· 6 years ago · Apr 20, 2019, 02:08 AM
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8 U.S. Department of Justice MterHey Werk Pretittet // Ma,? Cel'ltail'I Material
9 Preteeteti UH:tier Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen
10 Materials to WikiLeaks .................................. 45 d. ? WikiLeaks
11 Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials ....................
12 ................................................................................
13 .... 48 C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations
14 ............................................................................. 49
15 l. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims
16 ............ 49 2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections
17 ................................... 50 D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination
18 of Hacked Materials .................................. 51 l. ...................
19 ........................................................................... 51
20 a. Background ..................................................................
21 .................................... 51 b. Contacts with the Campaign about
22 WikiLeaks ................................................ 52 C. Harm to Ongoing
23 Matter .................... 54 d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen
24 Podesta Emails .................... 58 e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with
25 WikiLeaks ................................................ 59 2. Other Potential
26 Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials ......................... 61 a.
27 Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg)
28 .................................................... 61 b. Campaign Efforts to
29 Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails ...................................... 62 IV.
30 RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN
31 ................ 66 A. Campaign Period (September 2015 -November 8, 2016)
32 ......................................... 66 1. Trump Tower Moscow Project
33 ............................................................................. 67
34 a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) ............ 67
35 b. Communications with LC. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze
36 (Summer and Fall 2015)
37 ............................................................ 69 c. Letter of
38 Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-January 2016) ..........
39 ................................................................................
40 ...... 70 i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump
41 Organization .... 70 ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia
42 ......................................... 72 d. Discussions about Russia Travel
43 by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December 2015-June 2016)
44 ......................................................................... 76 i.
45 Sater's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia
46 ........................................ 76 ii. Candidate Trump's Opportunities
47 to Travel to Russia ............................ 78 2. George Papadopoulos .....
48 ................................................................................
49 ...... 80 a. Origins of Campaign Work
50 ..............................................................................
51 81 b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts
52 ........................................................................ 82 c.
53 March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting
54 ......................................................... 85 ii
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62 U.S. Department of Justice At-1:effley Wet'k Pt'etlttet /I Ma:y CeHtttiH
63 Mat:ef'ittl Preteetetl UHtler Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) d. George Papadopoulos
64 Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of Clinton Emails ....................
65 ........................................................................... 86
66 e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign
67 .................................... 89 f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of "Dirt"
68 ........................................................... 93 g. Additional
69 George Papadopoulos Contact..
70 ..................................................... 94 3. Carter Page ........
71 ................................................................................
72 .................... 9 5 a. Background .........................................
73 ............................................................. 96 b. Origins of
74 and Early Campaign Work
75 ............................................................. 97 c. Carter
76 Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow
77 ........................................................ 98 d. Later Campaign
78 Work and Removal from the Campaign ............................. 102 4. Dimitri
79 Simes and the Center for the National Interest
80 ...................................... 103 a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with
81 the Trump Campaign ......................... 103 b. National Interest Hosts a
82 Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel ...................................
83 ................................................................................
84 .. 105 c. Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI
85 ....................................... 107 d. Jared Kushner' s Continuing
86 Contacts with Simes ......................................... 108 5. June 9,
87 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower ..................................... ,
88 ......................... 110 a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting
89 ....................................................................... 110 i.
90 Outreach to Donald Trump Jr
91 .................................................................. 110 ii.
92 Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign ...................................
93 114 b. TheEventsofJune9,2016
94 ............................................................................ 116
95 i. Arrangements for the Meeting
96 ................................................................ 116 ii. Conduct
97 of the Meeting
98 .......................................................................... 117
99 c. Post-June 9 Events ..........................................................
100 ............................... 120 6. Events at the Republican National
101 Convention .................................................. 123 a. Ambassador
102 Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the Week of the RNC
103 ..................................................................... 123 b.
104 Change to Republican Party Platform
105 ............................................................ 124 7. Post-
106 Convention Contacts with Kislyak ................................ :
107 ............................ 127 a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to
108 Breakfast at the Ambassador's Residence
109 .............................................................................
110 127 b. Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak ......
111 127 8. Paul Manafort ...........................................................
112 ........................................... 129 a. Paul Manafort' s Ties to
113 Russia and Ukraine .................................................. 131 lll
114
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121 U.S. Department of Justice Atten1e~? Werk Pred1:1et /,' Mtty Cefltaifl Material
122 Preteeted Uflder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 1. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work
123 ......................................................... 131 11. Political
124 Consulting Work
125 ..................................................................... 132 iii.
126 Konstantin Kilimnik
127 ..............................................................................
128 132 b. Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign
129 .............. 134 i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign
130 ......................................................... 134 ii. Paul
131 Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts ..........................................
132 135 iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik
133 in the United States
134 ................................................................ 138 c. Post-
135 Resignation Activities
136 ............................................................................ 141
137 B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts
138 .......................................................... 144 1. Immediate
139 Post-Election Activity
140 ....................................................................... 144 a.
141 Outreach from the Russian Government..
142 ...................................................... 145 b. High-Level
143 Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels ....... 146 2. Kirill
144 Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration ...... 147 a.
145 Background .....................................................................
146 ............................... 14 7 b. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts
147 With the Incoming Administration ...............................................
148 .............................................. 149 c. Erik Prince and Kirill
149 Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles ................................ 151 i. George
150 Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev .................
151 ................................................................................
152 151 11. The Seychelles Meetings
153 ........................................................................ 153
154 iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip .... 155
155 d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U
156 .S.-Russia Relations ...........................................................
157 ....................... 156 3. Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner
158 and Michael Flynn in Trump Tower Following the Election
159 ................................................................. 159 4. Jared
160 Kushner' s Meeting with Sergey Gorkov
161 ................................................... 161 5. Petr A ven' s
162 Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team ........................................
163 163 6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich
164 ............. 166 7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn
165 ................................................... 167 a. United Nations Vote
166 on Israeli Settlements ................................................... 167
167 b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia
168 ....................................................................... 168 V.
169 PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS
170 ........................................................................ 174 A.
171 Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign
172 ............................................... 174 IV
173
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180 U.S. Department of Justice AtterAe~1 \\'erk Prea1::1et // Mft)1 CeHtttil'l
181 Material Preteetea UAaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) B. Russian Hacking and Dumping
182 Operations .............................................................. 175 1.
183 Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy
184 .................................................... 175 a. Background .........
185 ................................................................................
186 ........... 175 b. Charging Decision As to ....... 176 2. Potential Section 1030
187 Violation By .............................. 179 C. Russian Government Outreach
188 and Contacts ............................................................. 180
189 1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion
190 ............................................. 180 2. Potential Coordination:
191 Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. ? 951). 181 a. Governing Law ........
192 ................................................................................
193 ....... 181 b. Application .....................................................
194 ................................................ 182 3. Campaign Finance .......
195 ................................................................................
196 ....... 183 a. Overview Of Governing Law
197 ......................................................................... 184 b.
198 Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting
199 ................................................ 185 i. Thing-of-Value Element
200 ......................................................................... 186
201 ii. Willfulness ................................................................
202 ............................. 187 iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised
203 Information ...................................... 188 c. Application to
204 WikiLeaks 1.
205 ....................................................................... 189 ii.
206 Willfulness ....................................................................
207 ......................... 190 iii. Constitutional Considerations
208 ................................................................ 190 iv.
209 Analysis ....................................................................
210 190 4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation
211 ....................................... 191 a. Overview Of Governing Law
212 ......................................................................... 191 b.
213 Application to Certain Individuals
214 ................................................................. 192 i. George
215 Papadopoulos
216 ..............................................................................
217 192 11.
218 .............................................................................
219 194 111. Michael Flynn .........................................................
220 .............................. 194 iv. Michael Cohen ...........................
221 ........................................................... 195 V.
222 ..............................................................................
223 196 vi. Jeff Sessions ..........................................................
224 ................................. 197 vii. Others Interviewed During the
225 Investigation ....................................... 198 V
226
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233 U.S. Department of Justice AH:erHey \?Brit Pr6d1:1et // Mtty Cet1:tttifl
234 Mttterittl Preteeted Ut1:der Fed. R. Ct1iffl. P. 6(e) The presidential campaign
235 of Donald J. Trump ("Trump Campaign" or "Campaign") showed interest in
236 WikiLeaks's releases of documents and welcomed their otential to damage
237 candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016,
238 llfilllillliliilfll~llliillllllilllilli forecast to senior Campaign officials
239 that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate Clinton.
240 WikiLeaks's first release came in July 2016. Around the same time, candidate
241 Trump announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing
242 from a private server used b Clinton when she was Secreta of State he later said
243 that he was s ? eakin sarcasticall . WikiLeaks began releasing Podesta' s stolen
244 emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a U.S. media outlet released
245 video considered damaging to candidate Trump. Section lII of this Report details
246 the Office's investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other
247 efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails. RUSSIAN
248 CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN The social media campaign and the GRU hacking
249 operations coincided with a series of contacts between Trump Campaign officials
250 and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The Office investigated
251 whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring or
252 coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the
253 investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit
254 from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign
255 expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released
256 through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the
257 Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its
258 election interference activities. The Russian contacts consisted of business
259 connections, offers of assistance to the Campaign, invitations for candidate
260 Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign officials and
261 representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking
262 improved U.S.-Russian relations. Section IV of this Report details the contacts
263 between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition
264 periods, the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order.
265 2015. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump
266 Organization real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow.
267 Candidate Trump signed a Letter oflntent for Trump Tower Moscow by November
268 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization executive Michael Cohen emailed and
269 spoke about the project with the office of Russian government press secretary
270 Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through at least June
271 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump.
272 Spring 2016. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early
273 contact with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to
274 Russia and traveled to Moscow in April 2016. Immediately upon his return to
275 London from that trip, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that the Russian government had
276 "dirt" on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands 5
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284 U.S. Department of Justice At:t:erttey Werk Preettet // May Cetttaitt Material
285 Preteetee Utteer Fee. R. Cfiffl. P. 6(e) groups (with names such as "Being
286 Patriotic," "Stop All Immigrants," "Secured Borders," and "Tea Party News"),
287 purported Black social justice groups ("Black Matters," "Blacktivist," and
288 "Don't Shoot Us"), LGBTQ groups ("LGBT United"), and religious groups ("United
289 Muslims of America"). Throughout 2016, IRA accounts published an increasing
290 number of materials supporting the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton
291 Campaign. For example, on May 31, 2016, the operational account "Matt Skiber"
292 began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Facebook groups asking them to
293 help plan a "pro-Trump rally near Trump Tower."55 To reach larger U.S.
294 audiences, the IRA purchased advertisements from Facebook that promoted the IRA
295 groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audience members. According to Facebook, the IRA
296 purchased over 3,500 advertisements, and the expenditures totaled approximately
297 $100,000.56 During the U.S. presidential campaign, many IRA-purchased
298 advertisements explicitly supported or opposed a presidential candidate or
299 promoted U.S. rallies organized by the IRA ( discussed below). As early as March
300 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements that overtly opposed the Clinton
301 Campaign. For example, on March 18, 2016, the IRA purchased an advertisement
302 depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part, "If one day God
303 lets this liar enter the White House as a president -that day would be a real
304 national tragedy."57 Similarly, on April 6, 2016, the IRA purchased
305 advertisements for its account "Black Matters" calling for a "flashmob" of U.S.
306 persons to "take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016 or #nohillary2016."58
307 IRA-purchased advertisements featuring Clinton were, with very few exceptions,
308 negative.59 IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largely
309 supported his campaign. The first known IRA advertisement explicitly endorsing
310 the Trump Campaign was purchased on April 19, 2016. The IRA bought an
311 advertisement for its Instagram account "Tea Party News" asking U.S. persons to
312 help them "make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters" by uploading photos
313 with the hashtag "#KIDS4TRUMP."60 In subsequent months, the IRA purchased dozens
314 of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign, predominantly through the
315 Facebook groups "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Invaders," and "Secured Borders."
316 55 5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 5/31/16
317 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 56 Social Media
318 Influence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee
319 on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General
320 Counsel of Facebook). 57 3/18/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045505152575. 58
321 4/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6043740225319. 59 See SM-2230634, serial 213
322 (documenting politically-oriented advertisements from the larger set provided by
323 Facebook). 60 4/19/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045151094235. 25
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331 U.S. Department of Justice A4teffle)' \llel'k Pt'edttet // May Cetttail'l
332 Matet'ial Pt'eteeted U!'lder Fed. R. Ct'im. P. 6(e) related."80 Twitter also
333 announced that it had notified approximately 1.4 million people who Twitter
334 believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.81 5. U.S.
335 Operations Involving Political Rallies The IRA organized and promoted political
336 rallies inside the United States while posing as U.S. grassroots activists.
337 First, the IRA used one of its preexisting social media personas (Facebook
338 groups and Twitter accounts, for example) to announce and promote the event. The
339 IRA then sent a large number of direct messages to followers of its social media
340 account asking them to attend the event. From those who responded with interest
341 in attending, the IRA then sought a U.S. person to serve as the event's
342 coordinator. In most cases, the IRA account operator would tell the U.S. person
343 that they personally could not attend the event due to some preexisting conflict
344 or because they were somewhere else in the United States.82 The IRA then further
345 promoted the event by contacting U.S. media about the event and directing them
346 to speak with the coordinator.83 After the event, the IRA posted videos and
347 photographs of the event to the IRA's social media accounts. 84 The Office
348 identified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA. The earliest evidence of
349 a rally was a "confederate rally" in November 2015. 85 The IRA continued to
350 organize rallies even after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The attendance
351 at rallies varied. Some rallies appear to have drawn few (if any) pa1tici2ants
352 while others drew hundreds The reach and success of these Harm to Ongoing Matter
353 80 Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election" (updated Jan.
354 31, 2018). Twitter also reported identifying 50,258 automated accounts connected
355 to the Russian government, which tweeted more than a million times in the ten
356 weeks before the election. 81 Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016
357 US Election" (updated Jan. 31, 2018). ... 82 8/20/16 Facebook Message, ID
358 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID ; 7/21/16 Email, 83 See, e.g.,
359 7/21/16~gmail.com to joshmilton024@gmail.com to-84 @march_for_trump 6/25/16
360 Tweet (posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower). 85 Instagram ID
361 2228012168 (Stand For Freedom) 11/3/15 Post ("Good evening buds! Well I am
362 planning to organize a confederate rally[ ... ] in Houston on the 14 of November
363 and I want more people to attend."). 29
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370
371 U.S. Department of Justice Atlef'l'le;? Wef'k Pf'et.ittet // Mo; Cel'ltttift
372 Mttteriol Preteeted Uftt.ier Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT
373 LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN The Office identified multiple
374 contacts-"links," in the words of the Appointment between Trump Campaign
375 officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The Office
376 investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted
377 Russian interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election. In
378 particular, the investigation examined whether these contacts involved or
379 resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the Trump Campaign and Russia,
380 including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the Campaign in
381 exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future. Based on the
382 available information, the investigation did not establish such coordination.
383 This Section describes the principal links between the Trump Campaign and
384 individuals with ties to the Russian government, including some contacts with
385 Campaign officials or associates that have been publicly reported to involve
386 Russian contacts. Each subsection begins with an overview of the Russian contact
387 at issue and then describes in detail the relevant facts, which are generally
388 presented in chronological order, beginning with the early months of the
389 Campaign and extending through the post-election, transition period. A. Campaign
390 Period (September 2015 -November 8, 2016) Russian-government-connected
391 individuals and media entities began showing interest in Trump's campaign in the
392 months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015.288 Because Trump's status
393 as a public figure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior
394 business and entertainment dealings, this Office investigated whether a business
395 contact with Russia-linked individuals and entities during the campaign period-
396 the Trump Tower Moscow project, see Volume l, Section IV.A. I, infra-led to or
397 involved coordination of election assistance. Outreach from individuals with
398 ties to Russia continued in the spring and summer of 2016, when Trump was moving
399 toward-and eventually becoming-the Republican nominee for President. As set
400 forth below, the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period:
401 outreach to two of Trump's then-recently named foreign policy advisors,
402 including a representation that Russia had "dirt" on Clinton in the form of
403 thousands of emails (Volume I, Sections IV.A.2 & IV.A.3); dealings with a
404 D.C.-based think tank that specializes in Russia and has connections with its
405 government (Volume I, Section IV.A.4); a meeting at Trump Tower between the
406 Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was "part
407 of Russia and its government's support for [Trump]" (Volume I, Section IV.A.5);
408 events at the Republican National Convention (Volume I, Section IV.A.6); post-
409 Convention contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia's ambassador to
410 the United States (Volume I, Section IV.A.7); and contacts through campaign
411 chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for a Russian oligarch and a
412 pro-Russian political party in Ukraine (Volume I, Section IV.A.8). 288 For
413 example, on August 18, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet
414 newspaper Vzglyad, Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks
415 asking for a phone or in-person candidate interview. 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to
416 Hicks. One day earlier, the publication's founder (and former Russian
417 parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites-
418 Trump2016.ru and DonaldTrump2016.ru. No interview took place. 66
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426 U.S. Department of Justice Att:ot>Re~? Work Prodttet // Ma-y CoRtttiR Motet>ial
427 Pt>oteeted Uttdet> Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 1. Trump Tower Moscow Project The
428 Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside the United States
429 as part of its real estate portfolio. Some projects have involved the
430 acquisition and ownership (through subsidiary corporate structures) of property.
431 In other cases, the Trump Organization has executed licensing deals with real
432 estate developers and management companies, often local to the country where the
433 project was located.289 Between at least 2013 and 2016, the Trump Organization
434 explored a similar licensing deal in Russia involving the construction of a
435 Trump-branded property in Moscow. The project, commonly referred to as a "Trump
436 Tower Moscow" or "Trump Moscow" project, anticipated a combination of
437 commercial, hotel, and residential properties all within the same building.
438 Between 2013 and June 2016, several employees of the Trump Organization,
439 including president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal
440 with several Russian counterparties. From the fall of 2015 until the middle of
441 2016, Michael Cohen spearheaded the Trump Organization's pursuit of a Trump
442 Tower Moscow project, including by reporting on the project's status to
443 candidate Trump and other executives in the Trump Organization.290 a. Trump
444 Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) The Trump Organization
445 and the Crocus Group, a Russian real estate conglomerate owned and controlled by
446 Aras Agalarov, began discussing a Russia-based real estate project shortly after
447 the conclusion of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow.291 Donald J. Trump
448 Jr. served as _the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization; Emin
449 Agalarov (son of Aras Agalarov) and Irakli "Ike" Kaveladze represented the
450 Crocus Group during negotiations,292 with the occasional assistance of Robe1t
451 Goldstone.293 In December 2013, Kaveladze and Trump Jr. negotiated and signed
452 preliminary terms of 289 See, e.g., Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate
453 Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 151-52 (Sept. 7, 2017) ( discussing licensing
454 deals of specific projects). 290 As noted in Volume I, Section III.D.l, supra,
455 in November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress
456 concerning, among other things, the duration of the Trump Tower Moscow project.
457 See Information ,r 7(a), United States v. Michael Cohen, 1 :18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y.
458 Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 ("Cohen Information"). 291 See Interview of Donald J
459 Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 13 (Sept. 7, 2017)
460 ("Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr. Agalarov' s company,
461 Crocus Group, began preliminarily discussion [sic] potential real estate
462 projects in Moscow."). As has been widely reported, the Miss Universe pageant-
463 which Trump co-owned_at the time-was held at the Agalarov-owned Crocus City Hall
464 in Moscow in November 2013. Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant,
465 and Aras Agalarov's son Emin was a musical performer at the event, which Trump
466 attended. 292 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 2, 4-6; OSC-KA V _00385 (12/6/13 Email,
467 Trump Jr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov). 67
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475 U.S. Department of Justice Attet'Aey Werk Preauet // May CeAtaiA Material
476 Preteetea UAaer Fee. R. Crifl'I. P. 6(e) an agreement for the Trump Tower Moscow
477 project.294 On December 23, 2013, after discussions with Donald J. Trump, the
478 Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the organization
479 received a flat 3.5% commission on all sales, with no licensing fees or
480 incentives.295 The parties negotiated a letter of intent during January and
481 February 2014.296 From January 2014 through November 2014, the Trump
482 Organization and Crocus Group discussed development plans for the Moscow
483 project. Some time before January 24, 2014, the Crocus Group sent the Trump
484 Organization a proposal for a 800-unit, 194-meter building to be ? constructed
485 at an Agalarov-owned site in Moscow called "Crocus City," which had also been
486 the site of the Miss Universe pageant.297 In February 2014, Ivanka Trump met
487 with Emin Agalarov and toured the Crocus City site during a visit to Moscow.298
488 From March 2014 through July 2014, the groups discussed "design standards" and
489 other architectural elements.299 For example, in July 2014, members of the Trump
490 Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the "demographics
491 of these prospective buyers" in the Crocus City area, the development of
492 neighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portions of the
493 building.300 In August 2014, the Trump Organization requested specifications for
494 a competing Marriott-branded tower being built in Crocus City.301 Beginning in
495 September 2014, the Trump Organization stopped responding in a timely fashion to
496 correspondence and proposals from the Crocus Group.302 Communications between
497 the two groups continued through November 2014 with decreasing frequency; what
498 appears to be the last communication is dated November 24, 2014.303 The project
499 appears not to have developed past the planning stage, and no construction
500 occurred. 294 295 OSC-KA V _00452 (12/23/13 Email, Trmnp Jr. to Kaveladze & E.
