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1PROJECT MKIULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF
2RESEARCH INBEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION
3
4JOINT HEARING
5BEFORE THE
6
7SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
8AND THE
9
10SUBCOMMITTEE ON
11HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
12OF THE
13
14COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
15UNITED STATES SENATE
16NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
17FIRST SESSION
18
19AUGUST 3, 1977
20
21Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
22and Committee on Human Resources
23
24PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF
25RESEARCH INBEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION
26
27JOINT HEARING
28BEFORE THE
29
30SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
31AND THE
32
33SUBCOMMITTEE ON
34HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
35OF THE
36
37COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
38UNITED STATES SENATE
39NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
40FIRST SESSION
41
42AUGUST 3, 1977
43
44Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
45and Committee on Human Resources
46U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
4796-4080
48
49WASHINGTON : 1977
50
51For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
52Washington, D.C., 20402
53Stock No. 052-070-04357-1
54
55SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
56(Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d sess.)
57DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
58BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, Vice Chairman
59BIRCH BAYH, Indiana
60ADLAI E. STEVENSON, Illinois
61WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine
62WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky
63JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
64ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina
65GARY HART, Colorado
66DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
67
68CLIFFORD P. CAISE, New Jersey
69JAKE GARN, Utah
70CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
71JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
72JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
73RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
74MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
75
76ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio fember.
77HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio Member
78WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director
79EARL D. EISENHOWER, Minority Staff Director
80AUDREY H. HATRY, Chief Clerk
81
82COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
83HARRISON A. WILLIAMS Ja., New Jersey, Chairman
84JENNINGS RANDOLPH, West Virginia
85'CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
86EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
87GAYLORD NELSON, WisconsinTHOMAS F. EAGLETON, Missouri
88ALAN CRANSTON, California
89WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine
90Michigan
91DONALD W. RIEGLE,
92
93JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
94RICHARD S. S'CHWEIKER, Pennsylvania
95ROBERT T. STAFFORD, Vermont
96ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
97JOHN H. CHAPEE, Rhode Island
98S. I. HAYAKAWA, California
99S.,
100
101STEPHEN J. PARADISE, General Counsel and Staff Director
102MARJORIE M. WHITTAKER, Chief Clerk
103DON A. ZIMMERMAN, Minority Counsel
104
105SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
106EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts, Chairman
107CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
108GAYLORD NELSON, Wisconsin
109WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine
110HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR., New Jersey
111
112RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania
113JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
114JOHN H. iCHAFEE, Rhode Island
115
116(ex officlio)
117LAWRENCE HOROWITZ, ProfessionalStaff Member
118DAVID WINSTON, Minority Counsel
119
120CONTESTS
121Statements of:
122Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; accompanied by; Frank Laubinger, Office of Technical Services, Central Intelligence Agency; Al Brody, Office of Inspector General,
123Central Intelligence Agency; Ernest Mayerfield, Office of General
124Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, and George Cary, Legislative
125Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency ---------------------------Philip Goldman, former employee, Central Intelligence Agency ------John Gittinger, former employee, Central Intelligence Agency --------Appendix A.-XVII. Testing and Use of Chemical and Biological Agents
126by the Intelligence Community ----------------------------------Appendix B.-Documents Referring to Discovery of Additional MKULTRA
127Material ------------------------------------------------------Appendix C.-Documents Referring to Subprojects --------------------Material Submitted for the Record: .
128Psychological Assessments ---------------------------------------"Truth" Drugs in Interrogation ----------------------------------Construction of Gorman Annex-----------------------
129
130----
131
132Subproject 54-------------------------------------------------Drug Testing in Foreign Countries
133-----------MKSEARCH, OFTEN/CHICKWIT ------------------------------Employees Terminated Because of Their Participation in MKULTRA
134Subproject 3 -------------------------------------------------QKHILLTOP Definition -----------------------------------------
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154PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF
155RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION
156WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1977
157
158U.S.
159
160SENATE,
161
162SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
163AND SUBCOMIrrTEE ON HEALTH
164AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
165OF THE COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURGES,
166
167Washington, D.C.
168
169The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in room 1202,
170Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Daniel K. Inouye-(chairman
171of the Select Committee on Intelligence) presiding.
172Present: Senators Inouye (presiding), Kennedy, Goldwater, Bayh,
173Hathaway, Huddleston, Hart, Schweiker, Case, Garn, Chafee, Lugar
174and Wallop.
175Also present: William G. Miller, staff director, Select Committee on
176Intelligence; Dr. Lawrence Horowitz, staff director, Subcommittee
177on Health and Scientific Research; and professional staff members of
178both committees.
179Senator INOUYE. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is
180meeting today and is joined by the Subcommittee on Health and
181Scientific Research chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania. Senator
182Hathaway and Senator Chafee are members of both committees. We
183are to hear testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence, Adm.
184Stansfield Turner, and from other Agency witnesses on issues concerning new documents supplied to the committee in the last week on drug
185testing conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency.
186It should be made clear from the outset that in general, we are
187focusing on events that happened over 12 or as long as 25 years ago.
188It should be emphasized that the programs that are of greatest concern have stopped and that we are reviewing these past events in
189order to better understand what statutes and other guidelines might be
190necessary to prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the future. We
191also need to know and understand what is now being done by the CIA
192in the field of behavioral research to be certain that no current abuses
193are occurring.
194I want to commend Admiral Turner for his full cooperation with
195this committee and with the Subcommittee on Health in recognizing
196that this issue needed our attention. The CIA has assisted our committees and staffs in their investigative efforts and in arriving at
197remedies which will serve the best interests of our country.
198
199-
200
201The reappearance of reports of the abuses of the drug testing program. and reports of other previously unknown drug programs and
202projects for behavioral control underline the necessity for effective
203oversight procedures both in the executive branch and in the Congress. The Select Committee on Intelligence has been working very
204closely with President Carter, the Vice President, and Admiral
205Turner and his associates in developing basic concepts for statutory
206guidelines which will govern all activities of the intelligence agencies
207of the United States.
208In fact, it is my expectation that the President will soon announce
209his decisions on how he has decided the intelligence agencies of the
210United States shall be organized. This committee will be working
211closely with the President and Admiral Turner in placing this new
212structure under the law and to develop effective oversight procedures.
213It is clear that effective oversight requires that information must
214be full and forthcoming. Full and timely information is obviously
215necessary if the committee and the public is to be confident that any
216transgressions can be dealt with quickly and forcefully.
217One purpose of this hearing is to give the committee and the public
218an understanding of what new information has been discovered that
219adds to the knowledge already available from previous Church and
220Kennedy inquiries, and to hear the reasons why these documents were
221not available to the Church and Kennedy committees. It is also the
222purpose of this hearing to address the issues raised by any additional
223illegal or improper activities that have emerged from the files and to
224develop remedies to prevent such improper activities from occurring
225again.
226Finally, there is an obligation on the part of both this committee
227and the CIA to make every effort to help those individuals or institutions that may have been harmed by any of these improper or illegal
228activities. I am certain that Admiral Turner will work with this committee to see that this will be done.
229I would now like to welcome the most distinguished Senator from
230Massachusetts, the chairman of the Health Subcommittee, Senator
231Kennedy.
232Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We are
233delighted to join together in this very important area of public inquiry and public interest.
234Some 2 years ago, the Senate Health Subcommittee heard chilling
235testimony about the human experimentation activities of the Central
236Intelligence Agency. The Deputy Director of the CIA revealed that
237over 30 universities and institutions were involved in an "extensive
238testing and experimentation" program which included covert drug
239tests on unwitting citizens "at all social levels, high and low, native
240Americans and foreign." Several of these tests involved the administration of LSD to "unwitting subjects in social situations."
241At least one death, that of Dr. Olsen, resulted from these activities.
242The Afrency itself acknowledged that these tests made little scientific
243sense. The agents doing the monitoring were not qualified scientific
244observers. The test subjects were seldom accessible beyond the first
245hours of the test. In a number of instances, the test subject became ill
246for hours or days, and effective followup was impossible.
247
248Other experiments were equally offensive. For example, heroin
249addicts were enticed into participating in LSD experiments in order
250to get a reward-heroin.
251Perhaps most disturbing of all was the fact that the extent of experimentation on human subjects was unknown. The records of all
252these activities were destroyed in January 1973, at the instruction of
253then CIA Director Richard Helms. In spite of persistent inquiries by
254both the Health Subcommittee and the Intelligence Committee, no
255additional records or information were forthcoming. And no oneno single individual--could be found who remembered the details, not
256the Director of the CIA, who ordered the documents destroyed, not
257the official responsible for the program, nor any of his associates.
258We believed that the record, incomplete as it was, was as complete
259as it was going to be. Then one individual, through a Freedom of Information request, accomplished what two U.S. Senate committees
260could not. He spurred the agency into finding additional records pertaining to the CIA's program of experimentation with human subjects.
261These new records were discovered by the agency in March. Their
262existence was not made known to the Congress until July.
263The records reveal a far more extensive series of experiments than
264had previously been thought. Eighty-six universities or institutions
265were involved. NeV instances of unethical behavior were revealed.
266The intelligence community of this Nation, which requires a shroud
267of secrecy in order to operate, has a very sacred trust from the
268American people. The CIA's program of human experimentation of
269the fifties and sixties violated that trust. It was violated again on the
270day the bulk of the agency's records were destroyed in 1973. It is
271violated each time a responsible official refuses to recollect the details
272of the program. The best safeguard against abuses in the future is a
273complete public accounting of the abuses of the past.
274I think this is illustrated, as Chairman Inouye pointed out. These
275are issues, are questions that happened in the fifties and sixties, and
276go back some 15, 20 years ago, but they are front page news today, as
277we see in the major newspapers and on the television and in the media
278of this country; and the reason they are, I think, is because it just continuously begins to trickle out. sort of, month after month, and the
279best way to put this period behind us, obviously, is to have the full
280information, and I think that is the desire of Admiral Turner and of
281the members of this committee.
282The Central Intelligence Agency drugged American citizens without their knowledge or consent. It used university facilities and personnel without their knowledge. It funded leading researchers, often
283without their knowledge.
284These institutes, these individuals, have a right to know who they
285are and how and when they were used. As of today, the Agency itself
286refuses to declassify the names of those institutions and individuals,
287quite appropriately, I might say, with regard to the individuals under
288the Privacy Act. It seems to me to be a fundamental responsibility to
289notify those individuals or institutions, rather. I think many of them
290were caught up in an unwitting manner to do research for the
291Agency. Many researchers, distinguished researchers, some of our
292most outstanding members of our scientific community, involved in
293
294this network, now really do not know whether they were involved or
295not, and it seems to me that the whole health and climate in terms of
296our university and our scientific and health facilities are entitled to
297that response.
298So, I intend to do all I can to persuade the Agency to, at the very
299least, officially inform those institutions and individuals involved.
300Two years ago, when these abuses were first revealed, I introduced
301legislation, with Senator Schweiker and Senator Javits, designed to
302minimize the potential for any similar abuses in the future. That
303legislation expanded the jurisdiction of the National Commission on
304Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to cover all
305federally funded research involving human subjects. The research
306initially was just directed toward HEW activities, but this legislation
307covered DOD as well as the CIA.
308This Nation has a biomedical and behavioral research capability
309second to none. It has had for subjects of HEW funded research for
310the past 3 years a system for the protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research second to none, and the Human Experimentation Commission has proven its value. Today's hearings
311and the record already established underscore the need to expand its
312jurisdiction.
313The CIA supported that legislation in 1975, and it passed the Senate
314unanimously last year. I believe it is needed in order to assure all
315our people that they will have the degree of protection in.human experimentation that they deserve and have every right to expect.
316Senator INOUITE. Thank you very much. Now we will proceed with
317the hearings.. Admiral Turner?
318[The prepared statement of Admiral Turner follows:]
319PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
320
321INTELLIGENCE
322Mr. Chairman: In my letter to you of July 15, 1977, I reported our recent discovery of seven boxes of documents related to Project MKULTRA, a closely held
323CIA project conducted from 1953-1964. As you may recall, MKULTRA was an
324"umbrella project" under which certain sensitive subprojects were funded, involving among other things research on drugs and behavioral modification. During the Rockefeller Commission and Church Committee investigations in 1975,
325the cryptonym became publicly known when details of the drug-related death of
326Dr. Frank Olson were publicized. In 1953 Dr. Olson, a civilian employee of the
327Army at Fort Detrick, leaped to his death from a hotel room window in New
328York City about a week after having unwittingly consumed LSD administered to
329him as an experiment at a meeting of LSD researchers called by CIA.
330Most of what was known about the Agency's involvement with behavioral
331drugs during the investigations in 1975 was contained in a report on Project
332MKULTRA prepared by the Inspector General's office in 1963. As a result of
333that report's recommendations, unwitting testing of drugs on U.S. citizens was
334subsequently discontinued. The MKULTRA-related report was made available to
335the Church Committee investigators and to the staff of Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health. Until the recent discovery, it was believed that all of the
336MKULTRA files dealing with behavioral modification had been destroyed in
3371973 on the orders of the then retiring Chief of the Office of Technical Service,
338with the authorization of the then DCI, as has been previously reported. Almost
339all of the people who had had any connection with the aspects of the project
340which interested Senate investigators in 1975 were no longer with the Agency
341at that time. Thus, there was little detailed knowledge of the 1IKULTRA subprojects available to CIA during the Church Committee investigations. This
342lack of available details, moreover, was probably not wholly attributable to the
343
344destruction of MKULTRA files in 1973; the 1963 report on MKULTRA by the
345Inspector General notes on page 14: "Present practice is to maintain no records
346of the planning and approval of test programs."
347When I reported to you last on this matter, my staff had not yet had an
348opportunity to review the newly located material in depth. This has now been
349accomplished, and I am in a position to give you a description of the contents of
350the recovered material. I believe you will be most interested in the following
351aspects of the recent discovery:
352How the material was discovered and why it was not previously found;
353The nature of this recently located material;
354How much new information there is in the material which may not have
355been previously known and reported to Senate investigators; and
356What we believe the most significant aspects of this find to be.
357To begin, as to how we discovered these materials. The material had been
358sent to our Retired Records Center outside of Washington and was discovered
359there as a result of the extensive search efforts of an employee charged with responsibility for maintaining our holdings on behavioral drugs and for responding
360to Freedom of Information Act requests on this subject. During the Church
361Committee investigation in 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related material were
362made by examining both the active and retired records of all branches of CIA
363considered at all likely to have had association with MKULTRA documents. The
364retired records of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the Branch responsible for
365such work were not searched, however. This was because financial papers associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA were normally maintained
366by the Branch itself under the project file, not by the Budget and Fiscal Section.
367In the case at hand, however, the newly located material was sent to the Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Section as part of its
368own retired holdings. The reason for this departure from normal procedure is not
369known. As a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and destruction
370in 1973 by the then-retiring Director of the Office as well as discovery in 1975
371by CIA officials responding to Senate investigators.
372The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned
373in his efforts to respond to FOIA requests. He reviewed all listings of material
374of this Branch stored at the Retired Records Center, including those of the
375Budget and Fiscal Section and, thus, discovered the MKULTRA-related docuinents which had been missed in the previous searches. In sum, the Agency failed
376to uncover these particular documents in 1973 in the process of attempting to
377destroy them; it similarly failed to locate them in 1975 in response to the Church
378Committee hearings. I am convinced that there was no attempt to conceal this
379material during the earlier searches.
380Next, as to the nature of the recently located material, it is important to
381realize that the recovered folders are finance folders. The bulk of the material in
382them consists of approvals for advance of funds, vouchers, accountings, and the
383like-most of which are not very informative as to the nature of the activities
384that were undertaken. Occasional project proposals or memoranda commenting on some aspect of a subproject are scattered throughout this material.
385In general, however, the recovered material does not include status reports or
386other documents relating to operational considerations or progress in the various
387subprojects, though some elaboration of the activities contemplated does appear.
388The recovered documents fall roughly into three categories:
389First, there are 149 MKULTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have
390some connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition
391and testing or administering drugs surreptitiously.
392Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers, including
393audit reports and financial statements from "cut-out" (i.e., intermediary)
394funding mechanisms used to conceal CIA's sponsorship of various research
395projects.
396Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence
397activities previously funded under MKULTRA which have nothing to do
398either with behavioral modification, drugs, and toxins or with any other related matters.
399We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into
400categories under descriptive headings. In broad outline, at least, this presents the
401contents of these files. The activities are placed in the following 15 categories:
402
4036
4041. Research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol:
40517 subprojects probably not involving human testing;
40614 subprojects definitely involving tests on human volunteers;
40719 subprojects probably including tests on human volunteers. While not
408known, some of these subprojects may have included tests on unwitting subjects as well;
4096 subprojects involving tests on unwitting subjects.
4102. Research on hypnosis: 8 subprojects, including 2 involving hypnosis and drugs
411in combination.'
4123. Acquisition of chemicals or drugs: 7 subprojects.
4134. Aspects of magicians' art useful in covert operatibns: e.g., surreptitious delivery of drug-related materials: 4 subprojects.
4145. Studies of human behavior, sleep research, and behavioral changes during
415psychotherapy: 9 subprojects.
4166. Library searches and attendance at seminars and international conferences
417on behavioral modification: 6 subprojects.
4187. Motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessment, and training techniques: 23 subprojects.
4198. Polygraph research : 3 subprojects.
4209. Funding mechanisms for MKULTRA external research activities: 3
421subprojects.
42210. Research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals in human tissue; provision of
423exotic pathogens and the capability to incorporate them in effective delivery
424systems: 6 subprojects.
425
42611. Activities whose objectives cannot be determined from available documentation : 3 subprojects.
42712. Subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities connected
428with the Army's Special Operations Division at Ft. Detrick, Md. This activity is
429outline in Book I of the Church Oommittee Report, pp. 388-389. (See Appendix A,
430pp. 68-69. Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army Assisted CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery systems for use
431against humans as well as against animals and crops. The objectives of these
432subprojects cannot be identified from the recovered material beyond the fact
433that the money was to be used where normal funding channels would require
434more written or oral justification than appeared desirable for security reasons
435or where operational considerations dictated short lead times for purchases. About
436$11,000 was involved during this period 1953-1960: 3 subprojects.
43713. Single subprojects in such areas as effects of electro-shock, harassment techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory perception, gas propelled sprays
438and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.
43914. One or two subprojects on each of the following:
440"Blood Grouping" research, controlling the activity of animals, energy
441storage and transfer in organic systems; and
442stimulus and response in biological systems.
44315. Three subprojects cancelled before any work was done on them having to
444do with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and research
445on biologically active materials to be tested through the skin on human volunteers.
446Now, as to how much new the recovered material adds to what has previously
447been reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee
448on Health on these topics, the answer is additional detail, for the most part: e.g.,
449the names of previously unidentified researchers and institutions associated on
450either a witting or unwitting basis with MKULTRA activities, and the names of
451CIA officials who approved or monitored the various subprojects. Some new substantive material is also present: e.g., details concerning proposals for experimentation and clinical testing associated with various research projects, and a
452possibly improper contribution by CIA to a private institution. However, the
453principal types of activities included have, for the most part, either been outlined
454to some extent or generally described in what was previously available to CIA
455in the way of documentation and was supplied by CIA to Senate investigators.
456For example:
457Financial disbursement records for the period 1960-1964 for 76 of the 149
458numbered MKULTRA subprojects had been recovered from the Office of Finance
459by CIA and were made available to the Church Committee investigators in August
460or September 1975.
461The 1963 Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the
462Church Committee and Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee mentions electro-shock
463
464and harassment substances (pp. 4, 16) ; covert testing
465on unwitting U.S. citizens
466(PP. 7, 10-12) ; the search for new materials through arrangements
467with specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals,
468state and federal institutions, and private research organizations (pp. 7, 9) ; and
469nical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojectsthe fact that the Techrelated to the control
470of human behavior between 1953-1963 (p. 21).
471The relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report
472on the Technical Service Division was also made available to the Church Committee
473staff. That report
474discusses techniques for human assessment and unorthodox
475methods of communication (p. 201) ; discrediting and disabling materials
476which can be covertly
477administered (pp 201-202) ; studies on magicians' arts as applied
478to covert operations (p. 202) ; specific funding mechanisms for research performed
479outside of
480CIA (pp. 202-203, 205) ; research being done on "K" (knockout)
481tolerance, and hypnotism (p. 203) ; research on LSD (p. 204) material, alcohol
482anti-personnel
483harassment and assassination delivery systems including aerosol ;generators
484and
485other spray devices (pp. 206-208) ; the role of Fort Detrick in support
486Biological/Chemical Warfare capability (p. 208) ; and material sabotage of CIA's
487(p. 209). Much of this material is reflected in the Church Committee research
488Report,
489Book I, pp. 385-422. (See Appendix A, pp. 65-102).
490The most significant new data discovered are, first, the names of researchers
491and institutions who participated in the MKULTRA project and, secondly,
492possibly improper contribution by CIA to a private institution. We are now ina
493possession of the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants who
494are identified in the recovered material dealing with the 149 subprojects. The
495names of 80 institutions where work was done or with which these people were
496affiliated are also mentioned.
497The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or
498chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics (in addition to those associated with universities), and 3 penal institutions. While the
499identities of some of these people and institutions were known previously, the
500discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.
501The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows:
502One project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private
503medical Institution. The fact that a contribution was made was previously
504known; indeed it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the
505Technical Service Division of CIA, pertinent portions of which had been reviewed by the Church Committee staff. The newly discovered material, however,
506makes it clear that this contribution was made through an intermediary, which
507made it appear to be a private donation. As a private donation, the contribution
508was then matched by federal funds. The institution was not made aware of the
509true source of the gift. This project was approved by the then DCI, and concurred
510in by CIA's top management at the time, including the then General Counsel who
511wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.
512The recently discovered documents give a greater insight into the scope of the
513unwitting drug testing but contribute little more than that. We now have collaborating information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried on
514in safehouses in San Francisco and New York City, and we have identified that
515three individuals were involved In this undertaking as opposed to the previously
516reported one person. We also know now that some unwitting testing took place
517on criminal sexual psychopaths confined at a State hospital and that, additionally, research was done on a knock-out or "K" drug in parallel with research to
518develop pain killers for cancer patients.
519These, then are the principal findings identified to date in our review of the
520recovered material. As noted earlier,. we believe the detail on the identities of
521researchers and institutions involved in CIA's sponsorship of drugs and behavioral modification is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem. Most of the people and institutions involved are not aware of Agency
522sponsorship. We should certainly assume that the researchers and institutions
523which cooperated with CIA on a witting basis acted in good fai-th and in the
524belief that they were aiding their government in a legitimate and proper purpose.
525I believe we all have a moral obligation to these researchers and institutions to
526protect them from any unjustified embarrassment or damage to their reputations
527which revelation of their identities might bring. In addition, I have a legal
528obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent. This is especially true, of course, for
529
530those researchers and institutions which were unwitting participants in CIAsponsored activities.
531Nevertheless, recognizing the right and the need of both the Senate Select
532Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Subcommittee on Health to investigate
533the circumstances of these activities in whatever detail they consider necessary,
534I am providing your Committee with all of the names on a classified basis. I
535hope that this will facilitate your investigation while protecting the individuals
536and institutions involved. Let me emphasize that the MKULTRA events are 12
537to 25 years in the past. I assure you that the CIA is in no way engaged in either
538witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.
539Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General and with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on. this matter. We are making available
540to the Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary to any
541investigation he may elect to undertake. We are working with both the Attorney
542General and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to determine
543whether it is practicable from this new evidence to attempt to identify any of
544the persons to whom drugs may have been administered unwittingly. No such
545names are part of these records, but we are working to determine if there are
546adequate clues to lead to their identification; and if so, how to go about fulfilling
547the Government's responsibilities in the matter.
548
549TESTIMONY OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
550INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK LAUBINGER, OFFICE
551OF TECHNICAL SERVICES; AL BRODY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
552GENERAL; ERNEST MAYERFIELD, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL;
553AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
554Admiral TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin
555by thanking you and Senator Kennedy for having a joint hearing this
556morning. I hope this will expedite and facilitate our getting all the
557information that both of your committees need into the record quickly.
558I would like also to thank you both for prefacing the remarks today
559by reminding us all that the events about which we are here to talk
560are 12- to 24-years old. They in no way represent the current activities
561or policies of the Central Intelligence Agency.
562What we are here to do is to give you all the information that we
563now have and which we did not previously have on a subject known
564as Project MKULTRA, a project which took place from 1953 to 1964.
565It was an umbrella project under which there were numerous subprojects for research, among other things, on drugs and behavioral
566modification. What the new material that we offer today is a supplement to the considerable material that was made available in 1975,
567during the Church committee hearinas, and also to the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research.
568At that time, the CIA offered up all of the information and documents it believed it had available. The principal one available at that
569time that gave the greatest amount of information on this subject
570was a report of the CIA's Inspector General written in 1963, and which
571led directly to the termination of this activity in 1964, 13 years ago.
572The information available in 1975 to the various investigating
573groups was indeed sparse, first because of the destruction of material
574that took place in 1973. as detailed by Senator Kennedy a minute ago,
575with the concurrence of the then Director of Central Tntelliaence and
576under the supervision of the Director of the Office of Technical
577Services that supervised Project MKULTRA.
578
579The material in 1975 was also sparse because most of the CIA people
580who had been involved in 1953 to 1964 in this activity had retired from
581the Agency. I would further add that I think the material was sparse
582in part because it was the practice at that time not to keep detailed
583records in this category.
584For instance, the 1963 report of the Inspector General notes:
585Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of
586test programs.
587
588In brief, there were few records to begin with and less after the
589destruction of 1973.
590What I would like to do now, though, is to proceed and let you know
591what the new material adds to our knowledge of this topic, and I
592will start by describing how the material was discovered and why it
593was not previously discovered. The material in question, some seven
594boxes, had been sent to our Retired Records Center outside of the
595Washington area. It was discovered there as the result of an extensive
596search by an employee charged with the responsibility for maintaining our holdings on behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom
597of Information Act requests on this subject.
598During the Church committee investigation of 1975, searches for
599MKULTRA-related material were made by examining both the active
600and the retired records of all of the branches of CIA considered likely
601to have had an association with MKULTRA documents. The retired
602records of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the branch that was responsible for such work were not searched, however. This was because the
603financial paper associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA
604were normally maintained by the branch itself under the project title,
605MKULTRA, not by the Budget and Fiscal Section under a special
606budget file.
607In the case at hand, however, this newly located material had been
608sent to the Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal
609Section of this branch as part of its own retired holdings. In short, what
610should have been filed by the branch itself was filed by the Budget
611and Fiscal Section, and what should have been filed under the project
612title, MKULTRA, was filed under budget and fiscal matters. The reason for this departure from the normal procedure of that time is simply
613not known, and as a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval
614and destruction in 1973, as well as discovery in 1975.
615The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone
616unturned in his efforts to respond to a Freedom of Information Act
617request, or several of them, in fact. He reviewed all of the listings of
618material of this branch, stored at the Retired Records Center, including
619those of the Budget and Fiscal Section, and thus discovered the
620MKULTRA-related documents, which had been missed in the previous
621searches.
622In sum, the agency failed to uncover these particular documents in
6231973, in the process of attempting to destroy them. It similarly failed
624to locate them in 1975, in response to the Church committee hearings.
625I am personally persuaded that there is no evidence of any attempt to
626conceal this material during the earlier searches. Moreover, as we will
627discuss as we proceed, I do not believe the material itself is such that
628
629there would be a motive on the part of the CIA to withhold this, having
630disclosed what it did in 1975.
631Next, let me move to the nature of this recently located material.
632It is important to remember what I have just noted, that these folders
633that were discovered are finance folders. The bulk of the material in
634them consists of approvals for the advance of funds, vouchers, and
635accountings and such, most of which are not very informative as to
636the nature of the activities that they were supporting. Occasional project proposals or memoranda commenting on some aspect of a subproject
637are scattered throughout this material. In general, however, the recovered material does not include overall status reports or other documents relating to operational considerations, or to the progress on
638various subprojects, though some elaboration of the activities contemplated does appear from time to time.
639There are roughly three categories of projects. First, there are 149
640MKULTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have some connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition and
641testing, or administering drugs surreptitiously. Second, there are two
642boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers, including audit reports
643and financial statements from intermediary funding mechanisms used
644to conceal CIA sponsorship of various research projects.
645Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence activities previously funded under MKULTRA but which
646have nothing to do either with behavioral modifications, drugs and
647toxins, or any closely related matter.
648We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into categories under descriptive headings. In broad outline,
649at least, this presents the contents of these files. The following 15
650categories are the ones we have divided these into.
651First, research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol.
652Within this, there are 17 projects probably not involving human testing. There are 14 subprojects definitely involving testing on human
653volunteers. There are 19 subprojects probably including tests on human
654'volunteers and 6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting
655human beings.
656Second, there is research on hypnosis, eight subprojects, including
657two involving hypnosis and drugs in combination.
658Third, there are seven projects on the acquisition of chemicals or
659drugs.
660Fourth, four subprojects on the aspects of the magician's art, useful
661in covert operations, for instance, the surreptitious delivery of drugrelated materials.
662Fifth, there are nine projects on studies of human behavior, sleep
663research, and behavioral change during psychotherapy.
664Sixth, there are projects on library searches and attendants at seminars and international conferences on behavioral modifications.
665Seventh, there are 23 projects on motivational studies, studies of
666defectors, assessments of behavior and training techniques.
667Eighth, there are three subprojects on polygraph research.
668Ninth, there are three subprojects on funding mechanisms for
669MKULTRA's external research activities.
670
671Tenth, there are six subprojects on research on drugs, toxins, and
672biologicals in human tissue, provision of exotic pathogens, and the
673capability to incorporate them in effective delivery systems.
674Eleventh, there are three subprojects on activities whose nature
675simply cannot be determined.
676Twelfth, there are subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities conducted with the Army Special Operations Division at Fort Detrich, Md. This activity is outlined in Book I of the
677Church committee report, pages 388 to 389. (See Appendix A, pp.
67868-69).
679Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army assisted the CIA in
680developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery
681systems-for use against humans as well as against animals and crops.
682Thirteenth, there are single subprojects in such areas as the effects
683of electroshock, harassment techniques for offensive use, analysis of
684extrasensory perception, gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four
685subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.
686Fourteenth, one or two subprojects on each of the following: blood
687grouping research; controlling the activities of animals; energy storage and transfer in organic systems; and stimulus and response in
688biological systems.
689Finally, 15th, there are three subprojects canceled before any work
690was done on them having to do with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and research on biologically active
691materials.
692Now, let me address how much this newly discovered material adds
693to what has previously been reported to the Church committee and
694to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health. The answer is basically additional detail. The principal types of activities included in
695these documents have for the most part been outlined or to some
696extent generally described in what was previously available in the
697way of documentation and which was supplied by the CIA to the
698Senate investigators.
699For example, financial disbursement records for the period of 1960
700to 1964 for 76 of these 149 subprojects had been recovered by the
701Office of Finance at CIA and were made available to the Church
702committee investigators. For example, the 1963 Inspector General
703report on MKULTRA made available to both the Church committee
704and the Subcommittee on Health mentions electroshock and harassment substances, covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens, the search
705for new materials through arrangements with specialists in hospitals
706and universities, and the fact that the Technical Service Division of
707CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of human
708behavior.
709For instance also, the relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General
710report was also made available to the Church committee staff, and
711that report discusses the techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of communication, discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly administered, studies on magicians' arts
712as applied to covert operations, and other similar topics.
713The most significant new data that has been discovered are, first,
714the names of researchers and institutions who participated in
715
716MKULTRA projects, and second, a possibly improper contribution
717by the CIA to a private institution. We are now in the possession of the names of 185 nongovernment researchers and assistants
718who are identified in the recovered material dealing with these 149
719subprojects.
720There are also names of 80 institutions where work was done or
721with which these people were affiliated. The institutions include 44
722colleges or universities, 15 research foundation or chemical or pharmaceutical companies or the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, in addition to
723those associated with the universities, and 3 penal institutions.
724While the identities of some of these people and institutions were
725known previously, the discovery of the new identities adds to our
726knowledge of MKULTRA.
727The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are
728as follows. One project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical institution. The fact that that contribution was made was previously known. Indeed, it was mentioned
729in the 1957 report of the Inspector General on the Technical Service
730Division of CIA that supervised MKULTRA, and pertinent portions
731of this had been reviewed by the Church committee staff.
732The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this
733contribution was made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation. As a private donation, the contribution
734was then matched by Federal funds. The institution was not made
735aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved Ithe then Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by CIA's
736top management including the then General Counsel, who wrote an
737opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.
738The recently discovered documents also give greater insight into
739the scope of the unwitting nature of the drug testing, but contribute
740little more than that. We now do have corroborating information that
741some of the unwitting drug testing was carried out in what is known
742in the intelligence trade as safe houses in San Francisco and in New
743York City, and we have identified that three individuals were involved in this undertaking, whereas we previously reported there was
744only one person.
745We also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual psychopaths confined at a State hospital, and that additionally research was done on a knockout or K drug in parallel with
746research to develop painkillers for cancer patients.
747These, then, are the principal findings identified to date in our review of this recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of researchers and institutions involved in CIA
748sponsorship of drug and behavioral modification research is a new
749element and one which poses a considerable problem. Most of the people and institutions involved were not aware of CIA sponsorship. We
750should certainly assume that the researchers and institutions which
751cooperated with CIA on a witting basis acted in good faith and in
752the belief that they were aiding their Government in a legitimate and
753proper purpose.
754I believe that we all have a moral obligation to these researchers
755and institutions to protect them from any unjustified embarrassment
756
757or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities
758might bring. In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Privacy
759Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers
760without their consent.
761This is especially true, of course, for those researchers and institutions which were unwitting participants in CIA sponsored activities.
762Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I certainly recognize the right and the
763need of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
764Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research to investigate
765the circumstances of these activities in whatever detail you consider
766necessary. I am providing your committee with all of the documentation, including all of the names, on a classified basis. I hope that this
767will facilitate your investigation while still protecting the individuals
768and the institutions involved.
769Let me emphasize again that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 24
770years in the past, and I assure you that CIA is in no way engaged in
771either witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.
772Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General on this
773matter. We are making available to the Attorney General whatever
774materials he may deem necessary to any investigations that he may
775elect to undertake. Beyond that, we are also working with the Attorney
776General to determine whether it is practicable from this new evidence
777to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have been administered unwittingly. No such names are part of these records. We have
778not identified the individuals to whom drugs were administered, but
779we are trying now to determine if there are adequate clues to lead to
780their identification, and if so how best to go about fulfilling the Government's responsibilities in this matter.
781Mr. Chairman, as we proceed with that process of attempting to
782identify the individuals and then determining what is our proper responsibility to them, I will keep both of these committees fully advised. I thank you, sir.
783Senator INouYE. Thank you very much, Admiral Turner. Your
784spirit of cooperation is much appreciated. I would like to announce to
785the committee that in order to give every member an opportunity to
786participate in this hearing, that we would set a time limit of 10 minutes
787per Senator.
788Admiral Turner, please give this committee the genesis of MKUL
789TRA. Who or what committee or commission or agency was responsible for dreaming up this grandiose and sinister project, and why was
790it necessary? What is the rationale or justification for such a project
791and was the President of the United States aware of this?
792Admiral TURNER. Mr. Chairman. I am going to ask Mr. Brody on
793my right, who is a long-time member of the CIA to address that in
794more detail. I believe everything that we know about the genesis was
795turned over to the Church committee and is contained in that material. Basically, it was a CIA-initiated project. It started out of a
796concern of our being taken advantage of by other powers who would
797use drugs against our personnel, and it was approved in the Agency. I
798have asked the question you just asked me, and have been assured that
799there is no evidence within the Agency of any involvement at higher
800echelons, the White House, for instance, or specific approval. That
801does not say there was not, but we have no such evidence.
802
80396-408 0 - 77 - 2
804
805Mr. Brody, would you amplify on my comments there, please?
806Mr. BRODY. Mr. Chairman, I really have very little to add to that.
807To my knowledge, there was no Presidential knowledge of this project at the time. It was a CIA project, and as the admiral said, it was
808a project designed to attempt to counteract what was then thought to
809be a serious threat by our enemies of using drugs against us. Most of
810what else we know about it is in the Senate Church committee report.
811Senator INOUYE. Were the authorized members of the Congress
812made aware of this project through the budgetary process?
813Mr. BRODY. We have no knowledge of that, sir.
814Senator INOUYE. Are you suggesting that it was intentionally kept
815away from the Congress and the President of the United States?
816Admiral TURNER. No, sir. We are only saying that we have no evidence one way or the other as to whether the Congress was informed
817of this particular project. There are no records to indicate.
818Senator INOUYE. Admiral Turner, are you personally satisfied by
819actual investigation that this newly discovered information was not
820intentionally kept away from the Senate of the United States ?
821Admiral TURNER. I have no way to prove that, sir. That is my conviction from everything I have seen of it.
822Senator INOUYE. Now, we have been advised that these documents
823were initially discovered in March of this year, and you were notified
824in July of this year, or June of this year, and the committee was notified in July. Can you tell us why the Director of Central Intelligence
825was notified 3 months after its initial discovery, why the delay?
826Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. All this started with several Freedom of
827Information Act requests, and Mr. Laubinger on my left was the individual who took it upon himself to pursue these requests with great
828diligence, and got permission to go to the Retired Records Center, and
829then made the decision to look not only under what would be the expected subject files, but through every file with which the branch that
830conducted this type of activity had any conceivable connection.
831Very late in March, he discovered these seven boxes. He arranged
832to have them shipped from the Retired Records Center to Washington, to our headquarters. They arrived in early April. He advised his
833appropriate superiors, who asked him how long he thought it would
834take him to go through these and screen them appropriately, clear
835them for Freedom of Information Act release.
836There are, we originally estimated, 5,000 pages here. We now think
837that was an underestimation, and it may be closer to 8,000 pages. He
838estimated it would take about 45 days or into the middle of May to
839do that. He was told to proceed, and as be did so there was nothing
840uncovered in the beginning of these 149 cases that appeared particularly startling or particularly additive to the knowledge that had already been given to the Church committee, some details, but no major
841revelations:
842He and his associates proceeded with deliberateness, but not a great
843sense of urgency. There were other interfering activities that came
844and demanded his time also. He was not able to put 100 percent of his
845time on it, and there did not appear to be cause for a great rush here.
846We were trying to be responsive to the Freedom of Information Act
847request within the limits of our manpower and our priorities.
848
849In early June, however, he discovered two projects, the one related
850to K drugs and the one related to the funding at the institution, and
851realized immediately that he had substantial new information, and
852he immediately reported this to his superiors.
853Two actions were taken. One was to notify the lawyers of the
854principal Freedom of Information Act requestor that we would have
855substantial new material and that it would be forthcoming as rapidly as
856possible, and the second was to start a memorandum up the chain
857that indicated his belief that we should notify the Senate Select Comimittee on Intelligence of this discovery because of the character at least
858of these two documents.
859As that proceeded up from the 13th of June, at each echelon we had
860to go through the legal office, the legislative liaison office and at each
861echelon about the same question was asked of him: Have you gone
862through all of this, so that when we notify the Senate Select Committee we do not notify half of the important relevations and not the
863other half? The last thing I want, Mr. Chairman, is in any way
864to
865be on any topic, give the appearance on any topic of being recalcitrant,
866reluctant, or having to have you drag things out of me, and my subordinates, much to my pleasure, had each asked, have you really gone
867through these 8,000 pages enough to know that we are not going to
868uncover a bombshell down -atthe bottom?
869By late June, about the 28th, this process reached my deputy. He
870notified me after his review of it on the 7th of July, which is the first
871I knew of it. I began reading into it. I asked the same probing question directly. I then notified my superiors, and on the 15th delivered
872to you my letter letting you know that we had this, and we have been
873working, many people, many hours since then, to be sure that what we
874are telling you today does include all the relevant material.
875Senator INOUYE. I would like to commend Mr. Laubinger for his
876diligence and expertise, but was this diligence the result of the Freedom of Information Act or could this diligence have been exercised
877during the Church hearings? Why was it not exercised?
878Admiral TURNER. There is no question that theoretically this diligence could have been exercised at any time, and it may well be that
879the Freedom of Information Act has made us more aware of this.
880Would you speak for yourself, please.
881Mr. LAUBINGER. I really don't attribute it, Senator, to diligence so
882much as thoroughness. If you can imagine the pressures under an
883organization trying to respond, which I think the CIA did at the time
884of the Church committee hearings, the hallways of the floor I am on
885were full of boxes from our records center. Every box that anyone
886thought could possibly contain anything was called up for search. It
887was one of a frantic effort to comply.
888When the pressure of that situation cools down, and you can start
889looking at things systematically, you are apt to find things that you
890wouldn't under the heat of a crash program, and that is what happened
891here.
892Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Senator Kennedy?
893
894Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Turner, this is an enormously distressing report that you give to the American Congress and to the American
895people today. Granted, it happened many years ago, but what we are
896
897basically talking about is an activity which took place in the country
898that involved the perversion and the corruption of many of our outstanding research centers in this country, with CIA funds, where some
899of our top researchers were unwittingly involved in research sponsored by the Agency in which they had no knowledge of the background or the support for.
900Much of it was done with American citizens who were completely
901unknowing in terms of taking various drugs, and there are perhaps
902any number of Americans who are walking around today on the east
903coast or west coast who were given drugs, with all the kinds of physical
904and psychological damage that can be caused. We have gone over that
905in very careful detail, and it is significant and severe indeed.
906I do not know what could be done in a less democratic country
907that would be more alien to our own traditions than was really done
908in this narrow area, and as you give this report to the committee, I
909would like to get some sense of your own concern about this type of
910activity, and how you react, having assumed this important responsibility with the confidence of President Carter and the overwhelming
911support, obviously, of the. Congress, under this set of circumstances.
912I did not get much of a feeling in reviewing your statement here this
913morning of the kind of abhorrence to this type of past activity which
914I think the American people would certainly deplore and which I
915believe that you do, but could you comment upon that question, and also
916perhaps give us what ideas you have to insure that it cannot happen
917again?
918Admiral TURNER. Senator Kennedy, it is totally abhorrent to me to
919think of using a human being as a guinea pig and in any way jeopardizing his life and his health, no matter how great the cause. I am not
920here to pass judgment on my predecessors, but I can assure you that
921this is totally beyond the pale of my contemplation of activities that
922the CIA or any other of our intelligence agencies should undertake.
923I am taking and have taken what I believe are adequate steps to
924insure that such things are not continuing today.
925Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us a little bit about that?
926Admiral TURNER. I have asked for a special report assuring me that.
927there are no drug activities extant, that is, drug activities that involve
928experimentation. Obviously, we collect intelligence about drugs and
929druo use in other countries, but there are no experimentations being
930conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, and I have had a special
931check made because of another incident that was uncovered some years
932ago about the unauthorized retention of some toxic materials at the
933CIA. I have had an actual inspection made of the storage places and
934the certification from the people in charge of those that there are no
935such chemical biological materials present in our keeping, and I have
936issued express orders that that shall not be the case.
937Beyond that, I have to rely in large measure on my sense of command and direction of the people and their knowledge of the attitude
938I have just expressed to you in this regard.
939Senator KENNEDY. I think that is very commendable.
940Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.
941Senator KENNEDY. I think it is important that the American people
942understand that.
943
94417
945You know, much of the research which is our area of interest that
946of acwas being done by the Agency and the whole involved sequence
947in a
948done
949been
950have
951could
952convinced
953am
954I
955Agency,
956the
957by
958done
959tivities
960InstiNational
961the
962of
963programs
964legitimate way through the research
965tutes of Mental Health, other sponsored activities. I mean, that is some
966other question, but I think you went to an awful lot of trouble, where
967these things could have been.
968Let me ask you specifically, on the followup of MKULTRA, are
969there now-I think you have answered, but I want to get a complete
970answer about any experimentations that are being done on human beings., whether it is drugs or behavioral alterations or patterns or any
971support, either directly or indirectly, being provided by the Agency in
972terms of any experimentation on human beings.
973Admiral TURNER. There is no experimentation with drugs on human
974beings, witting or unwitting, being conducted in any way.
975Senator KENNEDY. All right. Or being supported indirectly? I mean,
976are you contracted out?
977Admiral TURNER. Or being in any way supported.
978Senator KENNEDY. All right. How about the nondrug experimentation our Committee has seen-psychosurgery, for example, or psychological research?
979Admiral TURNER. We are continually involved in what we call assessment of behavior. For instance, we are trying to continually improve our polygraph procedures to, you know, assess whether a person
980is lying or not. This does not involve any tampering with the individnal body. This involves studying records of people's behavior under
981different circumstances, and so on, but it is not an experimental thing.
982Have I described that accurately, Al?
983Mr. BRODY. Yes.
984Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is limited to those areas?
985Admiral TURNER. Yes; it does not involve attempting to modify behavior. It only involves studying behavior conditions, but not trying
986to actively modify it, as was one of the objectives of MKULTRA.
987Senator KENNEDY. Well, we are scarce on time, but I am interested
988in the other areas besides polygraph where you are doing it. Maybe
989you can either respond now or submit it for the record, if you would do
990that. Would you provide that for the record?
991Admiral TURNER. Yes.
992[The material on psychological assessments follows:]
993Psychological assessments are performed as a service to officers in the operations directorate who recruit and/or handle agents. Except for people involved
994in training courses, the subjects of the assessments are foreign nationals. The
995assessments are generally done to determine the most successful tactic to persuade
996the subject to accept covert employment by the CIA, and to make an appraisal of
997his reliability and truthfulness.
998A majority of the work is done by a staff of trained psychologists, some of
999whom are stationed overseas. The assessments they do may be either direct or
1000indirect. Direct assessments involve a personal interview of the subject by the
1001psychologist. When possible the subject is asked to complete a formal "intelligence test" which is actually a disguised psychological test. Individuals being
1002assessed are not given drugs, nor are they subjected to physical harassment or
1003torture. When operating conditions are such that a face-to-face interview is not
1004possible, the psychologist may do an indirect assessment, using as source materials descriptions of the subject by others, interviews with people who know
1005him, specimens of his writings, etc.
1006
1007The other psychological assessments involve handwriting analysis or graphological assessment. The work is done by a pair of trained graphologists, assisted
1008by a small number of measurement technicians. They generally require at least
1009a page of handwritten script by the subject. Measurements are made of about
101030 different writing characteristics, and these are charted and furnished to the
1011graphologist for assessments.
1012The psychologists also give courses in psychological assessment to group of
1013operations officers, to sharpen their own capabilities to size up people. As part of
1014the training course, the instructor does a psychological assessment of each
1015student. The students are witting participants, and results are discussed with
1016them.
1017It is important to reiterate that psychological assessments are only a service
1018to the operations officers. In the final analysis, it is the responsibility of the
1019operations officer to decide how a potential agent should be approached, or to
1020make a judgement as to whether any agent is telling the truth.
