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1Governing by new performance expectations in Norwegian
2schools
3
4Introduction
5The Norwegian education system is part of the Nordic welfare state: for the most part publicly
6organised and financed and aimed at providing equality and the non-discriminatory right of
7everyone to achieve their desired level of education. Equity is one of the distinctive features
8of this model, on which social democracy as a political movement and broader ideology has
9had a crucial impact, and the system stands out as one of the most equitable worldwide, with
10small differences among schools .
11Since the end of the 1980s, the Norwegian educational system has gone through major
12reforms, influenced largely by new managerial ideas. Strategies to renew the public sector
13have been promoted as New Public Management  .
14During the late 1980s and 1990s, NPM did not directly challenge the established tradition of
15schooling, since its main consequences were for the restructuring of the local school
16administration at municipal level in terms of deregulation, horizontal specialisation and
17management by objectives. To date, marketisation as a principle has been less espoused in 
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19Norway, probably because the market in school choice for students and parents exists only in
20the larger cities. The population in Norway is widely dispersed, and decentralised settlement
21is still a desirable political aim for most political parties. Moreover, the comprehensive
22educational system remains strongly rooted in traditional ideologies and norms, and
23procedures for approving private schools are strictly regulated.
24However, the development of NPM changed direction and picked up speed when Norway was
25listed below the average of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
26 members by the Programme for International Student Assessment  in the
27early 2000s. The need for new assessment tools to measure and monitor students’
28performance levels, strong leadership in schools and accountability became key issues in the
29public debate on education, which centred increasingly on students’ achievements in basic
30skills as the main indicator of educational quality 
31New assessment policies with an emphasis on performance measurement, expectations about
32the use of data to improve education and emerging accountability practices characterise the
33transition process over the last decade. Yet we have limited knowledge about how managers
34at the municipal level and principals translate demands and respond to new expectations about
35performance management in Norwegian schools. This chapter aims to fill that gap.
36The present study explores how new modes of school governing are shaped and played out
37locally, with a particular focus on managerial elements, operative function and underlying
38logic. Moreover, we investigate how school principals engage with demands for increased
39performance and accountability, as well as their involvement in shaping and changing these
40governing structures. The study describes how one municipality has introduced and developed
41an evidence-based approach to school governance. 
423
43We start by briefly describing some distinguishing features of NPM adopted in Norway. The
44next sections outline the methodology and data sources, after which a thematic analysis of the
45data is provided. We conclude the chapter by highlighting tensions and paradoxes in
46Norwegian educational policy and the persistent dilemmas that are at the core of school
47leaders’ work.
48NPM reform in the Norwegian education system
49Student performance data as a quality indicator and the means to generate such data were first
50added to the policy agenda in Norway after the OECD review of Norwegian education in
511988 . The focus on outcomes achieved in relation to formulated goals and
52targets represents a key element of the NPM framework. Generally, during the 1990s, Norway
53was reluctant to adopt the new managerialism. After the publication of the first PISA results
54in 2001, a new discourse emerged, more insistent than anything previously, on educational
55quality and holding school leaders and teachers to account. In 2005, the parliament decided on
56a system for assessing national educational quality, called the National Quality Assessment
57System .
58According to current national educational policies in Norway, the key to improvement lies in
59the use of performance data and output controls. Local authorities, school principals and
60teachers are expected to use this information to improve their practice in ways that enhance
61student outcomes, particularly national test results . Reforms in the education
62sector during the 2000s have been largely shaped by managerialism, but Norway has
63employed only moderate incentives and sanctions linked to outcomes achieved. Interestingly,
64the monitoring and controlling aspects are concealed in the national policy rhetoric by a
65discourse that focuses on learning and development . 
664
67Although professional autonomy was still emphasised in the latest reform, the Knowledge
68Promotion , trust in the profession itself seems to be replaced by trust in the results. On
69one hand, it was argued that the managerial approach to education aimed at ensuring a basic
70standard for all, by levelling out disadvantages; on the other hand, it was a push for debureaucratisation
71and de-centralisation, ostensibly allowing for more differentiation and
72specialisation 
73New approaches to school governing have been developed in many municipalities that are
74responsible for the quality of schools, and in policy documents defined as school owners,
75alongside the new national expectations about using performance data to enhance educational
76quality.
77The key features of NPM, ‘the four Ms’, as outlined by Hood , can be identified in
78some of the larger cities in Norway. New titles have been created for managers at the
79municipal level, who are often trained and accredited as managers using business models.
