YjRRLiCr

1
2RESULT: 1
3
4PAGE: 5
5
6TEXT:
7
8  U.S. Department of Justice Atten1e~? Werk Pred1:1et /,' Mtty Cefltaifl Material
9  Preteeted Uflder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 1. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work
10  ......................................................... 131 11. Political
11  Consulting Work
12  ..................................................................... 132 iii.
13  Konstantin Kilimnik
14  ..............................................................................
15  132 b. Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign
16  .............. 134 i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign
17  ......................................................... 134 ii. Paul
18  Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts ..........................................
19  135 iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik
20  in the United States
21  ................................................................ 138 c. Post-
22  Resignation Activities
23  ............................................................................ 141
24  B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts
25  .......................................................... 144 1. Immediate
26  Post-Election Activity
27  ....................................................................... 144 a.
28  Outreach from the Russian Government..
29  ...................................................... 145 b. High-Level
30  Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels ....... 146 2. Kirill
31  Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration ...... 147 a.
32  Background .....................................................................
33  ............................... 14 7 b. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts
34  With the Incoming Administration ...............................................
35  .............................................. 149 c. Erik Prince and Kirill
36  Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles ................................ 151 i. George
37  Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev .................
38  ................................................................................
39  151 11. The Seychelles Meetings
40  ........................................................................ 153
41  iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip .... 155
42  d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U
43  .S.-Russia Relations ...........................................................
44  ....................... 156 3. Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner
45  and Michael Flynn in Trump Tower Following the Election
46  ................................................................. 159 4. Jared
47  Kushner' s Meeting with Sergey Gorkov
48  ................................................... 161 5. Petr A ven' s
49  Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team ........................................
50  163 6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich
51  ............. 166 7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn
52  ................................................... 167 a. United Nations Vote
53  on Israeli Settlements ................................................... 167
54  b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia
55  ....................................................................... 168 V.
56  PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS
57  ........................................................................ 174 A.
58  Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign
59  ............................................... 174 IV
60
61RESULT: 2
62
63PAGE: 14
64
65TEXT:
66
67  U.S. Department of Justice Atteffle'.} 'Nm?k P1:1edttet // May Cm~taitt Material
68  Preteetecl Uttcler Fed. R. C1:1im. P. 6(e) Trump Campaign and Manafort's
69  strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states. Months before that
70  meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik,
71  and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting.
72  Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump
73  speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered
74  damaging to his candidacy. Less than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second
75  release: thousands of John Podesta's emails that had been stolen by the GRU in
76  late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. government institutions were at the time
77  continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to
78  interfere in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department
79  of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
80  issued a joint public statement "that the Russian Government directed the recent
81  compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US
82  political organizations." Those "thefts" and the "disclosures" of the hacked
83  materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued,
84  "are intended to interfere with the US election process." Post-2016 Election.
85  Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government officials and
86  prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new
87  administration. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged
88  these efforts. The Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to
89  congratulate the President-Elect and to arrange a call with President Putin.
90  Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there. Kirill Dmitriev,
91  the chief executive officer of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, was among the
92  Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. In early
93  December, a business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of
94  the Trump Campaign and an associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon.
95  Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in January 2017 in the Seychelles and
96  discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same period, another business
97  associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served on
98  the Campaign or the Transition Team. Dmitriev and Kushner's friend collaborated
99  on a short written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which
100  Dmitriev implied had been cleared through Putin. The friend gave that proposal
101  to Kushner before the inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and
102  incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. On December 29, 2016, then-President
103  Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election.
104  Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian Ambassador
105  Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the
106  sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take
107  retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later,
108  President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. Putin)." The next
109  day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had
110  been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a
111  result of Flynn's request. * * * On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence
112  community briefed President-Elect Trump on a joint assessment-drafted and
113  coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and 7
114
115RESULT: 3
116
117PAGE: 70
118
119TEXT:
120
121  U.S. Department of Justice Atlertte~? \\'erk Predttet // May Cetttaitt Material
122  Preteetet:I Uttt:ler Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) wrote, "we can discuss to whom it
123  should be referred."271 On December 16, 2015, Smith informed Ledeen that he
124  declined to participate in her "initiative." According to one of Smith's
125  business associates, Smith believed Ledeen's initiative was not viable at that
126  time.272 Just weeks after Trump's July 2016 request to find the Clinton emails,
127  however, Smith tried to locate and obtain the emails himself. He created a
128  company, raised tens of thousands of dollars, and recruited security experts and
129  business associates. Smith made claims to others involved in the effort (and
130  those from whom he sought funding) that he was in contact with hackers with
131  "ties and affiliations to Russia" who had access to the emails, and that his
132  efforts were coordinated with the Trump Campaign.273 On August 28, 2016, Smith
133  sent an email from an encrypted account with the subject "Sec. Clinton's
134  unsecured private email server" to an undisclosed list ofrecipients, including
135  Campaign co-chairman Sam Clovis. The email stated that Smith was "u]ust
136  finishing two days of sensitive meetings here in DC with involved groups to poke
137  and probe on the above. It is clear that the Clinton's home-based, unprotected
138  server was hacked with ease by both State-related players, and private
139  mercenaries. Parties with varying interests, are circling to release ahead of
140  the election."274 On September 2, 2016, Smith directed a business associate to
141  establish KLS Research LLC in furtherance of his search for the deleted Clinton
142  emails.275 One of the purposes ofKLS Research was to manage the funds Smith
143  raised in support of his initiative.276 KLS Research received over $30,000
144  during the presidential campaign, although Smith represented that he raised even
145  more money.277 Smith recruited multiple people for his initiative, including
146  security experts to search for and authenticate the emails.278 In early
147  September 2016, as pait of his recruitment and fundraising effort, Smith
148  circulated a document stating that his initiative was "in coordination" with the
149  Trump Campaign, "to the extent permitted as an independent expenditure
150  organization."279 The document listed multiple individuals affiliated with the
151  Trump Campaign, including Flynn, Clovis, Bannon, 271 12/3/15 Email, Smith to
152  Szobocsan & Safron. 272 Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 1. 273 8/31/16 Email, Smith to
153  Smith. 274 8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith. 275 Incorporation papers ofKLS
154  Research LLC, 7/26/17 Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 2. 276 Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at
155  3. 277 Financial Institution Record of Peter Smith and KLS Research LLC, 10/31
156  /17 -10/11/16 Email, Smith to 278 Tait 8/22/17 302, at 3; York 7 /12/17 302, at
157  1-2; York 11/22/17 302, at 1. 279 York 7 /13/17 302 (attachment KLS Research,
158  LLC, "Clinton Email Reconnaissance Initiative," Sept. 9, 2016). 63
159
160RESULT: 4
161
162PAGE: 109
163
164TEXT:
165
166  U.S. Department of Justice Attonaiey \l/ork Prodttet // May Cottt:attt Material
167  Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from
168  the Campaign In July 2016, after returning from Russia, Page traveled to the
169  Republican National Convention in Cleveland.583 While there, Page met Russian
170  Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak; that interaction is described in
171  Volume I, Section IV.A.6.a, infra.584 Page later emailed Campaign officials with
172  feedback he said he received from ambassadors he had met at the Convention, and
173  he wrote that Ambassador Kisl ak was ver worried about candidate Clinton's world
174  views.585 Following the Convention, Page's trip to Moscow and his advocacy for
175  pro-Russia foreign policy drew the media's attention and began to generate
176  substantial press coverage. The Campaign responded by distancing itself from
177  Page, describing him as an "informal foreign policy advisor" who did "not speak
178  for Mr. Trump or the campaign."587 On September 23, 2016, Yahoo! News reported
179  that U.S. intelligence officials were investigating whether Page had opened
180  private communications with senior Russian officials to discuss U.S. sanctions
181  policy under a possible Trump Administration.588 A Campaign spokesman told
182  Yahoo! News that Page had "no role" in the Campaign and that the Campaign was
183  "not aware of any of his activities, past or present."589 On September 24, 2016,
184  Page was formally removed from the Campaign.590 Although Page had been removed
185  from the Campaign, after the election he sought a position in the Trump
186  Administration.591 On November 14, 2016, he submitted an application to the
187  Transition Team that inflated his credentials and experiences, stating that in
188  his capacity as a Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with "top
189  world leaders" and "effectively 5&3 Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at
190  3. 5&4 Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3. 5&5 ; 7/23/16 Email, Page
191  to Clovis; 7/25/16 Email, Page to Gordon & Schmitz. 586 587 See, e.g., Steven
192  Mufson & Tom Hamburger, Trump Advisor's Public Comments, Ties to Moscow Stir
193  Unease in Both Parties, Washington Post (Aug. 5, 2016). 58& Michael Isikoff, US.
194  Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo! News (Sept.
195  23, 2016). 5&9 Michael Isikoff, US. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump
196  Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo! News (Sept. 23, 2016); see also 9/25/16 Email, Hicks
197  to Conway & Bannon (instructing that inquiries about Page should be answered
198  with "[h]e was announced as an informal adviser in March. Since then he has had
199  no role or official contact with the campaign. We have no knowledge of
200  activities past or present and he now officially has been removed from all lists
201  etc."). 590 Page 3/16/17 302, at 2; see, e.g., 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to
202  Bannon & S. Miller (discussing plans to remove Page from the campaign). ,
203  "Transition Online Form," 11/14/16 -102
204
205RESULT: 5
206
207PAGE: 148
208
209TEXT:
210
211  U.S. Department of Justice Attoft'le'.y" Wofk Prodttet // Mfl')1 Cotttaitt
212  Material Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Third, according to Gates and
213  what Kilimnik told Patten, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed two sets of financial
214  disputes related to Mana fort's previous work in the region. Those consisted of
215  the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the Opposition Bloc owed to
216  Manafort for his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to
217  obtain payment.933 After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both. stated that they
218  left separately from Kilimnik because they knew the media was tracking Manafort
219  and wanted to avoid media reporting on his connections to Kilimnik.934 c. Post-
220  Resignation Activities Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August
221  2016, approximately two weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst
222  negative media reporting about his political consulting work for the pro-Russian
223  Party of Regions in Ukraine. Despite his resignation, Manafort continued to
224  offer advice to various Campaign officials through the November election.
225  Manafort told Gates that he still spoke with Kushner, Bannon, and candidate
226  Trump,935 and some of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails.
227  For example, on October 21, 2016, Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a
228  strategy memorandum proposing that the Campaign make the case against Clinton
229  "as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment" and that "Wikileaks
230  provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible way
231  -by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members."936
232  Later, in a November 5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled "Securing the Victory,"
233  Manafort stated that he was "really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday
234  and focusing on preserving the victory," and that he was concerned the Clinton
235  Campaign would respond to a loss by "mov[ing] immediately to discredit the
236  [Trump] victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-fraud, including the claim that
237  the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the
238  results."937 Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Manafort told the
239  Office that, in the wake of Trump's victory, he was not interested in an
240  Administration job. Manafort instead preferred to stay on the "outside," and
241  monetize his campaign position to generate business given his familiarity and
242  relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration.938 Manafort appeared to
243  follow that plan, as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan,
244  and China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entaii.939
245  Manafort' s activities in early 2017 included meetings relating to Ukraine and
246  Russia. The 933 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 2-4; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 7. 934 Gates
247  1/30/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5. 935 Gates 2/12/18 302, at 12. 936
248  NOSC000215 l 7-20 (10/21/16 Email, Manafo11 to Kushner). 937 NOSC00021573-75
249  (11/5/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner). 938 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1, 4-5; Gates
250  1/30/18 302, at 4. 939 Manafo11 9/12/18 302, at 1. 141
251
252RESULT: 6
253
254PAGE: 154
255
256TEXT:
257
258  U.S. Department of Justice AUerHey Werk Preti1:1et ,',' Miey CeHtttiH Material
259  Preteetea UHtier Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Aven told Putin he would take steps to
260  protect himself and the Alfa-Bank shareholders from potential sanctions, and one
261  of those steps would be to try to reach out to the incoming Administration to
262  establish a line of communication.986 A ven described Putin responding with
263  skepticism about Aven's prospect for success.987 According to Aven, although
264  Putin did not expressly direct him to reach out to the Trump Transition Team,
265  Aven understood that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had
266  raised. 988 A ven' s efforts are described in Volume I, Section IV.B.5, infra.
267  2. Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration
268  Aven's description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with the
269  behavior of Kirill Dmitriev, a Russian national who heads Russia's sovereign
270  wealth fund and is closely connected to Putin. Dmitriev undertook efforts to
271  meet members of the incoming Trump Administration in the months after the
272  election. Dmitriev asked a close business associate who worked for the United
273  Arab Emirates (UAE) royal court, George Nader, to introduce him to Trump
274  transition officials, and Nader eventually arranged a meeting in the Seychelles
275  between Dmitriev and Erik Prince, a Trump Campaign supporter and an associate of
276  Steve Bannon.989 In addition, the UAE national security advisor introduced
277  Dmitriev to a hedge fund manager and friend of Jared Kushner, Rick Gerson, in
278  late November 2016. In December 2016 and January 2017, Dmitriev and Gerson
279  worked on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia,
280  which Dmitriev implied he cleared through Putin. Gerson provided that proposal
281  to Kushner before the inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and
282  Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. a. Background Dmitriev is a Russian national
283  who was appointed CEO of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, the Russian Direct
284  Investment Fund (RDIF), when it was founded in 2011.990 Dmitriev reported
285  directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his "boss."991 RDIF has
286  co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth funds.992 Dmitriev
287  regularly interacted with Nader, a senior advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed
288  bin Zayed 989 Nader provided information to the Office in multi le interviews,
289  all but one of which were conducted under a proffer agreement . The investi
290  ators also interviewed Prince under a proffer agreement. Bannon was interviewed
291  by the Office, under a proffer agreement. 99? Kirill Dmitriev Biography, Russian
292  Direct Investment Fund, available at https://rdif.ru/Eng_person _ dmitriev _
293  kiri II/. See also Overview, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available at
294  https://rdif.ru/Eng_About/. 991 Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1. See also, e.g.,
295  12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to
296  Gerson. 992 147
297
298RESULT: 7
299
300PAGE: 155
301
302TEXT:
303
304  U.S. Department of Justice AUem:e)' '.Verk Prnd1:1et ,',' Mtty CeHtttiH
305  Mttterittl Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crtffl. P. 6(e) (Crown Prince Mohammed), in
306  connection with RDIF's dealings with the UAE.993 Putin wanted Dmitriev to be in
307  charge of both the financial and the political relationship between Russia and
308  the Gulf states, in part because Dmitriev had been educated in the West and
309  spoke English fluently.994 Nader considered Dmitriev to be Putin's interlocutor
310  in the Gulf region, and would relay Dmitriev's views directly to Crown Prince
311  Mohammed.995 Nader developed contacts with both U.S. presidential campaigns
312  during the 2016 election, and kept Dmitriev abreast of his efforts to do so.996
313  According to Nader, Dmitriev said that his and the government of Russia's
314  preference was for candidate Trum to win and asked Nader to assist him in meetin
315  members of the Trum Cam ai n.997 Nader did not introduce Dmitriev to anyone
316  associated with the Trump Campaign before the election.999 Erik Prince is a
317  businessman who had relationships with various individuals associated with the
318  Trump Campaign, including Steve Bannon, Donald Trump Jr., and Roger Stone.1005
319  Prince did not have a formal role in the Campaign, although he offered to host a
320  fundraiser for 993 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 1-2; Nader 1/23/18 302, at 2-3; 5/3/16
321  Email, Nader to Phares; .. 994 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 1-2. 995 Nader 1 /22/18
322  302, at 3. 996 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3; 998 999 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3. 1000
323  1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 1-5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21.
