CNYeDVng

1COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
2U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
3
4WASHINGTON, D.C.
5
6INTERVIEW OF: LISA PAGE - DAY 2
7
8Monday, July 16, 2018
9
10Washington, D.C.
11
12The above matter was held in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office
13
14 
15
16Building, commencing at 11:02 a.m.
17Mr. Baker. Okay. The time is 1 minute past 11:00 a.m. on
18uly 16th, continuing from Friday's session of the transcribed
19interview of former FBI attorney Lisa Page.
20EXAMINATION
21BY MR. BAKER:
22Q Good morning, Ms. Page, and thank you for agreeing to come
23back for a second session of questioning. A lot of ground was covered
24
25on Friday, so I want to clean up a couple of areas that I had questions
26
27on. So I might jump around a little bit. I'm going to try not to be
28
29repetitive from what you've already answered.
30
31But I wanted to clarify, at a very basic level, sometimes in the
32media's reporting you've been referred to as an FBI agent. In the
33truest sense of the word, as an agent relates to a principal, you are
34an agent of the government. But in FBI parlance, is it correct to say
35that you're not an 1811 series investigator special agent?
36
37fA I am not.
38
39Q You are, infact, an attorney and were assigned to the General
40Counsel's Office.
41
42A That's correct.
43
44Qs Okay.
45
46You started to get into a little bit on Friday and you articulated
47the best you could that -- I think you opened the door as to the
48different types of investigations or how an investigation is opened.
49
50It's my understanding there's three basic types of investigations:
51
52 
53
54There's an assessment. Then it moves to predicated investigations,
55 
56where you then have preliminary investigation and you have a full
57investigation. Is that correct?
58
59A That's correct.
60
61Q And my understanding of the different types of
62investigations is, on one end of the spectrum, it's how that case is
63opened, how maybe credible the information is or how vague the
64
65information is. And then on the other end of the spectrum, it's what
66
67type of investigative techniques can be employed in that type of
68
69investigation. And --
70
71A I wouldn't agree with respect to the substance of the
72information. It's not whether it's vague or credibleor not. It's
73really an assessment -- and, again, I don't have the standards in front
74of me, but each level of, sort of, investigative permission affords
75different levels of tools available.
76
77And so, to the extent you have more information or to the extent
78the information comes from a particularly credible source, it means
79that you can open a full investigation and -- but really
80the distinctions between -- certainly between a preliminary
81investigation and a full are a little bit of dancing on the head of
82apin. Imean, these are very, sort of, nuanced, subtle. Any credible
83allegation is sufficient for the FBI to open an investigation and take
84action for -- to sort of generalize broadly.
85
86Q But the assessment would be kind of the lower, a very
87
88initial -- the information maybe not even relating to a violation of
89
90 
91
92criminal law or national security; it could be proactively -- to
93 
94prevent or to develop information about something the FBI is tasked
95to investigate?
96
97A That's correct. I don't really want to -- I would hesitate
98to go down this path too carefully because there are multiple different
99types of assessments and different divisions have actually different
100authorities with respect to assessment, and I am by no means an expert
101on that. So without having the DIOG in front of me, I would not really
102be comfortable --
103
10410 al
105
106-- answering specific questions about --
107SIU lal
108
109-- what we can do at what level.
110
111Q But at a very basic level, the assessment is kind of the lower
112tier. You're limited in the types of investigative techniques you can
113use in the assessment when you compare that to one of the predicated
114types, either the PI or the full.
115
116A That is correct.
117
118Q Okay. When you're talking about a PI or a full, I talked
119
120briefly about, you know, the one standard to open on the one end, and
121
122then the other end, when you have a PI or a full that's properly opened,
123
124those are the types of investigations where you can use the more
125sophisticated investigative techniques. Is that correct?
126A They're not always sophisticated, but you can use more tools.
127
128Q Certainly more than you could in the assessment.
129
130 
131
132A That's correct.
133 
134Q And then one of the most sophisticated techniques would be
135a court-ordered Title III or a FISC-ordered FISA?
136
137A That's correct.
138
139Q And those techniques, even though they're authorized by the
140FBI's manual of -- that deals with compliance -- I believe it's
141referred to as the DIOG, domestic investigative operations guidelines,
142even though you're working with a validly opened, predicated
143investigation, when you get to those really extreme, sensitive
144techniques, the ones that are really intrusive, it's not just the FBI
145that decides or somebody in the FBI that decides, hey, we're going to
146use this technique. Is that correct?
147
148A That's correct. With respect to both of the two you
149
150describe, both the Title 3 wiretap and a FISC order, not only do you
151
152have vast approvals within the FBI itself, both of those tools require
153high-level approval at theJustice Department. And, of course, with
154respect to a FISA order, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
155General, him or herself, has to approve that.
156
157Q Okay. And then so, not only are there multiple approval
158levels for those type of techniques within the FBI, the Department of
159Justice also has approval requirements for that at the highest levels,
160but also there's court approval required for those. Is that not
161correct?
162
163A Of course.
164
165Q So it's fair to say that not one person in the FBI decides,
166
167 
168
169hey, we're going to do this sophisticated technique, electronic
170COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
171
172 
173surveillance of some sort, in a vacuum. There are levels outside Fthe
174FBI and even outside the executive branch.
175
176A That's correct. Certainly, the more intrusive the
177technique becomes, the greater supervision over that technique that
178the FBI has and the more approval levels, both within and outside the
179Department, will fall.
180
181Q There are inmany places in the FBI, I believe, opportunities
182for people that believe that compliance is not being adhered
183to -- there's many opportunities for people to report compliance
184concerns. And I believe this DIOG that we referenced has specific
185requirements for a supervisor that opens a case, if he's concerned the
186
187compliance isn't being met, there's opportunities to report if you
188
189believe that something is not being adhered to, either in the opening,
190
191the reporting, or the use of techniques in an investigation. Is that
192correct?
193
194A That's correct.
195
196Q If you can -- I don't think this would be classified; if it's
197not, don't answer -- what is an IOB violation?
198
199A It's not that it's classified; it's that I don't want to
200misspeak.
201
202Essentially, if there is a compliance violation associated with
203the activity that the FBI conducts while wearing its intelligence
204community hat, so it would presumably be classified, but it would be
205
206in the conduct of not a criminal investigation but a classified
207
208 
209
210investigation, to the extent there's an error, for example, an
211 
212overproduction, you know, we -- this is just for example's sake: We
213issue a national security letter. We receive back information which
214is beyond that which we're permitted to obtain pursuant to a national
215security letter. If that were to be uploaded into our, sort of, primary
216database, that would be an overproduction, and that would need to be
217required to the IOB.
218
219So it doesn't necessarily speak to the severity or the nature of
220the compliance incident, but compliance incidents involving the
221activity we conduct on the intelligence side, on the classified side
222
223of the work we do is reported to the IOB and often to other entities
224
225depending on whether it pertained to a FISA order or something else.
226
227Q Thank you. That's very helpful.
228
229So, outside the confines of any particular investigation, there
230is a mechanism and there are people responsible to receive and look
231into compliance issues.
232
233A Oh, yes.
234
235Q Okay. During your employment with the FBI, specifically
236your role with Midterm or the Russia investigation, are you aware of
237any compliance issues that were raised or even to the level of an IOB
238violation?
239
240A Not during the period of time in which I was on either
241investigation, no.
242
243Q Had you heard about --
244
245A Ihave since heard -- canI consult with counsel? I'msorry.
246
247 
248
249Q Absolutely.