501 Agalarov). 296 See, e.g., OSC-KAV _01158 (Letter agreement signed by Trump Jr. &
502 E. Agalarov); KAV _01147 (1/20/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.). 297
503 See, e.g., OSC-KA V _00972 (10/14/14 Email, McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from
504 Crocus Group contractor about specifications); OSC-KA V _00540 (1/24/14 Email,
505 McGee to Trump Jr. et al.). 298 See OSC-KA V 00631 (2/5/14 Email, E. A~alarov to
506 Ivanka Tn~ump Jr. & Kaveladze ); Goldstone Facebook post, 2/4/14 (8:01
507 a.m.)jjjijfiU(\h'llffi@[lm?--299 See, e.g., OSC-KAV_00791 (6/3/14 Email,
508 Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.; OSC-KAV_00799 (6/10/14 Email, Trump Jr. to
509 Kaveladze et al.); OSC-KA V _00817 (6/16/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze et
510 al.). 300 OSC-KAV 00870 (7/17/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.). 301 OSC-KA V
511 _00855 (8/4/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.). 302 OSC-KA V _ 00903 (9/29/14
512 Email, Tropea to McGee & Kaveladze (noting last response was on August 26,
513 2014)); OSC-KAV _00906 (9/29/14 Email, Kaveladze to Tropea & McGee (suggesting
514 silence "proves my fear that those guys are bailing out of the project")); OSC-
515 KA V _00972 (10/14/14 Email, McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group
516 contractor about development specifications)). 303 OSC-KA V _ 01140 ( 11/24/14
517 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.). 68
518
519RESULT: 11
520
521PAGE: 76
522
523TEXT:
524
525 U.S. Department of Justice Atterney Werk Pfedttet // Ma-y CmttaiA Material
526 Preteeted U11:eer Fed. R. Crim.. P. 6(e) b. Communications with J.C. Expert
527 Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015) In the late
528 summer of 2015, the Trump Organization received a new inquiry about pursuing a
529 Trump Tower project in Moscow. In approximately September 2015, Felix Sater, a
530 New based real estate advisor, contacted Michael Cohen, then-executive vice
531 president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump.304
532 Sater had previously worked with the Trump Organization and advised it on a
533 number of domestic and international projects. Sater had explored the
534 possibility of a Trump Tower project in Moscow while working with the Trump
535 Organization and therefore knew of the organization's general interest in
536 completing a deal there.305 Sater had also served as an informal agent of the
537 Trump Organization in Moscow previously and had accompanied lvanka Trump and
538 Donald Trump Jr. to Moscow in the mid-2000s.306 Sater contacted Cohen on behalf
539 of I.C. Expert Investment Company (LC. Expert), a Russian real-estate
540 development corporation controlled by Andrei Vladimirovich Rozov.307 Sater had
541 known Rozov since approximately 2007 and, in 2014, had served as an agent on
542 behalf of Rozov during Rozov's purchase of a building in New York City.308 Sater
543 later contacted Rozov and proposed that I.C. Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscow
544 project in which l.C. Expert would license the name and brand from the Trump
545 Organization but construct the building on its own. Sater worked on the deal
546 with Rozov and another.employee of l.C. Expert.309 Cohen was the only Trump
547 Organization representative to negotiate directly with l.C. Expert or its
548 agents. In approximately September 2015, Cohen obtained approval to negotiate
549 with I.C. Expert from candidate Trump, who was then president of the Trump
550 Organization. Cohen provided updates directly to Trump about the project
551 throughout 2015 and into 2016, assuring him the project was continuing.31? Cohen
552 also discussed the Trump Moscow project with Ivanka Trump as to design elements
553 (such as possible architects to use for the project311) and Donald J. Trump Jr.
554 (about his experience in Moscow and possible involvement in the project312)
555 during the fall of 2015. . rovided information to our Office in two 2017
556 interviews conducted under a proffer agreement 306 Sater9/19/17 302, at 1-2, 5.
557 307 Sater 9/19/17 302, at 3. 308 Rozov 1 /25/18 3 02, at 1. 309 Rozov 1/25/18
558 302, at I; see also 11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (sending letter of
559 intent). 31? Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-2, 4-6. 311 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. 312
560 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4-5. 69
561
562RESULT: 12
563
564PAGE: 81
565
566TEXT:
567
568 U.S. Department of Justice Attorfle)' \Vork Prod1:1et // Ma,? Cofl:htil'I:
569 Material Proteeted Uflder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Cohen that there was "no
570 bigger warranty in any project than [the] consent of the person of interest."342
571 Cohen rejected the proposal, saying that "[c]urrently our LOI developer is in
572 talks with VP's Chief of Staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to
573 meet."343 This email appears to be their final exchange, and the investigation
574 did not identify evidence that Cohen brought Klokov' s initial offer of
575 assistance to the Campaign's attention or that anyone associated with the Trump
576 Organization or the Campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date. Cohen explained
577 that he did not pursue the proposed meeting because he was already working on
578 the Moscow Project with Sater, who Cohen understood to have his own connections
579 to the Russian government.344 By late December 2015, however, Cohen was
580 complaining that Sater had not been able to use those connections to set up the
581 promised meeting with Russian government officials. Cohen told Sater that he was
582 "setting up the meeting myself. "345 On January 11, 2016, Cohen emailed the
583 office of Dmitry Peskov, the Russian government's press secretary, indicating
584 that he desired contact with Sergei Ivanov, Putin's chief of staff. Cohen
585 erroneously used the email address "Pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru" instead of "Pr
586 _peskova@prpress.gov .ru," so the email apparently did not go through.346 On
587 January 14, 2016, Cohen emailed a different address (info@prpress.gov.ru) with
588 the following message: Dear Mr. Peskov, Over the past few months, I have been
589 working with a company based in Russia regarding the development of a Trump
590 Tower-Moscow project in Moscow City. Without getting into lengthy specifics, the
591 communication between our two sides has stalled. As this project is too
592 important, I am hereby requesting your assistance. I respectfully request
593 someone, preferably you; contact me so that I might discuss the specifics as
594 well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals. I thank you in
595 advance for your assistance and look forward to hearing from you soon.347 Two
596 days later, Cohen sent an email to Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru, repeating his
597 request to speak with Sergei Ivanov.348 Cohen testified to Congress, and
598 initially told the Office, that he did not recall receiving a response to this
599 email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump
600 Moscow project as of January 2016. Cohen later admitted that these statements
601 were false. In 342 11/19/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (7:40 a.m.). 343 11/19/15
602 Email, Cohen to Klokov (12:56 p.m.). 344 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 12. 345 FS00004
603 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (6:17 p.m.)). 346 1/11/16 Email, Cohen to
604 pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru (9: 12 a.m.). 347 1/14/16 Email, Cohen to
605 info@prpress.gov.ru (9:21 a.m.). 348 1/16/16 Email, Cohen to
606 pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru (10:28 a.m.). 74
607
608RESULT: 13
609
610PAGE: 83
611
612TEXT:
613
614 U.S. Department of Justice Attort1ey Work Prndttet // Mtty Cot1tttil'I
615 Mttterittl Proteeted UHder Fed. R. Criffl. P. e(e) to Cohen, he elected not to
616 travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete proposals
617 about land plots that could be considered as options for the project.357 d.
618 Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December
619 2015-June 2016) i. Sater 's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia The late
620 January communication was neither the first nor the last time that Cohen
621 contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the Trump Moscow project. Beginning
622 in late 2015, Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump,
623 as representatives of the Trump Organization, to travel to Russia to meet with
624 Russian government officials and possible financing partners. In December 2015,
625 Sater sent Cohen a number of emails about logistics for traveling to Russia for
626 meetings.358 On December 19, 2015, Sater wrote: Please call me I have Evgeney
627 [Dvoskin] on the other line. [359] He needs a copy of your and Donald's
628 passports they need a scan of every page of the passports. Invitations & Visas
629 will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump Tower
630 Moscow. Politically neither Putins office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot
631 issue invite, so they are inviting commercially/ business. VTB is Russia's 2
632 biggest bank and VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin, will be at all meetings with Putin
633 so that it is a business meeting not political. We will be invited to Russian
634 consulate this week to receive invite & have visa issued.360 In response, Cohen
635 texted Sater an image of his own passport.361 Cohen told the Office that at one
636 point he requested a copy of candidate Trump's passport from Rhona Graff,
637 Trump's executive assistant at the Trump Organization, and that Graff later
638 brought Trump's passport to Cohen's 357 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-7. 358 See,
639 e.g., 12/1/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:41 p.m.) ("Please scan and send me a
640 copy of your passport for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs."). 359 Toll
641 records show that Sater was speaking to Evgeny Dvoskin. Call Records of Felix
642 Sater Dvoskin is an executive of Genbank, a large bank with lending focused in
643 Crimea, Ukraine. At the time that Sater provided this financing letter to Cohen,
644 Genbank was subject to U.S. government sanctions, see Russia/Ukraine-related
645 Sanctions and Identifications, Office of Foreign Assets Control (Dec. 22, 2015),
646 available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
647 center/sanctions/OFAEnforcement/Pages/20151222.aspx. Dvoskin, who had been
648 deported from the United States in 2000 for criminal activity, was under
649 indictment in the United States for stock fraud under the aliases Eugene Slusker
650 and Gene Shustar. See United States v. Rizzo, et al., 2:03-cr-63 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
651 6, 2003). 360 12/19/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (10:50 a.m.); FS00002 (12/19/15
652 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen, (10:53 a.m.). 361 FS00004 (12/19/15 Text Message,
653 Cohen to Sater); ERT_0198-256 (12/19/15 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater). 76
654
655RESULT: 14
656
657PAGE: 85
658
659TEXT:
660
661 U.S. Department of Justice Atterttey Werk Predttet // Ma;? Cmi.tftiH Matertal
662 Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crtm. P. 6(e) On June 9, 2016, Sater sent Cohen a
663 notice that he (Sater) was completing the badges for the Forum, adding, "Putin
664 is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well."370 On June
665 13, 2016, Sater forwarded Cohen an invitation to the Forum signed by the
666 Director of the Roscongress Foundation, the Russian entity organizing the
667 Forum.371 Sater also sent Cohen a Russian visa application and asked him to send
668 two passport photos.372 According to Cohen, the invitation gave no indication
669 that Peskov had been involved in inviting him. Cohen was concerned that Russian
670 officials were not actually involved or were not interested in meeting with him
671 (as Sater had alleged), and so he decided not to go to the Forum.373 On June 14,
672 2016, Cohen met Sater in the lobby of the Trump Tower in New York and informed
673 him that he would not be traveling at that time. 374 ii. Candidate Trump's
674 Opportunities to Travel to Russia The investigation identified evidence that,
675 during the period the Trump Moscow project was under consideration, the
676 possibility of candidate Trump visiting Russia arose in two contexts. First, in
677 interviews with the Office, Cohen stated that he discussed the subject of
678 traveling to Russia with Trump twice: once in late 2015; and again in spring
679 2016.375 According to Cohen, Trump indicated a willingness to travel if it would
680 assist the project significantly. On one occasion, Trump told Cohen to speak
681 with then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowski to coordinate the candidate's
682 schedule. Cohen recalled that he spoke with Lewandowski, who suggested that they
683 speak again when Cohen had actual dates to evaluate. Cohen indicated, however,
684 that he knew that travel prior to the Republican National Convention would be
685 impossible given the candidate's preexisting commitments to the Campaign.376
686 Second, like Cohen, Trump received and turned down an invitation to the St.
687 Petersburg International Economic Forum. In late December 2015, Mira Duma-a
688 contact oflvanka Trump's from the fashion industry-first passed along
689 invitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate Trump from Sergei Prikhodko, a Deputy
690 Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.377 On January 14, 2016, Rhona Graff
691 sent an email to Duma stating that Trump was "honored to be asked to participate
692 in the highly prestigious" Forum event, but that he would "have to decline" the
693 invitation given his "very grueling and full travel schedule" as a presidential
694 candidate.378 Graff 37? FS000 18 (6/9/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). 371
695 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (2:10 p.m.). 372 FS00018 (6/13/16 Text Message,
696 Sater to Cohen (2:20 p.m.)); 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen. 373 Cohen 9/12/18
697 302, at 6-8. 374 FS00019 (6/14/16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater (12:06 and 2:50
698 p.m.)). 375 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2. 376 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. 377 12/21/15
699 Email, Mira to Ivanka Trump (6:57 a.m.) (attachments); TRUMPORG_16_000057
700 (1/7/16 Email, I. Trump to Graff(9:18 a.m.)). 378 1/14/16 Email, Graff to Mira.
701 78
702
703RESULT: 15
704
705PAGE: 97
706
707TEXT:
708
709 U.S. Department of Justice Atlei-fle~? Werk Predttet // Mtty CetttaiR Material
710 Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) to discuss."471 Manafort forwarded the
711 message to another Campaign official, without including Papadopoulos, and
712 stated: "Let[']s discuss. We need someone to communicate that [Trump] is ? not
713 doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to
714 send any signal."472 On June 1, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email
715 chain with Lewandowski about a Russia visit, asking if Lewandowski "want[ ed] to
716 have a call about this topic" and whether "we were following up with it."473
717 After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to "connect with" Clovis because he was
718 "running point," Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that "the Russian MF A" was asking
719 him "if Mr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point."474
720 Papadopoulos wrote in an email that he "[w]anted to pass this info along to you
721 for you to decide what's best to do with it and what message I should send (or
722 to ignore)."475 After several email and Skype exchanges with Timofeev,476
723 Papadopoulos sent one more email to Lewandowski on June 19, 2016, Lewandowski's
724 last day as campaign manager.477 The email stated that "[t]he Russian ministry
725 of foreign affairs" had contacted him and asked whether, if Mr. Trump could not
726 travel to Russia, a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could attend
727 meetings.478 Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was "willing to make the trip
728 off the record if it's in the interest of Mr. Trump and the campaign to meet
729 specific people."479 Following Lewandowski's departure from the Campaign,
730 Papadopoulos communicated with Clovis and Walid Phares, another member of the
731 foreign policy advisory team, about an the-record meeting between the Campaign
732 and Russian government officials or with Papadopoulos's other Russia
733 connections, Mifsud and Timofeev.480 Papadopoulos also interacted 471 5/21/16
734 Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort (2:30: 14 p.m.). 472 Papadopoulos Statement of
735 Offense ,r 19 n.2. 473 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (3:08:18 p.m.).
736 474 6/1/16 Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos (3:20:03 p.m.); 6/1/16 Email,
737 Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.). 475 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis
738 (3:29:14 p.m.). Papadopoulos's email coincided in time with another message to
739 Clovis suggesting a Trump-Putin meeting. First, on May 15, 2016, David a distant
740 relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt-emailed Clovis about
741 a potential Campaign meeting with Berel Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia. The
742 email stated that Klein had contacted Lazar in February about a possible Trump-
743 Putin meeting and that Lazar was "a very close confidante of Putin."
744 DJTFP00011547 (5/15/16 Email, Klein to Clovis (5:45:24 p.m.)). The investigation
745 did not find evidence that Clovis responded to Klein's email or that any further
746 contacts of significance came out of Klein's subsequent meeting with Greenblatt
747 and Rabbi Lazar at Trump Tower. Klein 8/30/18 302, at 2. 476 Papadopoulos
748 Statement of Offense ,r 21 (a). 477 478 6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to
749 Lewandowski (1 :11 :11 p.m.). 479 6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:
750 11: 11 p.m.). 480 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 21; 7/14/16 Email,
751 Papadopoulos to Timofeev (11 :57:24 p.m.); 7/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to
752 Mifsud; 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (2:14:18 p.m.). 90
753
754RESULT: 16
755
756PAGE: 117
757
758TEXT:
759
760 U.S. Department of Justice Attoraey Work Prodttet // Mtt; Coatttifl Mttterittl
761 Proteeted Uader Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) reaction, Simes believed that he
762 provided the same information at a small group meeting of foreign policy experts
763 that CNI organized for Sessions.663 5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower On
764 June 9, 2016, senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower
765 with a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about
766 Hillary Clinton from the Russian government. The meeting was proposed to Donald
767 Trump Jr. in an email from Robert Goldstone, at the request of his then-client
768 Emin Agalarov, the son of Russian real-estate developer Aras Agalarov. Goldstone
769 relayed to Trump Jr. that the "Crown prosecutor of Russia ... offered to provide
770 the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that would
771 incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as "part of Russia and its
772 government's support for Mr. Trump." Trump Jr. immediately responded that "if
773 it's what you say I love it," and arranged the meeting through a series of
774 emails and telephone calls. Trump Jr. invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort
775 and senior advisor Jared Kushner to attend the meeting, and both attended.
776 Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it occurred, and Michael
777 Cohen recalled that Trump Jr. may have told candidate Trump about an upcoming
778 meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton, without linking the
779 meeting to Russia. According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he
780 has no recollection of learning of the meeting at the time, and the Office found
781 no documentary evidence showing that he was made aware of the meeting--or its
782 Russian connection-before it occurred. The Russian attorney who spoke at the
783 meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, had previously worked for the Russian government
784 and maintained a relationship with that government throughout this period of
785 time. She claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were
786 provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats. Trump Jr. requested evidence to
787 support those claims, but Veselnitskaya did not provide such information. She
788 and her associates then turned to a critique of the origins of the Magnitsky
789 Act, a 2012 statute that imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian
790 officials and that resulted in a retaliatory ban on adoptions of Russian
791 children. Trump Jr. suggested that the issue could be revisited when and if
792 candidate Trump was elected. After the election, Veselnitskaya made additional
793 efforts to follow up on the meeting, but the Trump Transition Team did not
794 engage. a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr. Aras
795 Agalarov is a Russian real-estate developer with ties to Putin and other members
796 of the Russian government, including Russia's Prosecutor General, Yuri
797 Chaika.664 Aras Agalarov is the president of the Crocus Group, a Russian
798 enterprise that holds substantial Russian government construction contracts and
799 that-as discussed above, Volume I, Section IV.A.I, supra 663 Simes 3/8/18 302,
800 at 30. 664 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 4. 110
801
802RESULT: 17
803
804PAGE: 123
805
806TEXT:
807
808 U.S. Department of Justice AMorAey Work Prod1:1et ,',' May CofttaiH Matet'ial
809 Protected Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) emails or the upcoming meeting.711
810 Similarly, neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone informing candidate
811 Trump of the meeting, including Trump Jr.712 President Trump has stated to this
812 Office, in written answers to questions, that he has "no recollection of
813 learning at the time" that his son, Manafort, or "Kushner was considering
814 participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative
815 information about Hillary Clinton."713 b. The Events of June 9, 2016 i.
816 Arrangements for the Meeting Veselnitskaya was in New York on June 9, 2016, for
817 appellate proceedings in the Prevezon civil forfeiture liti ation.714 That da ,
818 Veselnitskaya called Rinat Akhmetshin, a Soviet-born U.S. lobbyist, and when she
819 learned that he was in New York, invited him to lunch. Akhmetshin told the
820 Office that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnitsky Act and had worked
821 on the Prevezon litigation.716 Kaveladze and Anatoli Samochornov, a 711
822 Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 28-29,
823 84, 94-95 (Sept. 7, 2017). The Senate Judiciary Committee interview was not
824 under oath, but Trump Jr. was advised that it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. ? 1001
825 to make materially false statements in a congressional investigation. Id. at
826 10-11. 712 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 3-4; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 10. 713 Written
827 Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question I,
828 Patts (c)). We considered whether one sequence of events suggested that
829 candidate Trump had contemporaneous knowledge of the June 9 meeting. On June 7,
830 2016 Trump announced his intention to give "a major speech" "probably Monday of
831 next week"-which would have been June 13-about "all of the things that have
832 taken place with the Clintons." See, e.g., Phillip Bump, What we know about the
833 Trump Tower meeting, Washington Post (Aug. 7, 2018). Following the June 9
834 meeting, Trump changed the subject of his planned speech to national security.
835 But the Office did not find evidence that the original idea for the speech was
836 connected to the anticipated June 9 meeting or that the change of topic was
837 attributable to the failure of that meeting to produce concrete evidence about
838 Clinton. Other events, such as the Pulse nightclub shooting on June 12, could
839 well have caused the change. The President's written answers to our questions
840 state that the speech's focus was altered ''[i]n light of' the Pulse nightclub
841 shooting. See Written Responses, supra. As for the original topic of the June 13
842 speech, Trump has said that "he expected to give a speech referencing the
843 publicly available, negative inf01mation about the Clintons," and that the draft
844 of the speech prepared by Campaign staff"was based on publicly available
845 material, including, in particular, information from the book Clinton Cash by
846 Peter Schweizer." Written Responses, supra. In a later June 22 speech, Trump did
847 speak extensively about allegations that Clinton was corrupt, drawing from the
848 Clinton Cash book. See Full Transcript: Donald Trump NYC Speech on Stakes of the
849 Election, politico.com (June 22, 2016). 714 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya
850 Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017) at 41, 42; Alison
851 Frankel, How Did Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Get into US. for Trump Tower
852 Meeting? Reuters, (Nov. 6, 2017); Michael Kranish et al., Russian Lawyer who Met
853 with Trump Jr. Has Long History Fighting Sanctions, Washington Post (July 11,
854 2017); see OSC-KA VOOl 13 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); RG000073
855 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Lieberman 12/13/17 302, at 5; see also
856 Prevezon Holdings Order (Oct. 17, 2016). 715 116
857
858RESULT: 18
859
860PAGE: 124
861
862TEXT:
863
864 U.S. Department of Justice Attorttey 'Nork Proattet // Mtty Cotttttitt
865 Mttterittl Proteetea Uttaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Russian-born translator who
866 had assisted Veselnitska Prevezon case, also attended the lunch.717 meeting
867 asked Akhmetshin what she should tell him. According to several participants in
868 the lunch, Veselnitskaya showed Akhmetshin a document alleging financial
869 misconduct by Bill Browder and the Ziff brothers (Americans with business in
870 Russia , and those individuals subse uentl makin olitical donations to the
871 DNC.719 The group then went to Trump Tower for the meeting.721 ii. Conduct of
872 the Meeting Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner participated on the Trump side,
873 while Kaveladze, Samochomov, Akhmetshin, and Goldstone attended with
874 Veselnitskaya.722 The Office spoke to every participant except Veselnitska a and
875 Trum Jr., the latter of whom declined to be voluntaril interviewed b the Office
876 Goldstone recalled that Trump Jr. invited Veselnitskaya to begin but did not say
877 anything about the subject of the meeting.725 Participants agreed that
878 Veselnitskaya stated that the Ziff brothers had broken Russian laws and had
879 donated their profits to the DNC or the Clinton Campaign.726 She asserted that
880 the Ziff brothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering 717 Kaveladze
881 11/16/17 302, at 7; Samochornov 7 /13/17 302, at 2, 4; r subject matter of the
882 Trump Tower meeting coming up at lunch. Samochomov 7/12/17 302, at 4. In her
883 later Senate statement and interactions with the press, Veselnitskaya produced
884 what she claimed were the talking points that she brought to the June 9 meeting.