324  148
325
326RESULT: 8
327
328PAGE: 156
329
330TEXT:
331
332  U.S. Department of Justice Atten1e:,,? Werk Predttet // May CetttttiH Mttterittl
333  Preteetecl Under Fed. R Criffl. P. 6(e) Trump and sent unsolicited policy papers
334  on issues such as foreign policy, trade, and Russian election interference to
335  Bannon.1006 After the election, Prince frequently visited transition offices at
336  Trump Tower, primarily to meet with Bannon but on occasion to meet Michael Flynn
337  and others.1007 Prince and Bannon would discuss, inter alia, foreign policy
338  issues and Prince's recommendations regarding who should be appointed to fill
339  key natio~sitions.1008 Although~ affiliated with the transition, Nader---
340  received assurances -that the incoming Administration considered Prince a
341  trusted associate.10 b. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the
342  Incoming Administration , ! A I Investigative Technique ? n ? ? Investigative
343  Technique Investigative Technique I ? . ? ? ? . ? . . . . . . . . .. ?
344  Investigative Technique ? ' Investigative Technique 1006 Prince 4/4/18 302, at
345  l, 3-4; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 19-20; 10/18/16 Email,
346  Prince to Bannon. 1007 Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 6; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 5; Flynn
347  1/24/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302, at 11; Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5, 8; Bannon
348  2/14/18 302, at 20-21; 11/12/16 Email, Prince to Corallo. 1008 Prince 4/4/18
349  302, at 5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21. 1011 l012 1014 1015 Investigative
350  Technique Investigative Technique Investigative Technique Investigative
351  Technique Investigative Technique 149 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6; 1111
352
353RESULT: 9
354
355PAGE: 159
356
357TEXT:
358
359  U.S. Department of Justice Atterttey \?erk Predttet // May Cetttaitt .Mttterial
360  Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Dmitriev.1040 Nader told Dmitriev that
361  the people he met had asked for Dmitriev's bio, and Dmitriev replied that he
362  would update and send it.1041 Nader later received from Dmitriev two files
363  concerning Dmitriev: one was a two-page biography, and the other was a list of
364  Dmitriev's positive quotes about Donald Trump.1042 The next morning, Nader
365  forwarded the message and attachments Dmitriev had sent him to Prince.1043 Nader
366  wrote to Prince that these documents were the versions "to be used with some
367  additional details for them" (with "them" referring to members of the incoming
368  Administration).1044 Prince opened the attachments at Trump Tower within an hour
369  of receiving them.1045 Prince stated that, while he was at Trump Tower that day,
370  he spoke with Kellyanne Conway, Wilbur Ross, Steve Mnuchin, and others while
371  waiting to see Bannon.1046 Cell-site location data for Prince's mobile phone
372  indicates that Prince remained at Trump Tower for approximately three hours.1047
373  Prince said that he could not recall whether, durin those three hours, he met
374  with Bannon and discussed Dmitriev with him.1048 Prince booked a ticket to the
375  Seychelles on January 7, 2017.1050 The following day, Nader wrote to Dmitriev
376  that he had a "pleasant surprise" for him, namely that he had arranged for
377  Dmitriev to meet "a Special Guest" from "the New Team," referring to Prince.1051
378  Nader asked Dmitriev if he could come to the Seychelles for the meeting on
379  January 12, 2017, and Dmitriev agreed.1052 The f9llowing day,~urance from Nader
380  that the Seychelles meeting would be worthwhile.1053 ---Dmitriev was not
381  enthusiastic about the idea of meeting with Prince, and that Nader assured him
382  that Prince wielded influence with the incoming 1040 1/4/17 Text Message, Nader
383  to Prince; 1/4/17 Text Messa es, Nader to Dmitriev (5:24 a.m. -5:26 a.m.); Nader
384  1/22/18 302, at 8-9; 1041 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (7:24:27 a.m.).
385  1042 1/4/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (7:25-7:29 a.m.) 1043 1/4/17 Text
386  Messages, Nader to Prince. 1044 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince; 1045
387  Prince 5/3/18 302, at 1-3. 1046 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2-3. 1047 Cell-site
388  location data for Prince's mobile phone 1048 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 3. 1049 1050
389  1/5/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince. Investigative Technique 1051 1/8/17 Text
390  Messages, Nader to Dmitriev (6:05 -6: 10 p.m.). 1052 1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader
391  & Dmitriev (6: 10 -7:27 p.m.). 1053 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader. 152
392
393RESULT: 10
394
395PAGE: 160
396
397TEXT:
398
399  U.S. Department of Justice Atterttey Wetlc Predtiet // Ma:,1 Cetttaitt Material
400  Prnteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6Ee) Administration.1054 Nader wrote to
401  Dmitriev, "This guy [Prince] is designate?d by Steve [Bannon] to meet you! I
402  know him and he is very very well connected and trusted by the New Team. His
403  sister is now a Minister of Education."1055 According to Nader, Prince had led
404  him to believe that Bannon was aware of Prince's upcoming meeting with Dmitriev,
405  and Prince acknowledged that it was fair for Nader to think that Prince would
406  pass information on to the Transition Team.1056 Bannon, however, told the Office
407  that Prince did not tell him in advance about his meeting with Dmitriev.1057 ii.
408  The Seychelles Meetings Dmitriev arrived with his wife in the Seychelles on
409  January 11, 2017, and checked into the Four Seasons Resort where Crown Prince
410  Mohammed and Nader were staying.1058 Prince arrived that same day.1059 Prince
411  and Dmitriev met for the first time that afternoon in Nader's villa, with Nader
412  present.1060 The initial meeting lasted approximately 30-45 minutes.1061 Prince
413  described the eight years of the Obama Administration in negative terms, and
414  stated that he was looking forward to a new era of cooperation and conflict
415  resolution.1063 According to Prince, he told Dmitriev that Bannon was effective
416  if not conventional, and that Prince provided policy papers to Bannon.1064 1054
417  1055 1/9/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (2:12:56 p.m.); Nader 1/19/18 302,
418  at 13; Ill 1056 Nader 1/19/18 302, at 13; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 3. 1057 Bannon
419  2/14/18 302, at 25-26. 1058 1/10/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (2:05:54
420  -3:30:25 p.m.); 1/11/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (2: 16: 16 -5:17:59
421  p.m.). 1059 1/7/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince. 1060 1/11/17 Text Messages, Nader &
422  Dmitriev (5:18:24 -5:37:14 p.m.); 1062 1063 1064 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4. 1065
423  153
424
425RESULT: 11
426
427PAGE: 161
428
429TEXT:
430
431  U.S. Department of Justice Atteme'.)'" Werk Predt1et ,',' May CeHtttiH Material
432  Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) topic of Russian interference in the 2016
433  election did not come up. Prince added that he would inform Bannon about his
434  meeting with Dmitriev, and that if there was interest in continuin the
435  discussion, Bannon or someone else on the Transition Team would do so.1011
436  Afterwards, Prince returned to his room, where he learned that a Russian
437  aircraft carrier had sailed to Libya, which led him to call Nader and ask him to
438  set up another meeting with Dmitriev. 1073 According to Nader, Prince called and
439  said he had checked with his associates back home and needed to convey to
440  Dmitriev that Libya was "off the table."1074 Nader wrote to Dmitriev that Prince
441  had "received an urgent message that he needs to convey to you immediately," and
442  arranged for himself, Dmitriev, and Prince to meet at a restaurant on the Four
443  Seasons property. 101s At the second meeting, Prince told Dmitriev that the
444  United States could not acce Russian involvement in Lib a because it would make
445  the situation there much worse.1076 1066 1067 1068 1069 Prince 5/3/18 302, at
446  4-5. 1070 1072 1073 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 10; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4; 1075
447  1/11/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (9: 13 :54 -10:24:25 p.m.). Prince,
448  however, denied that and recalled that he was making these remarks to Dmitriev
449  not in an official capacity for the transition but based on his experience as a
450  former naval officer. Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4. 154
451
452RESULT: 12
453
454PAGE: 162
455
456TEXT:
457
458  U.S. Department of Justice Aft6mey 'Nm?k Pr6tit1et // Mfr)1 CetttttiA Material
459  Pretecteci UAE:icr Feti. R. Cri1tt. P. 6(e) 1077 After the brief second meeting
460  concluded, Nader and Dmitriev discussed what had transpired.1078 Dmitriev told
461  Nader that he was disappointed in his meetings with Prince for two reasons:
462  first, he believed the Russians needed to be communicating with someone who had
463  more authority within the incoming Administration than Prince had.1079 Second,
464  he had hoped to have a discussion of greater substance, such as outlinin a
465  strate ic roadmap for both countries to follow.1080 Dmitriev told Nader that
466  Prince's comments -were insulting 1081 Hours after the second meeting, Prince
467  sent two text messages to Bannon from the Seychelles.1082 As described further
468  below, investigators were unable to obtain the content of these or other
469  messages between Prince and Bannon, and the investigation also did not identify
470  evidence of any further communication between Prince and Dmitriev after their
471  meetings in the Seychelles. iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after
472  the Seychelles Trip After the Seychelles meetings, Prince told Nader that he
473  would inform Bannon about his discussion with Dmitriev and would convey that
474  someone within the Russian power structure was interested in seeking better
475  relations with the incoming Administration.1083 On January 12, 2017, Prince
476  contacted Bannon's personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following
477  week.1084 Several days later, Prince messaged her again asking about Bannon's
478  schedule.1085 Prince said that he met Bannon at Bannon's home after returning to
479  the United States in mid-January and briefed him about several topics, including
480  his meeting with Dmitriev .1086 Prince told the Office that he explained to
481  Bannon that Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign wealth fund and was
482  interested in improving relations between the United States and Russia.1087
483  Prince had on his cellphone a screenshot ofDmitriev's Wikipedia page dated
484  January 16, 2017, 1079 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 9, 15; -1080 Nader 1/22/18 302, at
485  15. 1081 1083 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 1 0; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4; 1084 1/12/17
486  Text Messages, Prince to Preate. 1085 1/15/17 Text Message, Prince to Preate.
487  1086 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. 1087 Prince 4/4/18 302,
488  at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. 155
489
490RESULT: 13
491
492PAGE: 163
493
494TEXT:
495
496  U.S. Department of Justice Atlerney ?werk Predt:1et /,' May Cm'ttaitt Material
497  Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) and Prince told the Office that he likely
498  showed that image to Bannon.1088 Prince also believed he provided Bannon with
499  Dmitriev's contact information.1089 According to Prince, Bannon instructed
500  Prince not to follow up with Dmitriev, and Prince had the impression that the
501  issue was not a priority for Bannon.1090 Prince related that Bannon did not
502  appear angry, just relatively uninterested.1091 Bannon, by contrast, told the
503  Office that he never discussed with Prince anything regarding Dmitriev, RDIF, or
504  any meetings with Russian individuals or people associated with Putin.1092
505  Bannon also stated that had Prince mentioned such a meeting, Bannon would have
506  remembered it, and Bannon would have objected to such a meeting having taken
507  place.1093 The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not be
508  independently clarified by reviewing their communications, because neither one
509  was able to produce any of the messages they exchanged in the time period
510  surrounding the Seychelles meeting. Prince's phone contained no text messages
511  prior to March 2017, though provider records indicate that he and Bannon
512  exchanged dozens of messages.1094 Prince denied deleting any messages but
513  claimed he did not know why there were no messages on his device before March
514  2017.1095 Bannon's devices similarly contained no messages in the relevant time
515  period, and Bannon also stated he did not know why messages did not appear on
516  his device.1096 Bannon told the Office that, during both the months before and
517  after the Seychelles meeting, he regularly used his personal Blackberry and
518  personal email for work-related communications (including those with Prince),
519  and he took no steps to preserve these work communications.1097 d. Kirill
520  Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U.S.Russia Relations
521  Dmitriev's contacts during the transition period were not limited to those
522  facilitated by Nader. In approximately late November 2016, the UAE national
523  security advisor introduced Dmitriev to Rick Gerson, a friend of Jared Kushner
524  who runs a hedge fund in New York.1098 Gerson stated he had no formal role in
525  the transition and had no involvement in the Trump 1088 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5;
526  1/16/17 Image on Prince Phone (on file with the Office). 1089 Prince 5/3/18 302,
527  at 5. 1090 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. 1091 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. 1092 Bannon
528  10/26/18 302, at 10-11. 1093 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11. 1094 Call Records of
529  Erik Prince 1095 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 6. 1096 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11;
530  Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 36. 1097 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11. 1098 Gerson 6/5/18
531  302, at 1, 3; 11/26/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/25/17 Text Message,
532  Dmitriev to Nader. 156
533
534RESULT: 14
535
536PAGE: 165
537
538TEXT:
539
540  U.S. Department of Justice Att:erney ',l.Zerk Predttet II Mtty Centttin
541  Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) with.1109 After his trip to the
542  Seychelles, Dmitriev told Gerson that Bannon had asked Prince to meet with
543  Dmitriev and that the two had had a positive meeting.1110 On January 16, 2017,
544  Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U.S.-Russia reconciliation that he and
545  Gerson had been discussing into a two-page document that listed five main
546  points: (1) jointly fighting terrorism; (2) jointly engaging in anti-weapons of
547  mass destruction efforts; (3) developing "win-win" economic and investment
548  initiatives; (4) maintaining an honest, open, and continual dialogue regarding
549  issues of disagreement; and (5) ensuring proper communication and trust by "key
550  people" from each country.1111 On January 18, 2017, Gerson gave a copy of the
551  document to Kushner.1112 Kushner had not heard of Dmitriev at that time.1113
552  Gerson explained that Dmitriev was the head of RDIF, and Gerson may have alluded
553  to Dmitriev's being well connected.1114 Kushner placed the document in a file
554  and said he would get it to the right people.1115 Kushner ultimately gave one
555  copy of the document to Bannon and another to Rex Tillerson; according to
556  Kushner, neither of them followed up with Kushner about it.1116 On January 19,
557  2017, Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two-page document, telling him that this
558  was "a view from our side that I discussed in my meeting on the islands and with
559  you and with our friends. Please share with them -we believe this is a good
560  foundation to start from."1117 Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the
561  document to Kushner soon after delivering it.1118 On January 26, 2017, Dmitriev
562  wrote to Gerson that his "boss"-an apparent reference to Putin-was asking if
563  there had been any feedback on the proposal.1119 Dmitriev said, "[w]e do not
564  want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed. At the same time, my boss
565  asked me to try to have the key US meetings in the next two weeks if
566  possible."1120 He informed Gerson that Putin and President Trump would speak by
567  phone that Saturday, and noted that that information was "very
568  confidential."1121 The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his
569  "boss" again yesterday who had "emphasized that this is a great priority for us
570  and that we need to build this communication 1109 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 4. 1110
571  1 /18/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson. 1111 1/16/17 Text Messages; Dmitriev
572  & Gerson. 1112 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2. 1113 Gerson
573  6/5/18 302, at 3. 1114 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18.302, at 1-2;
574  Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 22. 1115 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3. 1116 Kushner 4/11/18
575  302, at 32. 1117 1/19/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11: 11 :56 a.m.). 1118
576  1/18/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2. 1119 1/26/17
577  Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. 1120 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.
