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1♦ INTRODUCTION
2The impact of the Napoleonic Wars, the experience of the War of 1812, and the changing roles of the American military moved many in the officer corps to begin seeing their craft not merely as a job, but as a profession and a career. Education and the study of the art of warfare became important to the officer corps not only in the Army but also in the Navy. Over time, officers came to see the principal role of the military as the defense of the United States. To fulfill this role, the officer corps believed the military had to prepare itself, and the nation, for war.
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4The War with Mexico gave the military, especially the Army, the chance to exhibit the progress of its initial professionalization. Ironically, many of the officers who fought against Mexico would, just more than a decade later, fight each other in one of the bloodiest wars in American history, the Civil War.
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7♦ NAPOLEON AND A REVOLUTION IN WARFARE
8The Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) caused a revolution in military affairs, one that continues to influence the practice of warfare and the way many nations approach military organization and purpose. The establishment of the French Republic in 1792 reflected and encouraged an intense sense of nationalism among the French people. The French government obligated all citizens to join the armed service in order to form huge armies with which France conquered neighboring countries, established republican governments in those subjugated states, and tried to make a republican empire out of the European continent. The monarchies that had escaped France’s initial conquest, however, developed their own sense of nationalist energy that they could channel toward a massive effort to contain the French state. If victory came with breaking the enemy’s will to fight, then nationalism made that objective all the more difficult for both sides by the time of the Napoleonic Wars. Warfare became an intense, year-round endeavor that harnessed the total resources of the nation state. These resources included conscription, which gave states an almost inexhaustible pool of manpower to maintain such large armies. With seemingly unlimited numbers of men, generals became bolder in their willingness to accept larger casualties in pursuit of victory.
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10Napoleon Bonaparte became the master practitioner of this new style of warfare. Napoleon took control of the French Republic, declared himself emperor in 1804, and accelerated French expansion during the first years of the nineteenth century. His hallmark strategy involved seeking a climactic battle that would completely destroy the enemy’s army. Employing overwhelming force and swift maneuver, Napoleon inflicted huge casualties and extracted a devastating psychological toll on the enemy.
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12With such large national armies facing him, however, Napoleon's strategy required him to sacrifice large casualties of his own, which he willingly did. Tactically, more mobile artillery allowed him to employ cannon at close range without increasing the risk of losing them to enemy fire. Case shot at close range fired by artillery batteries that could so swiftly shift positions made Napoleonic battles a holocaust of gunfire. Moreover, Napoleon's organization and placement of divisions before and during battle gave him a strategic advantage. Even in the United States, military officers took note of this intensified way of war.
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14Napoleon’s way of war gave birth to modern military thought. A new generation of military thinkers examined Napoleon’s successes and failures and wrote about this new approach to warfare. Antoine Henri Jomini, a French officer born in Switzerland, and the Prussian Karl von Clausewitz were the most prominent of these thinkers. Their writings helped solidify Napoleon’s influence on modern warfare.
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16Jomini had the most immediate effect on American military thought. He was a major general in Napoleon’s army and later served in the Russian army of Alexander L During the Napoleonic Wars, Jomini held staff positions that permitted him to closely observe Napoleon’s methods. His position also gave him experience in logistics and troop movements during battles, but he never personally commanded troops in combat. He wrote prolifically, publishing twenty-seven books on modern warfare. His most influential work was his 1838 Precis de Part de la guerre (Summary of the Art of War). Jomini was influenced by Enlightenment thought and found the human and financial cost of Napoleonic battle disturbing. As a result, Jomini found perfection in the less costly tactics and strategy of Frederick the Great, who ruled Prussia from 1740 until 1772. Still, Jomini admired the brilliance of Napoleon’s offensive capabilities and sought to interpret them for professional military study. Jomini argued that warfare had universal fundamental principles that military strategists could understand and apply.