1021
1022Admiral TURNER. The kind of thing we are interested in is, what
1023will motivate a man to become an agent of the United States in a difficult situation. We have to be familiar with that kind of attitudinal
1024response that we can expect from people we approach to for one reason
1025or another become our spies, but I will be happy to submit a very
1026specific listing of these.
1027Senator KENNEDY. Would you do that for the committee?
1028In the followups, in the MKSEARCH, in the OFTEN, and the
1029CHICKWIT, could you give us also a report on those particular
1030programs?
1031Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
1032Senator KENNEDY. Did they involve experimentation, human
1033experimentation?
1034Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
1035Senator KENNEDY. None of them?
1036Admiral TURNER. Let me say this, that CHICKWIT program is the
1037code name for the CIA participation in what was basically a Department of Defense program. This program was summarized and reported to the Church committee, to the Congress, and I have since they
1038have been rementioned in the press in the last 2 days here, I have not
1039had time to go through and personally review them. I have ascertained
1040that all of the files that we had and made available before are intact,
1041and I have put a special order out that nobody will enter those files
1042or in any way touch them without my permission at this point, but
1043they are in the Retired Records Center outside of Washington, and
1044they are available.
1045I am not prepared to give you full details on it, because I simply
1046haven't read into that part of our history, but in addition I would suggest when we want to get into that we should get the Department of
1047Defense in with us.
1048Senator KENNEDY. Well, you will supply that information to the
1049Intelligence Committee, the relevant, I mean, the health aspects, obviously, and the research we are interested in?
1050Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
1051Senator KENNEDY. Will you let us know, Admiral Turner?
1052Admiral TURNER. I will be happy to.
1053[See p. 169 for the material referred to.]
1054Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. I am running out of time. Do you
1055support the extension of the protection of human subjects legislation
1056to include the CIA and the DOD? You commented favorably on that
1057
1058before, and I am hopeful we can get that on the calendar early in
1059September, and that is our strong interest.
1060Admiral TURNER. The CIA certainly has no objection to that proposed legislation, sir. It is not my role in the administration to be the
1061supporter of it or the endorser of it.
1062Senator KENNEDY. As a personal matter, since you have reviewed
1063these subjects, would you comment? I know it is maybe unusual, but
1064you can understand what we are attempting to do.
1065Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
1066Senator KENNEDY. From your own experience in the agency, you
1067can understand the value of it.
1068Just finally, in your own testimony now with this additional information, it seems quite apparent to me that you can reconstruct in very
1069careful detail this whole project in terms of the responsible CIA
1070officials for the program. You have so indicated in your testimony.
1071Now with the additional information, and the people, that have been
1072revealed in the examination of the documents, it seems to be pretty
1073clear that you can track that whole program in very careful detail,
1074and I would hope, you know, that you would want to get to the bottom
1075of it, as the Congress does as well. I will come back to that in my next
1076round. Thank you very much.
1077Senator INOUYE. Senator Goldwater?
1078Senator GOLDWATER. I have no questions.
1079Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker?
1080Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1081Admiral Turner, I would like to go back to your testimony on page
108212, where you discuss the contribution to the building fund of a
1083private medical institution. You state, "Indeed, it was mentioned in a
10841957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division of
1085CIA, pertinent portions of which had been reviewed by the Church
1086committee staff." I would like to have you consider this question very
1087carefully. I served as a member of the original Church committee.
1088My staffer did a lot of the work that you are referring to here. He
1089made notes on the IG's report. My question to you is, are you saying
1090that the section that specifically delineates an improper contribution
1091was in fact given to the Church committee staff to see?
1092Admiral TURNER. The answer to your question is "Yes." The information that a contribution had been made was made available, to the
1093best of my knowledge.
1094Senator SCHWEIKER. Only certain sections of the report were made
1095
1096available. The report had to be reviewed out at Langley; it was not
1097reviewed here, and copies were not given to us here. I just want you to
1098carefully consider what you are saying, because the only record we
1099have are the notes that the staff took on anything that was of
1100significance.
1101Admiral TURNER. My understanding was that Mr. Maxwell was
1102
1103shown the relevant portion of this report that disclosed that the contribution had been made.
1104Senator SCHWEIKER. To follow this up further, I'd like to say that
1105I think there was a serious flaw in the way that the IG report was
1106handled and the Church committee was limited. I am not making any
1107accusations, but because of limited access to the report, we have a situ-
1108
1109ation where it is not even clear whether we actually saw that material
1110or not, simply because we could not keep a copy of the report under
1111the procedures we had to follow. We were limited by notetaking, and
1112so it is rather ambiguous as to just what was seen and what was not
1113seen. I certainly hope that the new Intelligence Committee will not
1114be bound by procedures that so restrict its ability to exercise effective
1115oversight.
1116I have a second question. Does it concern you, Admiral, that we used
1117a subterfuge which resulted in the use of Federal construction grant
1118funds to finance facilities for these sorts of experiments on our own
1119people? Because as I understand what you are saying, while the CIA
1120maybe only put up $375,000, this triggered a response on the part of
1121the Federal Government to provide on a good faith basis matching
1122hospital funds at the same level. We put up more than $1 million of
1123matching funds, some based on an allegedly private donation which
1124was really CIA money.
1125Isn't there something basically wrong with that?
1126Admiral TURNER. I certainly believe there is. As I stated, the General Counsel of the CIA at that time rendered a legal opinion that
1127this was a legal undertaking, and again I am hesitant to go back and
1128revisit the atmosphere, the laws, the attitudes at that time, so whether
1129the counsel was on good legal ground or not, I am not enough of a
1130lawyer to be sure, but it certainly would occur to me if it happened
1131today as a very questionable activity.
1132Senator SCH1WEIKER. Well, I think those of us who worked on and
1133amended the Hill-Burton Act and other hospital construction assistance laws over the years, would have a rather different opinion on
1134the legal intent or object of Congress in passing laws to provide hospital construction project money. These funds weren't intended for
1135this.
1136It reminds me a little bit of the shellfish toxin situation which turned
1137up when I was on the Church committee. The Public Health Service
1138was used to produce a deadly poison with Public Health money. Here
1139we are using general hospital construction money to carry on a series of
1140drug experiments.
1141Admiral TURNER. Excuse me, sir. If I could just be, I think, accurate, I don't think any of this $375,000 or the matching funds were
1142used to conduct drug experiments. They were used to build the hospital. Now, the CIA then put more money into a foundation that was
1143conducting research on the CIA's behalf supposedly in that hospital, so
1144the intent was certainly there, but the money was not used for
1145experimentation.
1146Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I understand it was used for bricks and
1147mortar, but the bricks were used to build the facility where the experiments were carried on; were they not?
1148Admiral TURNER. We do not have positive evidence that they were.
1149It certainly would seem that that was the intent, but I do not want to
1150draw inferences hereSenator SCHWEIKER. Well, why else would they give this money for
1151the building fund if the building was not used for a purpose that
1152benefited the CIA program?
1153Admiral TURNER. I certainly draw the inference that the CIA
1154expected to benefit from it, and some of the wording says the General
1155
1156Counsel's opinion was that this was legal only if the CIA was going
1157to derive adequate benefit from it, but, sir, there is no evidence of what
1158benefit was derived.
1159Senator ScHW-EIKER. There must have been some pretty good benefits
1160at stake. The Atomic Energy Commission was to bear a share of the
1161cost, and when they backed out for some reason or another, the CIA
1162picked up part of their tab. So, at two different points there were
1163indications that CIA decisionmakers thought there was great benefit
1164to be derived from whatever happened within the brick and mortar
1165walls of that facility.
1166Admiral TURNER. You are absolutely right. I am only taking the
1167position that I cannot substantiate that there was benefit derived.
1168Senator SCHWEIKER. The agreement documents say that the CIA
1169would have access to one-sixth of the space involved in the construction
1170of the wing, so how would you enter into an agreement that specifically
1171says that you will have access to and use of one-sixth of the space and
1172not perform something in that space? I cannot believe it was empty.
1173Admiral TURNER. Sir, I am not disputing you at all, but both of us
1174are saying that the inference is that one-sixth of the space was used,
1175that experimentation was done, and so on, but there is no factual evidence of what went on as a result of that payment or what went on in
1176that hospital. It is just missing. It is not that it didn't happen.
1177Senator SCHTWEIKER. Admiral Turner, one other
1178Senator KENNEDY. Would the Senator yield on that point?
1179Senator SCHWEIKEu. I understand that in the agency's documents
1180on the agreement it was explicitly stated that one-sixth of the facility
1181would be designated for CIA use and made available for CIA research. Are you familiarMr. BnoDY. Senator, as I recall, you are right in that there is a mention of one-sixth, but any mention at all has to do with planning. There
1182are no subsequent reports as to what happened after the construction
1183took place.
1184Senator SCIWKEnR. Admiral Turner, I read in the New York Times
1185that part of this series of MKULTRA experiments involved an arrangement with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to test LSD surreptitiously on unwitting patrons in bars in New York and San
1186Francisco. Some of the subjects became violently ill and were hospitalized. I wonder if you would just briefly describe what we were
1187doing there and how it was carried out? I assume it was through a safe
1188house operation. I don't believe your statement went into much detail.
1189Admiral TURNER. I did mention the safe house operation in my
1190statement, sir, and that is how these were carried out. What we have
1191learned from the new documentation is the location and the dates at
1192which the safe houses were run by the CIA and the identification of
1193three individuals who were associated with running those safe houses.
1194We know something about the construction work that was done in
1195them because there were contracts for this. Beyond that, we are pretty
1196much drawing inferences as to the things that went on as to what you
1197are saying here.
1198Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, the subjects were unwitting. You can
1199infer that much, right?
1200Admiral TURNER. Right.
1201
1202Senator SCHWEIKER. If you happened to be at the wrong bar at the
1203wrong place and time, you got it.
1204Mr. BRODY. Senator, that would be-contacts were made, as we
1205understand it, in bars, et cetera, and then the people may have been
1206invited to these safe houses. There really isn't any indication as to
1207the fact that this took place in the bars.
1208Admiral TURNER. We are trying to be very precise with you, sir, and
1209not draw an inference here. There are 6 cases of these 149 where we
1210have enough evidence in this new documentation to substantiate that
1211there was unwitting testing and some of that involves these safe
1212houses. There are other cases where it is ambiguous as to whether the
1213testing was witting or voluntary. There are others where it was clearly
1214voluntary.
1215Senator SCHWEIKER. Of course, after a few drinks, it is questionable
1216whether informed consent means anything to a- person in a bar
1217anyway.
1218Admiral TURNER. Well, we don't have any indication that all these
1219cases where it is ambiguous involved drinking of any kind. There are
1220cases in penal institutions where it is not clear whether the prisoner
1221was given a choice or not. I don't know that he wasn't given a choice,
1222but I don't positively know that he was, and I classify that as an
1223ambiguous incident.
1224Senator INoUYE. Your time is up, Senator.
1225Senator Huddleston?
1226Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1227Admiral Turner, you stated in your testimony that you are convinced there was no attempt to conceal this recently discovered documentation during the earlier searches. Did you question the individuals connected with the earlier search before you made that judgment?
1228Admiral TURNER. Yes; I haven't, I don't think, questioned everybody who looked in the files or is still on our payroll who looked in
1229the files back in 1975, but Mr. Laubinger on my left is the best authority on this, and I have gone over it with him in some detail.
1230Senator HUDDLESTON. But you have inquired, you think, sufficiently
1231to assure yourself that there was no intent on the part of any person
1232to conceal these records from the previous committee?
1233Admiral TURNER. I am persuaded of that both by my questioning
1234of people and by the circumstances and the way in which these documents were filed, by the fact. which I did not and should have mentioned in my testimony, that these were not the official files. The ones
1235that we have received or retrieved were copies of files that were working files that somebody had used, and therefore were slipped into a
1236different location, and again I say to you, sir, I can't imagine their
1237deliberately concealing these particular files and revealing the other
1238things that they did reveal in 1975. I don't see the motive for that,
1239because these are not that damning compared with the overall material
1240that was provided.
1241Senator HUDDLESTON. Is this the kind of operation that if it were
1242continuing now or if there were anything similar to it, that you would
1243feel compelled to report to the Select Committee on Intelligence?
1244Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. You mean, if I discovered that something like this were going on without my knowledge? Yes, I would
1245feel absolutely the requirement to-
1246
1247Senator HUDDLESTON. But if it were going on with your knowledge,
1248would you report it to the committee? I assume you would.
1249Admiral TURNER. Yes. Well, it would not be going on with my
1250knowledge, but theoretically the answer is yes, sir.
1251Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, then, what suggestions would you have
1252as we devise charters for the various intelligence agencies? What
1253provision would you suggest to prohibit this kind of activity from
1254taking place? Would you suggest that it ought to be specifically outlined in a statutory charter setting out the parameters of the permissible operation of the various agencies?
1255Admiral TURNER. I think that certainly is something we must consider as we look at the legislation for charters. I am not on the face
1256of it opposed to it. I think we would have to look at the particular
1257wording as we are going to have to deal with the whole charter issue
1258as to exactly how precise you want to be in delineating restraints and
1259curbs on the intelligence activities.
1260Senator HUDDLESTON. In the case of sensitive type operations, which
1261this certainly was, which might be going on today, is the oversight
1262activity of the agency more intensive now than it was at that time?
1263Admiral TURNER. Much more so. I mean, I have briefed you, sir,
1264and the committee on our sensitive operations. We have the Intelligence Oversight Board. We have a procedure in the National Security Council for approval of very sensitive operations. I think the
1265amount of spotlight focused on these activities is many, manyfold
1266what it was in these 12 to 24 years ago.
1267Senator HUDDLESTON. How about the record keeping?
1268Admiral TURNER. Yes; I can't imagine anyone having the gall to
1269think that he can just blithely destroy records today with all of the
1270attention that has come to this, and certainly we are emphasizing that
1271that is not the case.
1272Senator HUDDLESTON. Admiral, I was particularly interested in the
1273activity that took place at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at
1274Lexington, Ky., in which a Dr. Harris Isbell conducted experiments
1275on people who were presumably patients there. There was a narcotics
1276institution, I take it, and Dr. Isbell was, according to the New York
1277Times story, carrying on a secret series of correspondence with an
1278individual at the agency by the name of Ray. Have you identified who
1279that person is?
1280Admiral TURNER. Sir, I find myself in a difficult position here at
1281a public hearing to confirm or deny these names in view of my legal
1282responsibilities under the Privacy Act not to disclose the names of
1283individuals here.
1284Senator HUDDLESTON. I am just. asking you if you have identified
1285the person referred to in that article as Ray. I am not asking you who
1286he was. I just want to know if you know who he is.
1287Admiral TURNER. No. I am sorry, was this W-r-a-y or R-a-y?
1288Senator HUDDLESTON. It is listed in the news article as R-a-y, in
1289quotations.
1290Admiral TURNER. No, sir, we have not identified him.
1291Senator HUDDLESTON. So you have no knowledge of whether or
1292not he is still a member of your staff or connected with the Agency in
1293any way. Have you attempted to identify him?
1294
1295[Pause.]
1296Admiral TURNER. Senator, we have a former employee whose
1297first
1298name is Ray who may have had some connection with these
1299activities.
1300Senator HUDDLESTON. You suspect that but you have not
1301verified
1302that at this time, or at least you are not in a position to indicate
1303that
1304you have verified it?
1305Admiral TURNER. That is correct.
1306Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you.
1307Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1308Senator INOUYE. Senator Wallopi?
1309Senator WALLOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1310Admiral Turner, not all of the-and in no way trying to excuse
1311you of the hideous nature of some of these projects, but not all of the
1312projects under MKULTRA are of a sinister or even a moral nature.
1313Is that a fair statement?
1314Admiral TURNER. That is correct.
1315Senator WALLOP. Looking down through some of these 17 projects
1316not involving human testing, aspects of the magician's art, it doesn't
1317seem as though there is anything very sinister about that. Studies of
1318human behavior and sleep research, library searches. Now, those
1319things in their way are still of interest, are they not, to the process
1320of intelligence gathering?
1321Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I have not tried to indicate that we
1322either are not doing or would not do any of the things that were
1323involved in MKULTRA, but when it comes to the witting or unwitting
1324testing of people with drugs, that is certainly verboten, but there are
1325other things.
1326Senator WALLOP. Even with volunteer patients? I mean, I am not
1327trying to put you on the spot to say whether it is going on, but I mean,
1328it is not an uncommon thing, is it, in the prisons of the United States
1329for the Public Health Service to conduct various kinds of experiments
1330with vaccines and, say, sunburn creams? I know in Arizona they have
1331done so.
1332Admiral TURNER. My understanding is, lots of that is authorized.
1333but I am not of the opinion that this is not the CIA's business, and
1334that if we need some information in that category, I would prefer
1335to go to the other a'ppropriate authorities of the Government and ask
1336them to get it for us r-ther than to in any waySenator WALLOP. Well, you know, you have library searches and attendants at the national seminars. This is why I wanted to ask you if
1337the bulk of these projects were in any way the kinds of things that the
1338Agency might not do now. A President would not have been horrified
1339by the list of the legitimate types of things. Isn't that probably the
1340case?
1341Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
1342Senator WALLOP. And if it did in fact appear in the IG report, is
1343there any reason to suppose that the President did not know of this
1344project? You said there was no reason to suppose that he did, but let
1345me reverse that. Is there any reason to suppose that they did not?
1346Admiral TURNER. No.
1347Senator WALLOP. Well, you know, I just cannot imagine you or
1348literally anybody undertaking projects of the magnitude of dollars
1349here and just not knowing about it, not informing your superior that
1350
1351these were going on, especially when certain items of it appear in the
1352Inspector General's report on budget matters.
1353Admiral TURNER. Well, I find it difficult when it is that far back to
1354hypothesize what the procedures that the Director was using in terms
1355of informing his superiors were. It is quite a different climate from
1356today, and I think we do a lot more informing today than they did
1357back then, but I find it very difficult to guess what the level of knowledge was.
1358Senator WALLOP. I am really not asking you to second-guess it, but
1359it just seems to me that, while the past is past, and thank goodness we
1360are operating under different sets of circumstances, I think it is naive
1361for us to suppose that these things were conducted entirely without the
1362knowledge of the Presidents of the United States during those times.
1363It is just the kinds of research information that was being sought was
1364vital to the United States, not the means, but the information that they
1365were trying to find.
1366Admiral TURNER. I am sorry. Your question is, was this vital? Did
1367we view it as vital?
1368Senator WALLOP. Well, your implication at the beginning was that
1369it was a response to the kinds of behavior that were seen in Cardinal
1370Mindszenty's trial and other things. I mean, somebody must have
1371thought that this was an important defensive reaction, if nothing else,
1372on the part of the United States.
1373Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I am sure they did, but again I just don't
1374know how high that -permeatedthe executive branch.
1375Senator WALLOP. But the kinds of information are still important
1376to you. I mean, I am not suggesting that anyone go back and do that
1377kind of thing again, but I'm certain it would be of use to you to know
1378what was going to -happen to one of your agents assuming someone had
1379put one of these things into his bloodstream, or tried to modify his
1380behavior.
1381Admiral TURNER. Absolutely, and you know, we would be very concerned if we thought there were things like truth serums or other
1382things that our agents or others could be subjected to by use or improper use of drugs by other powers against our people or agents.
1383Senator WALLOP. Are there? I don't ask you to name them, but are
1384there such serums?
1385Admiral TURNER. I don't know of them if there are. I would have to
1386answer that for the record, sir.
1387Senator WALLOP. I would appreciate that.
1388[The material referred to follows:]
1389"TRUTH"
1390
1391DRUGS IN INTERROGATION
1392
1393The search for effective aids to interrogation is probably as old as man's need
1394to obtain information from an uncooperative source and as persistent as his
1395impatience to shortcut any tortuous path. In the annals of police investigation,
1396physical coercion has at times been substituted for painstaking and time-consuming inquiry in the belief that direct methods produce quick results. Sir James
1397Stephens, writing in 1883, rationalizes a grisly example of "third degree" practices by the police of India : "It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade
1398rubbing red pepper in a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up
1399evidence."
1400More recently, police officials in some countries have turned to drugs for assistance in extracting confessions from accused persons, drugs which ara esumed
1401
140226
1403to relax the individual's defenses to the point that he unknowingly reveals truthiS
1404humanitarian
1405he has been trying to conceal. This investigative technique, however of individual
1406as an alternative to p~hysical torture, still raises serious questions
1407only marginal
1408rights and liberties. In this country, where drugs have ofgained
1409"psychological third
1410acceptance in police work, their use has provoked cries that after a quarter of
1411degree" and has precipitated medico-legal controversies
1412a century still occasionally flare into the open.
1413accepted
1414The use of so-called "truth" drugs in police work is similar to the
1415in the two procedures lies
1416psychiatric practice of narco-analysis; the difference.is concerned with empirical
1417in their different objectives. The police investigator
1418truth that may be used against the suspect, and therefore almost solely with
1419ultimately on
1420probative truth: the usefulness of the suspect's revelations depends
1421their acceptance in evidence by a court of law. The psychiatist, on the other hand,
1422mentally ill, is
1423using the same "truth" drugs in diagnosis and treatment of the
1424reality rather than
1425primarily concerned with psychological truth or psychological
1426the time they occur,
1427empirical fact. A patient's aberrations are reality for him at rather
1428than reliable
1429and an accurate account of these fantasies and delusions,
1430recollection of past events, can be the key to recovery.
1431The notion of drugs capable of illuminating hidden recesses of the mind, helpof justice,
1432ing to heal the mentally ill and preventing or reversing the miscarriage
1433literature.
1434has provided an exceedingly durable theme for the press and popular
1435While acknowledging that "truth serum" is a misnomer twice over-the drugs
1436are not sera and they do not necessarily bring forth probative truth-journalistic
1437accounts continue to exploit the appeal of the term. The formula is to play up
1438a few spectacular "truth" drug successess and to imply that the drugs are more
1439maligned than need be and more widely employed in criminal investigation than
1440can officially be admitted.
1441Any technique that promises an increment of success in extracting information
1442from an uncompliant source is ipso facto of interest in intelligence operations.
1443If the ethical considerations which in Western countries inhibit the use of narcointerrogation in police work are felt also in intelligence, the Western services
1444must at least be prepared against its possible employment by the adversary. An
1445understanding of "truth" drugs, their characteristic actions, and their potentialities, positive and negative, for eliciting useful information is fundamental to an
1446adequate defense against them.
1447This discussion, meant to help toward such an understanding, draws primarily
1448upon openly published materials. It has the limitations of projecting from criminal investigative practices and from the permissive atmosphere of drug psychotherapy.
1449SCOPOLAMINE
1450
1451AS "TRUTH SERUM"
1452
1453Early in this century physicians began to employ scopolamine, along with
1454morphine and chloroform, to induce a state of "twilight sleep" during childbirth.
1455A constituent of henbane, scopolamine was known to produce sedation and drowsiness, confusion and disorientation, incoordination, and amnesia for events experienced during intoxication. Yet physicians noted that women in twilight sleep
1456answered questions accurately and often volunteered exceedingly candid remarks.
1457In 1922 it occurred to Robert House, a Dallas, Texas obstetrician, that a similar
1458technique might be employed in the interrogation of suspected criminals, and he
1459arranged to interview under scopolamine two. prisoners in the Dallas county
1460jail whose guilt seemed clearly confirmed. Under the drug, both men denied the
1461charges on which they were held; and both, upon trial, were found not guilty.
1462Enthusiastic at this success, House concluded that a patient under the influence
1463of scopolamine "cannot create a lie . . . and there is no power to think or reason." [14] His experiment and this conclusion attracted wide attention, and the
1464idea of a "truth" drug was thus launched upon the public consciousness.
1465The phrase "truth serum" is believed to have appeared first in a news -report
1466of House's experiment in the Los Angeles Record, sometime in 1922. House resisted
1467the term for a while but eventually came to employ it regularly himself. He published some eleven articles on scopolamine in the years 1921-1929, with a noticeable increase in polemical zeal as time went on. What had begun as something
1468of a scientific statement turned finally into a dedicated crusade by the "father of
1469truth serum" on behalf of his offspring, wherein he was "grossly indulgent of its
1470wayward behavior and stubbornly proud of its minor achievements." [11]
1471
1472Only a handful of cases in which scopolamine was used for police interrogation came to public notice, though there is evidence suggesting that some police
1473forces may have used it extensively. [2, 16] One police writer claims that the
1474threat of scopolamine interrogation has been effective in extracting confessions
1475from criminal suspects, who are told they will first be rendered unconscious by
1476chloral hydrate placed covertly in their coffee or drinking water.[16]
1477Because of a number of undesirable side effects, scopolamine was shortly disqualified as a "truth" drug. Among the most disabling of the side effects are
1478hallucinations, disturbed perception, somnolence, and physiological phenomena
1479such as headache, rapid heart, and blurred vision, which distract the subject from
1480the central purpose of the interview. Furthermore, the physical action is long, far
1481outlasting the psychological effects. Scopolamine continues, in some cases, to make
1482anesthesia and surgery safer by drying the mouth and throat and reducing secretions that might obstruct the air passages. But the fantastically, almost painfully,
1483dry "desert" mouth brought on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking,
1484even in a tractable subject.
1485THE BARBITURATES
1486
1487The first suggestion that drugs might facilitate communication with emotionally disturbed patients came quite by accident in 1916. Arthur S. Lovenhart
1488and his associates at the University of Wisconsin, experimenting with respiratory
1489stimulants, were surprised when, after an injection of sodium cyanide, a catatonic
1490patient who had long been mute and rigid suddenly relaxed, opened his eyes, and
1491even answered a few questions. By the early 1930's a number of psychiatrists
1492were experimenting with drugs as an adjunct to established methods of therapy.
1493At about this time police officials, still attracted by the possibility that drugs
1494migh help in the interrogation of suspects and witnesses, turned to a class of
1495depressant drugs known as the barbiturates. By 1935 Clarence W. Muehlberger,
1496head of the Michigan Crime Detection Laboratory at East Lansing, Was using
1497barbiturates on reluctant suspects, though police work continued to be hampered
1498by the courts' rejection of drug-induced confessions except in a few carefully
1499circumscribed instances.
1500The barbiturates, first synthesized in 1903, are among the oldest of modern
1501drugs and the most versatile of all depressants. In this half-century some 2,500
1502have been prepared, and about two dozen of these have won an important place
1503in medicine. An estimated three to four billion doses of barbiturates are prescribed by physicians in the United States each year, and they have come to be
1504known by a variety of commercial names and colorful slang expressions: "goofballs," Luminal, Nembutal, "red devils." "yellow jackets." "pink ladies," etc.
1505Three of them which are used in narcoanalysis and have seen service as "truth"
1506drugs are sodium amytal (amobarbital), pentothal sodium (thiopental), and to a
1507lesser extent seconal (secobarbital).
1508As one pharmacologist explains it, a subject coming under the Influence of a
1509barbiturate injected intravenously goes through all the stages of progressive
1510drunkenness, but the time scale is on the order of minutes instead of hours.
1511Outwardly the sedation effect is dramatic, especially if the subject is a psychiatric
1512patient in tension. His features slacken, his body relaxes. Some people are
1513momentarily excited; a few beocme silly and giggly. This usually passes, and
1514most subjects fall asleep, emerging later in disoriented semi-wakefulness.
1515The descent into narcosis and beyond with progressively larger doses can be
1516divided as follows:
1517I. Sedative stage.
1518II. Unconsciousness, with exaggerated reflexes (hyperactive stage).
1519III. Unconsciousness, without reflex even to painful stimuli.
1520IV. Death.
1521Whether all these stages can be distinguished in any given subject depends
1522largely on the dose and the rapidity with which the drug is induced. In
1523anesthesia, stages I and II may last only two or three seconds.
1524The first or sedative stage can be further divided:
1525Plane 1. No evident effect, or slight sedative effect.
1526Plane 2. Cloudiness, calmness, amnesia. (Upon recovery, the subject will
1527not remember what happened at this or "lower" planes or stages.)
1528Plane 3. Slurred speech, old thought patterns disrupted, inability to integrate or learn new patterns. Poor coordination. Subject becomes unaware
1529of paniful stimuli.
1530
1531Plane 3 is the psychiatric "work" stage. It may last only a few minutes, but
1532it can be extended by further slow injection of drug. The usual practice is to
1533bring the subject quickly to Stage II and to conduct the interview as he passes
1534back into the sedative stage on the way to full consciousness.
1535CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
1536
1537The general abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agents
1538"to make people do things against their will" has precluded serious systematic
1539study (at least as published openly) of the potentialities of drugs for interrogation. Louis A. Gottschalk, surveying their use in information-seeking interviews, [13] cites 136 references; but only two touch upon the extraction of
1540Intelligence information, and one of these concludes merely that Russian techniques in interrogation and indoctrination are derived from age-old police
1541methods and do not depend on the use of drugs. On the validity of confessions
1542obtained with drugs, Gottschalk found only three published experimental studies
1543.that he deemed worth reporting.
1544One of these reported experiments by D. P. Morris in which intravenous sodium
1545amytal was helpful in detecting malingerers. [12] The subjects, soldiers, were
1546at first sullen,.negativistic, and non-productive under amytal, but as the interview proceeded they revealed the fact of and causes for their malingering. Usually
1547the interviews turned up a neurotic or psychotic basis for the deception.
1548The other two confession studies, being more relevant to the highly specialized, untouched area of drugs in intelligence interrogation, deserve more detailed
1549review.
1550Gerson and Victoroff [12] conducted amytal interviews with 17 neuropsychiatric
1551patients, soldiers who had charges against them, at Tilton General Hospital,
1552Fort Dix. First they were interviewed without amytal by a psychiatrist, who,
1553neither ignoring nor stressing their situation as prisoners or suspects under
1554scrutiny, urged each of them to discuss his social and family background, his
1555army career, and his version of the charges pending against him.
1556
1557The patients were told only a few minutes in advance that narcoanalysis would
1558be performed. The doctor was considerate, but positive and forthright. He indicated that they had no choice but to submit to the procedure. Their attitudes
1559varied from unquestioning compliance to downright refusal.
1560Each patient was brought to complete narcosis and permitted to sleep. As he
1561became semiconscious and could be stimulated to speak, he was held in this stage
1562with additional amytal while the questioning proceeded. He was questioned
1563first about innocuous matters from his background that he had discussed before
1564receiving the drug. Whenever possible, he was manipulated into bringing up
1565himself the charges pending against him before being questioned about them.
1566If he did this in a too fully conscious state, it proved more effective to ask him
1567to "talk about that later" and to interpose a topic that would diminish suspicion,
1568delaying the interrogation on his criminal activity until he was back in the
1569proper stage of narcosis.
1570The procedure differed from therapeutic narcoanalysis in several ways: the
1571setting, the type of patients, and the kind of "truth" sought. Also, the subjects
1572were kept in twilight consciousness longer than usual. This state proved richest
1573in yield of admissions prejudicial to the subject. In it his speech was thick,
1574mumbling, and disconnected, but his discretion was markedly reduced. This valuable interrogation period, lasting only five to ten minutes at a time, could be
1575reinduced by injecting more amytal and putting the patient back to sleep.
1576The interrogation technique varied from case to case according to background
1577information about the patient, the seriousness of the charges, the patient's attitude under narcosis, and his rapport with the doctor. Sometimes it was useful to
1578pretend, as the patient grew more fully conscious, that he had already confessed
1579during the amnestic period of the interrogation, and to urge him, while his memory and sense of self-protection were still limited, to continue to elaborate the
1580details of what he had "already described." When it was obvious that a subject
1581was withholding the truth, his denials were quickly passed over and ignored,
1582and the key questions would be reworded in a new approach.
1583
1584Several patients revealed fantasies, fears, and delusions approaching delirium,
1585
1586much of which could readily be distinguished from reality. But sometimes there
1587was no way for the examiner to distinguish truth from fantasy except by reference to other sources. One subject claimed to have a child that did not exist,
1588
158929
1590another threatened to kill on sight a stepfather who had been dead a year, and
1591yet another confessed to participating in a robbery when in fact he had only
1592purchased goods from the participants. Testimony concerning dates and specific
1593places was untrustworthy and often contradictory because of the patient's loss
1594of time-sense. His veracity in citing names and events proved questionable. Because of his confusion about actual events and what he thought or feared had
1595happened, the patient at times managed to conceal the truth unintentionally.
1596As the subject revived, he would become aware that he was being questioned
1597about his secrets and, depending upon his personality, his fear of discovery, or
1598the degree of his disillusionment with the doctor, grow negativistic, hostile, or
1599physically aggressive. Occasionally patients had to be forcibly restrained during
1600this period to prevent injury to themselves or others as the doctor continued to
1601interrogate. Some patients, moved by fierce and diffuse anger, the assumption
1602that they had already been tricked into confessing, and a still limited sense of
1603discretion, defiantly acknowledged their guilt and challenged the observer to
1604"do something about it." As the excitement passed, some fell back on their original stories and others verified the confessed material. During the follow-up
1605interview nine of the 17 admitted the validity of their confessions; eight repudiated their confessions and reaffirmed their earlier accounts.
1606With respect to the reliability of the results of such interrogation, Gerson
1607and Victoroff conclude that persistent, careful questioning can reduce ambiguities in drug interrogation, but cannot eliminate them altogether.
1608At least one experiment has shown that subjects are capable of maintaining a
1609lie while under the influence of a barbiturate. Redlich and his associates at
1610Yale[25] administered sodium amytal to nine volunteers, students and professionals, who had previously, for purposes of the experiment, revealed shameful
1611and guilt-producing episodes of their past and then invented false self-protective
1612stories to cover them. In nearly every case the cover story retained some elements of the guilt inherent in the true story.
1613Under the influence of the drug, the subjects were crossexamined on their
1614cover stories by a second investigator. The results, though not definitive, showed
1615that normal individuals who had good defenses and no overt pathological traits
1616could stick to their invented stories and refuse confession. Neurotic individuals
1617with strong unconscious self-punitive tendencies, on the other hand, both confessed more easily and were inclined to substitute fantasy for the truth, confessing to offenses never actually committed.
1618In recent years drug therapy has made some use of stimulants, most notably
1619amphetamine (Benzedrine) and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrine).
1620These drugs, used either alone or following intravenous barbiturates, produce
1621an outpouring of ideas, emotions, and memories which has been of help in diagnosing mental disorders. The potential of stimulants in interrogation has received little attention, unless in unpublished work. In one study of their psychiatric use Brussel et al. [7] maintain that methedrine gives the liar no time to
1622think or to organize his deceptions. Once the drug takes hold, they say, an insurmountable urge to pour out speech traps the malingerer. Gottschalk, on
1623the other hand, says that this claim is extravagant, asserting without elaboration that the study lacked proper controls. [13] It is evident that the combined
1624use of barbiturates and stimulants, perhaps along with ataraxics (tranquilizers),
1625should be further explored.
1626OBSERVATIONS
1627
1628FROM
1629
1630PRACTICE
1631
1632J. M. MacDonald, who as a psychiatrist for the District Courts of Denver
1633has had extensive experience with narcoanalysis, says that drug interrogation
1634is of doubtful value in obtaining confessions to crimes. Criminal suspects under
1635the influence of barbiturates may deliberately withhold information, persist in
1636giving untruthful answers, or falsely confess to crimes they did not commit.
1637The psychopathic personality, in particular, appears to resist successfully the
1638influence of drugs.
1639MacDonald tells of a criminal psychopath who, having agreed to narco-interrogation, received 1.5 grams of sodium amytal over a period of five hours. This
1640man feigned amnesia and gave a false account of a murder. "He displayed little
1641or no remorse as he (falsely) described the crime, including burial of the body.
1642Indeed he was very self-possessed and he appeared almost to enjoy the examination. From time to time he would request that more amytal be injected."[211
1643MacDonald concludes that a person who gives false information prior to re-
1644
164596-408
1646
16470 - 77 - 3
1648
164930
1650ceiving drugs is likely to give false information also under narcosis, that the
1651drugs are of little value for revealing deceptions, and that they are more effective
1652in releasing unconsciously repressed material than in evoking consciously suppressed information.
1653Another psychiatrist known for his work with criminals, L. Z. Freedman,
1654gave sodium amytal to men accused of various civil and military antisocial acts.
1655The subjects were mentally unstable, their conditions ranging from character
1656disorders to neuroses and psychoses. The drug interviews proved psychiatrically
1657beneficial to the patients, but Freedman found that his view of objective reality
1658was seldom improved by their revelations. He was unable to say on the basis of
1659the narco-interrogation whether a given act had or had not occurred. Like MacDonald, he found that psychopathic individuals can deny to the point of unconsciousness crimes that every objective sign indicates they have committed.[10]
1660F. G. Inbau, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, who has had considerable experience observing and participating in "truth" drug tests, claims
1661that they are occasionally effective on persons who would have disclosed the
1662truth anyway had they been properly interrogated, but that a person determined to lie will usually be able to continue the deception under drugs.
1663The two military psychiatrists who made the most extensive use of narcoanalysis during the war years, Roy R. Grinker and John C. Spiegel, concluded that
1664in almost all cases they could obtain from their patients essentially the same
1665material and give them the same emotional release by therapy without the use
1666of drugs, provided they had sufficient time.
1667The essence of these comments from professionals of long experience is that
1668drugs provide rapid access to information that is psychiatrically useful but of
1669doubtful validity as empirical truth. The same psychological information and a
1670less adulterated empirical truth can be obtained from fully conscious subjects
1671through non-drug psychotherapy and skillful police interrogation.
1672APPLICATION TO CI INTERROGATION
1673
1674The almost total absence of controlled experimental studies of "truth" drugs
1675and the spotty and anecdotal nature of psychiatric and police evidence require
1676that extrapolations to intelligence operations be made with care. Still, enough
1677is known about the drugs' action to suggest certain considerations affecting the
1678possibilities for their use in interrogations.
1679It should be clear from the foregoing that at best a drug can only serve as
1680an aid to an interrogator who has a sure understanding of the psychology and
1681techniques of normal interrogation. In some respects, indeed, the demands on his
1682skill will be increased by the baffling mixture of truth and fantasy in drug-induced
1683output. And the tendency against which he must guard in the interrogate to give
1684the responses that seem to be wanted without regard for facts will be heightened
1685by drugs: the literature abounds with warnings that a subject in narcosis is
1686extremely suggestible.
1687It seems possible that this suggestibility and the lowered guard of the narcotic
1688state might be put to advantage in the case of a subject feigning ignorance of a
1689language or some other skill that had become automatic with him. Lipton[20]
1690found sodium amytal helpful in determining whether a foreign subject was merely
1691pretending not to understand English. By extension, one can guess that a drugged
1692interrogatee might have difficulty maintaining the pretense that he did not comprehend the idiom of a profession he was trying to hide.
1693There is the further problem of hostility in the interrogator's relationship to
1694a resistance source. The accumulated knowledege about "truth" drug reaction
1695has come largely from patient-physician relationships of trust and confidence.
1696The subject in narcoanalysis is usually motivated a priori to cooperate with the
1697psychiatrist, either to obtain relief from mental suffering or to contribute to a
1698scientific study. Even in police work, where an atmosphere of anxiety and threat
1699may be dominant, a relationship of trust frequently asserts itself: the drug is
1700administered by a medical man bound by a strict code of ethics; the suspect
1701agreeing to undergo narcoanalysis in a desperate bid for corroboration of his
1702testimony trusts both drug and psychiatrist, however apprehensively; and finally,
1703as Freedman and MacDonald have indicated, the police psychiatrist frequently
1704deals with a "sick" criminal, and some order of patient-physician relationship
1705necessarily evolves.
1706
1707Rarely has a drug interrogation involved "normal" individuals in a hostile
1708or genuinely threatening milieu. It was from a non-threatening experimental
1709setting that Eric Lindemann could say that his "normal" subjects "reported a
1710general sense of euphoria, ease and confidence, and they exhibited a marked increase in talkativeness and conimunicability."[18] Gerson and Victoroff list poor
1711doctor-patient rapport as one factor interfering with the completeness and authenticity of confessions by the Fort Dix soldiers, caught as they were in a
1712command performance and told they had no choice but to submit to narcointerrogation.
1713From all indications, subject-interrogator rapport is usually crucial to obtaining the psychological release which may lead to unguarded disclosures. Role-playing on the part of the interrogator might be a possible solution to the problem
1714of establishing rapport with a drugged subject. In therapy, the British narcoanalyst William Sargent recommends that the therapist deliberately distort the
1715facts of the patient's life-experience to achieve heightened emotional response
1716and abreaction.[27] In the drunken state of narcoanalysis patients are prone to
1717accept the therapist's false constructions. There is reason to expect that a drugged
1718subject would communicate freely with an interrogator playing the role of relative, colleague, physician, immediate superior, or any other person to whom his
1719background indicated he would be responsive.
1720Even when rapport is poor, however, there remains one facet of drug action
1721eminently exploitable in interrogation-the fact that subjects emerge from
1722narcosis feeling they have revealed a great deal, even when they have not. As
1723Gerson and Victoroff demonstrated 'at Fort Dix, this psychological set provides a
1724major opening for obtaining genuine confessions.
1725POSSIBLE VARIATIONS
1726In studies by Beecher and his associates, [3-6] one-third to one-half the
1727individuals tested proved to be placebo reactors, subjects who respond with
1728symptomatic relief to the administration of any syringe, pill, or capsule, regardless of what it contains. Although no studies are known to have been made of the
1729placebo phenomenon as applied to narco-interrogation, it seems reasonable that
1730when a subject's sense of guilt interferes with productive interrogation, a placebo
1731for pseudo-narcosis could have the effect of absolving him of the responsibility
1732for his acts and thus clear the way for free communication. It is notable that
1733placebos are most likely to be effective in situations of stress. The individuals
1734most likely to react to placebos are the more anxious, more self-centered, more
1735dependent on outside stimulation, those who express their needs more freely
1736socially, talkers who drain off anxiety by conversing with others. The nonreactors are those clinically more rigid and with better than average emotional
1737control. No sex or I.Q. differences between reactors and non-reactors have been
1738found.
1739Another possibility might be the combined use of drugs with hypnotic trance
1740and post-hypnotic suggestion: hypnosis could presumably prevent any recollection of the drug experience. Whether a subject can be brought to trance against
1741his will or unaware, however, is a matter of some disagreement. Orne, in a survey
1742of the potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation,[23] asserts that it is doubtful, despite many apparent indications to the contrary, that trance can be induced
1743in resistant subjects. It may be possible, he adds, to hypnotize a subject unaware,
1744but this would require a positive relationship with the hypnotist not likely to
1745be found in the interrogation setting.
1746In medical hypnosis, pentothal sodium is sometimes employed when only light
1747trance has been induced and deeper narcosis is desired. This procedure is a
1748possibility for interrogation, but if a satisfactory level of narcosis could be
1749achieved through hypnotic trance there would appear to be no need for drugs.
1750DEFENSIVE MEASURES
1751
1752There is no known way of building tolerance for a "truth" drug without creating a disabling addiction, or of arresting the action of a barbiturate once induced.
1753The only full safeguard against narco-interrogation is to prevent the administration of the drug. Short of this, the best defense is to make use of the same
1754knowledge that suggests drugs for offensive operations: if a subject knows that
1755on emerging from narcosis he will have an exaggerated notion of how much he
1756has revealed he can better resolve to deny he has said anything.
1757
175832
1759The disadvantages and shortcomings of drugs in offensive operations become
1760positive features of the defense posture. A subject in narco-interrogation is
1761intoxicated, wavering between deep sleep and semi-wakefulness. His speech is
1762garbled and irrational, the amount of output drastically diminished. Drugs
1763disrupt established thought patterns, including the will to resist, but they do so
1764indiscriminately and thus also interfere with the patterns of substantive information the interrogator seeks. Even under the conditions most favorable for
1765the interrogator, output will be contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untruth.
1766Possibly the most effective way to arm oneself against narco-interrogation
1767would be to undergo a "dry run." A trial drug interrogation with output taped
1768for playback would familiarize an individual with his own reactions to "truth"
1769drugs, and this familiarity would help to reduce the effects of harassment by
1770the interrogator before and after the drug has been administered. From the viewpoint of the intelligence service, the trial exposure of a particular operative to
1771drugs might provide a rough benchmark for assessing the kind and amount of
1772information he would divulge in narcosis.
1773There may be concern over the possibility of drug addiction intentionally or
1774accidentally induced by an adversary service. Most drugs will cause addiction
1775with prolonged use, and the barbiturates are no exception. In recent studies at
1776the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital for addicts in Lexington, Ky., subjects
1777received large doses of barbiturates over a period of months. Upon removal of
1778the drug, they experienced acute withdrawal symptoms and behaved in every
1779respect like chronic alcoholics.
1780Because their action is extremely short, however, and because there is little
1781likelihood that they would be administered regularly over a prolonged period,
1782barbiturate "truth" drugs present slight risk of operational addiction. If the
1783adversary service were intent on creating addiction in order to exploit withdrawal, it would have other, more rapid.means of producing states as unpleasant
1784as withdrawal symptoms.
1785The hallucinatory and psychotomimetic drugs such as mescaline, marihuana,
1786LSD-25, and microtine are sometimes mistakenly associated with narcoanalytic
1787interrogation. These drugs distort the perception and interpretation of the sensory input to the central nervous system and affect vision, audition, smell, the
1788sensation of the size of body parts and their position in space, etc. Mescaline and
1789LSD-25 have been used to create experimental "psychotic states," and in a
1790minor way as aids in psychotherapy.
1791Since information obtained from a person in a psychotic drug state would be
1792unrealistic, bizarre, and extremely difficult to assess, the self-administration of
1793LSD-25, which is effective in minute dosages, might in special circumstances
1794offer an operative temporary protection against interrogation. Conceivably, on
1795the other hand, an adversary service could use such drugs to produce anxiety or
1796terror in medically unsophisticated subjects unable to distinguish drug-induced
1797psychosis from actual insanity. An enlightened operative could not be thus
1798frightened, however, knowing that the effect of these hallucinogenic agents is
1799transient in normal individuals.
1800Most broadly, there is evidence that drugs have least effect on well-adjusted
1801individuals with good defenses and good emotional control, and that anyone who
1802can withstand the stress of competent interrogation in the waking state can do
1803so in narcosis. The essential resources for resistance thus appear to lie within
1804the individual.
1805CONCLUSIONS
1806The salient points that emerge from this discussion are the following. No such
1807magic brew as the popular notion of truth serum exists. The barbiturates, by
1808disrupting defensive patterns, may sometimes be helpful in interrogation, but
1809even under the best conditions they will elicit an output contaminated by deception, fantasy, garbled speech, etc. A major vulnerability they produce in the subject is a tendency to believe he has revealed more than he has. It is possible, however, for both normal individuals and psychopaths to resist drug interrogation;
1810it seems likely that any individual who can withstand ordinary intensive interrogation can hold out in narcosis. The best aid to a defense against narco-interrogation is foreknowledge of the process and its limitations. There is an acute
1811need for controlled experimental studies of drug reaction, not only to depressants
1812but also to stimulants and to combinations of depressants, stimulants, and
1813ataraxics.