578  1121 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. 158
579
580RESULT: 15
581
582PAGE: 167
583
584TEXT:
585
586  U.S. Department of Justice Attemey Werk Pfedttet // Mlt)1 CtJHtttifl Material
587  Pfeteeted Ur,der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Foresman, at the end of an early December
588  2016 meeting with incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and his
589  designated deputy (K.T. McFarland) in New York, Flynn asked Foresman for his
590  thoughts on Kislyak. Foresman had not met Kislyak but told Flynn that, while
591  Kislyak was an important person, Kislyak did not have a direct line to
592  Putin.1132 Foresman subsequently traveled to Moscow, inquired of a source he
593  believed to be close to Putin, and heard back from that source that Ushakov
594  would be the official channel for the incoming U.S. national security
595  advisor.1133 Foresman acknowledged that Flynn had not asked him to undertake
596  that inquiry in Russia but told the Office that he nonetheless felt obligated to
597  report the information back to Flynn, and that he worked to get a face-to-face
598  meeting with Flynn in January 2017 so that he could do so.1134 Email
599  correspondence suggests that the meeting ultimately went forward, 1135 but Flynn
600  has no recollection of it or of the earlier December meeting.1136 (The
601  investigation did not identify evidence of Flynn or Kushner meeting with Ushakov
602  after being given his name.1137) In the meantime, although he had already formed
603  the impression that Kislyak was not necessarily the right point of contact, 1138
604  Kushner went forward with the meeting that Kislyak had requested on November 16.
605  It took place at Trump Tower on November 30, 2016.1139 At Kushner' s invitation,
606  Flynn also attended; Bannon was invited but did not attend.1140 During the
607  meeting, which lasted approximately 30 minutes, Kushner expressed a desire on
608  the part of the incoming Administration to start afresh with U.S.-Russian
609  relations.1141 Kushner also asked Kislyak to identify the best person (whether
610  Kislyak or someone else) with whom to direct future discussions-someone who had
611  contact with Putin and the ability to speak for him.1142 The three men also
612  discussed U.S. policy toward Syria, and Kislyak floated the idea of having
613  Russian generals brief the Transition Team on the topic using a secure
614  communications line.1143 After Flynn explained that there was no secure line in
615  the Transition Team offices, 1132 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 17. 1133 Foresman
616  10/17/18 302, at 17-18. 1134 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 18. 1135 RMF-SCO-00000015
617  (1/5/17 Email, Foresman to Atencio & Flaherty); RMF-SCO-00000015 (1/5/17 Email,
618  Flaherty to Foresman & Atencio). Office). 1136 9/26/18 Attorney Proffer from
619  Covington & Burling LLP (reflected in email on file with the 1137 Vargas 4/4/18
620  302, at 5. 1138 Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 4. 1139 AKIN_GUMP _BERKOWITZ_0000016-019
621  (11/29/16 Email, Vargas to Kuznetsov). 114? Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 2; NOS00004240
622  (Calendar Invite, Vargas to Kushner & Flynn). 1141 Kushner Strut. at 6. 1142
623  Kushner Strut. at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18. 1143 Kushner Stmt. at 7;
624  Kushner 4/11 /18 302, at 18; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 2. 160
625
626RESULT: 16
627
628PAGE: 176
629
630TEXT:
631
632  U.S. Department of Justice A:ttort1ey Work Prodt:1et ,',' Mtt~' CoHtttiH
633  Mttterittl Proteeted Ut1der Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) imposed sanctions on nine
634  Russian individuals and entities.1222 On December 29, 2016, the Obama
635  Administration also expelled 35 Russian government officials and closed two
636  Russian government-owned compounds in the United States.1223 During the rollout
637  of the sanctions, President-Elect Trump and multiple Transition Team senior
638  officials, including McFarland, Steve Bannon, and Reince Priebus, were staying
639  at the a-Lago club in Palm Beach, Florida. Flynn was on vacation in the
640  Dominican Republic, 1224 but was in daily contact with McFarland.1225 The
641  Transition Team and President-Elect Trump were concerned that these sanctions
642  would harm the United States's relationship with Russia.1226 Although the
643  details and timing of sanctions were unknown on December 28, 2016, the media
644  began reporting that retaliatory measures from the Obama Administration against
645  Russia were forthcoming.1227 When asked about imposing sanctions on Russia for
646  its alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election, President-Elect
647  Trump told the media, "I think we ought to get on with our lives."1228 Russia
648  initiated the outreach to the Transition Team. On the evening of December 28,
649  2016, Kislyak texted Flynn, "can you kindly call me back at your
650  convenience."1229 Flynn did not respond to the text message that evening.
651  Someone from the Russian Embassy also called Flynn the next morning, at 10:38
652  a.m., but they did not talk. 1230 The sanctions were announced publicly on
653  December 29, 2016. 1231 At 1 :53 p.m. that day, McFarland began exchanging
654  emails with multiple Transition Team members and advisors about the impact the
655  sanctions would have on the incoming Administration.1232 At 2:07 p.m., a
656  Transition Team member texted Flynn a link to a New York Times article about the
657  sanctions.1233 At 2:29 1222 Taking Additional Steps to Address the National
658  Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-EnabledActivities, The
659  White House, Office ofthe Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016). 1223 Statement by the
660  President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
661  Harassment, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016). 1224
662  Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 14; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 3-8; Bannon 2/12/18 302,
663  at 5. 1225 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 1; McFarland 11/22/17
664  302, at 3-9. 1226 Flynn 11/17 /l 7 302, at 3. 1227 Christine Wang, US to
665  announce new sanctions against Russia in response to election hacking, CNBC
666  (Dec. 28, 2016). 1228 John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by
667  Russia: "Get on with our lives", Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016). 1229 SF000006
668  (12/28/16 Text Message, Kislyak to Flynn). 123? Call Records of Michael T. Flynn
669  1231 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2-3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 4-5. 1232 12/29/16
670  Email, McFarland to O'Brien et al.; 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.
671  1233 SF00000t (12/29/16 Text Message, Flaherty to Flynn). 169
672
673RESULT: 17
674
675PAGE: 177
676
677TEXT:
678
679  U.S. Department of Justice Atloffle)' Wofk Prodttet II May CoAtail'l Mittertal
680  Proteeted U!'lder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) p.m., McFarland called Flynn, but they
681  did not talk.1234 Shortly thereafter, McFarland and Bannon discussed the
682  sanctions. 1235 According to McFarland, Bannon remarked that the sanctions would
683  hurt their ability to have good relations with Russia, and that Russian
684  escalation would make things more difficult.1236 McFarland believed she told
685  Bannon that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak later that night.1237
686  McFarland also believed she may have discussed the sanctions with Priebus, and
687  likewise told him that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak that night.1238 At
688  3: 14 p.m., Flynn texted a Transition Team member who was assisting McFarland,
689  "Time for a call???"1239 The Transition Team member responded that McFarland was
690  on the phone with Tom Bossert, a Transition Team senior official, to which Flynn
691  responded, "Tit for tat w Russia not good. Russian AMBO reaching out to me
692  today."1240 Flynn recalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about
693  the sanctions until he had heard from the team at Mar-a-Lago.1241 He first spoke
694  with Michael Ledeen, 1242 a Transition Team member who advised on foreign policy
695  and national security matters, for 20 minutes.1243 Flynn then spoke with
696  McFarland for almost 20 minutes to discuss what, if anything, to communicate to
697  Kislyak about the sanctions.1244 On that call, McFarland and Flynn discussed the
698  sanctions, including their potential impact on the incoming Trump
699  Administration's foreign policy goals.1245 McFarland and Flynn also discussed
700  that Transition Team members in Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the
701  situation.1246 They both understood that Flynn would relay a message to Kislyak
702  in hopes of making sure the situation would not get out of hand.1247 1234 Call
703  Records of K.T. McFarland 1235 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6. 1236 McFarland
704  12/22/17 302, at 5-6. 1237 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6. 1238 McFarland 12/22/17
705  302, at 6. 1239 SF00000l (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty). 1240
706  SF00000l (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty). 1241 Flynn 11/20/17 302, at
707  3. 1242 Michael Ledeen is married to Barbara Ledeen, the Senate staffer whose
708  2016 efforts to locate Hillary Clinton's missing emails are described in Volume
709  I, Section III.D.2, supra. 7. 1243 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3; Call Records of
710  Michael Ledeen 1244 Fl nn 11/17 /17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense ;
711  Call Records of Michael T. Flynn 1245 Flynn 11/17117 302, at 3-4 1246 Flynn
712  11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense ,r 3( c); McFarland 12/22/17
713  302, at 6-1247 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7. 170
714
715RESULT: 18
716
717PAGE: 178
718
719TEXT:
720
721  U.S. Department of Justice /\tleffle)" Werk Pred1:1et // Mity Cml:taiH Material
722  Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Immediately after speaking with McFarland,
723  Flynn called and spoke with Kislyak.1248 Flynn discussed multiple topics with
724  Kislyak, including the sanctions, scheduling a video teleconference between
725  President-Elect Trump and Putin, an upcoming terrorism conference, and Russia's
726  views about the Middle East.1249 With respect to the sanctions, Flynn requested
727  that Russia not escalate the situation, not get into a "tit for tat," and only
728  respond to the sanctions in a reciprocal manner.1250 Multiple Transition Team
729  members were aware that Flynn was speaking with Kislyak that day. In addition to
730  her conversations with Bannon and Reince Priebus, at 4:43 p.m., McFarland sent
731  an email to Transition Team members about the sanctions, informing the group
732  that "Gen [F]lynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening."1251 Less than
733  an hour later, McFarland briefed President-Elect Trump. Bannon, Priebus, Sean
734  Spicer, and other Transition Team members were present.1252 During the briefing,
735  President-Elect Trump asked McFarland if the Russians did "it," meaning the
736  intrusions intended to influence the presidential election.1253 McFarland said
737  yes, and President-Elect Trump expressed doubt that it was the Russians.1254
738  McFarland also discussed potential Russian responses to the sanctions, and said
739  Russia's response would be an indicator of what the Russians wanted going
740  forward.1255 President-Elect Trump opined that the sanctions provided him with
741  leverage to use with the Russians.1256 McFarland recalled that at the end of the
742  meeting, someone may have mentioned to President-Elect Trump that Flynn was
743  speaking to the Russian ambassador that evening.1257 After the briefing, Flynn
744  and McFarland spoke over the phone.1258 Flynn reported on the substance of his
745  call with Kislyak, including their discussion of the sanctions.1259 According to
746  McFarland, Flynn mentioned that the Russian response to the sanctions was not
747  going to be escalatory because they wanted a good relationship with the incoming
748  Administration.1260 McFarland also gave Flynn a summary of her recent briefing
749  with President-Elect Trump.1261 1248 Flynn Statement of Offense ,r 3(d). 1249
750  Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense ,r 3(c); 12/30/16 Email,
751  Flynn to McFarland. 125? Flynn 11/17 /17 302, at 1; Flynn Statement of Offense
752  ,r 3(d). 1251 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al. 1252 12/29/16 Email,
753  Westerhoutto Flaherty; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 1253 McFarland 12/22/17
754  302, at 7. 1254 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 1255 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
755  1256 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 1257 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 1258
756  McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 1259 Flynn 11/17 /17 302, at 4; Flynn Statement of
757  Offense ,r 3(e). 1260 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 8. 1261 McFarland 12/22/17 302,
758  at 8. 171
759
760RESULT: 19
761
762PAGE: 179
763
764TEXT:
765
766  U.S. Department of Justice Attet?Hey \l/erk Predttet // Mtty CeHtttiH Mttterittl
767  Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) The next day, December 30, 2016, Russian
768  Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that Russia would respond in kind to the
769  sanctions.1262 Putin superseded that comment two hours later, releasing a
770  statement that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the
771  sanctions at that time.1263 Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great
772  move on delay (by V. Putin)."1264 Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message
773  to McFarland summarizing his call with Kislyak from the day before, which she
774  emailed to Kushner, Bannon, Priebus, and other Transition Team members.1265 The
775  text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics discussed
776  with Kislyak.1266 Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion
777  of sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama
778  Administration's foreign policy.1267 On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn
779  and told him the request had been received at the highest levels and that Russia
780  had chosen not to retaliate to the sanctions in response to the request.1268 Two
781  hours later, Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with
782  Kislyak.1269 According to McFarland, Flynn remarked that the Russians wanted a
783  better relationship and that the relationship was back on track. 127? Flynn also
784  told McFarland that he believed his phone call had made a difference.1271
785  McFarland recalled congratulating Flynn in response.1272 Flynn spoke with other
786  Transition Team members that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the
787  sanctions.1273 Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the next day
788  and that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversation with Kislyak.1274
789  Bannon, 1262 Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on recent US sanctions
790  and the expulsion of Russian diplomats, Moscow, December 20, 2016, The Ministry
791  ofForeign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Dec. 30, 2016 (5:32 a.m.)). 1263
792  Statement of the President of the Russian Federation, Kremlin, Office of the
793  President (Dec. 30, 2016 (7:15 a.m.)). 1264 @realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (11:41
794  a.m.) Tweet. 1265 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to McFarland; 12/30/16 Email, McFarland
795  to Kushner et al. 1266 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al. 1267 Flynn
796  11/17/17 302, at 4. 1268 Call Records of Michael T. Flynn ; Flynn 11/17/17 302,
797  at l; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense iJ3(g). 1269 Call
798  Records of Michael T. Flynn ; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3;
799  McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 1270 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 1271
800  McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 1272 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 1273 Flynn
801  11/17 /17 302, !1t 5-6. 1274 Flynn 11/21/17 3 02, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at
802  3; Flynn 1 /19/17 302, at 5; Flynn Statement of Offense ,r 3(h). 172
803
804RESULT: 20
805
806PAGE: 180
807
808TEXT:
809
810  U.S. Department of Justice Atterttey Werk Predttet /,' Ma,? Cetttaitt Material
811  Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) for his part, recalled meeting with
812  Flynn that day, but said that he did not remember discussing sanctions with him.
813  1275 Additional information about Flynn's sanctions-related discussions with
814  Kislyak, and the handling of those discussions by the Transition Team and the
815  Trump Administration, is provided in Volume II of this report. * * * In sum, the
816  investigation established multiple links between Trump Campaign officials and
817  individuals tied to the Russian government. Those links included Russian offers
818  of assistance to the Campaign. In some instances, the Campaign was receptive to
819  the offer, while in other instances the Campaign officials shied away.
