· 6 years ago · Apr 20, 2019, 02:06 AM
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8 U.S. Department of Justice At:t:ef'fle)' Werle Predttet /,' Ma;? CeHtail'l
9 Material Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) TABLE OF CONTENTS -VOLUME I
10 INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I .......................................................
11 ................................................... 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO
12 VOLUME 1. ................................................ ,
13 ............................................. 4 I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S
14 INVESTIGATION
15 ......................................................................... ,
16 ....... 11 II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN
17 ..................................................... 14 A. Structure of the
18 Internet Research Agency
19 ................................................................. 15 B. Funding
20 and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin
21 ................................................. 16 C. The IRA Targets U.S.
22 Elections ......................................................................
23 ............ 19 1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014
24 ....................... , .............. 19 2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-
25 Controlled Social Media Accounts ..................... 22 3. U.S. Operations
26 Through Facebook.
27 ..................................................................... 24 4. U.S.
28 Operations Through Twitter
29 ......................................................................... 26 a.
30 Individualized Accounts ........................................................
31 ........................... 26 b. IRA Botnet Activities ........................
32 .............................................................. 28 5. U.S.
33 Operations Involving Political Rallies
34 .......................................................... 29 6. Targeting and
35 Recruitment of U.S. Persons
36 .......................................................... 31 7. Interactions
37 and Contacts with the Trump Campaign ...........................................
38 33 a. Trump Campaign Promotion ofIRA Political Materials
39 ................................. 33 b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in
40 Connection to Rallies ................. 35 Ill. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING
41 OPERATIONS .....................................................................
42 36 A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign
43 ....................................................... 36 1. GRU Units Target
44 the Clinton Campaign
45 ............................................................. 36 2. Intrusions
46 into the DCCC and DNC Networks
47 ..................................................... 38 a. Initial Access .....
48 ................................................................................
49 ............... 3 8 b. Implantation ofMalware on DCCC and DNC Networks
50 ................................ 38 c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC
51 Networks .................................... 40 B. Dissemination of the Hacked
52 Materials ......................................................................
53 41 I. DCLeaks ..................................................................
54 ............................................. 41 2. Guccifer 2.0 ...............
55 ................................................................................
56 ............ 42 3. Use of WikiLeaks .................................. :
57 .............................................................. 44 a. WikiLeaks's
58 Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign ............... 44 b.
59 WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks
60 ........................... 45
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68 U.S. Department of Justice MterHey Werk Pretittet // Ma,? Cel'ltail'I Material
69 Preteeteti UH:tier Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen
70 Materials to WikiLeaks .................................. 45 d. ? WikiLeaks
71 Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials ....................
72 ................................................................................
73 .... 48 C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations
74 ............................................................................. 49
75 l. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims
76 ............ 49 2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections
77 ................................... 50 D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination
78 of Hacked Materials .................................. 51 l. ...................
79 ........................................................................... 51
80 a. Background ..................................................................
81 .................................... 51 b. Contacts with the Campaign about
82 WikiLeaks ................................................ 52 C. Harm to Ongoing
83 Matter .................... 54 d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen
84 Podesta Emails .................... 58 e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with
85 WikiLeaks ................................................ 59 2. Other Potential
86 Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials ......................... 61 a.
87 Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg)
88 .................................................... 61 b. Campaign Efforts to
89 Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails ...................................... 62 IV.
90 RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN
91 ................ 66 A. Campaign Period (September 2015 -November 8, 2016)
92 ......................................... 66 1. Trump Tower Moscow Project
93 ............................................................................. 67
94 a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) ............ 67
95 b. Communications with LC. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze
96 (Summer and Fall 2015)
97 ............................................................ 69 c. Letter of
98 Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-January 2016) ..........
99 ................................................................................
100 ...... 70 i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump
101 Organization .... 70 ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia
102 ......................................... 72 d. Discussions about Russia Travel
103 by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December 2015-June 2016)
104 ......................................................................... 76 i.
105 Sater's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia
106 ........................................ 76 ii. Candidate Trump's Opportunities
107 to Travel to Russia ............................ 78 2. George Papadopoulos .....
108 ................................................................................
109 ...... 80 a. Origins of Campaign Work
110 ..............................................................................
111 81 b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts
112 ........................................................................ 82 c.
113 March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting
114 ......................................................... 85 ii
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122 U.S. Department of Justice AtterAe~1 \\'erk Prea1::1et // Mft)1 CeHtttil'l
123 Material Preteetea UAaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) B. Russian Hacking and Dumping
124 Operations .............................................................. 175 1.
125 Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy
126 .................................................... 175 a. Background .........
127 ................................................................................
128 ........... 175 b. Charging Decision As to ....... 176 2. Potential Section 1030
129 Violation By .............................. 179 C. Russian Government Outreach
130 and Contacts ............................................................. 180
131 1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion
132 ............................................. 180 2. Potential Coordination:
133 Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. ? 951). 181 a. Governing Law ........
134 ................................................................................
135 ....... 181 b. Application .....................................................
136 ................................................ 182 3. Campaign Finance .......
137 ................................................................................
138 ....... 183 a. Overview Of Governing Law
139 ......................................................................... 184 b.
140 Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting
141 ................................................ 185 i. Thing-of-Value Element
142 ......................................................................... 186
143 ii. Willfulness ................................................................
144 ............................. 187 iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised
145 Information ...................................... 188 c. Application to
146 WikiLeaks 1.
147 ....................................................................... 189 ii.
148 Willfulness ....................................................................
149 ......................... 190 iii. Constitutional Considerations
150 ................................................................ 190 iv.
151 Analysis ....................................................................
152 190 4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation
153 ....................................... 191 a. Overview Of Governing Law
154 ......................................................................... 191 b.
155 Application to Certain Individuals
156 ................................................................. 192 i. George
157 Papadopoulos
158 ..............................................................................
159 192 11.
160 .............................................................................
161 194 111. Michael Flynn .........................................................
162 .............................. 194 iv. Michael Cohen ...........................
163 ........................................................... 195 V.
164 ..............................................................................
165 196 vi. Jeff Sessions ..........................................................
166 ................................. 197 vii. Others Interviewed During the
167 Investigation ....................................... 198 V
168
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175 U.S. Department of Justice Atten1e:y? '>lork Preettet // Moy Cefttttift Material
176 Preteetee Ul'leer Fee. R. Criffl.. P. 6(e) INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I This report
177 is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. ? 600.8(c), which
178 states that, "[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he ... shall
179 provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or
180 declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached." The Russian government
181 interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion.
182 Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In June,
183 the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response team publicly announced
184 that Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked
185 materials-hacks that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government-
186 began that same month. Additional releases followed in July through the
187 organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in October and November. In late
188 July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks's first release of stolen documents, a foreign
189 government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign
190 foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had suggested to a
191 representative of that foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received
192 indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign
193 through the anonymous release of information damaging to Democratic presidential
194 candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July 31, 2016,
195 to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump
196 Campaign were coordinating with the Russian government in its interference
197 activities. That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian
198 government "directed recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and
199 institutions, including US political organizations," and, "[t]hese thefts and
200 disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process." After the
201 election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia
202 for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional
203 committees were examining Russia's interference in the election. Within the
204 Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017
205 appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The order appointing the
206 Special Counsel authorized him to investigate "the Russian government's efforts
207 to interfere in the 2016 presidential election," including any links or
208 coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the
209 Trump Campaign. As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel's
210 investigation established that Russia interfere~ in the 2016 presidential
211 election principally through two operations. First, a Russian entity carried out
212 a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and
213 disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, a Russian
214 intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities,
215 employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign and then released
216 stolen documents. The investigation also identified numerous links between the
217 Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although the investigation
218 established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump
219 presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it
220 would benefit
221
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228 U.S. Department of Justice Atterrte~? Werk Predttet // May Cetttairt Material
229 Preteetee Urteer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I RUSSIAN
230 SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the
231 earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation-a
232 social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social
233 discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and
234 received funding from Russian oligarch Y evgeniy Prigozhin and companies he
235 controlled. Pri ozhin is widel re orted to have ties to Russian President
236 Vladimir Putin In mid-2014, the IRA sent em lo mission with instructions The IRA
237 later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S.
238 political system through what it termed "information warfare." The campaign
239 evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the
240 U.S. electoral system, to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored
241 candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton. The IRA' s operation also
242 included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names
243 of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside
244 the United States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S.
245 grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump
246 Campaign officials in the United States. The investigation did not identify
247 evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA. Section II
248 of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media
249 campaign. RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS At the same time that the IRA operation
250 began to focus ?on supporting candidate Trump in early 2016, the Russian
251 government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions (hacking)
252 and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian
253 intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General
254 Staff of the Russian Army (GRU) carried out these operations. In March 2016, the
255 GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign volunteers and
256 employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU
257 hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign
258 Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU stole
259 hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and
260 networks. Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian
261 government's role in hacking its network, the GRU began disseminating stolen
262 materials through the fictitious online personas "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer 2.0."
263 The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks.
264 4
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272 U.S. Department of Justice AH:erHey \?Brit Pr6d1:1et // Mtty Cet1:tttifl
273 Mttterittl Preteeted Ut1:der Fed. R. Ct1iffl. P. 6(e) The presidential campaign
274 of Donald J. Trump ("Trump Campaign" or "Campaign") showed interest in
275 WikiLeaks's releases of documents and welcomed their otential to damage
276 candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016,
277 llfilllillliliilfll~llliillllllilllilli forecast to senior Campaign officials
278 that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate Clinton.
279 WikiLeaks's first release came in July 2016. Around the same time, candidate
280 Trump announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing
281 from a private server used b Clinton when she was Secreta of State he later said
282 that he was s ? eakin sarcasticall . WikiLeaks began releasing Podesta' s stolen
283 emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a U.S. media outlet released
284 video considered damaging to candidate Trump. Section lII of this Report details
285 the Office's investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other
286 efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails. RUSSIAN
287 CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN The social media campaign and the GRU hacking
288 operations coincided with a series of contacts between Trump Campaign officials
289 and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The Office investigated
290 whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring or
291 coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the
292 investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit
293 from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign
294 expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released
295 through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the
296 Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its
297 election interference activities. The Russian contacts consisted of business
298 connections, offers of assistance to the Campaign, invitations for candidate
299 Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign officials and
300 representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking
301 improved U.S.-Russian relations. Section IV of this Report details the contacts
302 between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition
303 periods, the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order.
304 2015. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump
305 Organization real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow.
306 Candidate Trump signed a Letter oflntent for Trump Tower Moscow by November
307 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization executive Michael Cohen emailed and
308 spoke about the project with the office of Russian government press secretary
309 Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through at least June
310 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump.
311 Spring 2016. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early
312 contact with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to
313 Russia and traveled to Moscow in April 2016. Immediately upon his return to
314 London from that trip, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that the Russian government had
315 "dirt" on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands 5
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323 U.S. Department of Justice l\.ttortte~? Work Pt'od1:1et // Mtty Cotttttitt
324 Mttterittl Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) of emails. One week later,
325 in the first week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a
326 foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the
327 Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous
328 release of information damaging to candidate Clinton. Throughout that period of
329 time and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two
330 Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian
331 government. No meeting took place. Summer 2016. Russian outreach to the Trump
332 Campaign continued into the summer of 2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the
333 presumptive Republican nominee for President. On June 9, 2016, for example, a
334 Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald Trump Jr., Jared
335 Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email proposing
336 the meeting had described as "official documents and information that would
337 incriminate Hillary." The materials were offered to Trump Jr. as "part of Russia
338 and its government's support for Mr. Trump." The written communications setting
339 up the meeting showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from
340 Russia that could assist candidate Trump's electoral prospects, but the Russian
341 lawyer's presentation did not provide such information. Days after the June 9
342 meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC announced that
343 Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to
344 opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents. In July 2016,
345 Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page traveled in his personal capacity to
346 Moscow and gave the keynote address at the New Economic School. Page had lived
347 and worked in Russia between 2003 and 2007. After returning to the United
348 States, Page became acquainted with at least two Russian intelligence officers,
349 one of whom was later charged in 2015 with conspiracy to act as an unregistered
350 agent of Russia. Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-
351 Russian foreign policy drew media attention. The Campaign then distanced itself
352 from Page and, by late September 2016, removed him from the Campaign. July 2016
353 was also the month WikiLeaks first released emails stolen by the GRU from the
354 DNC. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents
355 revealing information about the Clinton Campaign. Within days, there was public
356 reporting that U.S. intelligence agencies had "high confidence" that the Russian
357 government was.behind the theft of emails and documents from the DNC. And within
358 a week of the release, a foreign government informed the FBI about its May 2016
359 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the Russian government
360 could assist the Trump Campaign. On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign
361 government rep01ting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential
362 coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the
363 Trump Campaign. Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul
364 Manafort met in New York City with his long-time business associate Konstantin
365 Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. Kilimnik
366 requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine that
367 Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel's Office was a "backdoor" way for
368 Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would
369 require candidate Trump's assent to succeed (were he to be elected President).
370 They also discussed the status of the 6
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377
378 U.S. Department of Justice Atteffle'.} 'Nm?k P1:1edttet // May Cm~taitt Material
379 Preteetecl Uttcler Fed. R. C1:1im. P. 6(e) Trump Campaign and Manafort's
380 strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states. Months before that
381 meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik,
382 and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting.
383 Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump
384 speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered
385 damaging to his candidacy. Less than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second
386 release: thousands of John Podesta's emails that had been stolen by the GRU in
387 late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. government institutions were at the time
388 continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to
389 interfere in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department
390 of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
391 issued a joint public statement "that the Russian Government directed the recent
392 compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US
393 political organizations." Those "thefts" and the "disclosures" of the hacked
394 materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued,
395 "are intended to interfere with the US election process." Post-2016 Election.
396 Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government officials and
397 prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new
398 administration. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged
399 these efforts. The Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to
400 congratulate the President-Elect and to arrange a call with President Putin.