885 720 721 E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. 722 E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302,
886 at 4. 723 E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4; Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 9. 724
887 725 726 117
888
889RESULT: 19
890
891PAGE: 156
892
893TEXT:
894
895 U.S. Department of Justice Atten1e:,,? Werk Predttet // May CetttttiH Mttterittl
896 Preteetecl Under Fed. R Criffl. P. 6(e) Trump and sent unsolicited policy papers
897 on issues such as foreign policy, trade, and Russian election interference to
898 Bannon.1006 After the election, Prince frequently visited transition offices at
899 Trump Tower, primarily to meet with Bannon but on occasion to meet Michael Flynn
900 and others.1007 Prince and Bannon would discuss, inter alia, foreign policy
901 issues and Prince's recommendations regarding who should be appointed to fill
902 key natio~sitions.1008 Although~ affiliated with the transition, Nader---
903 received assurances -that the incoming Administration considered Prince a
904 trusted associate.10 b. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the
905 Incoming Administration , ! A I Investigative Technique ? n ? ? Investigative
906 Technique Investigative Technique I ? . ? ? ? . ? . . . . . . . . .. ?
907 Investigative Technique ? ' Investigative Technique 1006 Prince 4/4/18 302, at
908 l, 3-4; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 19-20; 10/18/16 Email,
909 Prince to Bannon. 1007 Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 6; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 5; Flynn
910 1/24/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302, at 11; Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5, 8; Bannon
911 2/14/18 302, at 20-21; 11/12/16 Email, Prince to Corallo. 1008 Prince 4/4/18
912 302, at 5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21. 1011 l012 1014 1015 Investigative
913 Technique Investigative Technique Investigative Technique Investigative
914 Technique Investigative Technique 149 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6; 1111
915
916RESULT: 20
917
918PAGE: 159
919
920TEXT:
921
922 U.S. Department of Justice Atterttey \?erk Predttet // May Cetttaitt .Mttterial
923 Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Dmitriev.1040 Nader told Dmitriev that
924 the people he met had asked for Dmitriev's bio, and Dmitriev replied that he
925 would update and send it.1041 Nader later received from Dmitriev two files
926 concerning Dmitriev: one was a two-page biography, and the other was a list of
927 Dmitriev's positive quotes about Donald Trump.1042 The next morning, Nader
928 forwarded the message and attachments Dmitriev had sent him to Prince.1043 Nader
929 wrote to Prince that these documents were the versions "to be used with some
930 additional details for them" (with "them" referring to members of the incoming
931 Administration).1044 Prince opened the attachments at Trump Tower within an hour
932 of receiving them.1045 Prince stated that, while he was at Trump Tower that day,
933 he spoke with Kellyanne Conway, Wilbur Ross, Steve Mnuchin, and others while
934 waiting to see Bannon.1046 Cell-site location data for Prince's mobile phone
935 indicates that Prince remained at Trump Tower for approximately three hours.1047
936 Prince said that he could not recall whether, durin those three hours, he met
937 with Bannon and discussed Dmitriev with him.1048 Prince booked a ticket to the
938 Seychelles on January 7, 2017.1050 The following day, Nader wrote to Dmitriev
939 that he had a "pleasant surprise" for him, namely that he had arranged for
940 Dmitriev to meet "a Special Guest" from "the New Team," referring to Prince.1051
941 Nader asked Dmitriev if he could come to the Seychelles for the meeting on
942 January 12, 2017, and Dmitriev agreed.1052 The f9llowing day,~urance from Nader
943 that the Seychelles meeting would be worthwhile.1053 ---Dmitriev was not
944 enthusiastic about the idea of meeting with Prince, and that Nader assured him
945 that Prince wielded influence with the incoming 1040 1/4/17 Text Message, Nader
946 to Prince; 1/4/17 Text Messa es, Nader to Dmitriev (5:24 a.m. -5:26 a.m.); Nader
947 1/22/18 302, at 8-9; 1041 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (7:24:27 a.m.).
948 1042 1/4/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (7:25-7:29 a.m.) 1043 1/4/17 Text
949 Messages, Nader to Prince. 1044 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince; 1045
950 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 1-3. 1046 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2-3. 1047 Cell-site
951 location data for Prince's mobile phone 1048 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 3. 1049 1050
952 1/5/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince. Investigative Technique 1051 1/8/17 Text
953 Messages, Nader to Dmitriev (6:05 -6: 10 p.m.). 1052 1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader
954 & Dmitriev (6: 10 -7:27 p.m.). 1053 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader. 152
955
956RESULT: 21
957
958PAGE: 166
959
960TEXT:
961
962 U.S. Department of Justice Att6rHey W6rk Pr6dttet /,' May Cmi:taifl Material
963 Prnteeted Umier Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee) channel to avoid bureaucracy."1122 On
964 January 28, 2017, Dmitriev texted Nader that he wanted "to see if I can confirm
965 to my boss that your friends may use some of the ideas from the 2 pager I sent
966 you in the telephone call that will happen at 12 EST,"1123 an apparent reference
967 to the call scheduled between President Trump and Putin. Nader replied,
968 "Definitely paper was so submitted to Team by Rick and me. They took it
969 seriously!"1124 After the call between President Trump and Putin occurred,
970 Dmitriev wrote to Nader that "the call went very well. My boss wants me to
971 continue making some public statements that us [sic] Russia cooperation is good
972 and important."1125 Gerson also wrote to Dmitriev to say that the call had gone
973 well, and Dmitriev replied that the document they had drafted together "played
974 an important role."1126 Gerson and Dmitriev appeared to stop communicating with
975 one another in approximately March 2017, when the investment deal they had been
976 working on together showed no signs of progressing.1127 3. Ambassador Kislyak's
977 Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn m Trump Tower Following the
978 Election On November 16, 2016, Catherine Vargas, an executive assistant to
979 Kushner, received a request for a meeting with Russian Ambassador Sergey
980 Kislyak.1128 That same day, Vargas sent Kushner an email with the subject,
981 "MISSED CALL: Russian Ambassador to the US, Sergey Ivanovich Kislyak .... "1129
982 The text of the email read, "RE: setting up a time to meet w/you on 12/1. LMK
983 how to proceed." Kushner responded in relevant part, "I think I do this one
984 --confirm with Dimitri [Simes of CNI] that this is the right guy ."1130 After
985 reaching out to a colleague of Simes at CNI, Vargas reported back to Kushner
986 that Kislyak was "the best go-to guy for routine matters in the US," while Yuri
987 Ushakov, a Russian foreign policy advisor, was the contact for "more
988 direct/substantial matters."1131 Bob Foresman, the UBS investment bank executive
989 who had previously tried to transmit to candidate Trump an invitation to speak
990 at an economic forum in Russia, see Volume I, Section IV.A.l.d.ii, supra, may
991 have provided similar information to the Transition Team. According to 1122
992 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:04:41 p.m.). 1123 1/28/17 Text
993 Message, Dmitriev to Nader (I'l :05:39 a.m.). 1124 1/28/17 Text Message, Nader
994 to Dmitriev (11: 11 :33 a.m.). 1125 1/29/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11
995 :06:35 a.m.). 1126 1/28/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; 1/29/17 Text
996 Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. 1127 Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 4; 3/21/17 Text
997 Message, Gerson to Dmitriev. 1128 Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional
998 Committees ("Kushner Stmt. "), at 6 (7 /24/17) (written statement by Kushner to
999 the Senate Judiciary Committee). 1129 NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Vargas to
1000 Kushner (6:44 p.m.)). 1130 NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas (9:54
1001 p.m.)). 1131 11/17/16 Email, Brown to Simes (10:41 a.m.); Brown 10/13/17 302, at
1002 4; 11/17/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner (12:31:18). 159
1003
1004RESULT: 22
1005
1006PAGE: 167
1007
1008TEXT:
1009
1010 U.S. Department of Justice Attemey Werk Pfedttet // Mlt)1 CtJHtttifl Material
1011 Pfeteeted Ur,der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Foresman, at the end of an early December
1012 2016 meeting with incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and his
1013 designated deputy (K.T. McFarland) in New York, Flynn asked Foresman for his
1014 thoughts on Kislyak. Foresman had not met Kislyak but told Flynn that, while
1015 Kislyak was an important person, Kislyak did not have a direct line to
1016 Putin.1132 Foresman subsequently traveled to Moscow, inquired of a source he
1017 believed to be close to Putin, and heard back from that source that Ushakov
1018 would be the official channel for the incoming U.S. national security
1019 advisor.1133 Foresman acknowledged that Flynn had not asked him to undertake
1020 that inquiry in Russia but told the Office that he nonetheless felt obligated to
1021 report the information back to Flynn, and that he worked to get a face-to-face
1022 meeting with Flynn in January 2017 so that he could do so.1134 Email
1023 correspondence suggests that the meeting ultimately went forward, 1135 but Flynn
1024 has no recollection of it or of the earlier December meeting.1136 (The
1025 investigation did not identify evidence of Flynn or Kushner meeting with Ushakov
1026 after being given his name.1137) In the meantime, although he had already formed
1027 the impression that Kislyak was not necessarily the right point of contact, 1138
1028 Kushner went forward with the meeting that Kislyak had requested on November 16.
1029 It took place at Trump Tower on November 30, 2016.1139 At Kushner' s invitation,
1030 Flynn also attended; Bannon was invited but did not attend.1140 During the
1031 meeting, which lasted approximately 30 minutes, Kushner expressed a desire on
1032 the part of the incoming Administration to start afresh with U.S.-Russian
1033 relations.1141 Kushner also asked Kislyak to identify the best person (whether
1034 Kislyak or someone else) with whom to direct future discussions-someone who had
1035 contact with Putin and the ability to speak for him.1142 The three men also
1036 discussed U.S. policy toward Syria, and Kislyak floated the idea of having
1037 Russian generals brief the Transition Team on the topic using a secure
1038 communications line.1143 After Flynn explained that there was no secure line in
1039 the Transition Team offices, 1132 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 17. 1133 Foresman
1040 10/17/18 302, at 17-18. 1134 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 18. 1135 RMF-SCO-00000015
1041 (1/5/17 Email, Foresman to Atencio & Flaherty); RMF-SCO-00000015 (1/5/17 Email,
1042 Flaherty to Foresman & Atencio). Office). 1136 9/26/18 Attorney Proffer from
1043 Covington & Burling LLP (reflected in email on file with the 1137 Vargas 4/4/18
1044 302, at 5. 1138 Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 4. 1139 AKIN_GUMP _BERKOWITZ_0000016-019
1045 (11/29/16 Email, Vargas to Kuznetsov). 114? Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 2; NOS00004240
1046 (Calendar Invite, Vargas to Kushner & Flynn). 1141 Kushner Strut. at 6. 1142
1047 Kushner Strut. at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18. 1143 Kushner Stmt. at 7;
1048 Kushner 4/11 /18 302, at 18; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 2. 160
1049
1050RESULT: 23
1051
1052PAGE: 168
1053
1054TEXT:
1055
1056 U.S. Department of Justice A1:l:tm?1ey '.Vsrk Prodttet // Mey Cmttttifl MMeriel
1057 Proteeted Under Fed. R. Cri1'l'I. P. 6(e) Kushner asked Kislyak if they could
1058 communicate using secure facilities at the Russian Embassy.1144 Kislyak quickly
1059 rejected that idea. 1145 4. Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov On
1060 December 6, 2016, the Russian Embassy reached out to Kushner's assistant to set
1061 up a second meeting between Kislyak and Kushner.1146 Kushner declined several
1062 proposed meeting dates, but Kushner's assistant indicated that Kislyak was very
1063 insistent about securing a second meeting.1147 Kushner told the Office that he
1064 did not want to take another meeting because he had already decided Kislyak was
1065 not the right channel for him to communicate with Russia, so he arranged to have
1066 one of his assistants, A vi Berkowitz, meet with Kislyak in his stead.1148
1067 Although embassy official Sergey Kuznetsov wrote to Berkowitz that Kislyak
1068 thought it "important" to "continue the conversation with Mr. Kushner in
1069 person,"1149 Kislyak nonetheless agreed to meet ? instead with Berkowitz once it
1070 became apparent that Kushner was unlikely to take a meeting. Berkowitz met with
1071 Kislyak on December 12, 2016, at Trump Tower.1150 The meeting lasted only a few
1072 minutes, during which Kislyak indicated that he wanted Kushner to meet someone
1073 who had a direct line to Putin: Sergey Gorkov, the head of the owned bank
1074 Vnesheconombank (VEB). Kushner agreed to meet with Gorkov.1151 The one-on-one
1075 meeting took place the next day, December 13, 2016, at the Colony Capital
1076 building in Manhattan, where Kushner had previously scheduled meetings.1152 VEB
1077 was (and is) the subject of Department of Treasury economic sanctions imposed in
1078 response to Russia's annexation of Crimea. 1153 Kushner did not, however, recall
1079 any discussion during his meeting with Gorkov about the sanctions against VEB or
1080 sanctions more generally.1154 Kushner stated in an interview that he did not
1081 engage in any preparation for 1144 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18. 1145 Kushner
1082 4/11/18 302, at 18. 1146 Kushner Strut. at 7; NOSC00000123 (12/6/16 Email,
1083 Vargas to Kushner (12: 11 :40 p.m.)). 1147 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19;
1084 NOSC00000130 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas (10:41 p.m.)). 1148 Kushner
1085 4/11/18 302, at 19; Kushner Stmt. at 7; DJTFP_SCO_01442290 (12/6/16 Email,
1086 Berkowitz to 1149 DJTFP SCO 01442290 (12/7/16 Email --to Berkowitz (12:31 :39
1087 p.m.)). 1150 Berkowitz 1/12/18 302, at 7; AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_O0000l-04
1088 (12/12/16 Text Messages, Berkowitz & 202-701-8532). 1151 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at
1089 19; NOSC00000130-135 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Berkowitz). 1152 Kushner
1090 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130-135 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Berkowitz).
1091 1153 Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial
1092 Services and Energy Sectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel
1093 Entities, and those Undermining Ukraine's Sovereignty, United States Department
1094 of the Treasury (Jul. 16, 2014). 1154 Kushner 4/11 /18 302, at 20. 161
1095
1096RESULT: 24
1097
1098PAGE: 192
1099
1100TEXT:
1101
1102 U.S. Department of Justice JMeme)? Werk Predttet ,',' May Cefltatfl Material
1103 Preteeted Uflcler Fecl. R. Crtffl. P. 6(e) outside of the U.S. who are not legal
1104 permanent residents, and certain non-U.S. entities located outside of the U.S. ?
1105 A and willful[]" violation involving an aggregate of $25,000 or more in a
1106 calendar year is a felony. 52 U.S.C. ? 30109(d)(l)(A)(i); see Bluman, 800 F.
1107 Supp. 2d at 292 (noting that a willful violation will require some "proof of the
1108 defendant's knowledge of the law"); United States v. Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d
1109 573, 577 (E.D. Va. 2013) (applying willfulness standard drawn from Bryan v.
1110 United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998)); see also Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1,
1111 19 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en bane) (same). A "knowing[] and willful[]" violation
1112 involving an aggregate of $2,000 or more in a calendar year, but less than
1113 $25,000, is a misdemeanor. 52 U.S.C. ? 30109(d)(l)(A)(ii). b. Application to
1114 June 9 Trump Tower Meeting The Office considered whether to charge Trump
1115 Campaign officials with crimes in connection with the June 9 meeting described
1116 in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra. The Office concluded that, in light of the
1117 government's substantial burden of proof on issues of intent ("knowing" and
1118 "willful"), and the difficulty of establishing the value of the offered
1119 information, criminal charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that
1120 "the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a
1121 conviction." Justice Manual? 9-27.220. In brief, the key facts are that, on June
1122 3, 2016, Robert Goldstone emailed Donald Trump Jr., to pass along from Emin and
1123 Aras Agalarov an "offer" from Russia's "Crown prosecutor" to "the Trump
1124 campaign" of "official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary
1125 and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to [Trump Jr.'s] father."
1126 The email described this as "very high level and sensitive information" that is
1127 "part of Russia and its government's support to Mr. Trump-helped along by Aras
1128 and Emin." Trump Jr. responded: "if it's what you say I love it especially later
1129 in the summer." Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had follow-up conversations and,
1130 within days, scheduled a meeting with Russian representatives that was attended
1131 by Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner. The communications setting up the meeting
1132 and the attendance by high-level Campaign representatives support an inference
1133 that the Campaign anticipated receiving derogatory documents and information
1134 from official Russian sources that could assist candidate Trump's electoral
1135 prospects. This series of events could implicate the federal election-law ban on
1136 contributions and donations by foreign nationals, 52 U.S.C. ? 3012 l(a)(l )(A).
1137 Specifically, Goldstone passed along an offer purportedly from a Russian
1138 government official to provide "official documents and information" to the Trump
1139 Campaign for the purposes of influencing the presidential election. Trump Jr.
1140 appears to have accepted that offer and to have arranged a meeting to receive
1141 those materials. Documentary evidence in the form of email chains supports the
1142 inference that Kushner and Mana fort were aware of that purpose and attended the
1143 June 9 meeting anticipating the receipt of helpful information to the Campaign
1144 from Russian sources. The Office considered whether this evidence would
1145 establish a conspiracy to violate the foreign contributions ban, in violation of
1146 18 U.S.C. ? 371; the solicitation of an illegal foreignsource contribution; or
1147 the acceptance or receipt of "an express or implied promise to make a 185
1148
1149RESULT: 25
1150
1151PAGE: 202
1152
1153TEXT:
1154
1155 U.S. Department of Justice Attorney 1Nork Prodttet II :May Contain Ma:teria:l
1156 Preteeted Under Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Second, Flynn made false statements
1157 about calls he had previously made to representatives of Russia and other
1158 countries regarding a resolution submitted by Egypt to the United Nations
1159 Security Council on December 21, 2016. Specifically, Flynn stated that he only
1160 asked the countries' positions on how they would vote on the resolution and that
1161 he did not request that any of the countries take any particular action on the
1162 resolution. That statement was false. On December 22, 2016, Flynn called
1163 Kislyak, informed him of the incoming Trump Administration's opposition to the
1164 resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution.
1165 Flynn also falsely stated that Kislyak never described Russia's response to his
1166 December 22 request regarding the resolution. Kislyak in fact told Flynn in a
1167 conversation on December 23, 2016, that Russia would not vote against the
1168 resolution if it came to a vote. See Flynn Statement of Offense ,r 4. Flynn made
1169 these false statements to the FBI at a time when he was serving as National
1170 Security Advisor and when the FBI had an open investigation into Russian
1171 interference in the 2016 presidential election, including the nature of any
1172 links between the Trump Campaign and Russia. Flynn's false statements and
1173 omissions impeded and otherwise had a material impact on that ongoing
1174 investigation. Flynn Statement of Offense ,r,r 1-2. They also came shortly
1175 before Flynn made separate submissions to the Depa1tment of Justice, pursuant to
1176 FARA, that also contained materially false statements and omissions. Id. ,r 5.
1177 Based on the totality of that conduct, the Office decided to charge Flynn with
1178 making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U .S.C. ? l00l(a). On
1179 December 1, 2017, and pursuant to a plea agreement, Flynn pleaded guilty to that
1180 charge and also admitted his false statements to the Department in his FARA
1181 filing. See id.; Plea Agreement, United States v. Michael T Flynn, No.
1182 l:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 3. Flynn is awaiting sentencing. iv.
1183 Michael Cohen Michael Cohen was the executive vice president and special counsel
1184 to the Trump Organization when Trump was president of the Trump Organization.
1185 Information ,r 1, United States v. Cohen, No. 1 :18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29,
1186 2018), Doc. 2 ("Cohen Information"). From the fall of 2015 through approximately
1187 June 2016, Cohen was involved in a project to build a Trump-branded tower and
1188 adjoining development in Moscow. The project was known as Trump Tower Moscow. In
1189 2017, Cohen was called to testify before the House Permanent Select Committee on
1190 Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI),
1191 both of which were investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential
1192 election and possible links between Russia and the presidential campaigns. In
1193 late August 2017, in advance of his testimony, Cohen caused a two-page statement
1194 to be sent to SSCI and HPSCI addressing Trump Tower Moscow. Cohen Information
1195 ,r,r 2-3. The letter contained three representations relevant here. First, Cohen
1196 stated that the Trump Moscow project had ended in January 2016 and that he had
1197 briefed candidate Trump on the project only three times before making the
1198 unilateral decision to terminate it. Second, Cohen represented that he never
1199 agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the project and never considered
1200 asking Trump to travel for the project. Third, Cohen stated that he did not
1201 recall any Russian government contact about the project, including any response
1202 to an email that 195
1203
1204RESULT: 26
1205
1206PAGE: 209
1207
1208TEXT:
1209
1210 U.S. Department of Justice AUeme~? Werk Pt'etittet // Mey CeHtttifl Meteriel
1211 Preteeteti UHtier Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 2. FBI Director Corney Publicly Confirms
1212 the Existence of the Russia Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI
1213 ........................................................... 52 3. The President
1214 Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public Statements that he had No
1215 Connection to Russia ................................................. 55 4. The
1216 President Asks Corney to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russia Investigation ..
1217 ................................................................................
1218 ........................ 57 D. Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the
1219 Termination of FBI Director Corney .............................................
1220 ............................................................................. 62
1221 1. Corney Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to Answer
1222 Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation ............. 62 2.