820  Ultimately, the investigation did not establish that the Campaign coordinated or
821  conspired with the Russian government in its election-interference activities.
822  1275 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 9. 173
823
824RESULT: 21
825
826PAGE: 229
827
828TEXT:
829
830  U.S. Department of Justice Attef'Re~? Wef'k Pl'etittet // May CeRtaiR Material
831  Preteetetl UReef" Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) and Harm to Ongoing Matter 26 oke to
832  Trump~;;;;~;~;~;;~;.,;~; ; Manafort recalled that Trump responded that Manafort
833  should keep Trump u~ty campaign manager Rick Gates said that Man~ssure about
834  -information and that Manafort instructed Gates~ status updates on u com in
835  releases.28 Around the same time Gates was with Trump on a trip to an airport ,
836  and shortly after the call ended, Trum2 told Gates that more releases of
837  damaging information would be coming.29 i:?jih??l?Uf?MhflrlfDiM -were discussed
838  within the Campaign,3? and in the summer of 2016, the Campaign was planning a
839  communications strategy based on the possible release of Clinton emails by
840  WikiLeaks.31 3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking
841  to Aid Candidate Trump In the days that followed WikiLeaks's July 22, 2016
842  release of hacked DNC emails, the Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions
843  that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump. On July 26, 2016, Trump tweeted
844  that it was "[c]razy" to suggest that Russia was "dealing with Trump"32 and that
845  "[f]or the record," he had "ZERO investments in Russia."33 In a press conference
846  the next day, July 27, 2016, Trump characterized "this whole thing with Russia"
847  as "a total deflection" and stated that it was "farfetched" and "ridiculous."34
848  Trump said that the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven,
849  but stated that it would give him "no pause" if Russia had Clinton's emails.35
850  Trump added, "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000
851  emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded President's
852  activities, and his own criminal conduct, is descriped in Volume II, Section
853  ILK, infra, and in Volume I, Section IV.A. I, supra. 26 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8.
854  27 . As explained in footnote 197 of Volume I, Section III.D. l.b, supra, this
855  Office has included Manafort's account of these events because it aligns with
856  those of other witnesses and is corroborated to that extent. 28 Gates l 0/25/18
857  302, at 4. 29 Gates I 0/25/ 18 302, at 4. 30 Bannon 1/18/ l 9 3 02, at 3.
858  31Gates4/11/18302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18302, at2(messa~ formed in
859  June/Jul timeframe based on claims b Assan eon June 12, 2016, ----. ).
860  32@rea!DonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:47 p.m. ET) Tweet. 33 @realDonaldTrump 7/26/16
861  (6:50 p.m. ET) Tweet. 34 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-S PAN
862  (July 27, 2016). 35 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July
863  27, 2016). 18
864
865RESULT: 22
866
867PAGE: 231
868
869TEXT:
870
871  U.S. Department of Justice AttorHey Work Protittet // Ma,.? CotttaiH Material
872  Proteeteti UHaer Fee. R. Griff!. P. 6(e) advisors had developed a "party line"
873  that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections to Russia.45 In
874  addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump Campaign reacted to
875  reports of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign by seeking to
876  distance itself from Russian contacts. For example, in August 2016, foreign
877  policy advisor J.D. Gordon declined an invitation to Russian Ambassador Sergey
878  Kislyak's residence because the timing was "not optimal" in view of media
879  reports about Russian interference.46 On August 19, 2016, Manafort was asked to
880  resign amid media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political
881  party in Ukraine and links to Russian business.47 And when the media published
882  stories about Page's connections to Russia in September 2016, Trump Campaign
883  officials terminated Page's association with the Campaign and told the press
884  that he had played "no role" in the Campaign.48 On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks
885  released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian intelligence agency from
886  Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta.49 The same day, the federal government
887  announced that "the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of
888  e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political
889  organizations."50 The government statement directly linked Russian hacking to
890  the releases on WikiLeaks, with the goal of interfering with the presidential
891  election, and concluded "that only Russia's senior-most officials could have
892  authorized these activities" based on their "scope and sensitivity."51 On
893  October 11, 2016, Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating
894  Russia's hacking and said that candidate Trump might have known in advance that
895  the hacked emails were going to be released.52 Vice Presidential Candidate Mike
896  Pence was asked whether the Trump 45 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at I; Cohen 9/18/18
897  302, at 3-5. The formation of the "party line" is described in greater detail in
898  Volume II, Section Il.K, infra. 46 DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to
899  Pchelyakov) (stating that "[t]hese days are not optimal for us, as we are busily
900  knocking down a stream of false media stories"). The invitation and Gordon's
901  response are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.7.a, supra. 47 See, e.g., Amber
902  Phillips, Paul Manafort's complicated ties to Ukraine, explained, Washington
903  Post (Aug. 19, 2016) ("There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with
904  investigations into [Manafort's] ties to a pro-Russian political party in
905  Ukraine."); Tom Winter & Ken Dilanian, Donald Trump Aide Paul Manafort
906  Scrutinized for Russian Business Ties, NBC (Aug. 18, 2016). Relevant events
907  involving Manafort are discussed in Volume 1, Section IV.A.8, supra. 48 Michael
908  Isikoff, U.S. intel officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin,
909  Yahoo News (Sep. 23, 2016); see, e.g., 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon;
910  9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon & S. Miller; Page 3/16/17 302, at 2. 49
911  @WikiLeaks 10/7/16 (4:32 p.m. ET) Tweet. 50 Joint Statement from the Department
912  Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on
913  Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). 51 Joint Statement from the Department Of
914  Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on
915  Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). 52 John Wagner & Anne Gearan, Clinton
916  campaign chairman ties email hack to Russians, suggests Trump had early warning,
917  Washington Post (Oct. 11, 2016). 20
918
919RESULT: 23
920
921PAGE: 232
922
923TEXT:
924
925  U.S. Department of Justice Atteffl:e)' Werk Predttet // Ma:)? Cefl:ta:ifl:
926  Ma:teria:l Preteeted Ufl:der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Campaign was "in cahoots"
927  with WikiLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information and responded,
928  "Nothing could be further from the truth."53 4. After the Election, Trump
929  Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided
930  his Election On November 8, 2016, Trump was elected President. Two days later,
931  Russian officials told the press that the Russian government had maintained
932  contacts with Trump's "immediate entourage" during the campaign.54 In response,
933  Hope Hicks, who had been the Trump Campaign spokesperson, said, "We are not
934  aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with any foreign
935  entities before yesterday, when Mr. Trump spoke with many world leaders."55
936  Hicks gave an additional statement denying any contacts between the Campaign and
937  Russia: "It never happened. There was no communication between the campaign and
938  any foreign entity during the campaign."56 On December 10, 2016, the press
939  reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had "concluded that Russia interfered
940  in last month's presidential election to boost Donald Trump's bid for the White
941  House."57 Reacting to the story the next day, President-Elect Trump stated, "I
942  think it's ridiculous. I think it's just another excuse."58 He continued that no
943  one really knew who was responsible for the hacking, suggesting that the
944  intelligence community had "no idea if it's Russia or China or somebody. It
945  could be somebody sitting in a bed some place."59 The President-Elect 53 Louis
946  Nelson, Pence denies Trump camp in cahoots with WikiLeaks, Politico (Oct. 14,
947  2016). 54 Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump
948  Allies, Diplomat Says, New York Times (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Russian Deputy
949  Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov saying, "[t]here were contacts" and "[ cannot
950  say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian
951  representatives"); Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump;
952  says contacts underway, Associated Press (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Ryabkov
953  saying, "I don't say that all of them, but a whole array of them supported
954  contacts with Russian representatives"). 55 Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials
955  Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says, New York Times (Nov. 11, 2016)
956  (quoting Hicks). 56 Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with
957  Trump; says contacts underway, Associated Press (Nov. I 0, 2016) (quoting
958  Hicks). Hicks recalled that after she made that statement, she spoke with
959  Campaign advisors Kellyanne Conway, Stephen Miller, Jason Miller, and probably
960  Kushner and Bannon to ensure it was accurate, and there was no hesitation or
961  pushback from any of them. Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 4. 57 Damien Gayle, CIA
962  concludes Russia interfered to help Trump win election, say reports, Guardian
963  (Dec. 10, 2016). 58 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with
964  President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016). 59 Chris
965  Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ
966  Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016). 21
967
968RESULT: 24
969
970PAGE: 234
971
972TEXT:
973
974  U.S. Department of Justice AM:ome, Work Protl1:1et // Mtty Contttin Mttterittl
975  Proteetetl Untler Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) electability.69 The assessment further
976  concluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian government had
977  developed a clear preference for Trump.70 Several days later, BuzzFeed published
978  unverified allegations compiled by former British intelligence officer
979  Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump's Russia
980  connections under the headline "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To
981  Russia."71 In a press conference the next day, the President-Elect called the
982  release "an absolute disgrace" and said, "I have no dealings with Russia. I have
983  no deals that could happen in Russia, because we've stayed away .... So I have
984  no deals, I have no loans and I have no dealings. We could make deals in Russia
985  very easily ifwe wanted to, I just don't want to because I think that would be a
986  conflict."72 Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories
987  about his Russian connections, the Russia investigations, and the intelligence
988  community assessment of Russian interference as a threat to the legitimacy of
989  his electoral victory.73 Hicks, for example, said that the President-Elect
990  viewed the intelligence community assessment as his "Achilles heel" because,
991  even if Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped
992  him win, taking away from what he had accomplished.74 Sean Spicer, the first
993  White House communications director, recalled that the President thought the
994  Russia story was developed to undermine the legitimacy of his election.75 Gates
995  said the President viewed the Russia investigation as an attack on the
996  legitimacy of his win.76 And Priebus recalled that when the intelligence
997  assessment came out, the President-Elect was concerned people would question the
998  legitimacy of his win.77 69 Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
999  Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election, at 1
1000  (Jan. 6, 2017). 70 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russia's
1001  Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election, at 1 (Jan. 6,
1002  2017). 71 Ken Bensinger et al., These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To
1003  Russia, BuzzFeed (Jan. 10, 2017). 72 Donald Trump's News Conference: Full
1004  Transcript and Video, New York Times (Jan. 11, 2017), available at
1005  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01 / 11/us/politics/trump-presstranscript. htm I.
1006  73 Priebus I 0/13/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18; Spicer 10/16/ I 7 302,
1007  at 6; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 2; Gates 4/18/ I 8 302, at 3; see Pompeo 6/28/17
1008  302, at 2 (the President believed that the purpose of the Russia investigation
1009  was to delegitimize his presidency). 74 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18. 75 Spicer
1010  10/17/17 302, at 6. 76 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 3. 77 Priebus I 0/13/ 17 302, at 7.
1011  23
1012
1013RESULT: 25
1014
1015PAGE: 236
1016
1017TEXT:
1018
1019  U.S. Department of Justice Att6f'fle~? '.Verlc PrnEittet // May C6Htaift
1020  Material Pr6teeteEI Ut1Eier Fee. R. Crim. P. e(e) Flynn, who was in the
1021  Dominican Republic at the time, and K.T. McFarland, who was slated to become the
1022  Deputy National Security Advisor and was at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida
1023  with the President-Elect and other senior staff, talked by phone about what, if
1024  anything, Flynn should communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions.82 McFarland
1025  had spoken with incoming Administration officials about the sanctions and
1026  Russia's possible responses and thought she had mentioned in those conversations
1027  that Flynn was scheduled to speak with Kislyak.83 Based on those conversations,
1028  McFarland informed Flynn that incoming Administration officials at Lago did not
1029  want Russia to escalate the situation.84 At 4:43 p.m. that afternoon, McFarland
1030  sent an email to several officials about the sanctions and informed the group
1031  that "Gen [F]lynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening."85
1032  Approximately one hour later, McFarland met with the President-Elect and senior
1033  officials and briefed them on the sanctions and Russia's possible responses.86
1034  Incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus recalled that McFarland may have
1035  mentioned at the meeting that the sanctions situation could be "cooled down" and
1036  not escalated.87 McFarland recalled that at the end of the meeting, someone may
1037  have mentioned to the President-Elect that Flynn was speaking to the Russian
1038  Ambassador that evening.88 McFarland did not recall any response by the Elect.89
1039  Priebus recalled that the President-Elect viewed the sanctions as an attempt by
1040  the Obama Administration to embarrass him by delegitimizing his election.90
1041  Immediately after discussing the sanctions with McFarland on December 29, 2016,
1042  Flynn called Kislyak and requested that Russia respond to the sanctions only in
1043  a reciprocal manner, without escalating the situation.91 After the call, Flynn
1044  briefed McFarland on its substance.92 Flynn told McFarland that the Russian
1045  response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory because Russia wanted a
1046  good relationship with the Trump Administration.93 On December 30, 2016, Russian
1047  President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory
1048  measures 82 Statement of Offense at 2-3, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, 1: l
1049  7-cr-232 (0.0.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 4 (Flynn Statement of Offense); Flynn
1050  11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7.