1814
181533
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1863ed.) Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1954.
186428. Snider, R. S. Cerebellum. Sci. Am., Aug. 1958, 84.
186529. Uhr, L., & Miller, L. G. (eds.). Drugs and Behavior. New York-London:
1866John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960.
1867
1868Senator WALLOP. If they are, I would assume that you would still
1869try to find from either theirs or somebody else's information how to
1870protect our people from that kind of activity.
1871Admiral TURNER. Yes.
1872Senator WALLOP. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1873Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafee?
1874Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1875
1876Admiral Turner, I appreciate that these tawdry activities were taking place long before your watch, and I think you have correctly
1877labeled them as abhorrent, 'but not only were they abhorrent, it seems
1878to me they were rather bungled, amateurish experiments that don't
1879seem to have been handled in a very scientific way, at least from the
1880scanty evidence we have.
1881It seems to me that there were the minimum of reports and the
1882Agency didn't have the ability to call it quits. It went on for some 12
1883years, as you mentioned. What I would like to get to is, are you convinced now in your Agency that those scientific experiments, legitimate ones that you were conducting with polygraph and so forth, were
1884being conducted in a scientific manner and that you are handling it in
1885a correct manner to get the best information that you are seeking in
1886the end?
1887Admiral TURNER. Yes, I am, and I also have a sense of confidence
1888that we are limiting ourselves to the areas where we need to be involved as opposed to areas where we can rely on others.
1889Senator CHAFEE. I am convinced of that from your report. I just do
1890hope that you have people who are trained in not only handling this
1891type of experiment, but in preparing the proper reports and drawing
1892the proper data from the reports. You are convinced that you have
1893this type of people?
1894Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
1895Senator CHAFEE. The second point I am interested in was the final
1896lines in your testimony here, which I believe are very important, and
1897that is that the Agency is doing all it can in cooperation with other
1898branches of the Government to go about tracking down the identity of
1899those who were in some way adversely affected, and see what can be
1900done to fulfill the government's responsibilities in that respect. I might
1901add that I commend you in that, and I hope you will pursue it
1902vigorously.
1903A hospital in my State was involved in these proceedings, and it is
1904unclear exactly what did take place, so I have both a parochial interest
1905in this and a national interest as well, and I do hope you will press on
1906with it. It involves not only you, I appreciate, but also HEW and perhaps the Attorney General.
1907Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir. We will.
1908Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1909Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.
1910Admiral Turner, MKULTRA subproject 3 was a project involving
1911the surreptitious administration of LSD on unwitting persons,.was it
1912not?
1913Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
1914Senator INOUYE. In February 1954, and this was in the very early
1915stages of MAKULTRA, the Director of Central Intelligence wrote to
1916the technical services staff officials criticizing their judgment because
1917they had participated in an experiment involving the administration
1918of LSD on an unwitting basis to Dr. Frank Olson, who later committed
1919suicide. Now, the individuals criticized were the same individuals who
1920were responsible for this subproject 3, involving exactly the same practices. Even though these individuals were clearly aware of the dangers
1921of surreptitious administration and had been criticized by the Director
1922
1923of Central Intelligence, subproject 3 was not terminated immediately
1924after Dr. Olson's death.
1925In fact. according to documents, it continued for a number of years.
1926Can you provide this committee with any explanation of how such
1927testing could have continued under these circumstances?
1928Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I really can't.
1929Senator INOUYE. Are the individuals in the technical services who
1930carried on subproject 3 still on the CIA payroll?
1931Admiral TURNER. I am sorry. Are you asking, are they today?
1932Senator INOUYE. Yes.
1933Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
1934Senator INOUYE. What would you do if you criticized officials of the
1935technical services staff and they continued to carry on experimentation for a number of years?
1936Admiral TURNER. I would do two things, sir. One is, I would be sure
1937at the beginning that I was explicit enough that they knew that I
1938didn't want that to be continued anywhere else, and two, if I found it
1939being continued, I would roll some heads.
1940Senator INOUYE. Could you provide this committee with information as to whether the individuals involved had their heads rolled?
1941Admiral TURNER. I don't believe there is any evidence they did, but
1942I will double check that.
1943[See p. 170 for material referred to.]
1944Senator INOUYE. As you know, Senator Huddleston and his subcommittee are deeply involved in the drafting of charters and guidelines
1945for the intelligence community. We will be meeting with the President
1946tomorrow. Our concern is, I think, a basic one. Can anything like this
1947occur again?
1948Admiral TURNER. I think it would be very, very unlikely, first, because we are all much more conscious of these issues than we were back
1949in the fifties, second, because we have such thorough oversight procedures. I cannot imagine that this kind of activity could take place
1950today without some member of the CIA itself bypassing me, if I were
1951authorizing this, and writing to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and
1952blowing the whistle on this kind of activity.
1953I am also doing my very best, sir, to encourage an openness with
1954myself and a free communication in the Agency, so that I am the one
1955who finds these things if they should happen. The fact is that we must
1956keep you and your committee and now the new committee in the House
1957informed of our sensitive activities. I think all of these add up to a
1958degree of scrutiny such that this kind of extensive and flagrant activity
1959could not happen today without it coming to the attention of the proper
1960authorities to stop it.
1961Senator INOUYE. A sad aspect of the MKULTRA project was that
1962it naturally involved the people who unwittingly or wittingly got involved in experimentation. I would appreciate it if you would report
1963back to this committee in 3 months on what the Agency has done to
1964notify these individuals and these institutions, and furthermore, to
1965notify us as to what steps have been taken to identify victims, and if
1966identified, what you have done to assist them, monetarily or otherwise.
1967Admiral TURNER. All right, sir. I will be happy to.
1968Senator GOLDWATER. Will the Senator yield?
1969
1970Senator INoUYE. Yes, Sir.
1971Senator GOLDWATER. I wonder if he could include in that report for
1972our information only a complete listing of the individuals and the
1973experiments done on them, and whether they were'witting or unwitting,
1974volunteer or nonvolunteer, and what has been the result in each case.
1975I think that would be interesting.
1976Admiral TURNER. Fine. Yes, Sir.
1977Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy?
1978Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. It is your intention to notify the individuals who have been the subjects of the research, is that right,
1979Admiral Turner? Do you intend to notify those individuals?
1980Admiral TURNER. Yes.
1981Senator KENNEDY. If you can identify them, you intend to notify
1982them?
1983Admiral TURNER. Yes.
1984Senator KENNEDY. And you intend to notify the universities or research centers as well?
1985Admiral TURNER. Senator, I am torn on that. I understand your
1986opening statement. I put myself in the position of the president of one
1987of those universities, let's say. If he were witting-if his university
1988had been witting of this activity with us, he has access to all that information today. If he were not witting, I wonder if the process of
1989informing him might put his institution's reputation in more jeopardy
1990than letting them go on the way they are today, not knowing. I really
1991don't know the equities here.
1992Senator KENNEDY. Well, the problem is, all you have to do is pick up
1993the newspapers and you see these universities mentioned. In many instances, I think you are putting the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, where there is a complete change of administration, and they may for one reason or another not have information
1994that they are under suspicion. There is innuendo; there is rumor. I
1995cannot help but believe that it will just get smeared all over the newspapers in spite of all the security steps that have been taken.
1996It seems to me that those universities should be entitled to that information, so that the ones with other administrations can adapt procedures to protect those universities. The importance of preserving the
1997independence of our research areas and the communities seems to me to
1998be a very fundamental kind of question about the protection of the
1999integrity of our universities and our research centers.
2000Admiral TURNER. You are saying that you feel that if we identify
2001them privately to themselves, we can benefit them in an adequate way to
2002cover the risk that this will lead to a more public disclosure? There are
2003lots of the 80 who have not been identified publicly at this point.
2004Senator KENNEDY. I think the universities themselves should be notified. I think then the universities can take whatever steps in terms of
2005their setting up the procedures to protect their own kinds of integrity
2006in terms of the future. I would certainly hope that they would feel
2007that they could make a public comment or a public statement on it.
2008I think it is of general public interest, particularly for the people that
2009are involved in those universities, to have some kind of awareness of
2010whether they were used or were not used and how they were used.
2011I think they are entitled to it, and quite frankly, if there is a public
2012official or an official of the university that you notify and he wants
2013
2014for his own particular reasons not to have it public, I don't see why
2015those in a lesser echelon or lower echelon who have been effectively used
2016by it should not have the information as well.
2017So, I would hopethat you would notify the universities and then
2018also indicate to the public. I can't conceive that this information will
2019not be put out in the newspapers, and it puts the university people at
2020an extraordinary disadvantage, and of course some of it is wrong,
2021which is the fact of the matter, and I think some university official
2022saying, well, it isn't so, is a lot different than if they know it is confirmed or it is not confirmed in terms of the Agency itself. I think that
2023there is a responsibility there.
2024Admiral TURNER. I have great sympathy with what you are saying.
2025I have already notified one institution because the involvement was so
2026extensive that I thought they really needed to protect themselves, and
2027I am most anxious to do this in whatever way will help all of the
2028people who were perhaps unwitting participants in this, and the difficulty I will have is, I can't quite do, I think, what you suggested, in
2029that I may not be able to tell an institution of the extent and nature of
2030its participation.
2031Senator KENNEDY. Well, you can tell them to the best of your information, and it seems to me that just because the university or an
2032individual is going to be embarrassed is not a reason for classifying
2033the information. So, I would hope-I mean, I obviously speak as an
2034individual Senator, but I feel that that is an incredible disservice to
2035the innocent individuals and, I think, a disservice to the integrity of
2036the universities unless they are notified, to be able to develop procedures you are developing with regards to your own institution and
2037we are trying to in terms of the Congress. Certainly the universities
2038are entitled to the same.
2039Admiral TURNER. Yes. Not all of these, of course, were unwitting.
2040Senator KENNEDY. That's right.
2041Admiral TURNER. Many of them were witting, and therefore they
2042can take all those precautionary steps on their own, but I am perfectly
2043open to doing this. I am only interested in doing it in a way that when
2044identifying a university it will not lead to the public disclosure of the
2045individuals, whom I am not allowed to disclose, and so on.
2046Senator KENNEDY. That could be done, it seems to me.
2047Admiral TURNER. So, we will see if we can devise a way of notifying
2048these institutions on a private basis so that they can then make their
2049own decision whether their equities are best served by their announcing it publicly or their attempting to maintain itSenator KENNEDY. Or you. I wonder. What if they were to ask you
2050to announce or indicate ?
2051Admiral TURNER. My personal conscience, sir, at this time, is that I
2052would be doing a disserve to these universities if I notified the public.
2053Senator KENNEDY. Would you meet with some university officials
2054and ask what their views are or whether they feel that the preservation of the integrity of the universities would be better served or not?
2055I think that would be useful to find out from small, large, private, and
2056public universities' officials how they view the integrity
2057Admiral TURNER. Fine. I will phone several university presidents
2058today who are my friends and who are not involved in this, and ask
2059them what they think the equities would be.
2060
2061Senator KENNEDY. All right. You let us know, too.
2062Admiral TURNER. But I am not sure that I see that there is any great
2063benefit in my notifying the public as opposed to the university notifying them. Let him have his choice whether he wants-each institution
2064wants to have it made public.
2065Senator KENNEDY. Yes. The fact would remain that the institution's
2066credibility would be better served if the institution's president were to
2067deny it and the university indicated that it did not participate in that
2068program than if the university were to deny it and the Agency says
2069nothing. It seems to me that that would be the strongest, and the only
2070way that that is going to be credible. I would value it if you would get
2071some input from universities as to what they believe is the fairest way
2072in terms of the preservation of the integrity of the universities.
2073Let me, if I could, ask on the question of the uses of these safe
2074houses, as I understand from information that was provided to us in
2075the course of our last committee, the testing of various drugs on individuals happened at all social levels, high and low, it happened on
2076native Americans and also on foreign nationals. That is what I understand was the nature of the project itself.
2077Now, I am just wondering whether those tests were conducted at the
2078two locations on the east coast and the west coast which were known
2079as safe houses. To your knowledge, is that correct?
2080Admiral TURNER. Yes.
2081Senator KENNEDY. In terms of the research in this particular program, it did not go beyond the safe houses located on the east coast and
2082the west coast? I believe I am correct on that.
2083Admiral TURNER. That type of unwitting testing of sort of randomly selected individuals, yes.
2084Senator KENNEDY. It was just located in those two places?
2085Admiral TURNER. To the best of our knowledge, there were only two
2086locations.
2087Senator KENNEDY. Well, how do we interpret randomly selected?
2088
2089Admiral TURNER. Well, as opposed to prisoners in a prison who were
2090somehow selected.
2091Senator KENNEDY. All right. Do you know from this information
2092how many people were recruited during this period?
2093Admiral TURNER. No idea.
2094Senator KENNEDY. Do you know approximately?
2095
2096Admiral TURNER. I asked that question the other day, and we just
2097don't have-apparently we are very-well, either there were no
2098records kept of the actual numbers and types of people tested or they
2099were destroyed.
2100Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker.
2101Senator SCmWEKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
2102Admiral Turner, I would like to come back to the experiments
2103which may have been conducted at the hospital research facilities
2104which the CIA helped to finance. It wasn't clear to me from your previous answers what kind of work was done there. I gather you are unclear on that, too, from your remarks, yet I find in the CIA documentation which you have supplied us, a list describing some of the
2105advantages the Agency hoped to gain. It says:
2106(a) One-sixth of the total space in the new hospital wing will be available to the
2107Chemical Division of TSS * * * ; (b) Agency sponsorship of sensitive research
2108
2109projects will be completely deniable; (c) Full professional cover will be provided
2110for up to three biochemical employees of the Chemical Division; (4) Human
2111patients and volunteers for experimental use will be available under controlled
2112clinical conditions with the full supervision of
2113
2114and there is a blank, something has been deleted.
2115It seems pretty clear to me what they intended to do in that particular wing. Doesn't it to you? Why would you go to such elaborate
2116
2117preparations, to buy part of the wing, bring three of your own personnel there, give them a cover, and give them access to patients?
2118Why would you go to such trouble and expense to arrange all that, if
2119you weren't planning to experiment on people in the hospital?
2120Admiral TURNER. I agree with you 100 percent, sir. Those were
2121clearly the intentions. I have no evidence that it was carried out in
2122that way. I am not trying to be defensive, Senator. I am only trying
2123to be absolutely precise here.
2124Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, then, as to the nature of what was done
2125there, the last paragraph on the same page of the document says,
2126"The facilities of the hospital and the. ability to conduct controlled
2127experimentations under safe clinical conditions using materials with
2128which any agency connection must be completely deniable will augment and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS,
2129such as," and then there's another deletion.
2130Now, the words following "such as" have been deleted. That is still
2131classified, or at least it was removed when this document was sanitized
2132and released. It seems to be that whatever was deleted right there would
2133give you a pretty good clue as to what they were doing, since it says
2134that the activities would "augment and complement other -programs"
2135undertaken by TSS. So, I have trouble understanding why you don't
2136know what was contemplated. Just the fact.that similar programs are
2137referred to in the document, though what they are is still deleted,
2138should enable you to check it out.
2139You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned
2140following the "such as" in the classified version of this document.
2141Admiral TURNER. Senator, I have not said that we don't know what
2142was contemplated being done there. We do not know what was done
2143there.
2144Senator SCHWEIKER. Why did you delete that reference? Why is
2145that still classified, that particular project of whatever it is?
2146Admiral TURNER. I don't know this particular case. We will get you
2147the exact answer to that one and inform you about it, but it is quite
2148probable that that other case is unrelated to this in the-well, not unrelated, but that that was a project that still deserves to be classified.
2149[The material referred to follows:]
2150Construction of the Gorman Annex was begun in 1957 and the Annex was
2151
2152dedicated in March 1959. Of the several MKULTRA projects conducted at
2153
2154Georgetown only one involving human testing covered a time span subsequent
2155to March 1959. Subproject 45 ran from 1955 to 1963, thus it is possible that
2156the final four years (1959-1963) of the subproject could have been spent in
2157the Gorman Annex. However, there is no reference to the Gorman Annex or a
2158"new Annex" in Subproject 45 papers, neither is there any mention of the subproject moving to a new location in 1959 or later years.
2159Authorization to contribute CIA funds toward construction of the Gorman
2160Annex is contained in Subproject 35 of MKULTRA. Recently discovered material
2161indicated that Dr. Geschickter continued his research for sleep- and amnesiaproducing drugs under Project MKSEARCH through July 1967 at Georgetown
2162University Hospital. But it is impossible to determine if the facilities of the
2163Gorman Annex were involved.
2164
2165Senator SCHWEIKER. I think that would give us a pretty good clue
2166as to what was going to be done in the wing the CIA helped to finance.
2167Was there any indication at all in the records you found that the
2168project ultimately used cancer patients or terminally ill patients in
2169connection with this facility?
2170Admiral TURNER. I'm sorry. I missed your question because I was
2171trying to get the data on the last one. I will read you the blank.
2172Senator SCHWEIKER. Go ahead.
2173Admiral TURNER. QKHILLTOP. It doesn't help you, butSenator SCHWEIKER. Can you tell us what that is, or is it still
2174classified?
2175Admiral TURNER. I don't know, and I assume from the fact that
2176we deleted it, it is still classified, but I will get you that answer, sir.
2177Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you. I'd like to see that information.
2178[See p. 171 for material referred to.]
2179*
2180Now my next question was: Is there any indication, Admiral, that
2181projects in that particular center involved experimentation on terminally ill cancer patients?
2182Admiral TURNER. I missed the first part of your question, sir. I am
2183very sorry.
2184Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you have any indication that some experiments in the facility used terminally ill cancer patients as subjects?
2185You do acknowledge in your statement and it is clar from other documents that these kinds of experiments were at some point being done
2186somewhere. My question is, is there any indication that cancer patients
2187or terminally ill patients were experimented with in this wing?
2188Admiral TURNER. Yes, it does appear there is a connection here, sir.
2189Senator SCHWEIKER. The other question I had relates to the development of something which has been called the perfect concussion.
2190A series of experiments toward that end were described in the CIA
2191documents. I wonder if you would just tell us what your understanding
2192of perfect concussion is.
2193Admiral TURNER. Is that in my testimony, sir, or in some other
2194document?
2195Senator SCHWEIKER. Subproject 54, MKULTRA, which involved
2196examination of techniques to cause brain concussions and amnesia by
2197using weapons or sound waves to strike individuals without giving
2198warning and without leaving any clear physical marks. Someone
2199dubbed it "perfect concussion"-maybe that was poetic license on the
2200part of our staff rather than your poets over there. I wonder if you
2201could just tell us what brain concussion experiments were about?
2202Admiral TURNER. This project, No. 54, was canceled, and never
2203carried out.
2204Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I do believe the first year of the project
2205in 1955 was carried out by the Office of Naval Research, according to
2206the information that you supplied us. The CIA seems to have been participating in some way at that point, because the records go on to say
2207that the experimenter at ONR found out about CIA's role, discovered
2208that it was a cover, and then the project was transferred to
2209MKULTRA in 1956. Again, this is all from the backup material you
2210have given us. So, it was canceled at some time. I am not disagreeing
2211
2212with that, but apparently for at least a year or two, somebody was
2213investigating the production of brain concussions with special blackjacks, sound waves, and other methods as detailed in the backup
2214material.
2215Admiral TURNER. The data available to me is that this project was
2216never funded by the CIA, but I will d)uble-check that and furnish the
2217information for the record for you as to whether there was ever any
2218connection here and if so, what the nature of the work was.
2219[The material referred to follows:]
2220Mr. Laubinger corrected his testimony regarding Subproject 54 during the
2221September 21, 1977 hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific
2222Research of the Human Resources Committee. The relevant portion is reproduced
2223below:
2224Mr. LAIBINGER. On project 54, it has got a rather sensational proposal in there,
2225in terms of the.work that they propose to do, and you asked about the proposal
2226and I said, in fact, it was never funded under MKULTRA. Now, I overlooked--at
2227least, my memory did not serve me correctly when I went through that file folder
2228to see one memorandum dated January 10, 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a
2229matter of fact, that that proposal was based on prior work that was funded by
2230the Agency.
2231Senator ScnwnxKER. By what?
2232Mr. LAUBINGER. By the CIA. So, that information was in their file folder. It
2233did not happen to be in my head when I testified.
2234Senator SCHWEIKER. I think I might have read you that, and that is why I
2235argued at the time with you, because I think I had in front of me, as I recall,
2236some indication that it was funded there. I did read that to you. So, you did
2237supply it to us; there is no argument about that information.
2238Mr. LAUBINGER. Perhaps I am sort of headstrong, myself, and in my own view,
2239I am reading under the ULTRA project, that if it had been funded under
2240ULTRA, it would have had a project number and identified as such. The thing
2241that threw me was that it was funded, apparently, outside of any MKULTRA
2242activity and it was under the normal contracting process, so that it was not
2243included in MKULTRA as 'any work done under that funding umbrella.
2244The file folder that you have and I have, right here, makes it quite clear,
2245however, that a year's work was done through navy funding-a navy funding
2246mechanism-on which the proposal was based that ultimately came into the
2247MKULTRA program. That second proposal was never funded. So, there was
2248conflict and I, personally, I think, introduced a little bit of confusion in that in
2249my testimony.
2250
2251Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, do you agree or not agree with DOD's statement
2252here that even though the initial funding was navy, it was really a conduit for
2253the CIA?
2254Mr. LAUBINGER. I think that is correct.
2255
2256Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes; I would appreciate that. I would like to
2257know how it went from ONR to CIA after a year. Somebody made a
2258decision to make that transfer, and to make this an MKULTRA subject. There had to be some sort of review that led to a decision to
2259continue that kind of concussion-total blackout, maximum amnesia,
2260and whatever else it was you were interested in-study and testing.
2261Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, if I may try to say a few words on that,
2262the files that were available to us for inspection, which are limited,
2263indicated that there was a project being carried on by the Navy having
2264to do with the effects of brain concussion. The CIA developed an interest in that, and considered funding it, but actually never did, and as
2265the admiral testified, the MKULTRA is merely a funding mechanism,
2266a place they go for money to do such things, but there is no evidence
2267that I know of that that project was ever funded.
2268
2269Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I am confused, because here
2270again is another quote from a document that we have seen, which
2271you
2272have released and supplied to us:
2273Following is the technical progress made under
2274current [deleted] contract:
2275(a) Specialized instrumentation and numerous the
2276testing techniques have been
2277developed to obtain the desired dynamic data; (b)
2278considerable data has now
2279been obtained supporting the resonance-cav~ilation theory
2280of brain concussion; and
2281(c) preliminary accelerationi threshold data has been obtained
2282for a fluid-filled
2283glass simulated skull.
2284
2285It goes on to talk about a blast range and a 2 ,5 0 0 -square-foot
2286laboratory. The document notes that "Three blast test series
2287have been run
2288to date." It describes a special blackjack device, "a pancake-type
2289blackjack giving a high peak impact force with a low unit
2290surface pressure."
2291I agree the records are inconclusive as to the results
2292of this work,
2293but it certainly seems that some testing was done.
2294Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, you are putting us in
2295same position
2296I think you were stating that you were in earlier in the
2297referring
2298to docunments not before us, but I believe you are quoting
2299from a proposaL
2300that someone sent to the Agency to fund
2301this work, and he is referring
2302to past work. The past work would have encompassed
2303a lot of things
2304like that, but CIA was not involved with that.
2305Senator SCHWETKER. What do you mean, Admiral, on
23066 of your
2307testimony when you mention projects using magician's page
2308art? How do
2309magicians get into the spook business?
2310Admiral TURNER. I have interpreted this as to how to slip the mickey
2311into the finn, but I would like to ask my advisers here to comment.
2312Mr. Bory. I think that is essentially it, Senator. It is surreptitious
2313administration of material to someone, deceptive practices, how
2314to
2315distract someone's attention while you are doing something else,
2316as
2317I understand it. It was also some type of a covert communication
2318project involved with the study of how magicians and their assistants
2319perhaps communicate mformation to one another without having other
2320people know it. This is the type of thing that was involved, sir.
2321Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
2322Senator INoUYE. Senator Huddleston?
2323Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
2324Admiral, in your checking these newly discovered documents and
2325interviewing members of the CIA staff, did you find information that
2326would confirm the contention described by the reporters for the New
2327York Times that this type of experimentation was begun out of a
2328fear at the Agency that foreign powers might have had drugs which
2329would allow them to alter the behavior of American citizens or agents
2330or members of the Armed Forces who were taken into custody, and
2331which would have resulted in false confessions and the like? Is my
2332question clear?
2333Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I haven't personally read the documentation on that. In my discussions with the people who are well informed in this area at the Agency, I am told that that is the case.
2334Senator HUDDLESTON. Was there any evidence or any indication that
2335there were other motives that the Agency might also be looking for
2336(1-ugs that could be applied for other purposes, such as debilitating an
2337individual or even killing another person? Was this part of this kind
2338of experimentation?
2339
2340Admiral TURNER. Yes; I think there is. I have not seen in this series
2341of documentation evidence of desire to kill, but I think the project
2342turned its character from a defensive to an offensive one as it went
2343along, and there certainly was an intention here to develop drugs that
2344could be of use.
2345Senator HUDDLESTON. The project continued for some time after it
2346was learned that, in fact, foreign powers did not have such a drug as
2347was at first feared, didn't it?
2348Admiral TURNER. That is my understanding. Yes, sir.
2349
2350Senator HUDDLESTON. Is there any indication that knowledge gained
2351as a result of these experiments has been useful or is being applied in
2352any way to present operations?
2353Mr. BRODY. Senator, I am not sure if there is any body of knowledge.
2354A great deal of what there was, I gather, was destroyed in 1973. I
2355would like to defer to Frank here. Do you know of any?
2356Mr. LAUBINGER. I know of no drugs or anything like that developed
2357under this program that ever reached operational use or are in use
2358-today.-
2359
2360Senator HUDDLESTON.
2361
2362So apparently any information that was
2363
2364gathered was apparently useless and not worth continuing, not worth
2365further development on the part of the Agency.
2366Mr. LAUBINGER. I am having difficulty hearing your questions.
2367Senator HUDDLESTON. I can hardly hear myself.
2368
2369Admiral TURNER. I think the answer to your question is that we have
2370no evidence of great usefulness on this, and yet I think we should
2371rememberSenator HUDDLESTON. Well, is it accurate to say that this experimentation produced few useful results or had little application at all to the
2372operations of the Agency or anybody else as far as we know?
2373Admiral TURNER. I think that is basically correct. At the same time,
2374I would point out that we had two CIA prisoners in China and one in
2375the Soviet Union at this time, and we were concerned as to what kinds
2376of things might be done to them, but I am not saying thatSenator HUDDLESTON. Have you detected any sign that any other na-
2377
2378tion is continuing or has in the past conducted experiments similar to
2379this or with a similar objective?
2380Admiral TURNER. I am not prepared to answer that one off the top
2381of my head, sir, but I will get it to you.
2382[The material referred to follows:]
2383
2384We maintain no files of up-to-date information on. the testing of drugs in
2385foreign countries. Some years ago we occasionally would review foreign research
2386on antibiotics and pharmaceuticals in connection with public bhealth and civil
2387defense assesments. For a few years beginning in 1949 we assessed foreign
2388research on LSD under Project ARTICHOKE because of concern that such
2389drugs might be employed. gainst Agency and other U.S. personnel. Information
2390relative to this work has already been provided to relevant Committees. In this
2391early work we also occasionally looked at foreign human experimentation; we
2392long ago eliminated our holdings on this subject and no collection requirements
2393are any longer served. As consumer interest in this area has dropped off
2394and higher priority areas need attention, we have virtually no present coverage
2395with the possible exception of an occasional scanning of the literature for a
2396specific program. To the best of our knowledge no other unit in the Intelligence
2397Community is tracking this subject now.
2398
2399Senator HUDDLESTON. You don't know whether any of your agents
2400anywhere in the world have been subjected to any kind of procedure
2401like this?
2402Admiral TURNER. We certainly know of other powers conducting
2403research in these areas, yes.
2404Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know how they go about that research?
2405Admiral TURNER. It is pretty sketchy, the information we have.
2406Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know of any other organization in this
2407country or any institution that has conducted extensive research on
2408unwitting individuals and through unwitting institutions?
2409Admiral TURNER. Well, I have read something in the newspapers
2410about this, but I have not familiarized myself with it in specifics.
2411Senator HUDDLESTON. It is not a normal mode of operation for human research, is it?
2412Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
2413Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
2414Senator INOUYE. Senator Wallop?
2415Senator WVALLOP. Mr. Chairman, I only have one to follow up on
2416Senator Huddleston's questions and my earlier ones. You are not really
2417saying, are you, Admiral Turner, that there are no mind-altering
2418drugs or behavior modification procedures which have been used by
2419foreign powers?
2420Adiniral TURNER. No, sir, I am not.
2421Senator WALLOP. I drew that inference partly in answer to my question that you knew of no truth serum. Maybe that is a misnomer, but
2422surely there are relaxants that make tongues looser than they would
2423otherwise be. Isn't that true?
2424Admiral TURNER. Yes.
2425Senator WALLOP. So I think it is fair to say, too, that the experience
2426of many American prisoners of war in the Korean conflict would
2427indicate that there are behavior modification procedures in use by
2428foreign powers of a fairly advanced degree of sophistication.
2429Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
2430Senator WALLOP. Again, I will just go back and say I think this
2431must have been part of the motivation. I don't think you would have
2432mentioned Cardinal Mindszenty had you thought his behavior was
2433normal at the time or had anybody else. So, I would just again say
2434I think it is a little bit scapegoating. I don't think the object of this
2435hearing is in any way to lay blame on those passed or those dead or
2436otherwise, but I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say that it
2437stopped with the directors of the CIA or the DCI's of the time. Also
2438I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say they didn't even know it,
2439but that it was some lower echelon acting alone.
2440I think this was a behavior pattern that was prevalent in those
2441years, and I think the object lesson is that we have discovered, we
2442think and we hope, through your assurances and other activities of
2443the Congress, means of avoiding future incidents of that kind. I thank
2444you, Mr. Chairman.
2445Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafee?
2446Senator CTrAFEE. No questions.
2447Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy, I think you have another
2448question.
2449
2450Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about the two safe houses on the
2451east and west coast as being the sources for the unwitting trials, now,
2452the importance of this and the magnitude of it, I think, is of significance, because we have seen from your records that these were used
2453over a period of 8 or 9 years, and the numbers could have been considerable. You are unable to determine, at least in your own research,
2454what the numbers would be and what the drugs were, how many people
2455were involved, but it could have been considerable during this period
2456of time.
2457It would certainly appear to me in examining the documents and
2458the flow charts of cash slips that were expended in these areas that it
2459was considerable, but that is a judgmental factor on it, but I think
2460it is important to try and find out what the Agency is attempting to
2461do to get to the bottom of it.
2462Now, the principal agent that was involved as I understand it is
2463deceased and has been deceased for 2 years. The overall agent, Mr.
2464Gottlieb, has indicated a fuzzy memory about this whole area. He
2465has testified before the Intelligence Committee. Yet he was responsible for the whole program. Then, the Director had indicated the
2466destruction of the various materials and unfamiliarity with the
2467project.
2468Now, you have indicated in your testimony today that there are two
2469additional agents on page 9 of your testimony, you indicated there
2470are two additional agents which you have uncovered at the bottom of
2471it, and you say, the names of CIA officials who approved or monitored
2472the various projects. You talk about the two additional agents in your
2473testimony.
2474Now, I am just wondering if you intend to interview those agents
2475to find out exactly what is being done. I suppose, first of all, shouldn't
2476the project manager know what was being done?
2477Admiral TURNER. Our first problem, Senator, is that we have been
2478unable to associate an individual with those names at this point. We
2479are still burrowing to find out who these people are. We haven't identified them as having been CIA employees, and we don't know whether
2480these were false names.
2481Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that down, as I understand it?
2482Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
2483Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that down, and you have every
2484intention of interviewing those people to find out whatever you can
2485about the program and project?
2486Admiral TURNER. My only hesitation here is whether I will do this
2487or the Justice Department.
2488Senator KENNEDY. It will be pursued, though, I understand?
2489Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
2490Senator KENNEDY. Either through the Agency or through the Justice Department?
2491Admiral TURNER. [Nods in the affirmative.]
2492Senator KENNEDY. Is it plausible that the director of the program
2493would not understand or know about the details of the program?
2494Is it plausible that Dr. Gottlieb would not understand the full range
2495of activities in those particular safe houses?
2496
249796-408 0 - 77 - 4
2498
2499Admiral TURNER. Let me say it is unlikely. I don't know Mr. Gottlieb.
2500Senator KENNEDY. Has anybody in the Agency talked with Mr.
2501Gottlieb to find out about this?
2502Admiral TURNER. Not since this revelation has come out.
2503Senator KENNEDY. Not since this revelation? Well, why not?
2504Armiral TURNER. He has left our employ, Senator.
2505Senator KENNEDY. Does that mean that anybody who leaves is, you
2506know, covered for lifetime?
2507Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
2508Senator KENNEDY. Why wouldn't you talk with him and find out?
2509You have new information about this program. It has been a matter
2510of considerable interest both to our committee and to the Intelligence
2511Committee. Why wouldn't you talk to Mr. Gottlieb?
2512Admiral TURNER. Well, again, I think the issue is whether this
2513should be done by the Justice Department or ourselves.
2514Senator KENNEDY. Well, are we wrestling around because you and
2515Attorney General Bell can't agreeAdmiral TURNER. No, sir.
2516Senator KENNEDY [continuing]. On who ought to do it?
2517Admiral TURNER. We are proceeding together in complete agreement
2518as to how to go. I have, in connection with trying to find all of these
2519Americans or others who were unwittingly tested, I have some considerable concern about the CIA running around this country interviewing and interrogating people, because I don't want to give any
2520impression that we are doing domestic intelligence.
2521Senator KENNEDY. I am just talking about one, in this case. That
2522was the man who was responsible for the whole program, and to
2523find out whether anyone within the Agency since you have had this
2524new material has talked to Gottlieb since 1975, and if the answer is
2525no, I want to know why not.
2526Admiral TURNER. The reason he was not interviewed in connection
2527with the 1975 hearings was that he had left the employ of the CIA
2528and there was a concern on the part of the Agency that it would appear
2529to the investigators that the CIA was in some way trying to influence
2530him and influence his testimony before the committee. If these
2531committees have no objection, we would be happy to contact Dr.
2532Gottlieb and see if he can augment anything here in this new information, though I don't think there is much in this new information
2533that he can add to as opposed to what was available in 1975.
2534Senator KENNEDY. Well, you see, Admiral Turner, you come to the
2535two committees this morning and indicate that now at last we have the
2536information. We don't have to be concerned about anything in the
2537future on it. Now, I don't know how you can give those assurances to
2538the members of these committees as well as to the American people
2539when you haven't since 1975 even talked to the principal person that
2540was in charge of the program, and the records were destroyed. He is
2541the fellow that was running the program, and the Agency has not
2542talked to him since the development of this new material.
2543Admiral TURNER. Our only concern here is the proprieties involved,
2544and we will dig into this and work with the Justice Department on
2545
2546who, if either of us, should get into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb so as
2547not to prejudice any legal rights that may be involved 'here, or to appear in any way to be improper.
2548Senator KENNEDY. Well, do I understand you have not contacted the
2549Justice Department about this particular case since the development
2550of this new material about Gottlieb?
2551Admiral TURNER. Not about Gottlieb specifically. We have contacted
2552him.
2553Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is amazing to me. I mean, can you understand the difficulty that any of us might have in terms of comprehending that when you develop a whole new series of materials that are on
2554the front page of every newspaper in the country and are on every television, I mean, that means something, but it does not mean nearly as
2555much as the interest that we have in the fact about the testing of unwitting Americans, and every single document that the staff reviews
2556has Mr. Gottlieb's name on it and you come up to tell us that we don't
2557have to worry any more, we have these other final facts, and Mr. Gottlieb has not been talked to?
2558Admiral TURNER. Sir, I am not saying that these are in any way the
2559final facts. I am saying these are all the facts we have available.
2560Senator KENNEDY. And you have not talked to the person who was
2561in charge of the program, so what kind of value or what kind of weight
2562can we give it?
2563Admiral TURNER. We are happy to talk to him. I thinkthe issue
2564here again is one of propriety and how to go about this. We have not,
2565I believe, enough new information about Gottlieb's participation here
2566to signal that his interview would be that much more revealing than
2567what was revealed in 1975.
2568Senator KENNEDY. The importance of it, I think, from our point
2569of view, is, he would know the drugs that were administered, the volume of drugs, how it was administered, and in terms of your ability
2570to follow up to protect these people and their health, to the extent that
2571it can be done, that opportunity is being lost.
2572I want to get on to some others, but will you give us the assurance
2573that you will get ahold of Gottlieb or that you will talk to Attorney
2574General Bell and talk with Gottlieb?
2575Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
2576Senator KENNEDY. And let us know as to the extent of it. I don't
2577see how we can fufill our responsibility in this area on the drug testing without our hearing from Gottlieb as well, but I think it is important that you do so, particularly since all of the materials have
2578been destroyed.
2579These other two agents, have they talked to them?
2580Admiral TURNER. We don't know who they are, sir. We are trying
2581to track down and see whether these names can be releated to anybody.
2582Senator KENNEDY. That is under active investigation by the Agency?
2583Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
2584Senator KENNEDY. And you have the intention of talking to those
2585people when you locate them. Is that correct?
2586Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, under the same circumstances as Gottlieb.
2587Senator KENNEDY. And you have people working on it?
2588Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
2589
2590Senator KENNEDY. With regards to the activities that took place in
2591these safe houses, as I understand from the records, two-way mirrors
2592were used. Is that your understanding?
2593Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. We have records that construction was
2594done to put in two-way mirrors.
2595Senator KENNEDY. And they were placed in the bedroom, as I
2596understand.
2597[Pause.]
2598Senator KENNEDY. Well, we have documents
2599Admiral TURNER. I believe that was in the Church record, but I
2600don't have the details.
2601Senator KENNEDY. And rather elaborate decorations were added, as
2602I understand, at least, to the one in San Francisco, in the bedroom,
2603which are French can-can dancers, floral pictures, drapery, including
2604installation of bedroom mirrors, three framed Toulouse Lautrec posters with black silk mats, and a number of other-red bedroom curtains and recording equipment, and then a series of documents which
2605were provided to the committee which indicate a wide proliferation
2606of different cash for $100, generally in the $100 range over any period
2607of time on the particular checks. Even the names are blocked out, as
2608to the person who is receiving it. Cash for undercover agents, operating expenses, drinks, entertainment while administering, and then it
2609is dashed out, and then the other documents, that would suggest, at
2610least with the signature of your principal agent out there, that"called to the operation, midnight, and climax."
2611What can you tell us that it might suggest to you about what techniques were being used by the Agency in terms of reaching that sort
2612of broad-based group of Americans that were being evidently enticed
2613for testing in terms of drugs and others? Do you draw any kind of
2614conclusion about what might have been going on out there in these
2615safe houses?
2616Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
2617[General laughter.]
2618Senator KENNEDY. There is a light side to it, but there is also an
2619enormously serious side. And that is that at least the techniques which
2620are used or were used in terms of testing, and trying to find out exactly the range of drugs used and the numbers of people involved and
2621exactly what that operation was about, as well as the constant reiteration of the use of small sums of cash at irregular intervals. A variety
2622of different techniques were employed but there is an awful lot of
2623documentation putting these matters together.
2624When you look at the fact that it is a broad range population that
2625has been tested, tested in these two areas, with the kind of cash slips
2626that were used in this, payment mechanisms and decorations and all
2627of the rest, we are not able to put a bottom line on it but one thing is
2628for sure, and that is, Gottlieb knows. That is one thing for sure, because his name appears on just about every one of these documents,
2629and it is, I think, very important to find out what his understanding
2630is of the nature of that. So, we will hear more about that.
2631Admiral TURNER. I believe Gottlieb has been interviewed by the
2632Congress.
2633Senator KENNEDY. That's right, he has, and in reviewing the record,
2634it is not very satisfactory, and it just seems with the new information
2635
2636and the new documentation and the new memoranda-and he did not
2637have the checks at that time-and with the wide variety of different
2638memoranda with his name on it, his memory could be stimulated on
2639that.
2640Thank you.
2641Senator INOUYE. I would like to thank the admiral and his staff for
2642participating in this hearing. I believe the record should show that this
2643hearing was held at the request of the Agency and the admiral. It was
2644not held because we insisted upon it. It was a volunteer effort on the
2645part of the Agency. I think the record should also indicate that Admiral Turner has forwarded to this committee a classified file including
2646all of the names of the institutions and the persons involved as the
2647experimentors.
2648I should also indicate that this hearing is just one step involved in
2649the committee's investigation of drug abuse. Just as you have had much
2650work in going over the 8,000 pages, the staff of this committee has had
2651equal problems, but I would like the record to show that you have
2652made these papers and documents available to the committee. I thank
2653you for that.
2654As part of the ongoing investigation, we had intended to call upon
2655many dozens of others, experimentors, or those officials in charge, and
2656one of those will be Dr. Gottlieb.
2657In thanking you, I would like to say this to the American people,
2658that what we have experienced this morning in this committee room
2659is not being duplicated in any other committee room in any other part
2660of the world. I doubt that very much. Our Agency and our intelligence
2661community has been under much criticism and has been subjected to
2662much abuse, in many cases justified, but this is the most open society
2663that I can think of. For example, in Great Britain there are about six
2664people who are aware of the identity of the man in charge of intelligence. In other countries, similar conditions exist. Here in the United
2665States we not only know Admiral Turner, we have had open hearings
2666with him, such as this. The confirmation hearings were all open.
2667In a few weeks, the Senate of the United States will debate a resolution to decide upon whether we should disclose the amounts and funds
2668being used for counterintelligence and national intelligence. I would
2669hope that in presenting this issue to the public, the media will take note
2670that the Agency has cooperated and will continue to. The abuse that
2671we have learned about this morning is one I hope will never happen
2672again, but without constant oversight on the part of the Executive
2673Office, on the part of the Congress, it could happen again. It is important therefore that we continue in this oversight activity.
2674So, once again, Admiral, I thank you very much for helping us. We
2675will continue to call upon you for your assistance. We would like to
2676submit to you several questions that the members and staff have prepared. We hope you will look them over carefully and prepare responses for the record, sir.
2677Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman ?
2678Senator INOUYE. Yes, sir?
2679Senator KENNEDY. I, too, want to thank Admiral Turner for his
2680responsiveness. I have had meetings with him in the committees and
2681also conversations, telephone conversations, and private meetings, and
2682
2683I have found him personally to be extremely responsive, and it is a
2684very difficult challenge which he has accepted in heading this Agency.
2685I want you to know, personally, I, too, would like to see this put behind
2686us. I don't think we are quite there yet in terms of this particular area
2687that we are interested in. I think the Intelligence Committee has
2688special responsibilities in this area of the testing, so we look forward
2689to working with you in expediting the time that we can put it behind,
2690but it does seem to me that we have to dig in and finish the chapter.
2691So, I want to personally express my appreciation to you, Admiral
2692Turner, and thank you for your cooperation and your help, and I look
2693forward to working with you.
2694Admiral TURNER. Thank you.
2695Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure you emphasized
2696this enough, but I think the record ought to show that Admiral Turner
2697informed the Select Committee on his own initiative when the new
2698documentation was found. The documentation has been made available to us voluntarily, in a spirit of cooperation.
2699I think this shows a vast difference from the mode of operation that
2700existed prior to the formation at least of the Church committee, and
2701a difference that is very helpful.
2702Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Thank you very much,
2703Admiral.
2704We would now like to call upon Mr. Philip Goldman and Mr. John
2705Gittinger.
2706Mr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger, will you please rise and take the
2707oath.
2708Do you solemly swear that the testimony you are about to give is
2709the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
2710Mr. GOLDMAN. I do.
2711Mr. GITTINGER. I do.
2712Senator INouYE. Thank you, sir.
2713
2714Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, and after that, Mr.
2715Gittinger.
2716Senator KENNEDY. Before we start in, we had a third witness, Mr.
2717Chairman, Mr. Pasternac, who planned to testify, traveled to Washington-he lives in Washington, and was contacted recently-with
2718the intention of testifying this morning. And something-he called
2719us late this morning and indicated that he wanted to get a counsel
2720before he would wish to testify.
2721Senator INOUYE. Mr. Goldman.
2722
2723Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, sir.
2724TESTIMONY OF PHILIP GOLDMAN, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL
2725INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2726Mr. GOLDMAN. I am Philip Goldman.
2727Senator INOUYE. And you are a former employee of the. Central
2728Intelligence Agency?
2729Mr. GOLDMAN. Over 10 years ago.
2730Senator INOUYE. And you were employed at the time when
2731MKULTIRA was in operation?
2732Mr. GoLDMAN. There were some MKULTRA's in operation at the
2733time I was there.
2734
2735Senator INoUYE. And Mr. John Gittinger, are you a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency?
2736TESTIMONY OF JOHN GITTINGER, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL
2737INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2738
2739Mr.
2740
2741GITINGER.
2742
2743I am.
2744
2745Senator INOuYE. Are you still an employee?
2746Mr. GITINGER. No.
2747Senator INouYE. Were you a member of the Agency at the time
2748MKULTRA was in operation?
2749Mr. GITINGER. Yes.
2750Senator INouYE. Thank you. Senator Kennedy.
2751Senator KENNEDY. I want to welcome both of you to the committee.
2752If we could start with Mr. Goldman. Were you the project engineer
2753for the safe houses in either San Francisco or New York?
2754Mr. GOLDMAN. I-know of -no safei-ouse irrSan Francisco.
2755Senator KENNEDY. How about in New York?
2756Mr. GOLDMAN. I knew of one facility that was established there,
2757but I didn't know anything of its operation.
2758Senator KENNEDY. Were you a monitor on any testing of drugs on
2759unwitting persons in San Francisco?
2760
2761Mr. GOLDMAN. No.
2762Senator KENNEDY. Well, we have a classified document here that was
2763provided by the Agency that lists your name as a monitor of the program and I would appreciate it if you would lookMr. GOLDMAN. I think the misunderstanding arises because I was
2764project officer.
2765Senator KENNEDY. Well, would you take a look at that?
2766[Mr. Goldman inspected the document.]
2767Mr. GOLDMAN. This document as it states is correct. However,
2768mySenator KENNEDY. That document is correct?
2769Mr. GOLDMAN. As far as I see on the first page, the project. But
2770mySenator KENNEDY. Well, could I get it back, please.
2771That would indicate that you were a monitor of the program.
2772Mr. GOLDMAN. I was in charge of disbursing the moneys to Morgan
2773Hall.
2774Senator KENNEDY. To whom was that?