1223 The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Corney
1224 ...................................... 64 E. The President's Efforts to Remove
1225 the Special Counsel.. ........................................... 77 1. The
1226 Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reaction ..............
1227 78 2. The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts ofinterest...
1228 .......... 80 3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for
1229 Obstruction of Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have
1230 the Special Counsel Removed ....................................................
1231 ................................ 84 F. The President's Efforts to Curtail the
1232 Special Counsel Investigation .......................... 90 1. The President
1233 Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions to Curtail the Special
1234 Counsel Investigation .........................................................
1235 90 2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski
1236 ..................................................... 92 3. The President
1237 Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview ....... 93 4. The
1238 President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation
1239 ....................... 94 G. The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of
1240 Emails About the June 9, 2016 Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign
1241 Officials ............................... 98 1. The President Learns About the
1242 Existence of Emails Concerning the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting
1243 ............................................................................. 98
1244 2. The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclose
1245 Information About the June 9 Meeting
1246 ............................................................... 100 3. The
1247 President Directs Trump Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries About the June 9
1248 Meeting ........................................................................
1249 ............................ 101 4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016
1250 Meeting ............................................... 103 H. The President's
1251 Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over the Investigation .......
1252 ................................................................................
1253 .................. 107 1. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his
1254 Recusal. ................... 107 2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse
1255 or Direct Investigations Covered by his Recusal. ...............................
1256 ....................................................... 109 ii
1257
1258RESULT: 27
1259
1260PAGE: 210
1261
1262TEXT:
1263
1264 U.S. Department of Justice At:t:ol'tte~? Wol'k Pl'oe:lttet // May Cotttaitt
1265 Material Pl'oteeteti Utte:le!' Fee:I. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) I. The President Orders
1266 McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel ............
1267 ................................................................................
1268 .............. 113 1. .The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the
1269 Special Counsel... .......... 113 2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute
1270 the Press Reports ..................... 114 J. The President's Conduct Towards
1271 Flynn, Manafort,litlllll ????? ........................... 120 1. Conduct
1272 Directed at Michael Flynn
1273 .................................................................... 120 2.
1274 Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort
1275 ..................................................................... 122 3.
1276 Harm to Ongoing Matter ????????????????????????????????????
1277 ................................... 128 K. The President's Conduct Involving
1278 Michael Cohen .................................................. 134 l.
1279 Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow Project
1280 ................................................................................
1281 .................. 134 2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a "Party Line"
1282 Distancing Candidate Trump From Russia .........................................
1283 ................................................... 138 3. Cohen Submits False
1284 Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump Tower Moscow Project in Accordance
1285 with the Party Line ............................... 139 4. The President Sends
1286 Messages of Support to Cohen .......................................... 144 5.
1287 The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Government. .....
1288 ................................................................................
1289 ................... 148 L. Overarching Factual Issues ..........................
1290 .............................................................. 156 III. LEGAL
1291 DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To THE PRESIDENT
1292 ................................................................................
1293 ............................................ 159 A. Statutory Defenses to the
1294 Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions to the Conduct Under
1295 Investigation
1296 ........................................................................... 160
1297 1. The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive Acts ..
1298 ................................................................................
1299 ................................ 160 2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad
1300 Reading of Section 1512( c )(2) .................. 162 3. The Legislative
1301 History of Section 1512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing Its Text. .............
1302 ................................................................................
1303 ................. 164 4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not
1304 Suggest That Section 1512( c )(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this
1305 Investigation .......................... 165 5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might
1306 Apply to the Conduct in this Investigation .....................................
1307 ................................................................... 167 B.
1308 Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to
1309 Presidential Conduct ...........................................................
1310 ....................................... 168 1. The Requirement of a Clear
1311 Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential Conduct Does Not Limit the
1312 Obstruction Statutes ............................................. 169 iii
1313
1314RESULT: 28
1315
1316PAGE: 214
1317
1318TEXT:
1319
1320 U.S. Department of Justice Attef'Ae:,? WElf'k Pt1Eltittet // Moy CElAtoiA
1321 Motet1iol Pt1eteeteti UAtier Feti. R. Ct1im. P. 6(e) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME
1322 II Our obstruction-of-justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the
1323 President that related to the Russian-interference investigations, including the
1324 President's conduct towards the law enforcement officials overseeing the
1325 investigations and the witnesses to relevant events. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE
1326 OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION The key issues and events we examined include the
1327 following: The Campaign's response to reports about Russian support for Trump.
1328 During the 2016 presidential campaign, questions arose about the Russian
1329 government's apparent support for candidate Trump. After WikiLeaks released
1330 politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been
1331 hacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia was
1332 responsible for the hacks at the same time that he and other Campaign officials
1333 privately sought information about any further planned WikiLeaks releases. Trump
1334 also denied having any business in or connections to Russia, even though as late
1335 as June 2016 the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a
1336 skyscraper to be built in Russia called Trump Tower Moscow. After the election,
1337 the President expressed concerns to advisors that reports of Russia's election
1338 interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election.
1339 Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn. In mid-January 2017,
1340 incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the Vice
1341 President, other administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to
1342 Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about Russia's response to U.S. sanctions on
1343 Russia for its election interference. On January 27, the day after the President
1344 was told that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar
1345 statements to the FBI, the President invited FBI Director Corney to a private
1346 dinner at the White House and told Corney that he needed loyalty. On February
1347 14, the day after the President requested Flynn's resignation, the President
1348 told an outside advisor, "Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over."
1349 The advisor disagreed and said the investigations would continue. Later that
1350 afternoon, the President cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting
1351 with Corney. Referring to the FBI's investigation of Flynn, the President said,
1352 "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He
1353 is a good guy. T hope you can let this go." Shortly after requesting Flynn's
1354 resignation and speaking privately to Corney, the President sought to have
1355 Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland draft an internal letter stating
1356 that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak.
1357 McFarland declined because she did not know whether that was true, and a White
1358 House Counsel's Office attorney thought that the request would look like a quid
1359 pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered. The President's reaction to
1360 the continuing Russia investigation. Tn February 2017, Attorney General Jeff
1361 Sessions began to assess whether he had to recuse himself from related
1362 investigations because of his role in the Trump Campaign. Tn early March, the
1363 President told White House Counsel Donald McGahn to stop Sessions from recusing.
1364 And after Sessions announced his recusal on March 2, the President expressed
1365 anger at the decision and told advisors that he should have an Attorney General
1366 who would protect him. That weekend, the President took Sessions aside at an
1367 event and urged him to "unrecuse." Later in March, Corney publicly 3
1368
1369RESULT: 29
1370
1371PAGE: 216
1372
1373TEXT:
1374
1375 U.S. Department of Justice AtterHe:) Werle Preattet // May CeHtaiH Mitteria:1
1376 Preteetea UHder Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's
1377 investigation. Two days after directing McGahn to have the Special Counsel
1378 removed, the President made another attempt to affect the course of the Russia
1379 investigation. On June 19, 2017, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office
1380 with his former campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, a trusted advisor outside
1381 the government, and dictated a message for Lewandowski to deliver to Sessions.
1382 The message said that Sessions should publicly announce that, notwithstanding
1383 his recusal from the Russia investigation, the investigation was "very unfair"
1384 to the President, the President had done nothing wrong, and Sessions planned to
1385 meet with the Special Counsel and "let [him] move forward with investigating
1386 election meddling for future elections." Lewandowski said he understood what the
1387 President wanted Sessions to do. One month later, in another private meeting
1388 with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the President asked about the status of his
1389 message for Sessions to limit the Special Counsel investigation to future
1390 election interference. Lewandowski told the President that the message would be
1391 delivered soon. Hours after that meeting, the President publicly criticized
1392 Sessions in an interview with the New York Times, and then issued a series of
1393 tweets making it clear that Sessions's job was in jeopardy. Lewandowski did not
1394 want to deliver the President's message personally, so he asked senior White
1395 House official Rick Dearborn to deliver it to Sessions. Dearborn was
1396 uncomfortable with the task and did not follow through. Efforts to prevent
1397 public disclosure of evidence. In the summer of 2017, the President learned that
1398 media outlets were asking questions about the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump
1399 Tower between senior campaign officials, including Donald Trump Jr., and a
1400 Russian lawyer who was said to be offering damaging information about Hillary
1401 Clinton as "part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump." On
1402 several occasions, the President directed aides not to publicly disclose the
1403 emails setting up the June 9 meeting, suggesting that the emails would not leak
1404 and that the number of lawyers with access to them should be limited. Before the
1405 emails became public, the President edited a press statement for Trump Jr. by
1406 deleting a line that acknowledged that the meeting was with "an individual who
1407 [Trump Jr.] was told might have information helpful to the campaign" and instead
1408 said only that the meeting was about adoptions of Russian children. When the
1409 press asked questions about the President's involvement in Trump Jr.' s
1410 statement, the President's personal lawyer repeatedly denied the President had
1411 played any role. Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of
1412 the investigation. In early summer 2017, the President called Sessions at home
1413 and again asked him to reverse his recusal from the Russia investigation.
1414 Sessions did not reverse his recusal. In October 2017, the President met
1415 privately with Sessions in the Oval Office and asked him to "take [a] look" at
1416 investigating Clinton. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty
1417 pursuant to a cooperation agreement, the President met with Sessions in the Oval
1418 Office and suggested, according to notes taken by a senior advisor, that if
1419 Sessions unrecused and took back supervision of the Russia investigation, he
1420 would be a "hero." The President told Sessions, "I'm not going to do anything or
1421 direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly." In response,
1422 Sessions volunteered that he had never seen anything "improper" on the campaign
1423 and told the President there was a "whole new leadership team" in place. He did
1424 not unrecuse. Efforts to have McGahn deny that the President had ordered him to
1425 have the Special Counsel removed. In early 2018, the press reported that the
1426 President had directed McGahn to 5
1427
1428RESULT: 30
1429
1430PAGE: 217
1431
1432TEXT:
1433
1434 U.S. Department of Justice Attot1Aey Wot1k Protittet // Muy CoHtuiA Muteriul
1435 Proteeteti UAtiet' Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) have the Special Counsel removed in
1436 June 2017 and that McGahn had threatened to resign rather than carry out the
1437 order. The President reacted to the news stories by directing White House
1438 officials to tell McGahn to dispute the story and create a record stating he had
1439 not been ordered to have the Special Counsel removed. McGahn told those
1440 officials that the media reports were accurate in stating that the President had
1441 directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed. The President then met with
1442 McGahn in the Oval Office and again pressured him to deny the reports. In the
1443 same meeting, the President also asked McGahn why he had told the Special
1444 Counsel about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel and why
1445 McGahn took notes of his conversations with the President. McGahn refused to
1446 back away from what he remembered happening and perceived the President to be
1447 testing his mettle. Conduct towards Flynn, Manafort,~. After Flynn withdrew from
1448 a joint defense agreement with the President and began cooperating with the
1449 government, the President's personal counsel left a message for Flynn's
1450 attorneys reminding them of the President's warm feelings towards Flynn, which
1451 he said "still remains," and asking for a "heads up" if Flynn knew "information
1452 that implicates the President." When Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could
1453 no longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, the
1454 President's personal counsel said he would make sure that the President knew
1455 that Flynn's actions reflected "hostility" towards the President. During
1456 Manafort's prosecution and when the jury in his criminal. trial was
1457 deliberating, the President praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was
1458 being treated unfairly, and declined to rule out a pardon. After Manafort was
1459 convicted, the President called Manafort "a brave man" for refusin to "break"
1460 and said that "fli in " "almost ou ht to be Conduct involving Michael Cohen. The
1461 President's conduct towards Michael Cohen, a former Trump Organization
1462 executive, changed from praise for Cohen when he falsely minimized the
1463 President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project, to castigation of
1464 Cohen when he became a cooperating witness. From September 2015 to June 2016,
1465 Cohen had pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump
1466 Organization and had briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times,
1467 including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal.
1468 In 2017, Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project, including
1469 stating that he had only briefed Trump on the project three times and never
1470 discussed travel to Russia with him, in an effort to adhere to a "party line"
1471 that Cohen said was developed to minimize the President's connections to Russia.
1472 While preparing for his congressional testimony, Cohen had extensive discussions
1473 with the President's personal counsel, who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen
1474 should "stay on message" and not contradict the President. After the FBI
1475 searched Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the President publicly asserted
1476 that Cohen would not "flip," contacted him directly to tell him to "stay
1477 strong," and privately passed messages of support to him. Cohen also discussed
1478 pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on
1479 message he would be taken care of. But after Cohen began cooperating with the
1480 government in the summer of 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called
1481 him a "rat," and suggested that his family members had committed crimes. 6
1482
1483RESULT: 31
1484
1485PAGE: 223
1486
1487TEXT:
1488
1489 U.S. Department of Justice AMat'Ae)' 'ilafk Pt'adttet // Muy CaAtO:it'l
1490 M0:teri0:I Prateeted UAder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) The omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C.
1491 ? 1503 prohibits an "endeavor" to obstruct justice, which sweeps more broadly
1492 than Section 1512's attempt provision. See United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d
1493 287,302 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th
1494 Cir. 1988) ( collecting cases). "It is well established that a[ n] [obstruction-
1495 of-justice] offense is complete when one corruptly endeavors to obstruct or
1496 impede the due administration of justice; the prosecution need not prove that
1497 the due administration of justice was actually obstructed or impeded." United
1498 States v. Davis, 854 F .3d 1276, 1292 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks
1499 omitted). B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations After the appointment
1500 of the Special Counsel, this Office obtained evidence about the following events
1501 relating to potential issues of obstruction of justice involving the President:
1502 (a) The President's January 27, 2017 dinner with former FBI Director James
1503 Corney in which the President reportedly asked for Corney's loyalty, one day
1504 after the White House had been briefed by the Department of Justice on contacts
1505 between former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and the Russian
1506 Ambassador; (b) The President's February 14, 2017 meeting with Corney in which
1507 the President reportedly asked Corney not to pursue an investigation of Flynn;
1508 (c) The President's private requests to Corney to make public the fact that the
1509 President was not the subject of an FBI investigation and to lift what the
1510 President regarded as a cloud; (d) The President's outreach to the Director of
1511 National Intelligence and the Directors of the National Security Agency and the
1512 Central Intelligence Agency about the FBI's Russia investigation; (e) The
1513 President's stated rationales for terminating Corney on May 9, 2017, including
1514 statements that could reasonably be understood as acknowledging that the FBT's
1515 Russia investigation was a factor in Corney's termination; and (f) The
1516 President's reported involvement in issuing a statement about the June 9, 2016
1517 Trump Tower meeting between Russians and senior Trump Campaign officials that
1518 said the meeting was about adoption and omitted that the Russians had offered to
1519 provide the Trump Campaign with derogatory information about Hillary Clinton.
1520 Taking into account that information and our analysis of applicable statutory
1521 and constitutional principles (discussed below in Volume II, Section III,
1522 infra), we determined that there was a sufficient factual and legal basis to
1523 further investigate potential obstruction-of-justice issues involving the
1524 President. Many of the core issues in an obstruction-of-justice investigation
1525 turn on an individual's actions and intent. We therefore requested that the
1526 White House provide us with documentary evidence in its possession on the
1527 relevant events. We also sought and obtained the White House's concurrence in
1528 our conducting interviews of White House personnel who had relevant information.
1529 And we interviewed other witnesses who had pertinent knowledge, obtained
1530 documents on a 12
1531
1532RESULT: 32
1533
1534PAGE: 226
1535
1536TEXT:
1537
1538 U.S. Department of Justice AUerney Werk Pwdttet ,',' M!t)1 Centain Material
1539 Preteet:ecl Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION
1540 INVESTIGATION This section of the report details the evidence we obtained. We
1541 first provide an overview of how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential
1542 campaign, and how candidate Trump responded. We then tum to the key events that
1543 we investigated: the President's conduct concerning the FBI investigation of
1544 Michael Flynn; the President's reaction to public confirmation of the FBI's
1545 Russia investigation; events leading up to and surrounding the termination of
1546 FBI Director Corney; efforts to terminate the Special Counsel; efforts to
1547 curtail the scope of the Special Counsel's investigation; efforts to prevent
1548 disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower meeting between
1549 Russians and senior campaign officials; efforts to have the Attorney General
1550 unrecuse; and conduct towards McGahn, Cohen, and other witnesses. We summarize
1551 the evidence we found and then analyze it by reference to the three statutory
1552 obstruction-of-justice elements: obstructive act, nexus to a proceeding, and
1553 intent. We focus on elements because, by regulation, the Special Counsel has
1554 "jurisdiction ... to investigate ... federal crimes committed in the course of,
1555 and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as
1556 perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of
1557 witnesses." 28 C.F.R. ? 600.4(a). Consistent with our jurisdiction to
1558 investigate federal obstruction crimes, we gathered evidence that is relevant to
1559 the elements of those crimes and analyzed them within an elements framework-
1560 while refraining from reaching ultimate conclusions about whether crimes were
1561 committed, for the reasons explained above. This section also does not address
1562 legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President; those
1563 defenses are analyzed in Volume II, Section III, iefra. A. The Campaign's
1564 Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump During the 2016 campaign,
1565 the media raised questions about a possible connection between the Trump
1566 Campaign and Russia.7 The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released
1567 politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been
1568 hacked by Russia. Trump responded to questions about possible connections to
1569 Russia by denying any business involvement in Russia-even though the Trump
1570 Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late as June 2016.
1571 Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same
1572 time as he and other Campaign advisors privately sought information about any
1573 further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election, when questions persisted
1574 about possible links between Russia and the Trump Campaign, the President-Elect
1575 continued to deny any connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns
1576 that reports of Russian election interference might lead the public to question
1577 the legitimacy of his election.8 7 This section summarizes and cites various
1578 news stories not for the truth of the information contained in the stories, but
1579 rather to place candidate Trump's response to those stories in context. Volume I
1580 of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that
1581 were reported on by the media during the campaign. 8 As discussed in Volume I,
1582 while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties
1583 to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign,
1584 the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign
1585 conspired or coordinated with representatives ofthe Russian government to
1586 interfere in the 2016 election. 15
1587
1588RESULT: 33
1589
1590PAGE: 230
1591
1592TEXT:
1593
1594 U.S. Department of Justice At:te!'He~? Wel'lc Prea1:1et // Ma~? CeHtaiH
1595 Matel'ial Pl'eteetea UHtfor Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) mightily by our press."36
1596 Trump also said that "there's nothing that I can think of that I'd rather do
1597 than have Russia friendly as opposed to the way they are right now," and in
1598 response to a question about whether he would recognize Crimea as Russian
1599 territory and consider lifting sanctions, Trump replied, "We'll be looking at
1600 that. Yeah, we'll be looking."37 During the press conference, Trump repeated "I
1601 have nothing to do with Russia" five times.38 He stated that "the closest [he]
1602 came to Russia" was that Russians may have purchased a home or condos from
1603 him.39 He said that after he held the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in 2013 he
1604 had be.en interested in working with Russian companies that "wanted to put a lot
1605 of money into developments in Russia" but "it never worked out."40 He explained,
1606 "[t]rankly, I didn't want to do it for a couple of different reasons. But we had
1607 a major developer ... that wanted to develop property in Moscow and other
1608 places. But we decided not to do it."41 The Trump Organization, however, had
1609 been pursuing a building project in Moscow-the Trump Tower Moscow from
1610 approximately September 2015 through June 2016, and the candidate was regularly
1611 updated on developments, including possible trips by Michael Cohen to Moscow to
1612 promote the deal and by Trump himself to finalize it.42 Cohen recalled speaking
1613 with Trump after the press conference about Trump's denial of any business
1614 dealings in Russia, which Cohen regarded as untrue.43 Trump told Cohen that
1615 Trump Tower Moscow was not a deal yet and said, "Why mention it if it is not a
1616 deal?"44 According to Cohen, at around this time, in response to Trump's
1617 disavowal of connections to Russia, campaign 36 Donald Trump News Conference,
1618 Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). Within five hours of Trump's remark, a
1619 Russian intelligence service began targeting email accounts associated with
1620 Hillary Clinton for possible hacks. See Volume I, Section III, supra. In written
1621 answers submitted in this investigation, the President stated that he made the
1622 "Russia, if you're listening" statement "in jest and sarcastically, as was
1623 apparent to any objective observer." Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.
1624 20, 2018), at 13 (Response to Question II, Part ( d) ). 37 Donald Trump News
1625 Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). In his written answers
1626 submitted in this investigation, the President said that his statement that
1627 "we'll be looking" at Crimea and sanctions "did not communicate any position."
1628 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to
1629 Question IV, Part (g)). 38 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN
1630 (July 27, 2016). 39 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July
1631 27, 2016). 40 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27,
1632 2016). 41 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
1633 42 The Trump Tower Moscow project and Trump's involvement in it is discussed in
1634 detail in Volume I, Section TV.A. I, supra, and Volume TI, Section TT.K, infra.
1635 43 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4. 44 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4-5. 19
1636
1637RESULT: 34
1638
1639PAGE: 288
1640
1641TEXT:
1642
1643 U.S. Department of Justice Attorae:,? Work Proattet // May Coataia Mtt1:erial
1644 Proteetee Uaaer Fee. R. Crira. P. 6(e) was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower
1645 Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump was repeatedly briefed on
1646 the ro ress of those efforts.498 In addition, some witnesses said that ~s aware
1647 that ? ? . --at a time when public reports stated that Russian intelligence
1648 officials were behind the hacks, and that Trump privately sought information
1649 about future WikiLeaks releases.499 More broadly, multiple witnesses described
1650 the President's preoccupation with press coverage of the Russia investigation
1651 and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his
1652 election.500 Finally, the President and White House aides initially advanced a
1653 pretextual reason to the press and the public for Corney's termination. In the
1654 immediate aftermath of the firing, the President dictated a press statement
1655 suggesting that he had acted based on the DOJ recommendations, and White House
1656 press officials repeated that story. But the President had decided to fire
1657 Corney before the White House solicited those recommendations. Although the
1658 President ultimately acknowledged that he was going to fire Corney regardless of
1659 the Department of Justice's recommendations, he did so only after DOJ officials
1660 made clear to him that they would resist the White House's suggestion that they
1661 had prompted the process that led to Corney's termination. The initial reliance
1662 on a pretextual justification could support an inference that the President had
1663 concerns about providing the real reason for the firing, although the evidence
1664 does not resolve whether those concerns were personal, political, or both. E.