250 
251
252COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
253[Discussion off the record. ]
254
255Ms. Page. Thank you. Upon consultation with FBI counsel, I'm
256either -- I'm not sure whether the answer would call for a classified
257answer or whether I would be permitted to answer the question fully.
258But I can say, during the period of time that I was involved in both
259the Clinton email investigation and the Russia investigation, I am not
260aware of any compliance incident or event requiring reporting to the
261IOB.
262
263BY MR. BAKER:
264
265Q Okay. So, during your tenure or at another time,
266there -- without the specifics of the violation, the mechanisms for
267reporting compliance issues, including IOB violations, was not
268stymied, stifled --
269
270Oh, no, no. They exist. Yes.
271
272Okay. And they would be complied with, as far as you know.
273NAT
274
275Okay. The FBI --
276
277A I guess I would note, too, that the Department of Justice
278plays a significant oversight role with respect to what gets reported
279to the IOB or to the FISC. And so, again, it's not an issue that exists
280
281solely within the FBI's purview to determine but is often identified
282
283by the Department of Justice and then the FBI would follow up with an
284
285IOB or other notification as appropriate.
286
287Q And would it be correct to say, in addition to that mechanism,
288
289 
290
291the FBI has their own internal audits of those techniques. The
292 
293National Security Law Branch and others, the Inspection Division,
294conducts random inspections of the files that were used to utilize those
295sophisticated techniques.
296
297A That is correct, yes.
298
299Q Okay.
300
301The FBI, by its very motto, "Fidelity, Bravery, Integrity,”
302subscribes to very high ideals. They also have a core value -- a list
303of core values that certainly is not intended to be exhaustive, but
304what they indicate in the fewest words possible to sort of be the essence
305and the heart of the FBI: rigorous obedience to the Constitution of
306the United States; respect for the dignity of all those we protect;
307compassion, fairness, uncompromising personal integrity and
308
309institutional integrity; accountability by accepting responsibility
310
311for our actions and decisions and their consequences; leadership by
312
313example, both personal and professional.
314
315Do you believe that everyone, to the best of your knowledge,
316associated with Midyear Exam and the Russian investigation upheld the
317FBI's core values?
318
319A I think so, yes.
320
321Q And do you believe based on your experience as an
322attorney -- and your role of an attorney, if I'm not mistaken, would
323be to advise the investigators and other members of the team on legal
324issues, what they could, what they couldn't do, and potentially
325
326compliance issues as well.
327
328 
329
330A So that is the role ofan attorney. I wouldn't agree that
331 
332that was necessarily my role, because I was not on the -- as I described,
333I think, on Friday, I was not on the team in the same way that the other,
334sort of, members of the investigative team were. I was really --I
335was supporting the Deputy Director, soI was, inaway, a liaison between
336the team and, sort of, executive management at the FBI.
337
338So I wouldn't say that my role certainly in any day-to-day
339Capacity was to provide legal advice to the team.
340
341Q So, in your role as a liaison from the Deputy's office to
342the Midyear team, what was your role as a liaison? Did you attend
343meetings? You relayed information back?
344
345A I did. Both of those things. As I think I described on
346
347Friday, part of the value that I tried to add to the Deputy Director's
348
349office was to ensure that he had the most complete information possible
350
351at all times. And so I definitely stayed abreast of the investigative
352activity. To the extent there were disagreements or frustrations with
353the Department or areas where there might -- where a disagreement or
354other issue might ultimately rise to the Deputy Director's level, I
355tried to stay abreast of those as well, keep him sufficiently informed.
356
357Q And while you were assigned attorney adviser, special
358assistant, what was your title in the Deputy's office as an OGC rep?
359
360A Counsel or special counsel to the Deputy Director.
361
362Q Were you -- I mean, you're answering to the Deputy. You're
363still a part of OGC technically, though, right?
364
365A Yes. I ama partof OGC. I'm still a lawyer. I'm still,
366
367 
368
369you know, to the extent relevant, covered by the attorney-client
370 
371privilege. But my role is to support the Deputy Director. But, to
372that end, I was in regular, if not daily, contact with the general
373counsel to sort of ensure that our efforts and information was in sync.
374Q But you're not giving legal advice to the Deputy per se.
375A We're sort of splitting hairs. I may have been, depending
376on the issue. My role was not necessarily to tell him, this is
377
378permissible, thisis impermissible. That is really what OGC was there
379
380to do. He might ask me, you know, what do you think, and certainly
381
382that might result in the conveyance of legal advice. But he has an
383entire division devoted to that type of activity. I was there more
384to help him make decisions and, sort of, apply judgment to what it was
385we were looking at.
386
387I also, because of the unique position, had a macro view of the
388entire organization. And soTI sort of tried to help connect dots that
389may have seemed otherwise disparate but might ultimately have a
390relevance with respect to whatever particular issue was in front of
391us, not just in the Clinton investigation.
392
393Q And if something came your way in this assignment that
394related to legal advice, you certainly had the resources of the General
395Counsel's Office to reach out to or to incorporate in a decision on
396whatever the legal issue might be.
397
398A That's correct. And, in fact, that is what I did. So, to the
399extent -- just as an example, if the Deputy Director was reviewing a
400
401FISA and he had a question about the sufficiency of the probable cause,
402
403 
404
405he might ask me my opinion, and I might give it, but, at the end of
406 
407the day, it would notstop there. We would return it to the General
408Counsel's Office. He would consult with Mr. Baker or the deputy
409general counsel or whomever had the substantive information necessary
410and would get the, sort of, final legal determination from the Office
411of General Counsel.
412
413Q So the way the General Counsel's Office is set up, it's not
414
415a lot of general practitioners. It sounds like there's a lot of very
416
417specific specialists. You have national security law people that
418would know answers to FISA-type questions. You have criminal lawyers
419that would maybe know answers to just general investigative techniques.
420
421So you would kind of coordinate where a particular question that
422the Deputy might have might be properly referred to in the General
423Counsel's Office.
424
425A That's exactly right, yes, and to other divisions as well.
426To the extent it was not a legal question that came up but simply, you
427know, the Deputy wants more information about this operational plan,
428I might also reach back into a substantive division to pass that
429information along.
430
431(0 ©) <- ha
432
433You mentioned in your role as a liaison you would go to a lot of
434meetings, frequent meetings, and report back to the Deputy. Was there
435disagreement, dissension at these meetings on any particular path to
436take, either investigatively or prosecuting?
437
438We talked a little bit Friday about the decision to or to not
439
440 
441
442charge in specific statutes. There was this issue of Mr. Comey
443 
444drafting this press release and then releasing -- doing the press
445release and then letters to Congress.
446
447Was there dissension in meetings about any of these controversial
448topics, or was everybody, yes, we agree with this? How did that work?
449
450A That's a very broad question. If you are talking
451specifically about the Clinton email investigation --
452
453Okay.
454Is that --
455For now.
456
457A Okay. So certainly there are, you know, 8 or 10 of us who
458made up sort of the core group of people who met with Director Comey.
459There was -- I wouldn't say dissension, but there was the benefit of
460that group and the comfort that we all with each other, and, in fact,
461the kind of culture and environment that Director Comey tried to foster
462absolutely allowed for disagreement, and we were all quite comfortable,
463I think, expressing our views.
464
465And to the extent somebody said we should take X step and somebody
466disagreed, it was entirely common for that group of individuals to
467openly disagree with one another, to do so in front of the Director,
468in the hopes that the best answer would sort of rise to the top.