80They may or may not have an educational background. Managerial elements include a
81combination of performance measurement, quality indicators, target setting, accountability
82and the use of incentives and sanctions. Much faith is put in assessment tools that provide data
83and information. Results from national tests are used locally for benchmarking, the basis on
84which schools aim to perform better than the municipal average . Many Chief
85Education Officers  at municipal level also increasingly use performance-related pay to
86reward principals who can demonstrate good results in national tests in literacy and numeracy.
87At the same time, the welfarist legacy, which emphasises education for the public good,
88remains strong, mediating the reading, interpretation and shaping of international trends.
89However, conflicting rationales identified as neo-liberalism or technical–economic rationality
90are gaining ground. One of the main tensions is between discourses rooted in socially 
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92democratic ideologies, linked to notions of equity, participation and comprehensive education,
93and discourses of competition and privatisation, which underpin NPM. The latter also
94includes strong leaders and entrepreneurs driving the modernisation project in education, and
95in many municipalities the logic of contractualism has been successfully institutionalised. The
96use of new evaluation technologies both by managers at the municipal level and principals to
97monitor student outcomes can be read as a shift towards what has been termed organisational
98professionalism, which incorporates standardised work procedures and relies on external
99regulation and accountability measures . It echoes the management discourse
100promoted by the OECD, where performance orientation is closely connected to output
101control.
102A Norwegian study has identified how teachers are apparently redefining professionalism in
103this new governance regime. While holding to classical professional ideals, teachers have
104become more proactive in terms of creating legitimacy for their work .
105Although cautious privatisation1
106is promoted nationally, to date elements linked to a market
107ideology are evident only in larger cities where competition among schools is possible, and to
108some degree in upper secondary education. Norway is comparable in size to Britain, but has
109only 5 million inhabitants. The population is widely dispersed, and many of the schools are
110quite small. In small municipalities far from the cities, managerial accountability is expected
111to happen ‘some time’ in the future.
112
1131 According to the Education Act, it is not permitted to make profits from private schools, and companies that
114have tried to bypass the law have lost their license and can no longer be in charge of schools.
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116Methodology and data sources
117This paper draws mainly on content analysis of selected policy documents that describe the
118procedures, tools and processes for local school governing in a particular municipality, which
119happens to be one of the largest cities in Norway. The city was chosen because it has taken a
120lead in stimulating national debates about testing and achievement scores. We identified and
121selected three key policy documents for analysis:
122Doc. 1: ‘Key Principles for Management by Objectives and Results’ describes elements in the school
123governing system ;
124Doc 2: ‘Strategic Chart’, based on balanced scorecard, presents prioritised areas, objectives and targets for
125schools and local administration;
126Doc 3: ‘Guidelines for Comprehensive Risk Management’ states the key principles for risk management and
127preventive measures to identify and reduce risk factors.
128The first reading of these documents concentrated on identifying important features in the
129local school governing system. The second reading focused on the functions of the different
130tools, accompanying accountabilities, use of incentives or sanctions and inherent logic, with a
131view to exploring stakeholders’ perceptions of the implementation of these concepts and
132tools. In addition, the Chief Education Officer  and three principals at three different
133types of schools were interviewed2
134.
135Table 1: Criteria for selection of schools
136
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138These interviews were conducted in 2011 as part of Guri Skedsmo’s postdoc project and the Vifee-project
139which she led together with Therese N. Hopfenbeck.
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141The principal in School 1 is in mid-career, the principal in School 2 is at an early stage in her
142career and the principal in School 3 is a veteran. The interviews were conducted in locations
143chosen by the informants. All interviews were audiotaped and transcribed, and the two
144researchers independently analysed the transcripts to identify emergent themes and
145characteristics of management approaches. Our presentation of the findings includes some
146illustrative excerpts from the interviews.
147Findings
148During the last 20 years, administrative structures with clear definitions of tasks and
149responsibilities have been established. Each school represents a self-governing unit, and the
150main type of accountability can be characterised as managerial through hierarchical
151relationships: the school principals monitor the teachers’ work, the principals are monitored
152by officers at the municipal level and the CEO is accountable to the elected local politicians.
153Procedures, tools and processes highlighted in key policy documents
154Analysis of the selected policy documents yielded three key features of the local governing
155system .