1665 The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel Overview The Acting
1666 Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, prompting the
1667 President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney
1668 General Sessions had failed to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted
1669 his resignation, which the President ultimately did not accept. The President
1670 told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest, but
1671 they responded that those claims were "ridiculous" and posed no obstacle to the
1672 Special Counsel's service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarly
1673 cleared the Special Counsel's service. On June 14, 2017, the press reported that
1674 the President was being personally investigated for obstruction of justice and
1675 the President responded with a series of tweets 498 See Volume II, Section II.K.
1676 l, infra. 499 See Volume l, Section ITLD.1, supra. 500 In addition to whether
1677 the President had a motive related to Russia-related matters that an FBI
1678 investigation could uncover, we considered whether the President's intent in
1679 firing Corney was connected to other conduct that could come to light as a
1680 result of the FBT's Russian-interference investigation. In paiticular, Michael
1681 Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the
1682 Trump Tower Moscow project and involvement in other activities. And facts
1683 uncovered in the Russia investigation, which our Office referred to the U.S.
1684 Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, ultimately led to the
1685 conviction of Cohen in the Southern District ofNew York for campaign-finance
1686 offenses related to payments he said he made at the direction of the President.
1687 See Volume II, Section II.K.5, infra. The investigation, however, did not
1688 establish that when the President fired Corney, he was considering the
1689 possibility that the FBI's investigation would uncover these payments or that
1690 the President's intent in firing Corney was otherwise connected to a concern
1691 about these matters coming to light. 77
1692
1693RESULT: 35
1694
1695PAGE: 309
1696
1697TEXT:
1698
1699 U.S. Department of Justice A1:t:0rMey Wark Pratlttet // Mtty CaMtttiM Mttterittl
1700 Prnteetetl UMeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) investigation for obstruction of justice.
1701 The sequence of those events raises an inference that after seeking to terminate
1702 the Special Counsel, the President sought to exclude his and his campaign's
1703 conduct from the investigation's scope. The President raised the matter with
1704 Lewandowski again on July 19, 2017, just days after emails and information about
1705 the June 9, 2016 meeting between Russians and senior campaign officials had been
1706 publicly disclosed, generating substantial media coverage and investigative
1707 interest. The manner in which the President acted provides additional evidence
1708 of his intent. Rather than rely on official channels, the President met with
1709 Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office. The President selected a loyal "devotee"
1710 outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting an inference that he
1711 was working outside White House channels, including McGahn, who had previously
1712 resisted contacting the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel. The
1713 President also did not contact the Acting Attorney General, who had just
1714 testified publicly that there was no cause to remove the Special Counsel.
1715 Instead, the President tried to use Sessions to restrict and redirect the
1716 Special Counsel's investigation when Sessions was recused and could not properly
1717 take any action on it. The July 19, 2017 events provide further evidence of the
1718 President's intent. The President followed up with Lewandowski in a separate
1719 one-on-one meeting one month after he first dictated the message for Sessions,
1720 demonstrating he still sought to pursue the request. And just hours after
1721 Lewandowski assured the President that the message would soon be delivered to
1722 Sessions, the President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in
1723 which he publicly attacked Sessions and raised questions about his job security.
1724 Four days later, on July 22, 2017, the President directed Priebus to obtain
1725 Sessions's resignation. That evidence could raise an inference that the
1726 President wanted Sessions to realize that his job might be on the line as he
1727 evaluated whether to comply with the President's direction that Sessions
1728 publicly announce that, notwithstanding his recusal, he was going to confine the
1729 Special Counsel's investigation to future election interference. G. The
1730 President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9, 2016
1731 Meeting Behveen Russians and Senior Campaign Officials Overview By June 2017,
1732 the President became aware of emails setting up the June 9, 2016 meeting between
1733 senior campaign officials and Russians who offered derogatory information on
1734 Hillary Clinton as "part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump."
1735 On multiple occasions in late June and early July 2017, the President directed
1736 aides not to publicly disclose the emails, and he then dictated a statement
1737 about the meeting to be issued by Donald Trump Jr. describing the meeting as
1738 about adoption. Evidence I. The President Learns About the Existence of Emails
1739 Concerning the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting In mid-June 2017-the same week
1740 that the President first asked Lewandowski to pass a message to Sessions-senior
1741 Administration officials became aware of emails exchanged during 98
1742
1743RESULT: 36
1744
1745PAGE: 310
1746
1747TEXT:
1748
1749 U.S. Department of Justice AM:eri,e,? Werk Prm:ittet // Ma,? Cei,taii, Material
1750 Preteeteti Ui,tier Feti. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) the campaign arranging a meeting
1751 between Donald Trump Jr., Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and a Russian
1752 attorney.663 As described in Volume I, Section TV.A.5, supra, the emails stated
1753 that the "Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia" had offered "to provide the Trump
1754 campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate
1755 Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as part of "Russia and its government's
1756 support for Mr. Trump."664 Trump Jr. responded, "[I]f it's what you say I love
1757 it,"665 and he, Kushner, and Manafort met with the Russian attorney and several
1758 other Russian individuals at Trump Tower on June 9, 2016.666 At the meeting, the
1759 Russian attorney claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia
1760 were provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats, and the Russian attorney
1761 then spoke about the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 U.S. statute that imposed financial
1762 and travel sanctions on Russian officials and that had resulted in a retaliatory
1763 ban in Russia on U.S. adoptions of Russian children.667 According to written
1764 answers submitted by the President in response to questions from this Office,
1765 the President had no recollection of learning of the meeting or the emails
1766 setting it up at the time the meeting occurred or at any other time before the
1767 election.668 The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request from
1768 SSCI that called for the production of various information, including, "[a] list
1769 and a description of all meetings" between any "individual affiliated with the
1770 Trump campaign" and "any individual formally or informally affiliated with the
1771 Russian government or Russian business interests which took place between June
1772 16, 2015, and 12 pm on January 20, 2017," and associated records.669 Trump
1773 Organization attorneys became aware of the June 9 meeting no later than the
1774 first week of June 2017, when they began interviewing the meeting participants,
1775 and the Trump Organization attorneys provided the emails setting up the meeting
1776 to the President's personal counsel.670 Mark Corallo, who had been hired as a
1777 spokesman for the President's personal legal team, recalled that he learned
1778 about the June 9 meeting around June 21 or 22, 201 7. 671 Priebus recalled
1779 learning about the June 9 meeting from Fox News host Sean Hannity in late June
1780 2017.672 Priebus notified one 663 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at
1781 2. 664 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17
1782 (11:01 a.m. ET) Tweet. 665 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone);
1783 @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (l 1:01 a.m. ET) Tweet. 666 Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at
1784 4. 667 See Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra (describing meeting in detail). 668
1785 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question
1786 I, Parts (a) through (c)). The President declined to answer questions about his
1787 knowledge of the June 9 meeting or other events after the election. 669 DJTFP
1788 _SCO _pDF _00000001-02 (5/17/17 Letter, SSCI to Donald J. Trump for President,
1789 Inc.). 670 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 12; 6/2/17 and 6/5/17 Emails, Goldstone &
1790 Garten; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 3; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. 671 Corallo 2/15/18
1791 302, at 3. 672 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7. 99
1792
1793RESULT: 37
1794
1795PAGE: 345
1796
1797TEXT:
1798
1799 U.S. Department of Justice AMon=tey 'Nork Prodttet // Ma;? CoH:taiH: Material
1800 Protedee UH:der Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) K. The President's Conduct Involving
1801 Michael Cohen Overview The President's conduct involving Michael Cohen spans the
1802 full period of our investigation. During the campaign, Cohen pursued the Trump
1803 Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump Organization. Cohen briefed
1804 candidate Trump on the project numerous times, including discussing whether
1805 Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal. After the media began
1806 questioning Trump's connections to Russia, Cohen promoted a "party line" that
1807 publicly distanced Trump from Russia and asserted he had no business there.
1808 Cohen continued to adhere to that party line in 2017, when Congress asked him to
1809 provide documents and testimony in its Russia investigation. [n an attempt to
1810 minimize the President's connections to Russia, Cohen submitted a letter to
1811 Congress falsely stating that he only briefed Trump on the Trump Tower Moscow
1812 project three times, that he did not consider asking Trump to travel to Russia,
1813 that Cohen had not received a response to an outreach he made to the Russian
1814 government, and that the project ended in January 2016, before the first
1815 Republican caucus or primary. While working on the congressional statement,
1816 Cohen had extensive discussions with the President's personal counsel, who,
1817 according to Cohen, said that Cohen should not contradict the President and
1818 should keep the statement short and "tight." After the FBI searched Cohen's home
1819 and office in April 2018, the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not
1820 "flip" and privately passed messages of support to him. Cohen also discussed
1821 pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on
1822 message, he would get a pardon or the President would do "something else" to
1823 make the investigation end. But after Cohen began cooperating with the
1824 government in July 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called him a
1825 "rat," and suggested his family members had committed crimes. Evidence 1.
1826 Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement m the Trump Tower Moscow Project
1827 The President's interactions with Cohen as a witness took place against the
1828 background of the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project. As
1829 described in detail in Volume I, Section IV.A. 1, supra, from September 2015
1830 until at least June 2016, the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscow
1831 project in Russia, with negotiations conducted by Cohen, then-executive vice
1832 president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump.909
1833 The Trump Organization had previously and 909 In August 2018 and November 2018,
1834 Cohen pleaded guilty to multiple crimes of deception, including making false
1835 statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, as described later
1836 in this section. When Cohen first met with investigators from this Office, he
1837 repeated the same lies he told Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project.
1838 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 12-17. But after Cohen pleaded guilty to offenses in the
1839 Southern District ofNew York on August 21, 2018, he met with investigators again
1840 and corrected the record. The Office found Cohen's testimony in these subsequent
1841 proffer sessions to be consistent with and corroborated by other information
1842 obtained in the course of the Office's investigation. The Office's sentencing
1843 submission in Cohen's criminal case stated: "Starting with his second meeting
1844 with the [Special Counsel's Office] in September 2018, the defendant has
1845 accepted responsibility not only for 134
1846
1847RESULT: 38
1848
1849PAGE: 346
1850
1851TEXT:
1852
1853 U.S. Department of Justice A*erH:ey '.Verk Pr0dttet // May C0H:taiH: Material
1854 Pr0teeted UH:der Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) unsuccessfully pursued a building
1855 project in Moscow.910 According to Cohen, in approximately September 2015 he
1856 obtained internal approval from Trump to negotiate on behalf of the Trump
1857 Organization to have a Russian corporation build a tower in Moscow that licensed
1858 the Trump name and brand.911 Cohen thereafter had numerous brief conversations
1859 with Trump about the project.912 Cohen recalled that Trump wanted to be updated
1860 on any developments with Trump Tower Moscow and on several occasions brought the
1861 project up with Cohen to ask what was happening on it.913 Cohen also discussed
1862 the project on multiple occasions with Donald Trump Jr. and Ivanka Trump.914 In
1863 the fall of 2015, Trump signed a Letter of Intent for the project that specified
1864 highly lucrative terms for the Trump Organization.915 In December 2015, Felix
1865 Sater, who was handling negotiations between Cohen and the Russian corporation,
1866 asked Cohen for a copy of his and Trump's passports to facilitate travel to
1867 Russia to meet with government officials and possible financing partners.916
1868 Cohen recalled discussing the trip with Trump and requesting a copy of Trump's
1869 passport from Trump's personal secretary, Rhona Graff.917 By January 2016, Cohen
1870 had become frustrated that Sater had not set up a meeting with Russian
1871 government officials, so Cohen reached out directly by email to the office of
1872 Dmitry his false statements concerning the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project, but
1873 also his broader efforts through public statements and testimony before Congress
1874 to minimize his role in, and what he knew about, contacts between the [Trump
1875 Organization] and Russian interests during the course of the campaign. . . . The
1876 information provided by Cohen about the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project in these
1877 proffer sessions is consistent with and corroborated by other information
1878 obtained in the course of the [Special Counsel's Office's] investigation ....
1879 The defendant, without prompting by the [Special Counsel's Office], also
1880 corrected other false and misleading statements that he had made concerning his
1881 outreach to and contacts with Russian officials during the course of the
1882 campaign." Gov't Sentencing Submission at 4, United States v. Michael Cohen, I:
1883 I 8-cr-85O (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2018), Doc. 14. At Cohen's sentencing, our Office
1884 further explained that Cohen had "provided valuable information ... while taking
1885 care and being careful to note what he knows and what he doesn't know."
1886 Transcript at 19, United States v. Michael Cohen, I: l 8-cr-85O (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
1887 12, 2018), Doc. 17 (Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript). 910 See Volume I, Section IV.A.
1888 I, supra (noting that starting in at least 2013, several employees of the Trump
1889 Organization, including then-president of the organization Donald J. Trump,
1890 pursued a Trump Tower Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties). 911
1891 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 15. 912 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2,
1892 4. 913 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4. 914 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4, I 0. 915 MDC-H-
1893 OOO618-25 (10/28/15 Letter oflntent, signed by Donald J. Trump, Trump
1894 Acquisition, LLC and Andrey Rozov, LC. Expert Investment Company); Cohen 9/12/18
1895 302, at 3; Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response
1896 to Question III, Parts (a) through (g)). 916 MDC-H-OOO6OO ( 12/19/15 Email,
1897 Sater to Cohen). 917 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. 135
1898
1899RESULT: 39
1900
1901PAGE: 347
1902
1903TEXT:
1904
1905 U.S. Department of Justice AtterAey Werk Preauet // May CeAtaiA Material
1906 Preteetea UAder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Peskov, who was Putin's deputy chief of
1907 staff and press secretary.918 On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email
1908 response from Elena Poliakova, Peskov's personal assistant, and phone records
1909 confirm that they then spoke for approximately twenty minutes, during which
1910 Cohen described the Trump Tower Moscow project and requested assistance in
1911 moving the project forward.919 Cohen recalled briefing candidate Trump about the
1912 call soon afterwards.92? Cohen told Trump he spoke with a woman he identified as
1913 "someone from the Kremlin," and Cohen reported that she was very professional
1914 and asked detailed questions about the project.921 Cohen recalled telling Trump
1915 he wished the Trump Organization had assistants who were as competent as the
1916 woman from the Kremlin.922 Cohen thought his phone call renewed interest in the
1917 project.923 The day after Cohen's call with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen,
1918 asking him to "[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat ... It's about
1919 Putin they called today."924 Sater told Cohen that the Russian government liked
1920 the project and on January 25, 2016, sent an invitation for Cohen to visit
1921 Moscow "for a working visit."925 After the outreach from Sater, Cohen recalled
1922 telling Trump that he was waiting to hear back on moving the project forward.926
1923 After January 2016, Cohen continued to have conversations with Sater about Trump
1924 Tower Moscow and continued to keep candidate Trump updated about those
1925 discussions and the status of the project.927 Cohen recalled that he and Trump
1926 wanted Trump Tower Moscow to succeed and that Trump never discouraged him from
1927 working on the project because of the campaign.928 In March or April 2016, Trump
1928 asked Cohen if anything was happening in Russia.929 Cohen also 918 See FS00004
1929 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); TRUMPORG_MC_000233 (1/11/16 Email,
1930 Cohen to pr _peskova@prpress.gof.ru); MDC-H-000690 (1 /14/16 Email, Cohen to
1931 info@prpress.gov.ru); TRUMPORG_MC_000235 (1/16/16 Email, Cohen to
1932 pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru). 919 1/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen; Call Records
1933 ofMichael Cohen. (Showing a 22-minute call on January 20, 2016, between Cohen
1934 and the number Poliakova provided in her email); Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2-3.
1935 After the call, Cohen saved Poliakova's contact information in his Trump
1936 Organization Outlook contact list. 1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22
1937 a.m.). 92? Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 921 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5-6; Cohen I
1938 l/12/18 302, at 4. 922 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 923 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5.
1939 924 FS0O0l l (1/21/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). 925 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at
1940 5; 1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (attachment). 926 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 927
1941 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6. In later congressional testimony, Cohen stated that he
1942 briefed Trump on the project approximately six times after January 2016. Hearing
1943 on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform
1944 Committee, 116th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 24) (testimony
1945 of Michael Cohen). 928 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6. 929 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4. 136
1946
1947RESULT: 40
1948
1949PAGE: 348
1950
1951TEXT:
1952
1953 U.S. Department of Justice AttorHey Work Pros1:1et // Mey CoHteiH Meteriel
1954 Proteetes UHeer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) recalled briefing Donald Trump Jr. in
1955 the spring-a conversation that Cohen said was not "idle chit chat" because Trump
1956 Tower Moscow was potentially a $1 billion deal.930 Cohen recalled that around
1957 May 2016, he again raised with candidate Trump the possibility of a trip to
1958 Russia to advance the Trump Tower Moscow project.931 At that time, Cohen had
1959 received several texts from Sater seeking to arrange dates for such a trip.932
1960 On May 4, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen, "T had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the
1961 trip does happen the question is before or after the convention ..... Obviously
1962 the premeeting trip (you only) can happen anytime you want but the 2 big guys
1963 [is] the question. I said I would confirm and revert."933 Cohen responded, "My
1964 trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the
1965 convention."934 On May 5, 2016, Sater followed up with a text that Cohen thought
1966 he probably read to Trump: Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the
1967 St. Petersburg Forum which is Russia's Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet
1968 there with you and possibly introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev .... This
1969 is perfect. The entire business class of Russia will be there as well. He said
1970 anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to
1971 discuss.935 Cohen recalled discussing the invitation to the St. Petersburg
1972 Economic Forum with candidate Trump and saying that Putin or Russian Prime
1973 Minister Dmitry Medvedev might be there.936 Cohen remembered that Trump said
1974 that he would be willing to travel to Russia if Cohen could "lock and load" on
1975 the deal.937 Tn June 2016, Cohen decided not to attend the St. Petersburg
1976 Economic Forum because Sater had not obtained a formal invitation for Cohen from
1977 Peskov.938 Cohen said he had a quick conversation with Trump at that time but
1978 did not tell him that the project was over because he did not want Trump to
1979 complain that the deal was on-again-off-again if it were revived.939 During the
1980 summer of 2016, Cohen recalled that candidate Trump publicly claimed that he had
1981 nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards privately checked with
1982 Cohen about the status of the Trump Tower Moscow project, which Cohen found
1983 "interesting."940 At some point 93? Cohen 9/ 12/18 302, at 10. 931 Cohen 9/12/18
1984 302, at 7. 932 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. 933 FS000 15 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater
1985 to Cohen). 934 FS000l5 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater). 935 FS00016-17
1986 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). 936 Cohen 9/12/ l 8 302, at 7. 937 Cohen
1987 9/12/18 302, at 7. 938 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7-8. 939 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8.
1988 94? Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 137
1989
1990RESULT: 41
1991
1992PAGE: 349
1993
1994TEXT:
1995
1996 U.S. Department of Justice Atterttey Wm?k Preettet // May Cetttaitt Material
1997 Preteetee Utteer Fee. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) that summer, Cohen recalled having a
1998 brief conversation with Trump in which Cohen said the Trump Tower Moscow project
1999 was going nowhere because the Russian development company had not secured a
2000 piece of property for the project.941 Trump said that was "too bad," and Cohen
2001 did not recall talking with Trump about the project after that.942 Cohen said
2002 that at no time during the campaign did Trump tell him not to pursue the project
2003 or that the project should be abandoned. 943 2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a
2004 "Party Line" Distancing Candidate Trump From Russia As previously discussed, see
2005 Volume II, Section II.A, supra, when questions about possible Russian support
2006 for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump denied
2007 having any personal, financial, or business connection to Russia, which Cohen
2008 described as the "party line" or "message" to follow for Trump and his senior
2009 advisors.944 After the election, the Trump Organization sought to formally close
2010 out certain deals in advance of the inauguration.945 Cohen recalled that Trump
2011 Tower Moscow was on the list of deals to be closed out.946 In approximately
2012 January 2017, Cohen began receiving inquiries from the media about Trump Tower
2013 Moscow, and he recalled speaking to the President-Elect when those inquiries
2014 came in.947 Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about the Trump Tower
2015 Moscow project might not be consistent with the "message" that the President-
2016 Elect had no relationship with Russia.948 In an effort to "stay on message,"
2017 Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump Tower Moscow deal was not
2018 feasible and had ended in January 2016.949 Cohen recalled that this was part of
2019 a "script" or talking points he had developed with President-Elect Trump and
2020 others to 941 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. Cohen could not recall the precise timing
2021 of this conversation, but said he thought it occurred in June or July 2016.