469
470Q And is that how it ultimately was decided? Is that how a
471
472decision was decided? There was discussion, there was consensus, the
473
474best decision rose to the top? Was there ever a vote and just simple
475
476majority --
477
478 
479
480A This is the FBI. It's not a majority rule. The Director
481 
482
483COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
484would make an ultimate decision. So, no, I am not aware of anything
485
486ever being based on majority vote. It's the Director's -- he leads
487
488the organization. He's the one who'd ultimately be accountable for
489those decisions.
490
491But the people that I worked with and that group of people who
492would regularly meet with the Director all unquestionably felt free
493to voice their views.
494
495Q Do you recall Director Comey ever taking a position that was
496contrary to the consensus of the group?
497
498A Iwouldn't say "consensus." Idon't think that that's a fair
499statement. I was not present for the meeting in October when he decided
500to send -- to notify Congress of his decision to reopen the Clinton
501email investigation, but I am aware that there was disagreement among
502the team. There was not a consensus that everybody agreed it should
503be done. People had different views about whether we should and
504whether we shouldn't and the timing of it if we did in the first place.
505And ultimately it was Director Comey's decision to make.
506
507Q Okay. Thank you.
508
509BY MR. SOMERS:
510
511Q Could we back up for a second? Art asked a pretty compound
512question. Was there dissent, disagreement, however you would
513characterize it, with investigative techniques on the Midyear Exam?
514
515A Investigative techniques? That's a really broad question.
516
517Q Whether a search warrant should be used?
518
519 
520
521A Oh. So this was before I was involved in the investigation,
522COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
523
524 
525but it's my understanding -- it's not a disagreement within the FBI,
526but there were lots and lots and lots of disagreements between the FBI
527and the Department.
528
529Generally, I can't think of anything in particular that would have
530been FBI-specific with respect to, like, this agent wants to take step
531
532and this agent -- somebody else wants to take step Y.
533
534But, certainly, my understanding is, at the outset of the
535investigation -- again, I was not personally involved, but there was
536a great deal of discussion between the FBI and the Department with
537
538respect to whether to proceed, obtain the server which housed the bulk
539
540of Secretary Clinton's emails, pursuant to consent or pursuant toa
541
542subpoena or other compulsory process.
543And was that dissent between the FBI and the Department?
544That's correct. Yes.
545And what was the FBI's preference?
546To obtain it pursuant to compulsory process.
547The server?
548I'm sorry?
549The server?
550The server, yes. Sorry.
551Q And how about -- were there any other disagreements between
552the Department and the --
553A Oh, my gosh. I mean --
554
5556) -- FBI on investigative techniques?
556
557 
558
559A Yes, all the time. In a vacuum, it's hard to just come up
560 
561with them off the top of my head.
562
563Q Was the FBI being told that it couldn't use certain
564investigative techniques by the Department?
565
566A "It couldn't use." Not -- I'm trying to think of specific
567examples. I'm sorry. Not that -- to the extent there would be a
568
569disagreement, I don't think it would ever be quite that strident. I
570
571think it would be the view of the Department that it was strategically
572
573advantageous.
574
575Oh. Well, sohere is anexample. Wehad -- but this is not about
576the type of process to obtain, but there were, I think, months of
577disagreement with respect to obtaining the Mills and Samuelson laptops.
578
579So Heather Mills and -- Cheryl Mills and Heather Samuelson were
580both lawyers who engaged in the sorting. Once it had been identified
581that Secretary Clinton had these emails -- I'm guessing it's pursuant
582to the FOIA request, but I don't really know -- she -- well, our
583understanding is that she asked her two lawyers to take the bulk of
584the 68@,00@ emails and to sort out those which were work-related from
585those which were personal and to produce the work-related ones to the
586State Department.
587
588They did so. That 30,000 is sort of the bulk of the emails that
589we relied on in order to conduct the investigation, although we found
590other emails a jillion other places.
591
592We, the FBI, felt very strongly that we had to acquire and attempt
593
594to review the content of the Mills and Samuelson laptops because, to
595
596 
597
598the extent the other 30,9000 existed anywhere, that is the best place
599 
600that they may have existed. And notwithstanding the fact that they
601had been deleted, you know, we wanted at least to take a shot at using,
602you know, forensic recovery tools in order to try to ensure that, in
603fact, the sorting that occurred between -- or by Mills and Samuelson
604was done correctly and --
605
606Q=Sorry.
607
608A No, that's okay.
609
610Q It was -- is that -- for lack of a better term, is it usual
611to rely on the target of an investigation to provide evidence against
612bo at= nearing
613
614A Well, that happens. That's not uncommon. I mean, in
615
616white-collar cases in particular, issuing subpoenas to the target, even
617
618though -- particularly if it's, like, a corporate target, that's
619
620certainly a way to do it.
621
622You're misunderstanding a little bit, though, because that sort
623and all of that activity took place before there was a criminal
624investigation. So that activity is what -- the testimony that we
625received, the, sort of, evidence we received, is that the State
626Department reaches out to Secretary Clinton when they discover, "We
627don't have your emails on a State Department system. Do you have your
628emails?" And the answer is, "Yes." And the State Department, rather
629than the State Department itself conducting that analysis of whether
630or not there was -- or whether these emails were work-related or not,
631
632deferred to Secretary Clinton to do that.
633
634 
635
636So this long precedes any FBI investigation or any FBI
637 
638involvement.
639BY MR. BREITENBACH:
640Q But didn't you say that months went by before you made the
641determination as to whether to access those laptops --
642No. I'm sorry.
643-- though consent or through --
644
645ee
646
647Q -- compulsory process?
648A
649
650But that's -- so we have to -- we're talking about two
651different events here.
652
653Back in 2613 -- I don't remember when -- this is before there was
654any FBI investigation. When there is first an inquiry by the State
655Department into why do we have no Secretary Clinton emails that go to
656Secretary Clinton herself, that precipitates Mills and Samuelson
657conducting this sorting activity and producing to the State Department,
658here are the emails which are work-related. Produce them to FOIA,
659produce them to Congress, wherever they went. I haveno idea. We had
660nothing to do with this -- we, the FBI.
661
662Skip ahead to February/March of 2016, right? The criminal
663investigation has now been open for 6 or 7 months. We discover
664that -- we discover these facts, right? These facts were not known
665to us. We don't know how she first did the sorting for the State
666Department. We discover these facts.
667
668We go to the Department and say: We need to get these laptops.
669
670 
671
672We need to try to get in them and review them and see if, in fact, there
673 
674are other emails which either are work-related or, potentially -- what
675
676we were really looking for -- other emails which would speak to, you
677
678know, give some indicia of her intent with respect to why she set up
679
680this server and whether it was intended to mishandle classified and
681all of that.
682
683That back-and-forth starting February/March-ish of 2016 and
684going through, I'd say, June of 2016 is the disagreement I was referring
685to. So that’s a disagreement between us, the FBI, and the DOJ with
686respect to why we needed to get these laptops and how to get these
687laptops.
688
689And what the FBI believed -- and there's copious texts about this
690because it was a, sort of, ongoing argument -- was that we had to at
691least attempt to get them. Even if we were unsuccessful, even ifa
692court determined that they were attorney-client work product or opinion
693work product, which is what the Department was concerned about, we
694couldn't credibly close the investigation without having tried to get
695into these laptops and to have reviewed -- see if any additional emails
696could be recovered and to question Mills and Samuelson about how they
697engaged in that sort in order to see whether it seemed righteous and,
698you know, proper or whether there was anything, kind of, nefarious or
699questionable about it.