1051  83 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 4-7 (recalling discussions about this issue with
1052  Bannon and Priebus). 84 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at
1053  3-4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7. 85 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et
1054  al. 86 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 87 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 3. 88 McFarland
1055  12/22/17 302, at 7. Priebus thought it was possible that McFarland had mentioned
1056  Flynn's scheduled call with Kislyak at this meeting, although he was not
1057  certain. Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 3. 89 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 90 Priebus
1058  1/18/18 302, at 3. 91 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at
1059  3-4. 92 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7-8; Flynn
1060  11/17/17 302, at 4. 93 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 8. 25
1061
1062RESULT: 26
1063
1064PAGE: 237
1065
1066TEXT:
1067
1068  U.S. Department of Justice Atteffley Werk Prec41:tet // May Cefltaifl Material
1069  Preteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) in response to the sanctions at that time
1070  and would instead "plan ... further steps to restore RussianUS relations based
1071  on the policies of the Trump Administration."94 Following that announcement, the
1072  President-Elect tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. Putin) -I always knew he
1073  was very smart!"95 On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him that
1074  Flynn's request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen
1075  not to retaliate in response to the request.96 Later that day, Flynn told
1076  McFarland about this follow-up conversation with Kislyak and Russia's decision
1077  not to escalate the sanctions situation based on Flynn's request.97 McFarland
1078  recalled that Flynn thought his phone call had made a difference.98 Flynn spoke
1079  with other incoming Administration officials that day, but does not recall
1080  whether they discussed the sanctions.99 Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions
1081  issue with incoming Administration official Stephen Bannon the next day.10?
1082  Flynn said that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversations with
1083  Kislyak, and he and Bannon agreed that they had "stopped the train on Russia's
1084  response" to the sanctions.101 On January 3, 2017, Flynn saw the President-Elect
1085  in person and thought they discussed the Russian reaction to the sanctions, but
1086  Flynn did not have a specific recollection of telling the President-Elect about
1087  the substance of his calls with Kislyak.102 Members of the intelligence
1088  community were surprised by Russia's decision not to retaliate in response to
1089  the sanctions.103 When analyzing Russia's response, they became aware of Flynn's
1090  discussion of sanctions with Kislyak.104 Previously, the FBI had opened an
1091  investigation of Flynn based on his relationship with the Russian govemment.105
1092  Flynn's contacts with Kislyak became a key component of that investigation.106
1093  94 Statement by the President of Russia, President of Russia (Dec. 30, 2016)
1094  12/30/16. 95 @realDonaldTrump 12/30/ I 6 (2:41 p.m. ET) Tweet. 96 Flynn 1 /19/
1095  18 3 02, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3. 97 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 3;
1096  Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 6; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10; Flynn Statement of
1097  Offense, at 3. 98 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 1 O; see Flynn 1 /19/ 18 302, at 4.
1098  99 Flynn 11 /17117 302, at 5-6. 10? Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 4-5. Bannon recalled
1099  meeting with Flynn that day, but said he did not remember discussing sanctions
1100  with him. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 9. 101 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at I; Flynn 1/19/18
1101  302, at 5. 102 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 6; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 6. to3 McCord
1102  7/17/17 302, at 2. to4 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2. 105 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2-3;
1103  Corney 11/15/17 302, at 5. 106McCord 7/17/17 302, at2-3. 26
1104
1105RESULT: 27
1106
1107PAGE: 243
1108
1109TEXT:
1110
1111  U.S. Department of Justice AH:erfl:e~? \llerk PreElttet // May Cefl:taiH.
1112  Material PreteeteEI Ufl:Eler FeEI. R. Crim. P. 6(e) instructed McGahn to work
1113  with Priebus and Bannon to look into the matter further and directed that they
1114  not discuss it with any other officials. 154 Priebus recalled that the President
1115  was angry with Flynn in light of what Yates had told the White House and said,
1116  "not again, this guy, this stuff." I 55 That evening, the President dined with
1117  several senior advisors and asked the group what they thought about FBI Director
1118  Comey.156 According to Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, who was at
1119  the dinner, no one openly advocated terminating Corney but the consensus on him
1120  was not positive.157 Coats told the group that he thought Corney was a good
1121  director.158 Coats encouraged the President to meet Corney face-to-face and
1122  spend time with him before making a decision about whether to retain him.159 5.
1123  McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President Trump has
1124  Dinner with FBI Director Corney The next day, January 27, 2017, McGahn and
1125  Eisenberg discussed the results of Eisenberg's initial legal research into
1126  Flynn's conduct, and specifically whether Flynn may have violated the Espionage
1127  Act, the Logan Act, or 18 U.S.C. ? 1001.160 Based on his preliminary research,
1128  Eisenberg informed McGahn that there was a possibility that Flynn had violated
1129  18 U.S.C. ? 1001 and the Logan Act. 161 Eisenberg noted that the United States
1130  had never successfully prosecuted an individual under the Logan Act and that
1131  Flynn could have possible defenses, and 154 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7; SCRO
1132  15_000 I 98-99 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel
1133  to the President). 155 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 8. Several witnesses said that
1134  the President was unhappy with Flynn for other reasons at this time. Bannon said
1135  that Flynn's standing with the President was not good by December 2016. Bannon
1136  2/12/18 302, at 12. The President-Elect had concerns because President Obama had
1137  warned him about Flynn shortly after the election. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 4-5;
1138  Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 7 (President Obama's comment sat with President-Elect
1139  Trump more than Hicks expected). Priebus said that the President had become
1140  unhappy with Flynn even before the story of his calls with Kislyak broke and had
1141  become so upset with Flynn that he would not look at him during intelligence
1142  briefings. Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 8. Hicks said that the President thought
1143  Flynn had bad judgment and was angered by tweets sent by Flynn and his son, and
1144  she described Flynn as "being on thin ice" by early February 2017. Hicks 12/8/17
1145  302, at 7, 10. 156 Coats 6/ 14/17 302, at 2. 157 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2. 158
1146  Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2. 159 Coats 6/14/17 3 02, at 2. 160 SCR015_000199
1147  (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
1148  President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8. 161 SCR015_000199 (2/15/17 Draft
1149  Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); Eisenberg
1150  11/29/17 302, at 9. 32
1151
1152RESULT: 28
1153
1154PAGE: 244
1155
1156TEXT:
1157
1158  U.S. Department of Justice At:tertte~? Werk Prmhtet // May CetttaiH: Material
1159  Pi=eteetecl UH:cler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) told McGahn that he believed it was
1160  unlikely that a prosecutor would pursue a Logan Act charge under the
1161  circumstances.162 That same morning, McGahn asked Yates to return to the White
1162  House to discuss Flynn again.I63 In that second meeting, McGahn expressed doubts
1163  that the Department of Justice would bring a Logan Act prosecution against
1164  Flynn, but stated that the White House did not want to take action that would
1165  interfere with an ongoing FBI investigation of Flynn.164 Yates responded that
1166  Department ofJustice had notified the White House so that it could take action
1167  in response to the infonnation provided.165 McGahn ended the meeting by asking
1168  Yates for access to the underlying information the Department of Justice
1169  possessed pertaining to Flynn's discussions with Kislyak.166 Also on January 27,
1170  the President called FBI Director Corney and invited him to dinner that
1171  evening.167 Priebus recalled that before the dinner, he told the President
1172  something like, "don't talk about Russia, whatever you do," and the President
1173  promised he would not talk about Russia at the dinner.168 McGahn had previously
1174  advised the President that he should not communicate directly with the
1175  Department of Justice to avoid the perception or reality of political
1176  interference in law enforcement.169 When Bannon learned about the President's
1177  planned dinner with Corney, he suggested that he or Priebus also attend, but the
1178  President stated that he wanted to dine with Corney alone.17? Corney said that
1179  when he arrived for the dinner that evening, he was surprised and concerned to
1180  see that no one else had been invited.171 162 SCR0l5_000199 (2/15/17 Draft
1181  Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); Eisenberg
1182  11 /29/17 302, at 9. 163 SCR015_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from
1183  the Office of the Counsel to the President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8; Yates
1184  8/15/17 302, at 8. 164 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8. 165
1185  Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 5; see SCR015_00199 (2/15/17
1186  Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President)
1187  ("Yates was unwilling to confirm or deny that there was an ongoing investigation
1188  but did indicate that the Department of Justice would not object to the White
1189  House taking action against Flynn."). 166 Yates 9/15~17 302, at 9; Burnham
1190  11/3/17 302, at 5. In accordance with McGahn's request, the Department of
1191  Justice made the underlying information available and Eisenberg viewed the
1192  information in early February. Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17
1193  Electronic Communication, at I (documenting 2/2/17 meeting with Eisenberg). 167
1194  Corney 11/15/17 302, at 6; SCR0l2b_000O0I (President's Daily Diary, 1/27/17);
1195  Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence
1196  Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B.
1197  Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 2-3). 168 Priebus I 0/ 13/17 302, at 17.
1198  169 See McGahn I 1 /30/17 302, at 9; Dhillon 11 /21 /17 302, at 2; Bannon 2/ 12/
1199  18 302, at 17. 170 Bannon 2/ 12/1 8 302, at 17. 171 Hearing on Russian Election
1200  Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June
1201  8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the
1202  FBI, at 3); see Corney 11/15/17 302, at 6. 33
1203
1204RESULT: 29
1205
1206PAGE: 253
1207
1208TEXT:
1209
1210  U.S. Department of Justice AttorRey Werk Pretiuet // May CoRtaifl Material
1211  Preteeteti URtier Feti. R. Crim. P. 6(e) a press conference and said that he
1212  removed Flynn because Flynn "didn't tell the Vice President of the United States
1213  the facts, and then he didn't remember. And that just wasn't acceptable to
1214  me."247 The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with
1215  Kislyak, but "it certainly would have been okay with me if he did. I would have
1216  directed him to do it if I thought he wasn't doing it. I didn't direct him, but
1217  I would have directed him because that's his job."248 In listing the reasons for
1218  terminating Flynn, the President did not say that Flynn had lied to him.249 The
1219  President also denied having any connection to Russia, stating, "I have nothing
1220  to do with Russia. I told you, I have no deals there. I have no anything."250
1221  The President also said he "had nothing to do with" WikiLeaks's publication of
1222  information hacked from the Clinton campaign.251 9. The President Attempts to
1223  Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn's
1224  Discussions with Kislyak On February 22, 2017, Priebus and Bannon told McFarland
1225  that the President wanted her to resign as Deputy National Security Advisor, but
1226  they suggested to her that the Administration could make her the ambassador to
1227  Singapore.252 The next day, the President asked Priebus to have McFarland draft
1228  an internal email that would confirm that the President did not direct Flynn to
1229  call the Russian Ambassador about sanctions.253 Priebus said he told the
1230  President he would only direct McFarland to write such a letter if she were
1231  comfortable with it.254 Priebus called McFarland into his office to convey the
1232  President's request that she memorialize in writing that the President did not
1233  direct Flynn to talk to Kislyak.255 McFarland told Priebus she did not know
1234  whether the President had directed Flynn to talk to Kislyak about sanctions, and
1235  she declined to say yes or no 247 Remarks by President Trump in Press
1236  Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 248 Remarks by President Trump in Press
1237  Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). The President also said that Flynn's
1238  conduct "wasn't wrong -what he did in terms of the information he saw." The
1239  President said that Flynn was just "doing the job," and "if anything, he did
1240  something right." 249 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White
1241  House (Feb. 16, 2017); Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9. 250 Remarks by President Trump
1242  in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 251 Remarks by President Trump
1243  in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 252 KTMF _ 00000047 (McFarland
1244  2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 16-17. 253 See
1245  Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11; see also KTMF _00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17
1246  Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. 254 Priebus 1 I I 8/
1247  18 302, at 1 1. 255 KTMF _ 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/ 17 Memorandum for the
1248  Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. 42
1249
1250RESULT: 30
1251
1252PAGE: 257
1253
1254TEXT:
1255
1256  U.S. Department of Justice A1:terAe~1 Werk Pretittet // May CeAtaiA Material
1257  Preteeteti Ui,tier Feti. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) testified that he understood the
1258  President's statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the way Corney
1259  reacted at the time. b. Nexus to a proceeding. To establish a nexus to a
1260  proceeding, it would be necessary to show that the President could reasonably
1261  foresee and actually contemplated that the investigation of Flynn was likely to
1262  lead to a grand jury investigation or prosecution. At the time of the
1263  President's one-on-one meeting with Corney, no grand jury subpoenas had been
1264  issued as part of the FBI's investi ation into Fl nn. But Fl nn's lies to the
1265  FBI violated federal criminal law, , and resulted in Flynn's prosecution for
1266  violating 18 U .S.C. ? 100 I. By the time the President spoke to Corney about
1267  Flynn, DOJ officials had informed McGahn, who informed the President, that
1268  Flynn's statements to senior White House officials about his contacts with
1269  Kislyak were not true and that Flynn had told the same version of events to the
1270  FBI. McGahn also informed the President that Flynn's conduct could violate 18
1271  U.S.C. ? l 001. After the Vice President and senior White House officials
1272  reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's calls on February 10, 2017,
1273  they believed that Flynn could not have forgotten his conversations with Kislyak
1274  and concluded that he had been lying. In addition, the President's instruction
1275  to the FBI Director to "let[] Flynn go" suggests his awareness that Flynn could
1276  face criminal exposure for his conduct and was at risk of prosecution. c.
1277  Intent. As part of our investigation, we examined whether the President had a
1278  personal stake in the outcome of an investigation into Flynn-for example,
1279  whether the President was aware of Flynn's communications with Kislyak close in
1280  time to when they occurred, such that the President knew that Flynn had lied to
1281  senior White House officials and that those lies had been passed on to the
1282  public. Some evidence suggests that the President knew about the existence and
1283  content of Flynn's calls when they occurred, but the evidence is inconclusive
1284  and could not be relied upon to establish the President's knowledge. In advance
1285  of Flynn's initial call with Kislyak, the President attended a meeting where the
1286  sanctions were discussed and an advisor may have mentioned that Flynn was
1287  scheduled to talk to Kislyak. Flynn told McFarland about the substance of his
1288  calls with Kislyak and said they may have made a difference in Russia's
1289  response, and Flynn recalled talking to Bannon in early January 2017 about how
1290  they had successfully "stopped the train on Russia's response" to the sanctions.