2022 Cohen recalled that the conversation happened at some point after candidate
2023 Trump was publicly stating that he had nothing to do with Russia. Cohen 3/19/19
2024 302, at 2. 942 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 943 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 944 Cohen
2025 11/20/18 302, at l; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3, 5; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9. 945
2026 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2; see also Rtskhiladze 4/4/18 302, at 8-9. 946 Cohen
2027 9/18/18 302, at 1-2. 947 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3. 948 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
2028 949 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 5. The article was published on February 19, 2017, and
2029 reported that Sater and Cohen had been working on plan for a Trump Tower Moscow
2030 "as recently as the fall of2015" but had come to a halt because of the
2031 presidential campaign. Consistent with Cohen's intended patty line message, the
2032 article stated, "Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of
2033 intent for a project in Moscow from a Russian real estate developer at that time
2034 but determined that the project was not feasible." Megan Twohey & Scott Shane, A
2035 Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump Associates, New York
2036 Times (Feb. 19, 2017). 138
2037
2038RESULT: 42
2039
2040PAGE: 350
2041
2042TEXT:
2043
2044 U.S. Department of Justice At:terHey Work Prodttet // May CoHtaiH Material
2045 Proteeted UHder Feel. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) dismiss the idea of a substantial
2046 connection between Trump and Russia.95? Cohen said that he discussed the talking
2047 points with Trump but that he did not explicitly tell Trump he thought they were
2048 untrue because Trump already knew they were untrue.951 Cohen thought it was
2049 important to say the deal was done in January 2016, rather than acknowledge that
2050 talks continued in May and June 2016, because it limited the period when
2051 candidate Trump could be alleged to have a relationship with Russia to an early
2052 point in the campaign, before Trump had become the party's presumptive
2053 nominee.952 3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump
2054 Tower Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Line In early May 2017, Cohen
2055 received requests from Congress to provide testimony and documents in connection
2056 with congressional investigations of Russian interference in the 2016
2057 election.953 At that time, Cohen understood Congress's interest in him to be
2058 focused on the allegations in the Steele reporting concerning a meeting Cohen
2059 allegedly had with Russian officials in Prague during the campaign.954 Cohen had
2060 never traveled to Prague and was not concerned about those allegations, which he
2061 believed were provably false.955 On May 18, 2017, Cohen met with the President
2062 to discuss the request from Congress, and the President instructed Cohen that he
2063 should cooperate because there was nothing there.956 Cohen eventually entered
2064 into a joint defense agreement (JOA) with the President and other individuals
2065 who were part of the Russia investigation.957 In the months leading up to his
2066 congressional testimony, Cohen frequently spoke with the President's personal
2067 counsel.958 Cohen 95? Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 5-6. 951 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 6.
2068 952 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at I 0. 953 P-SCO-000000328 (5/9/17 Letter, HPSCI to
2069 Cohen); P-SCO-000000331 (5/12/17 Letter, SSCI to Cohen). 954 Cohen 11/20/18 302,
2070 at 2-3. 955 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2-3. 956 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2; Cohen
2071 11/20/19 302, at 3. 957 Cohen 11 /12/18 302, at 2. 958 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at
2072 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18, at 2-6. Cohen told investigators about his conversations
2073 with the President's personal counsel after waiving any privilege of his own and
2074 after this Office advised his counsel not to provide any communications that
2075 would be covered by any other privilege, including communications protected by a
2076 joint defense or common interest privilege. As a result, most of what Cohen told
2077 us about his conversations with the President's personal counsel concerned what
2078 Cohen had communicated to the President's personal counsel, and not what was
2079 said in response. Cohen described certain statements made by the President's
2080 personal counsel, however, that are set forth in this section. Cohen and his
2081 counsel were better positioned than this Office to evaluate whether any
2082 privilege protected those statements because they had knowledge of the scope of
2083 their joint defense agreement and access to privileged communications that may
2084 have provided context for evaluating the statements they shared. After
2085 interviewing Cohen about these matters, we asked the President's personal
2086 counsel if he wished to provide information to us about his conversations with
2087 Cohen related to Cohen's congressional testimony about 139
2088
2089RESULT: 43
2090
2091PAGE: 351
2092
2093TEXT:
2094
2095 U.S. Department of Justice Atterrte,-? \llerk Preettet // Ma,-? Certtairt
2096 Material Preteetee Urteer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) said that in those conversations
2097 the President's personal counsel would sometimes say that he had just been with
2098 the President.959 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel told him
2099 the JOA was working well together and assured him that there was nothing there
2100 and if they stayed on message the investigations would come to an end soon.960
2101 At that time, Cohen's legal bills were being paid by the Trump Organization,961
2102 and Cohen was told not to worry because the investigations would be over by
2103 summer or fall of 20 l 7.962 Cohen said that the President's personal counsel
2104 also conveyed that, as part of the JOA, Cohen was protected, which he would not
2105 be if he "went rogue."963 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel
2106 reminded him that "the President loves you" and told him that ifhe stayed on
2107 message, the President had his back.964 In August 2017, Cohen began drafting a
2108 statement about Trump Tower Moscow to submit to Congress along with his document
2109 production.965 The final version of the statement contained several false
2110 statements about the project.966 First, although the Trump Organization
2111 continued to pursue the project until at least June 2016, the statement said,
2112 "The proposal was under consideration at the Trump Organization from September
2113 2015 until the end of January 2016. By the end of January 2016, I determined
2114 that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business reasons and should
2115 not be pursued further. Based on my business determinations, the Trump
2116 Organization abandoned the proposal."967 Second, although Cohen and candidate
2117 Trump had discussed possible travel to Russia by Trump to pursue the venture,
2118 the statement said, "Despite overtures by Mr. Sater, I never considered asking
2119 Mr. Trump to travel to Russia in connection with this proposal. I told Mr. Sater
2120 that Mr. Trump would not travel to Russia unless there was a definitive
2121 agreement in place."968 Third, although Cohen had regularly briefed Trump on the
2122 status Trump Tower Moscow. The President's personal counsel declined and,
2123 through his own counsel, indicated that he could not disaggregate information he
2124 had obtained from Cohen from information he had obtained from other parties in
2125 the IDA. In view of the admonition this Office gave to Cohen's counsel to
2126 withhold communications that could be covered by privilege, the President's
2127 personal counsel's uncertainty about the provenance of his own knowledge, the
2128 burden on a privilege holder to establish the elements to support a claim of
2129 privilege, and the substance of the statements themselves, we have included
2130 relevant statements Cohen provided in this report. If the statements were to be
2131 used in a context beyond this report, further analysis could be warranted. 959
2132 Cohen l 1 /20/18 302, at 6. 96? Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2, 4. 961 Cohen 11 /20/18
2133 302, at 4. 962 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 8; Cohen 1 1 /20/18 302, at 3-4. 963 Cohen
2134 11/20/18 302, at 4. 964 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2. 965
2135 P-SCO-000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Email and Attachment, Michael
2136 Cohen's Counsel to Cohen). Cohen said it was not his idea to write a letter to
2137 Congress about Trump Tower Moscow. Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7. 966 P-SCO-00009478
2138 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 967 P-SCO-00009478
2139 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 968 P-SCO-00009478
2140 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 140
2141
2142RESULT: 44
2143
2144PAGE: 353
2145
2146TEXT:
2147
2148 U.S. Department of Justice Atterfl:e:y Werk Pretlttet // MB:)' Cefl:taiH
2149 Material Preteetetl Ufl:tler Fett. R. Criffl. P. 6(e1 message to Trump.979 Cohen
2150 anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed Putin meeting when he
2151 testified before Congress because he had talked about the potential meeting on
2152 Sean Hannity's radio show.98? Cohen recalled explaining to the President's
2153 personal counsel the "whole story" of the attempt to set up a meeting between
2154 Trump and Putin and Trump's role in it.981 Cohen recalled that he and the
2155 President's personal counsel talked about keeping Trump out of the narrative,
2156 and the President's personal counsel told Cohen the story was not relevant and
2157 should not be included in his statement to Congress.982 Cohen said that his
2158 "agenda" in submitting the statement to Congress with false representations
2159 about the Trump Tower Moscow project was to minimize links between the project
2160 and the President, give the false impression that the project had ended before
2161 the first presidential primaries, and shut down further inquiry into Trump Tower
2162 Moscow, with the aim of limiting the ongoing Russia investigations.983 Cohen
2163 said he wanted to protect the President and be loyal to him by not contradicting
2164 anything the President had said.984 Cohen recalled he was concerned that ifhe
2165 told the truth about getting a response from the Kremlin or speaking to
2166 candidate Trump about travel to Russia to pursue the project, he would
2167 contradict the message that no connection existed between Trump and Russia, and
2168 he rationalized his decision to provide false testimony because the deal never
2169 happened.985 He was not concerned that the story would be contradicted by
2170 individuals who knew it was false because he was sticking to the party line
2171 adhered to by the whole group.986 Cohen wanted the support of the President and
2172 the White House, and he believed that following the party line would help put an
2173 end to the Special Counsel and congressional investigations.987 Between August
2174 18, 2017, when the statement was in an initial draft stage, and August 28, 2017,
2175 when the statement was submitted to Congress, phone records reflect that Cohen
2176 spoke with the President's pcersonal counsel almost daily.988 On August 27,
2177 2017, the day before Cohen 979 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 5. 98? Cohen 9/18/18 302,
2178 at 11. 981 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 982 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2; see Cohen
2179 9/18/18 302, at 11 (recalling that he was told that if he stayed on message and
2180 kept the President out of the narrative, the President would have his back). 983
2181 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8; Information at 4-5, United States v. Michael Cohen, I:
2182 l 8-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 (Cohen Information). 984 Cohen I
2183 1/20/18 302, at 4. 985 Cohen I I /20/18 302, at 4; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3,
2184 4, 6. 986 Cohen 9/12/l 8 302, at 9. 987 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8-9. 988 Cohen
2185 11/12/18 302, at 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5; Call Records of Michael Cohen
2186 (Reflecting three contacts on August 18, 2017 (24 seconds; 5 minutes 25 seconds;
2187 and IO minutes 58 seconds); two contacts on August 19 (23 seconds and 24 minutes
2188 26 seconds); three contacts on August 23 (8 seconds; 20 minutes 33 seconds; and
2189 5 minutes 8 seconds); one contact on August 24 (11 minutes 59 seconds); 14
2190 contacts on August 27 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37 seconds; I minute 16 seconds; 1
2191 minutes 35 142
2192
2193RESULT: 45
2194
2195PAGE: 354
2196
2197TEXT:
2198
2199 U.S. Department of Justice Atteffl:ey Werle Pretlttct // May Cet~taiR Material
2200 Pretectea URacr Fca. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) submitted the statement to Congress,
2201 Cohen and the President's personal counsel had numerous contacts by phone,
2202 including calls lasting three, four, six, eleven, and eighteen minutes.989 Cohen
2203 recalled telling the President's personal counsel, who did not have first-hand
2204 knowledge of the project, that there was more detail on Trump Tower Moscow that
2205 was not in the statement, including that there were more communications with
2206 Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the statement
2207 reflected.99? Cohen stated that the President's personal counsel responded that
2208 it was not necessary to elaborate or include those details because the project
2209 did not progress and that Cohen should keep his statement short and "tight" and
2210 the matter would soon come to an end.991 Cohen recalled that the President's
2211 personal counsel said "his client" appreciated Cohen, that Cohen should stay on
2212 message and not contradict the President, that there was no need to muddy the
2213 water, and that it was time to move on.992 Cohen said he agreed because it was
2214 what he was expected to do.993 After Cohen later pleaded guilty to making false
2215 statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, this Office sought
2216 to speak with the President's personal counsel about these conversations with
2217 Cohen, but counsel declined, citing potential privilege concerns.994 At the same
2218 time that Cohen finalized his written submission to Congress, he served as a
2219 source for a Washington Post story published on August 27, 2017, that reported
2220 in depth for the first time that the Trump Organization was "pursuing a plan to
2221 develop a massive Trump Tower in Moscow" at the same time as candidate Trump was
2222 "running for president.in late 2015 and early 2016."995 The article reported
2223 that "the project was abandoned at the end of January 2016, just before the
2224 presidential primaries began, several people familiar with the proposal
2225 said."996 Cohen recalled that in speaking to the Post, he held to the false
2226 story that negotiations for the deal ceased in January 2016.997 seconds; 6
2227 minutes 16 seconds; I minutes 10 seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55
2228 seconds; 4 minutes 56 seconds; 11 minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2
2229 seconds; 2 seconds). 989 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5; Call Records of Michael
2230 Cohen. (Reflecting 14 contacts on August 27, 2017 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37
2231 seconds; 1 minute 16 seconds; I minutes 35 seconds; 6 minutes 16 seconds; I
2232 minutes IO seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55 seconds; 4 minutes 56
2233 seconds; 11 minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2 seconds; 2 seconds)). 99?
2234 Cohen 1 l /20/ 1 8 302, at 5. 991 Cohen 1 I /20/18 302, at 5. Cohen also vaguely
2235 recalled telling the President's personal counsel that he spoke with a woman
2236 from the Kremlin and that the President's personal counsel responded to the
2237 effect of "so what?" because the deal never happened. ? Cohen 11 /20/18 302, at
2238 5. 992 Cohen 11 /20/18 302, at 5. 993 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 994 2/8/19
2239 email, Counsel for personal counsel to the President to Special Counsel's
2240 Office. 995 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump's business
2241 sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he ran/or president, Washington
2242 Post (Aug. 27, 2017). 996 Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump's business sought deal
2243 on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he ran/or president, Washington Post (Aug. 27,
2244 2017). 997 Cohen 9/18/ I 8 302, at 7. 143
2245
2246RESULT: 46
2247
2248PAGE: 355
2249
2250TEXT:
2251
2252 U.S. Department of Justice Attorttey Work Proettet // Ma)' CoHtaiH Material
2253 Proteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) On August 28, 2017, Cohen submitted his
2254 statement about the Trump Tower Moscow project to Congress.998 Cohen did not
2255 recall talking to the President about the specifics of what the statement said
2256 or what Cohen would later testify to about Trump Tower Moscow.999 He recalled
2257 speaking to the President more generally about how he planned to stay on message
2258 in his testimony.1000 On September 19, 2017, in anticipation of his impending
2259 testimony, Cohen orchestrated the public release of his opening remarks to
2260 Congress, which criticized the allegations in the Steele material and claimed
2261 that the Trump Tower Moscow project "was terminated in January of 2016; which
2262 occurred before the Iowa caucus and months before the very first primary."1001
2263 Cohen said the release of his opening remarks was intended to shape the
2264 narrative and let other people who might be witnesses know what Cohen was saying
2265 so they could follow the same message.1002 Cohen said his decision was meant to
2266 mirror Jared Kushner's decision to release a statement in advance of Kushner's
2267 congressional testimony, which the President's personal counsel had told Cohen
2268 the President liked.1003 Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, after
2269 Cohen's opening remarks had been printed by the media, the President's personal
2270 counsel told him that the President was pleased with the Trump Tower Moscow
2271 statement that had gone out.1004 On October 24 and 25, 2017, Cohen testified
2272 before Congress and repeated the false statements he had included in his written
2273 statement about Trump Tower Moscow.1005 Phone records show that Cohen spoke with
2274 the President's personal counsel immediately after his testimony on both
2275 days.1006 4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen In January 2018,
2276 the media reported that Cohen had arranged a $130,000 payment during the
2277 campaign to prevent a woman from publicly discussing an alleged sexual encounter
2278 she had 998 P-SCO-000009477 -9478 (8/28/17 Letter and Attachment, Cohen to
2279 SSCI). 999 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9. 100? Cohen 9/12/18
2280 302, at 9. 1001 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; see, e.g., READ: Michael Cohen's
2281 statement to the Senate intelligence committee, CNN (Sept. 19, 2017). 1002 Cohen
2282 9/18/18 302, at 7. 1003 Cohen 9/ 18/18 302, at 7; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 6. 1004
2283 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 6. Phone records show that the President's personal
2284 counsel called Cohen on the morning of September 20, 2017, and they spoke for
2285 approximately 11 minutes, and that they had two more contacts that day, one of
2286 which lasted approximately 18 minutes. Call Records of Michael Cohen.
2287 (Reflecting three contacts on September 20, 2017, with calls lasting for 11
2288 minutes 3 seconds; 2 seconds; and 18 minutes 38 seconds). 1005 Cohen
2289 Information, at 4; Executive Session, Permanent Select Committee on
2290 Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, Interview of Michael Cohen (Oct.
2291 24, 2017), at I 0-11, 117-119. 1006 Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting
2292 two contacts on October 24, 2017 (12 minutes 8 seconds and 8 minutes 27 seconds)
2293 and three contacts on October 25, 2017 (1 second; 4 minutes 6 seconds; and 6
2294 minutes 6 seconds)). 144
2295
2296RESULT: 47
2297
2298PAGE: 360
2299
2300TEXT:
2301
2302 U.S. Department of Justice ,r\M;e,rHe,? '.Ve,rk Pre,ettet // Ma,? Cm1:taiH
2303 Material Pre,teetea UHaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) stories in order to get
2304 himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?). He even retained Bill and
2305 Crooked Hillary's lawyer. Gee, I wonder if they helped him make the choice!"1043
2306 On August 21, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to
2307 eight felony charges, including two counts of campaign-finance violations based
2308 on the payments he had made during the final weeks of the campaign to women who
2309 said they had affairs with the President.1044 During the plea hearing, Cohen
2310 stated that he had worked "at the direction of' the candidate in making those
2311 payments.1045 The next day, the President contrasted Cohen's cooperation with
2312 Manafort's refusal to cooperate, tweeting, "I feel very badly for Paul Manafort
2313 and his wonderful family. 'Justice' took a 12 year old tax case, among other
2314 things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused
2315 to 'break'-make up stories in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for a brave
2316 man!"1046 On September 17, 2018, this Office submitted written questions to the
2317 President that included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow project and
2318 attached Cohen's written statement to Congress and the Letter of Intent signed
2319 by the President.1047 Among other issues, the questions asked the President to
2320 describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with Cohen about the
2321 project, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether the
2322 President "at any time direct[ ed] or suggest[ ed] that discussions about the
2323 Trump Moscow project should cease," or whether the President was "informed at
2324 any time that the project had been abandoned."1048 On November 20, 2018, the
2325 President submitted written responses that did not answer those questions about
2326 Trump Tower Moscow directly and did not provide any information about the timing
2327 of the candidate's discussions with Cohen about the project or whether he
2328 participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer
2329 pursued.1049 Instead, the President's answers stated in relevant part: I had few
2330 conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall; they were brief, and
2331 they were not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and I do not
2332 recall any discussion of travel to Russia in connection with it. I do not
2333 remember discussing it with 1043 @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:26 a.m. ET) Tweet;
2334 @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:38 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:56
2335 a.m. ET) Tweet. At the time of these tweets, the press had reported that Cohen's
2336 financial interests in taxi cab medallions were being scrutinized by
2337 investigators. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump
2338 Discussing Payment to Playboy Model, New York Times (July 20, 2018). 1044 Cohen
2339 Information. 1045 Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript, at 23. 1046 @realDonaldTrurnp
2340 8/22/18 (9:21 a.m. ET) Tweet. 1047 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to
2341 President's Personal Counsel (attaching written questions for the President,
2342 with attachments). 1048 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's
2343 Personal Counsel (attaching written questions for the President), Question III,
2344 Parts (a) through (g). 1049 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20,
2345 2018). 149
2346
2347RESULT: 48
2348
2349PAGE: 361
2350
2351TEXT:
2352
2353 U.S. Department of Justice AMeri,c:,? 'Nerk Preauct // Ma:,? CentaiH Material
2354 Pretcctca Uttacr Fca. R. Criffl. P. 6(c) anyone else at the Trump Organization,
2355 although it is possible. T do not recall being aware at the time of any
2356 communications between Mr. Cohen and Felix Sater and any Russian government
2357 official regarding the Letter oflntent.1050 On November 29, 2018, Cohen pleaded
2358 guilty to making false statements to Congress based on his statements about the
2359 Trump Tower Moscow project.1051 In a plea agreement with this Office, Cohen
2360 agreed to "provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to
2361 which this Office deems relevant."1052 Later on November 29, after Cohen's
2362 guilty plea had become public, the President spoke to reporters about the Trump
2363 Tower Moscow project, saying: I decided not to do the project. . . . I decided
2364 ultimately not to do it. There would have been nothing wrong ifI did do it. Ifl
2365 did do it, there would have been nothing wrong. That was my business .... It was
2366 an option that I decided not to do .... I decided not to do it. The primary
2367 reason . . . T was focused on running for President. . . . I was running my
2368 business while I was campaigning. There was a good chance that I wouldn't have
2369 won, in which case I would've gone back into the business. And why should I lose
2370 lots of opportunities? 1053 The President also said that Cohen was "a weak
2371 person. And by being weak, unlike other people that you watch-he is a weak
2372 person. And what he's trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So he's lying
2373 about a project that everybody knew about."1054 The President also brought up
2374 Cohen's written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project:
2375 "So here's the story: Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote
2376 before he testified in the House and/or Senate. It talked about his
2377 position."1055 The President added, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't
2378 matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign."1056
2379 In light of the President's public statements following Cohen's guilty plea that
2380 he "decided not to do the project," this Office again sought information from
2381 the President about whether he participated in any discussions about the project
2382 being abandoned or no longer pursued, including when he "decided not to do the
2383 project," who he spoke to about that decision, and what motivated 1050 Written
2384 Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question III,
2385 Parts (a) through (g)). 1051 Cohen Information; Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript. 1052
2386 Plea Agreement at 4, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1: l 8-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y.
2387 Nov. 29, 2018). 1053 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SP AN (Nov. 29, 2018).
2388 In contrast to the President's remarks following?cohen's guilty plea, Cohen's
2389 August 28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen, not the President,
2390 "decided to abandon the proposal" in late January 2016; that Cohen "did not ask
2391 or brief Mr. Trump ... before I made the decision to terminate further work on
2392 the proposal"; and that the decision ? to abandon the proposal was "unrelated"
2393 to the Campaign. P-SCO-000009477 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28,
2394 2017)). 1054 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). 1055
2395 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). 1056 President Trump
2396 Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). 150
2397
2398RESULT: 49
2399
2400PAGE: 362
2401
2402TEXT:
2403
2404 U.S. Department of Justice Attente)" Werk Preettet // May Centain Material
2405 Preteetee Under Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) the decision.1057 The Office also again
2406 asked for the timing of the President's discussions with Cohen about Trump Tower
2407 Moscow and asked him to specify "what period of the campaign" he was involved in
2408 discussions concerning the project.1058 In response, the President's personal
2409 counsel declined to provide additional information from the President and stated
2410 that "the President has fully answered the questions at issue."1059 In the weeks
2411 following Cohen's plea and agreement to provide assistance to this Office, the
2412 President repeatedly implied that Cohen's family members were guilty of crimes.
2413 On December 3, 2018, after Cohen had filed his sentencing memorandum, the
2414 President tweeted, '"Michael Cohen asks judge for no Prison Time.' You mean he
2415 can do all of the TERRIBLE, unrelated to Trump, things having to do with fraud,
2416 big loans, Taxis, etc., and not serve a long prison term? He makes up stories to
2417 get a GREAT & ALREADY reduced deal for himself, and get his wife and father-in-
2418 law (who has the money?) off Scott Free. He lied for this outcome and should, in
2419 m o inion serve a full and com lete sentence."1060 On Decem her 12, 2018, Cohen
2420 was sentenced to three years of imprisonment.1062 The next day, the President
2421 sent a series of tweets that said: I never directed Michael Cohen to break the
2422 law .... Those charges were just agreed to by him in order to embarrass the
2423 president and get a much reduced prison sentence, which he did-including the
2424 fact that his family was temporarily let off the hook. As a lawyer, Michael has
2425 great liability to me!1063 On December 16, 2018, the President tweeted,
2426 "Remember, Michael Cohen only became a 'Rat' after the FBI did something which
2427 was absolutely unthinkable & unheard of until the Witch Hunt was illegally
2428 started. They BROKE INTO AN ATTORNEY'S OFFICE! Why didn't they break into the
2429 DNC to get the Server, or Crooked's office?"1064 In January 2019, after the
2430 media reported that Cohen would provide public testimony in a congressional
2431 hearing, the President made additional public comments suggesting that Cohen's
2432 1057 1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel.