700
701The Department's view for months was that we would not be able
702to get into them, a court would not, sort of, grant us access, so we
703
704shouldn't bother trying. And that was a source of -- I wouldn't sa
705
706 
707
708constant conflict but regular conflict every time it came up. Because
709 
710quite early on we started pushing the Department to reach out to Mills’
711lawyer and -- Mills and Samuelson's lawyer to sort of start the process
712of trying to get into these laptops, and the Department was very
713reluctant to do so for the reasons that I've described.
714
715Q So you had the opportunity, then, conceivably, to execute
716a search warrant -- if you're using the timetable you had
717mentioned -- back in February of 2016. You could have executed a
718search warrant and obtained those --
719
720A Well, not without the Department, right? The Department has to
721-- we cannot on our own, the FBI cannot execute a search warrant
722without approval from the Justice Department.
723
724Q So was the Department pushing back on obtaining compulsory
725process to obtain those laptops? Because months, you say, go by. I
726mean, in your timetable from February to June, what is that --
727
728A Ish. Let me just be --
729
730Q -- 4 to 5 months? Four or 5 months passes before you are
731able to gain access to those laptops.
732
733A To the best of my recollection, yes. It's either February or
734March. TI just want to put a little bit of hedge in it, because I'm not
735100-percent certain.
736
737But I know that the conversations about whether to obtain the
738
739laptops and how to obtain the laptops is one that is ongoing. It is
740
741one that ultimately rises to the head of the OEO, the Office of
742
743Enforcement Operations, which is the unit at the Justice Department
744
745 
746
747who would have to approve a warrant on a lawyer -- because, of course,
748 
749these were all lawyer laptops. It rose to that individual, it rose
750to George Toscas, over the course of this 3 months or so.
751
752But, yes, there was an ongoing disagreement about whether there
753was utility to obtain the laptops and, if so, how to obtain them.
754
755Q So, in your experience, what may happen when a subject of
756an investigation is aware that the FBI is attempting to obtain evidence
757yet the FBI does not obtain it and months pass? What are the
758possibilities?
759
760A Obviously, there's the risk of destruction of evidence. I
761will note, however, that it's my recollection that those laptops had
762been sequestered by Mills and Samuelson's lawyer. So it's not --I
763don't believe that they were in the possession of Mills and Samuelson
764once we, sort of, started raising this question with the Department.
765It's my recollection that the Department informed Mills and Samuelson's
766lawyer that we had an interest in these and that she took possession
767of them.
768
769Q So destruction of evidence. Can you imagine any other
770
771possibilities if you fail OR RMT CME LC MR IT subject is
772
773aware of it?
774Ms. Jeffress. I'm not sure what the question is.
775Ms. Page. Yeah, I'm not sure. I'm sorry.
776BY MR. BREITENBACH:
777Q Any other possibilities in the -- in terms of a subject being
778
779aware that evidence is attempting to be obtained by the FBI yet the
780
781 
782
783FBI does not obtain that compulsory.
784 
785A I think destruction of evidence is the big one.
786
787Q And you were never aware that destruction of evidence
788occurred?
789
790A Not to my knowledge, no.
791
792Q Thank you.
793
794BY MR. SOMERS:
795
796Q Okay. Then the second part of Art's question was
797disagreement about prosecutive techniques between the FBI and DOJ.
798Were there any disagreements about techniques for prosecution?
799
800A No, because nobody thought that the evidence could sustain
801a prosecution. So --
802
803Q What about, sort of -- I guess, what about impaneling a grand
804jury? Was there disagreement about whether a grand jury should be
805impaneled?
806
807A grand jury was impaneled.
808
809But was there disagreement prior to the impaneling about
810
811Oh. I'm not aware.
812What about discussion about the statutes that should be
813charged or could be charged?
814
815A No, I don't think so. I mean, it was always fairly
816
817self-evident that we were looking at mishandling statutes. And,
818
819again, the evidence was just never there to sufficiently support,
820
821really, a prosecution. I mean, I think they even looked at Federal
822
823 
824
825Records Act violations -- they, meaning the Department -- andthere
826 
827was never sufficient evidence to support any criminal prosecution under
828any statute.
829
830Mr. Breitenbach. Was a grand jury impaneled for the purposes of
831the email investigation?
832
833Ms. Page. Yes. That's my understanding.
834
835Mr. Breitenbach. Okay.
836
837Ms. Page. I'msorry. Can TI consult with counsel for a second?
838
839Mr. Breitenbach. Yes.
840
841[Discussion off the record. ]
842
843Ms. Page. Sorry.
844
845Mr. Breitenbach. Are you aware of whether evidence was ever
846presented to the grand jury in terms of adjudicating a decision?
847
848Ms. Page. Well, wait. "In terms of adjudicating adecision."
849Are you --
850
851Ms. Bessee. Can I address?
852
853So I will instruct her not to answer any questions that go into
854the process of the grand jury.
855
856He can rephrase the question, but if it goes into the process of
857the grand jury, you will not be able to answer.
858
859Ms. Page. Well, why don't I answer -- I can't speak to whether
860any -- what activity was conducted before the grand jury. I can answer
861that no case was presented to the grand jury because that would have
862
863been an abuse of the grand jury.
864
865The Department is required to at least believe that you have
866
867 
868
869probable cause in order -- probable cause that a crime has been
870COMMITTEE SE
871
872 
873
874COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
875committed. I'm sorry, that's not true. The Department's rules
876require that to present a case before the grand jury you have to have
877a reasonable belief that the case can be proven beyond a reasonable
878doubt. And we did not have that belief with respect to the Clinton
879email investigation.
880
881And so we would not have put the case before the grand jury,
882essentially presented all of the evidence that we had collected to date,
883because, it's my I assessment -- although, again, this is just me,
884personally, talking based on my prior experience as a prosecutor, not
885with respect to what was conducted inthis investigation. But it's
886my assessment that that would've been an inappropriate use of grand
887jury, because the prosecutors putting in that evidence would not have
888believed that there was a crime to be charged.
889
890Does that make sense? That was a little bit tortured.
891
892BY MR. BREITENBACH:
893
894Q Yes. But, as the FBI, did you make a recommendation or not
895as to whether to present it to a grand jury?
896
897py I don't know.
898
899Q So it would've been the Department --
900
901A So let me clarify one thing. The grand jury was used to
902
903obtain evidence. Right? So there are certain things, for example,
904
905like a subpoena of records, which would require the impaneling of a
906
907grand jury and using tools before the grand jury in order to obtain
908
909evidence. That occurred.
910
911 
912
913I am not, both substantively and also on advice of FBI counsel,
914 
915in a position to discuss what type of evidence was obtained by the grand
916sian
917
918What I can say is that I do not believe there was ever any
919
920disagreement with respect to whether we needed to ask the grand jury
921
922to return an indictment. It would have been inappropriate to have
923presented all of the evidence collected, whether by grand jury subpoena
924or any other tool -- consent, search warrants, testimony, you know,
925of other witness, interviews of witnesses. It would not have been
926appropriate to ask the grand jurors to return an indictment or to review
927the weight of the evidence where we did not believe that that case was
928prosecutable.
929
930Q But was that the FBI's decision to make?
931
932A No, it was the Department's decision to make. It was the
933decision made by the Department.
934
935Q At the end of the day, you're saying it was the decision of
936the Department --
937
938A Yes.
939
940Q =-- prosecutors not to present this to the grand jury for an
941indictment.
942
943A That is correct, yes.