156Table 2: Key features of local school governing 
1578
158Hands-on professional management represents an overall management concept for this
159municipality. It relates to the establishment of schools as self-governing units, with
160management ensured by different tools. Performance management stands out as the main
161pillar for governing. Objectives and targets are specified in a ‘strategic chart’, which, together
162with performance indicators and measures of performance, is the most important tools for
163monitoring. Performance indicators are divided into three categories: 1) key statistics and
164facts about the schools and their resources; 2) student outcomes in national tests, local
165screening tests, the National Student Survey and the local survey of students’ learning
166environments; and 3) self-evaluation of efforts and results in strategic development areas.
167The local education authority has developed an extensive plan for testing throughout the
168school year. The results are used to set targets and initiate efforts to improves, monitor results
169and hold key actors to account. Students’ performance in tests is used to identify those who
170achieve below the critical limit. The underlying logic is performativity in terms of identifying
171dysfunctional organisation and management.
172The management contract provides a basis for the annual performance appraisal of principals.
173This reviews the previous year’s achievements and sets objectives and targets for the next
174year, which are negotiated by principals and municipal officers. Salaries may be adjusted
175accordingly: if targets are achieved or exceeded, the principal can receive an annual salary
176increase of 3000–4000 EUR. Data aggregated from individual schools are publicly accessible,
177creating reputational risk to schools and their principals. This may have consequences for the
178enrolment of students. Although most parents at primary level choose a school near their
179home, they are in principle free to choose any school.
180In recent years, risk management has become a central feature in school governing. It is
181defined as an ‘analytical tool to ensure that every threat to goal attainment is taken into 
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183account and properly managed’ . The analysis involves identifying important
184factors to achieve targets and assessing possible risks and taking action to mitigate them.
185School principals are required to develop a plan for each action, with targets, timelines and
186responsible persons, and are accountable for the implementation and timing of relevant
187measures to avoid failure to achieve targets.
188The third element is financial management. Key figures, budgeting and audits are used to
189control output and hold principals accountable, the underlying logic being to establish budget
190discipline.
191The next sections deal with how the CEO and three principals interpret and translate the
192policy into practice.
193Enactment of policy at the municipal level
194The CEO has headed the education sector for over 10 years, consistently promoting a strong
195focus on classroom practices and student learning: ‘My aim all the time was to establish a
196system with clear expectations and a practice where we can demonstrate effects on student
197learning.’ She describes this as both a self-defined mission and a mandate from city
198politicians. Leadership has attained a mantra-like status for her, ‘leadership, leadership,
199leadership’ is the solution for schools that score low in academic achievement. Accordingly,
200she has worked in close collaboration with the Norwegian Business School, which offers a
201master’s programme in management that stresses general leadership skills and the principal’s
202role in implementing policies to raise students outcomes 
203The CEO emphasises the need to develop solid structures in the school system and transparent
204systems for documenting learning outcomes:
20510
206The idea was […] to establish evidence-based practices in schools. […] The principal has a
207management contract […] this is part of our balanced scorecard system […] They have a strategic chart
208[…] this is part of our governing tools which we follow up on.
209She claims that setting high expectations for student achievement, keeping track of principals’
210and teachers’ professional development needs and holding them accountable for results are
211keys to school improvement. The management contract is a useful monitoring tool. At the
212same time, she criticises the national educational authorities for ‘accepting’ low academic
213scores and weak leadership in many schools, questioning how it is possible to claim that
214Norway offers equal opportunities for a good education for all within such a low-stakes
215system, and arguing for the need to act to avoid sliding backwards. Setting high expectations
216for students is important, particularly so for students from a minority background:
217I do not like to talk about minority language students; I prefer focusing on students who do not speak
218Norwegian properly. We need to create appropriate help and opportunities for these students because
219often they do not have support from their parents. There is a risk that they will not fulfil their potential if
220they do not speak Norwegian fluently.
221The CEO is pleased with her accomplishments over the last 10 years, particularly when
222reflecting on the situation in which she started this job:
223When I started in this municipality, we had creative teaching practices, good teachers and all that …
224there is no doubt about that. But there was no direction [knocks on the table for emphasis], there was no
225structure and there was no focus on results [knocks on the table] […]
226She strongly disagrees with those who argue that teaching in this city has become more
227bureaucratised during her leadership, because ‘we simply need to have control over learning
228processes’. She also ‘models’ the type of conversations she expects principals to have with
229teachers: 
23011
231What outcomes did you achieve last year? What is your ambition now? How are you going to work
232with your students to fulfil their potential? Why did your students perform less well in language than
233last year? And so on. It is a matter of what kind of expectations you have. Then, of course, the principal
234has to create conditions for the teachers to accomplish their goals.