2775Mr. GOLDMAN. To the individual whose name was listed at the top
2776of that document.
2777Senator KENNEDY. And you knew that he was running the project
2778in San Francisco?
2779Mr. GOLDMAN. I knew he was the person who was in charge out
2780there.
2781Senator KENNEDY. All right.
2782Mr. GOLDMAN. But I had no knowledge nor did I seek knowledge of
2783actually what he was doing, because there would be other things
2784involved.
2785I did receive
2786Senator KENNEDY. What were you doing?
2787
2788Mr. GOLDMAN. I was collecting-I had to be sure that all the receipts that ever were turned in balanced with the moneys that were
2789paid out to see that everything was run all right. There was no illegal
2790use of funds as far as we could determine by the receipts and cash.
2791Senator KENNEDY. So even though the Agency document indicates
2792that you were a monitor for the program, one of the few monitors of
2793that particular program which you mentioned for San Francisco and
2794Mill Valley, Calif., you described your responsibility only as a carrier
2795of money, is that correct?
2796Mr. GOLDMAN. I would say as a disburser or carrying out-seeing
2797that the moneys were handled properly. There was within that-I
2798don't know what's done or what he did do in conjunction with other
2799people.
2800Senator KENNEDY. Were you responsible for the disbursement of
2801all the funds?
2802Mr. GOLDMAN. I was responsible for turning over the check to him.
2803Senator KENNEDY. And what did you know of the program itself?
2804Mr. GOLDMAN. The only thing I knew of the program was what he
2805furnished us in terms of receipts and that sort of thing. I didn't indulge or concern myself in that.
2806Senator KENNEDY. You still wrote, and I'll let you examine itit's a classified document-but you wrote a rather substantive review
2807of the program in May of 1963, talking about the experiments, the
2808factual data that had been collected, covert and realistic field trials,
2809albout the necessity of those particular-and talked about the effectiveness of the various programs, the efficiency of various delivery
2810systems. That doesn't sound to me like someone who is onlyMr. GOLDMAN. Well, if you would refresh my memory, if I could
2811read this I would certainly agree with whatever is said there, if it was
2812written.
2813Senator KENNEDY. I am trying to gather what your role was. You've
2814indicated first of all that you didn't know about-you knew about a
2815safe house in New York; now we find out that you're the carrier for
2816the resources as well and the agent in San Francisco. We find out now
2817that the CIA put you as a monitor. You're testifying that you only were
2818the courier, and here we have just one document, and there are many
2819others that talk about the substance of that program with your name
2820on it and I am just trying to find out exactly what role you were
2821playing.
2822Mr. GOIDMAN. The only thing I can tell you about this and I am
2823
2824drawing completely on my memory is that this individual who was
2825in charge out there conducted these things and reported them back to
2826the Afrency. I didn't participate in any of them. All I know was that he
2827furnished me with receipts for things that were done and told of the
2828work that they had done.
2829Senator KENNEnY. Well, that document covers more than receipts.
2830Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes, it tells of what-they had conducted work out
2831there.
2832Senator KENNEDY. It describes, does it not? Read the paragraph 2.
2833Mr. GOT DMAN. "A numher of covert"
2834Senator KENNEDY. Well, you can't read it, it's a classified document,
2835and I don't know why, quite frankly, but it relates to the substance
2836
2837of those programs and your name is signed to the memorandums on
2838it. I am not interested in you trying to review for us now what is in the
2839document, but I think it would be unfortunate if we were left with the
2840opinion that all you were was a courier of resources when we see a
2841document with your name on it, signed, that talks about the substance
2842of the program. And what we're interested in is the substance of the
2843program. We have the recent documents that were provided by the
2844Agency, which do indicate that you were at least involved in the
2845substance, and I'm just trying to find out whether you're willing to
2846tell us about that.
2847Mr. GOLDMAN. I am perfectly willing to tell you everything that
2848I can remember.
2849Senator KENNEDY. But you can't remember anything.
2850Mr. GOLDMAN. I can't remember the substantive parts of these
2851things, I really can't.
2852Senator KENNEDY. Of the program that was taking place.
2853Do you have any greater familiarity with what was happening in
2854New York?
2855Mr. GOLDMAN. No, no.
2856Senator KENNEDY. And you have the same function with regards
2857to New York?
2858Mr. GOLDMAN. The same function with regard to New York.
2859Senator KENNEDY. Did you ever go to San Francisco?
2860
2861Mr.
2862
2863GOLDMAN.
2864
2865Yes.
2866
2867Senator KENNEDY. Did you meet with the agent in charge?
2868
2869Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
2870Senator KENNEDY. And why
2871
2872aid you meet with him?
2873
2874Mr. GOLDMAN. To discuss some of the receipts and things that were
2875
2876there to find out if these were indeed true expenditures and to find out
2877if everything was going along all right for the work that was being
2878done.
2879Senator KENNEDY. What work was being done?
2880
2881Mr. GOLDMAN. No, the reports of these things and whatever was
2882being done. I don't know who he reported to but he did report to
2883somebody.
2884Senator KENNEDY. You travel out there to find out about the work
2885
2886that's being done, and what does he tell you, that the work is being
2887done well andMr. GOLDMAN. He told me that the work that they were doing was
2888going along, progressing satisfactorily, but to be very frank with
2889youSenator KENNEDY. But he didn't tell you what the work was?
2890Mr. GOLDMAN. To be very frank with you, Senator, I cannot re-
2891
2892member the things that happened back in those days. I've been away
2893from the company-from the Agency for over 10 years, and that is
2894even farther back than that, and that was just about the time when I
2895first engaged in this, so it was my firstSenator KENNEDY. Did they disburse a series of $100 checks, to
2896
2897your recollection?
2898Mr. GOLDMAN. I don't recollect it, but if you have it there, then
2899they did.
2900Senator KENNEDY. Did you know Dr. Gottlieb?
2901Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
2902
2903Senator KENNEDY. How did you know Dr. Gottlieb?
2904Mr. GOLDMAN. He had been head of the division when I was recruited.
2905
2906Senator KENNEDY. Did you talk to him about these programs? Did
2907
2908you have anything to do with him during this period of time?
2909Mr. GOLDMAN. I didn't have anything to do with him until I would
2910say probably in the sixties.
2911Senator KENNEDY. And can you tell us what you had to do with
2912him then?
2913Mr. GOLDMAN. Just what you see there on the papers.
2914
2915Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is the request for the money and he
2916
2917approves it.
2918Mr. GOLDMAN. That is the request for money and he approves it,
2919and I am quite sure that I probably discussed with him whether the
2920work was going along all right, whether his reports were being turned
2921in, and whether he was satisfied with the way things were going
2922and did he have any complaints about the way other people were
2923requesting him, but I did not engage myself in anything he was doing.
2924Senator KENNEDY. Well, did you get the impression that Gottlieb
2925knew what was going on?
2926Mr. GOLDMAN. I didn't ask.
2927
2928Senator KENNEDY. But you told him that your impression that what
2929was going on even though you didn't know what was going on, was going on well, I guess? [Laughter.]
2930
2931Mr. GOLDMAN. I told Gottlieb what you saw in there was that the
2932things appeared to be going along all right. I was repeating and parroting back the words that were giveh to me while I was there.
2933Senator KENNEDY. What was the money being spent for, do you
2934know?
2935Mr. GOLDMAN. No; I can't recall that, sir.
2936Senator KENNEDY. Would you remember if we told you it was red
2937curtains and can-can picturesMr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.
2938Senator KENNEDY. Floral pictures and the rest.
2939Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.
2940Senator KENNEDY. Recorders.
2941Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.
2942
2943Senator KENNEDY. Recorders and two-way mirrors.
2944Mr. GOLDMAN. Wait, hold on. You're slipping a word in there now.
2945Senator KENNEDY. But you would have authorized those funds,
2946would you not, since you were theMr. GOLDMAN. Did you say two-way mirrors?
2947Senator KENNEDY. Yes.
2948Mr. GOLDMAN. Where?
2949Senator KENNEDY. In the safe houses.
2950Mr. GOLDMAN. Where?
2951Senator KENNEDY. San Francisco.
2952Mr. GOLDMAN. No.
2953Senator KENNEDY. How about New York?
2954Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
2955Senator KENNEDY. You remember now that you approved expenditures for New York?
2956
2957Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
2958
2959Senator KENNEDY. What were those expenditures for?
2960
2961Mr. GOLDMAN. That was a transfer of money over for the use in
2962an apartment in New York by the Bureau of Narcotics. It was for
2963their use.
2964Senator KENNEDY. Do you have any knowledge of what was going
2965on in the apartment?
2966Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir, other than I know that it had been used, according to the information that I have been given, it was used by the
2967Bureau of Narcotics to make meetings with individuals who they were
2968interested in with regard to pushing dope-not pushing dope, but selling narcotics and that sort of thing.
2969Senator KENNEDY. Well, I am sure you had many responsibilities and
2970it's a long time ago, but the Agency does indicate that you were project
2971monitor for that particular program.
2972Mr. GOLDMAN. That's correct.
2973Senator KENNEDY. Your own testimony indicates you went out to review the expenditures of funds to find out whether they were being
2974wisely used, that you came back and talked to the project director, Mr.
2975Gottlieb, to give him a progress report about what was going on out
2976there.
2977Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes, sir, I did.
2978Senator KENNEDY. All those things are true, and yet you draw a
2979complete blank in terms of what was the project itself. That's where
2980the record is now.
2981Mr. GOLDMAN. I did not go out there to review the projects nor did
2982I come back and talk with Mr. Gottlieb and review what I had observed
2983in terms of any projects that they-that is, other parts of the Agency
2984might have in operation there. I simply reported back those things
2985which were told to me by the individual out there who-and I carried
2986them back and they are contained in the report that you have in front
2987of you, word for word, just as it was given to me.
2988Senator KENNEDY. The report that you examined here is a substantive report on the particular program and project. And I don't think
2989anyone who wasn't familiar with the project-this is a personal evaluation-could write a report on the substance of it without knowing
2990about it. Now, that's mine. Maybe you can't remember and recollect,
2991and that'sMr. GOLDMAN. No; everything I put down in there is things that I
2992was told while I was out there, and if there was any -ancillary information involved in there I can tell you I just don't remember that. I really
2993don't.
2994At the time-that was some years ago. At the time-a lot of time has
2995passed since then and I have made quite sure that if I could recollect it
2996at all, I would do it. If you have some papers and you want me to certify whether yes, this is so or that is so, I can do that, but I can't recall
2997it mentally.
2998Senator KENNEDY. You just certified the principal. There are others
2999up here.
3000I would like to go to Dr. Gittinger.
3001Mr. GINGER. It's Mr. Gittinger.
3002Senator KENNEDY. How long did you serve with the Agency?
3003
3004Mr. GIrrNGER. Twenty-six years.
3005Senator KENNEDY. Excuse me?
3006Mr. GITINGER. Twenty-six years.,
3007Senator KENNEDY. Twenty-six years.
3008And at some point you moved into the operational support side, is
3009that correct?
3010Mr. GrlINGER. Yes.
3011Senator KENNEDY. And did you know Sidney Gottlieb?
3012Mr. GirrINGER. Yes, sir.
3013Senator KENNEDY. And did he inform you about the research projects involving LSD?
3014Mr. GITTINGER. Yes, sir.
3015Senator KENNEDY. It is my understanding that you were also aware
3016of some of the drug testing projects conducted on unwitting subjects
3017on the west coast using the Bureau of Narcotics people in the operation.
3018Is that true?
3019
3020Mr. GITTINGER. I was.
3021
3022Senator INOUYE. Excuse me. Would you speak into the microphone?
3023I cannot hear you.
3024Mr. GITTINGER. Sorry.
3025Senator KENNEDY. Do you know which drugs were involved in those
3026tests?
3027Mr. GIrrINGER. LSD. And I can't remember for sure much of the
3028others. What is the substance of marihuana, cannabis, is that right, that
3029can be delivered by other than smoking?
3030Senator KENNEDY. Cannabis?
3031Mr. GITTINGER. There had been some discussion of that; yes.
3032Senator KENNEDY. And was heroin also used?
3033Mr. GITTINGER. Heroin used by CIA?
3034Senator KENNEDY. No. In the west coast operation.
3035Mr. GITINGER. Absolutely not.
3036Senator KENNEDY. Now, to your knowledge, how were the drugs administered to the unwitting subjects?
3037Mr. GIrTINGER. I have no direct knowledge.
3038Senator KENNEDY. Why did you go to the safe houses?
3039Mr. GITTINGER. It's a very complicated story. Just in justification of
3040myself, this came up just day before yesterday. I have not really had
3041enough time to get it all straightened in my mind, so I ramble.
3042Senator KENNEDY. Well, you take your time and tell us in your own
3043words. We've got some time here.
3044Mr. GITTINGER. My responsibilities which would involve any of the
3045period of time that you were talking about really was not -directly
3046related to drugs at all. I was a psychologist charged with the responsibility of trying to develop as much information as I could on various
3047cultures, overseas cultures, anthropological type data, if you follow
3048what I mean. I was also engaged in trying to work out ways and means
3049of assessing people and understanding people.
3050I originally became involved in this through working on Chinese
3051culture, and over a series of time I was introduced to the problem of
3052brainwashing, which is the thing that really was the most compelling
3053thing in relationship to this, and became charged with the responsibility of trying to find out a little bit about interrogation techniques.
3054
3055And among other things, we decided or I decided that one of the best
3056sources of interrogation techniques would be trying to locate and interview and become involved with experienced police interrogators in
3057the country and experienced people who had real practical knowledge
3058of interrogation. The reason for this is that we had become pretty well
3059convinced after the experience of the brainwashing problems coming
3060out of China, that it was the techniques of the interrogators that were
3061causing the individuals to make confessions and so forth in relationship
3062to this, rather than any kind of drugging and so forth. So we were
3063very much interested in interrogation techniques, and this led to me
3064being introduced to the agent in the west coast, and I began to talk to
3065him in connection with these interrogation techniques.
3066Senator KENNEDY. OK. Now, that is the agent that ran the tests
3067on the west coast on the unwitting people. That's where you come in,
3068correct?
3069Mr. GirrlNGER. If I understand-would you say that again?
3070Senator KENNEDY. The name Morgan Hall has been-that is the
3071name that has been used.
3072Mr. GrINGER. Yes.
3073Senator KENNEDY. And that is the agent that you met with.
3074Mr. GIrrlNGER. That is right.
3075Senator KENNEDY. And you met at the safe house.
3076Mr. GIrrINGER. Yes, sir.
3077Senator KENNEDY. Whom did you meet with in the safe house?
3078Mr. GITTINGER. This is the part that is hard for me to say, and I am
3079sorry that I have to. In connection with some work that we were
3080doing, we needed to have some information on sexual habits. Morgan
3081Hall provided informants for me to talk to in connection with the sex
3082habits that I was interested in trying to find information. During one
3083period of time the safe house, as far as I was concerned, was used for
3084just these particular type of interviews. And I didn't see the red
3085curtains.
3086Senator KENNEDY. Those were prostitutes, were they?
3087Mr. GITTINGER. Yes, sir.
3088Senator KENNEDY. How many different times were you there that
3089you had similarMr. GITTINGER. I couldn't possibly say with any certainty on that.
3090Four or five times.
3091Senator KENNEDY. Four or five times.
3092Mr. GirrlNGER. Over-you remember now, the period that I'm talking about when I would have any involvement in this is from about
30931956 to 1961. So it's about a 4- or 5-year period which is the only time
3094that I know anything about what you are talking about here today.
3095Senator KENNEDY. Did Morgan Hall make the arrangements for
3096the prostitutes to meet with you?
3097Mr. GITTINGER. Yes, sir.
3098Senator KENNEDY. Did the interviews that you had have anything to
3099do with drugs?
3100Mr. GIrrINGER. Well, as I tried to explain earlier when this was
3101being discussed a little bit beforehand, again I think it is pretty hard
3102for most people now to recognize how little there was known about
3103drugs at the period of time that we are talking about, because the
3104
3105drug age or the drug culture comes later on. Consequently, those of
3106us who had any responsibility in this area were interested in trying to
3107get as much information as we could on the subculture, the subculture
3108drug groups, and obviously the Bureau of Narcotics represented a
3109means of doing this. Consequently, other types of things that were
3110involved in discussions at that time would have to do with the underground use of drugs.. When 1 am talking about this I am talking about
3111the folkways in terms of unwitting use of drugs. Did these people that
3112I was talking to have any information about this and on rare instances
3113they were able to tell me about their use, and in most cases this would
3114largely turn out to be a Mickey Finn or something of that sort rather
3115than anything esoteric.
3116I also was very much interested because we had relatively little
3117information, believe it or not, at that time, in terms of the various
3118reactions that people were having to drugs. Therefore, these people
3119were very informative in terms of they knew a great deal of information about reactions.
3120Senator KENNEDY. At least you gathered-or am I correct in assuming that you gathered the impression that the prostitutes that you had
3121talked to were able to slip the drugs to people as I understand it. Did
3122you form any impression on that?
3123Mr. GITTINGER. I certainly did not form the impression that they
3124did this as a rule orSenator KENNEDY. But they had the knowledge.
3125Mr. GITTINGER. They had the knowledge or some of them had had
3126knowledge of this being done. But again, as it turned out, it was largely
3127in this area of knockout drops.
3128Senator KENNEDY. Looking back now did you form any impression
3129about how the Agency was actually testing the broad spectrum of social
3130classes in these safe houses? With the large disbursal of cash in
3131small quantities, $100 bills and the kinds of elaborate decorations and
3132two-way mirrors in the bedrooms and all the rest, is there any question
3133in your own mind what was going on in the safe houses, or the techniques that were being used to administer these drugs?
3134Mr. GITTINGER. I find it very difficult to answer that question, sir. I
3135had absolutely no direct knowledge there was a large number of this. I
3136had no knowledge that anyone other than-than Morgan Hall was in
3137any way involved in the unwitting administration of drugs.
3138Senator KENNEDY. But Gottlieb would know, would he not?
3139Mr. GITTINGER. I believe so, yes, sir.
3140Senator KENNEDY. Could we go into the Human Ecology Foundation and talk about that and how it was used as an instrument in terms
3141of the support of research?
3142Mr. GITTINGER. Yes, sir.
3143Senator KENNEDY. Could you describe it to us? Could you describe
3144the Human Ecology Foundation, how it functioned and how it worked?
3145Mr. GITTINGER. May I tell something about how it evolved, which I
3146think is important?
3147Senator KENNEDY. Sure.
3148Mr. GITTINGER. The Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, so-called, was actually a-I am confused here now as to whether
3149I should name you names.
3150
3151Senator KENNEDY. Well, we're not interested in names or institutions, so we prefer that you do not. That has to be worked out in
3152arrangements between Admiral Turner and the individuals and the
3153institutions.
3154But we're interested in what the Foundation really was and how it
3155functioned and what its purpose was.
3156Mr. GirriNGER. Tell, it was established to undertake research in the
3157general area of the behavioral -sciences. It definitely had almost no
3158focus or interest in, say, drug-related type of activities except in a very
3159minor way, because it was largely set up to attempt to gain a certain
3160amount of information and to fund projects which were psychological,
3161sociological, anthropological in character. It was established in the
3162sense of a period of time that a lot of us who are in it wish we could
3163do it over again, but we were interested in trying to get together a panel
3164of the most representative high-level behavioral scientists we could to
3165oversee and help in terms of developing the Society for the Investigation of Hunan Ecology type of program.
3166The Agency in effect provided the money. They did not direct the
3167projects. Now, the fact of the matter is, there are a lot of innocent people who received the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology
3168money which I know for a fact they were never asked to do anything
3169for the CIA but they did get through this indirectly. They had no
3170knowledge that they were getting CIA money.
3171Senator KENNEDY. Over what period of time did this take place?
3172Mr. GrrrINGER. As far as I was concerned, it was the period of time
3173ending in 1961. I believe the Human Ecology fund finally phased out
3174in 1965, but I was not involved in this phasing out.
3175Senator KENNEDY. Can you give the range of the different sort of
3176individual projects of the universities in which it was active?
3177Mr. GITTINGER. Well, it would have as many as-I am very fuzzy
3178on my memory on the number of projects. It is over 10, 20, 30.
3179Senator KENNEDY. After it made the grants, what was the relationship of the Agency with the results of the studies? The Foundation
3180acquired the money to make the grants from the Agency, and then it
3181made the grants to these various research programs.
3182Mr. GrrrlNGER. Yes, sir.
3183Senator KENNEDY. And that included eight universities as well as
3184individual researchers?
3185Mr. GIrlNGER. Yes, sir.
3186Senator KENNEDY. Then what follow-up was there to that, sir?
3187Mr. GIrrlNGER. Well, in every sense of the word, the organization
3188was run exactly like any other foundation, and it carried with it the
3189same thing in terms of making certain that the people that they had
3190given money to used it for the purpose for which it had been granted,
3191that they had access to any of the reports that they had put out, but
3192there were no strings attached to anybody. There wasn't any reason
3193they couldn't publish anvthing thst thev put out.
3194Senator KENNEDY. What sort of budget are we talking about here?
3195Mr. GrrrlNGER. I honestly do not remember. I would iuess we are
3196talking in the realm of about $150,000 a year, but don't hold me to that,
3197because I don't know.
3198
3199Senator KENNEDY. What is your view about such funding as a professional person, in terms of compromising the integrity of a university, sir? .
3200Mr. GITrlNGER. Well, obviously, sir, insofar as today there is no
3201question about it. I will have to say at the time that we were doing this
3202there was quite an entirely different kind of an attitude, and I do
3203know for a fact that we moved to start towards phasing out the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology and the Human Ecology Fund for the very reason that we were beginning to recognize that
3204it was moving into an area but this would be compromised.
3205Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is commendable, both your attitude
3206and the reasons for it, but during that period of time it still was involved in behavior research programs, as I understand it.
3207Mr. GirlNGERZ. Yes, sir. On its own, in connection with this, it
3208participated again, and these again were not CIA-directed projects,
3209but these were all things which would theoretically contribute to the
3210general knowledge at the time where the things like the study of the
3211Hungarian refugees-obviously, the study of the Hungarian refugees
3212who came to this country after the Hungarian revolt was a very useful exercise to try to get information about the personality characteristics of the Communists and so forth.
3213Senator KENNEDY. Were there other foundations that were doing
3214similar kinds of work?
3215Mr. GlrrNGER. Not to my knowledge, sir.
3216Senator KENNEDY. You believeMr. GirlNGER. You mean, CIA, other CIA?
3217Senator KENNEDY. Right.
3218Mr. GITrrNGER. Well, my answer is in the sense that I know of no
3219other CIA foundations, no. There were, of course, other foundations
3220doing similar kinds of work in the United States.
3221Senator KENNEDY. Have you heard of the Psychological Assessments Foundation?
3222Mr. GIrrlNGER. I certainly have.
3223Senator KENNEDY. What was that? What function did that have?
3224Mr. GITTrNGER. Now, this was bringing us up to a different era. I
3225believe the functions of that organization have nothing whatsoever
3226to do with the things that are being talked about here while I was
3227associated with it.
3228Senator KENNEDY. Rather than getting into the work, it was another
3229foundation, was it not? It was another foundation supported by the
3230Agency?
3231Mr. GrTNGER. What, the Psychological Assessment?
3232Senator KENNEDY. Yes.
3233Mr. GrnNGER. No, sir, it was not.
3234Senator KENNEDY. It did not get any support at all from the
3235Agency?
3236Mr. GIrlNGER. Oh, yes, sir. It did get support, but it was a business
3237firm.
3238
3239Senator KENNEDY. It was a business but it got support from the
3240Agency?
3241Mr. GIrrINGER. It got money from it, but it definitely was not in
3242
3243MKULTRA or in any way associated with this.
3244
3245Senator KENNEDY. All right. I want to thank you for your helpful
3246testimony, Mr. Gittinger. It is not easy to go back into the past. I
3247think you have been very fair in your characterizations, and I think
3248it is quite appropriately indicated that there are different standards
3249now from what they were 25 years ago, and I think you have responded
3250very fairly and completely to the inquiries, and I think with a good
3251deal of feeling about it.
3252You are a person who is obviously attempting to serve the country's
3253interest, so I want to thank you very much for your statement and
3254for your helpful timeliness.
3255Mr. GITINGER. Thank you, sir.
3256Senator INoU-i. Senator Case?
3257Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I had
3258another committee that I had to complete the hearing with this morning before I got here.
3259I shall read the testimony with very great interest, and I appreciate your testimony as I have heard it. I would like to comment just on
3260one point, and that is, it relates to a story in the press yesterday about
3261part of this program involving the funding of a grant at a foreign
3262university. I would like to elicit from you a comment as to the additional sensitivity and difficulty that that practice involves from your
3263standpoint as a scientist, as well as a citizen, if you will.
3264Mr. GITINGER. I will say it was after the fact thinking. It was utter
3265stupidity the way things worked out to have used some of this money
3266outside the United States when it was CIA money. I can categorically
3267state to my knowledge and I don't claim a complete knowledge all the
3268way across of the human ecology functions, but to my knowledge, and
3269this is unfortunate, those people did not know that they were getting
3270money from CIA, and they were not asked to contribute anything to
3271CIA as such.
3272Senator CASE. It would be interesting to try to examine this by turning the thing around and thinking what we would think if this happened from a foreign official agency to our own university. Thank you,
3273Mr. Chairman.
3274Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker.
3275
3276Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
3277Dr. Goldman, I wonder if you would tell us what your training and
3278educational background is?
3279Dr. GOLDMAN. I have already given a biography for the record.
3280Senator SCHWETKER. I have not seen it. Who has it? Is it classified?
3281We may have it for the record, but may I ask you to briefly describe
3282your training and background for us now? I hope it is no secret.
3283Dr. GOLDMAN. Well, I was told if I was asked this to say that. I was
3284told that by your staff people, but I have no objection to telling you.
3285I am a resident from Pennsylvania, southwest Pennsylvania, Lancaster County. I went to Penn State, and I am in nutrition.
3286Senator SOHWEIKER. In what?
3287Dr. GOLDMAN. Nutrition.
3288Senator SCHWEIKER. Were you in charge of a section or segment of
3289the CIA in your past capacity?
3290Dr. GOLDMAN. During the time I was with that organization, I was
3291in charge of one small section of it, one small segment of it; yes.
3292
329396-408 0 - 77 - 5
3294
3295Senator SCHWEIKER. What was the function or purpose of that section that you headed?
3296Dr. GOLDMAN. To provide support for the other parts of the division.
3297Senator SCHWEIKER. Where in the chain of command would that put
3298you in relation to Dr. Gottlieb?
3299Dr. GOLDMAN. Pretty far down the line.
3300Senator SCHWEIKER. Mr. Gittinger, I would just like to ask you a
3301few questions. We appreciate your frankness and candor with the committee, and we realize this is a very difficult area to go into. I am not
3302quite clear on two matters that were raised earlier. First, were the safe
3303houses we were talking about here used on occasion by the prostitutes
3304you referred to?
3305Mr. GITTINGER. I really have not the slightest idea.
3306Senator SCHWEIKER. Were the prostitutes used in any way to slip
3307the customers drugs for observation purposes?
3308Mr. GrTiNGER. Not to my direct knowledge.
3309Senator SCHWEIKER. Would you have been in a position to know the
3310answer to either of these questions?
3311Mr. GITTINGER. May I say, probably not, and may I make an aside
3312to explain a little bit of this, please, sir?
3313Senator SCHWEIKER. Mr. Gittinger, a moment ago you mentioned
3314brainwashing techniques, as one area that you had, I guess, done some
3315work in. How would you characterize the state of the art of brainwashing today? Who has the most expertise in this field, and who is
3316or is not doing it in terms of other governments?
3317During the Korean war there was a lot of serious discussion about
3318brainwashing techniques being used by the North Koreans, and I am
3319interested in finding out what the state of the art is today, as you see it.
3320Mr. GITTINGER. Well, of course, there has been a great deal of work
3321on this, and there is still a great deal of controversy. I can tell you that
3322as far as I knew, by 1961, 1962, it was at least proven to my satisfaction that brainwashing, so called, is some kind of an esoteric device
3323where drugs or mind-altering kinds of conditions and so forth were
3324used, did not exist even though "The Manchurian Candidate" as a
3325movie really set us back a long time, because it made something impossible look plausible. Do you follow what I mean ? But by 1962 and
33261963, the general idea that we were able to come up with is that brainwashing was largely a process of isolating a human being, keeping
3327him out of contact, putting him under long stress in relationship to
3328interviewing and interrogation, and that they could produce any
3329change that way without having to resort to any kind of esoteric
3330means.
3331Senator SCHWEIKER. Are there ways that we can ascertain this from
3332a distance when we see a captive prisoner either go on television, in
3333a photograph, or at a press conference? In other words, are there certain signs that you have learned to recognize from your technical
3334background, to tell when brainwashing has occurred? Or is that very
3335difficult to do?
3336Mr. GITTINGER. It is difficult to do. I think it is posible now in terms
3337of looking at a picture of somebody who has been in enemy hands for
3338a long period of time. We can get some pretty good ideas of what kind
3339of circumstances he has been under, if that is what you mean.
3340
3341Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
3342Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.
3343Before adjourning the hearings, I would like to have the record
3344show that Dr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger have voluntarily cooperated
3345with the committee in staff interviews, that they appear this morning
3346voluntarily, and they are not under subpena.
3347Gentlemen, I realize that this experience may have been an unhappy
3348one and possibly a painful one. Therefore, we thank you very much
3349for participating this morning. We also realize that the circumstances
3350of that time differed very much from this day, and possibly the national attitude, the national political attitude condoned this type of
3351activity. So, we have not asked you to come here as persons who have
3352committed crimes, but rather in hope that you can assist us in studying
3353this problem so that it will not occur once again. In that spirit we
3354thank you for your participation, and we look forward to working
3355with you further in this case.
3356Thank you very much.
3357Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Ohairman, I would like also to thank the
3358witnesses. These are difficult matters, and I think all of us are very
3359grateful.
3360Senator SCHWEIKER. I think the witnesses should know that though
3361it may not always seem that way, what we are trying to do is to probe
3362the past and look at the policies of the past to affect the future. I think
3363our emphasis really is on the future, not the past, but it is important
3364that we learn from the past as we formulate policies and legislation
3365for the future, I hope that all of the witnesses who did come before us
3366voluntarily this morning, including Admiral Turner respect the fact
3367that we are questioning the past to learn about the future. I think it
3368should be looked at in that light.
3369Senator KENNEDY. I think that is the spirit in which we have had
3370these hearings. It seems to me that from both these witnesses and
3371others, Gottlieb knows the information and can best respond, and we
3372are going to make every effort in the Senate Health Committee to get
3373Mr. Gottlieb to appear, and we obviously look forward to cooperating
3374with Senator Inouye and the other members of the committee in getting the final chapter written on this, but we want to thank you very
3375much for your appearance here.
3376Senator INOUYE. The hearing will stand in recess, subject to the call
3377of the Chair.
3378[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the -hearing was recessed, subject to the
3379call of the Chair.]
3380
3381APPENDIX A
3382XVII. TESTING AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
3383Under its mandate ' the Select Committee has studied the testing and
3384use of chemical and biological agents by intelligence agencies. Detailed
3385descriptions of the programs conducted by intelligence agencies involving chemical and biological agents will be included in a separately
3386published appendix to the Senate Select Committee's report. This section of the report will discuss the rationale for the programs, their
3387monitoring and control, and what the Committee's investigation has
3388revealed about the relationships among the intelligence agencies and
3389about their relations with other government agencies and private institutions and individuals.2
3390Fears that countries hostile to the United States would use chemical and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led
3391to the development of a defensive program designed to discover techniques for American intelligence agencies to detect and counteract
3392chemical and biological agents. The defensive orientation soon became
3393secondary as the possible use of these agents to obtain information
3394from, or gain control over, enemy agents became apparent.
3395Research and development programs to find materials which could
3396be used to alter human behavior were initiated in the late 1940s and
3397early 1950s. These experimental programs originally included testing
3398of drugs involving witting human subjects, and culminated in tests
3399using unwitting, nonvolunteer human subjects. These tests were designed to determine the potential effects of chemical or biological
3400agents when used operationally against individuals unaware that they
3401had received a drug.
3402The testing programs were considered highly sensitive by the intelligence agencies administering them. Few people, even within the
3403agencies, knew of the programs and there is no evidence that either
3404the executive branch or Congress were ever informed of them. The
3405highly compartmented nature of these programs may be explained in
3406part by an observation made by the CIA Inspector General that, "the
3407knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activi1 Senate Resolution 21 directs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
3408Activities to investigate a number of issues:
3409"(a) Whether agencies within the intelligence community conducted illegal
3410domestic activities (Section 2(1) and (2));
3411"(b) The extent to which agencies within the intelligence community cooperate (Section 2(4) and (8));
3412"(c) The adequacy of executive branch and congressional oversight of intelligence activities (Section 2(7) and (11));
3413"(d) The adequacy of existing laws to safeguard the rights of American citizens (Section 2(13))."
3414'The details of these programs may never be known. The programs were highly
3415compartmented. Few records were kept. What little documentation existed for
3416the CIA's principal program was destroyed early in 1973.
3417(385)
3418
3419(65)
3420
3421386
3422ties would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles3
3423and would be detrimental to the accomplishment of its missions."
3424The research and development program, and particularly the covert testing programs, resulted in massive abridgments of the rights
3425of American citizens, sometimes with tra'gic consequences. The deaths
3426of two Americans 3a can be attributed to these programs; other participants in the testing programs may still suffer from the residual effects. While some controlled testing of these substances might be defended, the nature of the tests, their scale, and the fact that they were
3427continued for years after the danger of surreptitious administration
3428of LSD to unwitting individuals was known, demonstrate a fundamental disregard for the value of human life.
3429The Select Committee's investigation of the testing and use of chemical and biological agents also raise serious questions about the adequacy of command and control procedures within the Central Intelligence Agency and military intelligence, and about the relationships
3430among the intelligence agencies, other governmental agencies, and
3431private institutions and individuals. The CIA's normal administrative
3432controls were waived for programs involving chemical and biological
3433agents to protect. their security. According to the head of the Audit
3434Branch O-f the CIA. these waivers produced "gross administrative
3435failures." They prevgnted the CIA's internal review mechanisms (the
3436Office of General Counsel, the Inspector General, and the Audit Staff)
3437from adequately supervising the programs. In general, the waivers had
3438the paradoxical effect of providing less restrictive administrative controls and less effective internal review for controversial and highly
3439sensitive projects than those governing normal Agency activities.
3440The security of the programs was protected not only by waivers
3441of normal administrative controls, but also by a high degree of compartmentation within the CIA. This compartmentation excluded the
3442CIA's Medical Staff from the principal research and testing program
3443employing chemical and biological agents.
3444It also may have led to agency policymakers receiving differing
3445and inconsistent responses when they posed questions to the CIA
3446component involved.
3447Jurisdictional uncertainty within the CIA was matched by jurisdictional conflict among the various intelligence agencies. A spirit of
3448cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of information which initially
3449characterized the programs disappeared. Military testers withheld inlormation from the CIA, ignoring suggestions for coordination from
3450their superiors. The CIA similarly failed to provide informiation to
3451the military on the CIA's testing program. This failure to cooperate
3452was conspicuously manifested in an attempt by the Army to conceal
34533CIA Inspector General's Survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.
3454" On January 8, 1953. Mr. Harold Blauer died of circulatory collapse and heart
3455failure following an intravenous injection of a synthetic mescaline derivative
3456while a subject of tests conducted by New York State Psychiatric Institute under
3457a contract let by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. The Committee's investigation
3458into drug testing by U.S. intelligence agencies focused on the testing of LSD, however, the committee did receive a copy of the U.S. Army Inspector General's
3459Report, issued on October 1975, on the events and circumstances of Mr. Blauer's
3460death. His death was directly atributable to the administration of the synthetic
3461mescaline derivative.
3462
3463387
3464their overseas testing program, which included surreptitious administration of LSD, from the CIA. Learning of the Army's program,
3465the Agency surreptitiously attempted to obtain details of it.
3466The-decision to institute one of the Army's LSD field testing projects
3467had been based, at least in part, on the finding that no long-term residual effects had ever resulted from the drug's administration. The
3468CIA's failure to inform the Army of a death which resulted from the
3469surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting Americans, may well
3470have resulted in the institution of an unnecessary and potentially lethal
3471program.
3472The development, testing, and use of chelnical and biological agents
3473by intelligence agencies raises serious questions about the relationship
3474between the intelligence community and foreign governments, other
3475agencies of the Federal Government, and other institutions and individuals. The questions raised range from the legitimacy of American
3476complicity in actions abroad which violate American and foreign laws
3477to the possible compromise of the integrity of public and private institutions used as cover by intelligence agencies.
3478
3479A.
3480
3481THE PROGRAMS INVESTIGATED
3482
34831. Project CHATTER
3484Project CHATTER was a Navy program that began in the fall of
34851947. Responding to reports of "amazing results" achieved by the
3486Soviets in using "truth drugs," the program focused on the identification and testing of. such drugs for use in interrogations and in the
3487recruitmenc of agents. The research included laboratory experiments
3488on animals and hump , subjects involving Anabasis aphylla, scopolamine, and rhescaline in order to determine their speech-inducing qualities. Overseas experiments were conducted as part of the project.
3489The project expanded substantially during the Korean War, and
3490ended shortly after the war, in 1953. .
3491
34922. Project BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE
3493The'earliest of the CIA's major programs involving the use of
3494chemical and biological agents, Project BLUEBIRD, was approved by
3495the Director in 1950. Its objectives were:
3496(a) discovering means of conditioning personnel to prevent
3497unauthorized extraction of information from them by known
3498means, (b) investigating the possibility of control of an individual by application of special interrogation techniques,
3499(c) memory enhancement, and (d) establishing defensive
3500means for preventing hostile control of Agency personnel.4
3501As a result of interrogations conducted overseas during the project,
3502another goal was added-the evaluation of offensive uses of unconvent:ional interrogation techniques, including hypnosis and drugs. In
3503*August1951, the project was renamed ARTICHOKE. Project ARTICHOKE included in-house experiments on interrogation techniques,
3504conducted "under medical and security controls which would ensure
3505'CIA memorandum to the Select Committee, "Behavioral Drugs and Testing,"
35062/11/75.
3507
3508388
3509that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer for the experiments."' Overseas interrogations utilizing a combination of sodium
3510pentothal and hypnosis after physical and psychiatric examinations of
3511the subjects were also part of ARTICHOKE.
3512The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which studied scientific
3513advances by hostile powers, initially led BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE
3514efforts. In 1952, overall responsibility for ARTICHOKE was transferred from OSI to'the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO), predecessor to the present Office of Security. The CIA's Technical Services and Medical Staffs were to be called upon as needed; OSI would
3515retain liaison function with other government agencies.- The change
3516in leadership from an intelligence unit to an operating unit apparently reflected a change in emphasis; from the study of actions by
3517hostile powers to the use, both for offensive and defensive purposes,
3518of special interrogation techniques-primarily hypnosis and truth
3519serums.
3520Representatives. from each Agency unit involved in ARTICHOKE
3521met almost monthly to discuss their progress. 8These discussions included the planning of overseas interrogations as well as further
3522experimentation in the U.S.
3523. Information about project ARTICHOKE 'after the fall of 1953
3524is scarce. The CIA maintains that the project ended in 1956, but evidence suggests that Office of Security and Office of Medical Services
3525use of "special interrogation" techniques continued for several years
3526thereafter.
35273. IKNAOMI
3528MKNAOMI was another major CIA program in this area. In 1967,
3529the CIA summarized the purposes of MKNAOMI:
3530(a) To provide for a covert support base to meet clandestine operational requirements.
3531(b) To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specific use of TSD [Technical Services Division].
3532(c) To maintain in operational readiness special and unique
3533items for the dissemination of biological and chemical materials.
3534(d) To provide for the required surveillance, testing, upgrading, and evaluation of materials and items in order to
3535of reassure absence of defects and complete predictability
35369
3537sults to be expected under operational conditions.
3538Under an agreement reached with the Army in 1952, the Snecial
3539Operations Division (SOD) at Fort Detrick was to assist CIA in
3540developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery
35415
3542Memorandum from Robert Taylor, O/DD/P to the Assistant Deputy (Inspection and Security) and Chief of the Medical Staff, 3/22/52.
3543a Memorandum from H. Marshall Chadwell. Assistant Director. Scientific Intelligence, to the Deputy Director/Plans (DDP) "Proiect ARTICHOKE," 8/29/52.
3544*"Progress Report, Project ARTICHOKE." 1/12/53.
3545Memorandum from Chief, TSD/Biological Braneh to Chief. TSD "MKNAOMI:
3546Funding. Obiectives. and Accornnli-br-nts." 10/18/17. T). 1. For a fuller description of MKNAOMI and the relationship between CIA and SOD. see p. 360 ff.
3547
3548389
3549systems. By this agreement, CIA acquired the knowledge, skill, and
3550facilities of the Army to develop biological weapons suited for CIA
3551use.
3552SOD developed darts coated with biological agents and pills containing several dif.rent biological agents which could remain potent
3553for weeks or months. SOD also developed a special gun for firing
3554darts coated with a chemical which could allow CIA agents to incapacitate a guard dog, enter an installation secretly, and return the dog to
3555consciousness when leaving. SOD scientists were unable to develop
3556
3557a similar incapacitant for humans. SOD also physically transferred
3558to CIA personnel biological agents in "bulk" form, and delivery
3559devices, including some containing biological agents.
3560In addition to the CIA's interest in biological weapons for use
3561against humans, it also asked SOD to study use of biological agents
3562against crops and animals. In its 1967 memorandum, the CIA stated:
3563Three methods and systems for carrying out a covert attack
3564against crops and causing severe crop loss have been developed and evaluated under field conditions. This was accomplished in anticipAtion of a requirement which was later
3565developed but was subsequently scrubbed just prior to putting into action.sa
3566MKNAOMI was terminated in 1970. On November 25, 1969, President Nixon renounced the use of any form of biological weapons that
3567kill or incapacitate and ordered the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. On February 14, 1970, the President clarified the
3568extent of his earJier order and indicated that toxins-chemicals that
3569are not living organisms but are produced by living organisms-were
3570considered biological weapons subject to his previous directive and
3571were to be destroyed. Although instructed to relinquish control of
3572material held for the CIA by 9OD, a CIA scientist acquired approximately 11 grams of shellfish toxin from SOD personnel at Fort Detrick which were stored in a little-used CIA laboratory where it went
3573undetected for five years.' 0
3574
35754. MKULTRA
3576MKULTRA was the principal CIA program involving the research
3577and development of chemical and biological agents. It was "concerned with the research and development of chemical, biological, and
3578radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior." 11
3579In January 1973, MKULTRA records were destroyed by Technical
3580Services Division personnel actin on the verbal orders of Dr. Sidney
3581Gottlieb, Chief of TSD. Dr. Gottlieb has testified, and former Director Helms has confirmed, that in ordering the records destroyed, Dr.
3582Gottlieb was carrying out the verbal order of then DCI Helms.
3583MKULTRA began with a proposal from the Assistant Deputy
3584Director for Plans, Richard Helms, to the DCI, outlining a special
3585* Ibid. p. 2.
3586
3587Senate Select Committee, 9/16/75, Hearings, Vo. 1.
3588n Memorandum from the CIA Inspector General to the Director, 7/26/63.
3589'0
3590
3591390
3592funding mechanism for highly sensitive CIA research and development projects that studied the use of biological and chemical materials
3593in altering human behavior. The projects involved:
3594Research to develop a capability in the covert use of biological and chemical materials. This alea involves the production of various physiological conditions which could support
3595present or future clandestine operations. Aside from the offefisive potential, the development of a comprehensive capability in this field of covert chemical and biological warfare
3596gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical
3597potential, thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe
3598as restrained in the use of these techwho might not 1be
35992
3600niques as we are.
3601MKULTRA was approved by the DCI on April 13, 1953 along the
3602lines proposed by ADDP Helms.
3603Part of the rationale for the establishment of this special funding mechanism was its extreme sensitivity. The Inspector General's
3604survey of MKULTRA in 1963 noted the following reasons for this
3605sensitivity:
3606a. Rih earch in the mailipulation of human behavior is considered by man7. zuthorities in medicine and related fields
3607to be professionaily unethical, therefore the reputation of
3608professional participants in the MIKULTRA-program are on
3609occasion in jeopardy.
3610b. Some MKILTRA activities raise questions of legality
3611implicit in the original charter.
3612- c. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products
3613places the rights and interests of U.S. citi7ens in jeopardy.
3614d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activity could induce serious adverse reaction in U.S. public
3615opinion, as well as stimulate offensive and defensive action
3616in this field on the part of foreign intelligence services."3
3617Over the ten-year life of the program, many "additional avenues to
3618the control of human behavior" were designated as appropriate for
3619investigation under the MICULTRA charter. These include "radiation,
3620electroshock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and
3621anthropoloy, graphology, harassment substances, and paramilitary
3622devices and materials." 14
3623The research and development of materials to be used for altering
3624human behavior consisted of three phases: first, the search for materials suitable for study; second, laboratory testing on voluntary
3625human snbiects in various types of institutions; third, the application
3626of MKTTLTRA materials in normal life settings.
3627The search for suitable materials was conducted through standing
3628arrangements with snecialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses,
3629hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research orgamu'femorandum from
3630
3631ADDP Holms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, Tab A, pp. 1-2.
3632T.G. Report on MKULTRA, 1963, pp. 1-2.
3633rbid, p. 4.
3634
363571
3636391
3637zations. The annual grants of funds to these specialists were made
3638under ostensible research foundation auspices, thereby concealing the
3639CIA's interest from the specialist's institution.
3640The next phase of the MKITLTRA program involved physicians,
3641toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general
3642hospitals, and in prisons. Utilizing the products and findings of the
3643basic research phase, they conducted intensive tests on human subjects.
3644I One of the first studies was conducted by the National Institute of
3645Mental Health. This study was intended to test various drugs, including hallucinogenics, at the NIMH Addiction Research Center in Lexington, Kentucky. The "Lexington Rehabilitation Center," as it was
3646then called, was a prison for drug addicts serving sentences for drug
3647violations.
3648The test subjects were volunteer prisoners who, after taking a brief
3649physical examination and signing a general consent form, were administered hallucinogenic drugs. As a reward for participation in the
3650program, the addicts were provided with the druz of their addiction.
3651LSD was one of the materials tested in the MIKULTRA program.
3652The final phase of LSD testing involved surreptitious administration
3653to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life settings by undercover officers of the Bureau of Narcotics acting for the CIA.