1291  It would have been reasonable for Flynn to have wanted the President to know of
1292  his communications with Kislyak because Kislyak told Flynn his request had been
1293  received at the highest levels in Russia and that Russia had chosen not to
1294  retaliate in response to the request, and the President was pleased by the
1295  Russian response, calling it a "[g]reat move." And the President never said
1296  publicly or internally that Flynn had lied to him about the calls with Kislyak.
1297  But McFarland did not recall providing the President-Elect with Flynn's read-out
1298  of his calls with Kislyak, and Flynn does not have a specific recollection of
1299  telling the President-Elect directly about the calls. Bannon also said he did
1300  not recall hearing about the calls from Flynn. And in February 2017, the
1301  President asked Flynn what was discussed on the calls and whether he had lied to
1302  the Vice President, suggesting that he did not already know. Our investigation
1303  accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew
1304  about Flynn's discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified
1305  the White House of those discussions in late January 2017. The evidence also
1306  does not establish that Flynn otherwise 46
1307
1308RESULT: 31
1309
1310PAGE: 258
1311
1312TEXT:
1313
1314  U.S. Department of Justice AMerf'le)' Werk Preettet // May Cetttaitt Material
1315  Preteetee Utteer Fee. R. Griff!. P. 6(e) possessed information damaging to the
1316  President that would give the President a personal incentive to end the FBI's
1317  inquiry into Flynn's conduct. Evidence does establish that the President
1318  connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI's broader Russia investigation and
1319  that he believed, as he told Christie, that terminating Flynn would end "the
1320  whole Russia thing." Flynn's firing occurred at a time when the media and
1321  Congress were raising questions about Russia's interference in the election and
1322  whether members of the President's campaign had colluded with Russia. Multiple
1323  witnesses recalled that the President viewed the Russia investigations as a
1324  challenge to the legitimacy of his election. The President paid careful
1325  attention to negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger
1326  when the story broke disclosing that Flynn had discussed sanctions with Kislyak.
1327  Just hours before meeting one-on-one with Corney, the President told Christie
1328  that firing Flynn would put an end to the Russia inquiries. And after Christie
1329  pushed back, telling the President that firing Flynn would not end the Russia
1330  investigation, the President asked Christie to reach out to Corney and convey
1331  that the President liked him and he was part of "the team." That afternoon, the
1332  President cleared the room and asked Corney to "let[] Flynn go." We also sought
1333  evidence relevant to assessing whether the President's direction to Corney was
1334  motivated by sympathy towards Flynn. In public statements the President
1335  repeatedly described Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia
1336  investigation, and the President directed advisors to reach out to Flynn to tell
1337  him the President "care[d]" about him and felt bad for him. At the same time,
1338  multiple senior advisors, including Bannon, Priebus, and Hicks, said that the
1339  President had become unhappy with Flynn well before Flynn was forced to resign
1340  and that the President was frequently irritated with Flynn. Priebus said he
1341  believed the President's initial reluctance to fire Flynn stemmed not from
1342  personal regard, but from concern about the negative press that would be
1343  generated by firing the National Security Advisor so early in the
1344  Administration. And Priebus indicated that the President's post-firing
1345  expressions of support for Flynn were motivated by the President's desire to
1346  keep Flynn from saying negative things about him. The way in which the President
1347  communicated the request to Corney also is relevant to understanding the
1348  President's intent. When the President first learned about the FBI investigation
1349  into Flynn, he told McGahn, Bannon, and Priebus not to discuss the matter with
1350  anyone else in the White House. The next day, the President invited Corney for a
1351  one-on-one dinner against the advice of an aide who recommended that other White
1352  House officials also attend. At the dinner, the President asked Corney for
1353  "loyalty" and, at a different point in the conversation, mentioned that Flynn
1354  had judgment issues. When the President met with Corney the day after Flynn's
1355  termination-shortly after being told by Christie that firing Flynn would not end
1356  the Russia investigation-the President cleared the room, even excluding the
1357  Attorney General, so that he could again speak to Corney alone. The President's
1358  decision to meet one-on-one with Corney contravened the advice of the White
1359  House Counsel that the President should not communicate directly with the
1360  Department of Justice to avoid any appearance of interfering in law enforcement
1361  activities. And the President later denied that he cleared the room and asked
1362  Corney to "let[] Flynn go"-a denial that would have been unnecessary if he
1363  believed his request was a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 47
1364
1365RESULT: 32
1366
1367PAGE: 261
1368
1369TEXT:
1370
1371  U.s: Department of Justice At:terHey Werk Preettet // MB:)1 CeHtttin Mttterittl
1372  Preteetee Under Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) language in the Code of Federal
1373  Regulations (CFR), which Sessions considered to be clear and decisive.286
1374  Sessions thought that any argument that the CFR did not apply to him was "very
1375  thin."287 Sessions got the impression, based on calls he received from White
1376  House officials, that the President was very upset with him and did not think he
1377  had done his duty as Attorney General.288 Shortly after Sessions announced his
1378  recusal, the White House Counsel's Office directed that Sessions should not be
1379  contacted about the matter.289 Internal White House Counsel's Office notes from
1380  March 2, 2017, state "No contact w/Sessions" and "No comms / Serious concerns
1381  about obstruction."290 On March 3, the day after Sessions's recusal, McGahn was
1382  called into the Oval Office.291 Other advisors were there, including Priebus and
1383  Bannon.292 The President opened the conversation by saying, "I don't have a
1384  lawyer."293 The President expressed anger at McGahn about the recusal and
1385  brought up Roy Cohn, stating that he wished Cohn was his attorney.294 McGahn
1386  interpreted this comment as directed at him, suggesting that Cohn would fight
1387  for the which I have recused myself to the extent they exist."); see Exec. Order
1388  No. 13775, 82 Fed. Reg. 10697 (Feb.14,2017). 286 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 1-2.
1389  28 C.F.R. ? 45.2 provides that "no employee shall participate in a criminal
1390  investigation or prosecution ifhe has a personal or political relationship with
1391  ... [a]ny person or organization substantially involved in the conduct that is
1392  the subject of the investigation or prosecution," and defines "political
1393  relationship" as "a close identification with an elected official, a candidate
1394  (whether or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a
1395  campaign organization, arising from service as a principal adviser thereto or a
1396  principal official thereof." 287 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 2. 288 Sessions I /17
1397  /I 8 302, at 3. 289 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 11; SC_AD _00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17
1398  Notes). It is not clear whether the President was aware of the White House
1399  Counsel's Office direction not to contact Sessions about his recusal. 290
1400  SC_AD_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the note "No comms
1401  / Serious concerns about obstruction" may have referred to concerns McGahn had
1402  about the press team saying "crazy things" and trying to spin Sessions's recusal
1403  in a way that would raise concerns about obstruction. McGahn l l/30/17 302, at
1404  19. Donaldson recalled that "No comms" referred to the order that no one should
1405  contact Sessions. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 11. 291 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2.
1406  292 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. 293 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. 294 McGahn
1407  12/12/17 302, at 2. Cohn had previously served as a lawyer for the President
1408  during his career as a private businessman. Priebus recalled that when the
1409  President talked about Cohn, he said Cohn would win cases for him that had no
1410  chance, and that Cohn had done incredible things for him. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at
1411  5. Bannon recalled the President describing Cohn as a winner and a fixer,
1412  someone who got things done. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 6. 50
1413
1414RESULT: 33
1415
1416PAGE: 262
1417
1418TEXT:
1419
1420  U.S. Department of Justice Attel'fl:e~? Werk Preclttet // MB:y CetttB:itt
1421  MB:teriB:I Preteetea Uttcler Feel. R. Critfl. P. 6(e) President whereas McGahn
1422  would not.295 The President wanted McGahn to talk to Sessions about the recusal,
1423  but McGahn told the President that DOJ ethics officials had weighed in on
1424  Sessions's decision to recuse.296 The President then brought up former Attorneys
1425  General Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder and said that they had protected their
1426  presidents.297 The President also pushed back on the DOJ contacts policy, and
1427  said words to the effect of, "You're telling me that Bobby and Jack didn't talk
1428  about investigations? Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?"298
1429  Bannon recalled that the President was as mad as Bannon had ever seen him and
1430  that he screamed at McGahn about how weak Sessions was.299 Bannon recalled
1431  telling the President that Sessions's recusal was not a surprise and that before
1432  the inauguration they had discussed that Sessions would have to recuse from
1433  campaign-related investigations because of his work on the Trump Campaign.300
1434  That weekend, Sessions and McGahn flew to Mar-a-Lago to meet with the
1435  President.301 Sessions recalled that the President pulled him aside to speak to
1436  him alone and suggested that Sessions should "unrecuse" from the Russia
1437  investigation.302 The President contrasted Sessions with Attorneys General
1438  Holder and Kennedy, who had developed a strategy to help their presidents where
1439  Sessions had not.303 Sessions said he had the impression that the President
1440  feared that the investigation could spin out of control and disrupt his ability
1441  to govern, which Sessions could have helped avert if he were still overseeing
1442  it.304 On March 5, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was informed that the
1443  FBI was asking for transition-period records relating to Flynn-indicating that
1444  the FBI was still actively investigating him.305 On March 6, the President told
1445  advisors he wanted to call the Acting Attorney 295 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2.
1446  296 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. 297 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3. Bannon said the
1447  President saw Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder as Attorneys General who protected
1448  the presidents they served. The President thought Holder always stood up for
1449  President Obama and even took a contempt charge for him, and Robert Kennedy
1450  always had his brother's back. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5. Priebus recalled that
1451  the President said he had been told his entire life he needed to have a great
1452  lawyer, a "bulldog," and added that Holder had been willing to take a contempt-
1453  of-Congress charge for President Obama. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. 298 McGahn
1454  12/12/17 302, at 3. 299 Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5. 300 Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5.
1455  301 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 5; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at
1456  3. 302 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at3-4. 303 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at3-4 304 Sessions
1457  1 /17/18 302, at 3-4. Hicks recalled that after Sessions recused, the President
1458  was angry and scolded Sessions in her presence, but she could not remember
1459  exactly when that conversation occurred. Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 13. 305 SC_AD
1460  _000 I 37 (Donaldson 3/5/17 Notes); see Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 13. 51
1461
1462RESULT: 34
1463
1464PAGE: 275
1465
1466TEXT:
1467
1468  U.S. Department of Justice Attt'lrHe~? Werk Prt'ldttet // May Cei,taiH Materittl
1469  Pwteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) some point during the conversation that a
1470  new start at the FBI would be appropriate and the President should consider
1471  replacing Corney as FBI director.397 According to Sessions, when the meeting
1472  concluded, it was clear that the President was unhappy with Corney, but Sessions
1473  did not think the President had made the decision to terminate Comey.398 Bannon
1474  recalled that the President brought Corney up with him at least eight times on
1475  May 3 and May 4, 2017 .399 According to Bannon, the President said the same
1476  thing each time: "He told me three times I'm not under investigation. He's a
1477  showboater. He's a grandstander. I don't know any Russians. There was no
1478  collusion."400 Bannon told the President that he could not fire Corney because
1479  "that ship had sailed."401 Bannon also told the President that firing Corney was
1480  not going to stop the investigation, cautioning him that he could fire the FBI
1481  director but could not fire the FBI.402 2. The President Makes the Decision to
1482  Terminate Corney The weekend following Corney's May 3, 2017 testimony, the
1483  President traveled to his resort in Bedminster, New Jersey.403 At a dinner on
1484  Friday, May 5, attended by the President and various advisors and family
1485  members, including Jared Kushner and senior advisor Stephen Miller, the
1486  President stated that he wanted to remove Corney and had ideas for a letter that
1487  would be used to make the announcement.404 The President dictated arguments and
1488  specific language for the letter, and Miller took notes.405 As reflected in the
1489  notes, the President told Miller that the letter should start, "While I greatly
1490  appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I
1491  have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship
1492  -pertaining to the 2016 presidential election, please be informed that I, and I
1493  believe the American public -including Os and Rs-have lost faith in you as
1494  Director of the FBT."406 Following the dinner, Miller prepared a termination
1495  letter based on those notes and research he conducted to support the President's
1496  arguments.407 Over the weekend, the President provided several rounds of 397
1497  Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). 398 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 9. 399 Bannon
1498  2/12/18 302, at 20. 400 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20. 401 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at
1499  20. 402 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20-21; see Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 28. 403 S.
1500  Miller I 0/31 /17 302, at 4-5; SCR025_000019 (President's Daily Diary, 5/4/17).
1501  404 S. Miller I 0/31/17 302, at 5. 405 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 5-6. 406 S.
1502  Miller 5/5/17 Notes, at I; see S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8. 407 S. Miller I
1503  0/31 /17 302, at 6. 64
1504
1505RESULT: 35
1506
1507PAGE: 285
1508
1509TEXT:
1510
1511  U.S. Department of Justice Attenatey Werk Preattet // May CeAte:iA Material
1512  Pt'eteetea UAaer Fea. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) after being sworn in.495 Late in the
1513  morning of May 12, 2017, the President tweeted, "Again, the story that there was
1514  collusion between the Russians & Trump campaign was fabricated by Dems as an
1515  excuse for losing the election."496 The President also tweeted, "James Corney
1516  better hope that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before he starts
1517  leaking to the press!" and "When James Clapper himself, and virtually everyone
1518  else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there is no collusion, when does it
1519  end?"497 Analysis In analyzing the President's decision to fire Corney, the
1520  following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: a.
1521  Obstructive act. The act of firing Corney removed the individual overseeing the
1522  FBI's Russia investigation. The President knew that Corney was personally
1523  involved in the investigation based on Corney's briefing of the Gang of Eight,
1524  Corney's March 20, 2017 public testimony about the investigation, and the
1525  President's one-on-one conversations with Corney. Firing Corney would qualify as
1526  an obstructive act if it had the natural and probable effect of interfering with
1527  or impeding the investigation-for example, if the termination would have the
1528  effect of delaying or disrupting the investigation or providing the President
1529  with the opportunity to appoint a director who would take a different approach
1530  to the investigation that the President perceived as more protective of his
1531  personal interests. Relevant circumstances bearing on that issue include whether
1532  the President's actions had the potential to discourage a successor director or
1533  other law enforcement officials in their conduct of the Russia investigation.