235Her deputy directors check on each principal twice a year, asking questions such as: ‘What
236are your ambitions? What went well last year? How do you explain the performance data in
237your school?’ Her style can be characterised as ‘hands-on professional management’.
238Responses to policy at the school level
239The principals in this study have a positive perception of this governing system and the strong
240focus on students’ academic achievements. They all endorse the clear expectations conveyed
241by the CEO and her emphasis on striving to enhance students’ learning and provide them with
242the best possible foundation for the future. Moreover, they are satisfied with the ways they are
243monitored at municipal level and emphasise that they maintain a good dialogue about student
244achievement and maximising their school’s potential by taking the context 
245and challenges into account. The results of national tests and the municipality’s own tests
246represent the most important quality indicator for principals. Principals use the national test
247results with a view to initiating strategies for improvement.
248The strong performance focus seems to place extra emphasis on the systems and tools used by
249teachers to monitor and track students’ learning. In all three schools, the students are tested at
250the end of each work period, i.e. after 1–2 weeks. The primary school has implemented a
251weekly quiz covering the main subject areas students have studied during the week. The
252results are used to adjust the work plan. If the students appear to have missed out on important
253areas, they are offered repetition classes. 
25412
255In the two lower secondary schools, students’ learning is tracked through tests administered
256by the teachers every second week. Additionally, they are assessed on the overall topic across
257the different subjects. Results from these tests form the basis for grading and recording the
258progress of individual students.
259Principals hold dialogues with teachers, establish routines for collaboration and exchange
260across teacher teams, and prioritise target areas. In the primary school, the students did not
261perform well on the national tests in literacy two years ago. The principal met with the fifthgrade
262teachers to target the problem areas, and with the fourth-grade teachers in order to learn
263from previous years. She also decided that the teachers should devote 15 minutes every day to
264reading with their students, focusing on reading strategies. The next year, the school improved
265its literacy results and achieved its goal of performing above the average of schools in the
266municipality.
267National test data are used to stream students, but the groups are not established permanently,
268as this would conflict with the Education Act. We identified some differences between
269schools related to practices for streaming and formulating learning goals. In one of the lower
270secondary schools, the students’ goals are aligned with their achievement levels. In the
271primary school,
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273the principal states that there is no reason not to have the same learning goals
274and assessment criteria for all students. The school has invested time in formulating
275understandable and measurable learning goals and the teachers have worked intensively on
276differentiated ways of providing feedback to students. The students then differ according to
277their respective degrees of accomplishing their aims. The school also hopes that teachers will
278
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280In primary schools, there is no grading, but parents meet the teachers and discuss their children’s progress.
281These schools also provide written reports on the students’ progress.
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283work more effectively on the mandatory written reports that are used as the basis for
284dialogues between teachers, individual students and their parents.4
285All three principals realise the need to monitor and support teachers’ work in the classroom.
286In two of the schools, a ‘school walkthrough’ [skolevandring] has been implemented, where
287the principals conduct brief lesson observations. However, the principals unfortunately cannot
288do this as often as they would like, because of their heavy administrative workload. However,
289the teachers in these schools find the observations and subsequent feedback useful and a sign
290that their work is valued. In the third school, this practice is not yet established.
291In one of the schools, the principal regularly meets students who are performing below the
292critical level, and they sign a contract agreeing on the learning goals for the next six months.
293When he follows up on these students, he finds the intervention has made a significant
294difference, because the students take it more seriously than discussions with their teachers.
295All the principals have management contracts that state their targets, which are evaluated in
296two annual performance appraisals with officers at municipal level. One of the principals
297admits not reaching his targets in the beginning because he was too ambitious. However, he
298has learned to become more strategic:
299To begin with, it was hard to articulate aims that you could actually achieve. After a while, you become
300more strategic when you formulate the aims so that it is actually possible to accomplish them .
301National test results are often used as a quality indicator on which the municipality may
302decide to award teachers a salary increase. Additionally, the principals have contracts with
303
3044
305The Education Act states that all students in Norway are entitled to have two annual assessment dialogues with
306their teachers, in which the parents also participate.