2433 1058 1/23/ 19 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel.
2434 1059 2/6/ l 9 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office.
2435 1060 @rea!DonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:24 a.m. ET and l 0:29 a.m. ET) Tweets
2436 (emphasis added). 1061 @realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 ( 10:48 a.m. ET) Tweet. 1062
2437 Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript. 1063 @realDonaldTrump 12/13/18 (8: 17 a.m. ET, 8:25
2438 a.m. ET, and 8:39 a.m. ET) Tweets (emphasis added). 1064@realDonaldTrump
2439 12/16/18 (9:39 a.m. ET) Tweet. 151
2440
2441RESULT: 50
2442
2443PAGE: 363
2444
2445TEXT:
2446
2447 U.S. Department of Justice AU6rtte)' W6rk Pr6ettet // Ma,? C6tttaitt Material
2448 Pwteetee UAeer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) family members had committed crimes. In
2449 an interview on Fox on January 12, 2019, the President was asked whether he was
2450 worried about Cohen's testimony and responded: [I]n order to get his sentence
2451 reduced, [Cohen] says "I have an idea, I'll ah, tell-I'll give you some
2452 information on the president." Well, there is no information. But he should give
2453 information maybe on his father-in-law because that's the one that people want
2454 to look at because where does that money-that's the money in the family. And I
2455 guess he didn't want to talk about his father-in-law, he's trying to get his
2456 sentence reduced. So it's ah, pretty sad. You know, it's weak and it's very sad
2457 to watch a thing like that. 1065 On January 18, 2019, the President tweeted,
2458 "Kevin Corke, @FoxNews 'Don't forget, Michael Cohen has already been convicted
2459 of perjury and fraud, and as recently as this week, the Wall Street Journal has
2460 suggested that he may have stolen tens of thousands of dollars .... ' Lying to
2461 reduce his jail time! Watchfather-in-law/"1066 On January 23, 2019, Cohen
2462 postponed his congressional testimony, citing threats against his family.1067
2463 The next day, the President tweeted, "So interesting that bad lawyer Michael
2464 Cohen, who sadly will not be testifying before Congress, is using the lawyer of
2465 Crooked Hillary Clinton to represent him-Gee, how did that happen?"1068 Also in
2466 January 2019, Giuliani gave press interviews that appeared to confirm Cohen's
2467 account that the Trump Organization pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project well
2468 past January 2016. Giuliani stated that "it's our understanding that
2469 [discussions about the Trump Moscow project] went on throughout 2016. Weren't a
2470 lot of them, but there were conversations. Can't be sure of the exact date. But
2471 the president can remember having conversations with him about it. The president
2472 also remembers-yeah, probably up-could be up to as far as October,
2473 November."1069 In an interview with the New York Times, Giuliani quoted the
2474 President as saying that the discussions regarding the Trump Moscow project were
2475 "going on from the day I announced to the day I won."1070 On January 21, 2019,
2476 Giuliani issued a statement that said: "My recent statements about discussions
2477 during the 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and candidate Donald Trump about
2478 a potential Trump Moscow 'project' were hypothetical and not based on
2479 conversations I had with the president."1071 1065 Jeanine Pirro Interview with
2480 President Trump, Fox News (Jan. 12, 2019) (emphasis added). 1066
2481 @rea!DonaldTrump 1/18/19 ( 10:02 a.m. ET) Tweet (emphasis added). 1067 Statement
2482 by Lanny Davis, Cohen's personal counsel (Jan. 23, 2019). 1068 @realDonaldTrump
2483 1/24/19 (7:48 a.m. ET) Tweet. 1069 Meet the Press Interview with Rudy Giuliani,
2484 NBC (Jan. 20, 2019). 1070 Mark Mazzetti et al., Moscow Skyscraper Talks
2485 Continued Through "the Day I Won, " Trump Is Said to Acknowledge, New York Times
2486 (Jan. 20, 2019). 1071 Maggie Haberman, Giuliani Says His Moscow Trump Tower
2487 Comments Were "Hypothetical", New York Times (Jan. 21, 2019). In a letter to
2488 this Office, the President's counsel stated that Giuliani's pub! ic comments
2489 "were not intended to suggest nor did they reflect knowledge of the existence or
2490 timing 152
2491
2492RESULT: 51
2493
2494PAGE: 364
2495
2496TEXT:
2497
2498 U.S. Department of Justice AMeirflC)' Werk Preiattet // May Cemtaifl Material
2499 Preitectea Uf!aer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(c) Analysis In analyzing the President's
2500 conduct related to Cohen, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of
2501 obstruction of justice. a. Obstructive act. We gathered evidence of the
2502 President's conduct related to Cohen on two issues: (i) whether the President or
2503 others aided or participated in Cohen's false statements to Congress, and (ii)
2504 whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to
2505 prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to the government. i. First,
2506 with regard to Cohen's false statements to Congress, while there is evidence,
2507 described below, that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to
2508 Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, the evidence available to us does
2509 not establish that the President directed or aided Cohen's false testimony.
2510 Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a "party line" that
2511 developed within the campaign to align with the President's public statements
2512 distancing the President from Russia. Cohen also recalled that, in speaking with
2513 the President in advance of testifying, he made it clear that he would stay on
2514 message-which Cohen believed they both understood would require false testimony.
2515 But Cohen said that he and the President did not explicitly discuss whether
2516 Cohen's testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project would be or was false,
2517 and the President did not direct him to provide false testimony. Cohen also said
2518 he did not tell the President about the specifics of his planned testimony.
2519 During the time when his statement to Congress was being drafted and circulated
2520 to members of the JOA, Cohen did not speak directly to the President about the
2521 statement, but rather communicated with the President's personal counsel-as
2522 corroborated by phone records showing extensive communications between Cohen and
2523 the President's personal counsel before Cohen submitted his statement and when
2524 he testified before Congress. Cohen recalled that in his discussions with the
2525 President's personal counsel on August 27, 2017-the day before Cohen's statement
2526 was submitted to Congress-Cohen said that there were more communications with
2527 Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the statement
2528 reflected. Cohen recalled expressing some concern at that time. According to
2529 Cohen, the President's personal counsel-who did not have first-hand knowledge of
2530 the projectresponded by saying that there was no need to muddy the water, that
2531 it was unnecessary to include those details because the project did not take
2532 place, and that Cohen should keep his statement short and tight, not elaborate,
2533 stay on message, and not contradict the President. Cohen's recollection of the
2534 content of those conversations is consistent with direction about the substance
2535 of Cohen's draft statement that appeared to come from members of the JOA. For
2536 example, Cohen omitted any reference to his outreach to Russian government
2537 officials to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin during the United Nations
2538 General Assembly, and Cohen believed it was a decision of of conversations
2539 beyond that contained in the President's [ written responses to the Special
2540 Counsel's Office]." 2/6/19 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special
2541 Counsel's Office. 153
2542
2543RESULT: 52
2544
2545PAGE: 366
2546
2547TEXT:
2548
2549 U.S. Department of Justice AH8f'fl:e~ '.V8rk Pr8E:ittet // May Cm~taifl Material
2550 Pr8teeteE:i UHE:ier Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) c. Intent. In analyzing the
2551 President's intent in his actions towards Cohen as a potential witness, there is
2552 evidence that could support the inference that the President intended to
2553 discourage Cohen from cooperating with the government because Cohen's
2554 information would shed adverse light on the President's campaign-period conduct
2555 and statements. i. Cohen's false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower
2556 Moscow project was designed to minimize connections between the President and
2557 Russia and to help limit the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations-a goal
2558 that was in the President's interest, as reflected by the President's own
2559 statements. During and after the campaign, the President made repeated
2560 statements that he had "no business" in Russia and said that there were "no
2561 deals that could happen in Russia, because we've stayed away." As Cohen knew,
2562 and as he recalled communicating to the President during the campaign, Cohen's
2563 pursuit of the Trump Tower Moscow project cast doubt on the accuracy or
2564 completeness of these statements. In connection with his guilty plea, Cohen
2565 admitted that he had multiple conversations with candidate Trump to give him
2566 status updates about the Trump Tower Moscow project, that the conversations
2567 continued through at least June 2016, and that he discussed with Trump possible
2568 travel to Russia to pursue the project. The conversations were not off-hand,
2569 according to Cohen, because the project had the potential to be so lucrative. In
2570 addition, text messages to and from Cohen and other records further establish
2571 that Cohen's efforts to advance the project did not end in January 2016 and that
2572 in May and June 2016, Cohen was considering the timing for possible trips to
2573 Russia by him and Trump in connection with the project. The evidence could
2574 support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the time of
2575 Cohen's false statements to Congress. Cohen discussed the project with the
2576 President in early 2017 following media inquiries. Cohen recalled that on
2577 September 20, 2017, the day after he released to the public his opening remarks
2578 to Congress-which said the project "was terminated in January of 2016"-the
2579 President's personal counsel told him the President was pleased with what Cohen
2580 had said about Trump Tower Moscow. And after Cohen's guilty plea, the President
2581 told reporters tha.t he had ultimately decided not to do the project, which
2582 supports the inference that he remained aware of his own involvement in the
2583 project and the period during the Campaign in which the project was being
2584 pursued. ii. The President's public remarks following Cohen's guilty plea also
2585 suggest that the President may have been concerned about what Cohen told
2586 investigators about the Trump Tower Moscow project. At the time the President
2587 submitted written answers to questions from this Office about the project and
2588 other subjects, the media had reported that Cohen was cooperating with the
2589 government but Cohen had not yet pleaded guilty to making false statements to
2590 Congress. Accordingly, it was not publicly known what information about the
2591 project Cohen had provided to the government. In his written answers, the
2592 President did not provide details about the timing and substance of his
2593 discussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he had
2594 decided to no longer pursue the project. Yet after Cohen pleaded guilty, the
2595 President publicly stated that he had personally made the decision to abandon
2596 the project. The President then declined to clarify the seeming discrepancy to
2597 our Office or answer additional questions. The content and timing of the
2598 President's provision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding
2599 the Trump Tower Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been
2600 concerned about the information that Cohen could provide as a witness. 155
2601
2602RESULT: 53
2603
2604PAGE: 367
2605
2606TEXT:
2607
2608 U.S. Department of Justice Attoff\e)" Wodc Pfoelttet // Mtt)" CoHtttiA Materittl
2609 Proteeteel UHeer Feel. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 111. The President's concern about
2610 Cohen cooperating may have been directed at the Southern District of New York
2611 investigation into other aspects of the President's dealings with Cohen rather
2612 than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow. There also is some evidence that
2613 the President's concern about Cohen cooperating was based on the President's
2614 stated belief that Cohen would provide false testimony against the President in
2615 an attempt to obtain a lesser sentence for his unrelated criminal conduct. The
2616 President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen, refused to "break" and "make up
2617 stories in order to get a 'deal."' And after Cohen pleaded guilty to making
2618 false statements to Congress, the President said, "what [Cohen]'s trying to do
2619 is get a reduced sentence. So he's lying about a project that everybody knew
2620 about." But the President also appeared to defend the underlying conduct,
2621 saying, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't matter because I was allowed to
2622 do whatever I wanted during the campaign." As described above, there is evidence
2623 that the President knew that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump
2624 Tower Moscow project and that Cohen did so to protect the President and minimize
2625 the President's connections to Russia during the campaign. iv. Finally, the
2626 President's statements insinuating that members of Cohen's family committed
2627 crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as an
2628 effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the
2629 President by Cohen or others. It is possible that the President believes, as
2630 reflected in his tweets, that Cohen "ma[d]e[] up stories" in order to get a deal
2631 for himself and "get his wife and father-in-law ... off Scott Free." It also is
2632 possible that the President's mention of Cohen's wife and father-in-law were not
2633 intended to affect Cohen as a witness but rather were part of a public-relations
2634 strategy aimed at discrediting Cohen and deflecting attention away from the
2635 President on Cohen-related matters. But the President's suggestion that Cohen's
2636 family members committed crimes happened more than once, including just before
2637 Cohen was sentenced (at the same time as the President stated that Cohen
2638 "should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence") and again just
2639 before Cohen was scheduled to testify before Congress. The timing of the
2640 statements supports an inference that they were intended at least in part to
2641 discourage Cohen from further cooperation. L. Overarching Factual Issues
2642 Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or
2643 declination decision, the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant
2644 to analysis of the facts concerning the President's course of conduct. 1. Three
2645 features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland
2646 obstructionjustice prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice. First, the
2647 conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate
2648 the President's constitutional authority and raises garden-variety obstruction-
2649 of-justice issues. Other events we investigated, however, drew upon the
2650 President's Article II authority, which raised constitutional issues that we
2651 address in Volume II, Section III.B, infra. A factual analysis of that conduct
2652 would have to take into account both that the President's acts were facially
2653 lawful and that his position as head of the Executive Branch provides him with
2654 unique and powerful means of influencing official proceedings, subordinate
2655 officers, and potential witnesses. 156
2656
2657RESULT: 54
2658
2659PAGE: 400
2660
2661TEXT:
2662
2663 U.S. Department of Justice At:t:orflc)' Work Proauet II Ma)' CoHtaifl Material
2664 Protcetca UHElcr Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(c) APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY The following
2665 glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities
2666 referenced in the two volumes of this report. It is not intended to be
2667 comprehensive and is intended only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of
2668 the report. Agalarov, Aras Agalarov, Emin Akhmetov, Rinat Akhmetshin, Rinat
2669 Aslanov, Dzheykhun (Jay) Assange, Julian Aven, Petr Bannon, Stephen (Steve)
2670 Baranov, Andrey Berkowitz, A vi Boente, Dana Bogacheva, Anna Bossert, Thomas
2671 (Tom) Referenced Persons Russian real-estate developer ( owner of the Crocus
2672 Group); met Donald Trump in connection with the Miss Universe pageant and helped
2673 arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya
2674 and Trump Campaign officials. Performer, executive vice president of Crocus
2675 Group, and son of Aras Agalarov; helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at
2676 Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. Former
2677 member in the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to conduct work for
2678 Ukrainian political pai1y, the Party of Regions. U.S. lobbyist and associate of
2679 Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
2680 between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. Head of U.S. department of
2681 the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an "active measures" social media
2682 campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Founder of
2683 WikiLeaks, which in 2016 posted on the internet documents stolen from entities
2684 and individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party. Chairman of the board of
2685 Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the Presidential Transition Team in
2686 connection with anticipated post-election sanctions. White House chief
2687 strategist and senior counselor to President Trump (Jan. 2017-Aug.2017); chief
2688 executive of the Trump Campaign. Director of investor relations at Russian
2689 state-owned oil company, Rosneft, and associate of Carter Page. Assistant to
2690 Jared Kushner. Acting Attorney General (Jan. 2017 -Feb. 2017); Acting Deputy
2691 Attorney General (Feb. 2017 -Apr. 2017). Internet Research Agency employee who
2692 worked on "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016
2693 U.S. presidential election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses
2694 in 2014. Former homeland security advisor to the President who also served as a
2695 senior official on the Presidential Transition Team. B-1
2696
2697RESULT: 55
2698
2699PAGE: 403
2700
2701TEXT:
2702
2703 U.S. Department of Justice Attort1e:,? Work Pl'oEluet // Ma:,? Cot1tain Material
2704 ProteeteEI Ut1tler Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Fabrizio, Anthony (Tony) Fishbein,
2705 Jason Flynn, Michael G. (a/k/a Michael Flynn Jr.) Flynn, Michael T. Foresman,
2706 Robert (Bob) Futerfas, Alan Garten, Alan Gates, Richard (Rick) III Gerson,
2707 Richard (Rick) Gistaro, Edward Glassner, Michael Goldstone, Robert Gordon,
2708 Jeffrey (J.D.) Gorkov, Sergey Graff, Rhona Partner at the research and
2709 consulting firm Fabrizio, Lee & Associates. He was a pollster for the Trump
2710 Campaign and worked with Paul Manafort on Ukraine-related polling after the
2711 election. Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent
2712 WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump.org on September 20,
2713 2016. Son of Michael T. Flynn, National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017-Feb. 13,
2714 2017). National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 -Feb. 13, 2017), Director of the
2715 Defense Intelligence Agency (July 2012-Aug.7, 2014), and Trump Campaign advisor.
2716 He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about communications with Ambassador
2717 Sergey Kislyak in December 2016. Investment banker who sought meetings with the
2718 Trump Campaign in spring 2016 to discuss Russian foreign policy, and after the
2719 election met with Michael Flynn. Outside counsel for the Trump Organization and
2720 subsequently personal counsel for Donald Trump Jr. General counsel of the Trump
2721 Organization. Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural
2722 Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort. He pleaded
2723 guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate U.S. laws, as well
2724 as making false statements to the FBI. New York hedge fund manager and associate
2725 of Jared Kushner. During the transition period, he worked with Kirill Dmitriev
2726 on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia. Deputy
2727 Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration. Political
2728 director of the Trump Campaign who helped introduce George Papadopoulos to
2729 others in the Trump Campaign. Publicist for Emin Agalarov who contacted Donald
2730 Trump Jr. to arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia
2731 Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. National security advisor to the
2732 Trump Campaign involved in changes to the Republican party platform and who
2733 communicated with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at the Republican National
2734 Convention. Chairman of Vnesheconombank (VEB), a Russian state-owned bank, who
2735 met with Jared Kushner during the transition period. Senior vice-president and
2736 executive assistant to Donald J. Trump at the Trump Organization. B-4
2737
2738RESULT: 56
2739
2740PAGE: 404
2741
2742TEXT:
2743
2744 U.S. Department of Justice /\Horney \l/01?k Prodttet // May Cot?taitt Material
2745 Prntectcd Uttdcr Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c) Hawker, Jonathan Heilbrunn, Jacob Hicks,
2746 Hope Holt, Lester Hunt, Jody Ivanov, Igor Ivanov, Sergei Kasowitz, Marc Katsyv,
2747 Denis Katsyv, Peter Kaveladze, IrakJi (Ike) Kaverzina, Irina Kelly, John
2748 Khalilzad, Zalmay Kilimnik, Konstantin Kislyak, Sergey Klimentov, Denis Harm to
2749 Ongoing Matter Public relations consultant at FTI Consulting; worked with Davis
2750 Manafort International LLC on public relations campaign in Ukraine. Editor of
2751 the National Interest, the periodical that officially hosted candidate Trump's
2752 April 2016 foreign policy speech. White House communications director (Aug. 2017
2753 -Mar. 2018) and press secretary for the Trump Campaign. NBC News anchor who
2754 interviewed President Trump on May 11, 2017. Chief of staff to Attorney General
2755 Jeff Sessions (Feb. 2017 -Oct. 2017). President of the Russian International
2756 Affairs Council and former Russian foreign minister. Ivan Timofeev told George
2757 Papadopoulos that Ivanov advised on arranging a "Moscow visit" for the Trump
2758 Campaign. Special representative of Vladimir Putin, former Russian deputy prime
2759 minister, and former FSB deputy director. In January 2016, Michael Cohen emailed
2760 the Kremlin requesting to speak to Ivanov. President Trump's personal counsel
2761 (May 2017 -July 2017). Son of Peter Katsyv; owner of Russian company Prevezon
2762 Holdings Ltd. and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya. Russian businessman and
2763 father of Denis Katsyv. Harm to Ongoing Matter Vice president at Crocus Group
2764 and Aras Agalarov's deputy in the United States. He participated in the June 9,
2765 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign
2766 officials. Employee of the internet Research Agency, which engaged in an "active
2767 measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential
2768 election. White House chief of staff (July 2017 -Jan.2019). U.S. special
2769 representative to Afghanistan and former U.S. ambassador. He met with Senator
2770 Jeff Sessions during foreign policy dinners put together through the Center for
2771 the National Interest. Russian-Ukrainian political consultant and long-time
2772 employee of Paul Manafort assessed by the FBI to have ties to Russian
2773 intelligence. Former Russian ambassador to the United States and current Russian
2774 senator from Mordovia. Employee of the New Economic School who informed high-
2775 ranking Russian government officials of Carter Page's July 2016 visit to Moscow.
2776 B-5
2777
2778RESULT: 57
2779
2780PAGE: 407
2781
2782TEXT:
2783
2784 U.S. Department of Justice Att:erne)" Werle Prnelttet // Ma)' CeRtaiR Material
2785 Prnteeteel UReief Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Oganov, Georgiy Oknyansky, Henry (a/k/a
2786 Henry Greenberg) Page, Carter Papadopoulos, George Parscale, Bradley Patten,
2787 William (Sam) Jr. Peskov, Dmitry Phares, Walid Pinedo, Richard Podesta, John Jr.
2788 Podobnyy, Victor Poliakova, Elena Polonskaya, Olga Pompeo, Michael Porter,
2789 Robert Priebus, Reince Advisor to Oleg Deripaska and a board member of
2790 investment company Basic Element. He met with Paul Manafort in Spain in early
2791 2017. Florida-based Russian individual who claimed to have derogatory
2792 information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. He met with Roger Stone in May 2016.