1534  The President fired Corney abruptly without offering him an opportunity to
1535  resign, banned him from the FBI building, and criticized him publicly, calling
1536  him a "showboat" and claiming that the FBI was "in turmoil" under his
1537  leadership. And the President followed the termination with public statements
1538  that were highly critical of the investigation; for example, three days after
1539  firing Corney, the President referred to the investigation as a "witch hunt" and
1540  asked, "when does it end?" Those actions had the potential to affect a successor
1541  director's conduct of the investigation. The anticipated effect of removing the
1542  FBI director, however, would not necessarily be to prevent or impede the FBI
1543  from continuing its investigation. As a general matter, FBI investigations run
1544  under the operational direction of FBI personnel levels below the FBI director.
1545  Bannon made a similar point when he told the President that he could fire the
1546  FBI director, but could not fire the FBI. The White House issued a press
1547  statement the day after Corney was fired that said, "The investigation would
1548  have always continued, and obviously, the termination of Corney would not have
1549  ended it." Tn addition, in his May 11 interview with Lester Holt, the President
1550  stated that he understood when he made the decision to fire Corney that the
1551  action might prolong the investigation. And the President chose McCabe to serve
1552  as interim director, even 495 Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump
1553  Demanded Loyalty. Camey Demurred., New York Times (May 11, 2017). 496
1554  @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (7:51 a.m. ET) Tweet. 497 @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17
1555  (8:26 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:54 a.m. ET) Tweet. 74
1556
1557RESULT: 36
1558
1559PAGE: 290
1560
1561TEXT:
1562
1563  U.S. Department of Justice Attorne,-? Work Proattet// Me:y Coftte:ifl Material
1564  Proteetea Uflcler Fe?!. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) The President then told Sessions he
1565  should resign as Attorney General.509 Sessions agreed to submit his resignation
1566  and left the Oval Office.510 Hicks saw the President shortly after Sessions
1567  departed and described the President as being extremely upset by the Special
1568  Counsel's appointment.511 Hicks said that she had only seen the President like
1569  that one other time, when the Access Hollywood tape came out during the
1570  campaign.512 The next day, May 18, 2017, FBI agents delivered to McGahn a
1571  preservation notice that discussed an investigation related to Corney's
1572  termination and directed the White House to preserve all relevant documents.513
1573  When he received the letter, McGahn issued a document hold to White House staff
1574  and instructed them not to send out any burn bags over the weekend while he
1575  sorted things out.514 Also on May 18, Sessions finalized a resignation letter
1576  that stated, "Pursuant to our conversation of yesterday, and at your request, I
1577  hereby offer my resignation."515 Sessions, accompanied by Hunt, brought the
1578  letter to the White House and handed it to the President.516 The President put
1579  the resignation letter in his pocket and asked Sessions several times whether he
1580  wanted to continue serving as Attorney General.517 Sessions ultimately told the
1581  President he wanted to stay, but it was up to the President. 518 The President
1582  said he wanted Sessions to stay.519 At the conclusion of the meeting, the
1583  President shook Sessions's hand but did not return the resignation letter.520
1584  When Priebus and Bannon learned that the President was holding onto Sessions's
1585  resignation letter, they became concerned that it could be used to influence the
1586  Department of Justice.521 Priebus told Sessions it was not good for the
1587  President to have the letter because it 509 Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes);
1588  Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 510 Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions
1589  1/17/18 302, at 14. 511 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21. 512 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21.
1590  The Access Hollywood tape was released on October 7, 2016, as discussed in
1591  Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra. 513 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9;
1592  SCR015_000175-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House Staff). 514 McGahn
1593  12/14/17 302, at 9; SCRO 15_0001 75-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House
1594  Staff). The White House Counsel's Office had previously issued a document hold
1595  on February 27, 2017. SCRO 15_000171 (2/17 /17 Memorandum from McGahn to
1596  Executive Office of the President Staff). 515 Hunt-000047 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes);
1597  5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resigning as Attorney General). 516
1598  Hunt-000047-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 517
1599  Hunt-000047-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 518
1600  Hunt-000048-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/I 8 302, at 14. 519 Sessions
1601  1/17/18 302, at 14. 520 Hunt-000049 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes). 521 Hunt-000050-51
1602  (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes). 79
1603
1604RESULT: 37
1605
1606PAGE: 291
1607
1608TEXT:
1609
1610  U.S. Department of Justice AtterRey Werle Pi=eattet // May CeRtttiR Material
1611  Prnteetea URE:ier Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) would function as a kind of "shock
1612  collar" that the President could use any time he wanted; Priebus said the
1613  President had "DOJ by the throat."522 Priebus and Bannon told Sessions they
1614  would attempt to get the letter back from the President with a notation that he
1615  was not accepting Sessions's resignation.523 On May 19, 2017, the President left
1616  for a trip to the Middle East.524 Hicks recalled that on the President's flight
1617  from Saudi Arabia to Tel Aviv, the President pulled Sessions's resignation
1618  letter from his pocket, showed it to a group of senior advisors, and asked them
1619  what he should do about it.525 During the trip, Priebus asked about the
1620  resignation letter so he could return it to Sessions, but the President told him
1621  that the letter was back at the White House, somewhere in the residence.526 It
1622  was not until May 30, three days after the President returned from the trip,
1623  that the President returned the letter to Sessions with a notation saying, "Not
1624  accepted."527 2. The President Asse11s that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of
1625  Interest In the days following the Special Counsel's appointment, the President
1626  repeatedly told advisors, including Priebus, Bannon, and McGahn, that Special
1627  Counsel Mueller had conflicts of interest.528 The President cited as conflicts
1628  that Mueller had interviewed for the FBI Director position sho11ly before being
1629  appointed as Special Counsel, that he had worked for a law firm that represented
1630  people affiliated with the President, and that Mueller had disputed certain fees
1631  relating to his membership in a Trump golf course in Northern Virginia.529 The
1632  President's advisors pushed 522 Hunt-000050 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Priebus
1633  10/13/17 302, at 21; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 21. 523 Hunt-000051 (Hunt 5/18/17
1634  Notes). 524 SCR026_000110 (President's Daily Diary, 5/19/17). 525 Hicks 12/8/ 17
1635  3 02, at 22. 526 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21. Hunt's notes state that when
1636  Priebus returned from the trip, Priebus told Hunt that the President was
1637  supposed to have given him the letter, but when he asked for it, the President
1638  "slapped the desk" and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel. Hunt-000052
1639  (Hunt Notes, undated). 527 Hunt-000052-53 (Hunt 5/30/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter,
1640  Sessions to President Trump (resignation letter). Robert Porter, who was the
1641  White House Staff Secretary at the time, said that in the days after the
1642  President returned from the Middle East trip, the Presidenttook Sessions's
1643  letter out ofa drawer in the Oval Office and showed it to Porter. Porter 4/13/18
1644  302, at 8. 528 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10; McGahn
1645  3/8/18 302, at I; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 529
1646  Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at JO. In October 2011, Mueller
1647  resigned his family's membership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling,
1648  Virginia, in a letter that noted that "we live in the District and find that we
1649  are unable to make full use of the Club" and that inquired "whether we would be
1650  entitled to a refund of a portion of our initial membership fee," which was paid
1651  in 1994. I 0/ 12/11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. About two
1652  weeks later, the controller of the club responded that the Muellers' resignation
1653  would be effective October 31, 2011, and that they would be "placed on a
1654  waitlist to be refunded on a first resigned I first refunded basis" in
1655  accordance with the club's legal 80
1656
1657RESULT: 38
1658
1659PAGE: 292
1660
1661TEXT:
1662
1663  U.S. Department of Justice Attorrtey Work Protittet // May CorttaiH Material
1664  Proteeteti Urttier Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) back on his assertion of conflicts,
1665  telling the President they did not count as true conflicts.530 Bannon recalled
1666  telling the President that the purported conflicts were "ridiculous" and that
1667  none of them was real or could come close to justifying precluding Mueller from
1668  serving as Special Counsel.531 As for Mueller's interview for FBI Director,
1669  Bannon recalled that the White House had invited Mueller to speak to the
1670  President to offer a perspective on the institution of the FBI.532 Bannon said
1671  that, although the White House thought about beseeching Mueller to become
1672  Director again, he did not come in looking for the job.533 Bannon also told the
1673  President that the law firm position did not amount to a conflict in the legal
1674  community.534 And Bannon told the President that the golf course dispute did not
1675  rise to the level of a conflict and claiming one was "ridiculous and petty."535
1676  The President did not respond when Bannon pushed back on the stated conflicts of
1677  interest. 536 On May 23, 2017, the Department of Justice announced that ethics
1678  officials had determined that the Special Counsel's prior law firm position did
1679  not bar his service, generating media reports that Mueller had been cleared to
1680  serve.537 McGahn recalled that around the same time, the President complained
1681  about the asserted conflicts and prodded McGahn to reach out to Rosenstein about
1682  the issue.538 McGahn said he responded that he could not make such a call and
1683  that the President should instead consult his personal lawyer because it was not
1684  a White House issue.539 Contemporaneous notes of a May 23, 2017 conversation
1685  between McGahn and the President reflect that McGahn told the President that he
1686  would not call Rosenstein and that he would suggest that the President not make
1687  such a call either.540 McGahn advised that the President could discuss the issue
1688  with his personal attorney but it would "look like still trying to meddle in
1689  [the] investigation" and "knocking out Mueller" would be "[a]nother fact used to
1690  claim obst[ruction] of documents. 10/27/11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National
1691  Golf Club. The Muellers have not had further contact with the club. ? 530
1692  Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 3; Bannon I 0/26/18 302, at 13 (confirming that he,
1693  Priebus, and McGahn pushed back on the asserted conflicts). 531 Bannon I 0/26/18
1694  302, at 12-13. 532 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 533 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
1695  534 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 535 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13. 536 Bannon
1696  10/26/18 302, at 12. 537 Matt Zapotosky & Matea Gold, Justice Department ethics
1697  experts clear Mueller to lead Russia probe, Washington Post (May 23, 2017). 538
1698  McGahn 3/8/18 302, at I; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 1 0; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at
1699  12. 539 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. McGahn and Donaldson said that after the
1700  appointment of the Special Counsel, they considered themselves potential fact
1701  witnesses and accordingly told the President that inquiries related to the
1702  investigation should be brought to his personal counsel. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at
1703  7; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5. 540 SC_AD_00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17Notes). 81
1704
1705RESULT: 39
1706
1707PAGE: 293
1708
1709TEXT:
1710
1711  U.S. Department of Justice A~erHe~? \\'erk Predttet // Moy CeHtoiH Material
1712  Preteeted UHaer Fee. R:. Crim. P. 6(e) just[ice]."541 McGahn told the President
1713  that his "biggest exposure" was not his act of firing Corney but his "other
1714  contacts" and "calls," and his "ask re: Flynn."542 By the time McGahn provided
1715  this advice to the President, there had been widespread reporting on the
1716  President's request for Corney's loyalty, which the President publicly denied;
1717  his request that Corney "let[] Flynn go," which the President also denied; and
1718  the President's statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination
1719  of Corney had relieved "great pressure" related to Russia, which the President
1720  did not deny.543 On June 8, 2017, Corney testified before Congress about his
1721  interactions with the President before his termination, including the request
1722  for loyalty, the request that Corney "let[] Flynn go," and the request that
1723  Corney "lift the cloud" over the presidency caused by the ongoing
1724  investigation.544 Corney's testimony led to a series of news reports about
1725  whether the President had obstructedjustice.545 On June 9, 2017, the Special
1726  Counsel's Office informed the White House Counsel's Office that investigators
1727  intended to interview intelligence community officials who had allegedly been
1728  asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation.546 On
1729  Monday, June 12, 2017, Christopher Ruddy, the chief executive ofNewsmax Media
1730  and a longtime friend of the President's, met at the White House with Priebus
1731  and Bannon.547 Ruddy recalled that they told him the President was strongly
1732  considering firing the Special Counsel 541 SC_AD_00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17Notes).
1733  542 SC AD 00361 (Donaldson 5/31 / 17 Notes). 543 See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt,
1734  In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Corney Demurred., New York Times
1735  (May 11, 2017); Michael S. Schmidt, Corney Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to
1736  End Flynn Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017); Matt Apuzzo et al.,
1737  Trump Told Russians That Firing 'Nut Job' Corney Eased Pressure From
1738  Investigation, New York Times (May 19, 2017). 544 Hearing on Russian Election
1739  Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June
1740  8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the
1741  FBI, at 5-6). Corney testified that he deliberately caused his memorandum
1742  documenting the February 14, 2017 meeting to be leaked to the New York Times in
1743  response to a tweet from the President, sent on May 12, 2017, that stated "James
1744  Corney better hope that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before he
1745  starts leaking to the press!," and because he thought sharing the memorandum
1746  with a reporter "might prompt the appointment of a special counsel." Hearing on
1747  Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,
1748  115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 55) (testimony by James B.