401 Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there. Kirill Dmitriev,
402 the chief executive officer of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, was among the
403 Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. In early
404 December, a business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of
405 the Trump Campaign and an associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon.
406 Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in January 2017 in the Seychelles and
407 discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same period, another business
408 associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served on
409 the Campaign or the Transition Team. Dmitriev and Kushner's friend collaborated
410 on a short written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which
411 Dmitriev implied had been cleared through Putin. The friend gave that proposal
412 to Kushner before the inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and
413 incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. On December 29, 2016, then-President
414 Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election.
415 Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian Ambassador
416 Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the
417 sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take
418 retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later,
419 President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. Putin)." The next
420 day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had
421 been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a
422 result of Flynn's request. * * * On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence
423 community briefed President-Elect Trump on a joint assessment-drafted and
424 coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and 7
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432 U.S. Department of Justice A1:1:erHey \?erk Predt1et // Mey CeHtttiH Matel'ial
433 Pl'eteeted UHder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) and whether prosecution would serve a
434 substantial federal interest that could not be adequately served by prosecution
435 elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. See Justice Manual ? 9-27 .220.
436 Section V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging
437 decisions, which contain three main components. First, the Office determined
438 that Russia's two principal interference operations in the 2016 U.S.
439 presidential election-the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping
440 violated U.S. criminal law. Many of the individuals and entities involved in the
441 social media campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to
442 defraud the United States by undermining through deceptive acts the work of
443 federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. elections, as
444 well as related counts of identity theft. See United States v. Internet Research
445 Agency, et al., No. 18-cr-32 (D.D.C.). Separately, Russian intelligence officers
446 who carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal
447 email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to
448 violate, among other federal laws, the federal computer-intrusion statute, and
449 the have been so char ed. See United States v. Ne ksho, et al., No. 18-cr-215
450 D.D.C .. Second, while the investigation identified numerous links between
451 individuals with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with
452 the Trump Campaign, the evidence was not sufficient to support criminal charges.
453 Among other things, the evidence was not sufficient to charge any Campaign
454 official as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other Russian
455 principal. And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meeting and WikiLeaks's
456 releases of hacked materials was not sufficient to charge a criminal campaign-
457 finance violation. Further, the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any
458 member of the Trump Campaign conspired with representatives of the Russian
459 government to interfere in the 2016 election. Third, the investigation
460 established that several individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign lied to
461 the Office, and to Congress, about their interactions with Russian-affiliated
462 individuals and related matters. Those lies materially impaired the
463 investigation of Russian election interference. The Office charged some of those
464 lies as violations of the federal statements statute. Former National Security
465 Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his interactions with
466 Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period. George Papadopoulos, a
467 foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to
468 investigators about, inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with
469 Joseph Mifsud, the professor who told Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on
470 candidate Clinton .in the form of thousands of emails. Former Trump Organization
471 attorney Michael Cohen leaded uilt to makin false statements to Con ress about
472 the Trum Moscow ro ? ect. 9
473
474RESULT: 10
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476PAGE: 43
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478TEXT:
479
480 U.S. Department of Justice Attem1:ey Work Prod1:1et /,' M1ty Cot1t1tit1
481 Mftteri1tl Proteeted Ut1der Fed. R. Crifl'I. P. 6(e) III. RUSSIAN HACKING AND
482 DUMPING OPERATIONS Beginning in March 2016, units of the Russian Federation's
483 Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) hacked the computers
484 and email accounts of organizations, e?mployees, and volunteers supporting the
485 Clinton Campaign, including the email account of campaign chairman John Podesta.
486 Starting in April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the
487 Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National
488 Committee (DNC). The GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton
489 Campaign employees, advisors, and volunteers. In total, the GRU stole hundreds
490 of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks.109
491 The GRU later released stolen Clinton Campaign and DNC documents through online
492 personas, "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer 2.0," and later through the organization
493 WikiLeaks. The release of the documents was designed and timed to interfere with
494 the 2016 U.S. presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign. , the
495 Trump Campaign about WikiLeaks's activities. The investigation was unable to
496 resolve WikiLeaks's release of the stolen Podesta emails on October 7, 2016, the
497 same day a video from years earlier was published of Trump using graphic
498 language about women. A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign 1. GRU
499 Units Target the Clinton Campaign Two military units of the GRU carried out the
500 computer intrusions into the Clinton Campaign, DNC, and DCCC: Military Units
501 26165 and 74455.110 Military Unit 26165 is a GRU cyber unit dedicated to
502 targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental organizations
503 outside of Russia, including in the United States.111 The unit was sub-divided
504 into departments with different specialties. One department, for example,
505 developed specialized malicious software "malware" , while another de artment
506 conducted large-scale spearphishing campaigns.112 jfllllililliliilllilli
507 lilillllll~ a bitcoin mining operation to 109 As discussed in Section V below,
508 our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from the hacking of these
509 computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions, in
510 violation of 18 U.S.C. ?? 1030 and 371. See Volume I, Section V.B, infra;
511 Indictment, United States v. Netyksho, No. I :18-cr-215 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018),
512 Doc. 1 ("Netyksho Indictment"). 110 Netyksho Indictment ,r 1. 111 Separate from
513 this Office's indictment of GRU officers, in October 2018 a grand jury sitting
514 in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging certain
515 members of Unit 26165 with hacking the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, the World Anti-
516 Doping Agency, and other international sport associations. United States v.
517 Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, No. 18-263 (W.D. Pa.). 112 A spearphishing email
518 is designed to appear as though it originates from a trusted source, and
519 solicits information to enable the sender to gain access to an account or
520 network, or causes the recipient to 36
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524PAGE: 48
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526TEXT:
527
528 U.S. Department of Justice Attarl'ley Werk Predttet // Mey Cel'ltail'l Material
529 Preteeted Unaer Fed. R. Cril'l'I. P. 6(e) Unit 26165 officers appear to have
530 stolen thousands of emails and attachments, which were later released by
531 WikiLeaks in July 2016.136 B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials The GRU's
532 operations extended beyond stealing materials, and included releasing documents
533 stolen from the Clinton Campaign and its supporters. The GRU carried out the
534 anonymous release through two fictitious online personas that it created-DCLeaks
535 and Guccifer 2.0-and later through the organization WikiLeaks. 1. DCLeaks The
536 GRU began planning the releases at least as early as April 19, 2016, when Unit
537 26165 registered the domain dcleaks.com through a service that anonymized the
538 registrant.137 Unit 26165 paid for the registration using a pool of bitcoin that
539 it had mined. 138 The dcleaks.com landing page pointed to different tranches of
540 stolen documents, arranged by victim or subject matter. Other dcleaks.com pages
541 contained indexes of the stolen emails that were being released (bearing the
542 sender, recipient, and date of the email). To control access and the timing of
543 releases, pages were sometimes password-protected for a period of time and later
544 made unrestricted to the public. Starting in June 2016, the GRU posted stolen
545 documents onto the website dcleaks.com, including documents stolen from a number
546 of individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign. These documents appeared to
547 have originated from personal email accounts (in particular, Google and
548 Microsoft accounts), rather than the DNC and DCCC computer networks. DCLeaks
549 victims included an advisor to the Clinton Campaign, a former DNC employee and
550 Clinton Campaign employee, and four other campaign volunteers.139 The GRU
551 released through dcleaks.com thousands of documents, including personal
552 identifying and financial information, internal correspondence related to the
553 Clinton Campaign and prior political jobs, and fundraising files and
554 information.140 136 Netyksho Indictment ,i 29. The last-in-time DNC email
555 released by WikiLeaks was dated May 25, 2016, the same period of time during
556 which the GRU gained access to the DNC's email server. Netyksho Indictment ,i
557 45. 137 Netyksho Indictment ,i 35. Approximately a week before the registration
558 of dcleaks.com, the same actors attem ted to re ister the website
559 electionleaks.com using the same domain registration service. 138 See
560 SM-2589105, serial 181; Netyksho Indictment ,i 2l(a). 140 See, e.g., Internet
561 Archive, "htt s://dcleaks.com/" archive date Nov. 10, 2016). Additionally,
562 DCLeaks released documents relating to , emails belonging to_, and emails from
563 2015 relating to Republican Party employees (under the portfolio name "The
564 United States Republican Party"). "The United States Republican Party" portfolio
565 contained approximately 300 emails from a variety of GOP members, PACs,
566 campaigns, state parties, and businesses dated between May and October 2015.
567 According to open-source reporting, these victims shared the same 41
568
569RESULT: 12
570
571PAGE: 51
572
573TEXT:
574
575 U.S. Department of Justice AtierHey Werk Predttet // Moy CeHtttiH Material
576 Preteeted UHeer Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) In early August 2016, Twitter's suspension
577 of the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account. After it was reinstated, GRU officers
578 posing as Guccifer 2.0 wrote 1;c?)Wp ,,ia private message, "thank u for writing
579 back ... do u find anyt[h]ing interesting in the docs i posted?" On August 17,
580 2016, the GRU added, "please tell me if i can help u anyhow ... it would be a
581 great pleasure to me." On September 9, 2016, the GRUi;(T);f posing as Guccifer
582 2.0-referred to a stolen DCCC document posted online and asked ? "what do u
583 think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential
584 campaign." -responded, "pretty standard."155 The investigation did not identify
585 evidence of other communications between-and Guccifer 2.0. 3. Use of WikiLeaks
586 In order to expand its interference in the 20 I 6 U.S. presidential election,
587 the GRU units transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the
588 chairman of the Clinton Campaign to WikiLeaks. GRU officers used both the
589 DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas to communicate with WikiLeaks through Twitter
590 private messaging and through encrypted channels, including possibly through
591 WikiLeaks's private communication system. . a. WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition
592 Toward the Clinton Campaign WikiLeaks, and particularly its founder Julian
593 Assange, privately expressed opposition to candidate Clinton well before the
594 first release of stolen documents. In November 2015, Assange wrote to other
595 members and associates of WikiLeaks that "[w]e believe it would be much better
596 for GOP to win ... Dems+Media+liberals woudl [sic] then form a block to reign in
597 their worst qualities. . . . With Hillary in charge, GOP will be pushing for her
598 worst qualities., dems+media+neoliberals will be mute .... She's a bright, well
599 connected, sadisitic sociopath."156 In March 2016, WikiLeaks released a
600 searchable archive of approximately 30,000 Clinton emails that had been obtained
601 through FOIA litigation.157 While designing the archive, one WikiLeaks member
602 explained the reason for building the archive to another associate: 154 155 Harm
603 to Ongoing Matter 156 1 l/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276,
604 @WikiLeaks et al. Assange also wrote that, "GOP will generate a lot oposition
605 [sic], including through dumb moves. Hillary will do the same thing, but co-opt
606 the liberal opposition and the GOP opposition. Hence biliary has greater freedom
607 to statt wars than the GOP and has the will to do so." Id. 157 WikiLeaks,
608 "Hillary Clinton Email Archive," available at https://wikileaks.org/clinton-
609 emails/. 44
610
611RESULT: 13
612
613PAGE: 52
614
615TEXT:
616
617 U.S. Department of Justice AttorHey Work Prodttet // Mtty Cofl:tttifl:
618 Mttterittl Proteeted UHder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) [W]e want this repository to
619 become "the place" to search for background on hillary's plotting at the state
620 department during 2009-2013. . . . Firstly because its useful and will annoy
621 Hillary, but secondly because we want to be seen to be a resource/player in the
622 US election, because eit [sic] may en[]courage people to send us even more
623 important leaks.158 b. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks
624 Shortly after the GRU's first release of stolen documents through dcleaks.com in
625 June 2016, GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persona to contact WikiLeaks about
626 possible coordination in the future release of stolen emails. On June 14, 2016,
627 @dcleaks _ sent a direct message to @WikiLeaks, noting, "You announced your
628 organization was preparing to publish more Hillary's emails. We are ready to
629 support you. We have some sensitive information too, in particular, her
630 financial documents. Let's do it to ether. What do ou think about ublishin our
631 info at the same moment? Thank ou."159 Around the same time, WikiLeaks initiated
632 communications with the GRU persona Guccifer 2.0 shortly after it was used to
633 release documents stolen from the DNC. On June 22, 2016, seven days after
634 Guccifer 2.0's first releases of stolen DNC documents, WikiLeaks used Twitter's