944
945Q Thank you.
946
947BY MR. PARMITER:
948Q Can I ask a couple of additional questions regarding, sort
949
950of, the internal discussions and what was discussed?
951
952 
953
954Was there ever, in your experience, any discussion at any of the
955 
956meetings involving Midyear about whether the act of setting up the
957server itself was problematic or whether that showed any level of
958intent?
959
960A I don't know.
961
962Q But you were never -- you never experienced anything like
963sere
964
965A I don't recall being present for a conversation like that.
966But, also, to the extent it may have occurred -- this investigation
967was opened in July of 2015. I don't become involved in it until
968February of 2016. So, to the extent there were questions about that,
969they may have been resolved before I was involved.
970
971Q Okay.
972
973How often, in your experience, does the FBI Director or the Deputy
974Director in the course of their ordinary duties access or review or,
975you know, have dealings with classified information?
976
977A Every single day.
978
979Q Every day. Okay. So what -- by being on a private server,
980
981would you agree classified information is not in its proper place?
982A By being on any unclassified system, whether private or
983government, classified information should not have traversed it.
984That's correct.
985Q So, given your answers to both of those questions, do you
986think that, you know, assuming the Deputy Director or the Director had
987
988set up a private server of their own, just hypothetically, to, you know,
989
990 
991
992transact government business, all of their business, would you say it
993 
994would be inevitable that classified information would pass over that
995server?
996
997pA No, sir. So, at the FBI and at the State Department, we have
998three separate systems for each level of classification. So whether
999that system existed at the State Department or whether it existed on
1000somebody's private server, inevitably if there was -- if it was
1001somebody's private server, lots of unclassified government business
1002would traverse that system in the same way it does for, you know, the
1003FBI's unclassified system or the State Department's unclassified
1004system, but there's nothing inevitable about whether or if classified
1005information would traverse that unclassified system.
1006
1007That certainly may happen occasionally on the FBI system, on an
1008unclassified FBI-run system. It's called a spill. It's an
1009
1010inadvertent, sort of, passage of classified information on asystem
1011
1012in which it doesn't belong. But the same is true if you're dealing
1013
1014with Top Secret information and it traverses the Secret side; that's
1015also a spill.
1016
1017So it's sort of indistinguishable whether the system itself is
1018classified or unclassified, only in that it's not authorized to handle
1019classified information.
1020
1021Q So would you -- so, okay. So is your answer is that if, you
1022know, a Cabinet Secretary or the FBI Director was using a private server
1023to conduct all of their business that it's not inevitable that
1024
1025classified information would pass through that server?
1026
1027 
1028
1029A If they were using it to conduct every single thing they did.
1030 
1031But it's not -- my understanding is that the Secret side was used for
1032Secret business and the TS side was used for TS business. So if every
1033single thing they did --
1034
1035Q That's at the FBI, though, correct?
1036
1037A Even at the State Department, it's my understanding. I
1038mean, it was a much more cumbersome system, in part because the
1039principals are constantly all over the world so the access to these
1040other classified systems is less readily available and so it's, sort
1041of, more cumbersome, it's, sort of, harder.
1042
1043But if the question is, if every single thing that the FBI
1044Director -- if all of the FBI Director's business was conducted on an
1045unclassified system, whether FBI-run or privately run, then, yes, it
1046is true, there would be classified information there.
1047
1048But those facts as you presented them are not my understanding
1049of what occurred, obviously, either at the FBI or at the State
1050Department.
1051
1052Mr. Meadows. Can I ask one clarifying question, Lisa?
1053
1054It appears, based on documents that we have, that there was a
1055conscious decision in the MYE to go down one avenue in terms of
1056prosecution or potential prosecution, and that is with the retention
1057of classified information on a private server, not the disclosure of
1058classified information.
1059
1060And, based on the documents we have, it looks like everybody
1061
1062focused on the retention but no one ever pursued the disclosure. Why
1063
1064 
1065
1066was that made?
1067 
1068=) 24 =
1069Mr. Meadows. And would you agree with that characterization?
1070Ms. Page. I'm not positive. That's the thing that I hesitated
1071about. So I'm not sure that I -- those were really activities that
1072would have been handled at a lower level than I was involved in. These
1073would have been the discussions -
1074Mr. Meadows. Right. Inmost of the documents, the caselaw that
1075
1076they were looking at only dealt with retention, which, actually,
1077
1078disclosure is a bigger deal from a national security threat. And yet
1079
1080it didn't appear that anybody looked at that, based on the documents
1081TMA = AAV 1 10
1082
1083Ms. Page. Somy guess -- andthisis -- I'm speculating here just
1084based on my knowledge of what the statutes require -- is that disclosure
1085requires intent. And so, particularly when we charge disclosure
1086cases, it's often in the context, for example, of amedia leak. Right?
1087It's somebody who had possession of the information and disclosed it
1088to somebody who was not authorized to have it. That's what those
1089disclosure cases look like.
1090
1091And what was occurring on Secretary Clinton's server is all people
1092who were righteously entitled to the information and who had a need
1093to know it and who were using that information in the execution of their
1094duties, but it was occurring on a system that wasn't appropriate for
1095it. So I think that's why the focus was on retention.
1096
1097Mr. Meadows. And one more, and then I'll yield back.
1098
1099 
1100
1101We have information from the inspector general of the
1102 
1103intelligence community that, I guess, initiated this entire
1104investigation -- they were the ones that came before you -- that there
1105were anomalies that would suggest that there was copies of every email
1106going to a third party.
1107
1108And I know you heard that in the hearing the other day, but we've
1109had substantial conversations with them. Is this news toyou today?
1110
1111Ms. Page. Itis. WhenI heard it in the hearing, it was -- maybe
1112I had heard it one other time just with respect to, like, news things,
1113but it was completely baffling to me.
1114
1115Mr. Meadows. Yeah. So --
1116
1117Ms. Page. I don't understand at all what that's a reference to.
1118I do know that we gave the server -- again, I'm not a technical person,
1119so this is going to be a little bit tortured here --
1120
1121Mr. Meadows. Right.
1122
1123Ms. Page. -- but that we took exhaustive efforts to look at
1124whether there were any other intrusions, whether there was
1125any exfiltration --
1126
1127Mr. Meadows. And you're saying they found none.
1128
1129Ms. Page. Correct -- whether there was any exfiltration of data
1130and --
1131
1132Mr. Meadows. Well, we know that some -- but it was basically in
1133the IG's report on how that came to pass.
1134
1135So, I guess, why would the investigative team not have had
1136
1137multiple interviews with Mr. Rucker, who brought it to the FBI's
1138
1139 
1140
1141attention originally?
1142 
1143Ms. Page. I
1144
1145Mr. Meadows. Because, according to the IG, you never interviewed
1146him and never interviewed them other than the initial conversation that
1147brought it. Why would that have --
1148
1149Ms. Page. SoI can't speak to that, because I don't know whether
1150
1151he -- I'm relying on your representation that he was not interviewed,
1152
1153but I also don't know whether he ever came to the FBI during the pendency
1154
1155of the investigation and provided that allegation. If he had --
1156
1157Mr. Meadows. Well, that was the whole reason it was opened up,
1158is my understanding, was him coming. They get it, they come to the
1159FBI. And so you're saying that's not the case?
1160
1161Ms. Page. I don't -- I am really trying --
1162
1163Mr. Meadows. Or that's not your understanding?
1164
1165Ms. Page. That's not my understanding.