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18Jomini suggested four primary rules for battle: maneuver one’s forces to bear upon the enemy's most important points and disrupt his communications without placing one’s own forces in a vulnerable position; concentrate one’s forces on only part of the enemy’s force rather than bringing them to bear on all of the enemy’s force; determine the decisive point of the battlefield and the enemy’s force to maneuver one’s forces against it; and when concentrating mass upon decisive points, do so swiftly and in a well-timed and coordinated maneuver. To conduct these moves required forethought and planning. The strategically intelligent general could plan and carry out such a campaign to bring his mass against the decisive point of the enemy's force in a climactic battle, thus achieving military victory.
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20Key to Jominian thought was the idea of maintaining the initiative. The general who had control of his forces and who, therefore, could force his opponent to react to his wishes had the strategic initiative. Ideally, according to Jomini, when a general conducted this sort of campaign, dominating the battlefield through superior maneuver, the enemy would capitulate without a battle of annihilation. Departing from Napoleon, Jomini contended that gaining territory, not annihilating the enemy's force, would achieve the overall political objectives of the war. In the 1830s, Jomini’s ideas became central to the curriculum at the U.S. Military Academy at WestPoint. His principles dominated U.S. Army thinking until after World War II.
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22Although his writings did not enjoy much influence in the United States until the middle of the twentieth century, Clausewitz, like Jomini, also sought to discover universal principles of warfare based upon the Napoleonic experience. Clausewitz served in both the Russian and Prussian armies during the Napoleonic Wars. Afterward, he served as superintendent of the Prussian Kriegsakademie until 1830, when he returned to field service as Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army. He died in 1830. Clausewitz’s single great work was Vom Krieg (On War), an enormous, posthumously published tome that outlined his concepts of the universal principles of war. Unlike Jomini, Clausewitz understood war as a violent act that was not subject to a set of strategic principles. Rather, factors beyond human control —what he termed “fog” and “friction”—determined the course of war. For Clausewitz, war was a “continuation” of diplomacy, a tool used to force an adversary to concede to your demands. Much like Napoleon, Clausewitz argued that such coercion worked by destroying the opposing military force and the enemy’s will to use military force, rather than by taking territory. Thus war, according to Clausewitz, was not an end in itself but rather a means to an end. Perhaps his most important concept is what students of military theory call the “trinity” —the three forces that determine a war’s development. According to Clausewitz, the forces are primordial violence, chance, and reason. Following the Vietnam War, On War gained a wider audience within the U.S. military.
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24Clearly, Jomini was the source of theoretical discussion among pre-Civil War American officers. Even before Jomini’s Precis was published, however, American officers had begun to explore the significance of the Napoleonic Wars, with the U.S. Military Academy at West Point serving as the center of that study. West Point-educated officers increasingly dominated the officer corps. In 1817, West Point accounted for 14.8 percent of Army officers. By 1830, 63.8 percent of Army officers graduated from the military academy, and by 1860, West Point produced 75.8 percent of U.S. Army officers. The appointment formula for West Point broadened significantly by the 1830s, giving each congressional and territorial district one appointment and providing for additional at-large appointments. In addition to making each class geographically balanced, if not diverse, the formula gave Congress a political interest in the academy, which helped soothe Jacksonian Era complaints about the non-egalitarian nature of the military. As a result of this system, most of the American officer corps shared a common educational foundation and military ethos.
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26West Point Superintendent Sylvanus Thayer began the process of making strategic theory part of the curriculum after the War of 1812. His travels in Europe after the war exposed him to the new literature on military thought, convincing him that Europe was indeed leading the new field of military studies. Thayer strove to establish an overall, integrated military strategy for the United States, bringing together the maritime defense tradition with the new strategic thought on land war. Although Thayer added strategic theory to the academy curriculum, external factors limited how much class time could be devoted to such studies. Several factors limited Thayer’s progress and kept West Point primarily a school of engineering, including the traditional fear of a standing army, a reduction in the Army's size, a lack of funds, the subsequent small number of cadets, and, not surprisingly, peace. Moreover, President Andrew Jackson’s harsh criticism and high-handed interference with the academy prompted Thayer to resign the superintendency in 1833.