635 direct message function to contact the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account and suggest
636 that Guccifer 2.0 "[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to
637 review and it will have a much higher impact than what you are doing."160 On
638 July 6, 2016, WikiLeaks again contacted Guccifer 2.0 through Twitter's private
639 messaging function, writing, "if you have anything hillary related we want it in
640 the next tweo [sic] days prefab le [sic] because the DNC is approaching and she
641 will solidify bernie supporters behind her after." The Guccifer 2.0 persona
642 responded, "ok ... i see." WikiLeaks also explained, "we think trump has only a
643 25% chance of winning against hillary ... so conflict between bernie and hillary
644 is interesting." 161 c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks Both
645 the GRU and WikiLeaks sought to hide their communications, which has limited the
646 Office's ability to collect all of the communications between them. Thus,
647 although it is clear that the stolen DNC and Podesta documents were transferred
648 from the GRU to WikiLeaks, -Investigative Technique 158 3/14/16 Twitter DM,
649 @WikiLeaks to Less than two weeks earlier, the same account had been used to
650 send a private message opposing the idea of Clinton "in whitehouse with her
651 bloodlutt and amitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist
652 appointees." 11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276,
653 @WikiLeaks et al. 159 6/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks. 160 Netyksho
654 Indictment ,r 47(a). 1617/6/16 Twitter DMs, @WikiLeaks & @guccifer_2. 45
655
656RESULT: 14
657
658PAGE: 53
659
660TEXT:
661
662 U.S. Department of Justice Atterttey Werk Predttet // Ma:y Cettta:itt Mttteria:l
663 Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) The Office was able to identify when
664 the GRU ( operating through its personas Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks) transferred
665 some of the stolen documents to WikiLeaks through online archives set up by the
666 GRU. Assan e had access to the internet from the Ecuadorian Embass in London, En
667 land. On July 14, 2016, GRU officers used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send
668 WikiLeaks an email bearing the subject "big archive" and the message "a new
669 attempt."163 The email contained an encrypted attachment with the name "wk dnc
670 link I .txt.gpg."164 Using the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account, GRU officers sent
671 WikiLeaks an encrypted file and instructions on how to open it.165 On July 18,
672 2016, WikiLeaks confirmed in a direct message to the Gucci fer 2.0 account that
673 it had "the 1 Gb or so archive" and would make a release of the stolen documents
674 "this week."166 On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and
675 other documents stolen from the DNC computer networks.167 The Democratic
676 National Convention began three days later. Similar communications occurred
677 between WikiLeaks and the GRU-operated persona DCLeaks. On September 15, 2016,
678 @dcleaks wrote to @WikiLeaks, "hi there! I'm from DC Leaks. How could we discuss
679 some submission-related issues? Am trying to reach out to you via your secured
680 chat but getting no response. I've got something that might interest you. You
681 won't be disappointed, I promise."168 The WikiLeaks account responded, "Hi
682 there," without further elaboration. The @dcleaks_ account did not respond
683 immediately. The same day, the Twitter account@guccifer_2 sent @dcleaks_ a
684 direct message, which is the first known contact between the personas.169 During
685 subsequent communications, the 163 This was not the GRU's first attempt at
686 transferring data to WikiLeaks. On June 29, 2016, the GRU used a Guccifer 2.0
687 email accou~ted file to a WikiLeaks email account. 6/29/16 Email,
688 guccifer2@mail.com (The email appears to have been undelivered.) 164 See
689 SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28 (analysis). 165 6/27/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 to
690 @WikiLeaks. 166 7/18/16 Twitter OM, @Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks. 167 "DNC Email
691 Archive," WikiLeaks (Jul. 22, 2016), available at https://wikileaks.org/dnc-
692 emails. 168 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks. 169 9/15/16 Twitter DM,
693 @guccifer _ 2 to @dcleaks _. 46
694
695RESULT: 15
696
697PAGE: 54
698
699TEXT:
700
701 U.S. Department of Justice AtterRe;? Werk Predttet // Mtt;? CeRtail'l Mftferial
702 Preteeted URder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Guccifer 2.0 persona informed DCLeaks that
703 WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and arrange for a way to speak through
704 encrypted emails.170 An analysis of the metadata collected from the WikiLeaks
705 site revealed that the stolen Podesta emails show a creation date of September
706 19, 2016.171 Based on information about Assange's computer and its possible
707 operating system, this date may be when the GRU staged the stolen Podesta emails
708 for transfer to WikiLeaks (as the GRU had previously done in July 2016 for the
709 DNC emails).172 The WikiLeaks site also released PDFs and other documents taken
710 from Podesta that were attachments to emails in his account; these documents had
711 a creation date of October 2, 2016, which appears to be the date the attachments
712 were separately staged by WikiLeaks on its site.173 Beginning on September 20,
713 2016, WikiLeaks and DCLeaks resumed communications in a brief exchange. On
714 September 22, 2016, a DCLeaks email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com sent an
715 email to a WikiLeaks account with the subject "Submission" and the message "Hi
716 from DCLeaks." The email contained a PGP-encr ted with the filename
717 "wiki_mail.txt.gpg."174 %?The email, however, bears a number of similarities to
718 the July 14, 2016 email in which GRU officers used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to
719 give WikiLeaks access to the archive of DNC files. On September 22, 2016 (the
720 same day of DCLeaks' email to WikiLeaks), the Twitter account dcleaks sent a sin
721 le messa e to WikiLeaks with the strin of characters The Office cannot rule out
722 that stolen documents were transferred to WikiLeaks through intermediaries who
723 visited during the summer of 2016. For example, public reporting identified A d
724 M"'ll M h w?kiL k . t h h . t d "th th t fi fth Investigative Technique 170 See
725 SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28; 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks. 171
726 See SM-2284941, serials 63 & 64 Investigative Technique At the time, certain
727 Apple operating systems used a setting that left a downloaded file's creation
728 date the same as the creation date shown on the host computer. This would
729 explain why the creation date on WikiLeaks's version of the files was still
730 September 19, 2016. See SM-Investigative Technique 2284941, serial 62 173 When
731 WikiLeaks saved attachments separately from the stolen emails, its computer
732 system appears to have treated each attachment as a new file and given it a new
733 creation date. See SM-2284941, serials 63 & 64. 174 See 9/22/16 Email,
734 dcleaksproject@gmail.com 175 Ellen Nakashima et al., A German Hacker Offers a
735 Rare Look Inside the Secretive World of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks, Washington
736 Post (Jan. 17, 2018). 47
737
738RESULT: 16
739
740PAGE: 55
741
742TEXT:
743
744 U.S. Department of Justice Atton=iey Work Protl1:1et // Mtl:y Cottt:tl:ifl
745 Mtl:teritl:l Proteetetl UAtier Fetl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Investigative Technique
746 . On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from the
747 Podesta email account. In total, WikiLeaks released 33 tranches of stolen emails
748 between October 7, 2016 and November 7, 2016. The releases included private
749 speeches given by Clinton; 177 internal communications between Podesta and other
750 high-ranking members of the Clinton Campaign; 178 and correspondence related to
751 the Clinton Foundation.179 In total, WikiLeaks released over 50,000 documents
752 stolen from Podesta's personal email account. The last-in-time email released
753 from Podesta' s account was dated March 21, 2016, two days after Podesta
754 received a spearphishing email sent by the GRU. d. WikiLeaks Statements
755 Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials As reports attributing the DNC
756 and DCCC hacks to the Russian government emerged, WikiLeaks and Assange made
757 several public statements apparently designed to obscure the source of the
758 materials that WikiLeaks was releasing. The file-transfer evidence described
759 above and other information uncovered during the investigation discredit
760 WikiLeaks's claims about the source of material that it posted. Beginning in the
761 summer of 2016, Assange and WikiLeaks made a number of statements about Seth
762 Rich, a former DNC staff member who was killed in July 2016. The statements
763 about Rich implied falsely that he had been the source of the stolen DNC emails.
764 On August 9, 2016, the @WikiLeaks Twitter account posted: "ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks
765 has decided to issue a US$20k reward for information leading to conviction for
766 the murder ofDNC staffer Seth Rich."180 Likewise, on August 25, 2016, Assange
767 was asked in an interview, "Why are you so interested in Seth Rich's killer?"
768 and responded, "We're very interested in anything that might be a threat to
769 alleged Wikileaks sources." The interviewer responded to Assange's statement by
770 commenting, "I know you don't want to reveal your source, but it certainly
771 sounds like you're suggesting a man who leaked information to WikiLeaks was then
772 murdered." Assange replied, "If there's someone who's potentially connected to
773 our publication, and that person has been murdered in suspicious t79 Netyksho
774 Indictment ,r 43. 180 @WikiLeaks 8/9/16 Tweet. 48
775
776RESULT: 17
777
778PAGE: 56
779
780TEXT:
781
782 U.S. Department of Justice Attort1ey Work Prndttet ,'/ May Cot1:tait1: Material
783 Proteeted Ut1:der Fed. R. Cri1fl. P. 6(e) circumstances, it doesn't necessarily
784 mean that the two are connected. But it is a very serious matter ... that type
785 of allegation is very serious, as it's taken very seriously by us."181 After the
786 U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was
787 behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton
788 materials released by WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. According to
789 media reports, Assange told a U.S. congressman that the DNC hack was an "inside
790 job," and purported to have "physical proof' that Russians did not give
791 materials to Assange. 182 C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations While releasing the
792 stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and WikiLeaks, GRU
793 officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign
794 and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in
795 several states. 1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked
796 Victims On July 27 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to
797 candidate Clinton's personal office . Earlier that day, candidate Trump made
798 public statements that included the following: "Russia, if you're listening, I
799 hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will
800 probably be rewarded mightily by our press."183 The "30,000 emails" were
801 apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been
802 stored on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as
803 Secretary of State. Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement, GRU
804 officers targeted for the first time Clinton's personal office. After candidate
805 Trump's remarks, Unit 26165 created and sent malicious links targeting 15 email
806 accounts at the domain including an email account belonging to Clinton aide The
807 investigation did not find evidence of earlier GRU attempts to compromise
808 accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was able to identify
809 these email accounts, which were not public.184 Unit 26165 officers also hacked
810 into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service copies of the DNC da
811 databases (referred to On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate function
812 designed to allow users to produce backups of as "snapshots"). The GRU then
813 stole those snapshots by moving 181 See Assange: "Murdered DNC Staffer Was
814 'Potential' WikiLeaks Source," Fox News (Aug. 25, 2016)(containing video of
815 Assange interview by Megyn Kelly). 182 M. Raju & Z. Cohen, A GOP Congressman's
816 Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange, CNN (May 23, 2018). 183 "Donald Trump on
817 Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails," YouTube Channel C-SPAN, Posted
818 7/27/16, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU (starting at
819 0:41). 49
820
821RESULT: 18
822
823PAGE: 58
824
825TEXT:
826
827 U.S. Department of Justice AttorHey Werle Proattet // Moy CoHtoiH Moteriol
828 Proteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crtffl. P. 6(e) for vulnerabilities continued through
829 the election. Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials
830 involved in election administration and personnel a~ involved in voting
831 technology. In August 2016, GRU officers targeted employees of ..... , a voting
832 technology company that developed software used by numerous U.S. counties to
833 manage voter rolls, and installed malware on the company network. Similarly, in
834 November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email accounts used
835 by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 U.S.
836 election.191 The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded
837 with malicious software (commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the
838 GRU to access the infected computer.192 The FBI was separately responsible for
839 this investigation. We understand the FBI believes that this operation enabled
840 the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county government.
841 The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did
842 not undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so.
843 D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials The Trump Campaign
844 showed interest in WikiLeaks's releases hout the summer and fall of 2016. 1. a.
845 Background I , Investigative Technique Investigative Technique 51
846
847RESULT: 19
848
849PAGE: 59
850
851TEXT:
852
853 U.S. Department of Justice Attertte,? Werk Proclttet // Mtt'' Cettttttft
854 Mttterittl Proteetecl UHcler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) b. Contacts with the
855 Campaign about WikiLeaks Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter On June
856 12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to "have emails relating to
857 Hillary Clinton which are pending publication,"194 but provided no additional
858 context. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . ... Harm to Ongoing.Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter
859 Gates recalled candidate Trump being generally frustrated that the Clinton
860 emails had not been found.196 , ! Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter
861 ?; 194 See Mahita Gajanan, Julian Assange Timed DNC Email Release for Democratic
862 Convention, Time (July 27, 2016) (qu.oting the June 12, 2016 television
863 interview). 195 In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
864 agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to
865 defraud and commit multiple offenses (i.e., tax fraud, failure to report foreign
866 bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal)
867 against the United States, as well as making false statements to our Office.
868 Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Richard W Gates III, l:
869 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 195 ("Gates Superseding Criminal
870 Information"); Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W Gates III, 1:
871 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 205 ("Gates Plea Agreement"). Gates has
872 provided information and in-comt testimony that the Office has deemed to be
873 reliable. 196 Gates I 0/25/18 302, at 1-2. 197 As explained further in Volume I,