3654The rationale for such testing was "that testing of materials under
3655accepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reactions and attributions that may occur in operational situations." 15
3656According to the CIA, the advantage of the relationship with the
3657Bureau was that
3658test subjects could be sought and cultivated within the setting
3659of narcotics control. Some subjects have been informers or
3660members of suspect criminal elements from whom the [Bureau of Narcotics] has obtained results of orwrational value
3661through the tests. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the
3662substances on individuals at all social levels, high and low,
3663native American and foreign, is of great significance and
3664testing has been performed an a variety of individualswithin
3665these categories. [Emphasis added.] 16
3666A special procedure. designated MKDELTA, was es'ablished to
3667govern the use of MKULTRA materials abrond. Such materials were
3668used on a number of occasions. Because MKULTRA records were
3669dostroved, it is imnossible to reconstruct the operational use of
3670MKULTRA materials by the CIA overseas; it has been determined
3671that the use of these materials abroad began in 1953, and possibly as
3672early as 1950.
3673Druns were used primarily as an aid to interrogations. but
3674MKULTRA/MKDELTA materials were also used for harassment,
3675discrediting, or disabling purposes. According to an Inspector General
3676Survey of the Technical Services Division of the CIA in 1957-an
3677inspection which did not discover the MKULTRA oroject involving
3678the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvolunteer
3679SIbid, p. 21.
3680* Ibid., pp. 11-12.
3681
368272
3683392
3684subjects-the CIA had developed six drugs for operational use and
3685they had been used in six different operations on a total of thirty-three
3686subjects.' By 1963 the number of operations and subjects had increased substantially.
3687In the spring of 1963, during a wide-ranging Inspector General
3688survey of the Technical Services Division, a member of the Inspector
3689General's staff, John Vance, learned about MKULTRA and about
3690the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvoluntary human subjects. As a result. of the discovery
3691and the Inspector General's subsequent -report,this testing was halted
3692and much tighter administrative controls were imposed on the program. According to the CIA, the project was decreased significantly
3693each budget year until its complete termination in the late 1960s.
3694
36955. The Testing of LSD by the Army
3696There were three major phases in the Army's testing of LSD. In the
3697first, LSD was administered to more than 1,000 American soldiers who
3698volunteered to be subjects in chemical warfare experiments. In the
3699second phase, Material Testing Program EA 1729, 95 volunteers received LSD in clinical experiments designed to evaluate potential
3700intelligence uses of the drug. In the third phase, Projects THIRD
3701CHANCE and DERBY HAT, 16 unwitting nonvolunteer subjects
3702were interrogated after receiving LSD as part of operational field
3703tests.
3704B. CIA DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS
3705
37061. The Rationale for the Testing Programs
3707The late 1940s and early 1950s were marked by concern over
3708the threat posed by the activities of the Soviet Union, the People's
3709Republic of China, and other Communist bloc countries. United States
3710concern over the use of chemical and biological agents by these powers
3711was acute. The belief that hostile powers had used chemical and biological agents in interrogations, brainwashing, and in attacks designed
3712to harass, disable, or kill Allied personnel created considerable pressure for a "defensive" program to investigate chemical and biological
3713agents so that the intelligence community could understand the mechanisms by which these substances worked and how their effects could
3714be defeated.,"
3715Of particular concern was the drug LSD. The CIA had received
3716reports that the Soviet Union was engaged in intensive efforts to produce LSD; and that the Soviet Union had attempted to purchase the
3717world's supply of the chemical. As one CIA officer who was deeply
3718involved in work with this drug described the climate of the times:
3719"[It] is awfully hard in this day and age to reproduce how frightening
3720all of this was to us at the time, particularly after the drug scene has
3721become as widespread and as knowledgeable in this country as it did.
3722But we were literally terrified, because this was the one material that we
3723Ibid, 1957, p. 201.
3724sThus an officer in the Office of Security of the CIA stressed the "urgency of
3725
3726the discovery of techniques and method that would permit our personnel, in the
3727event of their capture by the enemy, to resist or defeat enemy interrogation."
3728(Minutes of the ARTICHOKE conference of 10/22/53.)
3729
3730393
3731had ever been able to locate that really had potential fantastic possibilities if used wrongly." 19
3732But the defensive orientation soon became secondary. Chemical and
3733biological agents were to be studied in order "to perfect techniques . . .
3734for the abstraction of information from individuals whether willing or
3735not" and in order to "develop means for the control of the activities and
3736mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not." 20 One
3737Agency official noted that drugs would be useful in order to "gain control of bodies whether they were willing or not" in the process of removing personnel from Europe in the event of a Soviet attack. 2 1 In
3738other programs, the CIA began to develop, produce, stockpile, and
3739maintain in operational readiness materials which could be used to
3740harass, disable, or kill specific targets. 22
3741Reports of research and development in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the Communist Bloc countries provided
3742the basis for the transmutation of American programs from a defensive to an offensive orientation. As the Chief of the Medical Staff of
3743the Central Intelligence Agency wrote in 1952:
3744There is ample evidence in the reports of innumerable interrogations that the Communists were utilizing drugs, physical
3745duress, electric shock, and possibly hypnosis against their enemies. With such evidence it is difficult not to keep from becoming rabid about our apparent laxity. We are forced by this
3746mounting evidence to assume a more aggressive role in the
3747development of these techniques, but must be cautious to
3748maintain strict inviolable control because of the havoc that
3749could be wrought by such techniques in unscrupulous hands. 2 3
3750In order to meet the perceived threat to the national security, substantial programs for the testing and use of chemical and biological
3751agents-including projects involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects "at all social levels,
3752high and low, native American and foreign"-were conceived, and
3753implemented. These programs resulted in substantial violations of the
3754rights of individuals within the United States.
3755
37561 Testimony of CIA
3757
3758officer, 11/21/75, p. 33.
3759
3760'0 Memorandum from the Director of Security to ARTICHOKE
3761
3762representatives, Subject: "ARTICHOKE Restatement of Program."
3763n ARTICHOKE memorandum, 7/30/53.
3764" The Inspector General's Report of 1957 on the Technical Services Division
3765noted that "Six specific products have been developed and are available for operational use. Three of them are discrediting and disabling materials which can be
3766administered unwittingly and permit the exercise of a measure of control over the
3767actions of the subject."
3768A memorandum for the Chief, TSD, Biological Branch to the Chief, TSD,
376910/18/67, described two of the objectives of the CIA's Project MKNAOMI as:
3770"to stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specific use of
3771TSD" and "to maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for
3772the dissemination of biological and chemical materals."
3773' Memorandum from the Chief of the Medical Staff, 1/25/52.
3774
3775394
3776inAlthough the CIA recognized these effects of LSD to unwitting
377724
3778dividuals within the United States, the project continued. As the
3779Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, wrote the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence during discussions which led to the cessation of unwitting testing:
3780While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude upon an individual's private
3781and legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the
3782Agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current
3783of human behavior,
3784on enemy capabilities the manipulation
378525
3786and maintain an offensive capability.
3787There were no attempts to secure approval for the most controversial
3788aspects of these programs from the executive branch or Congress.
3789The nature and extent of the programs were closely held secrets; even
3790DCI McCone was not briefed on all the details of the program involving the surreptitious administration of LSD until 1963. It was
3791deemed imperative that these programs be concealed from the American people. As the CIA's Inspector General wrote in 1957:
3792Precautions must be taken not only to protect operations
3793from exposure to enemyeforces but also to conceal these activities from the American public in general. The knowledge
3794that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activities
3795would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic
3796circles and would be detrimental to the accomplishment
3797of its mission.26
37982. The Death of Dr.FrankOlson
3799The most tragic result of the testing of LSD by the CIA was the
3800death of Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian employee of the Army, who died
3801on November 27, 1953. His death followed his participation in a CIA
3802experiment with LSD. As part of this experiment, Olson unwittingly
3803received approximately 70 micrograms of LSD in a glass of Cointreau
3804he drank on November 19, 1953. The drug had been placed in the bottle
3805by a CIA officer, Dr. Robert Lashbrook, as part of an experiment
3806he and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb performed at a meeting of Army and
3807CIA scientists.
3808Shortly after this experiment, Olson exhibited symptoms of paranoia and schizophrenia. Accompanied by Dr. Lashbrook, Olson sought
3809psychiatric assistance in New York City from a physician, Dr. Harold
3810Abramson, whose research on LSD had been funded indirectly by
3811the CIA. While in New York for treatment, Olson fell to his death
3812from a tenth story window in the Statler Hotel.
3813*"Even during the discussions which led to the termination of the unwitting
3814testing, the DDP turned down the option of halting such tests within the U.S.
3815and continuing them abroad despite the fact that the Technical Services Division had conducted numerous operations abroad making use of LSD. The DDP
3816made this decision on the basis of security noting that the past efforts overseas
3817had resulted in "making an inordinate number of foreign nationals witting of
3818our role in the very sensitive activity." (Memorandum for the Deputy Director
3819of 5Central Intelligence from the Deputy Director for Plans, 12/17/63, p. 2.)
3820' Ibid., pp. 2-3.
38212 I.G. survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.
3822
3823395
3824a. Background.-Olson, an expert in aerobiology who was assigned
3825to the Special Operations Division (SOD) of the U.S. Army Biological Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland. This Division had three
3826primary functions
3827(1) assessing the vulnerability of American installations
3828to biological attack;
3829(2) developing techniques for offensive use of biological
3830weapons; and
383127
3832(3) biological research for the CIA.
3833Professionally, Olson was well respected by his colleagues in both
3834the Army and the CIA. Colonel Vincent Ruwet, Olson's immediate
3835superior at the time of his death, was in almost daily contact with
3836
3837Olson. According to Colonel Ruwet: "As a professional man . . . his
3838ability . . . was outstanding." 28 Colonel Ruwet stated that "during
3839the period prior to the experiment . . . I noticed nothing which
3840
3841would lead me to believe that he was of unsound mind." " Dr. Lashbrook, who had monthly contacts with Olson from early 1952 until
3842the time of his death, stated publicly that before Olson received LSD,
3843"as far as I know, he was perfectly normal." 30 This assessment is in
3844direct contradiction to certain statements evaluating Olson's emotional stability made in CIA internal memoranda written after
3845Olson's death.
3846b. The Experiment.-On November 18, 1953, a group of ten scientists fiom the CIA and Camp Detrick attended a semi-annual review
3847and analysis conference at a cabin located at Deep Creek Lake, Maryland. Three of the participants were from the CIA's Technical Services Staff. The Detrick representatives were all from the Special
3848Operations Division.
3849According to one CIA official, the Special Operations Division
3850participants "agreed that an unwitting experiment would be
3851desirable." "3This account directly contradicts Vincent Ruwet's recollection. Ruwet recalls no such discussion, and has asserted that he
3852would remember any such discussion because the SOD participants
385332
3854would have strenuously objected to testing on unwitting subjects.
3855meeting
3856In May, 1953, Richard Helms, Assistant DDP, held a staff
3857which the Chief of Technical Services Staff attended. At this meeting
3858Helms "indicated that the drug [LSD] was dynamite and that he
3859should be advised at all times when it was intended to use it." 3 In
3860addition, the then DDP, Frank Wisner, sent a memorandum to TSS
3861stating the requirement that the DDP personally 34approve the use of
3862LSD. Gottlieb went ahead with the experiment, securing the apStaff summary of Vincent Ruwet Interview, 8/13/75, p. 3.
3863" Memorandum of Col. Vincent Ruwet, To Whom It May Concern, no date,
3864p. 2.
3865" Ruwet Memorandum, p. 3.
3866aJoseph B. Treaster, New York Times, 7/19/75, p. 1.
3867Memorandum for the Record from Lyman Kirkpatrick, 12/1/53, p. 1.
38682 Ruwet (staff summary), 8/13/75, p. 6.
3869* Inspector General Diary, 12/2/53.
3870" Ibid. Dr. Gottleib has testified that he does not remember either the meeting
3871with Helms nor 'the Wisner memorandum. (Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 16.)
387227
3873
3874396
3875proval of his immediate supervisor. Neither the Chief of TSS nor
3876the DDP specifically authorized the experiment in which Dr. Olson
3877participated.35
3878According to Gottlieb.3 6 a "very small dose" of LSD was placed in
3879a bottle of Cointreau which was served after dinner on Thursday,
3880November 19. The drug was placed in the liqueur by Robert Lashbrook. All but two of the SOD participants received LSD. One did
3881not drink; the other had a heart condition.3 7 About twenty minutes
3882after they finished their Cointreau, Gottlieb informed the other participants that they had received LSD.
3883Dr. Gottlieb stated that "up to the time of the experiment," he
3884observed nothing unusual in Olson's behavior.3 7a Once the experiment
3885was underway, Gottlieb recalled that "the drug had a definite effect on
3886the group to the point that they were boisterous and laughing and they
3887could not continue the meeting or engage in sensible conversation."
3888The meeting continued until about 1:00 a.m., when the participants
3889retired for the evening. Gottlieb recalled that Olson, among others,
3890complained of "wakefulness" during the night.3 8 According to Gottlieb
3891on Friday morning "aside from some evidence of fatigue, I observed
3892nothing unusual in [Olson's] actions, conversation, or general behavior." 39 Ruwet recalls that Olson "appeared to be agitated" at
3893breakfast, but that he "did not consider this to be abnormal under the
3894circumstances." 40
3895c. The Treatment.-The following Monday, November 23, Olson
3896was waiting for Ruwet when he came in to work at 7:30 a.m. For the
3897next two days Olson's friends and family attempted to reassure hin
3898and help him "snap out" of what appeared to be a serious depression.
3899On Tuesday, Olson again came to Ruwet and, after an hour long conDr. Gottlieb testified that "given the information we knew up to this time,
3900and based on a lot of our own self-administration, we thought it was a fairly
3901benign substance in terms of potential harm." This is in conflict not only with 'Mr.
3902Helms' statement but also with material which had been supplied to the Technical
3903Services Staff. In one long memorandum on current research with LSD which
3904was supplied to TSD, Henry Beecher described the dangers involved with such
3905research in a prophetic manner. "The second reason to doubt Professor Rothland
3906came when I raised the question as to any accidents which had arisen from
3907the use of LSD-25. He said in a very positive way, 'none.' As it turned out
3908this answer could be called overly positive, for later on in the evening I was
3909discussing the matter with Dr. W. A. Stohl, Jr., a psychiatrist in Bleulera's
3910Clinic in Zurich where I had gone at Rothland's insistence. Stohl, when asked
3911the same question, replied, 'yes,' and added spontaneously, 'there is a case
3912Professor Rothland knows about. In Geneva a woman physician who had been
3913subject to depression to some extent took LSD-25 in an experiment and became
3914severely and suddenly depressed and committed suicide three weeks later.
3915While the connection is not definite, common knowledge of this could hardly
3916have allowed the positive statement Rothland permitted himself. This case is
3917a warning to us to avoid engaging subjects who are depressed, or who have been
3918subject to depression.' " Dr. Gottlieb testified that he had no recollection of
3919either the report or that particular section of it. (Sidney Gottlieb testimony,
392010/19/75, p. 78.)
3921" Memorandum of Sheffield Edwards for the record, 11/28/53, p. 2.
3922' Lashbrook (staff summary), 7/19/75, p. 3.
3923"a Gottlieb Memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 2.
3924Edwards memorandum, 11/28/53, p. 3.
3925Gottlieb memorandum. 12/7/53, p. 3.
39260
3927' Ruwet memorandum, p. 3.
3928
3929397
3930versation, it was decided that medical assistance for Dr. Olson was
3931desirable."1
3932Ruwet then called Lashbrook and informed him that "Dr. Olson
3933was in serious trouble and needed immediate professional attention." 42
3934Lashbrook agreed to make appropriate arrangements and told Ruwet
3935to bring Olson to Washington, D.C. Ruwet and Olson proceeded to
3936Washington to meet with Lashbrook, and the three left for New York
3937at about 2:30 p.m. to meet with Dr. Harold Abramson.
3938At that time Dr. Abramson was an allergist and immunologist
3939practicing medicine in New York City. He held no degree in psychiatry, but was associated with research projects supported indirectly
3940by the CIA. Gottlieb and Dr. Lashbrook both followed his work closely
3941in the early 1950s. 4 3 Since Olson needed medical help, they turned to
3942Dr. Abramson as the doctor closest to Washington who was experienced with LSD and cleared by the CIA.
3943Ruwet, Lashbrook, and Olson remained in New York for two days of
3944consultations with Abramson. On Thursday, November 26, 1953, the
3945three flew back to Washington so that Olson could spend Thanksgiving
3946with his family. En route from the airport Olson told Ruwet that he
3947was afraid to face his family. After a lengthy discussion, it was decided that Olson and Lashbrook would return to New York, and that
3948Ruwet would go to Frederick to explain these events to Mrs. Olson ."
3949Lashbrook and Olson flew back to New York the same day, again
3950for consultations with Abramson. They spent Thursday night in a
3951Long Island hotel and the next morning returned to the city with
3952Abramson. In further discussions with Abramson, it was agreed
3953that Olson should be placed under regular psychiatric care at an
3954institution closer to his home.4 5
3955d. The Death.-Because they could not obtain air transportation for
3956a return trip on Friday night, Lashbrook and Olson made reservations
3957for Saturday morning and checked into the Statler Hotel. Between
3958the time they checked in and 10:00 p.m.; they watched television,
3959visited the cocktail lounge, where each had two martinis, and dinner.
3960According to Lashbrook, Olson "was cheerful and appeared to enjoy
3961the entertainment." He "appeared no longer particulary depressed,
3962and almost the Dr. Olson I knew prior to the experiment." 46
3963After dinner Lashbrook and Olson watched television for about
3964an hour, and at 11:00, Olson suggested that they go to bed, saying that
3965"he felt more relaxed and contented than he had since [they] came
3966to New York." " Olson then left a call with the hotel operator to wake
3967them in the morning. At approximately 2:30 a.m. Saturday, November 28, Lashbrook was awakened by a loud "crash of glass." In his
3968report on the incident, he stated only that Olson "had crashed through
3969the closed window blind and the closed window and he fell to his death
3970from the window of our room on the 10th floor." 48
3971"Ibid., p. 4.
3972'2 Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 1.
397343 Staff summary of Dr. Harold Abramson interview, 7/29/75, p. 2.
3974" Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 3.
39754 Abramson memorandum, 12/4/53.
3976* Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 3.
39777 Ibid., p. 4.
39780 Ibid.
397996-408 0 - 77 - 6
3980
3981398
3982Immediately after finding that Olson had leapt to his death, Lashbrook telephoned Gottlieb at his home and informed him of the incident.4" Gottlieb called Ruwet and informed him of Olson's death
3983at approximately 2:45 a.m.50 Lashbrook then called the hotel desk
3984and reported the incident to the operator there. Lashbrook called
3985Abramson and informed him of the occurrence. Abramson told Lashbrook he "wanted to be kept out of the thing completely," but later
3986changed his mind and agreed to assist Lashbrook.5'
3987Shortly thereafter, uniformed police officers and some hotel employees came to Lashbrook's room. Lashbrook told the police he didn't
3988know why Olson had committed suicide, but he did know that Olson
3989"suffered from ulcers." 65
3990e. The Aftermath.-Following Dr. Olson's death, the CIA made
3991a substantial effort to ensure that his family received death benefits,
3992but did not notify the Olsons of the circumstances surrounding his
3993demise. The Agency also made considerable efforts to prevent the
3994death being connected with the CIA, and supplied complete cover for
3995Lashbrook so that his association with the CIA would remain a secret.
3996After Dr. Olson's death the CIA conducted an internal investigation of the incident. As part of his responsibilities in this investigation, the General Counsel wrote the Inspector General, stating:
3997I'm not happy with what seems to be a very casual attitude
3998on the part of TSS representatives to the way this experiment was conducted and the remarks that this is just one of
3999the risks running with scientific experimentation. I do not
4000eliminate the need for taking risks, but I do believe, especially when human health or life is at stake, that at least the
4001prudent, reasonable measures which can be taken to mini. mize the risk must be taken and failure to do so was culpable
4002negligence. The actions of the various individuals concerned
4003after effects of the experiment on Dr. Olson became manifest
4004also revealed the failure to observe normal and reasonable
4005precautions."
4006As a result of the investigation DCI Allen Dulles sent a personal
4007letter to the Chief of Technical Oneiations of the Technical Services
4008Staff who had approved the experiment criticizing him for "poor
4009judgment... in authorizing the use of this drug on such an unwitting
4010basis and without proximate medical safeguards." 54 Dulles also sent
4011a letter to Dr. Gotilieb, Chief of the Chemical Division of the Techifiical Services Staff, criticizing him for recommending the "unwitting
4012application of the drug" in that the proposal "did not give sufficient
4013emphasis for medical collaboration and for the proper consideration
4014of the rights of the individual to whom it was being administered."
4015CTA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.
4016Ruwet Memorandum, p. 11.
4017CIA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.
4018Z2 Ibid.
4019Memorandum from the General Counsel to the Inspector General. 1/4/54.
4020" Memorandum from DCI to Chief, Technical Opeiutions, TSS, 2/12/54.
40217 Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12/54.
4022
402379
4024399
4025The letters were hand carried to the individuals to be read and
4026returned. Although the letters were critical, a note from the Deputy
4027Director of Central Intelligence to Mr. Helms instructed him to inform the individuals that: "These are not reprimands and no personnel file notation are being made." 5
4028Thus, although the Rockefeller Commission has characterized them
4029as such, these notes were explicitly not reprimands. Nor did participation in the events which led to Dr. Olson's death have any apparent
4030effect on the advancement within the CIA of the individuals involved.
40313. The Surreptitious Administration of LSD to Unwitting NonVolunteer Human Subjects by the CIA After the Death of Dr.
4032Olson
4033The death of Dr. Olson could be viewed, as some argued at the time,
4034as a tragic accident, one of the risks inherent in the testing of new substances. It might be argued that LSD was thought to be benign.
4035After the death of Dr. Olson the dangers of the surreptitious administration of LSD were clear, yet the CIA continued or initiated 11 a
4036project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to nonvolunteer human subjects. This program exposed numerous individuals
4037in the United States to the risk of death or serious injury without their
4038informed consent, without medical supervision, and without necessary
4039follow-up to determine any long-term effects.
4040Prior to the Olson experiment, the Director of Central Intelligence
4041had approved MKULTRA, a research program designed to develop
4042a "capability in the covert use of biological and chemical agent
4043materials." In the proposal describing MKULTRA Mr. Helms, then
4044ADDP, wrote the Director that:
4045we intend to investigate the development of a chemical material which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state,
4046the specific nature of which can be reasonably well predicted
4047for each individual. This material could potentially aid in
4048discrediting individuals, eliciting information, and implanting suggestions and other forms of mental control.5s
4049On February 12, 1954, the Director of the Central Intelligence
4050Agency wrote TSS officials criticizing them for "poor judgment" in
4051administering LSD on "an unwitting basis and without proximate
4052medical safeguards" to Dr. Olson and for the lack of "proper consideration of the rights of the individual to whom it was being administered." 59 On the same day, the Inspector General reviewed a report
4053on Subproject Number 3 of MKULTRA, in which the same TSS
4054officers who had just received letters from the Director were quoted
4055as stating that one of the purposes of Subproject Number 3 was to
40566 Note from DDCI to Richard Helms, 2/13/54.
4057" The 1963 IG Report, which described the project involving the surreptitious
4058administration of LSD, placed the project beginning in 1955. Other CIA documents reveal that it was in existence as early as February 1954. The CIA has
4059told the Committee that the project began in 1953 and that the experiment which
4060led to Dr. Olson's death was part of the project.
4061" Memorandum from ADDP items to DOI Dulles, 4/3/53, tab A, p. 2.
40620 Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12/54; and memorandum from
4063DCI to Chief of Operations, TSS, 2/12/54.
4064
4065400
4066"observe the behavior of unwitting persons being questioned after
4067having been given a drug." o There is no evidence that Subproject
4068Number 3 was terminated even though these officers were unequivocally aware of the dangers of the surreptitious administration of LSD
4069and the necessity of obtaining informed consent and providing medical
4070safeguards. Subproject Number 3, in fact, used methods which showed
4071even less concern than did the OLSON experiment for the safety and
4072security of the participants. Yet the evidence indicates the project
4073continued until 1963.61
4074In the project, the individual conducting the test might make
4075initial contact with a prospective subject selected at random in a bar.
4076He would then invite the person to a "safehouse" where the test drug
4077was administered to the subject through drink or in food. CIA personnel might debrief the individual conducting the test, or observe
4078the test by using a one-way mirror and tape recorder in an adjoining
4079room.
4080Prior consent was obviously not obtained from any of the subjects.
4081There was also, obviously, no medical prescreening. In addition, the
4082tests were conducted by individuals who were not qualified scientific
4083observers. There were no medical personnel on hand either to administer the drugs or to observe their effects, and no follow-up was conducted on the test subjects.
4084As the Inspector General noted in 1963:
4085A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is
4086the infeasibility of performing scientific observation of results. The [individuals conducting the test] are not qualified
4087scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in
4088perfecting delivery techniques, and in identifying surface
408962
4090characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and side-effect.
4091This was particularly troublesome as in a
4092number of instances, . . . the test subject has become ill for
4093hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one case,
4094and the agent could only follow up by guarded inquiry
4095after the test subject's return to normal life. Possible sickness
4096and attendant economic loss are inherent contingent effects
4097of the testing.6 3
4098Paradoxically, greater care seems to have been taken for the safety
4099of foreign nationals against whom LSD was used abroad. In several64
4100cases medical examinations were performed prior to the use of LSD.
41010 Memorandum to Inspector General from Chief, Inspection and Review, on
4102Subproject #3 of MKULTRA, 2/10/54.
4103IG Report on MKULTRA, 1963.
4104* Ibid., p. 12.
4105
4106"'Ibid. According to the IG's survey in 1963, physicians associated with
4107MKULTRA could be made available in an emergency.
4108" The Technical Services Division which was responsible for the operational
4109use of LSD abroad took the position that "no physical examination of the subject
4110is required prior to administration of [LSD] by TSS trained personnel. A physi-
4111
4112401
4113Moreover, the administration abroad was marked -by constant observation made possible because the material was being used against
4114prisoners of foreign intelligence or security organizations. Finally,
4115during certain of the LSD interrogations abroad, local physicians
4116were on call, though these physicians had had no experience with LSD
411765
4118and would not be told that hallucinogens had been administered.
4119of
4120The CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration
4121LSD to unwitting human subjects in the United States was finally
4122halted in 1963, as a result of its discovery during the course of an
4123Inspector General survey of the Technical Services Division. When
4124the Inspector General learned of the project, he spoke to the Deputy
4125Director for Plans, who agreed that the Director should be briefed.
4126The DDP made it clear that the DCI and his Deputy were generally
4127familiar with MKULTRA. He indicated, however, that he, was not
4128sure it was necessary to brief the DDCI at that point.
4129On May 24, 1963, the DDP advised the Inspector General that he had
4130briefed the Director on the MKULTRA program and in particular
4131had covered the question of the surreptitious administration of LSD
4132to unwitting human subjects. According to the Inspector General, the
4133DDP said that "the Director indicated no disagreement and therefore
4134the 'testing' will continue." 66
4135One copy of an "Eyes Only" draft report on MKULTRA was
4136prepared by the Inspector General who recommended the termination
4137of the surreptitious administration project. The project was suspended
4138following the Inspector General's report.
4139On December 17, 1963, Deputy Director for Plans Helms wrote a
4140memo to the DDCI, who with the Inspector General and the Executive
4141Director-Comptroller had opposed the covert testing. He noted two
4142aspects of the problem: (1) "for over a decade the Clandestine Services has had the mission of maintaining a capability for influencing
4143human behavior;" and (2) "testing arrangements in furtherance of
4144this mission should be as operationally realistic and yet as controllable
4145as possible." Helms argued that the individuals must be "unwitting"
4146as this was "the only realistic method of maintaining the capability,
4147considering the intended operational use of materials to influence
4148human behavior as the operational targets will certainly be unwitting.
4149Should the subjects of the testing not be unwitting, the program would
4150only be "pro forma" resulting in a "false sense of accomplishment and
4151readiness." 67 Helms continued:
4152clan need not be present. There is no danger medically in the use of this material
4153as handled by TSS trained personnel." The Office of Medical Services had taken
4154the position that LSD was "medically dangerous." Both the Office of Security
4155and the Office of Medical Services argued that LSD "should not be administered
4156unless preceded by a medical examination .. . and should be administered only
4157by or in the presence of a physician who had studied it and its effect." (Memorandum from James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to Chief of Operations, 12/12/57, pp. 1-2.
4158* Physicians might be called with the hope that they would make a diagnosis
4159of mental breakdown which would be useful in discrediting the individual who
4160was the subject of the CIA interest.
4161" Memorandum for the Record prepared by the Inspector General, 5/15/63, p. 1.
41626
4163Ibid., p. 2.
4164
4165402
4166If one grants the validity of the mission of maintaining this
4167unusual capability and the necessity for unwitting testing,
4168there is only then the question of how best to do it. Obviously,
4169the testing should be conducted in such a manner as to permit
4170the opportunity to observe the results of the administration
4171on the target. It also goes without saying that whatever testing arrangement we adopt must afford maximum safeguards
4172for the protection of the Agency's role in this activity, as
4173well as minimizing the possibility of physical or emotional
4174damage to the individual tested. 68
4175In another memo to the Director of Central Intelligence in June,
41761964, Helms again raised the issue of unwitting testing. At that time
4177General Carter, then acting DCI, approved several changes in the
4178MKTULTRA program proposed by Mr. Helms as a result of negotiations between the Inspector General and the DDP. In a handwritten
4179note, however, Director Carter added that "unwitting testing will be
4180subject to a separate decision." 69.
4181No specific decision was made then or soon after. The testing had
4182been halted and, according to Walter Elder, Executive Assistant to
4183DCI McCone, the DCI was not inclined to take the positive step of
4184authorizing a resumption of the testing. At least through the summer,
4185the DDP did not press the issue. On November 9, 1964, the DDP
4186raised the issue again in a memo to the DCI, calling the Director's
4187attention to what he described as "several other indications during
4188the past year of an apparent Soviet aggressiveness in the field of
4189covertly administered chemicals which are, to say the least, inexplicable and disturbing." o
4190Helms noted that because of the suspension of covert testing, the
4191Akgency's "positive operational capability to use drugs is diminishing,
4192owing to a lack of realistic testing. With increasing knowledge of the
4193state of the art, we are less capable of staying up with Soviet advances
4194in this field. This in turn results in a waning capability on our part
4195to restrain others in the intelligence community (such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing operations in this area." "
4196Helms attributed the cessation of the unwitting testing to the high
4197risk of embarrassment to the Agency as well as the "moral problem."
4198He noted that no better covert situation had been devised than that
4199which had been used, and that "we have no answer to the moral
4200issue." 72
4201
4202Helms asked for either resumption of the testing project or its definitive cancellation. He argued that the status quo of a research and development program without a realistic testing program was causing
4203the Agency to live "with the illusion of a capability which is becoming
4204minimal and furthermore is expensive." "7Once again no formal action
4205was taken in response to the Helms' request.
4206Memorandum from DDP Helms to DDCI Carter, 12/17/63.
4207* Memorandum from DDP Helms to DCI, 6/9/64, p. 3.
420870Ibid., 11/9/64, p. 1.
4209n Ibid., pp. 1-2.
4210"Ibid., p. 2.
42117 Ibid.
4212
4213403 .
4214From its beginning in the early 1950's until its termination in 1963,
4215the program of surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer human subjects demonstrates a failure of the CIA's leadership to pay adequate attention to the rights of individuals and to provide effective guidance to CIA employees. Though it was known that
4216the testing was dangerous, the lives of subjects were placed in jeopardy and their rights were ignored during the ten years of testing
4217which followed Dr. Olson's death. Although it was clear that the laws
4218of the United States were being violated, the testing continued. While
4219the individuals involved in the Olson experiment were admonished
4220by the Director, at the same time they were also told that they were
4221not being reprimanded and that their "bad judgment" would not be
4222made part of their personnel records. When the covert testing project
4223was terminated in 1963, none of the individuals involved were subject
4224to any disciplinary action.
42254. Monitoring and Control of the Testing and Use of-Chemical and
4226BiologicalAgents by the CIA
4227The Select Committee found numerous failures in the monitoring
4228and control of the testing and use of chemical and 'biological agents
4229within the CIA.74 An analysis of the failures can be divided into four
4230sections: (a) the waiver of normal regulations or requirements; (b)
4231the problems in authorization procedures; (c) the failure of internal
4232review mechanisms such as the Office of General Counsel, the Inspector
4233General, and the Audit Staff; and (d) the effect of compartmentation
4234and competition within the CIA.
4235a. The Waiver of Administrative Control.-The internal controls
4236within any agency rest on: (1) clear and coherent regulations; (2)
4237clear lines of authority; and (3) clear rewards for those who conduct
4238themselves in accord with agency regulations and understandable and
4239immediate sanctions against those who do not. In the case of the testing and use of chemical and biological agents, normal CIA administrative controls were waived. The destruction of the documents on the
4240largest CIA program in this area constituted a prominent example of
4241the waiver of normal Agency procedures by the Director.
4242These documents were destroyed in early 1973 at the order of then
4243DCI Richard Helms. According to Helms, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, then
4244Director of TSD:
4245...
4246
4247came to me and said that he was retiring and that I was
4248
4249retiring and he thought it would be a good idea if these files
4250were destroyed. And I also believe part of the reason for
4251our thinking this was advisable was there had been relationships with outsiders in government agencies and other organizations and that these would be sensitive in this kind of a
4252thing but that since the program was over and finished and
4253done with, we thought we would just get rid of the files as
4254"Section 2(9) of S. Res. 21 instructs the Committee to examine: the "extent
4255to which United States intelligence agencies are governed by Executive Orders,
4256rules, or regulations either published or secret."
4257
425884
4259404
4260well, so that anybody who assisted us in the past would not
4261be subject to follow-up or questions, embarrassment, if you
4262will."
4263The destruction was based on a waiver of an internal CIA regulation, CSI 70-10, which regulated the "retirement of inactive records."
4264As Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director of Plans, wrote in
4265regulation CSI-70-10: "Retirement is not a matter of convenience or
4266of storage but of conscious judgment in the application of the rules
4267modified by knowledge of individual component needs. The heart of
4268this judgment is to ensure that the complete story can be reconstructed
4269in later years and by people who may be unfamiliar with the events." "
4270The destruction of the MKULTRA documents made it impossible
4271for the Select Committee to determine the full range and extent of the
4272largest CIA research program involving chemical and biological
4273agents. The destruction also prevented the CIA from locating and providing medical assistance to the individuals who were subjects in the
4274program. Finally, it prevented the Committee from determining the
4275full extent of the operations which made use of materials developed in
4276the MKULTRA program.7 7
4277From the inception of MKULTRA normal Agency procedures were
4278waived. In 1953, Mr. Helms, then Assistant Deputy Director for Plans,
4279proposed the establishment of MKULTRA. Under the proposal six
4280percent of the research and development budget of TSD would be
4281expended "without the establishment of formal contractual relations"
4282because contracts would reveal government interest. Helms also voted
4283that qualified individuals in the field "are most reluctant to enter into
4284signed agreements of any sort which connect them with this activity
4285since such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputa" Richard Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 5.
4286'Many Agency documents recording confidential relationships with individuals
4287and organizations are retained without public disclosure. Moreover, in the case of
4288MKULTRA the CIA had spent millions of dollars developing both materials and
4289delivery systems which could be used by the Clandestine Services; the reconstruction of the research and development program would be difficult if not impossible, without the documents, and at least one assistant to Dr. Gottlieb protested
4290against the document destruction on those grounds.
4291" Clandestine Services Institution (CSI) 70-10. When asked by the Select
4292Committee about the regularity of the procedure by which he authorized Dr.
4293Gottlieb to destroy the MKULTRA records, Helms responded:
4294"Well, that's hard to say whether it would be part of the regular procedure or
4295not, because the record destruction program is conducted according to a certain
4296pattern. There's a regular record destruction pattern in the Agency monitored by
4297certain people and done a certain way. So that anything outside of that, I suppose,
4298would have been unusual. In other words, there were documents being destroyed
4299because somebody had raised this specific issue rather than because they were
4300encompassed in the regular records destruction program. So I think the answer
4301to your question is probably yes." (Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 6.)
43027 Even prior to the destruction of documents, the MKULTRA records were far
4303from complete. As the Inspector General noted in 1963:
4304"Files are notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking in evaluative statements that might give perspective to management policies over time. A substantial portion of the MKULTRA record appears to rest in the memories of the principal officers and is therefore almost certain to be lost with their departures."
4305(G Report on MKULTRA, p. 23.)
4306
4307405
4308tions"."8 Other Agency procedures, i.e., the forwarding of documents
4309in support of invoices and the provision for regular audit procedures,
4310were also to be waived. On April 13, 1953, then DCI Allen Dulles
4311approved MKULTRA, noting that security considerations precluded
4312handling the project through usual contractual agreements.
4313Ten years later investigations of MKULTRA by both the Inspector
4314General and the Audit Staff noted substantial deficiencies which resulted from the waivers. Because TSD had not reserved the right to
4315audit the books of contractors in MKULTRA, the CIA had been
4316unable to verify the use of Agency grants by a contractor. Another
4317firm had failed to establish controls and safeguards which would assure "proper accountability" in use of government funds with the
4318result that "funds have been used for purposes not contemplated by
4319grants or allowable under usual contract relationship." " The entire
4320MKULTRA arrangement was condemned for having administrative
4321lines which were unclear, overly permissive controls, and irresponsible supervision.
4322The head of the Audit Branch noted that inspections and audits:
4323led us to see MKULTRA as frequently having provided a
4324device to escape normal administrative controls for research
4325that is not especially sensitive, as having allowed practices
4326that produce gross administrative failures, as having permitted the establishment of special relationships with unreliable organizations on an unacceptable basis, and as having
4327produced, on at least one occasion, a cavalier treatment of a
4328bona fide contracting organization.
4329While admitting that there may be a need for special mechanisms
4330for handling sensitive projects, the Chief of the Audit Branch wrote
4331that "both the terms of reference and the ground rules for handling
4332such special projects should be spelled out in advance so that diversion from normal channels does not mean abandonment of controls.
4333Special procedures may be necessary to ensure the security of highly
4334sensitive operations. To prevent the erosion of normal internal control mechanisms, such waivers should not be extended to less sensitive
4335operations. Moreover, only those regulations which would endanger
4336security should be waived; to waive regulations generally would
4337result in highly sensitive and controversial projects having looser
4338rather than stricter administrative controls. MKNAOMI, the Fort
4339Detrick CIA project for research and development of chemical and
4340biological agents, provides another example where efforts to protect
4341the security of agency activties overwhelmed administrative controls.
4342No written records of the transfer of agents such as anthrax or shellfish toxin were kept, "because of the sensitivity of the area and the
4343desire to keep any possible use of materials like this recordless." 81 The
434411Memorandum from ADDP Helms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, Tab. A, p. 2.
4345- Memorandum from IG to Chief, TSD, 11/8/63, as quoted in memorandum
4346from Chief, Audit Branch.
4347' The memorandum suggested that administrative exclusions, because of the
4348importance of such decisions, should require the personal approval of the Deputy
4349Director of Central Intelligence on an inidividual case basis. Present CIA policy
4350is that only the DCI can authorize certain exemptions from regulations.
4351sxSidney Gottlieb testimony, 10/18/75, Hearings, Vol. 1, p. 51.
4352
435386
4354406
4355result was that the Agency had no way of determining what materials were on hand, and could not be certain whether delivery systems
4356such as dart guns, or deadly substances such as cobra venom had been
4357issued to the field.
4358b. Authorization.-The destruction of the documents regarding
4359MKULTRA made it difficult to determine at what level specific projects in the program were authorized. This problem is not solely a result of the document destruction, however. Even at the height of
4360MKULTRA the IG noted that, at least with respect to the surreptitious administration of LSD, the "present practice is to maintain no
4361records of the planning and approval of test programs." 82
4362While it is clear that Allen Dulles authorized MiKULTRA, the record is unclear as to who authorized specific projects such as that involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer human subjects. Even given the sensitive and controversial
4363nature of the project, there is no evidence that when John McCone
4364replaced Allen Dulles as the Director of the Central Intelligence
4365Agency he was briefed on the details of this project and asked whether
4366it should be continued."3 Even during the 1963 discussions on the propriety of unwitting testing, the DDP questioned whether it was "necessary to brief General Carter," the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Director's "alter ago," because CIA officers felt it necessary to keep details of the project restricted to an absolute minimum
4367number of people. 4
4368In May of 1963, DDP Helms told the Inspector General that the
4369covert testing program was authorized because he had gone to the
4370Director, briefed him on it and "the Director indicated no disagreement and therefore the testing will continue." 85 Such authorization
4371even for noncontroversial matters is clearly less desirable than explicit authorization; in areas such as the surreptitious administration
4372of drugs, it is particularly undesirable. Yet according to testimony
43732 IG Report on MKULTRA,
43741963, p. 14.
4375" According to an assistant to Dr. Gottlieb, there were annual briefings of the
4376DCI and the DDP on MKULTRA by the Chief of TSD or his deputy. However, a
4377May 15, 1963 Memorandum for the Record from the Inspector General noted that
4378Mr. McCone had not been briefed in detail about the program. Mr. McCone's Executive Officer, Walter Elder, testified that it was "perfectly apparent to me" that
4379neither Mr. McCone nor General Carter, then the DDCI, was aware of the surreptitious administration project "or if they had been briefed they had not understood it." (Elder, 12/18/75, p. 13.) Mr. McCone testified that he "did not know"
4380whether he talked to anyone about the project but that no one had told him about
4381it in a way that "would have turned on all the lights." (John McCone testimony,
43822/3/76, p. 10.)
4383" According to Elder's testimony, "no Deputy Director, to my knowledge,
4384has ever been briefed or was it ever thought necessary to brief them to the extent
4385to which you would brief the Director."
4386" IG Memorandum for the Record. 5/15/63.
4387On the question of authorization of the covert testing program, Elder testified
4388as follows:
4389"But my reasonable judgment is that this was considered to be in the area of
4390continuing approval, having once been approved by the Director."
4391The theory of authorization carrying over from one administration to the next
4392seems particularly inappropriate for less visible, highly sensitive operations
4393which, unless brought to his attention by subordinates, would not come to the
4394attention of the Director.
4395
439687
4397407
4398before the Committee, authorization through lack of agreement -is
4399even more prevalent in sensitive situations."
4400* The unauthorized retention of shellfish toxin by Dr. Nathan Gordon
4401and his subordinates, in violation of a Presidential Directive, may have
4402resulted from the failure of the Director to issue written instructions to
4403Agency officials. The retention was not authorized by senior officials in
4404the Agency. The Director, Mr. Helms, had instructed Mr. Karamessines, the Deputy Director of Plans, and Dr. Gottlieb, the Chief of
4405Technical Services Division, to relinquish control to the Army of any
4406chemical or biological agents being retained for the CIA at Fort Detrick. Dr. Gottlieb passed this instruction on to Dr. Gordon. While
4407orders may be disregarded in any organization, one of the reasons that
4408Dr. Gordon used to defend the retention was the fact that he had not
4409received written instructions forbidding it.87
4410In some situations the existence of written instructions did not prevent unauthorized actions. According to an investigation by the CIA's
4411Inspector General TSD officers had been informed orally that Mr.
4412Helns was to be "advised at all times" when LSD was to be used. In
4413addition TSD had received a memo advising the staff that LSD was
4414not to be used without the permission of the DDP, Frank Wisner. The
4415experiment involving Dr. Olson went ahead without notification of
4416either Mr. Wisner or Mr. Helms. The absence of clear and immediate
4417punishment for that act must undercut the force of other internal instructions and regulations.
4418One last issue must be raised about authorization procedures within
4419the Agency. Chemical agents were used abroad until 1959 for discrediting or disabling operations, or for the purpose of interrogations
4420with the approval of the Chief of Operations of the DDP. Later the
4421approval of the Deputy Director for Plans was required for such
4422operations. Although the medical staff sought to be part of the approval process for these operations, they were excluded because, as the
4423Inspector General wrote in 1957:
4424Operational determinations are the responsibility of the
4425DD/P and it is he who should advise the DCI in these
4426respects just as it is he who is responsible for the results. It
4427is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief,
4428Medical Staff, (what, in effect, would be authority over clandestine operations.)"
4429Given the expertise and training of physicians, participation of the
4430Medical Staff might well have been useful.
4431Questions about authorization also exist in regard to those agencies
4432which assisted the CIA. For instance, the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non-volunteer human
4433subjects was conducted in coordination with the Bureau of Narcotics
4434and Dangerous Drugs. There is some question as to the Commissioner
4435of Narcotics' knowledge about the project.
4436
4437a Mr. Elder was asked whether the process of bringing forward a description of
4438actions by the Agency in getting approval through the absence of disagreement
4439was a common one. He responded, "It was not uncommon. . . . The more sensitive
4440the project the more likely it would lean toward being a common practice, based
4441on the need to keep the written record to a minimum."
44428 Nathan Gordan testimony, 9/16/75, Hearings, Vol. 1.
4443* 1957 IG Report.
4444
444588
4446-
4447
4448408
4449
4450In 1963, the Inspector General noted that the head of the BNDD
4451had been briefed about the project, but the IG's report did not indicate the level of detail provided to him. Dr. Gottlieb testified that "I
4452remember meeting Mr. Anslinger and had the general feeling that he
4453was aware." 89 Another CIA officer did not recall any discussion of
4454testing on unwitting subjects when he and Dr. Gottlieb met with Commissioner Anslinger.
4455In a memorandum for the record in 1967 Dr. Gottlieb stated that
4456Harry Giordano, who replaced Mr. Anslinger, told Dr. Gottlieb that
4457when he became Commissioner he was "only generally briefed on the
4458arrangements, gave it his general blessing, and said he didn't want to
4459know the details." The same memorandum states, however, that there
4460were several comments which indicated to Dr. Gottlieb that Mr. Giordano was aware of the substance of the project. It is possible that
4461the Commissioner provided a general authorization for the arrangement without understanding what it entailed or considering its propriety. A reluctance to seek detailed information from the CIA, and
4462the CIA's hesitancy to volunteer it, has -been found in a number of
4463instances during the Select Committee's investigations. This problem
4464is not confined to the executive branch but has also marked congressional relationships with the Agency.
4465c. Internal Review.-The waiver of regulations and the absence of
4466documentation make it difficult to determine now who authorized
4467which activities. More importantly, they made internal Agency review
4468mechanisms much less effective."o Controversial and highly sensitive
4469projects which should have been subject to the most rigorous inspection
4470lacked effective internal review.
4471Given the role of the General Counsel and his reaction to the surreptitious administration of LSD to Dr. Olson, it would have seemed
4472likely that he would be asked about the le'ality or propriety of any
4473subsequent projects involving such administration. This was not done.