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28Upon Thayer’s resignation, his protege, Denis Hart Mahan, became the leading proponent of Jominian thought at West Point. Mahan, an 1824 graduate of the academy, studied in France before joining the faculty. As primary instructor on warfare and engineering, Mahan influenced dozens of West Point graduates. Mahan taught warfare as both science and art, focusing on strategy, fortification, logistics, and tactics as well as on the role of warfare as a tool of statecraft. Mahan used S. F. Gay de Vernon’s
29Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification as his textbook. Gay de Vernon’s work focused on engineering and fortification, but included a chapter on Jomini’s ideas.
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31One of Mahan’s students, Lieutenant Henry W. Halleck, became the first American military officer to write a book on military thought and strategy. Published in 1846, just as the war with Mexico began, Halleck's Elements of Military Art and Science applied Jominian thought to the American strategic situation. On the surface, Halleck promoted the Jominian principle of offensive warfare and concentration of mass on decisive points. The book, however, gradually strays from this bold approach to a more cautious one. In applying these precepts to the United States, Halleck backed away even further from offensive war, focusing instead on the necessarily defensive nature of American military policy. Despite its territorial and commercial growth, the United States, according to Halleck, had no need for an aggressive military policy because of its unique geostrategic situation. In his mind, the primary role of the American military was to defend the nation against foreign attack and to protect American resources in the continental United States.
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33Halleck strongly supported the traditional policy of fixed coastal fortifications intended to help repel foreign invasion. Major ports and cities had to be denied to the enemy, and the threatened cities’ populations had to be protected. Yet, Halleck cautioned against becoming too dependent on such a static fortification system. Offensive warfare still had a role, although Halleck never seemed comfortable in fully endorsing it. In the end, Halleck’s prescription was largely Jominian in that he supported the defense of places rather than the Napoleonic preference for the destruction of enemy forces.
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35In 1847, Mahan published An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops, and the manner of Posting and Handling Them in Presence of an Enemy. With a Historical Sketch of the Rise and Progress of Tactics, &c., &c. — more simply referred to as Out-Post. Mahan believed that Napoleon had discovered all there was to know about the art of war; thus, by studying Napoleon and his campaigns, one could learn the art of war. Nevertheless, like Halleck, Mahan was cautious in his discussion of the movement of forces and the security of defensive positions. As for the offensive, Mahan, like Halleck, cautioned against recklessness, instead suggesting that the best offensive is the one that gains position through deception and maneuver at the least cost to one’s own forces. This was not, however, an endorsement of a Napoleonic willingness to accept tremendous losses in order to destroy the enemy’s forces. And, again like Halleck, Mahan believed in strong defensive fortifications as the best long-term military policy for the United States.
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37Neither soldier-scholar attempted to apply the principles of Napoleonic warfare to frontier constabulary duties or to the Indian problem. In trying to apply Napoleonic ideas to the United States, both men had to compromise those ideas to make them fit the American strategic situation. Both Halleck and Mahan seemed to confirm a preference for George Washington's defensive strategy in the War for American Independence or Winfield Scott's strategy of limited territorial gain to achieve political objectives in the War with Mexico, both of which are more Jominian in principle than Napoleonic.
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39It is important to understand the strategic context that influenced these men. The United States did not have serious concerns about a foreign invasion from the 1820s through the Civil War. Nor did American military officers spend much time studying Jomini, Halleck, and Mahan. The strategy course at West Point represented only a small portion of the overall curriculum, which remained dedicated to engineering and mathematics. As educated military men, officers thus had only a rudimentary understanding of Napoleonic warfare —mainly that a climactic battle to annihilate the enemy's force would bring victory.