874 Section IV.A.8, irifra, Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office.
875 We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer
876 sessions and before the grand jury. We have generally recounted his version of
877 events in this report only when his statements are sufficiently corroborated to
878 be trustworthy; to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may
879 themselves be of evidentiary value; or to provide Manafort's explanations for
880 certain events, even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation
881 was credible. His account appears here principally because it aligns with those
882 of other witnesses. 198 52
883
884RESULT: 20
885
886PAGE: 60
887
888TEXT:
889
890 U.S. Department of Justice Att:erttey '+\'erk Prnt=lttet // May Cetttaitt
891 Material Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Michael Cohen, former executive
892 vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump,
893 199 told the Office that he recalled an incident in which he was in candidate
894 Trum 's office in Trum Tower Cohen further told the Office that, after
895 WikiLeaks's subsequent release of stolen mails in July 2016, candidate Trump
896 said to Cohen something to the effect of 202 199 In November 2018, Cohen pleaded
897 guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count information charging him
898 with making false statements to Congress, in violation of 18 U.S.C. ? l00l(a) &
899 (c). He had previously pleaded guilty to several other criminal charges brought
900 by the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New York, after a
901 referral from this Office. In the months leading up to his false-statements
902 guilty plea, Cohen met with our Office on multiple occasions for interviews and
903 provided information that the Office has generally assessed to be reliable and
904 that is included in this report. 202 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at I 0. Harm to Ongoing
905 Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 203 Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4. 204 20S
906 53
907
908RESULT: 21
909
910PAGE: 61
911
912TEXT:
913
914 U.S. Department of Justice Att:erHey Werle Predttet ,',' May CeHtttiH Mttterittl
915 Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6Ee) developments with WikiLeaks and separately
916 told Gates to keep in touch--about future WikiLeaks releases.206 According to
917 Gates, by the late summer of 2016, the Trump Campaign was planning a press
918 strategy, a communications cam and messa in based on the ossible release of I
919 IQI 111 LV '-'ll~VII I~ HIQLL r Clinton emails b WikiLeaks.207 208 ,: Harm to
920 Ongoing Matter Harm to ungomg Matter to LaGuardia Airport. , shortly after the
921 call candidate Trump told Gates that more releases of damaging information would
922 be coming.209 c. Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
923 u ?. -? ? Harm to Ongoing Matter 207 Gates 4/10/18 302, at 3; Gates 4/11/18 302,
924 at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2. 208 209 Gates 10/25/18 302
925 (serial 241), at 4. 210 211 ,HOM 212 Corsi first rose to public prominence in
926 August 2004 when he published his book Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans
927 Speak Out Against John Kerry. In the 2008 election cycle, Corsi gained
928 prominence for being a leading proponent of the allegation that Barack Obama was
929 not born in the United States. Corsi told the Office that Donald Trump expressed
930 interest in his writings, and that he spoke with Trump on the phone on at least
931 six occasions. Corsi 9/6/18 302, at 3. 213 Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 2; Corsi was
932 first interviewed on September 6, 2018 at the Special Counsel's offices in
933 Washington, D.C. He was accompanied by counsel throughout the interview. Corsi
934 was subsequently interviewed on September 17, 2018; September 21, 2018; October
935 31, 2018; November I, 2018; and November 2, 2018. Counsel was 54
936
937RESULT: 22
938
939PAGE: 63
940
941TEXT:
942
943 U.S. Department of Justice Att:arttey Wat1k Pt1adttet // Mtty Catttttitt
944 Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Ct1iffl. P. 6(e) Malloch stated to
945 investigators that beginnin in or about Au ust 2016, he and Corsi had multiple
946 Face Time discussions about WikiLeaks ? had made a connection to Assange and
947 that the hacked emails of John Podesta would be released prior to Election Day
948 and would be helpful to the Trump Campaign. In one conversation in or around
949 August or September 2016, Corsi told Malloch that the release of the Podesta
950 emails was coming, after which "we" were going to be in the driver's seat.221
951 Harm to Ongoing Matter 1if11Harm to Ongoing Matter 1i1Harm to Ongoing Matter
952 111Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 111Harm to Ongoing Matter -Harm
953 to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ? Harm to Ongoing Matter 223 224 225
954 226 227 228 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter
955 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 56
956
957RESULT: 23
958
959PAGE: 65
960
961TEXT:
962
963 U.S. Department of Justice AM:erttey Wer:k Predttet // Mtty Cetttaitt Mttterial
964 Preteeted Uttder FeE:I. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016
965 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails On October 7 2016 four days after the Assange
966 press conference , the Washington Post published an Access Hollywood video that
967 captured comments by candidate Trump some years earlier and that was expected to
968 adversely affect the Campaign.239 Less than an hour after the video's
969 publication, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by the GRU from
970 the account of Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta. Harm to Ongoing Matter
971 111Harm to Ongoing Matter -Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter
972 1111Harm to Ongoing Matter Corsi said that, because he had no direct means o
973 communicating with WikiLeaks, he told members of the news site WNO-who were
974 participating on a conference call with him that day-to reach Assange
975 immediately.244 Corsi claimed that the pressure was 239 Candidate Trump can be
976 heard off camera making graphic statements about women. 240 241 242 243 244 In a
977 later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated Harm to Ongoing Matter that he
978 believed Malloch was on the call but then focused on other individuals who were
979 on the call-invitation, which Malloch was not. (Separate travel records show
980 that at the time of the call, Malloch was aboard a transatlantic flight). Corsi
981 at one point stated that after WikiLeaks 's release of stolen emails on October
982 7, 2016, he concluded Malloch had gotten in contact with Assange. Corsi 11/1/18
983 302, at 6. 58
984
985RESULT: 24
986
987PAGE: 66
988
989TEXT:
990
991 U.S. Department of Justice Attet'He~? Werk Prnfitiet // Mft)? CemaiH Material
992 Preteetee UHeer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) enormous and recalled telling the
993 conference call the Access Hollywood tape was coming.245 Corsi stated that he
994 was convinced that his efforts had caused WikiLeaks to release the emails when
995 they did.246 In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated that he thought
996 that he had told people on a WND conference call about the forthcoming tape and
997 had sent out a tweet asking whether anyone could contact Assange, but then said
998 that maybe he had done nothing.247 The Office investigated Corsi' s allegations
999 about the events of October 7 little corroboration for his alle ations about the
1000 da .248 However, the phone records themselves do not indicate that the
1001 conversation was with any of the reporters who broke the Access Hollywood sto ,
1002 and the Office has not otherwise been able to identif the substance of the
1003 conversation. However, the Office has not identified any conference call
1004 participant, or anyone who spoke to Corsi that day, who says that they received
1005 non-public information about the tape from Corsi or acknowledged having
1006 contacted a member of WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016 after a conversation with
1007 Corsi. e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks Donald Trump Jr. had
1008 direct electronic communications with WikiLeaks during the campaign period. On
1009 September 20, 2016, an individual named Jason Fishbein sent WikiLeaks the
1010 password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump's "unprecedented and
1011 dangerous" ties 245 During the same interview, Corsi also suggested that he may
1012 have sent out public tweets because he knew Assange was reading his tweets. Our
1013 Office was unable to find evidence of any such tweets. 246_ Corsi 9/21/18 302,
1014 at 6-7. 247 Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6. Harm to Ongoing Matter ??Harm to Ongoing
1015 Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 59
1016
1017RESULT: 25
1018
1019PAGE: 67
1020
1021TEXT:
1022
1023 U.S. Department of Justice At:tarHey 'ille,rk Pratittet // Ma;? Ce,AtttiH
1024 Material Pre,teeteti UHtier Feti. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) to Russia,
1025 PutinTrump.org.252 WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: '"Let's bomb Iraq' Progress for
1026 America PAC to launch "PutinTrump.org' at 9:30am. Oops pw is 'putintrump'
1027 putintrump.org." Several hours later, WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to
1028 Donald Trump Jr., "A PAC run anti-Trump site putintrump.org is about to launch.
1029 The PAC is a recycled pro-Iraq war PAC. We have guessed the password. It is
1030 'putintrump.' See 'About' for who is behind it. Any comments ?"253 Several hours
1031 later, Trump Jr. emailed a variety of senior campaign staff: Guys I got a weird
1032 Twitter DM from wikileaks. See below. I tried the password and it works and the
1033 about section they reference contains the next pie in terms of who is behind it.
1034 Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me
1035 as I follow them and it is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the
1036 conspiracy they are looking for could be? These are just screen shots but it's a
1037 fully built out page claiming to be a PAC let me know your thoughts and ifwe
1038 want to look into it.254 Trump Jr. attached a screenshot of the "About" page for
1039 the unlaunched site PutinTrump.org. The next day (after the website had launched
1040 publicly), Trump Jr. sent a direct message to WikiLeaks: "Off the record, l
1041 don't know who that is but I'll ask around. Thanks."255 On October 3, 2016,
1042 WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump Jr., asking "you guys" to help
1043 disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had advocated using a drone to
1044 target Julian Assange. Trump Jr. responded that he already "had done so," and
1045 asked, "what's behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?"256 WikiLeaks
1046 did not respond. On October 12, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote again that it was "great
1047 to see you and your dad talking about our publications. Strongly suggest your
1048 dad tweets this link if he mentions us wlsearch.tk."257 WikiLeaks wrote that the
1049 link would help Trump in "digging through" leaked emails and stated, "we just
1050 released Podesta emails Part 4."258 Two days later, Trump Jr. publicly tweeted
1051 the wlsearch.tk link.259 ' 252 9/20/16 Twitter DM~hbein to @WikiLeaks; see
1052 JF00587 (9/21/16 Messages, -@jabber.cryptoparty.is ~@jabber.cryptoparty.is);
1053 Fishbein 9/5/18 302, at 4. When interviewed by our Office, Fishbein produced
1054 what he claimed to be logs from a chatroom in which the participants discussed
1055 U.S. politics; one of the other participants had posted the website and password
1056 that Fishbein sent to WikiLeaks. 253 9/20/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to
1057 @DonaldJTrumpJr. 254 TRUMPORG _ 28 _ 000629-33 (9/21/16 Email, Trump Jr. to
1058 Conway et al. (subject "Wikileaks")). 255 9/21/16 Twitter DM, @DonaldJTrumpJr to
1059 @WikiLeaks. 256 10/3/16 Twitter DMs, @DonaldJTrumpJr & @WikiLeaks. 257 At the
1060 time, the link took users to a WikiLeaks archive of stolen Clinton Campaign
1061 documents. 258 10/12/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr. 259
1062 @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/14/16 (6:34 a.m.) Tweet. 60
1063
1064RESULT: 26
1065
1066PAGE: 71
1067
1068TEXT:
1069
1070 U.S. Department of Justice AM:at't=tey Wark Pra<:ittet // Moy CaHtoiH Material
1071 Prnteete<:i Ul'l:<:ier Fee. R. Crifl'I:. P. 6(e) and Kellyanne Conway.280 The
1072 investigation established that Smith communicated with at least Flynn and Clovis
1073 about his search for the deleted Clinton emails,281 but the Office did not
1074 identify evidence that any of the listed individuals initiated or directed
1075 Smith's efforts. In September 2016, Smith and Ledeen got back in touch with each
1076 other about their respective efforts. Ledeen wrote to Smith, "wondering if you
1077 had some more detailed reports or memos or other data you could share because we
1078 have come a long way in our efforts since we last visited .... We would need as
1079 much technical discussion as possible so we could marry it against the new data
1080 we have found and then could share it back to you 'your eyes only.'"282 Ledeen
1081 claimed to have obtained a trove of emails (from what she described as the "dark
1082 web") that purpo1ted to be the deleted Clinton emails. Ledeen wanted to
1083 authenticate the emails and solicited contributions to fund that effort. Erik
1084 Prince provided funding to hire a tech advisor to ascertain the authenticity of
1085 the emails. According to Prince, the tech advisor determined that the emails
1086 were not authentic.283 A backup of Smith's computer contained two files that had
1087 been downloaded from WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emails
1088 received by John Podesta. The files on Smith's computer had creation dates of
1089 October 2, 2016, which was prior to the date of their release by WikiLeaks.
1090 Forensic examination, however, established that the creation date did not
1091 reflect when the files were downloaded to Smith's computer. (It appears the
1092 creation date was when WikiLeaks staged the document for release, as discussed
1093 in Volume I, Section III.B.3.c, supra.284) The investigation did not otherwise
1094 identify evidence that Smith obtained the files before their release by
1095 WikiLeaks. Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list about
1096 Clinton's deleted emails until shortly before the election. For example, on
1097 October 28, 2016, Smith wrote that there was a "tug-of-war going on within
1098 WikiLeaks over its planned releases in the next few days," and that WikiLeaks
1099 "has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last, under the
1100 theory this allows little time for response prior to the U.S. election November
1101 8."285 An attachment to the 280 The same recruitment document listed Jerome
1102 Corsi under "Independent Groups/Organizations/Individuals," and described him as
1103 an "established author and writer from the right on President Obama and Sec.
1104 Clinton." 281 Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7-8; 10/15/16 Email, Smith to Flynn et al.;
1105 8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith (bee: Clovis et al.). 282 9/16/16 Email, Ledeen to
1106 Smith. 283 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 4-5. 284 The forensic analysis of Smith's
1107 computer devices found that Smith used an older Apple operating system that
1108 would have preserved that October 2, 2016 creation date when it was downloaded
1109 (no matter what day it was in fact downloaded by Smith). See Volume I, Section
1110 111.B.3.c, supra. The Office tested this theory in March 2019 by downloading the
1111 two files found on Smith's computer from WikiLeaks's site using the same Apple
1112 operating system on Smith's computer; both files were successfully downloaded
1113 and retained the October 2, 2016 creation date. See SM-2284941, serial 62. 285
1114 10/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith. 64
1115
1116RESULT: 27
1117
1118PAGE: 72
1119
1120TEXT:
1121
1122 U.S. Department of Justice Att6rHey W6rle: Pr6dttet // May C6HtaiH Material
1123 Pr6teeted Una er Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) email claimed that WikiLeaks would
1124 release "All 33k deleted Emails" by "November 1st." No emails obtained from
1125 Clinton's server were subsequently released. Smith drafted multiple emails
1126 stating or intimating that he was in contact with Russian hackers. For example,
1127 in one such email, Smith claimed that, in August 2016, KLS Research had
1128 organized meetings with parties who had access to the deleted Clinton emails,
1129 including parties with "ties and affiliations to Russia."286 The investigation
1130 did not identify evidence that any such meetings occurred. Associates and
1131 security experts who worked with Smith on the initiative did not believe that
1132 Smith was in contact with Russian hackers and were aware of no such
1133 connection.287 The investigation did not establish that Smith was in contact
1134 with Russian hackers or that Smith, Ledeen, or other individuals in touch with
1135 the Trump Campaign ultimately obtained the deleted Clinton emails. * * * In sum,
1136 the investigation established that the GRU hacked into email accounts of persons
1137 affiliated with the Clinton Campaign, as well as the computers of the DNC and
1138 DCCC. The GRU then exfiltrated data related to the 2016 election from these
1139 accounts and computers, and disseminated that data through fictitious online
1140 personas (DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0) and later through WikiLeaks. The
1141 investigation also established that the Trum Cam ai n dis la ed interest in the
1142 WikiLeaks releases, and that explained in Volume I, Section V.B, infra, the
1143 evidence was sufficient to support intrusion and other char es a ainst GRU
1144 officers for their role in election-related hackin . 286 8/31/16 Email, Smith to
1145 Smith. 287 Safron 3/20/18 302, at 3; Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 6. 65
1146
1147RESULT: 28
1148
1149PAGE: 96
1150
1151TEXT:
1152
1153 U.S. Department ofJustice AtteFHe~? Werk PF0eh:1et // Mtt)' CeHtttifl MateFial
1154 Preteetee Uneer Fee. R. CFil'l'l.. P. 6(e) meeting).463 During that meeting,
1155 Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level Russian government
1156 officials during his recent trip to Moscow. Mifsud also said that, on the trip,
1157 he learned that the Russians had obtained "dirt" on candidate Hillary Clinton.