1166
1167Mr. Meadows. So how did this whole MYE start if it wasn't from
1168nse
1169
1170Ms. Page. No, no.
1171
1172Mr. Meadows. -- inspector --
1173
1174Ms. Page. So my understanding -- and this is -- I am way out on
1175a limb here, because this is not stuff I was involved in. But my
1176understanding is that the IC IG did refer the existence of the server
1177to the FBI, but that was because of the existence of classified
1178information on that server, not because of any anomalous activity, not
1179
1180because of potential intrusion activity. Because it's not my
1181
1182 
1183
1184understanding that the IC IG conducted any sort of forensic analysis
1185 
1186
1187COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
1188like that.
1189
1190My understanding is that, once it was made evident during the
1191course of, I think, the FOIA production or maybe the production to
1192Congress that there was some classified information which existed on
1193a private email server, it got referred to the IC IG for those purposes,
1194not related to intrusive activity.
1195
1196Mr. Meadows. So what you're telling me, it would surprise you
1197to know today that, if there were anomalies, that the inspector
1198general's forensic team found those before it was referred to the FBI?
1199
1200Ms. Page. That's correct. I'm not sure --
1201
1202Mr. Meadows. Wouldthat -- if that is indeed the fact, would that
1203be a major concern to you?
1204
1205Ms. Page. It would be a concern that we didn't know that or that
1206that wasn't part of what they told us when they made the referral, but
1207less so, sir, honestly because our forensic investigators are so
1208phenomenal that, notwithstanding whatever the IC IG may or may not have
1209conveyed, I know we looked extensively at this question.
1210
1211Because that was a serious question. And to the extent that a
1212
1213foreign government or even a criminal outlet had had access to Secretary
1214
1215Clinton's private email server, that would have been something we cared
1216very much about. And it's my understanding that there was no evidence
1217that would have supported that kind of conclusion.
1218
1219Mr. Meadows. I yield back.
1220
1221BY MR. BAKER:
1222
1223 
1224
1225Q Regardless of how phenomenal forensic investigators might
1226 
1227be, is it still possible that an extremely sophisticated foreign
1228
1229intelligence service could penetrate a server, could extract
1230documents, could do a number of things without leaving a single forensic
1231footprint?
1232
1233A It's pretty -- I mean, everything is possible, but it's
1234unlikely. I think Friday's indictments are revelatory of that. You
1235don't get better than the GRU, and yet we have identified by name the
1236people involved in theDNC hacking. So I think it's quite unlikely.
1237
1238Q = Okay.
1239
1240Are you -- following up on what the Congressman was saying, are
1241you familiar with a private entity, privately financed, using private
1242forensic resources, for lack of a better word, went looking for some
1243of the emails from Secretary Clinton's server, her network, and, in
1244fact, found at least one document on a foreign server?
1245
1246A I don't know what you're referring to, no.
1247
1248Q Okay.
1249
1250Mr. Breitenbach. We were produced information indicating that
1251Mr. Strzok had indicated in an email that at least one Secret email
1252was accessed by a foreign party. Are you aware of that?
1253
1254Ms. Page. That may be true. I'm just not personally aware of
1255ag arbor
1256
1257Sh A oe 0
1258Q I believe on Friday, in discussing the statute that you were
1259
1260discussing, I believe, with Congressman Ratcliffe -- it was 793(f) o
1261
1262 
1263
1264Title 18 -- you had said that that statute was deemed by DOJ to be
1265 
1266unconstitutionally vague. Is that correct?
1267
1268A No. The "gross negligence” that -- the "gross negligence”
1269standard in 793(f), it was their assessment that it was
1270unconstitutionally vague, yes.
1271
1272Q Were you involved in discussions about, you know, its
1273ee T 40 aoa
1274
1275A I don't believe I was, no.
1276
1277Q Do you have any idea of why they believed it was
1278unconstitutionally vague?
1279
1280A I mean, I presume they looked at caselaw in which it had been
1281applied. Ireally don't know. I mean, I'm -- I am confident that it
1282was based on their own, sort of, research in consultation with others,
1283but I don't have personal knowledge about what the Department did in
1284order to come to that conclusion.
1285
1286(0 ©) <a
1287
1288Speaking of -- so did you do or did the OGC do their own evaluation
1289of the statute, or did you just rely on DOJ's assessment?
1290
1291I don't know. I did not.
1292Okay.
1293I can tell you that.
1294
1295Speaking of caselaw, are you aware whether or not that
1296
1297statute has been used in military prosecutions or the frequency with
1298
1299which it was used in civilian prosecutions? I know you had said once
1300
1301in 99 years, but --
1302
1303 
1304
1305py I think that there -- this is straining my memory now, but
1306COMMITTEB SENSITIVE
1307
1308 
1309
1310COMMITTBE SENSITIVE
1311I think that there may have been one UCM), Uniform Court of Military
1312Justice --
1313Q Code of --
1314
1315A -- Code of Military Justice -- thank you -- one UCMJ case in
1316
1317which it was charged, but, again, if my memory serves -- so I may get
1318
1319this wrong, but if my memory serves, the defendant in that case had
1320actually engaged in far more nefarious and suspicious activity, and
1321so it was a plea down to that, right? So if you're pleading to
1322something, then you don't really need to worry about -- I mean, if it's
1323unconstitutional, it's still unconstitutional.
1324
1325But it was not the case -- again, my recollection is that it was
1326somebody who had a hoard of classified information and then, when
1327confronted, tried to destroy the classified information -- sort of,
1328again, the indicia of knowledge and criminal intent that you will
1329sometimes see.
1330
1331So, if I'm not mistaken, there was one UCM] case, but I think
1332that's it.
1333
1334Q So, speaking of a hoard of classified information, do you
1335mean information that had been -- that was hard copies of physical
1336documents?
1337
1338A Hard copies and I think even, like -- if I'm remembering
1339right, and I could be mixing this up with another case, but, like, a
1340thumb drive of classified information that they were not authorized
1341
1342to have. So both hard copy and digital classified documents.
1343
1344 
1345
1346Q Do you believe --
1347COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
1348
1349 
1350[Phone ringing. ]
1351Ms. Page. Go ahead, please.
1352BY MR. PARMITER:
1353
1354Q Just, you know, your own perspective on this, do you believe
1355that -- what would be more vulnerable, classified material ona
1356computer server where it's not supposed to be or hard copies of
1357classified material at someone's house?
1358
1359A Well, if you're talking about more vulnerable to a cyber
1360attack, then obviously you need a computer in order for that to occur.
1361
1362(on 0) <-)Y an
1363
1364Do you -- sort of, going further down the line of, you know,
1365whether 793(f) in particular and the "gross negligence” standard in
1366
1367particular are unconstitutionally vague, I mean, do you think that DOJ
1368
1369views that as sort of a dead statute that won't be charged anymore?
1370
1371A Ido.
1372
1373Q Are you aware whether or not --
1374
1375A I mean, just the "gross negligence” part of it. Idon't have it
1376in front of me to -- but -- and, as I said last week, I'm by no means an
1377expert.
1378
1379Thank you. Go ahead.
1380
1381Q So are you aware of whether or not the Bureau ever sought
1382or obtained any sort of compulsory process, whether it's a search
1383warrant or something else, on the basis of 793(f) in particular?
1384
1385A I think so, but that would not have to have been the "gross
1386
1387 
1388
1389negligence" prong. I think they could have relied on the second prong
1390 
1391On (f)2 right there --
1392
1393iw esa a
1394
1395Q  -- as opposed to (f)1?