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41Studying strategic thought was an important step toward professionalism. Over the course of the pre-Civil War decades, a growing number of officers wrote books, articles, and reports on a wide range of mostly military subjects. They had certainly been influenced by similar trends in Europe. While the tradition of using European military officers as expert teachers in the United States slowed after the War of 1812 and ended by the 1830s, American officers traveled to Europe to learn about European military strategy, education, and training techniques. Despite some resistance to European military ideas among some senior officers, scores of junior officers spent time abroad to learn. They witnessed military operations; visited military schools, fortresses, and ports; brought back hundreds of books and treatises; and examined what they could of the latest European military technological developments.
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43Lieutenant Daniel Tyler visited France in 1828-1829 and somehow gained access to secret plans for new weapons designs and field maneuvers for French artillery units. Tyler translated the plans into English and produced a report that heavily influenced American artillery development before the Civil War. Many officers translated other French, Austrian, and Prussian infantry, cavalry, and artillery studies and manuals into English for American study. In 1840, a group of ordnance officers toured munitions factories, arsenals, and proving grounds across Europe, gaining invaluable knowledge about European munitions production and capabilities. Several officers spent as long as two years in Europe touring the continent, and meeting with their European counterparts. Even Thayer made a return trip in 1844 for a two-year tour of fortifications and schools, bringing back books, knowledge, and experience to the Corps of Engineers. Some American officers attended European military schools. For example, six cavalry officers attended the French cavalry school in 1839, while some artillerists attended the French artillery school at Metz.
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45Another trend in budding American military professionalism involved assigning American officers as observers with European armies in training or on actual operations in the field. Many officers who visited European armies, their schools, and installations noted the camaraderie and the common sense of purpose and dedication among officers, especially in the Prussian and Austrian officer corps. As a lieutenant, Philip Kearney observed and even participated in French military operations in Algeria. Lieutenant Colonel Edwin V. Summer observed British and French cavalry maneuvers in 1854. During the 1859 War of Italian Unification, several American officers observed combat operations.
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47The Crimean War of 1855-1856 presented the most important opportunity to see modern European military forces in action. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, a veteran of the War with Mexico, sent Major Richard Delafield of the Corps of Engineers, Major Alfred Mordecai of the Ordnance Department, and Captain George B. McClellan of the 1st Cavalry Regiment to observe the action. Arriving too late to witness the major battles, the officers nevertheless conducted extensive studies of battlefields, logistics, and transportation. Their reports offered valuable information on the organization of field armies, forts, arms design and manufacture, basic field equipment, and field hospitals.
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49Early professionalization also involved standardization of training, ordnance, and equipment. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun established the Artillery School of Practice at Fort Monroe in Virginia in 1824 and an Infantry School of Practice at Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis in 1826. Using the French “schools of practice” concept, units rotated through these schools to receive standardized training and drill. Lack of funding from Congress hampered the mission of these schools.
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51During the Jackson administration, egalitarianism and a need for troops during the Second Seminole War forced closure of both schools. In the early 1840s, however, the War Department established four regimental schools of practice at regimental posts across the country. In 1858, the artillery school reopened at Fort Monroe with an expanded mission to study the theoretical use of artillery. A cavalry school of practice informally operated at Jefferson Barracks before being formally established at Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania in 1855. At West Point, Mahan created a two-year postgraduate course for engineers. The schools of practice improved the Army’s use of light artillery and infantry tactical maneuver and, although the Civil War placed many of these schools on hiatus, the movement toward specialized, advanced military education gained even more momentum after the Civil War.
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53Standardizing fortification and ordnance received much attention during the 1840s and 1850s. The Corps of Engineers proposed hundreds of projects to strengthen and diversify fixed fortifications. Among the ideas put forward were floating batteries powered by steam (a favorite of Secretary of War Lewis Cass), and fortress design and placement that used railroads for logistics and troop movement. Individual engineers debated the merits and flaws in the coastal fortification system. At the same time, the Ordnance Department standardized munitions and equipment. Artillery design, the percussion rifle, breech-loading weapons, and other equipment and weapons received the Board of Ordnance’s stamp of approval. The board also considered proposals for new technologies from both military officers and civilian inventors. Its method of testing and approving new weapons and equipment for standardized use by the Army made the Board of Ordnance the Army's first real research and development program.