1158 As Papadopoulos later stated to the FBI, Mifsud said that the "dirt" was in the
1159 form of "emails of Clinton," and that they "have thousands of emails."464 On May
1160 6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos suggested to a
1161 representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received
1162 indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign
1163 through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary
1164 Clinton.465 e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign While he was
1165 discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials
1166 with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised
1167 of his efforts. On April 25, 2016, the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about
1168 the emails, Papadopoulos wrote to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that
1169 "[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by Putin for Mr. Trump to meet
1170 him when he is ready," and that "[t]he advantage of being in London is that
1171 these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in 'neutral' cities."466 On
1172 April 27, 2016, after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second
1173 message to Miller stating that "some interesting messages [were] coming in from
1174 Moscow about a trip when the time is right."467 The same day, Papadopoulos sent
1175 a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling Lewandowski that
1176 Papadopoulos had "been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin
1177 wanting to host [Trump] and the team when the time is right. "468 Papadopoulos'
1178 s Russia-related communications with Campaign officials continued throughout the
1179 spring and summer of 2016. On May 4, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an email
1180 from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow, asking Lewandowski
1181 whether that was "something we want to move forward with."469 The next day,
1182 Papadopoulos forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top
1183 of the email "Russia update."470 He included the same email in a May 21, 2016
1184 message to senior Campaign official Paul Manafort, under the subject line
1185 "Request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump," stating that "Russia has been eager to
1186 meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me 463
1187 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 14; 4/25/16 Text Messages, Mifsud &
1188 Papadopoulos. 464 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense~ 14. 465 This information is
1189 contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials.
1190 iHferfflatiat1. is lu 111 eHfareefflefl.t seHsitive (LES) sHs f!'lttst be
1191 trestes ueeersiHgly iH uHy e,cten1al sisseffliHstiatt. The foreign government
1192 conveyed this information to the U.S. government on July 26, 2016, a few days
1193 after WikiLeaks's release of Clinton-related emails. The FBI opened its
1194 investigation of potential coordination between Russia and the Trump Campaign a
1195 few days later based on the information. 466 4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S.
1196 Miller (8: 12:44 p.m.). 467 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (6:55:58
1197 p.m.). 468 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (7:15:14 p.m.). 469 5/4/16
1198 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (8:14:49 a.m.). 470 5/5/16 Email,
1199 Papadopoulos to Clovis (7:15:21 p.m.). 89
1200
1201RESULT: 29
1202
1203PAGE: 183
1204
1205TEXT:
1206
1207 U.S. Department of Justice Atterfte)' Werk Predt1et ,',' Ma:>? Cefltaifl
1208 Material Preteeted Uflder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) the releases, the defendants
1209 used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to disseminate documents through WikiLeaks. On
1210 July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents that
1211 the hacking conspirators had stolen from the DNC. Netyksho Indictment ,i 48. In
1212 addition, on October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks began releasing emails that some
1213 conspirators had stolen from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta after a
1214 successful spearphishing operation. Netyksho Indictment ,i 49. Harm to Ongoing
1215 Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter b. Charging Decision As to Harm to Ongoing Matter
1216 Harm to Ongoing Matter -Harm to Ongoing Matter 1278 The Office also considered,
1217 but ruled out, charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing and
1218 dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen
1219 property under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. ?? 2314 and
1220 2315. The statutes comprising the NSPA cover "goods, wares, or merchandise," and
1221 lower coutts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to tangible items
1222 since the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207
1223 (1985). See United States v. Yijia Zhang, 995 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344-48 (E.D. Pa.
1224 2014) (collecting cases). One of those post-Dowling decisions-United States v.
1225 Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991)-specifically held that the NSPA does not
1226 reach "a computer program in source code form," even though that code was stored
1227 in tangible items (i.e., a hard disk and in a three-ring notebook). Id. at
1228 1302-03. Congress, in turn, cited the Brown opinion in explaining the need for
1229 amendments to 18 U.S.C. ? 1030(a)(2) that "would ensure that the theft of
1230 intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in
1231 the same way theft of physical items [is] protected." S. Rep. 104-357, at 7
1232 (1996). That sequence of events would make it difficult to argue that hacked
1233 emails in electronic form, which are the relevant stolen items here, constitute
1234 "goods, wares, or merchandise" within the meaning of the NSPA. 176
1235
1236RESULT: 30
1237
1238PAGE: 208
1239
1240TEXT:
1241
1242 U.S. Department of Justice At:1:6me,? W6rk Pr6tlttet // Ma,? C6Htaifl Material
1243 Pr6teetetl UHtler Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) TABLE OF CONTENTS -VOLUME II
1244 INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME IT ......................................................
1245 ................................................... 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO
1246 VOLUME TI ......................................................................
1247 ....................... 3 I. BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES
1248 ................................................................ 9 A. Legal
1249 Framework of Obstruction_ of Justice
1250 ................................................................... 9 B.
1251 Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations
1252 .............................................................. 12 II. FACTUAL
1253 RES UL TS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION
1254 ...................................................... 15 A. The Campaign's
1255 Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump ................. 15 1.
1256 Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia ..............
1257 16 2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails
1258 ........... 17 3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was
1259 Seeking to Aid Candidate Trump .................................................
1260 .......................................... 18 4. After the Election, Trump
1261 Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided
1262 his Election ................................ 21 B. The President's Conduct
1263 Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn .................. 24 1. Incoming
1264 National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia with Russian
1265 Ambassador Sergey Kislyak
1266 ........................................................... 24 2. President-
1267 Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's Assessment of Russian
1268 Interference in the Election and Congress Opens Election-Interference
1269 Investigations
1270 ..................................................................... 27 3.
1271 Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to Incoming
1272 Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI
1273 ................................ 29 4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of
1274 Their Concerns About Flynn ............. 31 5. McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting
1275 About Flynn with Yates; President Trump has Dinner with FBI Director Corney
1276 ....................................................... 32 6. Flynn's
1277 Resignation ....................................................................
1278 .......................... 36 7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director
1279 Corney ................................... 38 8. The Media Raises Questions
1280 About the President's Delay in Terminating Flynn ...............................
1281 ................................................................................
1282 ...... 41 9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness
1283 Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak
1284 .............. 42 C. The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation of the
1285 FBl's Russia Investigation .....................................................
1286 ............................................................ 48 I. Attorney
1287 General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation ..................... 48
1288
1289RESULT: 31
1290
1291PAGE: 214
1292
1293TEXT:
1294
1295 U.S. Department of Justice Attef'Ae:,? WElf'k Pt1Eltittet // Moy CElAtoiA
1296 Motet1iol Pt1eteeteti UAtier Feti. R. Ct1im. P. 6(e) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME
1297 II Our obstruction-of-justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the
1298 President that related to the Russian-interference investigations, including the
1299 President's conduct towards the law enforcement officials overseeing the
1300 investigations and the witnesses to relevant events. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE
1301 OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION The key issues and events we examined include the
1302 following: The Campaign's response to reports about Russian support for Trump.
1303 During the 2016 presidential campaign, questions arose about the Russian
1304 government's apparent support for candidate Trump. After WikiLeaks released
1305 politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been
1306 hacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia was
1307 responsible for the hacks at the same time that he and other Campaign officials
1308 privately sought information about any further planned WikiLeaks releases. Trump
1309 also denied having any business in or connections to Russia, even though as late
1310 as June 2016 the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a
1311 skyscraper to be built in Russia called Trump Tower Moscow. After the election,
1312 the President expressed concerns to advisors that reports of Russia's election
1313 interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election.
1314 Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn. In mid-January 2017,
1315 incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the Vice
1316 President, other administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to
1317 Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about Russia's response to U.S. sanctions on
1318 Russia for its election interference. On January 27, the day after the President
1319 was told that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar
1320 statements to the FBI, the President invited FBI Director Corney to a private
1321 dinner at the White House and told Corney that he needed loyalty. On February
1322 14, the day after the President requested Flynn's resignation, the President
1323 told an outside advisor, "Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over."
1324 The advisor disagreed and said the investigations would continue. Later that
1325 afternoon, the President cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting
1326 with Corney. Referring to the FBI's investigation of Flynn, the President said,
1327 "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He
1328 is a good guy. T hope you can let this go." Shortly after requesting Flynn's
1329 resignation and speaking privately to Corney, the President sought to have
1330 Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland draft an internal letter stating
1331 that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak.
1332 McFarland declined because she did not know whether that was true, and a White
1333 House Counsel's Office attorney thought that the request would look like a quid
1334 pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered. The President's reaction to
1335 the continuing Russia investigation. Tn February 2017, Attorney General Jeff
1336 Sessions began to assess whether he had to recuse himself from related
1337 investigations because of his role in the Trump Campaign. Tn early March, the
1338 President told White House Counsel Donald McGahn to stop Sessions from recusing.
1339 And after Sessions announced his recusal on March 2, the President expressed
1340 anger at the decision and told advisors that he should have an Attorney General
1341 who would protect him. That weekend, the President took Sessions aside at an
1342 event and urged him to "unrecuse." Later in March, Corney publicly 3
1343
1344RESULT: 32
1345
1346PAGE: 226
1347
1348TEXT:
1349
1350 U.S. Department of Justice AUerney Werk Pwdttet ,',' M!t)1 Centain Material
1351 Preteet:ecl Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION
1352 INVESTIGATION This section of the report details the evidence we obtained. We
1353 first provide an overview of how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential
1354 campaign, and how candidate Trump responded. We then tum to the key events that
1355 we investigated: the President's conduct concerning the FBI investigation of
1356 Michael Flynn; the President's reaction to public confirmation of the FBI's
1357 Russia investigation; events leading up to and surrounding the termination of
1358 FBI Director Corney; efforts to terminate the Special Counsel; efforts to
1359 curtail the scope of the Special Counsel's investigation; efforts to prevent
1360 disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower meeting between
1361 Russians and senior campaign officials; efforts to have the Attorney General
1362 unrecuse; and conduct towards McGahn, Cohen, and other witnesses. We summarize
1363 the evidence we found and then analyze it by reference to the three statutory
1364 obstruction-of-justice elements: obstructive act, nexus to a proceeding, and
1365 intent. We focus on elements because, by regulation, the Special Counsel has
1366 "jurisdiction ... to investigate ... federal crimes committed in the course of,
1367 and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as
1368 perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of
1369 witnesses." 28 C.F.R. ? 600.4(a). Consistent with our jurisdiction to
1370 investigate federal obstruction crimes, we gathered evidence that is relevant to
1371 the elements of those crimes and analyzed them within an elements framework-
1372 while refraining from reaching ultimate conclusions about whether crimes were
1373 committed, for the reasons explained above. This section also does not address
1374 legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President; those
1375 defenses are analyzed in Volume II, Section III, iefra. A. The Campaign's
1376 Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump During the 2016 campaign,
1377 the media raised questions about a possible connection between the Trump
1378 Campaign and Russia.7 The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released
1379 politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been
1380 hacked by Russia. Trump responded to questions about possible connections to
1381 Russia by denying any business involvement in Russia-even though the Trump
1382 Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late as June 2016.
1383 Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same
1384 time as he and other Campaign advisors privately sought information about any
1385 further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election, when questions persisted
1386 about possible links between Russia and the Trump Campaign, the President-Elect
1387 continued to deny any connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns
1388 that reports of Russian election interference might lead the public to question
1389 the legitimacy of his election.8 7 This section summarizes and cites various
1390 news stories not for the truth of the information contained in the stories, but
1391 rather to place candidate Trump's response to those stories in context. Volume I
1392 of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that
1393 were reported on by the media during the campaign. 8 As discussed in Volume I,
1394 while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties
1395 to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign,
1396 the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign
1397 conspired or coordinated with representatives ofthe Russian government to
1398 interfere in the 2016 election. 15
1399
1400RESULT: 33
1401
1402PAGE: 228
1403
1404TEXT:
1405
1406 U.S. Department of Justice Atterfle~? Werle Predttet // Muy Cefltttifl
1407 Mttterittl Preteeted Uf!eer Fee. R. Griff!. P. 6(e) National Convention about
1408 the Trump Campaign's involvement in changing the Republican platform's stance on
1409 giving "weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces."18 2. The Trump
1410 Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails On June 14, 2016, a
1411 cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the Democratic
1412 National Committee (DNC) posted an announcement that Russian government hackers
1413 had infiltrated the DNC's computer and obtained access to documents.19 On July
1414 22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention, WikiLeaks posted
1415 thousands of hacked DNC documents revealing sensitive internal deliberations.20
1416 Soon thereafter, Hillary Clinton's campaign manager publicly contended that
1417 Russia had hacked the DNC emails and arranged their release in order to help
1418 candidate Trump.21 On July 26, 2016, the New York Times reported that U.S.
1419 "intelligence agencies ha[d] told the White House they now have 'high
1420 confidence' that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and
1421 documents from the Democratic National Committee.',22 Within the Trum Cam ai n,
1422 aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the hacks.23 discussed with Campaign
1423 officials that WikiLeaks would release the hacked material. Some witnesses said
1424 that Trump himself discussed the possibility of upcoming releases~. Michael
1425 Cohen, then-executive vice resident of the Trum Or anization and s ecial counsel
1426 to Trum , recalled hearin Cohen recalled that Trump responded, "oh good,
1427 alright," 18 Josh Rogin, Trump campaign guts GOP 's anti-Russia stance on
1428 Ukraine, Washington Post, Opinions (July 18, 2016). The Republican Platform
1429 events are described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6, supra. 19 Bears in the Midst:
1430 Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, CrowdStrike (June 15, 2016)
1431 (post originally appearing on June 14, 2016, according to records of the timing
1432 provided by CrowdStrike); Ellen Nakashima, Russian government hackers penetrated
1433 DNC, stole opposition research on Trump, Washington Post (June 14, 2016). 20 Tom
1434 Hamburger and Karen Tumulty, WikiLeaks releases thousands of documents about
1435 Clinton and internal deliberations, Washington Post (July 22, 2016). 21 Amber
1436 Phillips, Clinton campaign manager: Russians leaked Democrats' emails to help
1437 Donald Trump, Washington Post (July 24, 2016). 22 David E. Sanger and Eric
1438 Schmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C., New York Times
1439 (July 26, 2016). 23 Gates 4/10/18 302, at 5; Newman 8/23/18 302, at I. 24 Gates
1440 4/11/18 302, at 2-3 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2; see also Volume I,
1441 Section III.D. l, supra. 25 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8; see also Volume I, Section
1442 III.D. l, supra. According to Cohen, after WikiLeak~tolen DNC emails on July 22,
1443 2016, Trump said to Cohen words to the effect of,~ Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10.