1396A
1397
1398Yeah. And, again, I don't know what basis -- I shouldn't
1399have answeredthat question. I am speaking out of turn. I do not know
1400what statutes were alleged to the extent the Department sought
1401compulsory process. I have no idea, so I shouldn't answer that.
1402
1403Q = Okay.
1404
1405BY MR. BREITENBACH:
1406
1407Q If we were to tell you, though, that the search warrant was
1408predicated on 793, is that something that would be normal, to base a
1409search warrant and predicate a search warrant on a statute that the
1410Bureau is being told is unconstitutional?
1411
1412A You're misunderstanding. So 793(f) has two parts to it.
1413The second part -- so the first is, okay, whoever being entrusted with
1414having lawful possession or control of any document relating to the
1415national defense, one, through gross negligence permits it to be
1416removed or, two, having knowledge of the same, that it has been
1417illegally removed, shall be fined -- blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.
1418
1419So there would be nothing inappropriate for them to rely on the
1420second prong of 793(f), which is regularly charged and is a perfectly
1421common statute with respect to mishandling cases. There would be
1422
1423nothing inappropriate with respect to relying on the second prong of
1424
1425 
1426
1427793(f), in my view.
1428 
1429
1430COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
1431Q What are some of the factors that might rise to the level
1432
1433of "gross negligence,” in your opinion?
1434A  Idon't know. I have done absolutely no research or review
1435of this. I'm not in a position to answer that.
1436Did Mr. McCabe ever ask you that as his lawyer?
1437He did not.
1438Do you know whether Mr. Baker ever conducted any independent
1439analysis on the factors that might have met a "gross negligence” charge?
1440rN I don't know.
1441But, at the end of the day, this is the Department's
1442determination. Imean, it is up to the Department to determine whether
1443or not we have sufficient evidence to charge a case. So, even
1444
1445hypothetically, to the extent the FBI thought, you know, we have
1446
1447infinite evidence to support charge A, if the Department disagrees,
1448
1449the Department is going to have the final determination because they
1450
1451are the prosecutors. So --
1452
1453Q But if the FBI is not aware of the particular factors that
1454might be available in meeting that standard, then how would it know
1455whether to recommend to the Department to obtain any type of prosecution
1456based on that standard?
1457
1458A I mean, the FBI has to -- necessarily has to rely on the
1459Department's assessment of what's legally supportable under the law.
1460So there's nothing inappropriate about that sort of reliance.
1461
1462I'm not saying that no research was conducted. I'm saying that
1463
1464 
1465
1466I personally didn't do any. And to the extent it was conducted, I'm
1467 
1468just not aware of it as I sit here today.
1469Mr. Meadows. So let me ask you a clarifying question. Because
1470
1471I think this was an unusual case where Loretta Lynch, the AG, said that
1472
1473she was going to be independent of it and that she was going to leave
1474
1475it up to the FBI.
1476
1477So, if you did no research and from a "grossly negligent"
1478standpoint, how would you make the decision to prosecute or not if she
1479was being independent of that?
1480
1481Ms. Page. So, sir, I think that what she said was that she was
1482going to leave it up to the career prosecutors, not up to the FBI. So,
1483when she did her, kind of, half-recusal, she said that she was going
1484to defer to the recommendations of the career prosecutors in the case.
1485
1486Mr. Meadows. So what you're saying is that she halfway recused
1487herself but not really because there was other DOJ officials that were
1488weighing in on that?
1489
1490Ms. Page. I'm sorry, I should have been more clear. I can't
1491speak to the recusal and whether it was appropriate or inappropriate
1492or necessary --
1493
1494Mr. Meadows. No, but your characterization --
1495
1496Ms. Page. Oh, okay.
1497
1498Mr. Meadows. And I agree it's ahalf-recusal. Because, atthis
1499point -- so are you saying that it was prosecutors at DOJ that made
1500the decision on the "grossly negligent” versus "extremely careless"
1501
1502narrative?
1503
1504 
1505
1506Ms. Page. No.
1507 
1508
1509COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
1510Mr. Meadows Or was that the FBI?
1511
1512Ms. Page. No, no, no. So, I'msorry, I understand your question
1513
1514With respect to whether a charge could be sustained under the
1515"gross negligence" statute, that's a determination made by the
1516Department.
1517
1518With respect toMr. Comey's July 5th statement, when he -- inhis
1519
1520first draft of the statement back in May, he used the word "gross
1521
1522negligence.” I don't know whether he used it intending to rely on its
1523legal definition or not.
1524
1525With respect to the statement, we, the FBI, felt like it would
1526be confusing and misleading to use the word "gross negligence” when
1527the information that we had received from the Department was that there
1528was no charge sustainable under the "gross negligence" statute. And
1529so we, the FBI, omitted the "gross negligence" words in his press
1530conference statement and moved up the paragraph that already contained
1531the "extremely careless" language into a different spot in his speech.
1532
1533Mr. Meadows. So, Lisa, why would you change that within 2 days
1534of -- you know, you admitted the other day, on I think it was May the
15354th, where you said now there was real pressure to get the politics
1536out of it. And then we know within days that it was changed in what
1537we call the exoneration letter. So why would that have changed at that
1538particular point? Do you see how it looks bad?
1539
1540Ms. Page. I do. But -- so it's the -- that's just when we
1541
1542 
1543
1544had -- we, the whole team, had received the draft. Right? So the
1545 
1546Director -- and I don't remember the exact date --
1547
1548Mr. Meadows. But you received the draft before the text message
1549that says, oh, my gosh, now he's the nominee. And so you had actually
1550received it. We've got documents --
1551
1552Ms. Page. Is that right? I just don't remember the dates
1553exactly, sir.
1554
1555Mr. Meadows. And so receiving -- it was not after that. You got
1556that, and then all of a sudden within 48 hours it's changed. And as
1557
1558a reasonable person, you look, well, there's this statement and then
1559
1560all of a sudden it was changed. And you're saying that that had nothing
1561
1562to do with it?
1563
1564Ms. Page. Yeah, I don't -- I'm not sure I'm totally following
1565you, sir. I'm sorry.
1566
1567Mr. Meadows. Okay. Well, I'll be clear --
1568
1569. Page. I'm sorry.
1570
1571Mr. Meadows. -- because I want you to follow.
1572
1573Ms. Page. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
1574
1575Mr. Meadows. And you know that I've appreciated your willingness
1576to help.
1577
1578When you said that we had to get politics out of it and you
1579changed --
1580
1581Ms. Page. The pressure. I think what I said was that --
1582
1583Mr. Meadows. -- the pressure ramped up.
1584
1585Ms. Page. -- now that it was a two-person race -- I'm going to
1586
1587 
1588
1589try to find thetext itself. But now that it was a two-person race,
1590COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
1591
1592 
1593the pressure to finish it had sort of increased.
1594
1595Mr. Meadows. Right. So the memo was May 2nd.
1596
1597Ms. Page. Okay.
1598
1599Mr. Meadows. Your text message that we've got to clear this up
1600was May 4.
1601
1602Ms. Page. Okay.
1603
1604Mr. Meadows. And then we know it was changed by May 6. And
1605that's a real problematic timeframe that would indicate that all of
1606a sudden we've got to get this cloud from over, you know -- -
1607
1608Ms. Page. Oh, I see.
1609
1610Mr. Meadows. -- Hillary Clinton and we better change -- and it's
1611just -- it looks suspicious.