2793 Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who advocated Russian views and
2794 made July 2016 and December 2016 visits to Moscow. Foreign policy advisor to the
2795 Trump Campaign who received information from Joseph Mifsud that Russians had
2796 "dirt" in the form of thousands of Clinton emails. He pleaded guilty to lying to
2797 the FBI about his contact with Mifsud. Digital media director for the 2016 Trump
2798 Campaign. Lobbyist and business partner of Konstantin Kilimnik. Deputy chief of
2799 staff of and press secretary for the Russian presidential administration.
2800 Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and co-secretary general of the
2801 Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism (TAG). U.S. person who
2802 pleaded guilty to a single-count information of identity fraud. Clinton campaign
2803 chairman whose email account was hacked by the GRU. WikiLeaks released his
2804 stolen emails during the 2016 campaign. Russian intelligence officer who
2805 interacted with Carter Page while operating inside the United States; later
2806 charged in 2015 with conspiring to act as an unregistered agent of Russia.
2807 Personal assistant to Dmitry Peskov who responded to Michael Cohen's outreach
2808 about the Trump Tower Moscow project in January 2016. Russian national
2809 introduced to George Papadopoulos by Joseph Mifsud as an individual with
2810 connections to Vladimir Putin. U.S. Secretary of State; director of the Central
2811 Intelligence Agency (Jan. 2017-Apr. 2018). White House staff secretary (Jan.
2812 2017 -Feb. 2018). White House chief of staff (Jan. 2017 -July 2017); chair of
2813 the Republican National Committee (Jan. 2011-Jan. 2017). Prigozhin, Yevgeniy
2814 Head of Russian companies Concord-Catering and Concord Management and
2815 Consulting; supported and financed the Internet Research Agency, which engaged
2816 in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
2817 presidential election. B-8
2818
2819RESULT: 58
2820
2821PAGE: 408
2822
2823TEXT:
2824
2825 U.S. Department of Justice Attorne)' Work Produet // May CoHtaifl Material
2826 Proteeted URder Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Prikhodko, Sergei Prince, Erik Raffel,
2827 Josh Rasin, Alexei Rogers, Michael Rosenstein, Rod Rozov, Andrei Rtskhiladze,
2828 Giorgi Ruddy, Christopher Rybicki, James Samochornov, Anatoli Sanders, Sarah
2829 Huckabee Sater, Felix Saunders, Paul J. Sechin, Igor Sessions, Jefferson III
2830 (Jeff) Shoygu, Sergey Simes, Dimitri First deputy head of the Russian Government
2831 Office and former Russian deputy prime minister. In January 2016, he invited
2832 candidate Trump to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Businessman
2833 and Trump Campaign supporter who met with Presidential Transition Team officials
2834 after the election and traveled to the Seychelles to meet with Kirill Dmitriev
2835 in January 2017. White House communications advisor (Apr. 2017 -Feb. 2018).
2836 Ukrainian associate of Henry Oknyansky who claimed to possess derogatory
2837 information regarding Hillary Clinton. Director of the National Security Agency
2838 (Apr. 2014 -May 2018). Deputy Attorney General (Apr. 2017 -present); Acting
2839 Attorney General for the Russian election interference investigation (May 2017
2840 -Nov. 2018). Chairman of LC. Expert Investment Company, a Russian real-estate
2841 development corporation that signed a letter of intent for the Trump Tower
2842 Moscow project in 2015. Executive of the Silk Road Transatlantic Alliance, LLC
2843 who communicated with Cohen about a Trump Tower Moscow proposal. Chief executive
2844 of Newsmax Media and associate of President Trump. FBI chiefofstaff(May
2845 2015-Feb. 2018). Translator who worked with Natalia Veselnitskaya and attended a
2846 June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign
2847 officials. White House press secretary (July 2017 -present). Real-estate advisor
2848 who worked with Michael Cohen to pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project. Executive
2849 with the Center for the National Interest who worked on outlines and logistics
2850 of candidate Trump's April 2016 foreign policy speech. Executive chairman of
2851 Rosneft, a Russian-stated owned oil company. Attorney General (Feb. 2017 -Nov.
2852 2018); U.S. Senator (Jan. 1997 -Feb. 2017); head of the Trump Campaign's foreign
2853 policy advisory team. Russian Minister of Defense. President and chief executive
2854 officer of the Center for the National Interest. B-9
2855
2856RESULT: 59
2857
2858PAGE: 409
2859
2860TEXT:
2861
2862 U.S. Depa11ment of Justice Atterne)1 Werlt Predttet // May Ce11tB:i11 Material
2863 Preteeted U11der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Smith, Peter Spicer, Sean Stone, Roger
2864 Tillerson, Rex Timofeev, Ivan Trump, Donald Jr. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka
2865 Ushakov, Yuri Viktorovich Vaino, Anton Van der Zwaan, Alexander Vargas,
2866 Catherine Vasilchenko, Gleb Veselnitskaya, Natalia Weber, Shlomo Investment
2867 banker active in Republican politics who sought to obtain Hillary Clinton emails
2868 during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period. White House press secretary
2869 and communications director (Jan. 2017 -July 2017). U.S. Secretary of State
2870 (Feb. 2017-Mar. 2018). Director of programs at the Russian International Affairs
2871 Council and program director of the Valdai Discussion Club who communicated in
2872 2016 with George Papadopoulos, attempting to arrange a meeting between the
2873 Russian government and the Trump Campaign. President Trump's son; trustee and
2874 executive vice president of the Trump Organization; helped arrange and attended
2875 the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump
2876 Campaign officials. President Trump's son; trustee and executive vice president
2877 of the Trump Organization. President Trump's daughter; advisor to the President
2878 and former executive vice president of the Trump Organization. Aide to Vladimir
2879 Putin and former Russian ambassador to the United States; identified to the
2880 Presidential Transition Team as the proposed channel to the Russian government.
2881 Chief of staff to Russian president Vladimir Putin. Former attorney at Skadden,
2882 Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP; worked with Paul Manafort and Rick Gates.
2883 Executive assistant to Jared Kushner. Internet Research Agency employee who
2884 engaged in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016
2885 U.S. presidential election. Russian attorney who advocated for the repeal of the
2886 Magnitsky Act and was the principal speaker at the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump
2887 Tower with Trump Campaign officials. Rector of the New Economic School (NES) in
2888 Moscow who invited Carter Page to speak at NES commencement in July 2016.
2889 Yanukovych, Viktor Former president of Ukraine who had worked with Paul
2890 Manafort. B-10
2891
2892RESULT: 60
2893
2894PAGE: 418
2895
2896TEXT:
2897
2898 U.S. Department of Justice AttorHey Work Proettet // May CeHtaiH Mat:erial
2899 Proteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) WRITTEN QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED UNDER
2900 OATH BY PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP I. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower a. When
2901 did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was
2902 considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially
2903 negative information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the
2904 information from and the substance of the discussion. b. Attached to this
2905 document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between, among
2906 others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the emails reflected
2907 in Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other communications with Rob Goldstone and
2908 Emin Agalarov between June 3, 2016, and June 9, 2016. i. Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or
2909 anyone else tell you about or show you any of these communications? If yes,
2910 describe who discussed the communications with you, when, and the substance of
2911 the discussion(s). ii. When did you first see or learn about all or any part of
2912 the emails reflected in Exhibit A? iii. When did you first learn that the
2913 proposed meeting involved or was described as being part of Russia and its
2914 government's support for your candidacy? iv. Did you suggest to or direct anyone
2915 not to discuss or release publicly all or any portion of the emails reflected in
2916 Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you communicated with, when, the substance of
2917 the communication(s), and why you took that action. c. On June 9, 2016, Donald
2918 Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a meeting at Trump Tower
2919 with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer, Natalia Veselnitskaya (the
2920 11June 9 meeting"). i. Other than as set forth in your answers to I.a and l.b,
2921 what, if anything, were you told about the possibility of this meeting taking
2922 place, or the scheduling of such a meeting? Describe who you discussed this
2923 with, when, and what you were informed about the meeting. ii. When did you learn
2924 that some of the individuals attending the June 9 meeting were Russian or had
2925 any affiliation with any part of the Russian government? Describe who you
2926 learned this information from and the substance of the discussion(s). iii. What
2927 were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting? Describe each
2928 conversation in which you were told about what was discussed at the meeting, who
2929 the conversation was with, when it occurred, and the substance of the statements
2930 they made about the meeting. C-3
2931
2932RESULT: 61
2933
2934PAGE: 419
2935
2936TEXT:
2937
2938 U.S. Department of Justice Attort'iey Work Proattet // Ma)'' Cotttaitt Material
2939 Proteetea Uttaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting
2940 was about, in whole or in part, adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes,
2941 describe who you had that discussion with, when, and the substance of the
2942 discussion. d. For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what
2943 portion of each day were you in Trump Tower? i. Did you speak or meet with
2944 Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016? If yes, did
2945 any portion of any of those conversations or meetings include any reference to
2946 any aspect of the June 9 meeting? If yes, describe who you spoke with and the
2947 substance of the conversation. e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly
2948 with any member or representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If
2949 yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the communication.
2950 f. Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort,
2951 or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family,
2952 Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that
2953 took place after June 9, 2016 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by
2954 Russia to assist the campaign? If yes, describe who you learned this information
2955 from, when, and the substance of what you learned. g. On June 7, 2016, you gave
2956 a speech in which you said, in part, "I am going to give a major speech on
2957 probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things
2958 that have taken place with the Clintons." i. Why did you make that statement?
2959 ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons? iii.
2960 What did you believe the source(s) of that information would be? iv. Did you
2961 expect any of the information to have come from the June 9 meeting? v. Did
2962 anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to? If so, who? vi. Why did
2963 you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7, 2016? h. Did any
2964 person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the
2965 Russian government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary
2966 Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you were
2967 informed, and the content of such discussion(s). i. Did any person or entity
2968 inform you during the campaign that any foreign government or foreign leader,
2969 other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided, wished to provide, or offered
2970 to provide tangible support to your campaign, including by way of offering to
2971 provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If C-4
2972
2973RESULT: 62
2974
2975PAGE: 426
2976
2977TEXT:
2978
2979 U.S. Department of Justice AMenwy Werk Preattet // Ma:,? Contain Mate1?ial
2980 Preteetea Unaer Feel. R. Ct1ittt. P. 6(e) I. a. b. RESPONSES OF PRESIDENT DONALD
2981 J. TRUMP June 9. 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower When did you first learn that
2982 Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was considering participating
2983 in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about
2984 Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the information from and the substance
2985 of the discussion. Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails
2986 from June 2016 between, among others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In
2987 addition to the emails reflected in. Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other
2988 communications with Rob Goldstone and ?min Agalarov between )une 3, 2016, and
2989 June 9, 2016. i. Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you
2990 any of these communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications
2991 with you, when, and the substance of the discussion(s), 11. When did you first
2992 see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? iii.
2993 When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved cir was described as
2994 being part of Russia and its government's support for your candidacy? 1v. Did
2995 you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any
2996 portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you
2997 communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and why you took
2998 that action. c. On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared
2999 Kushner attended a meeting at Trump Tower with several individuals, including a
3000 Russian lawyer, Natalia Yeselnitskaya (the "June 9 meeting"). i. Other than as
3001 set fotth in your answers to I.a and l.b, what, if anything, were you told about
3002 the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the scheduling of such a
3003 meeting? Describe who you discussed this with, when, and what you were informed
3004 about the meeting. ii. When did you learn that some of the individuals attending
3005 the June 9 meeting were Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the
3006 Russian government? Describe who you learned this information from and the
3007 substance of the discussion(s). 6 C-11
3008
3009RESULT: 63
3010
3011PAGE: 427
3012
3013TEXT:
3014
3015 U.S. Department of Justice Atte,n1ey 'Nork Prne1:1et // M1t:,? Ce,Ht1tiH
3016 M1tteri1tl Pre,teetee UHeer Fee. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) iii. What were you told
3017 about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting? Describe each conversation in
3018 which you were told about whal was discussed at lhe meeting, who the
3019 conversation was with, when it occurred, and the substance of the statements
3020 lhey made about the meeting. iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was
3021 about, in whole or in part, adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe
3022 who you had that discussion with, when, and the substance of the discussion. d.
3023 For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion of each day
3024 were you in Trump Tower? 1. Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul
3025 Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016? If yes, did any portion of any of
3026 those conversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect of the June
3027 9 meeting? If yes, describe who you spoke with and the substance of the
3028 conversation. e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or
3029 representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who
3030 you spoke with, when, and the substance of the communication. f. Did you learn
3031 of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manaforl, or Jared Kushner
3032 and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Natalia Veselnitskaya,
3033 Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took place after June 9,
3034 20 l 6 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist the
3035 campaign? If yes. describe who you learned this information from, when, and the
3036 substance of what you learned. g. On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which
3037 you said, in part,'?[ am going to give a major speech on probably Monday of next
3038 week and we're going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place
3039 with the Clintons.'' 1. Why did you make that statement? ii. What information
3040 did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons? 111. What did you believe
3041 the source(s) of that information would be? iv. Did you expect any of the
3042 information to have come from the June 9 meeting? v. Did anyone help draft the
3043 speech that you were referring to? If so, who? vt. Why did you ultimately not
3044 give the speech you referenced on June 7, 2016? h. Did any person or entity
3045 inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian 7 C-12
3046
3047RESULT: 64
3048
3049PAGE: 428
3050
3051TEXT:
3052
3053 U.S. Department of Justice AtteirRey \Ve,rk Preifittet // MB:)' CeiRtB:iR
3054 MateriB:I Pre,teetefi Uttfier Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) government supported your
3055 candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the
3056 source(s) of the information. when you were informed, and the content of such
3057 discussion(s). 1. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that
3058 any foreign government or foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin,
3059 had provided, wished to provide, or offered to provide tangible support to your
3060 campaign, including by way of offering to provide negative information on
3061 Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you
3062 were informed, and the content of such discussion(s). Response to Question l,
3063 Parts (a) through (c) I have no recollection of learning at the time that Donald
3064 Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was considering participating in a
3065 meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary
3066 Clinton. Nor do I recall learning during the campaign that the June 9, 2016
3067 meeting had taken place, that the referenced emails existed. or that Donald J.
3068 Trump, Jr., had other communications with Emin Agalarov or Robert Goldstone
3069 between June 3, 2016 and June 9, 2016. Response to Question I, Part {d) I have
3070 no independent recollection of what portion of these four days in June of2016 I
3071 spent in Trump Tower. This was one of many busy months during a fast-paced
3072 campaign, as the primary season was ending and we were preparing for the general
3073 election campaign. I am now aware that my Campaign's calendar indicates that I
3074 was in New York City from June 6 -9, 2016. Calendars kept in my Trump Tower
3075 office reflect that I had various calls and meetings scheduled for each of these
3076 days. While those calls and meetings may or may not actually have taken place,
3077 they do indicate that I was in Trump Tower during a portion of each of these
3078 working days, and I have no reason to doubt that I was. When I was in New York
3079 City, I stayed at my Trump Tower apartment. My Trump Organization desk calendar
3080 also reflects that I was outside Trump Tower during portions of these days. The
3081 June 7, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to leave Trump Tower in the
3082 early evening for Westchester where I gave remarks after winning the California,
3083 New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota Republican primaries held that
3084 day. The June 8, 2016 calendar indicates a scheduled departure in late afternoon
3085 to attend a ceremony at my son's school. The June 9, 2016 calendar indicates I
3086 was scheduled to attend midday meetings and a fundraising luncheon at the Four
3087 Seasons Hotel. At this point, I do not remember on what dales these events
3088 occurred, but I do not currently have a reason to doubt that they took place as
3089 scheduled on my calendar. Widely available media reports, including television
3090 footage, also shed light on my activities during these days. For example, I am
3091 aware that my June 7, 2016 victory remarks at the Trump 8 C-13
3092
3093RESULT: 65
3094
3095PAGE: 429
3096
3097TEXT:
3098
3099 U.S. Department ofJustice AMerRe)? '.\'erk Preclttet // Ma)' Cm~tttil'l
3100 Mtttel'ittl Preteetecl Uftcler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) National Golf Club in
3101 Briarcliff Manor, New York, were recorded and published by the media. 1 remember
3102 winning those primaries and generally recall delivering remarks that evening. At
3103 this point in time, I do not remember whether I spoke or met with Donald Trump,
3104 Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016. My desk calendar indicates
3105 I was scheduled to meet with Paul Manafort on the morning of June 9, but I do
3106 not recall if that meeting took place. It was more than two years ago, at a time
3107 when I had many calls and interactions daily. ? Response to Question I, Part (e)
3108 I have no independent recollection of any communications I had with the Agalarov
3109 family or anyone r understood to be a representative of the Agalarov family
3110 after June 3, 2016 and before the end of the campaign. While preparing to
3111 respond to these questions, I have become aware of written communications with
3112 the Agalarovs during the campaign that were sent, received, and largely authored
3113 by my staff and which I understand have already been produced to you. In
3114 general, the documents include congratulatory letters on my campaign victories,
3115 emails about a painting Emin and Aras Agalarov arranged to have delivered to
3116 Trump Tower as a birthday present, and emails regarding delivery of a book
3117 written by Aras Agalarov. The documents reflect that the deliveries were
3118 screened by the Secret Service. Response to Question I, Part (t) I do not recall
3119 being aware during the campaign of communications between Donald Trump, Jr.,
3120 Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov
3121 family, Robert Goldstone, Natalia Yeselnitskaya (whose name I was not familiar
3122 with), or anyone I understood to be a Russian official. Response to Question I,
3123 Part (g) In remarks I delivered the night I won the California, New Jersey, New
3124 Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota Republican primaries, I said, "I am going to
3125 give a major speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be
3126 discussing all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons." In
3127 general, l expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available,
3128 negative information about the Clintons, including, for example, Mrs. Clinton's
3129 failed policies, the Clintons' use of the State Department to further their
3130 interests and the interests of the Clinton Foundation, Mrs. Clinton's improper
3131 use of a private server for State Department business, the destruction of 33,000
3132 emails on that server, and Mrs. Clinton's temperamental unsuitability for the
3133 office of President. In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I
3134 have become aware that the Campaign documents already produced to you reflect
3135 the drafting, evolution, and sources of information for the speech I expected to
3136 give "probably" on the Monday fol lowing my June 7, 2016 comments. These
3137 documents generally show that the text of the speech was initially drafted by
3138 Campaign staff 9 C-14
3139
3140RESULT: 66
3141
3142PAGE: 433
3143
3144TEXT:
3145
3146 U.S. Department of Justice Atterfte)' Werk Pret:ittet // May Cm1taift Material
3147 Prnteetet:i lJFtt:ier Fet:i. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Response to Question U, Part (b) I
3148 recall that in the months leading up to the election there was considerable
3149 media reporting about the possible hacking and release of campaign-related
3150 information and there was a lot of talk about this matter. At the time, I was
3151 generally aware of these media reports and may have discussed these issues with
3152 my campaign staff or others, but at this point in time -more than two years
3153 later -I have no recollection of any particular conversation, when it occurred,
3154 or who the participants were. Response to Question II, Part (c) I do not recall
3155 being aware during the campaign of any communications between the individuals
3156 named in Question II (c) and anyone I understood to be a representative of
3157 WikiLeaks or any of the other individuals or entities referred to in the
3158 question. Response to Question II, Part (d) I made the statement quoted in
3159 Question II (d) in jest and sarcastically, as was apparent to any objective
3160 observer. The context of the statement is evident in the full reading or viewing
3161 of the July 27, 2016 press conference, and I refer you to the publicly available
3162 transcript and video of that press conference. I do not recall having any
3163 discussion about the substance of the statement in advance of the press
3164 conference. I do not recall being told during the campaign of any efforts by
3165 Russia to infiltrate or hack the computer systems or email accounts of Hillary
3166 Clinton or her campaign prior to them becoming the subject of media repo11ing
3167 and I have no recollection of any particular conversation in that regard.
3168 Response to Question II, Part (e) I was in Trump Tower in New York City on
3169 October 7, 2016. I have no recollection of being told that WikiLeaks possessed
3170 or might possess emails related to John Podesta before the release of Mr.
3171 Podesta's emails was reported by the media. Likewise, I have no recollection of
3172 being told that Roger Stone, anyone acting as an intermediary for Roger Stone,
3173 or anyone associated with my campaign had communicated with WikiLeaks on October
3174 7, 2016. Response to Question II, Part (0 I do not recall being told during the
3175 campaign that Roger Stone or anyone associated with my campaign had discussions
3176 with any of the entities named in the question regarding the content or timing
3177 of release of hacked emails. Response to Question ll, Part (g) I spoke by
3178 telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign. I have no
3179 recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between
3180 June 1.2016 and 13 C-18
3181
3182RESULT: 67
3183
3184PAGE: 438
3185
3186TEXT:
3187
3188 U.S. Department of Justice AtterAey \\'erk Preettet // Ma)' Certtairt Material
3189 Preteetee Urteer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e1 Response to Question V, Part (a) I do not
3190 remember having been asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala, and I
3191 did not attend the event. During the course of preparing to respond to these
3192 questions, I have become aware of documents indicating that in March of 2016,
3193 the president of the World Chess Federation invited the Trump Organization to
3194 host, at Trump Tower, the 2016 World Chess Championship Match to be held in New
3195 York in November 2016. r have also become aware that in November 2016, there
3196 were press inquiries to my staff regarding whether I had plans to attend the
3197 tournament, which was not being held at Trump Tower. I understand these
3198 documents have already been provided to you. Execut d on N Ofl&M,lf.rc,J,.0,
3199 2018 President of the United States 18 C-23