1444 Cohen's role in the candidate's and later 17
1445
1446RESULT: 34
1447
1448PAGE: 229
1449
1450TEXT:
1451
1452 U.S. Department of Justice Attef'Re~? Wef'k Pl'etittet // May CeRtaiR Material
1453 Preteetetl UReef" Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) and Harm to Ongoing Matter 26 oke to
1454 Trump~;;;;~;~;~;;~;.,;~; ; Manafort recalled that Trump responded that Manafort
1455 should keep Trump u~ty campaign manager Rick Gates said that Man~ssure about
1456 -information and that Manafort instructed Gates~ status updates on u com in
1457 releases.28 Around the same time Gates was with Trump on a trip to an airport ,
1458 and shortly after the call ended, Trum2 told Gates that more releases of
1459 damaging information would be coming.29 i:?jih??l?Uf?MhflrlfDiM -were discussed
1460 within the Campaign,3? and in the summer of 2016, the Campaign was planning a
1461 communications strategy based on the possible release of Clinton emails by
1462 WikiLeaks.31 3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking
1463 to Aid Candidate Trump In the days that followed WikiLeaks's July 22, 2016
1464 release of hacked DNC emails, the Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions
1465 that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump. On July 26, 2016, Trump tweeted
1466 that it was "[c]razy" to suggest that Russia was "dealing with Trump"32 and that
1467 "[f]or the record," he had "ZERO investments in Russia."33 In a press conference
1468 the next day, July 27, 2016, Trump characterized "this whole thing with Russia"
1469 as "a total deflection" and stated that it was "farfetched" and "ridiculous."34
1470 Trump said that the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven,
1471 but stated that it would give him "no pause" if Russia had Clinton's emails.35
1472 Trump added, "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000
1473 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded President's
1474 activities, and his own criminal conduct, is descriped in Volume II, Section
1475 ILK, infra, and in Volume I, Section IV.A. I, supra. 26 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8.
1476 27 . As explained in footnote 197 of Volume I, Section III.D. l.b, supra, this
1477 Office has included Manafort's account of these events because it aligns with
1478 those of other witnesses and is corroborated to that extent. 28 Gates l 0/25/18
1479 302, at 4. 29 Gates I 0/25/ 18 302, at 4. 30 Bannon 1/18/ l 9 3 02, at 3.
1480 31Gates4/11/18302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18302, at2(messa~ formed in
1481 June/Jul timeframe based on claims b Assan eon June 12, 2016, ----. ).
1482 32@rea!DonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:47 p.m. ET) Tweet. 33 @realDonaldTrump 7/26/16
1483 (6:50 p.m. ET) Tweet. 34 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-S PAN
1484 (July 27, 2016). 35 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July
1485 27, 2016). 18
1486
1487RESULT: 35
1488
1489PAGE: 231
1490
1491TEXT:
1492
1493 U.S. Department of Justice AttorHey Work Protittet // Ma,.? CotttaiH Material
1494 Proteeteti UHaer Fee. R. Griff!. P. 6(e) advisors had developed a "party line"
1495 that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections to Russia.45 In
1496 addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump Campaign reacted to
1497 reports of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign by seeking to
1498 distance itself from Russian contacts. For example, in August 2016, foreign
1499 policy advisor J.D. Gordon declined an invitation to Russian Ambassador Sergey
1500 Kislyak's residence because the timing was "not optimal" in view of media
1501 reports about Russian interference.46 On August 19, 2016, Manafort was asked to
1502 resign amid media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political
1503 party in Ukraine and links to Russian business.47 And when the media published
1504 stories about Page's connections to Russia in September 2016, Trump Campaign
1505 officials terminated Page's association with the Campaign and told the press
1506 that he had played "no role" in the Campaign.48 On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks
1507 released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian intelligence agency from
1508 Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta.49 The same day, the federal government
1509 announced that "the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of
1510 e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political
1511 organizations."50 The government statement directly linked Russian hacking to
1512 the releases on WikiLeaks, with the goal of interfering with the presidential
1513 election, and concluded "that only Russia's senior-most officials could have
1514 authorized these activities" based on their "scope and sensitivity."51 On
1515 October 11, 2016, Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating
1516 Russia's hacking and said that candidate Trump might have known in advance that
1517 the hacked emails were going to be released.52 Vice Presidential Candidate Mike
1518 Pence was asked whether the Trump 45 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at I; Cohen 9/18/18
1519 302, at 3-5. The formation of the "party line" is described in greater detail in
1520 Volume II, Section Il.K, infra. 46 DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to
1521 Pchelyakov) (stating that "[t]hese days are not optimal for us, as we are busily
1522 knocking down a stream of false media stories"). The invitation and Gordon's
1523 response are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.7.a, supra. 47 See, e.g., Amber
1524 Phillips, Paul Manafort's complicated ties to Ukraine, explained, Washington
1525 Post (Aug. 19, 2016) ("There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with
1526 investigations into [Manafort's] ties to a pro-Russian political party in
1527 Ukraine."); Tom Winter & Ken Dilanian, Donald Trump Aide Paul Manafort
1528 Scrutinized for Russian Business Ties, NBC (Aug. 18, 2016). Relevant events
1529 involving Manafort are discussed in Volume 1, Section IV.A.8, supra. 48 Michael
1530 Isikoff, U.S. intel officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin,
1531 Yahoo News (Sep. 23, 2016); see, e.g., 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon;
1532 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon & S. Miller; Page 3/16/17 302, at 2. 49
1533 @WikiLeaks 10/7/16 (4:32 p.m. ET) Tweet. 50 Joint Statement from the Department
1534 Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on
1535 Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). 51 Joint Statement from the Department Of
1536 Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on
1537 Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). 52 John Wagner & Anne Gearan, Clinton
1538 campaign chairman ties email hack to Russians, suggests Trump had early warning,
1539 Washington Post (Oct. 11, 2016). 20
1540
1541RESULT: 36
1542
1543PAGE: 232
1544
1545TEXT:
1546
1547 U.S. Department of Justice Atteffl:e)' Werk Predttet // Ma:)? Cefl:ta:ifl:
1548 Ma:teria:l Preteeted Ufl:der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Campaign was "in cahoots"
1549 with WikiLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information and responded,
1550 "Nothing could be further from the truth."53 4. After the Election, Trump
1551 Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided
1552 his Election On November 8, 2016, Trump was elected President. Two days later,
1553 Russian officials told the press that the Russian government had maintained
1554 contacts with Trump's "immediate entourage" during the campaign.54 In response,
1555 Hope Hicks, who had been the Trump Campaign spokesperson, said, "We are not
1556 aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with any foreign
1557 entities before yesterday, when Mr. Trump spoke with many world leaders."55
1558 Hicks gave an additional statement denying any contacts between the Campaign and
1559 Russia: "It never happened. There was no communication between the campaign and
1560 any foreign entity during the campaign."56 On December 10, 2016, the press
1561 reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had "concluded that Russia interfered
1562 in last month's presidential election to boost Donald Trump's bid for the White
1563 House."57 Reacting to the story the next day, President-Elect Trump stated, "I
1564 think it's ridiculous. I think it's just another excuse."58 He continued that no
1565 one really knew who was responsible for the hacking, suggesting that the
1566 intelligence community had "no idea if it's Russia or China or somebody. It
1567 could be somebody sitting in a bed some place."59 The President-Elect 53 Louis
1568 Nelson, Pence denies Trump camp in cahoots with WikiLeaks, Politico (Oct. 14,
1569 2016). 54 Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump
1570 Allies, Diplomat Says, New York Times (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Russian Deputy
1571 Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov saying, "[t]here were contacts" and "[ cannot
1572 say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian
1573 representatives"); Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump;
1574 says contacts underway, Associated Press (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Ryabkov
1575 saying, "I don't say that all of them, but a whole array of them supported
1576 contacts with Russian representatives"). 55 Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials
1577 Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says, New York Times (Nov. 11, 2016)
1578 (quoting Hicks). 56 Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with
1579 Trump; says contacts underway, Associated Press (Nov. I 0, 2016) (quoting
1580 Hicks). Hicks recalled that after she made that statement, she spoke with
1581 Campaign advisors Kellyanne Conway, Stephen Miller, Jason Miller, and probably
1582 Kushner and Bannon to ensure it was accurate, and there was no hesitation or
1583 pushback from any of them. Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 4. 57 Damien Gayle, CIA
1584 concludes Russia interfered to help Trump win election, say reports, Guardian
1585 (Dec. 10, 2016). 58 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with
1586 President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016). 59 Chris
1587 Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ
1588 Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016). 21
1589
1590RESULT: 37
1591
1592PAGE: 253
1593
1594TEXT:
1595
1596 U.S. Department of Justice AttorRey Werk Pretiuet // May CoRtaifl Material
1597 Preteeteti URtier Feti. R. Crim. P. 6(e) a press conference and said that he
1598 removed Flynn because Flynn "didn't tell the Vice President of the United States
1599 the facts, and then he didn't remember. And that just wasn't acceptable to
1600 me."247 The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with
1601 Kislyak, but "it certainly would have been okay with me if he did. I would have
1602 directed him to do it if I thought he wasn't doing it. I didn't direct him, but
1603 I would have directed him because that's his job."248 In listing the reasons for
1604 terminating Flynn, the President did not say that Flynn had lied to him.249 The
1605 President also denied having any connection to Russia, stating, "I have nothing
1606 to do with Russia. I told you, I have no deals there. I have no anything."250
1607 The President also said he "had nothing to do with" WikiLeaks's publication of
1608 information hacked from the Clinton campaign.251 9. The President Attempts to
1609 Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn's
1610 Discussions with Kislyak On February 22, 2017, Priebus and Bannon told McFarland
1611 that the President wanted her to resign as Deputy National Security Advisor, but
1612 they suggested to her that the Administration could make her the ambassador to
1613 Singapore.252 The next day, the President asked Priebus to have McFarland draft
1614 an internal email that would confirm that the President did not direct Flynn to
1615 call the Russian Ambassador about sanctions.253 Priebus said he told the
1616 President he would only direct McFarland to write such a letter if she were
1617 comfortable with it.254 Priebus called McFarland into his office to convey the
1618 President's request that she memorialize in writing that the President did not
1619 direct Flynn to talk to Kislyak.255 McFarland told Priebus she did not know
1620 whether the President had directed Flynn to talk to Kislyak about sanctions, and
1621 she declined to say yes or no 247 Remarks by President Trump in Press
1622 Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 248 Remarks by President Trump in Press
1623 Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). The President also said that Flynn's
1624 conduct "wasn't wrong -what he did in terms of the information he saw." The
1625 President said that Flynn was just "doing the job," and "if anything, he did
1626 something right." 249 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White
1627 House (Feb. 16, 2017); Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9. 250 Remarks by President Trump
1628 in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 251 Remarks by President Trump
1629 in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 252 KTMF _ 00000047 (McFarland
1630 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 16-17. 253 See
1631 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11; see also KTMF _00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17
1632 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. 254 Priebus 1 I I 8/
1633 18 302, at 1 1. 255 KTMF _ 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/ 17 Memorandum for the
1634 Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. 42
1635
1636RESULT: 38
1637
1638PAGE: 288
1639
1640TEXT:
1641
1642 U.S. Department of Justice Attorae:,? Work Proattet // May Coataia Mtt1:erial
1643 Proteetee Uaaer Fee. R. Crira. P. 6(e) was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower
1644 Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump was repeatedly briefed on
1645 the ro ress of those efforts.498 In addition, some witnesses said that ~s aware
1646 that ? ? . --at a time when public reports stated that Russian intelligence
1647 officials were behind the hacks, and that Trump privately sought information
1648 about future WikiLeaks releases.499 More broadly, multiple witnesses described
1649 the President's preoccupation with press coverage of the Russia investigation
1650 and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his
1651 election.500 Finally, the President and White House aides initially advanced a
1652 pretextual reason to the press and the public for Corney's termination. In the
1653 immediate aftermath of the firing, the President dictated a press statement
1654 suggesting that he had acted based on the DOJ recommendations, and White House
1655 press officials repeated that story. But the President had decided to fire
1656 Corney before the White House solicited those recommendations. Although the
1657 President ultimately acknowledged that he was going to fire Corney regardless of
1658 the Department of Justice's recommendations, he did so only after DOJ officials
1659 made clear to him that they would resist the White House's suggestion that they
1660 had prompted the process that led to Corney's termination. The initial reliance
1661 on a pretextual justification could support an inference that the President had
1662 concerns about providing the real reason for the firing, although the evidence
1663 does not resolve whether those concerns were personal, political, or both. E.
1664 The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel Overview The Acting
1665 Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, prompting the
1666 President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney
1667 General Sessions had failed to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted
1668 his resignation, which the President ultimately did not accept. The President
1669 told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest, but
1670 they responded that those claims were "ridiculous" and posed no obstacle to the
1671 Special Counsel's service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarly
1672 cleared the Special Counsel's service. On June 14, 2017, the press reported that
1673 the President was being personally investigated for obstruction of justice and
1674 the President responded with a series of tweets 498 See Volume II, Section II.K.
1675 l, infra. 499 See Volume l, Section ITLD.1, supra. 500 In addition to whether
1676 the President had a motive related to Russia-related matters that an FBI
1677 investigation could uncover, we considered whether the President's intent in
1678 firing Corney was connected to other conduct that could come to light as a
1679 result of the FBT's Russian-interference investigation. In paiticular, Michael
1680 Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the
1681 Trump Tower Moscow project and involvement in other activities. And facts
1682 uncovered in the Russia investigation, which our Office referred to the U.S.
1683 Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, ultimately led to the
1684 conviction of Cohen in the Southern District ofNew York for campaign-finance
1685 offenses related to payments he said he made at the direction of the President.