4474He did not learn about this testing until the 1970's. Nor was the General Counsel's opinion sought on other MKULTRA projects, though
4475these had been characterized by the Inspector General in the 1957
4476Report on TSD as "unethical and illicit."91
4477There is no mention in the report of the 1957 Inspector General's
4478survey of TSD of the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD. That project was apparently not brought to the attention
4479of the survey team. The Inspector who discovered it during the IG's
44801963 survey of TSD recalls coming upon evidence of it inadvertently,
4481" Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 28.
44829 The IG's report on MKULTRA In 1963 stated:
4483"The original charter documents specified that TSD maintain exacting control of MKULTRA activities. In so doing, however, TSD has pursued a philosophy of minimum documentation in keeping with the high sensitivity of some
4484of the projects. Some files were found to present a reasonably complete record,
4485including most sensitive matters, while others with parallel objectives contained
4486little or no data at all. The lack of consistent records precluded use of routine
4487inspection procedures and raised a variety of questions concerning management and fiscal controls."
4488" CIA, Inspector General's report on TSD, 1957, p. 217.
4489
4490409
4491been called to his attention as an especially
4492rather than its having
4493sensitive project. 9 2
4494Thus both the General Counsel and the Inspector General, the principal internal mechanisms for the control of possibly improper actions,
4495were excluded from regular reviews of the project. When the project
4496was discovered the Executive Director-Comptroller voiced strong opposition to it; it is possible that the project would have been terminated in 1957 if it had been called to his attention when he then served
4497as Inspector General.
4498The Audit Staff, which also serves an internal review function
4499through the examination of Agency expenditures, also encountered
4500substantial difficulty with MKULTRA. When MKULTRA was first
4501proposed the Audit Staff was to be excluded from any function. This
4502was soon changed. However, the waiver of normal "contractual procedures" in MIULTRA increased the likelihood of "irregularities"
4503as well as the difficulty in detecting them. The head of the Audit
4504Branch characterized the MKULTRA procedures as "having allowed
4505practices that produced gross administrative failures," including a
4506lack of controls within outside contractors which would "assure proper
4507accountability in use of government funds." It also diminished the
4508CIA's capacity to verify the accountings provided by outside firms.
4509d. Compartmentation and Jurisdictional Conflict Within the
4510Agency.-As has been noted, the testing and use of chemical and
4511biological agents yas treated as a highly sensitive activity within the
4512CIA, This resulted in a high degree of compartmentation. At the same
4513time substantial jurisdictional conflict existed within the Agency between the Technical Services Division, and the Office of Medical Services and the Office of Security.
4514This compartmentation and jurisdictional conflict may well have
4515led to duplication of effort within the CIA and to Agency policymakers being deprived of useful information.
4516During the early 1950's first the BLUEBIRD Committee and then
4517the ARTICHOKE Committee were instituted to bring together representatives of the Agency components which had a legitimate interest in the area of the alteration of human behavior. By 1957 both these
4518committees had fallen into disuse. No information went to the Technical Services Division (a component supposedly represented on the
4519ARTICHOKE Committee) about ARTICHOKE operations being
4520conducted by the Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services.
4521The Technical Services Division which was providing support to the
4522Clandestine Services in the use of chemical and biological agents, but
4523provided little or no information to either the Office of Security or the
4524Office of Medical Services. As one TSD officer involved in these prowe were acquainted, we certainly didn't
4525grams testified: "Although
452693
4527share experiences."
4528" Even after the Inspector came upon it the IG did not perform a complete
4529investigation of it. It was discovered at the end of an extensive survey of TSD
4530and the Inspector was in the process of being transferred to another post within
4531the Agency.
4532"Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 14.
4533
453490
4535410
4536QKHILLTOP, another group designed to coordinate research in
4537this area also had little success. The group met infrequently-only
4538twice a year-and little specific information was exchanged. 9
4539Concern over security obviously played some role in the failure to
4540share information,95 but this appears not to be the only reason. A TSD
4541officer stated that the Office of Medical Services simply wasn't "particularly interested in what we were doing" and never sought such
4542information.6 On the other hand, a representative of the Office of
4543Medical Services consistently sought to have medical personnel participate in the use of chemical and biological agents suggested that
4544TSD did not inform the Office of Medical Services in order to prevent their involvement.
4545Jurisdictional conflict was constant in this area. The Office of
4546Security, which had been assigned responsibility for direction of
4547ARTICHOKE, consistently sought to bring TSD operations involving psychochemicals under the ARTICHOKE umbrella. The
4548Office of Medical Services sought to have OMS physicians advise and
4549participate in the operational use of drugs. As the Inspector General described it in 1957, "the basic issue is concerned with the extent
4550of authority that should be exercised by the Chief, Medical Staff, over
4551the activities of TSD which encroach upon or enter into the medical
4552field," and which are conducted by TSD "without seeking the prior
4553approval of the Chief, Medical Staff, and often without informing
4554him of their nature and extent." 97
4555As was noted previously, because the projects and programs of
4556TSD stemmed directly from operational needs controlled by the
4557DDP, the IG recommended no further supervision of these activities by the Medical Staff :
4558It is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the
4559Chief, Medical Staff, what, in effect, would be authority over
4560clandestine operations. Furthermore, some of the activities
4561of Chemical Division are not only unorthodox but unethical
4562and sometimes illegal. The DDP is in a better position to
4563evaluate the justification for such operations than the Chief,
4564Medical Staff .9 [Emphasis added.]
4565Because the advice of the Director of Security was needed for
4566"evaluating the risks involved" in the programs and because the
4567knowledge that the CIA was "engaging in unethical and illicit activities would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic
4568circles," the IG recommended that the Director of Security be fully
4569advised of TSD's activities in these areas.
4570Even after the Inspector General's Report of 1957, the compartmentation and jurisdictional conflict continued. They may have had a subThe one set of minutes from a QKHILLTOP meeting indicated that individuals in the Office of Medical Services stressed the need for more contact.
4571' When asked why information on the surreptitious administration of LSI)
4572was not presented to the ARTICHOKE committee, Dr. Gottlieb responded: "I
4573imagine the only reason would have been a concern for broadening the awareness of its existence."
4574'IA ifficer. 11/21/75. p. 14.
4575IG Survey of TS), 1957. p. 217.
45760a
4577
4578Ibid.
4579
458091
4581411
4582stantial negative impact on policymaking in the Agency. As the Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff noted in 1958, due to the
4583different positions taken by TSS, the Office of Security, and the Office
4584of Medical Services on the use of chemical or biological agents, it was
4585possible that the individual who authorized the use of a chemical or
4586biological agent could be presented with "incomplete facts upon which
4587to make a decision relevant to its use." Even a committee set up by the
4588DDP in 1958 to attempt to rationalize Agency policy did not have access to records of testing and use. This was due, in part, to excessive
4589compartmentation, and jurisdictional conflict.
4590TESTING ON HUMAN SUBJECTS BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
4591MATERIAL TESTING PROGRAM EA 1729, PROJECT THIRD
4592CHANGE, AND PROJECT DERBY HAT
4593
4594C. COVERT
4595
4596Gnours:
4597
4598EA 1729 is the designator used in the Army drug testing program
4599for Ivsergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Interest in LSD was originally
4600by open literaaroused at the Army's Chemical Warfare Laboratories
460199
4602intellipositive
4603The
4604compound.
4605the
4606of
4607effects
4608unusual
4609the
4610on
4611ture
4612compounds like
4613gence and counterintelligence potential envisioned for
4614100
4615supported the
4616LSD, and suspected Soviet interest in such materials,
4617development of an American military capability and resulted in experiments conducted jointly by the U.S. Army Intelligence Board and
4618the Chemical Warfare Laboratories.
4619These experiments, designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses
4620of LSD, were known collectively as "Material Testing Program EA
46211729." Two projects of particular interest conducted as part of these
4622experiments, "THIRD CHANCE" and "DERBY HAT", involved
4623the administration of LSD to unwitting subjects in Europe and the
4624Far East.
4625In many respects, the Army's testing programs duplicated research
4626which had already been conducted by the CIA. They certainly involved
4627the risks inherent in the early phases of drug testing. In the Army's
4628tests, as with those of the CIA, individual rights were also subordinated to national security considerations; informed consent and followup examinations of subjects were neglected in efforts to maintain the
4629secrecy of the tests. Finally, the command and control problems which
4630were apparent in the CIA's programs are paralleled by a lack of clear
4631authorization and supervision in the Army's programs.
4632" USAINTC staff study, "Material Testing Program, EA 1729," 10/15/59, p. 4.
4633'This same USAINTC study cited "A 1952 (several years prior to initial U.S.
4634interest in LSD-25) report that the Soviets purchased a large quantity of LSD-25
4635from the Sandoz Company in 1951, reputed to be sufficient for 50 million doses."
4636(Ibid., p. 16.)
4637Generally accepted Soviet methods and counterintelligence concerns were also
4638strong motivating factors in the initiation of this research:
4639"A primary justification for field experimentation in intelligence with EA 1729
4640is the counter-intelligence or defense implication. We know that the enemy philosophy condones any kind of coercion or violence for intelligence purposes. There
4641is proof that his intelligence service has used drugs in the past. There is strong
4642evidence of keen interest in EA 1729 by him. If for no other purpose than to know
4643what to expect from enemy intelligence use of the material and to, thus, he prepared to counter it, field experimentation is justified." (Ibid, p. 34)
4644
4645412
46461. Scope of Testing
4647Between 1955 and 1958 research was initiated by the Army Chemical
4648Corps to evaluate the potential for LSD as a chemical warfare incapacitating agent.. In the course of this research, LSD was administered
4649to more than 1,000 American volunteers who then participated in a
4650series of tests designed to ascertain the effects of the drug on their
4651ability to function as soldiers. With the exception of one set of tests
4652at Fort Bragg, these and subsequent laboratory experiments to evaluate chemical warfare potential were conducted at the Army Chemical
4653Warfare Laboratories, Edgewood, Maryland.
4654In 1958 a new series of laboratory tests were initiated at Edgewood.
4655These experiments were conducted as the initial phase of Material
4656Testing Program EA 1729 to evaluate the intelligence potential of
4657LSD, and included LSD tests on 95 volunteers.o' As part of these
4658tests, three structured experiments were conducted:
46591. LSD was administered surreptitiously at a simulated
4660social reception to volunteer subjects who were unaware of
4661the purpose or nature of the tests in which they were
4662participating;
46632. LSD was administered to volunteers who were subsequently polygraphed; and
46643. LSD was administered to volunteers who were then
4665confined to "isolation chambers".
4666These structured experiments were designed to evaluate the validity
4667of the traditional security training all subjects had undergone in the
4668face of unconventional, drug enhanced, interrogations.
4669At the conclusion of the laboratory test phase of Material Testing
4670Program EA 1729 in 1960, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for
4671Intelligence (ACSI) authorized operational field testing of LSD. The
4672first field tests were conducted in Europe by an Army Special Purpose Team (SPT) during the period from May to August of 1961.
4673These tests were known as Project THIRD CHANCE and involved
4674eleven separate interrogations of ten subjects, None of the subjects
4675were volunteers and none were aware that they were to receive
4676LSD. All but one subject, a U.S. soldier implicated in the theft of
4677classified documents, were alleged to be foreign intelligence sources
4678or agents. While interrogations of these individuals were only moderately successful, at least one subject (the U.S. soldier) exhibited
4679symptoms of severe paranoia while under the influence of the drug.
4680The second series of field tests, Project DERBY HAT, were conducted by an Army SPT in the Far East during the period
4681from August to November of 1962. Seven subjects were interrogated
4682under DERBY HAT, all of whom were foreign nationals either suspected of dealing in narcotics or implicated in foreign intelligence
4683operations. The purpose of this second set of experiments was to collect additional data on the utility of LSD in field interrogations, and
4684to evaluate any different effects the drug might have on "Orientals."
4685Inspector General of the Army Report. "Use of Volunteers in Chemical Agent
4686Research," 3/10/76. p. 138.
4687Wt
4688
4689413
4690
46912. Inadequate CoordinationAmong IntelligenceAgencies
4692On October 15, 1959, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center prepared
4693lengthy staff study on Material Testing Program EA 1729. The stated
4694purpose of the staff study was: "to determine the desirability of EA
46951729 on non-US subjects in selected actual operations under controlled
4696conditions. 1 0 2 It was on the basis of this study that operational field
4697tests were later conducted.
4698After noting that the Chemical Warfare Laboratories began experiments with LSD on humans in 1955 and had administered the drug
4699to over 1,000 volunteers, the "background" section of the study
4700concluded:
4701There has not been a single case of residual ill effect. Study
4702of the prolific scientific literature on LSD-25 and personal
4703communication between US Army Chemical Corps personnel and other researchers in this field have failed to disclose
4704an authenticated instance of irreversible change being produced in normal humans by the drug. 0 3
4705This conclusion was reached despite an awareness that there were
4706inherent medical dangers in such experimentation. In the body of this
4707same study it is noted that:
4708The view has been expressed that EA 1729 is a potentially
4709dangerous drug, whose pharmaceutical actions are not fully
4710understood and there has been cited the possibility of the
4711continuance of a chemically induced psychosis in chronic:
4712form, particularly if a latent schizophrenic were a subject,
4713with consequent claim or representation against the U.S.
4714Government.'0
4715An attempt was made to minimize potential medical hazards by careful selection of subjects prior to field tests. Rejecting evidence that
4716the drug might be hazardous, the study continued:
4717The claim of possible permanent damage caused by EA 1729
4718is an unproven hypothesis based on the characteristic effect
4719of the material. While the added stress of a real situation
4720may increase the probability of permanent adverse effect,
4721the resulting risk is deemed to be slight by the medical research personnel of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories.To
4722prevent even such a slight risk, the proposed plan for field
4723experimentation calls for overt, if possible, or contrivedthrough-ruse, if necessary, physical and mental examination
4724of any real situation subject prior to employment of the
4725subject.10 5
4726This conclusion was drawn six years after one deaith had occurred
4727which could be attributed, at least in part., to the effects of the
4728very drug the Army was proposing to field test.. The USAINTC staff,
4729however, was apparently unaware of the circumstances surrounding Dr. Olson's death. This lack of knowledge is indicative of the
4730TISAINTC staff study. "Material TEsting Program EA 1729." 10/15/.9, p. 4.
4731Ibid., p. 4.
4732'Ibid.. p. 25.
4733
4734"
4735
4736"03
4737
473810
4739
4740Ibid.
4741
474296-408 0 - 77 - 7
4743
4744414
4745general lack of interagency communication on drug related research.
4746As the October 1959 study noted, "there has been no coordination
4747with other intelligence agencies up to the present." 10G
4748
4749On December 7, 1959, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelli-
4750
4751gence (ACSI, apparently a General Willems) was briefed on the
4752proposed operational use of LSD by VUSAINTC Project Officer Jacobson, in preparation for Project. THIRD CHANCE. General Willems
4753expressed concern that the project had not been coordinated with the
4754FBI and the CIA. He is quoted as saying "that if this project is going
4755to be worth anything it [LSD] should be used on higher types of
4756non-U.S. subjects" in other words "staffers." He indicated this could
4757be accomplished if the CIA were brought in. The summary of the
4758briefing prepared by a MajorMIehorskY continues: "Of particular note
4759is that ACSI did not. direct coordination with CIA and the FBI but
4760only mentioned it for consideration by the planners." 107
4761After the briefing, four colonels, two lieutenant colonels and Major
4762Mehovsky iet to discuss interagency cooperation with CIA and FBI.
4763The group consensus was to postplone efforts toward coordination:
4764Lt. Col. Jacobson commented that before we coordinate with
4765CIA we should have more factual findings from field experimentation with counterintelligence cases that will strengthen
4766our position and proposal for cooperation. This approach
4767was agreed to by the conferees. 08
4768Had such coordination been achieved, the safety of these experiments
4769might have been viewed differently and the tests themselves might
4770have been seen as unnecessary.
47713. Subordination of Individual Rights to National Security Considerations
4772Just as many of these experiments may have been unnecessary, the
4773nature of the operational tests (polygraph-assisted interrogations of
4774drugged suspects) reflects a basic disregard for the fundamental
4775human rights of the subjects. The interrogation of an American
4776soldier as part of the THIRD CHANCE 1961 tests is an example of
4777this disregard.
4778The "trip report" for Project THIRD CHANCE, dated September 6, 1961, recounts the circumstances surrounding and the results of
4779the tests as follows:
4780[The subject] was a U.S. soldier who had confessed to theft
4781of classified documents. Conventional methods had failed to
4782ascertain whether espionage intent was involved. A significant
4783new admission by subject that lie told a fellow soldier of the
4784theft while lie still had the documents in his possession was
4785obtained during the EA 1729 interrogation along with other
4786variations of Subject's previous account. The interrogation
4787results were deemed by the local operational authority satisfactory evidence of Subject's claim of innocence in regard to
4788espionage intent.o 9
4789
4790'Ibid.,
47910
47921'
479310
4794
4795p. 6.
4796
4797Mehovsky Fact Sheet, 12/9/60, p. 1.
4798Ibid., p. 2.
4799
4800SPT Trip Report, Operation THIRD CHANCE, 9/6/61, p. 5.
4801
4802415
4803The subject apparently reacted very strongly to the drug, and the
4804interrogation, while productive, was difficult. The trip report
4805concluded:
4806(1) This case demonstrated the ability to interrogate a
4807subject profitably throughout a highly sustained and almost
4808incapacitating reaction to EA 1729.
4809(2) The apparent value of bringing a subject into the EA
48101729 situation in a highly stressed state was indicated.
4811(3) The usefulness of employing as a duress factor the device of inviting the subject's attention to his EA 1729influenced state and threatening to extend this state indefinitely even to a permanent condition of insanity, or to
4812bring it to an end at the discretion of the interrogators was
4813shown to be effective.
4814(4) The need for preplanned precautions against extreme
4815paranoiac reaction to EA 1729 was indicated.
4816(5) It was brought to attention by this case that where subject has undergone extended intensive interrogation prior to
4817the EA 1729 episode and has persisted in a version repeatedly
4818during conventional interrogation, adherence to the same version while under EA 1729 influence, however extreme the reaction, may not necessarily be evidence of truth but merely the
4819ability to adhere to a well rehearsed story."x0
4820This strong reaction to the drug and the accompanying discomfort
4821this individual suffered were exploited by the use of traditional interrogation techniques. While there is no evidence that physical violence
4822or torture were employed in connection with this interrogation, physical and psychological techniques were used in the THIRD CHANCE
4823experiments to exploit the subjects' altered mental state, and to maxiinize the stress situation. Jacobson described these methods in his trip
4824report:
4825Stressing techniques employed included silent treatment before or after EA 1729 administration, sustained conventional
4826interrogation prior to EA 1729 interrogation, deprivation of
4827food, drink, sleep or bodily evacuation, sustained isolation
4828prior to EA 1729 administration, hot-cold switches in approach, duress "pitches", verbal degradation and bodily discomfort, or dramatized threats to subject's life or mental
4829health."'
4830Another gross violation of an individual's fundamental rights occurred in September 1962 as part of the Army's DERBY HAT tests
4831in the Far East. A suspected Asian espionage agent was given 6
4832micrograms of LSD per kilogram of bodyweight. The administration
4833of the drug was completed at 1035 that morning:
4834At 1120, sweating became evident, his pulse became thready.
4835He was placed in a supine position. He began groaning with
4836expiration and became semicomatose.112
4837.o Ibid., pp. 17-18.
4838"' Ibid., p. 13.
4839
4840""DERBY
4841p. D10-2.
4842
4843HAT" Medical and Pharmacological Report: Case #1,
4844
48459/20/62,
4846
4847416
4848For the next 28 minutes, the subject remained semicomatose.
4849At 1148, responses to painful stimuli were slightly improved.
4850At 1155, he was helped to a sitting position.
4851At 1200, he became shocky again and was returned to supine
4852position.
4853At 1212, he was more alert and able to sit up with help.
4854At 1220, Subject was assisted to the interrogation table.
4855At 1230, he began moaning he wanted to die and usually
4856ignored questions. Rarely he stated "he didn't know."
4857At 1250, his phasic alertness persisted. He frequently refocused his eyes with eyelid assistance. He frequently threw
4858his head back with eyes closed.
4859At 1330, he was slightly more alert. He was forced-walked for
48605 minutes. He physically would cooperate until he became
4861shocky again (sweating, thready pulse, pale).
4862For the next three hours the subject remained in about the same condition. Continued attempts at interrogation yielded no relevant
4863answers. Six hours after receiving the drug, the subject began giving
4864relevant answers to questions. Eight and one-half hours after the
4865initial dosage, the subject was polygraphed. The interrogation continued for seventeen and one-half hours after the drug was administered.
4866There was some psychological and medical screening of the individuals tested within the United States, in Europe, and in
4867Asia. The proposal for the field experimentation in fact called for
4868such examinations. The fact of prescreening did not eliminate the
4869risk of injury; .the availability of medical staff did, however, limit
4870injury and may well have prevented the death of one or more of the
4871subjects. As the medical corps member of the team which surreptitiously administered the LSD noted, "one subject. . . did collapse after
4872the interrogation and the presence of the medical officer was not only
4873of value to the subject but to the interrogation team who were thus
4874assured that an unnecessary untoward result would not occur." "1
4875In the October 15, 1959, USAINTC staff study, moral and legal
4876ramifications of covert administration of LSD in field conditions were
4877considered.
4878It was always a tenet of Army Intelligence that the basic
4879American principle of the dignity and welfare of the individual will not be violated. . . . A more meticulous regard
4880for the prohibition against violence or duress is taken in
4881practice when the suspect is a US citizen or ally as against
4882an actual or potential enemy, in peace as against war, and in
4883respect to the nature of the crime. . . . In intelligence, the
4884stakes involved and the interests of national security may
4885permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values,
4886but not. legal
4887"n Ibid., p. D10-3.
4888
4889limits, through necessity. . . . Any
4890
4891' SPT Trip Report, Operation THIRD CHANCE, 7/25/61, p. 1.
4892
4893claim
4894
4895417
4896against the US Government for alleged injury due to EA
48971729 must be legally shown to have been due to the material.
4898Proper security and appropriate operational techniques
4899can protect the fact of employment of EA 1729.116
4900On the basis of this evaluation, the stiidy concluded that in view of
4901"the stakes involved and the interests of national security," the proposed phtn for field testing should be approved.
4902The surreptitious administration of drugs to unwitting subjects by
4903the Army raises serious constitutional and legal issues. The consideration given these issues by the Army was wholly insufficient. The character of the Army's volunteer testing program and the possibility that
4904drugs were simply substituted for other forms of violence or duress in
4905field interrogations raises serious doubts as to whether national security imperatives were properly interpreted. The "consent" forms
4906which each American volunteer signed prior to the administration of
4907LSD are a case in point. These forms contained no mention of the
4908medical and psychological risks inherent in such testing, nor do they
4909mention the nature of the psychotrophic drug to be administered:
4910The general nature of the experiments in which I have
4911voluteered. have been explained to me from the standpoint
4912of jossible hazards to my health. It is my understandingthat
4913the experime:dz are so designed, based on the results of
4914aniibals and previous human experimentation, that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment. I understand further that experiments will be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and medical
4915suffering and injury, and that I ,uill be at liberty to request
4916that the experiments be terminated at any time if in my opinion I have reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiments becomes undesirable.
4917I recognize that in the pursuit of certain experiments
4918transitorydiscomfort may occur. I recognize, also, that under
4919these circumstances, I must rely upon the skill and wisdom
4920of the physician supervising the experiment to institute whatever medical or surgical measures are indicated. [Emphasis
4921added.] i1s
4922
4923The exclusion of any specific discussion of the nature of LSD in
4924these forms raises serious doubts as to their validity. An "understanding . . . that the anticipated results will justify the performance of
4925the experiment" without full knowledge of the nature of the experiment is an incomplete "understanding." Similarly, the nature of the
4926experiment limited the ability of both the subject to request its request its termination and the experimenter to implement such a request.
4927Finally, the euphemistic characterization of "transitory discomfort"
4928and the agreement to "rely on the skill and wisdom of the physician"
4929combine to conceal inherent risks in the experimentation and may be
4930viewed as disolving the experimenter of personal responsibility for
4931damaging aftereffects. In summary, a "volunteer" program in which
4932subjects are not fully informed of potential hazards to their persons
4933is ''voluinteer" in name only.
4934u9USAINTC staff study, "Material Testing Program EA 1729," 10/15/59, p. 26.
4935" Sample volunteer consent form.
4936
4937418
4938This problem was compounded by the security statements signed
4939by each volunteer before he participated in the testing. As part of
4940this statement, potential subjects agreed that they would:
4941. not divulge or make available any information related
4942to U.S. Army Intelligence Center interest or participation in
4943the Department of the Army Medical Research Volunteer
4944Program to any individual, nation, organization, business,
4945association, or other group or entity, not officially authorized
4946to receive such information.
4947I understand that any action contrary to the provisions of
4948this statement will render me liable to punishment under the
4949provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.119
4950Under these provisions, a volunteer experiencing aftereffects of the test
4951might have been unable to seek immediate medical assistance.
4952This disregard for the well-being of subjects drug testing is inexcusable. Further, the absence of any comprehensive long-term
4953medical assistance for the subjects of these experiments is not only
4954unscientific; it is also unprofessional.
4955
49564. Lack of Normal Authorization and Supervision
4957
4958It is apparent from documents supplied to the Committee that the
4959Army's testing programs often operated under informal and nonroutine authorization. Potentially dangerous operations such as these
4960testing programs are the very projects which ought to be subject to
4961the closest internal scrutiny at the highest levels of the military command structure. There are numerous examples of inadequate review,
4962partial consideration, and incomplete approval in the administration
4963of these programs.
4964When the first Army program to use LSD on American soldiers in
4965"field stations" -was authorized in May 1955, the Army violated its
4966own procedures in obtaining approval. Under Army Chief of Staff
4967Memorandum 385, such proposals were to be personally approved by
4968the Secretary of the Army. Although the plan was submitted to him
4969on April 26, 1956, the Secretary issued no written authorization for
4970the project, and there is no evidence that he either reviewed or approved the plan. Less than a month later, 20the Army Chief of Staff
4971issued a memorandum authorizing the tests.1
4972Subsequent testing of LSD under Material Testing Program EA
49731729 operated generally under this authorization. When the plans for
4974this testing were originally discussed in early 1958 by officials of the
4975Army Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird and representatives of
4976the Chemical Warfare Center at Edgewood Arsenal, aivinformal proposal was formulated. This proposal was submitted to the Medical
4977Research Directorate at Edgewood by the President of the Army Intelligence Board on June 3, 1958. There is no evidence that the plan
4978was approved at any level higher than the President of the Intelligence Board or the Commanding General of Edgewood. The approval
4979at Edgewood appears to have been issued by the Commander's Adjutant. The Medical Research Laboratories did not submit the plan to
4980the Surgeon General for approval (a standard procedure) because
4981Sample Volunteer Security Statement.
4982Inspector General of the Army Report, "Use of Volunteers in Chemical
4983Agent Research," 3/10/76, p. 109.
4984
498599
4986419
4987the new program was ostensibly covered by the authorizations granted
4988in May 1956.121
4989The two projects involving the operational use of LSD (THIRD
4990CHANCE and DERBY HAT) were apparently approved by the
4991Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (General Willems) on
4992December 7, 1960.'22 This verbal approval came in the course of a
4993briefing on previous drug programs and on the planned field experimentation. There is no record of written approval being issued by the
4994ACSI to authorize these specific projects until January 1961, and
4995there is no record of any specific knowledge or approval by the Secretary of the Army.
4996On February 4, 1963, Major General C. F. Leonard, Army ACSI,
4997forwarded a copy of the THIRD CHANCE Trip Report to Army
4998Chief of Staff, General Earl Wheeler. 123 Wheeler had apparently
4999requested a copy on February 2. The report was routed through a General Hamlett. While this report included background on the origins
5000of the LSD tests, it appears that General 24Wheeler may only have read
5001The office 25memorandum
5002the conclusion and recommendations.
5003accompanying the Trip Report bears Wheeler's initials.1
50045. Terminationof Te8ting
5005On April 10, 1963, a briefing was held in the ACSI's office on the
5006results of Projects THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT. Both
5007SPT's concluded that more field testing was required before LSD
5008could be utilized as an integral aid to counterintelligence interrogations. During the presentation of the DERBY HAT results, General
5009Leonard (Deputy ACSI) directed that no further field testing be
5010undertaken. 1 2 6 After this meeting the ACSI sent a letter to the Commanding General of the Army Combat Developments Command
5011(CDC) requesting that he review THIRD CHANCE and DERBY
5012HAT and "make a net evaluation concerning the adoption of EA 1729
5013for future use as an effective and profitable aid in counterintelligence
5014interrogations." 127 On the same day the ACSI requested that the CDC
5015Commander revise regulation FM 30-17 to read in part:
5016...
5017
5018in no instance will drugs be used as an aid to interro-
5019
5020gations in counterintelligence or security operations without
5021prior permission of the Department of the Army. Requests
5022to use drugs as an investigative aid will be forwarded through
5023intelligence channels to the OACSI, DA, for approval....
5024Medical research has established that information obtained
5025through the use of these drugs is unreliable and invalid....
5026It is considered that DA [Army] approval must be a prerequisite for use of such drugs because of the moral, legal,
5027problems inherent in their use for intelmedical and political
502828
5029purposes.
5030ligence
5031"' Ibid., pp. 135, 137, 138.
5032
5033Mehovsky Fact Sheet, 12/9/60.
5034Memorandum from Leonard to Wheeler, 2/4/63.
5035u' SGS memorandum to Wheeler through Hamlett, 2/5/63.
5036'2s Ibid.
50377 M1aj. F. Barnett, memorandum for the record, 8/12/63.
5038" Yamaki memorandum for the record, 7/16/63.
50391"2
5040
5041"7
5042
5043Ibid.
5044
5045420
5046The subsequent adoption of this regulation marked the effective termination of field testing of LSD by the Army.
5047The official termination date of these testing programs is rather
5048unclear, but a later ACSI memo indicates that it may have occurred
5049in September of 1963. On the 19th of that month a meeting was held
5050between Dr. Van Sims (Edgewood Arsenal), Major Clovis (Chemical Research Laboratory), and ACSI representatives (General
5051Deholm and Colonel Schmidt). "As a result of this conference a determination was made to suspend the program and any further activity
5052pending a more profitable and suitable use." 129
5053
5054D.
5055
5056COOPERATION AND COMPETITION AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AGENCIES AND BETWEEN THESE AGENCIES AND OTHER
5057INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS
5058
50591. RelationshipsAmong Ageicies Within the Intelligence Community
5060Relationships among intelligence community agencies in this area
5061varied considerably over time, ranging from full cooperation to intense
5062and wasteful competition. The early period was- marked by a high
5063degree of cooperation among the agencies of the intelligence community. Although the military dominated research involving chemical
5064and biological agents, the information developed was shared with the
5065FBI and the CIA. But the spirit of cooperation did not continue. The
5066failure by the military to share information apparently breached the
5067spirit, if not the letter, of commands from above.
5068As noted above, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
5069was briefed on the proposed operational testing of LSD under Project
5070THIRD CHANCE, and expressed concern that the project had not
5071been coordinated with FBI and CIA. Despite this request, no coordination was achieved between the Army and either of these agencies.
5072Had such cooperation been forthcoming, this project may have been
5073evaluated in a different light.
5074The competition between the agencies in this area reached bizarre
5075levels. A military officer told a CIA representative in confidence about
5076the military's field testing of LSD in Europe under Project THIRD
5077CHANCE, and the CIA promptly attempted to learn surreptitiously
5078the nature and extent of the program. At roughly the same time Mr.
5079Helms argued to the DDCI that the unwitting testing program should
5080be continued, as it contributed to the CIA's capability in the area and
5081thus allowed the CIA "to restrain others in the intelligence community
5082(such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing operations.' 130
5083The MKNAOMI prdgram was also marked by a failure to share
5084information. The Army Special Forces (the principal customer of the
5085Special Operations Division at Fort Dietrick) and the CIA rather
5086than attempting to coordinate their efforts promulgated different requirements which varied only slightly. This apparently resulted in
5087some duplication of effort. In order to insure the security of CIA
5088operations, the Agency would request materials from SO) for operational use without fully or accurately describing the operational
5089requirements. This resulted in limitations on SOD's ability to assist
5090the CIA.
5091Undated ASCI memoifandui, p. 2.
50922 Memorandum from the DDP to the DCI, 11/9/64, p. 2.
5093
5094101
5095421
50960. Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and
5097ForeignLiaisonServices
5098The subjects of the CIA's operational testing of chemical and biological agents abroad were generally being held for interrogation by
5099foreign intelligence or security organizations. Although information
5100about the use of drugs was generally withheld from these organizations, cooperation with them necessarily jeopardized the security of
5101CIA interest in these materials. Cooperation also placed the American
5102Government in a position of complicity in actions which violated the
5103rights of the subjects, and which may have violated the laws of the
5104country in which the experiments took place.
5105Cooperation between the intelligence agencies and organizations in
5106foreign countries was not limited to relationships with the intelligence
5107or internal security organizations. Some MKULTRA research was
5108conducted abroad. While this is, in itself, not a questionable practice,
5109it is important that such research abroad not be undertaken to evade
5110American laws. That this was a possibility is suggested by an ARTICHOKE memorandum in which it is noted that working with the
5111scientists of a foreign country "might be very advantageous" since
5112that government "permitted certain activities which were not permitted by the United States government (i.e., experimeits on anthrax,
5113etc.). "131
5114
51153. The Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies
5116and Other Agencies of the U.S. Government
5117Certain U.S. government agencies actively assisted the efforts of
5118intelligence agencies in this area. One form of assistance was to provide "cover" for research contracts let by intelligence agencies, in
5119order to disguise intelligence community interest in chemical and
5120biological agents.
5121Other forms of assistance raise more serious questions. Although
5122the CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD
5123was conducted by Bureau of Narcotics personnel, there was no open
5124connection between the Bureau personnel and the Agency. The Bureau
5125was serving as a "cut-out" in order to make it difficult to trace Agency
5126participation. The cut-out arrangement, however, reduced the CIA's
5127ability to control the program. The Agency could not control the
5128process by which subjects were selected and cultivated, and could not
5129regulate follow-up after the testing. Moreover, as the CIA's Inspector
5130General noted: "the handling of test subjects in the last analysis rests
5131with the [Bureau of Narcotics] agent working alone. Suppression of
5132knowledge of critical results from the top CIA management is an
5133inherent risk in these operations." 132 The arrangement also made it
5134impossible for the Agency to be certain that the decision to end the
5135surreptitious administration of LSD would be honored by the Bureau
5136personnel.
5137The arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics was described as
5138"informal." 113 The informality of the arrangement compounded the
5139problem is aggravated by the fact that the 40 Committee has had vir13
5140
5141ARTICHOKE Memorandum, 6/13/52.
5142
5143IG Report on M1KULTRA. 1963, p. 14.
5144'xIbid.. This was taken by one Agency official to mean that there would be no
5145written contract and no formal mechanism for payment. (Elder, 12/18/75, p. 31.)
5146
5147422
5148apparent unwillingness on the part of the Bureau's leadership to ask
5149for details, and the CIA's hesitation in volunteering information.
5150These problems raise serious questions of command and control within
5151the Bureau.
5152the Intelligence Community Agencies and
5153Other Institutions and Individuals, Public and Private
5154
51554. Relationships Between
5156
5157The Inspector General's 1963- Survey of MKULTRA noted
5158that "the research and development" phase was conducted through
5159standing arrangements with "specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organizations" in a manner which concealed "from the institution the interests of the CIA." Only a few "key individuals" in each
5160institution were "made witting of Agency sponsorship." The research
5161and development phase was succeeded by a phase involving "physicians, toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and
5162general hospitals and prisons, who are provided the products and
5163findings of the basic research projects and proceed with intensive testing on human subjects." 1
5164According to the Inspector General, the MKULTRA testing programs were "conducted under accepted scientific procedures . . .
5165where health permits, test subjects are voluntary participants in the
5166programs." 135 This was clearly not true in the project involving the
5167surreptitious administration of LSD, which was marked by a complete lack of screening, medical supervision, opportunity to observe, or
5168medical or psychological follow-up.
5169The intelligence agencies allowed individual researchers to design
5170their project. Experiments sponsored by these researchers (wiich inchided one where narcotics addicts were sent to Lexington, Kentucky,
5171who were rewarded with the drug of their addiction in return for
5172participation in experiments with LSD) call into question the decision by the agencies not to fix guidelines for the experiments.
5173The MKUTLTRA research and development program raises other
5174questions, as well. It is not clear whether individuals in prisons, mental,
5175narcotics and general hospitals can provide "informed consent" to
5176participation in experiments such as these. There is doubt as to whether
5177institutions should be unwitting of the ultimate sponsor of research
5178being done in their facilities. The nature of the arrangements also
5179made it impossible for the individuals who were not aware of the
5180sponsor of the research to exercise any choice about their participation based on the sponsoring organization.
5181Although greater precautions are now being taken in research conducted on behalf of the intelligence community agencies, the dilemma
5182of classification remains. These agencies obviously wished to conceal
5183their interest in certain forms of research in order to avoid stimulating
5184interest in the same areas by hostile governments. In some cases today
5185contractors or researchers wish to conceal their, connection with these
5186agencies. Yet the fact of classification prevents open discussion and
5187debate upon which scholarly work depends.
5188"m Ibid. p. 9.
5189"3'
5190
5191Ibid. p. 10.
5192
5193103
5194APPENDIX B
5195DOCUMENTS
5196
5197REFERRING TO DISCOVERY OF ADDITIONAL MKULTRA MATERIAL
519822 June 1977
5199
5200MEMIOR.ANDUN FOR:
5201
5202Deputy Director'of Central Intelligence
5203
5204THROUGH
5205
5206:
5207
5208Deputy Director for Science and Technology
5209
5210SUBJECT
5211
5212:
5213
5214Request for Guidance on Handling
5215Recently Located MKULTRA Material
5216
52171. (U/AIUO) This memorandum is to advise you that
5218additional MKULTRA documents have been discovered and to
5219obtain your approval for follow-on actions required.
5220Paragraph 7 contains a recommended course of action.
5221As a result of John Harks FOXA re(U/AIUO)
52222.
5223quest (F-76-374),
5224all of the MIKULTRA material in OTS
5225possession was reviewed for possible release to him.
5226Following that review, the OTS material in the Retired
5227It was during that latter
5228Records Center was searched.
5229search that the subproject files were located among the.
5230retired records of the OTS Budget and Fiscal Section.
5231These files were not discovered earlier as the earlier
5232searches were limited to the examination of the-active
5233and retired records of those branches considered mo!t
5234likely to have generated or have had access tp NKULTRA
5235Chmistry,
5236Those branches included:
5237documents.
5238Biological, Behavioral Activities, and Contracts ManageBecause Dr. Gottlieb retrieved and destroyed all
5239ment.
5240the MKULTRA documents he was able to locate, it is not
5241surprising that the earlier search for MIKULTRA documents,
5242directed at areas where they were most likely to be found,
5243The purpose of establishing the MKULTRA
5244was unsuccessful.
5245mechanism was to limit knowledge of the sensitive work
5246being performed to those with an absolute nO'd to know.
5247If those precepts had been followed, the recently found
5248B&F files should have contained only financial and
5249(In retrospect, I realize that
5250administrative documents.
5251-I"7
5252
5253Dqcfaxl d by
5254dale
5255-__
5256
5257.
5258
52592
5260
52619
5262
5263qL
5264
5265104
5266u
5267
5268E
5269
5270Request for Guidance on Handling Rece-.
5271Located MULTRA Material
5272
5273T:
5274
5275a serious error was made in not havina B&F files
5276.- other
5277seemingly innocuous files searched earlier)
5278.Amost of the individual subproject folders contai: rciect
5279proposals and mer.oranda for the record, which i:
5280-.-- a
5281degrees, give a reasonably comalete picture o
5282t
5283e-:
5284of research funded through
52854.UTRA.
5286For your a:.:
5287the original memorandum setting u- KULTRA, signel
5288Mr.-Dulies, is also anon; these docunents.
5289A cc:
5290me7oranu. is attached.
52913.
5292.U!ATU0) At this
5293writin;, it does in:.a
5294that there is anything in these newly located fiet
5295would indicate the
5296actiiies
5297WIKULTRA
5298were
5299More
5300-t"i
5301or iord cn:troversial than indicated ov the Senate
5302(Church)
5303eo...tee Report.
5304If an
5305i
5306the re-er
5307i
5308true, i.e., m-os or the
5309K-n1r
5310? subarciects--------.---Thus, the overview of MSUJLTPA is essentially Un !-c.
5311With twz exceptions, the present find fills c:!nin
5312:
5313-
5314
5315One of these .cxcpt os is
5316:
5317c..:- concerns an activit- tht
5318.:
5319-epore
5320c--Ilier.
5321That rro-iect deals w
5322t.
5323a knockd:::drug which was concoeitant wi~t,
5324anz- a
5325o, cancer research at a maior universr.v
5326It - -----.
5327
5328.'A
5329
5330rer
5331
5332that an oaiective reading of that nroiect
5333
5334=nznstrate
5335
5336iwould
5337
5338the search for knockout materials and anesthet-cs
5339compatibl' actiities.
5340However, the re~searct
5341:
5342stated
5343tht
5344"ch-emical agents.. .will be Suibjected,
5345screenin...
5346advanced cancer varients".
5347o
5348T
5349
5350.
5351
5352t
5353
53545.
5355
5356CT7'
5357
5358(Cl
5359
5360Subroiect Number 35 contains full
5361of $35,000 to the G
5362
5363e.tr ibution
5364
5365:-e
5366-
5367
5368tils
5369-
5370
5371r
5372
5373Building(Fund.
5374The Agenv was :.
5375research proEra:s. manv of h
5376
5377were
5378
5379involvecin: drue
5380being cod:-.cted h
5381were i1dequatetC.
5382in
5383
5384----
5385
5386order
5387
5388to xaciiitzat
5389
5390azilries
5391
5392.
5393the
5394
5395once-i:
5396
5397research prozrr-;
5398it was decided to expedite the
5399-iln
5400progra ::
5401ce :-ribut:inz to it throu:a
5402'ch"-'c
5403::
5404was
5405also bcinc used to fund soece of the research prrjezts.
5406
5407105
5408Suj.ECT:
5409
5410Requcst
5411Lcted
5412
5413for Guidance on Handling Recently
5414.-IEULTRA Material
5415
5416it was
5417The contribti-n could be controversial in tothat
5418be a private
5419made throu -h a mechanism making it appear
54200 &
5421?rivate donations qualified for, andtZ
5422donation.
5423- received, an equal amount of Federal matching
5424tter from the Office of General Counsel dated
5425A
5426funds.
542721 Febuary 215 attesting to the legality of this funding
5428the Eil.
5429
5430is in
5431
5432The Legislative Counsel hap been C
5433(N 'AU9)
5434-76.
5435made aware c: the existence of these additional NKULTRA
5436documents which are still under review and saniti:ation.
5437to
5438The MARKS case is in litigationand we are committed
5439a-:rksof the existence of these files shortly,
5440advise Mr.
5441and to deliver the releasable material tc his attorneys
5442A Aetter from the Information and Privacy
5443by 31 July.
5444Staff to ::r. Ma k-:s' attorneys informing them of the.
5445existence -: this material is in the cocrcination process
5446and is scheiylei to be mailed on 24 June.
5447There are now two actions that should
5448(. T'.150)
5449be taken:
5450
5451Mr.
5452
5453a.
5454.
5455-existince.of
5456
5457inforr;
5458It
5459
5460is
5461
5462sanitized material to
5463Release aorropriately
5464tt orneys as required by FOIA litigation.
5465
5466;
5467::r-S'
5468
5469the Senate Select Committee of the
5470the recently lochted records prior to
5471Mr. Marks' attorneys.
5472
5473nform
5474
5475reco=mended that you approve of both of these actions.
5476
5477If additional details on the contents
5478(U/AIUC)
5479S.
5480of this material are desired; the 015 officers most familiar
5481witl it are prepared to brief you at your conkenience.
5482
5483David S. Brandwcin
5484Director
5485.
5486
5487Office of Technical
5488
5489Service
5490
5491The Didctor of Central Intelligence
5492
5493The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
5494Select Committee on Intelligence
5495United States Senate
5496Washington, D.C. 20510
5497Dear Mr. Chairman:
5498During the course of 1975 when the Senate Committee, chaired
5499by Senator Church, was investigating intelligence activities, the
5500CIA was asked to produce documentation on a program of experimentation
5501with the effect of drugs. Under this project conducted from 1953
5502to 1964 and known as "MK-ULTRA," tests were conducted on American
5503citizens in some.cates without their knowledge. The CIA, after
5504searching for such documentation, reported that most of the documents
5505on this matter have been destroyed. I find it my duty to report
5506to you now that our continuing search for drug related, as well as
5507other documents, has uncovered certain papers which bear on this
5508matter. Let me hasten to add that I am persuaded that there was no
5509previous attempt to conceal this material in the original 1975
5510exploration-r The material recently discovered was in the retired
5511archives filed under financial accounts and only uncovered by using
5512extraordinary and extensive search efforts. In this connection,
5513incidentally, I have personally commended the employee whose diligence
5514produced this find.
5515Because the new material now on hand is primarily of a financial
5516nature, it does not present a complete picture of the field of drug
5517experimentation activity but it does provide more detail than was
5518previously available to us. For example, the following types of
5519activities were undertaken:
5520a. Possible additional cases of drugs being tested on
5521American citizens, without their knowledge.
5522b. Research was undertaken on surreptitious methods of
5523administering drugs.
5524c. Some of. the persons chosen for experimentation were
5525drug addicts or alcoholics.
5526d. Research into the development of a knockout or "K"
5527drug was performed in conjunction with being done to
5528develop pain killers for advanced cancer patients, and tests
5529on such patients were carried out.
5530
55312
5532e. There is a possibility of an improper payment to a
5533private institution.
5534The drug related activities described in this newly located material
5535began almost 25 years ago. I assure you they were discontinued over
553610 years ago and do not take place today.
5537In keeping with the President's commitment to disclose any errors
5538of the Intelligence Community which are uncovered, I-would like to
5539volunteer to testify before your Committee on the full details of this
5540unfortunate series of events. I-am in the process of reading the
5541fairly voluminous material involved and do want to be certain that
5542I have a complete picture when I talk with the Committee. I will be
5543in touch with you next week to discuss when hearings might be
5544scheduled at the earliest opportunity.
5545I regret having to bring this issue to your attention, but I know
5546that it is essential to your oversight procedures that you be kept fully
5547informed in a timely manner.
5548Your
5549
5550STANSFIELD TURNER
5551
5552109
5553APPENDIX C
5554DOCUMENTS REFERRING TO SUBPROJECTS
5555date
5556
55571 May 1953
5558
5559MEMORADI
5560
5561FMRTE RECORD
5562Project MULTRA,
5563
5564SUBJECT:
5565
55661.
