impressed by the SME group, with further UK-US dialogue expected on
2475this before the next Working Group. He was also pleased there had been concrete outcomes and
2476agreed public language from the discussions on financial services and intellectual property. On
2477Continuity Agreements there had also been progress, particularly on the four agriculture-related
2478agreements, where there was now a clearer picture of what needs to be done to ensure trade
2479continues smoothly post-Brexit. In terms of preparations for a future UK/US FTA there had been
2480very useful discussions in across many sessions. On services there were strong shared objectives
2481and goals. Some good ideas had been presented on IP, providing a basis for moving this discussion
2482forward. This was also the case with SPS, where the US had presented their views on some of the
2483challenges in TTIP discussions. In sum, there was good progress on all three pillars. Dan also
2484emphasised the importance for US business of having early predictability on what an
2485implementation agreement would look like and how long it would last.
24862. Oliver Griffiths agreed with this overall summary and asked the leads for the individual sessions to
2487report back the headline messages.
24883. Sophie Brice summarised the Sustainability session. This was a good opportunity for introductory
2489conversations which laid clear groundwork for future work in this area. In particular future
2490conversations were likely to focus on (i) aspects of mutual interest to the UK and the US (e.g.
2491modern slavery/forced labor); (ii) enforcement mechanisms; (iii) opportunities for global UK-US
2492leadership on sustainability and (iv) sharing wider analysis and evidence of impact of sustainability
2493(labour/environment) provisions in trade agreements.
2494i. Oliver Griffiths noted that there will need to be further scoping here to ensure alignment of
2495expectations.
2496ii. Tim Wedding agreed this had been a good introductory meeting that had set out where
2497each side’s interests were and where there was commonality. He agreed that the four
2498priorities Sophie had laid out was where conversations should focus going forward.
24994. Ceri Morgan presented the highlights of the Agricultural Continuity Agreements session. Good
2500progress was made overall – it will be vital that work continues between Working Groups. For
2501Organics, Spirits and Wine the next step will be to set up technical VTCs, ahead of which Defra is
2502looking to share operability summaries as well as relevant draft continuity texts. On veterinary
2503equivalence (VEA) the UK will need to look at the US proposals in more detail and revert to the US.
2504The two sides will also facilitate a regulator to regulator discussion on VEA.
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2508i. For the US Julie Callahan reflected that veterinary equivalency agreements and organics
2509will need more work by regulators on both sides to ensure they are effective. However,
2510there is clear commitment on both sides to have these in place on day 1.
25115. Mark Prince summarised the two IP sessions, which covered enforcement, GIs and trade secrets.
2512Good progress was made on the workplan and next steps. This included encouraging progress on
2513SMEs in particular and Mark thanked the US for the first draft of an SME toolkit. The UK will work
2514jointly with the US on developing this. He also thanked the US for the invitation to the annual
2515gathering of attaches which will be attended by a UK representative from the IP Office.
2516i. For the US Christine Peterson thanked the UK and welcomed the progress on the STOs in
2517particular. Groundwork had been laid for a future FTA, with discussions about IP trade
2518policy, geographic indication & trade secrets. The US thanked the UK for being open in
2519these discussions.
25206. Julian Farrell summarised the SME session. The teams had compared best practices and
2521experiences of how to remove trade barriers and burdens on SMEs, and had laid the groundwork
2522for future discussions. The work on STOs had been particularly productive over the two days of
2523talks, and concrete outcomes had been agreed, including the intention is to hold a UK-US SMEs
2524workshop in Spring 2018 and produce a short joint document setting support for SMEs.
2525i. For the Christina Sevilla commented that the IP and SME brochures should be ready for
2526early 2018. The discussions had been very positive and had demonstrated how much the
2527UK and US had in common, but had only scratched the surface (including in terms of STOs
2528where there was more we could do together). Looking towards a future FTA, discussions
2529had covered the trade policy elements that will benefit SMEs.
25307. Tom Josephs summarised the Services session. There had been positive and constructive
2531discussion. Good progress had been made on the STOs, and there would be language on financial
2532dialogue in the statement after this working group. Both sides were keen to take forward
2533discussions on the continuity agreement on insurance. Both sides were also keen to be ambitious
2534in the digital sphere, as well as on financial services, and to continue close dialogues in these areas.
2535i. The US agreed there had been productive conversations. There are shared UK-US interests
2536across most areas, especially financial services, professional and business services. The
2537session had looked at past trade deals, building towards conversations on possible future
2538approaches for a UK/US FTA.
25398. Ceri Morgan summarised the SPS session. This had been a very useful session, covering a big topic.
2540This was the start of a discussion, which would need careful handling collectively going forwards.
2541The next step will be to move into technical exchange.
2542i. For the US Julie Callahan agreed that the session had been a very useful start to what
2543would need to be an ongoing conversation. She also noted (from the session) the US point
2544that US poultry producers don’t use chlorine in their food processes. She underlined the US
2545view that US SPS measures are based on science and risk assessment. The US recognised
2546that there are sensitive and critical issues for both sides in this area.
25479. Julian Farrell summarised the Regulatory Dialogue Follow-up session, which covered 3 issues: 1) UK
2548devolution and how this interacts with Brexit (the UK will look forward to hearing an equivalent US
2549presentation on the federal/state split at a future date); 2) transition of existing Mutual Recognition
2550Agreements (MRAs) – looking at what would need to be replicated to avoid a cliff edge – with the 
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2554emphasis on this being a purely technical exercise to ensure continuity; 3) Good regulatory
2555practice, discussing key topics the US would aspire to see in an FTA.
2556i. The US agreed that there had been helpful discussion across these 3 areas. On MRAs they
2557would need to get regulators together to discuss substance and ensure this worked on day
2558one post-Brexit. Another theme was commonality of goals and thinking about how we can
2559be ambitious in this area.
256010. Oliver Griffiths summarised by noting the good progress across the discussions and particularly on
2561STOs and continuity agreements. This Working Group had been a positive step forwards since July
2562and there is a strong commitment on both sides to make sure everything is in place for day one
2563post-Brexit. He committed to keep the US up to date on progress with the EU and would like to
2564further understand where the main issues are for the US vis-à-vis EU regulation. He also suggested
2565a US presentation on the state / federal split would be helpful. Finally, he noted the good practice
2566on both sides and encouraged continued engagement in between the Working Groups.
2567i. Dan Mullaney agreed and reemphasised the point about the importance of continuing
2568engagement outside of the formal Working Groups.
2569Action Items
2570 No new actions from this meeting
2571For any queries about the contents of this dossier or the Trade Working Group meetings, please contact:
2572Richard Salt
2573Deputy Director, UK-US Trade Policy Group
2574Department for International Trade