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308their teachers, and, in the annual performance appraisals, they assess the teachers’
309achievements according to the development aims and target areas stated in their contracts.
310Although the principals in the three selected schools may agree with the local policies and
311strong performance orientation, they also reflect on the implications of such a one-sided
312focus. This came out particularly in the interview with the veteran principal of the school with
313the most heterogeneous student group. On one hand, he thinks the schools in this municipality
314have profoundly improved their practices through their strong performance orientation. On
315the other hand, he points out some vital aspects of education that seem to receive less
316attention:
317[…] the aspects you focus on get better […] The general part of the curriculum gets less attention; it is
318saved for public sermons. In our school, we have struggled with social issues among the students and
319we need to focus on these issues in parallel […] If not […] then the consequences could be very bad for
320the students involved .
321The principal in the high SES school is also somewhat critical of stressing basic skills to the
322extent that schools feel obliged to direct all their efforts towards improving students’
323performance in these skills. She states:
324The students need to develop themselves in a range of areas and I am critical of putting the general part
325of the curriculum aside to focus only on developing basic skills .
326However, it seems that there is less leeway for discussing such issues at the municipal level.
327The three principals emphasise that they focus on student learning outcomes and work
328systematically to foster a conducive learning environment by enhancing collaboration among
329teachers and establishing effective routines to support practice. By doing so, they try to align
330high performance expectations with specific school priorities and their own sets of
331professional norms and values.
33215
333Discussion
334The present research exemplifies how managerial modes are  shaped and
335implemented as part of local school governing in Norway. Our analysis of local policy
336documents shows how managerialism is integrated into accountability policy, with the aim of
337setting clear performance targets to hold schools to account for achieved outcomes. The
338principal’s role is framed as that of an organisational manager, expected to respond to external
339demands and the needs of families or ‘consumers’. Performance expectations are closely
340related to national and municipal test results. By adding risk management, the intention is to
341ensure that threats to the attainment of goals are taken into account and managed. In certain
342ways, it implies control of processes leading up to educational outcomes and a kind of rational
343calculation of possible failure. Financial incentives connected to management contracts are a
344further motivation to achieve targets.
345The document analysis and the interview with the CEO clearly demonstrate how managerial
346elements have been introduced in local school governing, enabling a strong performance
347orientation through management by objectives and results, transparent structures and
348processes to monitor school results and explicit expectations of key actors to improve learning
349outcomes. Even though the study is small, the interviews with the principals exemplify how
350their translation of policy is mainly a process of compliance. The principals’ understanding of
351the mission and priorities of education largely chime with that of the CEO. Two of the
352principals acknowledge some dangers with performativity, as it directs the focus on what can
353be tested, while other aspects of education receive less attention unless the schools
354specifically prioritise them. The veteran principal is concerned with social problems among
355his students, and in his discussions with municipal officers he has to justify the time spent on
356this issue. Nonetheless, all three principals embrace the strong focus on learning outcomes,
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358realising that their hard, systematic work produces results and highlights how teachers can
359support students’ learning. They also emphasise the importance of analysing data to decide on
360the actions that will have the most impact on school improvement. The principals’
361justification of their actions with respect to achieving targets reflects the culture of
362accountability that exists in the municipality. If the targets are not achieved, the principals
363must provide explanations; if the results continue to decline, their performance will be
364scrutinised or they may be advised to find another job.
365Compared to the ways in which accountability practices are implemented in relation to highstakes
366testing in other countries , low test scores do not lead to
367closure of schools or dismissal of principals in Norway. Still, accountability policies do
368influence principals’ and teachers’ work . Schools are keen to perform
369well in the tests because of concerns about their reputation in their municipality . Some municipalities publish school results while others do
370not, but, either way, all the schools know how they performed in relation to one another. The
371use of management contracts and performance appraisals for principals strengthen the basis
372for the development of performativity. Moreover, accountability is enforced by implementing
373consequences if the school or the principal fails to meet performance targets.
374So far, international research has not verified the effectiveness of high-stakes systems in terms
375of significantly sustainable impacts . On the contrary,
376depending on what kind of accountability practices are applied, particularly regarding
377sanctions, elements such as performance-based incentives may lead some teachers to cheat in
378order to meet their targets. The extent of such occurrences is unknown, but research in major
379American cities has documented such trends . 