5567
5568Subproject 2
5569
5570Subproject 2 is being set up to provide a secure and
5571in rega
5572d
5573in r
5574
5575efficient means to exploit
5576to the MKOLTRAprogrem.
55774::;
5578
5579---
5580
5581W
5582
55832.
5584g
5585a practicing
5586psychiatrist
5587in
5588and a faculty member of the
5589His ast
5590-- -4
5591---t
5592positions have ineluded Chief Neuropsychiatrist a
5593Chief o the Psychiatric Section at
5594and OSS experience during World War II.
5595He has been of
5596value in the general MRULTRAfield as an overall advisor and
5597consultant, he has been of value in contacting individuals in the
5598area and in setting up projects there, and he has
5599done work himself which has contributed to the MKLTRtA field. His
5600professional activities and known connections with the
5601--
5602
56033..
5604
5605Subproject 2 would include:
5606
5607a.
5608Miscellaneous research and testing services in the
5609general field of MKULTRA.
5610b. Services as a contact and cut-out for projects in the
5611MKULTRAfield, primarily those located in t
5612area.
5613c. Monitoring of selected projects in the MKTRA field,
5614when located in the central
5615area.
5616d. .Services as a general consultant and advisor in
5617MKULTRAfield.
5618
5619the
5620
56214. The total cost of this project is not to exceed $4,65o.co
5622for a period of one year.
56235.
5624
5625-
5626
5627-
5628
5629..
5630
5631is cleared through TOP SECRET on a contact
5632
5633basis.
5634
5635Chemical Division/TSS
5636_date
5637
563896-408
5639
5640"
5641
5642*
5643
56440 - 77 - 8
5645
5646APPROVzD:
5647
5648.
5649
56503
5651
5652APPROVEDl:
5653
5654,"Chief, C eia.Dvs~
5655
5656PROGAM APPROVED
5657AND MCcaThNmED:
5658
5659APPROVED FM~
5660CN3LmATION OF FUNDS:
5661
5662-
5663
5664Date
5665Attacoent:
5666
5667Origi-a2
5668
5669Onip.:
5670
5671Reeih. Director
5672
56735
5674
5675111
5676
5677PROPOSAL.
5678
5679To study the possible synergistic action of drugs
5680
5681Objective:
5682
5683which ay be appropriate for use in abolishing consciousness.
5684
5685Situation:
5686
5687There is reason to believe that two or more drugs,
5688
5689used in combination, are more effective than single drugs.
5690
5691a-mbined
5692
5693The
5694
5695effect of some drugs, such as combinations of
5696
5697barbiturates,. areeknown.
5698of synergism is not known.
5699
5700With other combinations, -the degree
5701If considerable synergism is found
5702
5703to exist, two possibilities must be considered:
5704
5705(1) that a
5706
5707particularly useful combination may be found, and (2) that a
5708particular combination may be hazardous because of its effect
5709on respiration or some other vital function.
5710
5711To minimize
5712
5713hazards,. animal experiments should precede human experiments.
5714
5715Pronosal:
5716
5717Allocation of $1000 for animal experiments, to be
5718
5719drawn on as needed.
5720at
5721
5722-
5723
5724That experiments be conducted informally
5725
5726without a specific grant, and with appropriate cover.
5727
5728PROPOSAL
5729Objective:
5730
5731To study methods for the administration of drugs
5732
5733vithout the knowledge of the patient. Preparation of a manual.
5734
5735Method:
5736
5737A survey of methods which have been used by criminals
5738
5739for surreptitious administration of drugs.
5740
5741Analysis of the
5742
5743psychodynamics of situations of this nature.
5744
5745Proposa:
5746
5747That $1000 be allocated for this purpose, funds to
5748
5749be requested as needed.
5750
5751&
5752
5753113
57543.2 Lugo"tJ,55
5755
5756-J.UN -In'
5757
5758date
5759
5760FOR:
5761
5762MID21mIID
5763
5764S
5765
5766RECEI
5767
5768s Project IEOLIRA, Subroject M
5769
5770SUBJC
5771
57721. Subproject 2* is being initiated to
5773secure and aficient mean of exploi
5774with regard to the NKUIMs program.
5775
5776a
5777
5778-
5779
5780practicing psychiatrist in
5781mber of
5782He has been of value in the
5783serving as an advisor and
5784s p
5785IS
5786cunultant, contacting individuals in the
5787area, and carrying, out his own research program.
5788ia
5789
57902.
5791
5792p and a faculty
5793
57943. Subproject 2i would include the followings
5795W
5796(a) Miacallaneom research and testing eelicea
5797in the general field af.)EOLA.
5798(b)
5799in
5800
5801Services as a contact and cutout for projects
5802located in
5803fiethose
5804
5805(a)
5806
5807Monitoring of selected projects in the
5808
5809EDI2 field when located in the central
5810
5811(d) Services as a general consultant and advisor
5812in the EUILTR field.
5813(a) He would act as medical advisor and oonsultant
5814etablishas gg
5815Uvil be reimbursed for his services
5816C.4 w
5817and expenses upon receipt of an invoice at irregular
5818intervals. When travel expenses are incurred through
5819use of a camon carrier, they will be dougmated and
5820reimbursed in the usual manner; that is, consistant with
5821standard Government allowances.
5822
5823-
5824
5825G~;e
5826
5827~'~-j
5828-
5829
5830III.
5831
5832U~I I.
5833
5834-ar.'
5835-
5836
5837-
5838
5839C-
5840
5841114
58422
5843
58443
5845
5846Octoo
5847
5848MEMORANDUM FOR TEB RECORD
5849Project MLTRA, Subproject 16
5850
5851SUBJECT:
5852
58531.- Subproject 16 is a continuation of Subproject 3, which
5854involved the establishment and maintenance of facilities for the
5855realistic testing ff certain research and development items of
5856interest to CD/TSS and APD/TSS. The facilities were set up under
5857Subproject 3, and Subproject 16 is intended to provide for the
5858continued maintenance of the facilities.
58592. Subproject 3 was originally intended to provide funds for the
5860maintenance of the facilities for one year; but it turns out that the
5861costs of alterations, equipment, and initial supplies were underestimated in Subproject 3; hence the necessity to establish Subproject
586216 at this time.
5863
58643. Subproject 16 vill be cdnducted by
5865a
586621O
5867Certain support activities will be provided by CD/TSS
5868and APD/TSS.
5869
58704.
5871
5872The estimated cost for a period of one year is $7,740.00.
5873
5874C cvChemical Division, TSS
5875PROGRAM APPROVED
5876AND RECOMNDED:
5877
5878APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION
5879OF FUNDS:
5880
5881RDe:dch-irec
5882Date:
5883Original Only,
5884
5885Date:
5886
5887/~
5888
5889c-
5890
5891t
5892
5893or
5894
5895s
5896
5897'p
5898
5899115
5900
5901r
5902
5903opezied-
5904
5905- ac
5906
5907urel
5908
5909t
5910
5911avesaio'hi
5912
5913ular
5914
5915chech
5916
5917n
5918
5919o
5920
5921adened anc
5922
5923fritlibut
5924
5925- -:i
5926
5927f:.SafetY
5928
5929aak
5930
5931-ng
5932orsideath
5933
5934difficultIcaoe
5935
5936tv-
5937
5938thea
5939
5940joint crount b
5941ce
5942
5943aV
5944
5945n
5946
5947n thW
5948
5949a .
5950
5951ou could reco.r;
5952
5953the
5954
5955okysuies
5956
5957acc
5958h
5959cc e to-reeeat from - san-ofr bay
5960a
5961fd
5962zthaMnacs
5963t ardto
5964plaath
5965neylen8cdea'th-aruaouerIcommunctedt.,
5966excoln
5967I ahig
5968ud inetn
5969o
5970eitggl gotda
5971mttase
5972evths a beiered
5973to provide
5974wXinth-fulds
5975Il an eal
5976dif
5977futie
5978co o
5979sn
5980oiia
5981
5982also founditad
5983taso pletad fr
5984hiabrilt
5985tati
5986alad
5987iith
5988e
5989and beinrcedr:tatel
5990is opee
5991lno kinde ac
5992-c statio y .;
5993yoir fand plesedtCasherfo' r hd
5994c
5995edhs
5996
5997ie
5998
5999dea,
6000
6001rteon hae Aemetan
6002thastoi reeiane
6003nosaniend
6004re -ou ilfedme-a
6005h
6006ceighJ
6007thyou
6008thbiasis inetl to-aai.ie
60094
6010
6011de .oalAnd nov thathe
6012accotmo is -ang
6013yo70-U have funs depositedvria 'Casher'
6014chscizc
6015
6016rcoeda
6017elaqane
6018-vrote a rerence Tcn
6019for nt(9i
6020ofc
6021t
6022ne
6023I s
6024ote
6025a
6026suggevs you
6027cas B1
6028
6029a ugGest
6030o....sr 'say
6031
60326i odered cok
6033a
6034'&reon enbave asrdedstationerybe6
6035I osied .his migt acliltate paymnt_ otoil,
6036
6037t
6038
6039,b
6040
6041A n.-',Wat vith, susicious- banks; landla'da,
6042tlt
6043-coanes., etc , you is 11U understandtIthst crenLg the Jsn-1;.tArde pfimsonlity in th fo' ofjr2
6044is taking altl
6045doing:
6046
6047Se
6048
6049you
6050
6051nday, the 8th
6052
6053mi
6054.---
6055
6056116
6057LMORANDIS1 FOR TMR
6058m
6059
6060SULicT:
6061
6062ECORD
6063
6064Project ICULilRA, SubproJect 23
6065
6066The scope of this project is inteleV/to encompass all
60671.
6068those activities now engaged in by the
6069in its own facilities under the direction of CD/TISS. CO
6070At the present time the varicus projects at this facility (
6071are being concluded and it is deemed desirable
6072and
6073-&VV
6074from the standpoint of security and efficiency to replace these projects with a single project more general in its appoa
6075icates the
6076The attached pioosal from Dr.
60772.
6078extent of the. investigations that his facilities will aollo him to
6079carry out on the .aterials developed in the three projects referred
6080to in paragraph 1, as vell as certain other materials of interest to
6081also serves as a general consultant to this
6082Dr. ?.
6083Cd/TS
6084rovides cover and cut-out facilities to the AGenoy.
6085divsion
60863.
6087
6088The total cost of this project for a period of one year will
6089
6090not exceed : 2,70O.0(.
6091
6092-a been granted a Top Secret Clearance by
6093Dr.
6094!.
6095the Agency and is fully capable of protectinZ the security of the
6096Goerment'3 interest in such matters as this.
6097
6098lca
6099
6100iisin, TS3
6101
6102APPROVED:
6103
6104FPC='! U'DOED
6105
6106A:1.:'
6107
6108I-:
6109
6110J
6111
6112We, h:al
6113
6114APPROVED ?M2 0L
6115
6116O-FC-S
6117
6118-3
6119
6120Diin P .C
6121
6122dS
6123
6124117
6125The present ± vdstigation is concerned with chemLcal agent. which
6126are effective in modifying the behavior and function of the central nervous ystem.
61271 - It is proposed to study a variety of knoun drugs in this pharmacological class
6128that are in present day use and to synthesize n chemical agents or to modify
6129existing ones as occasicn may demand.
61302 - The various chemical agents investigated or synthesized vill be tested on
6131Their pharmacological
6132animals to determine their acute and chronic toicity.
6133effects ill be studied by a variety of assay technics, such as blood pressure
6134deterdnations, bronchial dilatation recordings, endocrine effects, etc. Caplate aninsl facilities vill be maintained for this purpose and pathologic
6135study ill be carried out an the affected organs when the animals are sacrificed.
61363 - Preliminary clinical investigation vill be carried out an the more promising
6137checal agents, and appropriate laboratory procedures ill be performed, such
6138as blood counts, urinalysis, etc. to determine the effectiveness and the side
6139reactions of the drugs under investigation.
61404 - Adequate reports will be submitted of the findings at quarterly interval.
61415 - Proposed budget:
6142Personnel
6143Synthetic ox panic chemdst
6144Research medical associate
6145Pharmacological assistant
6146Cemical assistant
6147Histology technician
6148CLinical technician
6149Cheical consultant
6150
6151$7,500.00
61526,500.00
6153,500.00
61544,000.00
61552,400.00
61563,600.00
6157$30,700.00
6158
6159Total salaries for peronal
6160Other Epemditures
6161Animals, animal maintenance & facilities
6162Cheical & laboratory supplies , expendable
6163Miscellaneous permanent equipment
6164Travel, medical meetings, etc.
6165Total other expenditures
6166TOTAL
6167
61684,000.00
61694,000.00
61702,000.002.000.00
617112,000.00
6172$ 42,700.00
6173
61748 October 195T
6175
6176MEMORANDM FOR TE RECORD
6177SUBJECT:
6178
6179Increase in the Scope of Subproject 23, Project MKULTRA
6180
61811. Due to e/considerable increase in the scope of the work undert the direction of TSS/CD under Subproject 23,
6182a
6183taken by
6184Project MKTRA, the $42,700.00 sum originally obligated for this work
6185is insufficient to cover the year's costs. It is therefore proposed to
6186add $15,000.00 to that already obligated under this Subproject.
61872. The total coat of this Subproject for the period 28 January 1954
6188to 28 January 1955 will thus amount to $57,700.00.
61893. The increase in scope responsible for this proposal consists of
6190the development and partial financing of two new sources of biologically
6191active compounds of interest in the progrsm TSS/CD is carrying out.
6192
6193Chemical Division, TSS
6194APPROVED FOR OIGATION
61950 FONDS:
6196
6197Research Director
6198
6199APPROVED:
6200
6201Chief, Chamical Division, TSS
6202
6203Date:
6204original Only.
6205
62063-J
6207
6208LA4
6209
6210~
6211
6212-
6213
62147~'
6215
6216119
6217
621825 AuguSt 1955
6219
6220MERANDUM FOR:
6221SUBJECT:
6222
6223THE RECORD
6224Authorization for Payment of Certain Expenses Under
6225Project MKULRA, Subproject 23
6226-
6227
62281. In order to carry on the work of the above Subproject, it
6229was necessary to test the effects of certain chemical substances
6230vhen administered to human beings. Certain of the anticipated
6231effects involved mental functions which precluded the use of mental
6232defectives for this particular study.
6233.
6234
6235a
6236
6237-*
6238
62392. In view of these circumstances the project engineer. with
6240verbal approval from his chief, authorized the contractor to pay the
6241hospitals expenses of certain persons suffering from incurable cancer
6242for the privilege of studying the effects of these chemicals during
6243their terminal illnesses. The total funds expended in this fashion
6244amounted to $658.05 and full value was received.
62453. It is requested that the Chief, TSS indicate his knowledge
6246and approval of this particular expenditure for audit purposes.
6247
6248TSS/Chemical Division
6249APPRCVED:
6250
6251APPROVED:
6252
6253.ie f,
6254Distribution:
6255Orig.
6256
6257- TSS/CD
6258
6259fS
6260
62614hief, TSS'Chemical Division
6262
6263120
626421 December 1954
6265
6266M4MRADUM FOR:
6267
6268Director of Central Intelligence
6269
6270SUBJECT
6271
6272Project INULTRA,
6273
6274Subproject 35
6275
62761. While the Director's statutory authority to expend funds
6277for confidential purposes is not limited by law, we believe that
6278of the
6279a gift of Government funds as such would exceed the intent
6280made
6281Congress in granting that power. Hoever, where a gift is
6282for the express purpose of producing something of value to this
6283is a reasonAgency which cannot ctherwise be obtained and there
6284able expectation that the value may be received, the gift may in
6285effect be an expenditure for proper official purposes.
6286In Subproject 35, it is stated that.the donation in
62872.
6288question would achieve certain ends desired by TSS. There seems
6289to be no question that those ends would be advantageous, so the
6290main questions appear to be whether they could not be attained
6291by more direct, normal methods, and, if not, whether the return
6292is necessary and reasonable in relation to the donation.
6293
62943. We are in no position to review the requirements of TSS
6295or to appraise the advantages that would result from this project.
6296We do not comment, therefore, on the value received if'the
6297project results in the benefits foreseen. We feel we should
6298corment on factors affecting the probability of achieving those
6299or no control. Once
6300In a legal sense, there is little
6301ends.
6302the funds are donated, the individual, his foundation, or the
6303us the
6304hospital could conceivably refuse to work for us or allow
6305use of the facilities.
63064. Practically, the control seems to be established as well
6307as circumstances permit. Certainly, as long as the individual is
6308alive and in his present position, we have every reason to expect
6309his complete cooperation in the future as in the past, unless
6310Even in the
6311through scoe act or fault of our own he is alienated.
6312event of his death or incapacity, there appears to be a reasonable
6313DCopy#d1d to:of1cop
6314by authority If: !87475
6315*~ao:.~ns1977
6316.a 7;
6317
6318La134
6319
6320A
6321-
6322
6323Copy #1
6324
6325ofil copy
6326
6327121
6328cherce c
6329ontir..
6330the ro,:ect.
6331if these probabilities appear
6332zurficient to chtain an adequate return for the expenditure, there
6333can be no legal objection to this aspect of the project.
6334
63355. It should be noted that there are two Circumstances which
6336require consideration in a final determination. As stated in
6337Section V, our contribution, by appearing to be from a private
6338source, would increase the matching Government contribution by a
6339similar amount which would not be the case if it were known that
6340this was in fact a Government contributicn also. Secondly, it is
6341the stated policy of the hospital tb charge the Government end
6342commercial organizations 80 per cent overhead on research contracts,
6343whereas nonprofit foxundations pay only direct costs but no overhead.
6344Because of the ostensible source, our projects will not be charged
6345overhead. This could be construed -as mbrally wrongful to the
6346hospital,- .as normally we would pay the 80 Per cent overhead
6347charge for projects performed directly for us, but I believe
6348this can be offset, at least to the amount of our donation, and
6349perhaps by the further a:ount by which the other Government contributions are increased by our dcnation. In any case, if the
6350project is a proper one and must be performed in this manner,
6351security dictates these circu'stances and they, therefore, do
6352not present a legal obstacle as such.
6353
63546. We raised the question whether funds for the hospital
6355construction could not be obtained from other normal charitable
6356sources. It appeared that there was a sting possibtility that
6357the individual concerned could raise adequate funds from private
6358resources, but it was the position of TSS that if this were the
6359case we would not obtain the-commitment from the individual and
6360the degree of control which this project is desiGned to achieve.
6361
6362IAWHRENCE R. HOUSTON
6363General Counsel
6364
6365-!:'ar~oed
6366to:
6367thsrit of : 187475
63687!- 2q77
6369
6370Dorngraded to:
6371by authority -: 27-173
6372Iatc: JUIDo
63731177
637422 IITDE:Z; CL E713:7
6375Copy # 1 of 1 copy
6376
6377122
6378
63798 April 1955
6380
6381U!VJMMIIIM FOR~:
6382
6383Chief, DD)/P/T-zc3
6384
6385SUBJECTAiendmmenTto Sub~r-T ject 35 of Frcject ZZT 2TRA
6386
6387We have noted ycur menorandiun of 6 April 1955 to the
6388Directorreneti-
6389
6390an increase of YIT50,OCQ for the TZS
6391
6392MID budget for this Froject.
6393
6394l'Thie, request does not affect
6395
6396in any .- ray the comments in my mrecrzndauo of 21 Dacember 1954.
6397
6398Docnaradad to:
6399b,.authority of: 187475
6400c'z:J1=0 1977
6401:I2 I!TDET; CL B3Y187475
6402
6403Coy#1ofIcp
6404
6405N
6406
6407123
6408
64095 May 1955
6410
6411A "-ticn of the 1Rosech and D9-7elo-,--nt P cgrmn of
6412TSS/ChanicaJ. Di-Aion~r 13 dsvoted tothe diacovery of the
6413follrwuing =atearl"s and mnethods:
64141. Sub ctances which will promote illogicei. thinking
6415and inpuJluivenes3 to the point wliare the rcxipient would be
6416discredited in public.
6417Substances which increase the efficiency of Tetation and perception.
6418
6419-2.
6420
64213. natarials vihich will prevGent or cournteract tho
6422intcccting offact ,of alcohol.
6423
64244. Miterials which will renote the intoxicatiz-Z offee of alcohol.
64255. Yaterials ich will proiuce the stgns and ytn
6426of recognized diaoas in a reversible uW so that thay x=.V
6427be used for imallngering, ae.
64286. Mter-4als which will render the indaotion of hypnosis
6429eaasr or otherwise nnYce its u.,efii1.ness.
64307. Sabstancoe which will enhance tho ability of i-&-i.iduals to withztahd priva.tionx, torturea and coercion during
6431b--ain-qiaahingu.
6432intarrc~ati=n and socal
64338. Materials and phyzical methods which will produce
6434amnesia for event3 precedirg and daring their use.
64359.
6436
6437Physical mnethods of proeucing cho&': and ecsAision
6438iod capable of sur.Ptit-JoUa
6439
6440over c =-ended periodze of ti--s
6441use,
6442
644310. Substances which prod-ace physical dinablement such
6444as paralysis of the legs,. acute anemia, ae.
6445
6446e:t
6447
6448Ul* SUbstances 'Uhich will problace
6449cubsequent let-down.
6450
6451ureu' euphoria with no
6452
645312. Substan'ces which alter proOnallity structure in such
6454a way that the toander~cy of the recipiCst to become depecndent
6455uecm another person is enhanced..
645613- A matori2J. w"Mch w-4ll cau.3e rantaj~ confusion of such
6457typsz that the i c~iv-dual iz.rits
6458influc viii fin i
6459diffiC lt to maintain. a fanbrication
6460cne
6461ueationing.
646214. Substances which will 1--4ar tho aenbiticu and
6463general 1w0-kng efficonoy of men whan adminintered in
6464undetactable awmuto.
646515. Sutances which loreote weaess or distortion
6466ofth CYezh Or herig 'culties, pro,)era-bly without
6467rper=a-Snt cf'iCct3.
646816. A kmcciccut P4ill which can surreptitiously be
6469administered in cL-'C ' food, ciga~rettes, as an aercsol,
6470etc., which will be s,-3e to use, provide a nx-ini of
6471=c
6472n,d be suitablz fcr u-se by agent types on an
6473ad boo basis.
647417. A Matzrial which can be Surroptiticusly
6475tered by the alove routes end which
6476in very sa-ll adminisa---,=to
6477will zake it jz-,,ooible for a man to perform any phy7sical
6478activity w~hatever.
64791he davelopmsnt of naterils of this ty6 foi- z h
6480st?.ndcrd prnctica of such ethical dn4 hou:=s as
648114MIt is a rc latit-oI7 roatine procedure to devaIDD a e-rug
6482to the Point Of hun-= t--ztin-g. O.cnrltha
6483d.Ug hcunes deopend
6484up~on the czrvicos of private phycicians for the final ci~a
6485tasti.-g. 'L-3 physicians arc willing- to assuno the re-oriiity.
6486Of such tests in.crdcr to edvem-ce the science of medicine. it
6487is dific*lt and sometirnss irmpossible fOr TW3/CD to offor auch
6488an inidu-c=,:nt with rospect to Its products. In practice, it hMs
6489bzen possible to usa outzide occeed contracto~rs for the precBmino-y
6490rhco o this uscrk
649111owavor, that part whX.fh involves human
6492tooting at effotive dose levels presents esc'urity problems which
6493cannot bac handlsd by the ordinr-sy ccntractor.
6494
6495125
6496
6497oj2S~ffara a unique opporThe propozed facility
6498barUXO -sdi~ cZ '-ach clinical1 tosting, in r&d±for thaeaar
6499to the marzq z:±mntagos cutlined in tho project proposal.
6500scurity p-.cb3.cna3 manticned above Pra slimimatad b7 the fact
6501ths rozenaibi-~t- for the tostin.7 will rest cczmoiotoly
6502I
6503I--Ia
6504the rpbFoicim and the hospital.
6505to
6506por~zx.,
6507I ill T.1c :M/
6508cliozelr to -mseow gua-that a'l- tosts aore
6509sc; 2zvi33 the -!ork!:
6510conduct-ad according to the recogni4zed practices cind c:.dy azieqiate eafoguzrd3.
6511tit'y
6512tion
6513The
6514that
6515Wpon
6516
6517.No.
6518
651996-408 0 - 77 - 9
6520
6521126
652210 May 1955
6523SUBPROJECT 35 OF PROJECT MKULTRA
6524
65251. Subproject 35 as approved by the DGI on 15 January 1955 contemplated a
6526to financial contribution of $125, 000 to the :
6527000
6528participate in the construction of a new.repearch wing to cost $3, 0
6529exclusive of furnishings and equipment. Agency funds will be transmitted
6530acut-out which through the
6531e s~p=ace inthe new researca wing being made
6532will result in oe-sixth oc
6533available for Agency-sponsored research involving covert biological and
6534chemical techniques of warfare.
6535
6536-
6537
6538am with CIA
65392. At that time (15 January 1955)
6540encouragement indicated a willingness to contribute $500, 000 to the construction fund. The building fund was to have been raised as follows:
6541$1,000,000 - Contributed by
6542of which
6543250, 000 - Donation from
6544$125, 000 to be supplied by CIA
65451,250,000 - Matching funds under Public Law 2Z1 equal
6546to the amount of the two above contributions
6547:-B
6548500,000-
6549
65501
6551-
6552
6553$3, 000, 000 - TOTAL
6554will not be
6555Since it now appears that the expected contribution by
65563.
6557forthcoming, permission is requested to increase the Agency's contribution
6558by $250, 000 which will result in a financial situation as follows:
6559$1, 000, 000 - Contributed by
6560including .
6561500,000 - Donation from
6562$375,000 supplied by CIA
65631,500,000 - Matching funds under Public Law 221 equal
6564to the amount of the two above contributions
6565
6566$3, 000, 000 - TOTAL
6567
65681
6569
6570-
6571
65724. The Agency's contribution would thus total $375,000.
6573This investment,
6574together with the equal sum resulting from matched funds, is fully justified
6575C.
6576in the opinion of TSS for reasons which will be explained by
6577Chief, TSS, and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief, TSS/Chemical Division.
6578The scope of subproject 35 has not changed since the Director originally
6579approved a request by TSS for permission to spend $125, 000 of available
6580
6581B
6582
65831
6584
6585rocedures established
6586rads for tihs purpose through the controls and
6587%!.':LTRA. At the time subproject 35 was set up within the scope of
6588cover arrangements
6589tC- :.,S M, D pro:;ram, security considerations and
6590werc c.ircesily.reviewed, and the Office of General Counsel assisted in legal
6591With the exception of funding arrangements, no changes in
6592:irogram have since been made.
6593f-
6594
6595steteri:mations.
6596
6597previously approved sum o $125, 000 are available
6598.Funds to cover
6599budget for FY 55 and have b en set aside. The TSS
6600wt -in the TSS
6601r the supplemental sum of
6602,ud ct, however, lacks funds with which to co
6603udget be increased by this
6604$250, 000, and it is requested that the TSS
6605amount. Supplementary funds available for subproject 35 can definitely be
6606obligated by the end of FY 55.
6607
6608L :Llhouty of: 167-175
6609.: !:o1977
6610i.
6611
661212 ..
6613
6614I:-:
6615
6616CL By 1874175
6617
6618-2-
6619
6620128
6621
6622AMENDMENT TO SUBPROJECT 35,
6623
6624PROJECT MKULTRA
6625
6626For the Purpose of Establishing a Cover Organization for Highly Sensitive
6627Warfare
6628Projects in the Field of Biological, Chemical and Radiological
6629
6630I.
6631
6632Background of Subproject 35.
6633
6634In January 1955 approval was given by the DCI to Subproject 35 of Project
6635The documents which lead to this approval (including comments
6636MAKULTRA.
6637of the OGC) are attached herewith as Tabs 2, A and 3.
6638which
6639Project MKULTRA is the framework of procedures and controls under
6640research projects in certain highly sensitive fields are carried out by TSS.
6641A description of the background of Project MKULTRA may be found on
6642page 1 of Tab A.
6643Subproject 35 establishes cover 'under which the Chemical Division of
6644DD/P/TSS would conduct certain sensitive projects in the fields of biological
6645and chemical warfare and consists of a proposed arrangement whereby the
6646Agency covertly contributes funds to assist th
6647in the construction of a new research wing. Contribution of these
6648- B
6649funds is to be made through the
6650would remain 4 s cut-out so that the
6651unwitting of Agency participation in the building program. Projects would
6652of the
6653later be carried out by the Chemical Division using the facilities
6654new research wing, and Agency employees would be able to participate
6655aware
6656in the work without the University or the Hospital authorities being
6657of Agency interest. Subproject 35 contemplated the contribution of Agency
6658funds to assist in the construction of facilities. Future research work
6659as cut-out and would be would be carried out through the.
6660separately funded under existing procedures and controls.
6661and the background of h are described on page 2 of Tab A. On the
66621
6663same page there will be found a further description of the
6664
6665II.
6666
6667Building Fund.
6668
6669The University will require $3, 000, 000 for the six-story addition to the
6670are
6671hospital exclusive of the cost of land, heating and power supply which
6672being provided by the University. Under Public Law 221, Subappropriation
6673
6674177
667501.'riys:
6676
6677B
6678
6679663, dated 26 August 1954, funds are available to match funds raised for
6680this purpose by the University.
6681When Subproject 35 was first prepared, it was hoped and expected that the
6682funds required would be provided as follows: The University has allocated
6683$1, 000, 000 to this project and will assume upkeep and staffing obligations.
6684agreed that if the Agency would provide S
6685- B
6686with a grant of $125, 000, the Fund would match this amount and
6687make a total donation of $250, 000 to the University Building Fund. At that
6688time, discussions with Ago 0indicated that
6689would contribute $500, 000
6690to the building project on the basis that radi ogical research would be
6691conducted in the new wing and that the constr
6692ion of the new facilities
6693was of interest to that Agency. In summary, th financial situation was
6694to have been as follows:
6695$1, 000, 000 250, 000 - Donation from
6696(of which $125, 000 was supplied by CIA)
66971, 250, 000 - Matched Funds under Public Law 221
6698500,000 -
6699
6700$3, 000, 000 - TOTAL
6701
67023
6703
6704Q
6705
6706It was recogpized that the Federal contribution
67071,250, 000 under Public
6708Law 221 would be seemingly inflated by reas
6709of the inclusion of the CIA
6710contribution in that of
6711It was felt that the value to
6712the Agency was such that this inflation of the Federal contribution was more
6713than justified by the importance of the over-all project and that furthermore,
6714the inclusion of the CIA contribution in that of _____
6715was the
6716best means of maintaining security.
6717
6718III
6719
6720/3
6721
6722The original informal commitment ont
6723pa
6724f
6725w
6726was first obtained
6727through verbal discussions with
6728wl'ch were fcllowed
6729up by an exchange of corresponden e between the DCI and 40
67301
6731Unfortunately at that time
6732was fully occupied with the controversy concerning the
6733and continued contact with
6734subordinates resulted in a ecision that
6735could not or
6736wvould not contribute to the Building und, but would be w. ing to support
6737an annual research program amount
6738to $50, 000 to $75, 0
6739It is not
6740
6741Copy # I of I copy
6742
6743C.
6744
6745C
6746
6747130
6748
6749o
6750or known whether this change in policy was suggested tp
6751whether it originated with him. Be that as it may, when the change in
6752policy became apparent, it was evident that additional funds would be required to complete the hospital construction.
6753IV.
6754
6755C_
6756
6757Suggcsted Funding.
6758
6759It is now suggested that the $3, 000, 000 required for the hospital wing be
6760provided as follows:
6761$1,000,000
6762
6763-
6764
6765500, 000 -Dnonfro
6766l'including
6767$375, 000 supplied by CIA)
67681,500,000 - Matched Funds from Public Law 221
6769$3, 000, 000 - TOTAL
6770
6771-
6772
6773ould thus consist of the original
6774The donation from
6775$125, 000 to be. supplied by CIA plus the sum of $125, 000 to be provided by
6776the Fund and a supplemental CIA contribution of $250, 000. Originally
6777Subproject 35 requested permission to make a contribution of $125, 000 to
6778the building fund and approval was given. This approval is enclosed
6779herewith as Tab 2. The purpose of this amendment to Subproject 35 is to
6780request permission to contribute an additional $250, 000 to the building
67813
6782it should be noted that construction fund through
6783the total Government contribution to the hospital fund still remains
6784unchanged at $1, 875, 000. The increase in the size of the contribution
6785by the Fund is not out of keeping with other operations of 6
6786and will - 13
6787not arouse undue comment because of its magnitude. The originally approved
6788contribution has not as yet been transmitted to
6789and neither the
6790-4
6791until
6792-original contribution nor the supplement would be paid to 'd
6793funds adequate to complete the project are made available. This condition
6794was specified by the DCI in approving the original contribution.
6795V.
6796
6797Source of CIA Funds.
6798
6799Funds to cover the initially approved sum of $125, 000 are available and have
6800been segregated for this purpose within the TSS FY 1955 Budget for Research
6801and Development. Insufficient funds remain in the TSS budget to cover the
6802supplementary sum of $230, 000, and it is therefore requested that the TSS
6803. budget be increased by this amount and that the increase be made available
6804to Subproject 35 of Project MKULTRA.
6805
6806Copy # 1 of 1 copy
6807
6808-3-
6809
6810131.
6811
6812VI.
6813
6814Comments by the Office of General Counsel.
6815
6816Tab 3 is a memorandum from the General Counsel to the DCI dated 21
6817December 1954, commenting on Subproject 35, and stating in part that
6818there are no fundamental legal objections if the probable benefits are conThe amendment to the Subproject
6819sidered a fair return for this expenditure.
6820contemplates only an increase in funds and in no way changes any other
6821aspect of the project. The project has been referred back to the OGC even
6822though no change in its structure is contemplated, and Tab 4 contains his
6823comments.
6824VII.
6825
6826Justification.
6827
6828The advantages and benefits accruing to the Agency outlined in Tab A are
6829felt by TSS to provide adequata and complete justification for the expenditure
6830of the additional sum herein requested which brings the total CIA contribution to $375, 000. The most important of these advantages and benefits
6831may be summarized as follows: (Fuller explanations may be found in Tab A).
6832a. One-sixth of the total space in the new hospital wing will be
6833available to the Chemical Division of TSS, thereby providing laboratory and office space, technical assistants; equipment and experimental animals.
6834b. Agency sponsorship of sensitive research projects will be
6835completely deniable.
6836c. Full professional cover will be.provided for up to three biochemical employees of the Chemical Division.
6837d. Human patients and volunteers for experimental use will be
6838available under controlled clinical conditions within the full
6839supervision of
6840.
6841Subproject 35.was originally conceived in October and November of 1954,
6842and the dnsuing six months have indicated that inc reasing emphasis and
6843importance are being placed on the Chemical Division's work in this field.
6844The facilities of the hospital and the ability to conduct controlled experiments under safe clinical conditions using materials with which any Agency
6845connection must be completely deniable will augment and complement other
6846programs recently taken over by TSS, such as
68474
684818747115
6849
6850rc,.-
6851
6852I'll
6853
6854of'7
6855
68567
6857
68581775copy
6859
686077
6861
68624 1
6863
6864of I COPY
6865
6866132
6867
6868It was originally thought that at least 18 months wouLd elapse after the
6869building funds had been raised before the facilities would be finished and
6870could be occupied by TSS, This lengthy delay has now been overcome.
6871IMVJWhas raised the $500, 000 which his Fund will ostensibly contribute,
6872he will then be allowed to use existing space in the present hospital in
6873order that he may build up the organization which will later occupy the new
6874of this
6875wing. This means that TSS will be able to begin to take advantage
6876cover situation within a matter of months instead of waiting for a year and
6877a half.
6878VIII.
6879
6880Security.
6881
6882Security matters. and details are being co-ordinated with the TSS Liaison
6883and Security Officer. Security of transmittal of the funds and cover arrangements are described in Tab A and remain unchanged.
6884IX.
6885
68864 E
6887
6888Agreement with
6889
6890as
6891
6892is described in Tab A, and the extent
6893The agreement with
6894of his co-operation and the control over his actions remain unchanged.
6895X.
6896
6897Resultant Financial Saving.
6898
6899The total contribution of $375, 000 by CIA will, result in an additional
6900It is felt that
6901$375, 000 in matching funds provided under Public Law 221.
6902the expenditure of these total funds is justified by the importance of the
6903programs which will be pursued at the new facility. Even though the CIA
6904contribution is increased under this amended project, the total of Federal
6905The use of this facility will allow work to
6906funds remains unchanged.
6907proceed under conditions of cover and security which would be impossible
6908to obtain elsewhere without an expenditure of equivalent or greater funds.
6909In addition, by funding individual projects for this facility through the
6910charge will be incurred for overhead expense. If
6911.no
6912openly sponsored by the iare
6913I
69141'ml'111
6915research projects
6916U1. S. Government, it is customary to pay an overhead rate equivalent
6917- 5
6918to 80% of salaries. However; if a non-profit fund, such as
6919sponsors research, the funds granted for the work are customarily
6920overhead.
6921used only to pay for salaries, equipment and supplies, but not
6922The Agency thus buys considerably more research.through
6923han would be the case if no cut-out were used.
692440
6925
692613-
6927
69289
6929
6930Copy # 1 of I copy
6931
6932133
6933
6934Subon*~tA
6935Ll-rezlh l-te fle
6936project 35, with 0-=c*znt
6937ov, the- 1-:!"
6938aspects. * T.hle- there is no le::al cont.rol -i
6939thrnre ccrt2tin incidenta1 conzidera.ticnz,
6940Lcb
6941tihere is rno ~ 'nft1leg'al obji-cnf
6942ProbabL b -ne2it-, -- re cozi-"rd a far
6943____
6944
6945for thia expenditure.
6946
6947___________
6948
6949(DATE)
6950I~FORM NO.
6951
695210.101 JAN 1952
6953
69544
6955
6956134
6957Tab A
6958
6959SUBPROJECT 35 - PROJECT MKULTRA
6960For the purpose of establishing a cover organization for highly
6961sensitive projects in the field of covert Biological, Chemical
6962and Radiological Warfare
6963
6964I.
6965
6966Background of Project MKULTRA.
6967
6968In 1953 the DCI approved Project MKULTRA which established procedures
6969and controls under which research projects in certain highly sensitive
6970fields could be carried out by TSS without the necessity of signing the
6971usual contracts. The approved procedures apply
6972over-all Research and Development budget, and no additional funds
6973are required. Controls established in the Project Review Committee
6974approval of the Research and Development program (other than the
6975signing of a contract) remain unchanged, and special provisions for
6976audit are included. All files are retained by TSS.
6977Thesd procedures and cbntrols were approved since it is highly undesirable from a policy and security point of view that contracts be
6978signed indicating Agency or Government interest in this field of endeavor. In a great many instances the work must be conducted by individuals who are not and should not be aware of Agency interest. In
6979other cases the individuals involved are unwilling to have their names
6980on a contract which remains out of their control in our files. Experience
6981has shown that qualified, competent individuals in the field of physiological, psychiatric and other biological sciences are very reluctant
6982to enter into.signed agreements of any sort which would connect them
6983.with this activity since such connection might seriously jeopardize
6984their professional reputations.
6985When Project:MKULTRA was approved, it was not contemplated that
6986it would be used for the establishment of cover. Over forty individual
6987research and development projects have been established under this
6988framework and have been carried out extremely successfully, both
6989from technical and administrative points of view. The experience
6990gained in handling these projects has emphasized that establishment
6991of better cover both for the projects and for associated Agency scientists
6992is of utmost importance. Subproject 35 would establish such cover.
6993
6994Dornareded to:
6995b z-. 1:
6996ty- or
6997
6998Aba
6999C?75
7000*
700110-77
7002
7003-
7004
7005x.t~ortty Of: 107475
7006jv~ 1977
7007!i2'T;
7008
7009ME BY 18S7475
7010
7011135
7012
7013Background of the
7014
7015II.
7016
7017IJ
7018
7019was incorporated in
7020It has a Board of Directors of six
7021who acts as Executive
7022members, one of whom i
7023it has solicited funds from various Director of the Fund.
7024individuals to finance a program of basic research in the chemotherapy
7025of cancer, asthma, hypertension, psychosomatic. disorders and other
7026ha-co-operated.with. the__..
7027chrbnic diseases. Since 1951 Q
7028Chemical Division of TSS and acted smoothly and efficiently, both as
7029a cut-out for dealing with contractors in the fields of covert chemical
7030and biological warfare, and as a prime contractor for certain areas of
7031biological research. Projects presently being handled for the Agency
7032by the Fund are administered under the controls and procedures
7033previously approved for MKULTRA.
7034
7035Th
7036
7037C
7038
7039III.
7040
7041Background of
7042
7043is internationally known as a
7044- C
7045in the field of41gliPresearch and is
7046nas eenassociated in
7047In thbepast
7048'3
7049a research capacity with both the
7050served as av
7051it
7052Du-ing the war l
7053l
70541MARISg
7055in the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in the Navy. Since then he-has
7056maintained a consulting relationship to the Navy medical research prois TOP SECRET cleared and witting of Agency - C.
7057:
7058gram.
7059sponsorship of-the programs carried out by the Fund as are two other
7060members of the Fund's Board of Directors.
7061
7062c
7063
7064Fund.
7065
7066IV.
7067
7068-
7069
7070eactively engaged in aT campaign to raise funds
7071or toe purpose of erecting a new clinical research wing on the existing
7072The research wing will cmsist of a building six stories high, 320 feet long and 50 feet wide. Two-thirds
7073of the space wvill be research laboratories and offices while 100
7074particiresearch beds will occupy the remainder.
7075pation in the fund-raising campaign outlined below will result in his
7076having control of one-sixth of the total space in addition to the baseto:-..r!d
7077i
7078
7079S.:J::-:
7080
7081).
7082
7083of: 187C75op
70841S77
7085
7086.
7087
7088Copy #
7089
7090of 2 copies
7091
7092I?
7093r
7094
7095136
7096
7097ment and general out-patient facilities. In this effort,
7098has secured the enthusiastic support of tlbe medical faculty an the
7099officers of the University who have carried the preliminary arrangements
7100forward to the maximum extent of their resources.
7101V.
7102
7103Financial Situation.
7104
7105The University will require about $3, 000, 000 for the
7106story addition.
7107This sum is exclusive of the cost of land and the heating and power supply
7108which are already available -t the site7 At the present ti me under Public
7109Law 2Z1, funds are available to match funds raised by the University.
7110The University has allocated $1, 000, 000 to this project and will assume
7111upkeep and staffing obligations.
7112has-agreed that if CIA will
7113a grant of $125, 000,
7114will provide
7115match this amount ann mae
7116oltal donation of $250, 000 to the University
7117Building Fund. This Agency's contribution will be made under the condition that it will be refunded if construction does not take.place.
7118TSS has discussed this situation with
7119______M
7120and has encouraged.
7121to donate
7122500,000 to the building project on the basis that 1 !
7123will be conducted in the new wing,
7124though aware of our
7125interest in the building, is unwitting of our specific fields of researchy.
7126-and individual projects. In summary, the financial situation would be as
7127follows:
7128
7129-
7130
7131-
7132
7133C
7134
7135.
7136
7137C
7138
713913
71401
7141
7142.
7143
7144$1,000,000 250,000 - Donation from
7145($125, 000 supplied by CIA)
71461,250,000 - Matched funds.from Public Law ZZ
7147500,000-
7148
7149mam
7150
7151erne
7152
7153-3
7154
7155.
7156
7157$3, 000, 000 - TOTAL
7158Although it is recognized that the Federal contribution of $1, 250, 000 under
7159P. L. 221 is seemingl inflated by reason of the inclusion of the CIA contribution in that. of
7160actually the value.to the CIA is
7161$250, 000 and not just $125, 000, the amount of CIA's contribution; furthermore the inclusion of the CIA co ntribution in that of
71624Nis
7163the best method of maintaining security..
7164-
7165
7166lrozn['nded to.
7167
7168t' athority
7169
7170(:,0:
7171
7172Juns
7173
7174-- J--e-
7175
7176of': 187475
71771977
7178
7179.
7180
7181Copy #
7182
7183of 2 copies
7184
7185/S
7186
7187137
7188
7189VI.
7190
7191Difficulties Faced by TSS.
7192
7193reIt has been generally recognized for some time that the external
7194search activities of the Chemical Division of TSS in the field of covert
7195biological, chemical and radiological warfare are sorely in need of
7196proper cover. Although Project MKULTRA provides excellent administrative and financial cover for projects, it does not afford cover for
7197scientific or technical personnel. MKULTRA has been used for
7198as a cut-out and for working
7199dealing through
7200directly with individuals or-private companies. The use of
7201in the future will be increasingly limited-due to
7202(a)'
7203
7204(b)
7205
7206(c)
7207
7208The increasing number of people who, albeit
7209properly cleared, are aware of the Agency
72108
7211connection with
7212that the Agency M
7213The feeling by
7214employees contacting him (Drs. Gottlieb,
7215etc.) have no cover of any sort and consequently expose him to unnecessary and
7216highly undesirable personal risk; and
7217
7218C
7219
7220C
7221
7222The widespread intra-Agency awareness of
7223the nature of the relationship between the
7224Fund and the Agency.
7225
7226Another serious problem faced by TSS/CD as a result of lack of suitable cover is the difficulty in planning careers for technical and
7227scientific personnel in the biological field. A long-range career
7228concept of activities in this field inevitably includes proper cover for
7229the individual concerned. The availability of research facilities
7230ill offer an excellent opportunity OI
7231at
7232is willing - C
7233to solve many of the above problems, and
7234Up
7235and able to make any reasonable arrangements to suit our needs.
7236. - C
7237to three Chemical Division employees can be integrated into
7238program for work in the new hospital wing on the
7239Agency's research projects. Although career planning was not a
7240consideration when planning the procedures and controls established
7241by Project MKULTRA, nevertheless this particular subproject, in
7242addition to its primary objective, will be of very great secondary help
72437 n uthority of: 187475
7244ILTD^T; CL B1 18747.
7245
7246-.
7247-4-
7248
7249Copy 9
7250
7251of 2 copies
7252
7253138
7254
7255in simplifying and eliminating many of the very awkward and dangerous
7256conditions facing certain Chemical Division employees.
7257and Benefits Accruing to TSS.
7258
7259VII. 'Advantages
7260
7261The contemplated arrangements will.jesult in many advantages and
7262benefits, including the following:
7263(a)
7264
7265One-sixth of the total space in the new research
7266and - C
7267is to be available to
7268in turn, will be available to the Chemical
7269Division of TSS. This will provide laboratory
7270and office space, technical assistants, equipment and experimental animals for use of Chemical
7271Division personnel in connection with specific
7272future projects.
7273
7274.wing
7275
7276(b)
7277
7278The cost of Chemical Division projects which are
7279to be carried out under this cover will be covered
7280by funds made available through Project MKULTRA,
7281and projects will be subject to the procedures
7282The
7283and, controls established for.MKULTRA.