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55Finally, any profession needs a means of sharing information, raising questions and discussing issues that affect the ability of that profession to fulfill its purpose. Before the Civil War, the American military already had developed such a process. Through various revisions of field manuals for artillery, infantry, and cavalry, officers discussed not only different methods and tactics for defense against foreign invasion, but also how best to deal with the Indian problem, maintain frontier security, and incorporate new technology. Journals, such as the Army and Navy Chronicle and the Military and Naval Magazine of the United States, became de facto professional publications in which officers could express concerns, raise issues, and share ideas. Some officers wrote military history. Congress published a wide range of military reports. The topics ran the gamut from military pay to infantry tactics, or from the diplomatic implications of exploratory expeditions to sanitation. Pre-Civil War era officers had a range of publications available to promote discussion about their profession at arms.
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57The Navy lagged behind the Army in professionalism. The establishment of the Depot for Charts and Instruments, the Naval Observatory, and the Nautical Almanac Office initiated some standardization, but resistance to new technology, especially steam, remained entrenched among senior officers. Naval education was inconsistent and mostly relied on the traditional midshipmen apprentice system. As a challenge to this system, Matthew Perry established what he called the Naval Lyceum at the Brooklyn Navy Yard in 1833, but there was no formalized curriculum—only loosely directed independent study. A Naval School had also been established at Philadelphia for midshipmen, but it hardly qualified as a military academy.
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59Secretary of the Navy (and historian) George Bancroft finally formalized midshipmen education in 1845, and moved the Naval School from Philadelphia to Annapolis, Maryland. Congress, which had been in recess when Bancroft made the switch, turned a blind eye once it learned that Bancroft had saved money by moving the school. Congress approved the move, and appropriated funds for its operation, thus officially creating the U.S. Naval Academy.
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61Nevertheless, the Navy had serious problems. Inconsistency in quality of command resulted in even more inconsistency in the administration of discipline. Questionable hangings for mutiny on the Somers in 1842, and other dubious executions and floggings brought naval justice and officership into question, ft took decades before these and other issues addressed adequately.
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63For the Army, at least, education, thought, and standardization in the pre-Civil War era put the American military on the path to professionalism. Army officers came to see themselves as part of a unique subculture with a sense of purpose and mission. The ideal of the educated, well-mannered, and courageous officer who was intellectually involved in the development of his craft gradually became the norm rather than the exception. The Navy did not catch up until after the Civil War.
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66♦ WAR WITH MEXICO
67American expansion encroached upon Mexican lands primarily via expeditions and illegal settlement. The exception to this pattern was the permission that Spanish authorities gave to Americans to settle in Texas in 1821. Shortly thereafter, Mexico gained independence from Spain, and disagreements between Texans and the Mexican government immediately ensued. When Mexico outlawed slavery in 1835, Texans rebelled. The Texas Revolution ended in April 1386 with a treaty granting independence from Mexico, and recognizing the Rio Grande River as the southern border of the new republic. When the United States annexed Texas in 1845, Mexico severed diplomatic relations with the United States. Historically, Mexico considered the Nueces River as Texas’s southern boundary, and saw the American annexation of Texas as a grab at Mexican territory. The Mexican government also worried that the U.S. wanted California, fn fact, President James K. Polk was interested in annexing California, and offered to buy the territory from Mexico, and to settle the border dispute over the Texas-Mexico boundary.
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69Polk anticipated a Mexican invasion of Texas and, perhaps, hoped that negotiations would break down. In preparation, the president ordered Brevet Brigadier