1686 See Volume II, Section II.K.5, infra. The investigation, however, did not
1687 establish that when the President fired Corney, he was considering the
1688 possibility that the FBI's investigation would uncover these payments or that
1689 the President's intent in firing Corney was otherwise connected to a concern
1690 about these matters coming to light. 77
1691
1692RESULT: 39
1693
1694PAGE: 339
1695
1696TEXT:
1697
1698 U.S. Department of Justice Atterttey Werk Pl'ea1:1et // May CentaiH Material
1699 Preteetea Uttaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Manafort."887 In an interview on November
1700 28, 2018, the President suggested that it was "very brave" that Manafort did not
1701 "flip": If you told the truth, you go to jail. You know this flipping stuff is
1702 terrible. You flip and you lie and you get-the prosecutors will tell you 99
1703 percent of the time they can get people to flip. It's rare that they can't. But
1704 I had three people: Manafort, Corsi-I don't know Corsi, but he refuses to say
1705 what they demanded.888 Manafort, Corsi . It's actually very brave.889 Tn
1706 response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President
1707 said, "It was never discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. Why would I
1708 take it off the table?"890 3. Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm
1709 to Ongoing Matter :?? Harm to Ongoing Matter aHarm to Ongoing Matter IIIHarm to
1710 Ongoing Matter 887 Stephen Collinson, Trump appears consumed by Mueller
1711 investigation as details emerge, CNN (Nov. 29, 2018). 888 "Corsi" is a reference
1712 to Jerome Corsi, who was involved in efforts to coordinate with WikiLeaks and
1713 Assange, and who stated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea offer
1714 fro~'s Office because he was "not going to sign a lie." Sara Murray & Eli
1715 Watkins,~ says he won't agree to plea deal, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018). 889 Marisa
1716 Schultz & Nikki Schwab, Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says
1717 pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018).
1718 That same day, the President tweeted: "While the disgusting Fake News is doing
1719 everything within their power not to report it that way, at least 3 major
1720 players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang ofDems is viciously telling
1721 witnesses to lie about facts & they will get relief. This is our Joseph McCarthy
1722 Era!" @rea!DonaldTrump 11/28/18 (8:39 a.m. ET) Tweet. 890 Marisa Schultz & Nikki
1723 Schwab, New York Post Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says
1724 pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018).
1725 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to
1726 Ongoing Matter 128
1727
1728RESULT: 40
1729
1730PAGE: 368
1731
1732TEXT:
1733
1734 U.S. Department of Justice Atter11ey Werk Preettet // May Cetttaitt Material
1735 Preteetee U11eer Fee. R. Cril'H. P. 6(e) Second, many obstruction cases involve
1736 the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying crime. Personal criminal
1737 conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper
1738 obstructive purpose, see, e.g., United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (2d
1739 Cir. 1988), or that he contemplated an effect on an official proceeding, see,
1740 e.g., United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 591 (2d Cir. 2015). But proof of
1741 such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense. See United States v.
1742 Greer, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating, in applying the obstruction
1743 sentencing guideline, that "obstruction of a criminal investigation is
1744 punishable even if the prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the
1745 investigation ultimately reveals no underlying crime"). Obstruction of justice
1746 can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal interests, to
1747 protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a
1748 gray area, or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of
1749 the justice system is the same regardless of whether a person committed an
1750 underlying wrong. In this investigation, the evidence does not establish that
1751 the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election
1752 interference. But the evidence does point to a range of other possible personal
1753 motives animating the President's conduct. These include concerns that continued
1754 investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and
1755 potential uncertainty about whether certain events-such as advance notice of
1756 WikiLeaks's release of hacked information or the June 9, 2016 meeting between
1757 senior campaign officials and could be seen as criminal activity by the
1758 President, his campaign, or his family. Third, many of the President's acts
1759 directed at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with the
1760 government and suggestions of possible future pardons, occurred in public view.
1761 While it may be more difficult to establish that public-facing acts were
1762 motivated by a corrupt intent, the President's power to influence actions,
1763 persons, and events is enhanced by his unique ability to attract attention
1764 through use of mass communications. And no principle of law excludes public acts
1765 from the scope of obstruction statutes. If the likely effect of the acts is to
1766 intimidate witnesses or alter their testimony, the justice system's integrity is
1767 equally threatened. 2. Although the events we investigated involved discrete
1768 acts-e.g., the President's statement to Corney about the Flynn investigation,
1769 his termination of Corney, and his efforts to remove the Special Counsel-it is
1770 important to view the President's pattern of conduct as a whole. That pattern
1771 sheds light on the nature of the President's acts and the inferences that can be
1772 drawn about his intent. a. Our investigation found multiple acts by the
1773 President that were capable of exetting undue influence over law enforcement
1774 investigations, including the Russian-interference and obstruction
1775 investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings
1776 in which the President sought to use his official power outside of usual
1777 channels. These actions ranged from efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to
1778 reverse the effect of the Attorney General's recusal; to the attempted use of
1779 official power to limit the scope of the investigation; to direct and indirect
1780 contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. Viewing
1781 the acts collectively can help to illuminate their significance. For example,
1782 the President's direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed was
1783 followed almost immediately by his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney
1784 General to limit the scope of the Russia investigation to prospective election-
1785 interference only-a temporal connection that suggests that both acts were taken
1786 with a related purpose with respect to the investigation. 157
1787
1788RESULT: 41
1789
1790PAGE: 400
1791
1792TEXT:
1793
1794 U.S. Department of Justice At:t:orflc)' Work Proauet II Ma)' CoHtaifl Material
1795 Protcetca UHElcr Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(c) APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY The following
1796 glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities
1797 referenced in the two volumes of this report. It is not intended to be
1798 comprehensive and is intended only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of
1799 the report. Agalarov, Aras Agalarov, Emin Akhmetov, Rinat Akhmetshin, Rinat
1800 Aslanov, Dzheykhun (Jay) Assange, Julian Aven, Petr Bannon, Stephen (Steve)
1801 Baranov, Andrey Berkowitz, A vi Boente, Dana Bogacheva, Anna Bossert, Thomas
1802 (Tom) Referenced Persons Russian real-estate developer ( owner of the Crocus
1803 Group); met Donald Trump in connection with the Miss Universe pageant and helped
1804 arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya
1805 and Trump Campaign officials. Performer, executive vice president of Crocus
1806 Group, and son of Aras Agalarov; helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at
1807 Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. Former
1808 member in the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to conduct work for
1809 Ukrainian political pai1y, the Party of Regions. U.S. lobbyist and associate of
1810 Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
1811 between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. Head of U.S. department of
1812 the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an "active measures" social media
1813 campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Founder of
1814 WikiLeaks, which in 2016 posted on the internet documents stolen from entities
1815 and individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party. Chairman of the board of
1816 Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the Presidential Transition Team in
1817 connection with anticipated post-election sanctions. White House chief
1818 strategist and senior counselor to President Trump (Jan. 2017-Aug.2017); chief
1819 executive of the Trump Campaign. Director of investor relations at Russian
1820 state-owned oil company, Rosneft, and associate of Carter Page. Assistant to
1821 Jared Kushner. Acting Attorney General (Jan. 2017 -Feb. 2017); Acting Deputy
1822 Attorney General (Feb. 2017 -Apr. 2017). Internet Research Agency employee who
1823 worked on "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016
1824 U.S. presidential election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses
1825 in 2014. Former homeland security advisor to the President who also served as a
1826 senior official on the Presidential Transition Team. B-1
1827
1828RESULT: 42
1829
1830PAGE: 403
1831
1832TEXT:
1833
1834 U.S. Department of Justice Attort1e:,? Work Pl'oEluet // Ma:,? Cot1tain Material
1835 ProteeteEI Ut1tler Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Fabrizio, Anthony (Tony) Fishbein,
1836 Jason Flynn, Michael G. (a/k/a Michael Flynn Jr.) Flynn, Michael T. Foresman,
1837 Robert (Bob) Futerfas, Alan Garten, Alan Gates, Richard (Rick) III Gerson,
1838 Richard (Rick) Gistaro, Edward Glassner, Michael Goldstone, Robert Gordon,
1839 Jeffrey (J.D.) Gorkov, Sergey Graff, Rhona Partner at the research and
1840 consulting firm Fabrizio, Lee & Associates. He was a pollster for the Trump
1841 Campaign and worked with Paul Manafort on Ukraine-related polling after the
1842 election. Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent
1843 WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump.org on September 20,
1844 2016. Son of Michael T. Flynn, National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017-Feb. 13,
1845 2017). National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 -Feb. 13, 2017), Director of the
1846 Defense Intelligence Agency (July 2012-Aug.7, 2014), and Trump Campaign advisor.
1847 He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about communications with Ambassador
1848 Sergey Kislyak in December 2016. Investment banker who sought meetings with the
1849 Trump Campaign in spring 2016 to discuss Russian foreign policy, and after the
1850 election met with Michael Flynn. Outside counsel for the Trump Organization and
1851 subsequently personal counsel for Donald Trump Jr. General counsel of the Trump
1852 Organization. Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural
1853 Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort. He pleaded
1854 guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate U.S. laws, as well
1855 as making false statements to the FBI. New York hedge fund manager and associate
1856 of Jared Kushner. During the transition period, he worked with Kirill Dmitriev
1857 on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia. Deputy
1858 Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration. Political
1859 director of the Trump Campaign who helped introduce George Papadopoulos to
1860 others in the Trump Campaign. Publicist for Emin Agalarov who contacted Donald
1861 Trump Jr. to arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia
1862 Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. National security advisor to the
1863 Trump Campaign involved in changes to the Republican party platform and who
1864 communicated with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at the Republican National
1865 Convention. Chairman of Vnesheconombank (VEB), a Russian state-owned bank, who
1866 met with Jared Kushner during the transition period. Senior vice-president and
1867 executive assistant to Donald J. Trump at the Trump Organization. B-4
1868
1869RESULT: 43
1870
1871PAGE: 406
1872
1873TEXT:
1874
1875 U.S. Department of Justice AUor1rn)1 Work Prodttet // May Cm1taitt Material
1876 Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Malloch, Theodore (Ted) Manafort, Paul
1877 Jr. Mashburn, John McCabe, Andrew McCord, Mary McFarland, Kathleen (K.T.)
1878 McGahn, Donald (Don) Medvedcv, Dmitry Melnik, Yuriy Mifsud, Joseph Miller, Matt
1879 Miller, Stephen Millian, Sergei Mnuchin, Steven Miiller-Maguhn, Andrew Nader,
1880 George Netyksho, Viktor the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial and travel
1881 sanctions on Russian officials. Chief executive officer of Global Fiduciary
1882 Governance and the Roosevelt Group. He was a London-based associate of Jerome
1883 Corsi. Trump campaign member (March 2016-Aug. 2016) and chairman and chief
1884 strategist (May 2016 -Aug. 2016). Trump administration official and former
1885 policy director to the Trump Campaign. Acting director of the FBI (May 2017
1886 -Aug. 2017); deputy director of the FBI (Feb. 2016 -Jan. 2018). Acting Assistant
1887 Attorney General (Oct. 2016-May 2017). Deputy White House National Security
1888 Advisor (Jan. 2017-May 2017). White House Counsel (Jan. 2017 -Oct. 2018). Prime
1889 Minister of Russia. Spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C.,
1890 who connected with George Papadopoulos on social media. Maltese national and
1891 former London-based professor who, immediately after returning from Moscow in
1892 April 2016, told George Papadopoulos that the Russians had "dirt" in the form of
1893 thousands of Clinton emails. Trump Campaign staff member who was present at the
1894 meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee in July 2016.
1895 Senior advisor to the President. Founder of the Russian American Chamber of
1896 Commerce who met with George Papadopoulos during the campaign. Secretary of the
1897 Treasury. Harm to Ongoing Matter Member of hacker association Chaos Computer
1898 Club and associate of Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks. Advisor to the
1899 United Arab Emirates's Crown Prince who arranged a meeting between Kirill
1900 Dmitriev and Erik Prince during the transition period. Russian military officer
1901 in command of a unit involved in Russian hacand-release operations to interfere
1902 in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. B-7
1903
1904RESULT: 44
1905
1906PAGE: 407
1907
1908TEXT:
1909
1910 U.S. Department of Justice Att:erne)" Werle Prnelttet // Ma)' CeRtaiR Material
1911 Prnteeteel UReief Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Oganov, Georgiy Oknyansky, Henry (a/k/a
1912 Henry Greenberg) Page, Carter Papadopoulos, George Parscale, Bradley Patten,
1913 William (Sam) Jr. Peskov, Dmitry Phares, Walid Pinedo, Richard Podesta, John Jr.
1914 Podobnyy, Victor Poliakova, Elena Polonskaya, Olga Pompeo, Michael Porter,
1915 Robert Priebus, Reince Advisor to Oleg Deripaska and a board member of
1916 investment company Basic Element. He met with Paul Manafort in Spain in early
1917 2017. Florida-based Russian individual who claimed to have derogatory
1918 information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. He met with Roger Stone in May 2016.
1919 Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who advocated Russian views and
1920 made July 2016 and December 2016 visits to Moscow. Foreign policy advisor to the
1921 Trump Campaign who received information from Joseph Mifsud that Russians had
1922 "dirt" in the form of thousands of Clinton emails. He pleaded guilty to lying to
1923 the FBI about his contact with Mifsud. Digital media director for the 2016 Trump
1924 Campaign. Lobbyist and business partner of Konstantin Kilimnik. Deputy chief of
1925 staff of and press secretary for the Russian presidential administration.
1926 Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and co-secretary general of the
1927 Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism (TAG). U.S. person who
1928 pleaded guilty to a single-count information of identity fraud. Clinton campaign
1929 chairman whose email account was hacked by the GRU. WikiLeaks released his
1930 stolen emails during the 2016 campaign. Russian intelligence officer who
1931 interacted with Carter Page while operating inside the United States; later
1932 charged in 2015 with conspiring to act as an unregistered agent of Russia.