1749  Corney, former Director of the FBI). 545 See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Corney lays
1750  out the case that Trump obstructed justice, Washington Post (June 8, 2017)
1751  ("Legal analysts said Corney's testimony clarified and bolstered the case that
1752  the president obstructed justice."). 546 6/9/17 Email, Special Counsel's Office
1753  to the White House Counsel's Office. This Office made the notification to give
1754  the White House an opportunity to invoke executive privilege in advance of the
1755  interviews. On June 12, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Admiral
1756  Rogers in the presence of agency counsel. Rogers 6/12/17 302, at I. On June 13,
1757  the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Ledgett. Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at I. On
1758  June 14, the Office interviewed Coats and other personnel from his office. Coats
1759  6/14/17 302, at 1; Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at I; Culver 6/14/17 302, at I. 547
1760  Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 5. 82
1761
1762RESULT: 40
1763
1764PAGE: 298
1765
1766TEXT:
1767
1768  U.S. Department of Justice Attertte~? \1/erk PreElttet // May Cattta:irl:
1769  Material PreteeteEl UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) investigation, but Donaldson
1770  inferred that the President's directive was related to the Russia
1771  investigation.592 Donaldson prepared to resign along with McGahn.593 That
1772  evening, McGahn called both Priebus and Bannon and told them that he intended to
1773  resign.594 McGahn recalled that, after speaking with his attorney and given the
1774  nature of the President's request, he decided not to share details of the
1775  President's request with other White House staff.595 Priebus recalled that
1776  McGahn said that the President had asked him to "do crazy shit," but he thought
1777  McGahn did not tell him the specifics of the President's request because McGahn
1778  was trying to protect Priebus from what he did not need to know.596 Priebus and
1779  Bannon both urged McGahn not to quit, and McGahn ultimately returned to work
1780  that Monday and remained in his position.597 He had not told the President
1781  directly that he planned to resign, and when they next saw each other the
1782  President did not ask McGahn whether he had followed through with calling
1783  Rosenstein.598 Around the same time, Chris Christie recalled a telephone_call
1784  with the President in which the President asked what Christie thought about the
1785  President firing the Special Counsel.599 Christie advised against doing so
1786  because there was no substantive basis for the President to fire the Special
1787  Counsel, and because the President would lose support from Republicans in
1788  Congress if he did so.600 Analysis In analyzing the President's direction to
1789  McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the following evidence is relevant
1790  to the elements of obstruction of justice: a. Obstructive act. As with the
1791  President's firing of Corney, the attempt to remove the Special Counsel would
1792  qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the 592 McGahn
1793  2/28/19 302, at 3-4; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4-5. Donaldson said she believed
1794  McGahn consciously did not share details with her because he did not want to
1795  drag her into the investigation. Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5; see McGahn 2/28/19
1796  302, at 3 .. 593 Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5. 594 McGahn 12/ 14/17 302, at IO;
1797  Call Records of Don McGahn; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at
1798  6-7. 595 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 4. Priebus and Bannon confirmed that McGahn did
1799  not tell them the specific details of the President's request. Priebus 4/3/18
1800  302, at 7; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10. 596 Priebus 4/3/ 18 3 02, at 7. 597 McGahn
1801  3/8/18 302, at 3; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4. 598 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3. 599
1802  Christie 2/13/ I 9 302, at 7. Christie did not recall the precise date of this
1803  call, but believed it was after Christopher Wray was announced as the nominee to
1804  be the new FBI director, which was on June 7, 2017. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7.
1805  Telephone records show that the President called Christie twice after that time
1806  period, on July 4, 2017, and July 14, 2017. Call Records of Chris Christie. 60?
1807  Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. 87
1808
1809RESULT: 41
1810
1811PAGE: 299
1812
1813TEXT:
1814
1815  U.S. Department of Justice AtterAey Wark Pret:ittet // Ma)'' CeAtaifl Material
1816  Pl'ateetet:i UAt:ier Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) investigation and any grand jury
1817  proceedings that might flow from the inquiry. Even if the removal of the lead
1818  prosecutor would not prevent the investigation from continuing under a new
1819  appointee, a factfinder would need to consider whether the act had the potential
1820  to delay further action in the investigation, chill the actions of any
1821  replacement Special Counsel, or otherwise impede the investigation. A threshold
1822  question is whetherthe President in fact directed McGahn to have the Special
1823  Counsel removed. After news organizations reported that in June 2017 the
1824  President had ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President
1825  publicly disputed these accounts, and privately told McGahn that he had simply
1826  wanted McGahn to bring conflicts of interest to the Department of Justice's
1827  attention. See Volume II, Section II.I, infra. Some of the President's specific
1828  language that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that
1829  explanation. Substantial evidence, however, supports the conclusion that the
1830  President went further and in fact directed McGahn to call Rosenstein to have
1831  the Special Counsel removed. First, McGahn's clear recollection was that the
1832  President directed him to tell Rosenstein not only that conflicts existed but
1833  also that "Mueller has to go." McGahn is a credible witness with no motive to
1834  lie or exaggerate given the position he held in the White House.601 McGahn spoke
1835  with the President twice and understood the directive the same way both times,
1836  making it unlikely that he misheard or misinterpreted the President's request.
1837  In response to that request, McGahn decided to quit because he did not want to
1838  participate in events that he described as akin to the Saturday Night Massacre.
1839  He called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packed up his office, prepared
1840  to submit a resignation letter with his chief of staff, told Priebus that the
1841  President had asked him to "do crazy shit," and informed Priebus and Bannon that
1842  he was leaving. Those acts would be a highly unusual reaction to a request to
1843  convey information to the Department of Justice. Second, in the days before the
1844  calls to McGahn, the President, through his counsel, had already brought the
1845  asserted conflicts to the attention of the Department of Justice. Accordingly,
1846  the President had no reason to have McGahn call Rosenstein that weekend to raise
1847  conflicts issues that already had been raised. Third, the President's sense
1848  ofurgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate action on a
1849  weekend-"You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod."-supp0ti McGahn's recollection
1850  that the President wanted the Department of Justice to take action to remove the
1851  Special Counsel. Had the President instead sought only to have the Department of
1852  Justice re-examine asserted conflicts to evaluate whether they posed an ethical
1853  bar, it would have been unnecessary to set the process in motion on a Saturday
1854  and to make repeated calls to McGahn. Finally, the President had discussed
1855  "knocking out Mueller" and raised conflicts of interest in a May 23, 2017 call
1856  with McGahn, reflecting that the President connected the conflicts to a plan to
1857  remove the Special Counsel. And in the days leading up to June 17, 2017, the
1858  President made clear to Priebus and Bannon, who then told Ruddy, that the
1859  President was considering terminating 601 When this Office first interviewed
1860  McGahn about this topic, he was reluctant to share detailed information about
1861  what had occurred and only did so after continued questioning. See McGahn
1862  12/14/17 302 (agent notes). 88
1863
1864RESULT: 42
1865
1866PAGE: 329
1867
1868TEXT:
1869
1870  U.S. Department of Justice Attertte;? Werk Preelttet // May Cetttaitt Material
1871  Preteeteel Utteler Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e) had not backed down and would not
1872  budge.828 Following the Oval Office meeting, the President's personal counsel
1873  called McGahn' s counsel and relayed that the President was '"fine" with
1874  McGahn.829 Analysis In analyzing the President's efforts to have McGahn deny
1875  that he had been ordered to have the Special Counsel removed, the following
1876  evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: a. Obstructive
1877  act. The President's repeated efforts to get McGahn to create a record denying
1878  that the President had directed him to remove the Special Counsel would qualify
1879  as an obstructive act if it had the natural tendency to constrain McGahn from
1880  testifying truthfully or to undermine his credibility as a potential witness
1881  ifhe testified consistently with his memory, rather than with what the record
1882  said. There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times and Washington
1883  Post stories were published in late January 2018, the President believed the
1884  stories were wrong and that he had never told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove
1885  the Special Counsel. The President correctly understood that McGahn had not told
1886  the President directly that he planned to resign. Tn addition, the President
1887  told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel,
1888  and in the Oval Office meeting with McGahn, the President said, "I never said to
1889  fire Mueller. I never said 'fire."' That evidence could indicate that the
1890  President was not attempting to persuade McGahn to change his story but was
1891  instead offering his own-but different-recollection of the substance of his June
1892  2017 conversations with McGahn and McGahn's reaction to them. Other evidence
1893  cuts against that understanding of the President's conduct. As previously
1894  described, see Volume IT, Section ILE, supra, substantial evidence supports
1895  McGahn's account that the President had directed him to have the Special Counsel
1896  removed, including the timing and context of the President's directive; the
1897  manner in which McGahn reacted; and the fact that the President had been told
1898  the conflicts were insubstantial, were being considered by the Department of
1899  Justice, and should be raised with the President's personal counsel rather than
1900  brought to McGahn. In addition, the President's subsequent denials that he had
1901  told McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed were carefully worded. When
1902  first asked about the New York Times story, the President said, "Fake news,
1903  folks. Fake news. A typical New York Times fake story." And when the President
1904  spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, he focused on whether he had used the word
1905  "fire," saying, "I never said to fire Mueller. I never said 'fire"' and "Did T
1906  say the word 'fire'?" The President's assertion in the Oval Office meeting that
1907  he had never directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed thus runs
1908  counter to the evidence. Tn addition, even if the President sincerely disagreed
1909  with McGahn's memory of the June 17, 2017 events, the evidence indicates that
1910  the President knew by the time of the Oval Office 828 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
1911  Kelly did not recall discussing the Oval Office meeting with the President after
1912  the fact. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. Handwritten notes taken by Kelly state,
1913  "Don[:] Mueller discussion in June. -Bannon Priebus -came out okay." WH0000l7685
1914  (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes). 829 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5 (agent note). 118
1915
1916RESULT: 43
1917
1918PAGE: 400
1919
1920TEXT:
1921
1922  U.S. Department of Justice At:t:orflc)' Work Proauet II Ma)' CoHtaifl Material
1923  Protcetca UHElcr Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(c) APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY The following
1924  glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities
1925  referenced in the two volumes of this report. It is not intended to be
1926  comprehensive and is intended only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of
1927  the report. Agalarov, Aras Agalarov, Emin Akhmetov, Rinat Akhmetshin, Rinat
1928  Aslanov, Dzheykhun (Jay) Assange, Julian Aven, Petr Bannon, Stephen (Steve)
1929  Baranov, Andrey Berkowitz, A vi Boente, Dana Bogacheva, Anna Bossert, Thomas
1930  (Tom) Referenced Persons Russian real-estate developer ( owner of the Crocus
1931  Group); met Donald Trump in connection with the Miss Universe pageant and helped
1932  arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya
1933  and Trump Campaign officials. Performer, executive vice president of Crocus
1934  Group, and son of Aras Agalarov; helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at
1935  Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. Former
1936  member in the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to conduct work for
1937  Ukrainian political pai1y, the Party of Regions. U.S. lobbyist and associate of
1938  Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
1939  between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. Head of U.S. department of
1940  the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an "active measures" social media
1941  campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Founder of
1942  WikiLeaks, which in 2016 posted on the internet documents stolen from entities
1943  and individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party. Chairman of the board of
1944  Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the Presidential Transition Team in
1945  connection with anticipated post-election sanctions. White House chief
1946  strategist and senior counselor to President Trump (Jan. 2017-Aug.2017); chief
1947  executive of the Trump Campaign. Director of investor relations at Russian
1948  state-owned oil company, Rosneft, and associate of Carter Page. Assistant to
1949  Jared Kushner. Acting Attorney General (Jan. 2017 -Feb. 2017); Acting Deputy
1950  Attorney General (Feb. 2017 -Apr. 2017). Internet Research Agency employee who
1951  worked on "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016
1952  U.S. presidential election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses
1953  in 2014. Former homeland security advisor to the President who also served as a
1954  senior official on the Presidential Transition Team. B-1
1955
1956RESULT: 44
1957
1958PAGE: 424
1959
1960TEXT:
1961
1962  U.S. Department of Justice At:terHe~? '+\'erk Pt'eattet // Mtty CeHtttiH
1963  Mttterittl Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Ct'iffi. P. 6(e) i. What consideration did
1964  you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing Russia's annexation of Crimea
1965  if you were elected? Describe who you spoke with about this topic, when, the
1966  substance of the discussion{s). V. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related
1967  Issues During the Transition a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess
1968  Championship gala on November 10, 2016? If yes, who asked you to attend, when
1969  were you asked, and what were you told about about why your presence was
1970  requested? i. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any
1971  interactions you had with any Russians or representatives of the Russian
1972  government at the event. b. Following the Obama Administration's imposition of
1973  sanctions on Russia iri December 2016 {"Russia sanctions"), did you discuss with
1974  Lieutenant General {LTG) Michael Flynn, K.T. McFarland, Steve Bannon, Reince
1975  Priebus, Jared Kushner, Erik Prince, or anyone else associated with the
1976  transition what should be communicated to the Russian government regarding the
1977  sanctions? If yes, describe who you spoke with about this issue, when, and the
1978  substance of the discussion{s). c. On December 29 and December 31, 2016, LTG
1979  Flynn had conversations with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about the Russia
1980  sanctions and Russia's response to the Russia sanctions. i. Did you direct or
1981  suggest that LTG Flynn have discussions with anyone from the Russian government
1982  about the Russia sanctions? ii. Were you told in advance of LTG Flynn's December
1983  29, 2016 conversation that he was going to be speaking with Ambassador Kislyak?
1984  If yes, describe who told you this information, when, and what you were told. If
1985  no, when and from whom did you learn of LTG Flynn's December 29, 2016
1986  conversation with Ambassador Kislyak? iii. When did you learn of LTG Flynn and
1987  Ambassador Kislyak's call on December 31, 2016? Who told you and what were you
1988  told? iv. When did you learn that sanctions were discussed in the December 29
1989  and December 31, 2016 calls between LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak? Who told
1990  you and what were you told? d. At any time between December 31, 2016, and
1991  January 20, 2017, did anyone tell you or suggest to you that Russia's decision
1992  not to impose reciprocal sanctions was attributable in any way to LTG Flynn's
1993  communications with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, identify who provided you with
1994  this information, when, and the substance of what you were told. C-9
1995
1996RESULT: 45
1997
1998PAGE: 425
1999
2000TEXT:
2001
2002  U.S. Department of Justice Attoffley Work Protittet // Mtty CotttttiH Mttterittl
2003  Proteeteti UAtier Fee. R. CrirA. P. 6(e) e. On January 12, 2017, the Washington
2004  Post published a column that stated that LTG Flynn phoned Ambassador Kislyak
2005  several times on December 29, 2016. After learning of the column, did you direct
2006  or suggest to anyone that LTG Flynn should deny that he discussed sanctions with
2007  Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, who did you make this suggestion or direction to,
2008  when, what did you say, and why did you take this step? i. After learning of the
2009  column, did you have any conversations with LTG Flynn about his conversations
2010  with Ambassador Kislyak in December 2016? If yes, describe when those
2011  discussions occurred and the content of the discussions. f. Were you told about
2012  a meeting between Jared Kushner and Sergei Gorkov that took place in December
2013  2016? i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the
2014  discussion(s}, and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting. g. Were
2015  you told about a meeting or meetings between Erik Prince and Kiri II Dmitriev or
2016  any other representative from the Russian government that took place in January
2017  2017? i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the
2018  discussion(s}, and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting(s). h.
2019  Prior to January 20, 2017, did you talk to Steve Bannon, Jared Kushner, or any
2020  other individual associated with the transition regarding establishing an
2021  unofficial line of communication with Russia? If yes, describe who you spoke
2022  with, when, the substance of the discussion(s), and what you understood was the
2023  purpose of such an unofficial line of communication. C-10