7284funds will be passed through
7285s has been done in the past. %iIll
7286in turn will either pay expenses directly or
7287transfer the money to the University for this
7288purpose. Each project will be individually
7289funded based on its particular budget, and there
7290will be no other continuing or recurring charges
7291for items such as space, facilities, etc.
7292
7293(c)
7294
7295The Agency's sponsorship of sensitive research
7296projects would be completely deniable since no
7297connection would exist between the University
7298and the Agency.
7299
7300(d)
7301
7302Excellent professional cover would be provided
7303for up to three bio-chemical employees of the
7304Chemical Division of TSS. This would allow open
7305attendance at scientific meetings.. the advancement
7306of personal. standing in the scientific world, and
7307as such, would constitute a major efficiency and
7308
7309rdod to
7310Drc
7311L*
7312t- :rthrity
7313cf: 137175
7314C :: Je
73151977
7316Copy #_/
7317C-5
7318
7319of 2 copies
7320
7321139
7322morale booster.
7323(e)
7324
7325Human patients and volunteers for experimental
7326use will be available under excellent clinical
7327conditions with the full supervision of
7328
7329(f)
7330
7331There would be available the equivalent of a
7332hospital safehouse.
7333
7334(g)
7335
7336It is expected that the output of useful results
7337of the Chemical Division in the bio-chemical
7338field will be greatly improved through the more
7339efficient use of technical personnel who would
7340be able to spend more of their time on actual
7341laboratory work.
7342
7343-
7344
7345(h)
7346
7347VIII.
7348
7349(i)
7350
7351Excellent facilities would be provided for
7352recruiting new scientific personnel since
7353members of the Chemical Division working under
7354this cover will be in daily contact with members
7355of the Graduate School of the University.
7356
7357(J)
7358
7359The regular University library and reprint
7360seryice will be available as a source of.
7361technical information.
7362
7363Funding.
7364
7365if
7366It is proposed that $125, 000 be granted to
7367approval is granted, TSS will arrange for payment to be made under
7368the procedures and controls of MKULTRA. These funds would come
7369out of the presently approved TSS Research and Development budget
7370for FY 1955 and no new funds are involved. The funds would be
7371In turn
7372transferred as a grant to
7373will match these funds with an equal amount and donate a total -of $250, 000 to the University as outlined in paragraph V. The sum of
7374$125, 000 would be entirely in the nature of a grant and would in due
7375
7376uIn
7377
7378b"
7379
7380fl' rrdod to:
7381:.iaor ty 0-: 187475
73821977-6
7383
7384Copy #
7385
7386C27Li.
7387L BY 137-175
7388--
7389
73906-
7391
7392/
7393
7394of 2 copies
7395
7396140
7397
7398course be merged with the entire $3, 000, 000 raised for the construction of the wing. The Agency would retain no residual interest in the
7399building or title to any equipment or facilities purchased with this
7400money.
7401This single grant will constitute the Agency'.s entire participation in
7402the new hospital wing, and there will be no recurring obligations in
7403the form of annual support of the hospital or additional grants. Trans8,
7404will be made
7405mission of Agency funds to
7406through previously established cover.channels set up by thea
7407for similar transmittals in the past. The donation on 4M books will be shown as having been received from
7408
7409-
7410
741143
7412
7413In the future when TSS sponsors sensitive research projects which are
7414each project
7415to be carried out in
7416as it has
7417will be individually financed through
7418been in the past in accordance with previously established procedures
7419and controls using allotted portions of the annual Research and Development budget. The University will be totally unwittingof Agency
7420sponsorship, and the projects to every outward appearance will be
7421sponsored by
7422M
7423.
7424C
7425will continue in
7426death,
7427In the event of
7428being and any activities under this project will be continued through
7429will be unaffected by his death.
7430fl~and
7431IX.
7432
7433Ca
7434
7435Memorandum of Agreement.
7436
7437A memorandum of agreement will be signed with
7438outlining to the greatest extent possible the arrangements under which
7439the hospital space under his control will be made available to Chemical
7440Division personnel and the manner in which cover will be provided and
7441other benefits obtained. No contract will be signed since
7442would be unable to reflect any of the Agency's contractual terms in his
7443makes the
7444arrangements with the University when
7445donation in question. The memorandum of agreement will be retained
7446in TSS.
7447
7448X.
7449
7450-
7451
7452Security.
7453
7454All security matters and details are being cojordinated with the TSS/
7455Liaison and Security Office..
7456fl ::iid toa:
7457Z4:7
7458t
7459of: 137475
7460J,:zo 1077
7461Copy Nf A of Z copies
7462
7463C
7464
7465-
7466
7467C
7468
7469141
7470
7471Resultant Financial Saving.
7472
7473XI.
7474
7475The $125, 000 to be contributed by CIA plus the $125, 000 in matching funds
7476provided under P. L. 221 to the Building Fund will be more than offset
7477in a few years by the savings which will result from use of this non-profit
7478or other educafund. If a research project at
7479tional non-profit institution is sponsored by the 1J. S. Government, it
7480is customary for the Government to pay for salaries, equipment,
7481.
7482supplies, .etc. and for overhead as well. In the case of .
7483the overhead amossnts to 80% of salaries. However, if a nonat
7484sponsors research a
7485profit foundation such as
7486non-profit institution, the funds granted for the work are customarily
7487used to pay for salaries, equipment and supplies but not for overhead.
7488The Government dollar thus buys considerably more research through
7489than would be the case if no cut-out were used.
7490XII.
7491
7492Legal Matters.
7493
7494of the Office
7495This matter has been discussed with
7496of General Counsel, and he is fully aware of all details surrounding this
7497grant.
7498
7499rofd to:
7500Ofthrt..
7501187475
7502JUZs 19~77
7503
7504Copy #
7505
7506copy A
7507
750896-408
7509
75100 - 77 - 10
7511
7512of 2 copies
7513
7514142
75159 AprilIVwr
7516MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD
7517SUBJECT
7518
7519Trip Report, Visit to .
75207 April 1963
7521
75221. The purpose of this triP was to make arrangements for
7523pro jec.
7524iad
7525been given ample previous
7526closing out the
7527notice that such was likely to be the iaent of the visit. anI he propared himself accordingly.
7528that it would not be
7529inp
7530Z. It was explained to
7531possible to carry over funds beyond the end of the current fiscal
7532year. Therefore all work would have to be completed and all payments made prior to 30 June. This deadline appeared acceptable to
7533him, and it was agreed that I would make my final visit there to
7534did not
7535receive reports and attend to final details on 16 Juno. Q
7536have a current financial report, but he estimated that funds currently
7537on hand would be about sufficient for remaining expenditures. Be
7538agreed to send the Society within the next 10 days a more exact statement of current balance and estimated remaining expenditures. I
7539tried to impress on him strongly that transfer of additional funds and/
7540or return of unexpeaded funds must be completed well bfore the end
7541of the fiscal year.
75423. Of the 30 cases called for in the original doeign 13 have
7543been completed (but only 4 have been transcribed from the tapes). In
7544addition there are 8 cases in proLreos (of which two are already in
7545interview and 6 are worked up to the point of having the lists of questions
7546prepared). It was agreed that to meet the deadline we would have to
7547limit the design to these 26 cases.
7548is so Involved in the administrative
75494. It is apparent that'
7550problems of the project that he is not paying any attention to the results.
7551Since to date only 4 cases have been transcribed there is no way of telling
7552what is coming out of it. I assume there were no dramatic reactions, because the interviewers would have let him know about them had they emerzed.
7553It is possiblo, however, that our own analysis cf the data may dredge up
7554something of value, although I am dubious on this point.
7555gave me his usual long involved talk on the difficulties
75565.
7557he had encountered which account for the delays. He also talked at some
7558
7559143
7560length about his -- "pcrimear.*
7561are mildly h.aur-raiamng. Fial
7562
7563-th bypnoul.. gos_ aspecta of wactb
7564ho made quite a pitchL for contining
7565Comec duch project as this ncott year,
7566withL roalisac. aputum~ deadlines."
7567
7568I told him we would diacues posiilitic
7569i~ter the present project was
7570compicted and we badl . cha~lco to closely examine the take.
7571
7572Distribution:
7573
7574144
7575
7576July 18, 1958
7577
7578Dear Mr. 11
7579
7580oi-N
7581
7582The experiment designed lo test the effectiveness of
7583certain medication in causing individuals to release guarded information has been completed in accordance with the original experimental design, with the exception that 25 instead of 30 cases
7584were used. This matter was discussed in more detail in my letter
7585oT July 15. Abstracts on all 25 cases, transcriptions of the interviews, Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Tests given at the hospital and previously given at this clinic, post-experimental .
7586rankings and evaluation sheets, and a schedule covering the drug
7587administration have all been submitted to you under separate
7588cover.
7589Enclosed is a financial statement which reprk sents the
7590final accounting of the funds allocated by you for use in this
7591project. If, for your purpose, you require a more detailed summary of what specific professional services were performed or
7592more detail with reference to travel expenses or any other item,
7593kindly let me know.
7594
7595You will note, in this connecion, that Dr.Wvas
7596This
7597compensated in an amount exceeding thatpa. to Dr.
7598ng
7599che
7600sient much tie
7601was occasioned by the fact that Dr."
7602and
7603the files and records at the
7604e stable for our purPrison selecting cases that m g
7605O
7606pose. It was from the cases selected by him that the subjects
7607chosen.
7608finally
7609were
7610used in the experiment
7611I have been instructed to write a check to the Society
7612for the balance in the account as o3 today. I would like to
7613
7614Mr.
7615
7616Page Two
7617
7618delay this matter for a few days. Several checks have been written during recent days, and I would like to be sure they cleared
7619You will
7620.before closing out the account.
7621the bank i
7622receive a check in the amount of $1356.26 early next week.
7623If there is any additional information required, I will
7624be happy to cooperate.
7625
7626Enc.
7627
7628146
7629ty
7630
7631Ca:
7632
7633est:.-4-ty oC-:
7634:
76351977
7636
7637.18747S
7638
7639/Y
7640
7641FJLEldUWU
7642
7643Z : CLEY 187475
7644
7645PhiN
7646
76471."CArI1
7648
7649which in
7650
7651locatedcat
7652,
7653
7654icated
7655
765613
7657
7658-
7659
7660.'he rescarch Project will be carried cut at, he
7661
7662The
7663
7664Rn
7665
7666(
76674
7668
7669.
7670
7671has one thousand, one hundred and thirty-five (1,135) bods.
7672
7673ospi
7674
7675At the present tine thoro ere one hundred and forty-two (142) napsychotics classiied es cri-0.nal-seael psychopaths.
7676
7677ThOro are four
7678
7679full-tire psychiatristo and varying nuabcro of endical interns; two
7680psycholo-iztrl four soc.al workers; nurses and attendants.
7681intendent of the Hecepital is
7682of the resesrch t.a-.
7683
7684za
7685
7686:
7687
7688super-
7689
7690The
7691
7692wittin
7693
7694renber
7695
7696-- tIrmecutive Secretary of the Stata "Icpartennt of
7697
7698fental
7699
7700Health and
7701
7702any re 'earch project is nornrally approved by the Co-ordi.nator of
7703of the State Denrtent of
7704this e-proval.
7705
7706possile for the rusoarcl teaa to
7707
7708dco
7709sleep
7710
7711sronrch
7712
7713will secure
7714
7715aental Health.
7716
7717or-fl.1:in
7718
7719space evilazle erA it is
7720at the Hospital while eerryisz
7721
7722out their investigation.
7723
7724The subjccts will be selected from the on
7725(162)
7726
7727crinisal-cortal psychopaths on
7728
7729idiom
7730
7731hund-d and forty-two
7732
7733there is an edaquate previous
7734
7735investi, ation including police roports, physical, nsycdantric
7736prycholcic eacdrntions -nd
7737Do-znwded to:
7738
7739t"
7740
7741f'.tcrity
7742
7743ofa:
7744
7745187475
7746
7747Ct': J1:ie 1877
7748J.
7749
775015/.
7751
7752I;
7753
7754CL I:
7755
7756107475
7757
7758accial
7759
7760C
7761
7762-
7763
7764of
7765
7766- The in-titution cos urder the directie
7767
7768hin-eorca.
7769
7770The a,
7771
7772ad
7773
7774range of the
7775
7776-
7777
7778C
7779C.
7780
7781147
7782rubjects
7783
7784varies from t::.0-ty' 'as saOvety years
7785
7786and ther
7787
7788a
7789
7790otion oi intallizcnce levels and social tnck70onde.
7791
7792Th
7793
7794following ran are sugzostod for the research toam:
7795
7796C
7797,
7798
7799experience in er
7800
7801a pzychologist who has had etonsive
7802aJ,
7803
7804dning crii
7805
7806F}as
7807
7808iriten extonsively
7809
7810on psychopathic sexual deviations; is an authority on poly-
7811
7812Croph and
7813
7814*flf
7815
7816intorro:ation rethods.
7817
7818-
7819
7820-C
7821
7822for ren thirty years, a psychiatrist to has
7823
7824spent his life in the trrotrnt of the criminal inrano ='d
7825
7826r=intins
7827
7828for the cr
7829
7830the crLy institution
7831
7832-
7833
7834and treatant for the cririnal-sxaal psychopath.
7835a prycliatrist who has a large private
7836practico.
7837
7838At the pocent timra he is exclusiva3y devoting
7839
7840his tine to psychcanlycis.
7841exirdnir
7842
7843crinzCals.
7844
7845As a
7846
7847Ho has had extensive axnericnco
7848
7849Navy
7850
7851extensive cxerience in
7852
7853psychiatrist to has had
7854
7855WIC
7856
7857in the field of eastern cultures, Oriental
7858psychiatry, brairwashing, etc.
7859rogation
7860
7861with
7862
7863and h.,pnoanlyis.
7864d to: flNI-2t7.1Lhrity C: 137475
7865date: JOn: 1977
7866-
7867
7868:2
7869
7870CL fY 1S7475
7871
7872He hao also done drug inter-
7873
7874crimntls and has engagod in narconalysis
7875
7876C-
7877
7878S?475--
7879
7880*
7881
7882utfIf
7883
7884.
7885
7886trit ::o is en tho-C
7887
7888y
7889
7890of
7891end rnitoains a private practice in the field
7892has had
7893
7894or psychi try.
7895
7896wide
7897
7898experience in -
7899
7900wOnvty-
7901
7902r~t rT--.lja3
7903jo~zi
7904bor.n-a
7905back
7906CL4
7907goiQg
7908dolug doaL-Z
7909th
7910crirlialas
7911
7912C
7913
7914venJL-Lp
7915Years,
7916
7917including dr-g interc;,ation.
7918
7919c Tf
7920
7921aphys3ician for the post twenty-five
7922
7923- C
7924-'3
7925
7926yors, has been
7927had cxtcnsive expOr-
7928
7929eal)iZ
7930
7931once
7932
7933in
7934
7935wiTh all sorts of crizinls
7936
7937rca interrogation.
7938
7939-
7940
7941C
7942
7943d ha s onaged
7944
7945LOcidos his city position, he also
7946
7947raintains a private practico in the field of general.
7948l
7949
7950edicine.
7951-has O
7952
7953his staff
7954
7955abo is
7956
7957co-sted
7958
7959cmn of tbo perchiatrists from
7960
7961-
7962
79631in the treat-
7964
7965interested .xd has used drags
7966
7967rent of patients and has also used hypnozio nith mretal
7968patients.
7969
7970The roesrch aseiotants have not been
7971
7972as yet but rijht well include payoloeliste
7973attachud to
7974
7975*
7976
7977Three tear
7978On, teen
7979
7980workin:
7981
7982now
7983
7984Ze cecrutary ill
7985
7986prG:;ont secrntery 'to will do all the
7987
7988be
7989
7990ocry
7991
7992celected
7993
7994or raies
7995
7996tene: rephic
7997
7998of two csnior proonaitonal zata each will be
7999with
8000
8001the
8002
8003eaces-
8004
8005work in ad .ition to her presnt duties.
8006
8007selected grcup of ptiea
8008
8009Ltorro;ation, h.:mnolu tx.d hypror3i :nan
8010
8011colected.
8012
8013will una stra iht
8014
8015ad h!.pnoin
8016
8017and a
8018
8019-
8020
8021-C
8022
8023H
8024
8025f
8026
8027149
8028
8029tetrhr;eocrnnabbol
8030roup o
8031
8032nctata
8033
8034Cerivatibv.
8035
8036AnoLher tez.n working on
8037
8038and a trtrz.Cdrocenlnabinol acctato derivative and intorrogation.
8039the third tean with anther Croup of
8040cation
8041
8042another
8043
8044cbjcctr wUill uze str4-ht interrogation, IZD uitlh interrogation
8045
8046and
8047
8048c
8049
8050U
8051
8052use straif
8053
8054Later.-
8055
8056t interro-
8057
8058a cotirnation of LSJ and a tctrhydrocnmabinol acetate
8059
8060derivative.
8061A reing of all the
8062
8063roers
8064
8065of the research prooect will be briefed
8066
8067on the druZs to be u:ied and all of t'i
8068ledge
8069
8070gained
8071
8072pharnacoloeicfl and rndical =oW-
8073
8074so far in the use of theco drugs.
8075
8076Ina:Loctirc Lroups of abects for experintation, the ffllowing
8077objectives will be sought:
80781)
8079
8080Cubjects will be selected .fio have denied allegations
8081of vYrious 1-inda that can bo chocked or strongly ren:d
8082on the basis of previously established records.
8083
80842)
8085
8086As far as possible, the actual 'research ran rd-dnistering
8087drus wrill not be awaro of the drug he is ad-dnistering
8088cnd pinocobs
8089
80903)
8091
8092will
8093
8094be intermrsed with drug adiistration.
8095
8096Procautions will be taken to neutralizo age, intelliguces physical condition, social bckground and any
8097other controllable factor in ecelecting 5roups.
8098
8099Ad-
8100
8101idnietration of drugs will be done both openly and
8102eurreptitiously.
81034)
8104
8105ocund recording will be
8106
8107iasdoof the interroation
8108
8109-nd wrt %ton reports will beLobtded in othter care:.
8110*.
8111
8112r..)
8113* it*?tt.
8114fl 7of
8115:.:
81161
8117
81181 7 i75
8119
8120I
8121
8122J.C1077
8123
8124r-;U
8125
8126i:-0z~ CLrcce
8127
8128In j
8129
8130of interro_-,tion with dru;: anti otbor tciniquiea -. i:fl
8131bo c-hecited
8132
8133aaln~bct-~i rccords r-nd qiw~ita.tivo and
8134
8135cramlt~tti-m rcnorba vwIll 1, cvalua~ed.
8136
8137Accurate aad
8138
8139J-I~=roportz S.ill bo kcpt -- iur.-ms will be =1)-.
8140mgtted on tho bazij of ;Ltorin pro~reso and corp2leta
8141
8142C'-tin' rmthods of
8143
8144151
8145
8146DRAPT/a"o
8147
814830 January 1961
8149
8150V2240RANDUM.! FOR THE RECORD
8151SUBJECT:
81521.
8153
8154Project MKULTRA, Subproject
8155
81562
8157
8158Subproject 42 is to be continued for the same purposes as
8159
8160when originallyestablished: to support
8161
8162covert
8163
8164and realistic field trials of certain research and development items
8165of interest to TSD, and to maintain the physical facilities required for
8166these trials.
81672.
8168
8169In the past year a number of covert and realistic field
8170
8171,trials have been successfully carried out.
8172
8173The
8174
8175seults of these
8176
8177experiments have provided factual data essential to establishing
8178protocols for a number of contemplated operations.
8179
8180A continuation
8181
8182of covert and realistic field trials are necessitated by the production
8183of new materials in TSD programs, particularly in areas requiring
8184detailed knowledge of the effectiveness pnd efficiency of deliverjI
8185systems. Additional trials are also necessitated by the need for
8186better controlled "field-type" experiments.
8187
81883.
8189
8190The estimated cost of the ,project is
8191
8192of six months.
8193.
8194
8195$5,000.00
8196
8197for a period
8198
8199Charges should be made against Allotment 1125-1390-3902.
8200
8201Accounting for funds and equipment under this subproject has
8202
8203been established on a detailed basis with the auditor and will continue
8204as in the past.
8205
8206152
8207
82085.
8209
8210is
8211
8212approved for TOP SECRET by the Agency and
8213
8214operates under cover for purposes of this subproject.
8215
8216TSD/Research Branch
8217APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION OF FUNDS:
8218
8219Date:
8220
8221Distribution:
8222Original only.
8223
8224153
8225
8226EMORANDUM
8227FOR THE RECORD
8228
8229SUBJECT:
8230
8231Project MKULTRA, Subproject 42
8232
82331. Subproject 42 is bein
8234continued support of the
8235
8236e tab *shed to provide for the
8237
8238acilities, and as such,
8239
8240is a continuation of Suboroect 16
8241Under Subproject 42, it
8242is intended that the
8243jacilities be moved from
8244
8245.6'
8246
8247to
8248
8249These facilities,
8250
8251in the new location, will continue to provide a means for the
8252realistic testing of certain R and D items of interest to
8253CD/TSS and APD/TSS.
82542. Subproject 42 will be conducted by Mr.
8255a seaman. Certain support activities will be prcvided by
8256
8257CD/ISS and APD/TSS.
82583. The estimated cost for a period of one year is
8259$8,300,00, starting 1 March 1955.
8260
82611:2EY G(ArL=-B
8262
8263Chief
8264TSS/Chemical Division
8265
8266APROVED FCR OBLIGATICN
8267OF FUNDS:
8268
8269APPROVED FOR ADDITIONAL
8270OBLnsaTWSor
8271OF UD (ft28.
8272
82733
8274
8275I
8276KtesearCf
8277
8278Date:
8279Original Only.,
8280
8281Ulrector
8282
8283esearh D
8284
82854
8286
8287Date:
8288
8289ect
8290
8291MRANDUM FOR:
8292:
8293
8294SUBJECT
82951.
8296
8297THE RECORD
8298Project-MKULTRA,
8299
8300Stlbproject 45.
8301
8302The scope of this project is intended to encompass
8303
8304all those activities nov engaged in by the
8305
8306a in its own facilities under the
8307direction of TSS, Chemical Division. These activities will
8308take the form of three lines of biochemical investigation;
8309namely, the curare-like effect of certain thiols, the preparation of hydrogenated quinolines and indole alkaloids, and the
8310continued study of diphenolic compounds. In addition to the
8311above investigations, the present biological testing and assaying techniquesi will be elaborated and broadened to include
8312cardiovascular and anticarcinogenic effects of compounds resulting from the above programs.
8313dicates
83142. The attached proposal from
8315the extent of the investigations that his facilities will allow
8316him to carry out on the materials deieloped in the three lines
8317of research referred to in paragraph 1 as well as certain other
8318also serves
8319materials of interest to TSS/CD.
8320as a general consfdtant to this Division and provides cover and
8321cut-out facilities to the Agency.
83223. The total cost of this project for a period of one year
8323will not exceed $100,000.00. At the present time, the sum of
8324$40,000.00 is being committed, the balance of the total to-be
8325com 5 ted at a later date.
8326as been granted a TOP SECRET clearance
83274.
8328.
8329by the Agency, and is fully capable of protecting the security
8330of the Government's interest in this matter.
8331
8332.
8333
8334TSS, Chemical Division
8335APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION
8336OF FUNDS:
8337
8338APPROVED:
8339
8340Sawibf TS/CemialDiviso
8341APPROVED FOR AIDITIONAL APIROPRIATIC
8342Attachments:
8343Proposal
8344Original Only. 4
8345
8346Research Director
8347Nate:
8348
8349(
8350
8351-
8352
8353i
8354
8355155
8356
8357Manuman
8358re'
8359
8360rsCOR
8361
8362-s
8363
8364UMFORt. THE RECafLD
8365
83661MMA
8367
8368Projwitt-KILRA, Subproject 45
8369
8370SUBJECT:
8371
83721. The scope of this project is intended to encompass all those
8373-4
8374Munder the direction of TSS/CD. These activities tae the form
8375of three lines of biochemical investigation, namely, the Curare-like
8376effect of certain thiols, the preparation of bydrogenated quinolines
8377and indole alkaloids and a program of investigation of toxic cerebral
8378states. -.This last investigation will include. bio-assay and chemicalanalysis of various body fluids of animals in which cerebral toxemias
8379have been produced. It is the aim of this program to endeavor to
8380understand the mechanism of such states as toxic delirium, tiremic
8381coma, and cerebral toxicity from'po soning. In order to continue the
8382and to make available a
8383established "cover" activities of t
8384and-&
8385Pool of subjects for testing purposes, the
8386effects of compounds resulting from the above program will
8387pool of
8388be evaluated.
83892
8390iadicates the
8391. The attached proposal from
8392extent of the investigations that his facilities will allow him to
8393carry out on the materials developed in the three lines of research
8394referred to in paragraph one, a well as certain other materials of
8395so serves as a general consultant
8396interest to TSS/CD.
8397to this Division and provides cover and cut-out facilities to the
8398
8399Agency.
8400
84013. The total cost of this project for a period of one year will
8402not exceed $100,000. Charges should be made against Allotment
84036-2502-10-001.
8404.
8405
84064.
8407
8408has been requested to subinit a summary account-
8409
8410annual audit report be made available for
8411ing or a copy of th
8412the sponsor's inspection. Also, it has been requested that any unexpended funds shall be returned to the Agency.
8413Title to any permanent equipment purchased by funds granted
8414hall be retained by the
8415lieu of higher overhead rates.
8416* other than its activities as a cut-out
8417
8418Deog
8419
8420b
8421
8422to:
8423187479
8424. ority of475
8425
8426E2 I!
8427
8428~
8429
8430CL BY 167475
8431
8432-17 - - - - --
8433
8434-
8435
84362-
8437
84386. It was mutually agreed that documentation and accounting for
8439travel expenses which are normally reimbursable by the
84404W shall conform wiGtKe acpted practices of th
8441
8442(4)
8443Y
8444
8445eed to comply with the requirements of
8446. .
8447the Memorandum of Agreement.
8448
8449c
8450CAPfROVED
8451
8452APPROM FOR OBLIGATION
8453OF FUINDS:
8454
8455Research Director
8456Date
8457
8458___
8459
8460Attachment:
8461Proposal
8462Distribution:
8463Original Only
8464
8465Do- .d to:
8466EC
8467t:Jun
8468
8469L S7 187475
84707
8471
84722 .r;CL By 287475
8473
8474___
8475
8476Chief , T 8/Chemical Division
8477
8478157
84791960
8480
8481pertod
8482
8483The researci to be undertaken durtng the twelve month
8484devoted
8485for shtch ftnanctal support to requested wt1l be
8486
8487-
8488
8489mechantam
8490to the conttnued analysts of the neural and endoortne
8491The screentngof stress and the. hemtcal agents that tnfluence tt.
8492of phases of
8493procedures are based largely upon a further analysts
8494stress and the tnfluences of thts phystologto behavtor complex
8495accompanyupon both body and sktn temperatures as detatled tn the
8496Eng report.
8497
8498at the
8499
8500The chemtcal synthests of new compounds trtll be constr.ued
8501under the superttston of
8502and at the
8503
8504under the supervtston
8505
85064
8507
8508These chemtoal agents wtll be screened for
8509reactton
8510thetr capactty to provoke stress or t.o suppress the stress
8511pharmatn Lts acute or chronto phases. Antmal testtng wtill tnclude
8512o .--
8513
8514.
8515
8516these compounds as
8517cologto screentng and proper toxtctty studtes..of
8518heretofore.
8519a
8520Chemtcal agents that have been. found acttve and wtthtn
8521on
8522suttable toxtotty range wtll be subjected to cltntcal screentng
8523carrted out on
8524approprtate pattents, the tntttal screentng betng
8525to chemtcal
8526devoted
8527advanced cancer pattents. The amount of money
8528Chemtcal compounds
8529synthests, however, has bean firther reduced.
8530synthesteed tn t?
8531those
8532as
8533avatlable from btologto sources as well
8534that are acttve tn
8535project wll be screened, parttoularly those
8536etther ratstng or lowertng body temperature.
8537As heretofore any agents whtch prove to be of tnterest
8538th nn transvlant
8539n
8540-..
8541.. n*,<'
8542-..
8543
854496-408 0 - 77 - 11
8545
8546158'
8547
8548GantmaZ tumors ndnana nce
8549
8550patiienta.Th6S
8551
8552- ' :areo/
8553
8554project zutll be od-nstdPred-a by-.product of thte major objeottve,- 7
8555whtch wtll be dtrected to the problem of stress.
8556
8557ANNGNOTICE
8558SEIMTECEIGENCE
8559I.iTRD NVOLVED
8560
8561159.
8562MEMORANDUM FOR: THtfEconn
8563SUBJECT
8564
85651.
8566
8567Continuation of M.ULTRA. Subproject
8568
8569.
8570
8571No.
8572
8573tis
8574
8575The scope of this subpro'ect includes all those activities
8576
8577now engaged in byy
8578cutout
8579under the direction of TSSftD-with the exception of those
8580functions specifically mentioned in connection with other MKULTRA
8581subprojecf
8582
8583In general, the research effort under this subproject
8584
8585will continue along the lines.laid down in previous years.
8586
8587These
8588
8589involve the synthesis and pharmacological and clinical evaluation
8590of compounds of those chemical families known to have hpplication
8591in the psychichemical and "K" fields.
8592
8593During the past year important
8594
8595compounds
8596progress-has been made in the area related to stressor
8597and the relationship of these materials to the physiological pathways
8598through which both stress and the reaction to it are mediated in
8599human beings. (As is indicated in the attached proposal, the work
8600of the past year has progressed to the point where more definitive
8601experiments on the stress reaction can be carried out.
8602
8603Primarily
8604
8605this was brought about by the characterization of several new
8606.u
86070
8608P o
8609
8610and the applicamaterials which produce stress reaction in humans
8611the
8612tion of some new clinical methods of measuring the extent of
8613disturbance produced.
8614
8615During the next year proportionally more
8616
8617of new
8618effort will be expended on the problem of the development
8619
8620-
8621
8622160
8623
8624is desirable in this direction and because a new approach to the
8625problem has been worked out.
8626
8627a.
8628
8629also serves as a general consultant to
8630
8631the Agency, provides services of a sensitive nature on an ad hoc
8632basis, and serves as a cut-out in procurement problems.
86333.
8634
8635The total cost of this project for a period of one year
8636
8637will not exceed $71, 500. 00.
8638
8639Charges should be made against
8640
8641Allotment 0525-1009-4902.
8642has been requested to submit a summary
8643
86444.
8645
8646accounting or a copy of the Fund's annual audit report for the
8647sponsor's insection.
8648
8649Also, it has been requested that any unexpended
8650
8651funds shall be returned to the Agency.
86525.
8653
8654Title to any permanent equipment purchased by funds
8655shall be retained b
8656
8657granted
8658
8659, in lieu of higher overhead rates.
86606.
8661
8662It was mutually agreed that documentation and accounting
8663
8664for travel expenses which are normally reimbursable byIP.
8665-
8666
8667Fund.
8668
8669tosraded ts: CCORNIUML
8670autority off: 187475
8671ca
8672datc: June 1977
8673E2 I""DT: CL BY 187475
8674
8675Mshall conform with the accepted practices of the
8676
8677161
8678MMORANDM FOR:
8679
8680TE
8681
8682SUBJECT
8683
8684Subpxoect ro.
8685Continuation of MKOLTRA,
8686
86871.
8688
8689MOD
8690
869145
8692
8693The scope of this subproject includes all those activities
8694
8695nov/ngaged in by
8696~
8697
8698under the direction of TSD/EB vith zbh exception of-those cutoutfunctions specifically mentioned in connection with other
8699subprojects.
8700
8701IMLTRA
8702
8703In general, the research effort under this subproject
8704
8705will continue along the lines laid down in previous years.
8706
8707These
8708
8709involve the synthesis and pharmacological and clinical evaluation of
8710compounds of those chemical families known to have application in the
8711psychochemical and "K"fields.
8712
8713During the coming year it is planned
8714
8715to concentrate more directly on the more practical aspects of the
8716"knockout" problem.
8717
8718Enough new potent substances have become available
8719
8720lately to make such a change in-emphasis -vorthihila. In connection
8721with this change it
8722w
8723
8724aMENM
8725
8726should be noted that certain findings made in
8727
8728project at U
8729
8730vhich cannot 3e further exploited at
8731
8732that facility vill be pursued at
8733reason it
8734
8735in the future.
8736
8737may be necessary to supplement the f
8738
8739For this
8740
8741andigl
8742of this subproject
8743
8744from time to time during the year due to increases of scope.
87452.
8746
8747also serves as a general consultant to the
8748
8749Agency, provides services of a sensitive nature on an ad hoc basis,
8750and serves as a cutout in-procurement problems.
8751
8752.E2
8753
8754I'?=;
8755
8756CL BY 187475
8757
8758162
87593.
8760
8761*In
8762
8763total
8764
8765ot
8766
8767not exceed $40,000.00.
8768
8769of this proJ.t
8770
8771for a pefi
8772
8773of
8774
8775ne ye-
8776
8777.1l
8778
8779Charges should be made against Allotment
8780
87812125-1390-3902.
8782*
8783
8784O.
8785
8786bas been requested to submit a summary
8787
8788accounting or a copy of the Fund's annual audit report for the
8789sponsor's. inspection.
8790
8791Also, it has been requested that any unexpended
8792
8793funds shall be returned to the Agency.
87945.
8795
8796Title to any permanent equipment purchased by funds granted
8797
87986
8799
8800M shall be retained by
8801in lieu of higher overhead rates.
88026.
8803
8804It vas mutually agreed that documentation and accounting for
8805
8806travel expenses which are normally reimbursable by
8807shall conform with the accepted practices of the Fund.
8808
8809Chief
8810
8811TSD/Research Branch
8812APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION O FUNDS:
8813
8814Research Director
8815De
8816Attachment:
8817Distribution:
8818
8819Proposal and Budget
8820Original only
8821
8822163
8823
8824MEMORANDUM FOR
8825
8826SUBJECT
8827
8828o
8829
8830THE RECORD
8831
8832:MKULTRA, Subproject 149
8833
88341.
8835
8836Lt
8837
88384
8839
8840This subproject is being established for the purpose
8841
8842of supporting realistic tests of certain development items and
8843delivery systems of interest. to TSD/BB.
88442.
8845
8846During the course of development it is sometimes
8847
8848found that certain very necessary experiments or tests are not
8849suited to ordinary laboratory facilities.
8850
8851At the same time,
8852
8853it would be difficult if not imp&ssible to conduct such tests
8854as operatiqnal field tests.
8855
8856This project is designed .to pro-
8857
8858vide a capability and facilities to fill this intermediate
8859requirement.
88603.
8861
8862The activities under this subproject will be con-
8863
8864ducted by Mr.
8865export business,
8866
8867,
8868
8869in
8870
8871an individual in the import and
8872Mr.
8873
8874e
8875
8876holds a TOP
8877
8878SECRET Treasury Department cleafice and a SECRET Agency
8879He is completely witting of the aims and goals of
8880
8881approval.
8882
8883his activities.
8884. 4.
8885
8886possesses unique facilities and personal
8887
8888Mr.
8889
8890abilities which makes him invaluable in this kind of testing
8891operation.
8892
8893Mr.
8894
8895because of Iis peculiar
8896
8897lants..and
8898
8899-
8900
8901capabilities as well, as his excellent connections with all of
8902the local law enforceient agencies, will provide a unique and
8903essential capability.
8904sident of the
8905
8906is no longer re-C.
8907
8908Because Mr.
8909area,
8910
8911it
8912
8913is
8914
8915necessary that a
8916
8917suitable replacement be provided in order that a capability
8918for continuance of our activities be maintained.
89195.
8920
8921The estimated cost of the project is $10,000.00 for
8922
8923a period of one year.
8924
8925Charges should be made against Allotment
8926
8927Number 4125-1390-3902.
8928
8929Reimbursement will be made for services
8930
8931rendered.
89326.
8933
8934Accounting for funds advanced and any equipment under
8935
8936this- subproject will be in accordance with account ng proce
8937ures established by
89387.
8939
8940A memorandum of agreement along lines estab
8941
8942shed by
8943
8944previous audit recommendations in like situations will be
8945executed.
8946
8947TSD/Biological Branch
8948
8949Distribution:
8950Original only
8951
8952165
8953SUBJECT:
89541.
89552.
8956
89573.
8958
8959of
8960This is a request for financial support for research on the mechanism
8961brain concussion for the period 1 Feb 1956 to 1 Feb 1957.
8962The resonance-cavitation theory upon which this research is to be based,
8963has been presented in the proposal, submitted to th
8964dated 27 March 1954.
8965program
8966The program as originally submAtted estimated the duration of the
8967to be from three to five years requesting a total of $72,109 for the initial
8968year.
8969
89704. At
8971,
8972
8973Request for Support of Research on the Mechanism of Brain Concussion
8974
8975the request of the
8976
8977to $24,925, was then awarded to the
8978to support this program from 1 Feb 1955
8979
89805. .amounting
8981t
89826.
8983
8984a reduced budget was submitted.
8985
8986Feb 1950.
8987
8988as
8989The progress made to date under the above contract can be summarized
8990follows:
8991A. RESEARCH FACILITIES
8992The following research facilities have been established for the
8993investigation of the very diverse aspects of the problems being
8994studied:
8995Atotal of 250 square feet of laboratory and office space
8996equipped with much of the diversified machinery and apparatus
8997necessary for research in this field.
8998b. Blast Range
8999located
9000A blast range has been established at
9001This
9002ry.
9003f the malaors
9004approximately
9005is closed to the public.
9006area is owned rby theMand
9007Three blast test-series have been run to date.
9008Arrangments have been made with the
9009hmncadavers.
9010
9011WARNING
9012ELLIGENtCE
9013;ES' AND METHODS IN1VOLVED
9014
9015for use of their
9016A test area has been assigned for this
9017
9018166
9019
9020B.
9021
9022PERSONNEL
9023
9024- -
9025
9026Both full-time technical personnel and part-time professional
9027research personnel have been acquired and indoctrinated relative
9028to their specific function.
9029C. TECHNICAL PROGRESS
9030Following is the technical progress made uxder the current
9031contract:
9032a.
9033
9034Specialized instrumentation and numerous testing techniques
9035have been developed to obtain-the desired dynamic data.
9036
9037b.
9038
9039Considerable data has now been obtained supporting the
9040resonance-cavitation theory of brain concussion.
9041
9042c.
9043
9044Preliminary acceleration threshold data has been obtained
9045for a fluid-filled glass simulated skull.
9046
9047d.
9048
9049Data kas been obtained on the nature and the magnitude of
9050pressure fluctuations within a glass simulated skull subject
9051to either impact or sound waves propagated in air.
9052
9053e.
9054
9055Initial studies have been made on the simulated glass skull
9056attempting to establish the cavitation patterns for various
9057types of impact.
9058
90597.
9060
9061The proposed method and program plan remain the same as stated in the
9062original proposal, except for the temporary- deletion of the immersion
9063blast study.
9064
90658.
9066
9067The current level of activity on this ptoject can be indicated by the
9068most recent billing to the
9069for the month of November, which amounted
9070to $4,034.61.
9071
90729.
9073
9074In the interest of efficiency and economy it is requested that at least
9075this level of activity be maintained for the coming year.
9076
9077WARNING Nfl
9078SELLIGENCE
9079AND METHODS INVOLVED
9080
9081167
9082
90831.1
9084
9085Trotter.
9086
9087W. defies
9088
9089brain concussion as,
9090
9091'an essentially
9092
9093due to head injury which is of instantanious
9094transient state
9095onset, manifests widespread symptoms of purely paralytic
9096kind, does not as such comprise any evidence of structural
9097cerebral injury, and is always followed by amnesia for the
9098actual moment of the accident."
9099
910010.2
9101
9102The implication of the underlined portion of the above statement
9103is that if a technique were devised to induce brain concussion
9104without giving either advance warning or causing external physical
9105trauma, the person upon recovery would be unable to recall what
9106had happened to him.
9107Under these conditions the same technique
9108of producing the concussion could be re-used many times without
9109disclosure of its nature.
9110
911110.3
9112
9113First, considering the possibilities of direct impact to the
9114head or body, it should be..possible-from the findings of this
9115research program to determine the following:
9116a. Optimum design of impacting devices.
9117b. Optimum points of impact on skull or body
9118for the specific effects desired..
9119c. Intensity of the blow for the effect desired.
9120
912110.4
9122
9123In regard to the potential impacting devices, there are certain
9124design requsitesothat are apparent at this time:
9125a. The impact should be delivered without
9126advance warning.
9127b.. The area of impact and force distribution
9128should be such that surface trauma does
9129not occur.
9130c. The intensity of the impacting force and
9131its duration should be such as to obtain
9132the desired effect.
9133d. The device should be as small and as silent
9134as possible.
9135
913610.5
9137
9138The specific impacting devices might take the form of any of
9139the following:
9140a. A pancake type black-jack giving a high peak
9141impact force with a low unit surface pressure.
9142b. Concealed or camouflaged spring-loaded impacting
9143devices that trigger upon contact with the head.
9144
9145(Original and sole copy
9146
9147:agg)
9148
9149168
9150-
9151
9152.*.
9153
9154-
9155
9156.-
9157
9158a.
9159
9160A prcjecttle
9161
9162u sing a sall
9163
9164type
9165
9166mpeter
9167
9168shot fllb
9169
9170oan
9171
9172eack
9173
9174as
9175fo
9176
9177asr.
9178ear
9179proJectle.
9180
9181an,
9182
9183a
9184
9185d. An explosive pad detonated in contact with the
9186head or the body.
918710.6
9188
9189Let us now consider the possibilities of exciting the resonance
9190There is coaisiderable evidence
9191cavitation directly without impact.
9192that resonance cavitation can be induced directljr in the following
9193ways:
9194a. A blast wave propagated in air. (Blast Concussion)
9195b. Physical excitation with a mechanical driver
9196or horn, tuned to the resonant frequency of
9197the head.
9198
919910.7
9200
9201A single blast pressure wave propagated in air must have considerable
9202intensity in order to produce brain concussion, however, there is
9203considerable evidence (Carver & Dinsley) that modification of the
9204pressure wave can produce profound effects.
9205
920610.8
9207
9208Excitation of the resonance cavitation by using a tuned driver
9209at this time appears to be well within the relm of possibility.
9210The neurotic-like manifestations normally associated with blast
9211concussion could possibly be induced by this method. Use of
9212this methodtiowever, would require actual physical contact with
9213the drivers.
9214
921510.9
9216
9217Excitation of the resonance cavitation by tuned sound waves also
9218appears to be a reasonable possibility. Concentration of the soundfield at some remote point could be effected with accoustical lenses
9219and reflectors. The blast duration would be in the order of a
9220tenth of a second. Masking of a noise of this duration should not
9221be too dificult.
9222
922311.0
9224
9225It would possibly.be advantageous to establish the effectivness
9226of both of the above methods as a tool in brain-wash therapy.
9227A full knowledge of the method and the rpsulting sequela should be
9228of aid to any person forced to submit to such treatment.
9229
923012.0
9231
9232Possibly the most significant potential aspect of this study would
9233be in the development of practical means of giving a person immunity,
9234One technique that appears
9235even though temporary, to brain concussion.
9236to have potentialities involves the introduction of a small quantity
9237This gas bubble
9238of gas, approximately 1 cc, into the spinal cord.
9239would then normally migrate to the ventricles located at the centrun
9240of the brain. The ability of this bubble to expand under dynamic
9241loading would be most effective in preventing resonance cavitation
9242from occuring.
9243
9244(Original and sole copy
9245
9246:agg)
9247
9248%6-4C8 13.,(
9249
9250MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
9251MKSEARCH. OFTEN/CHICKWIT
9252MKSEARCH was the name given to the continuation of the MKULTRA program. Funding commenced in FY 1966, and ended in FY 1972. Its purpose was to
9253develop, test, and evaluate capabilities in the covert use of biological, chemical,
9254and radioactive material systems and techniques for producing predictable human
9255behavioral and/or physiological changes in support of highly sensitive operational
9256requirements.
9257OFTEN/CHICKWIT
9258In 1967 the Office of Research and Development (ORD) and the Edgewood
9259Arsenal Research Laboratories undertook a program for doing research on the
9260identification and characterization of drugs that could influence human behavior.
9261Edgewood had the facilities for the full range of laboratory and clinical testing.
9262A phased program was envisioned that would consist of acquisition of drugs and
9263chemical compounds believed to have effects on the behavior of humans, and
9264testing and evaluating these materials through laboratory procedures and toxicological studies. Compounds believed promising as a result of tests on animals
9265were then to be evaluated clinically with human subjects at Edgewood. Substances
9266of potential use would then be analyzed structurally as a basis for identifying and
9267synthesizing possible new derivatives of greater utility.
9268The program was divided into two projects. Project OFTEN was to deal with
9269testing the toxicological, transmisivity and behavioral effects of drugs in animals
9270and, ultimately, humans. Project CHICKWIT was concerned-with acquiring information on new drug developments in Europe and the Orient, and with acquiring
9271samples.
9272There is a discrepancy between the testimony of DOD and CIA regarding the
9273testing at Edgewood Arsenal in June 1973. While there is agreement that human
9274testing occurred at that place and time, there is disagreement as to who was
9275responsible for financing and sponsorship. (See hearings before the Subcommittee
9276on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Human Resources Committee,
9277September 21, 1977.)
9278(169)
9279
9280THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE
9281WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
9282
9283Office of Legislative Counsel
9284
928523 December
9286
92871977
9288
9289Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
9290Select Committee on Intelligence
9291United States Senate
9292Washington, D.C.
929320510
9294Dear Mr. Chairman:
9295During Admiral Turner's 3 August 1977 testimony
9296before your Committee and the Senate Human Resources
9297Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, you asked
9298whether any Agency employees had been terminated because of
9299their participation in MKULTRA Subproject 3. Admiral
9300Turner indicated he did not believe any employee had
9301been terminated, but would have Agency records searched
9302on this question. Our records have been searched and the
9303results confirm the Director's testimony that no such
9304actions were taken.
9305Sincerel
9306
9307Ge
9308Car
9309egislatve Counsel
9310
9311171
9312
9313QKHILLTOP DEFINITION
9314QKHILLTOP was a cryptonym assigned in 1954 to a project to study Chinese
9315Communist brainwashing techniques and' to develop interrogation techniques.
9316Most of the early studies are believed to have been conducted by the Cornell
9317University Medical School Huipan Ecology Study Programs. The effort was
9318absorbed into the MKULTRA program and the QKHILLTOP cryptonym became
9319obsolete. The Society for the investigation of Human Ecology, later the Human
9320Ecology Fund, was an outgrowth of the QKHILLTOP.