38017
381The CEO’s ideas on the characteristics of teacher effectiveness chime with those suggested by
382research on overall school effectiveness. It is argued that achieving equality of opportunity is
383possible when educators are determined that all students can succeed and that this expectation
384should override the impact of structural disadvantage or a culture that emphasises
385disadvantage and marginalisation. In a multicultural environment, it is sensible to focus on
386basic skills such as reading, writing and numeracy to give all students the opportunity for
387social mobility and social access. Access depends on students’ proficiency in the Norwegian
388language and can be aligned to the legacy of a ‘common school for all’ and of abolishing the
389class-based society.
390The CEO is very clear in what she expects from her schools. At the same time, she advocates
391a monocultural approach to teaching and learning. Although she expresses concern for
392students from linguistic and ethnic minority groups, she does not talk about explicit strategies
393for inclusion but instead focuses on minority students’ deficits in speaking Norwegian
394fluently. It is crucial to enhance basic skills for all students, but inclusion of minority students
395does not appear to be a strategic priority for her. As Kalantzis and Cope  argued, it
396would require space and time to develop critical conversations about inclusion in local
397schools.
398In this municipality, individual schools seem free to prioritise such conversations and align
399the need to promote social competencies with their efforts to drive up performance in basic
400skills. The emphasis on performativity may encourage principals to be more responsive to
401external demands. Schools may also experience tensions between improving test scores and
402the need to equalise learning opportunities and accommodate cultural and socioeconomic
403differences. As a solution, some schools use the national and municipal test data to divide
404students into groups according to their academic achievement, in an attempt to standardise
405and make teachers’ work more efficient. Standardisation at group level becomes a means to 
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407fulfil legal requirements on adapting teaching according to individual needs and abilities.
408Since the Education Act prohibits streaming in permanent groups in compulsory education,
409schools have to change the group structure quite frequently.
410If student test results are the outcome measure that must be met, schools will be likely to
411focus on them at all costs. Therefore, as equity is not included as an outcome in economic
412models of agency theory and public choice, there is a risk of sacrificing equity in the
413implementation of managerial policies in education.
414Conclusion
415In this chapter, we have explored how new modes of school governance are shaped and
416played out. The analysis shows how NPM features are evident in the public provision of
417education in the municipality studied. The CEO’s approach can be characterised as hands-on
418professional management, and she expects the principals to implement similar strategies.
419Thus, there are explicit expectations and measures of performance for principals and schools.
420All these elements show NPM interventions in education and a shift towards organisational
421professionalism , which may replace the reliability of professional ethics with
422external forms of regulation and accountability. From the interviews with principals it is
423evident that this new focus brings good results, but at the same time can indicate a narrow
424focus and a neglect of key features of the legacy of education in Norway, such as citizenship
425and democracy. Moreover, it can divert from challenges at local school level unless the
426principals tackle these themselves. Considering these aspects as well as responding to new
427performance expectations create dilemmas for the principals.
42819
429A large emphasis on control of outputs is noticeable, as well as on avoidance of risk. On the
430one hand, the underlying logic of the managerial elements identified in this local system
431signifies accountability practices concentrating on performativity. On the other, the logic
432inherent in such elements implies identifying failures in specific practices and systems, which
433can be traced back to the decisions and performances of individual persons. If the search for
434failure becomes too dominant, principals may adopt certain strategies in order to avoid
435negative consequences. Over time, this could imply changes which break with the legacy of
436professional autonomy and trust in the profession.
437Despite variation in the ways the 428 municipalities in Norway have adopted managerial
438ideas in their local governing system, certain trends may be identified across the country . Based on the analysis of documents and the interview data,
439we argue that the language and local governing practices are changing. Introducing
440management principles into education has allowed for a reinterpretation of the educational
441process in terms of an economic transaction. The learner is often described as a consumer, the
442teacher as the provider and education as a ‘commodity’ to be delivered . This
443new language may erode a broader discussion about education for citizenship over the long
444term .
445It may be questioned whether traditional egalitarian values, concepts of equity are being
446challenged by these new managerial elements, particularly performativity. However, even
447though multiple managerial devices have entered educational policy, the narrative of a
448common public school for all remains strong. While equity refers to an appreciation of
449diversity that values the students’ different abilities and competencies, measurement and
450standardisation imply identifying and aiming to bridge achievement gaps. Such an approach
451may indicate a belief in minimising or suppressing individual differences. Whether Norway 
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453will maintain its legacy of valuing the common school for all as a tenet of equal educational
454opportunity remains an open question.