1933 Personal assistant to Dmitry Peskov who responded to Michael Cohen's outreach
1934 about the Trump Tower Moscow project in January 2016. Russian national
1935 introduced to George Papadopoulos by Joseph Mifsud as an individual with
1936 connections to Vladimir Putin. U.S. Secretary of State; director of the Central
1937 Intelligence Agency (Jan. 2017-Apr. 2018). White House staff secretary (Jan.
1938 2017 -Feb. 2018). White House chief of staff (Jan. 2017 -July 2017); chair of
1939 the Republican National Committee (Jan. 2011-Jan. 2017). Prigozhin, Yevgeniy
1940 Head of Russian companies Concord-Catering and Concord Management and
1941 Consulting; supported and financed the Internet Research Agency, which engaged
1942 in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
1943 presidential election. B-8
1944
1945RESULT: 45
1946
1947PAGE: 412
1948
1949TEXT:
1950
1951 U.S. Department of Justice Attorney \\'erk Prodttet // Ma)? C0Htait1 ~foterial
1952 Proteeted Ut1de1? Ped. R. Cri1T1. P. 6(e) Russian International Affairs Council
1953 Silk Road Group St. Petersburg International Economic Forum Tatneft
1954 Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism Unit 26165 (GRU) Unit
1955 74455 (GRU) Valdai Discussion Club WikiLeaks Russia-based nonprofit established
1956 by Russian government decree. It is associated with the Ministry of Foreign
1957 Affairs, and its members include Ivan Timofeev, Dmitry Peskov, and Petr Aven.
1958 Privately held investment company that entered into a licensing agreement to
1959 build a Trump-branded hotel in Georgia. Annual event held in Russia and attended
1960 by prominent Russian politicians and businessmen. Russian energy company.
1961 European group that sponsored a summit between European Parliament lawmakers and
1962 U.S. persons. George Papadopoulos, Sam Clovis, and Walid Phares attended the TAG
1963 summit in July 2016. GRU military cyber unit dedicated to targeting military,
1964 political, governmental, and non-governmental organizations outside of Russia.
1965 It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and organizations, as well as
1966 the subsequent release of the stolen data, in order to interfere in the 2016
1967 U.S. presidential election. GRU military unit with multiple departments that
1968 engaged in cyber operations. It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons
1969 and organizations, as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data, in
1970 order to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Group that holds a
1971 conference attended by Russian government officials, including President Putin.
1972 Organization founded by Julian Assange that posts information online, including
1973 data stolen from private, corporate, and U.S. Government entities. Released data
1974 stolen by the GRU during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. B-13
1975
1976RESULT: 46
1977
1978PAGE: 421
1979
1980TEXT:
1981
1982 U.S. Department of Justice Atlef'fle)1 \ltet'k Pt1eclttet // Moy CeHtttiH
1983 Motet1iol Prnteetecl UHE:ier Fee. R. Ct1iffl. P. 6(e) e. On October 7, 2016,
1984 emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by WikiLeaks. ? i.
1985 Where were you on October 7, 2016? ii. Were you told at any time in advance of,
1986 or on the day of, the October 7 release that Wikileaks possessed or might
1987 possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes, describe who told you this,
1988 when, and what you were told. iii. Are you aware of anyone associated with you
1989 or your campaign, including Roger Stone, reaching out to Wikileaks, either
1990 directly or through an intermediary, on or about October 7, 2016? If yes,
1991 identify the person and describe the substance of the conversations or contacts.
1992 f. Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger
1993 Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with Wikileaks, Guccifer
1994 2.0, or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If
1995 yes, describe who had such contacts, how you became aware of the contacts, when
1996 you became aware of the contacts, and the substance of the contacts. g. From
1997 June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you communicate
1998 with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) with Mr. Stone.
1999 i. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making to
2000 assist your campaign, and what requests, if any, did you make of Mr. Stone? ii.
2001 Did Mr. Stone ever discuss Wikileaks with you or, as far as you were aware, with
2002 anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you were told,
2003 from whom, and when. iii. Did Mr. Stone at any time inform you about contacts he
2004 had with Wikileaks or any intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcoming
2005 releases of information? If yes, describe what Stone told you and when. h. Did
2006 you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential pardon
2007 or other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had the
2008 discussion(s) with, when, and the content of the discussion(s). i. Were you
2009 aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those in
2010 Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the
2011 organization of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance
2012 with, when, and the content of the discussion(s). C-6
2013
2014RESULT: 47
2015
2016PAGE: 430
2017
2018TEXT:
2019
2020 U.S. Department of Justice Atterfl:e)" \\'erk PreEiuet // May Cofl:taifl:
2021 Material Prnteeted UHEier Fee. R. Cri1fl. P. 6(e) with input from various
2022 outside advisors and was based on publicly available material, including, in
2023 particular, information from the book CUnton Cash by Peter Schweizer. The Pulse
2024 Nightclub terrorist attack took place in the early morning hours of Sunday, June
2025 12, 2016. In light of that tragedy, I gave a speech directed more specifically
2026 to national security and terrorism than to the Clintons. That speech was
2027 delivered at the Saint Anselm College Institute of Politics in Manchester, New
2028 Hampshire, and, as reported, opened with the following: This was going to be a
2029 speech on Hillary Clinton and how bad a President, especially in these times of
2030 Radical Islamic Terrorism, she would be. Even her former Secret Service Agent,
2031 who has seen her under pressure and in times of stress, has stated that she
2032 lacks the temperament and integrity to be president. There will be plenty of
2033 oppo1tunity to discuss these important issues at a later time, and I will
2034 deliver that speech soon. But today there is only one thing to discuss: the
2035 growing threat of terrorism inside of our borders. I continued to speak about
2036 Mrs. Clinton's failings throughout the campaign, using the information prepared
2037 for inclusion in the speech to which I referred on June 7, 2016. Response to
2038 Question I, Part (h) I have no recollection of being told during the campaign
2039 that Vladimir Putin or the Russian government "suppotted" my candidacy or
2040 "opposed" the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. However, I was aware of some reports
2041 indicating that President Putin had made complimentary statements about me.
2042 Response to Question I, Part (i) I have no recollection of being told during the
2043 campaign that any foreign government or foreign leader had provided, wished to
2044 provide, or offered to provide tangible support to my campaign. II. Russian
2045 Hacking / Russian Efforts Using Social Media / WikiLeaks a. On June 14, 2016, it
2046 was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the computer network
2047 of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that Russian intelligence was
2048 behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June 14, 20 I 6, were you
2049 provided any information about any potential or actual hacking of the computer
2050 systems or email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic Congressional Campaign
2051 Committee (DCCC), the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, or individuals
2052 associated with the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who provided this
2053 information, when, and the substance of the information. 10 C-15
2054
2055RESULT: 48
2056
2057PAGE: 431
2058
2059TEXT:
2060
2061 U.S. Department of Justice Atterfte~? \l/erk Proa1:1et // May Ce11tai11 Material
2062 Proteetea U11aer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) b. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released
2063 nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by Democratic party officials. 1. Prior to
2064 the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that WikiLeaks,
2065 Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had possession of or
2066 planned to release emails or information that could help your campaign or hurt
2067 the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who you discussed this issue with, when,
2068 and the substance of the discussion(s). 11. After the release of emails by
2069 WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that WikiLeaks possessed or might
2070 possess additional information that could be released during the campaign? If
2071 yes, describe who provided this information, when, and what you were told. c.
2072 Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly,
2073 between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and (a)
2074 WikiLeaks, (b) Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Gucci
2075 fer 2.0, (e) representatives of Gucci fer 2.0, or (f) representatives of
2076 DCLeaks? If yes, describe who provided you with this information, when you
2077 learned of the communications, and what you know about those communications. d.
2078 On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: "Russia, if you're
2079 listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I
2080 think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press." 1. Why did you make
2081 that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, entity, or individual?
2082 ii. In advance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have
2083 with anyone else about the substance of the statement? iii. Were you told at any
2084 time before or after you made that statement that Russia was attempting to
2085 infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her
2086 campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and what you
2087 were told. e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta
2088 were released by WikiLeaks. i. Where were you on October 7, 20 I 6? ii. Were you
2089 told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7 release that
2090 WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes,
2091 describe who told you this, when, and what you were told. 11 C-16
2092
2093RESULT: 49
2094
2095PAGE: 432
2096
2097TEXT:
2098
2099 U.S. Department of Justice AtterRey Werk Presttet // Ma)' Cm~taiR Material
2100 Preteetes UAser Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) iii. Are you aware of anyone associated
2101 with you or your campaign, including Roger Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks,
2102 either directly or through an intermediary, on or about October 7, 2016? If yes,
2103 identify the person and describe the substance of the conversations or contacts.
2104 f. Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger
2105 Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with WikiLeaks, Guccifer
2106 2.0, or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If
2107 yes, describe who had such contacts, how you became aware of the contacts, when
2108 you became aware of the contacts, and the substance of the contacts. g. From
2109 June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you communicate
2110 with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) with Mr. Stone.
2111 1. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making to
2112 assist your campaign, and what requests. if any, did you make of Mr. Stone? ii.
2113 Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware, with
2114 anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you were told,
2115 from whom. and when. iii. Did Mr. Stone at anytime inform you about contacts he
2116 had with WikiLeaks or any intermediary of WikiLeaks. or about forthcoming
2117 releases of information? If yes, describe what Stone told you and when. h. Did
2118 you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential pardon
2119 or other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had the
2120 discussion(s) with, when, and the content of the discussion(s). i. Were you
2121 aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those in
2122 Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the
2123 organization of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance
2124 with, when, and the content of the discussion(s). Response to Question II, Part
2125 (a) I do not remember the date on which it was publicly reported that the DNC
2126 had been hacked, but my best recollection is that I learned of the hacking at or
2127 shortly after the time it became the subject of media reporting. I do not recall
2128 being provided any information during the campaign about the hacking of any of
2129 the named entities or individuals before it became the subject of media
2130 reporting. 12 C-17
2131
2132RESULT: 50
2133
2134PAGE: 433
2135
2136TEXT:
2137
2138 U.S. Department of Justice Atterfte)' Werk Pret:ittet // May Cm1taift Material
2139 Prnteetet:i lJFtt:ier Fet:i. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Response to Question U, Part (b) I
2140 recall that in the months leading up to the election there was considerable
2141 media reporting about the possible hacking and release of campaign-related
2142 information and there was a lot of talk about this matter. At the time, I was
2143 generally aware of these media reports and may have discussed these issues with
2144 my campaign staff or others, but at this point in time -more than two years
2145 later -I have no recollection of any particular conversation, when it occurred,
2146 or who the participants were. Response to Question II, Part (c) I do not recall
2147 being aware during the campaign of any communications between the individuals
2148 named in Question II (c) and anyone I understood to be a representative of
2149 WikiLeaks or any of the other individuals or entities referred to in the
2150 question. Response to Question II, Part (d) I made the statement quoted in
2151 Question II (d) in jest and sarcastically, as was apparent to any objective
2152 observer. The context of the statement is evident in the full reading or viewing
2153 of the July 27, 2016 press conference, and I refer you to the publicly available
2154 transcript and video of that press conference. I do not recall having any
2155 discussion about the substance of the statement in advance of the press
2156 conference. I do not recall being told during the campaign of any efforts by
2157 Russia to infiltrate or hack the computer systems or email accounts of Hillary
2158 Clinton or her campaign prior to them becoming the subject of media repo11ing
2159 and I have no recollection of any particular conversation in that regard.
2160 Response to Question II, Part (e) I was in Trump Tower in New York City on
2161 October 7, 2016. I have no recollection of being told that WikiLeaks possessed
2162 or might possess emails related to John Podesta before the release of Mr.
2163 Podesta's emails was reported by the media. Likewise, I have no recollection of
2164 being told that Roger Stone, anyone acting as an intermediary for Roger Stone,
2165 or anyone associated with my campaign had communicated with WikiLeaks on October
2166 7, 2016. Response to Question II, Part (0 I do not recall being told during the
2167 campaign that Roger Stone or anyone associated with my campaign had discussions
2168 with any of the entities named in the question regarding the content or timing
2169 of release of hacked emails. Response to Question ll, Part (g) I spoke by
2170 telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign. I have no
2171 recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between
2172 June 1.2016 and 13 C-18
2173
2174RESULT: 51
2175
2176PAGE: 434
2177
2178TEXT:
2179
2180 U.S. Department of Justice Attert1ey Werk Preelttet // Mft)' CefttEtiH
2181 MEtteriEtl Prateeteel UHder Fed. R. Cri1fl. P. 6(e) November 8, 2016. I do not
2182 recall discussing WikiLeaks with him, nor do I recall being aware of Mr. Stone
2183 having discussed WikiLeaks with individuals associated with my campaign,
2184 although I was aware that WikiLeaks was the subject of media reporting and
2185 campaign-related discussion at the time. Response to Question II, Part (h) I do
2186 not recall having had any discussion during the campaign regarding a pardon or
2187 action to benefit Julian Assange. Response to Question II, Part (i) I do not
2188 recall being aware during the campaign of specific effo11s by foreign
2189 individuals or companies to assist my campaign through the use of social media
2190 postings or the organization of rallies. III. The Trump Organization Moscow
2191 Project a. In October 2015, a "Letter of Intent," a copy of which is attached as
2192 Exhibit B, was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the
2193 "Trump Moscow project"). 1. When were you first informed of discussions about
2194 the Trump Moscow project? By whom? What were you told about the project? ii. Did
2195 you sign the letter of intent? b. In a statement provided to Congress, attached
2196 as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated: "To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was
2197 never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three
2198 occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015." Describe
2199 all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or anyone else associated with the Trump
2200 Organization, about the Trump Moscow project, including who you spoke with,
2201 when, and the substance of the discussion(s). c. Did you learn of any
2202 communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government
2203 officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, regarding the
2204 Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this info1mation to you,
2205 when, and the substance of what you learned. d. Did you have any discussions
2206 between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a potential trip to Russia by you
2207 and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the Trump Moscow project? If yes,
2208 describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). e.
2209 Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow
2210 project 14 C-19