1612
1613Ms. Page. I see what you'resaying, sir. I don't know if this
1614
1615is reassuring at all, but the decision to change the statement, to omit
1616
1617the "gross negligence" language from the statement, was actually not
1618
1619either me or Pete's recommendation. It was another lawyer. I don't
1620know if this is any consolation, but --
1621
1622Mr. Meadows. Yeah. We've got the email chains. So who was the
1623other lawyer?
1624
1625Ms. Page. I'm --
1626
1627Mr. Meadows. That's aclosed case. You should be able to tell
1628
1629Ms. Page. I have been told by the FBI that people, other than
1630
1631myself, who are GS-15s, we're not, sort of, providing that.
1632
1633 
1634
1635Mr. Meadows. So you're saying this is someone lower than a GS-15
1636 
1637that made that kind of decision?
1638
1639Ms. Page. Well, it's not a decision; it's just legal advice,
1640right? So there were a group of us --
1641
1642Mr. Meadows. You're saying someone lower than a GS-15 make a
1643legal decision --
1644
1645Ms. Page. No. It wasa GS-15. It's not lower than. It wasa
1646GS-15. So we had received --
1647
1648Mr. Meadows. So was it Ms. Moyer?
1649
1650Ms. Page. We had received the draft of the statement. A group
1651of us had gotten together in order to consolidate our comments so that
1652we were not providing back to the chief of staff to the Director four
1653separate drafts that they had to now reconcile.
1654
1655Mr. Meadows. Right.
1656
1657Ms. Page. So the four of us got together. We were sort of
1658reviewing it, sort of, step by step. And the recommendation was: I
1659don't think that we should use this phrase, “gross negligence," because
1660it has an actual legal term.
1661
1662And it was our collective understanding that the Department did
1663not think that -- and we agreed -- that there was not sufficient evidence
1664to support both "gross negligence" and that, more importantly, it was
1665not a sustainable statute because it was unconstitutionally vague and
1666never charged.
1667
1668And so we, really, sort of, as a collective but on recommendation
1669
1670of counsel, removed that language and moved up the “extremely careless"
1671
1672 
1673
1674paragraph.
1675 
1676Mr. Ratcliffe. Ms. Page, let me ask youa question. How well
1677do you know Jim Comey?
1678
1679Ms. Page. How well do I know Jim Comey?
1680
1681Mr. Ratcliffe. Yeah.
1682
1683Ms. Page. I mean, he's not my personal friend, but I've been in
1684a lot of meetings with him.
1685
1686Mr. Ratcliffe. Did any of the other folks that you're
1687referencing in connection with making the change have more
1688prosecutorial experience than Jim Comey?
1689
1690Ms. Page. No.
1691
1692Mr. Ratcliffe. As someone that knows Jim Comey, is he a person
1693that chooses his words carefully?
1694
1695Ms. Page. He is, yeah. But I --
1696
1697Mr. Ratcliffe. Would he throw around a term like "gross
1698negligence" not really meaning gross negligence?
1699
1700Ms. Page. In this case, I actually think so, sir, but only
1701because it's a term that obviously he was familiar with in the statute,
1702
1703but as DAG I am certain he would not have ever seen such a case. And
1704
1705the truth of the matter is 793(f) is not necessarily a particularly
1706
1707controversial statute; it's one that's used with some regularity. And
1708so I'm not sure, as I sit here today, how familiar with the detail and
1709the specifics of 793(f) he would have been.
1710
1711So my guess is he's trying to use a term that makes sense, that
1712
1713has sort of a commonsense feel to it, which "gross negligence" does
1714
1715 
1716
1717and obviously appears inthe statute. But it was sort of our assessment
1718 
1719that to use that phrase, because it does have a legal meaning, but then
1720to not charge gross negligence, as we knew it was not supportable, would
1721just be confusing.
1722
1723Mr. Ratcliffe. But you knew it was not supportable because the
1724Department of Justice told you that it wouldn't be supportable.
1725
1726Ms. Page. That's correct, sir.
1727
1728Mr. Ratcliffe. So you accepted that as the basis for which you
1729wanted to make that change?
1730
1731Ms. Page. That's correct.
1732
1733Mr. Meadows. I think we're out of time, but one last question
1734real quickly.
1735
1736So you made that determination without having interviewed the
1737last 17 witnesses and Ms. Clinton?
1738
1739Ms. Page. Yes, sir, because the legal determination wouldn't
1740have been affected by the factual -- the facts, sort of, that may have
1741come out of those investigations, right?
1742
1743So let's assume things are going swimmingly and, in fact, all 17
1744
1745of those witnesses admit, "We did it, it was on purpose, we totally
1746
1747wanted to mishandle classified information," gross negligence would
1748still have been off the table because of the Department's assessment
1749that it was vague. We would have other crimes to now charge, but gross
1750negligence would not have been among them.
1751
1752Mr. Meadows. Thank you.
1753
1754 
1755
1756[Recess. |
1757COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
1758
1759 
1760ee oe |
1761Ms. Kim. We'll go back on the record. The time is 12:10.
1762Thank you for being here, Ms. Page.
1763NNR MRO)
1764BY MS. KIM:
1765
1766Q Where you left off that discussion with Mr. Meadows, I just
1767want to read you back testimony that you gave last week and see if that
1768is responsive to the question.
1769
1770So you said it was the FBI team's understanding that, quote, "we
1771
1772neither had sufficient evidence to charge gross negligence nor had it
1773
1774ever been done because the Department viewed it as constitutionally
1775
1776Vague."
1777
1778Is that correct?
1779
1780A That's correct.
1781
1782Q And so you said that: When we saw the term gross negligence
1783in the Director's statements, we were concerned that it would be
1784confusing to leave it in there because it was our understanding that
1785we did not have sufficient evidence nor the sort of constitutional basis
1786to charge gross negligence.
1787
1788Is that correct?
1789
1790A Correct.
1791
1792Q And so you said what you actually did was you didn't change
1793the language. You -- and this is me directly quoting you. "We didn't
1794
1795actually change gross negligence to extremely careless. We removed
1796
1797 
1798
1799the gross negligence language."
1800 
1801Extremely careless had already appeared in that draft, so it was
1802Director Comey's language, was it not?
1803
1804A That's correct.
1805
1806Q And we moved that draft up earlier -- we moved that paragraph
1807earlier in the draft.
1808
1809So it was not a substitution. It was simply an omission of the
1810phrase gross negligence because the legal team believed it would be
1811ele] na EP aa) a
1812
1813Is that correct?
1814
1815A That's correct.
1816
1817Q Thank you.
1818
1819Ms. Page, there have been some other representations made about
1820your testimony last week already in the press.
1821
1822I think one representation that has been made to the press is that
1823there was an inconsistency in the way that you read a text versus the
1824way that Mr. Strzok explained the text.
1825
1826I would like to read your testimony about that text to you. The
1827text I'm talking about is the “menace” text?
1828
1829A Okay.
1830
1831Q So you stated when you were confronted with the text: "Well,
1832
1833I'm not certain, to be honest with you. I think it's Donald Trump,
1834
1835but the reason I'm hesitating is because this is so close in time to
1836the opening of the Russia investigation that the concern that we all
1837
1838had was there was a member of his campaign colluding with Russia was
1839
1840 
1841
1842so great that I'm not -- I'm not 100 percent positive that I can split
1843 
1844those."
1845
1846Do you recognize that as your testimony from last week?
1847
1848A Yes.
1849
1850Q Mr. Strzok, when asked about that same text, stated: "Sir,
1851my understanding of the word ‘menace’ and the use of ‘menace’ was the
1852broad context of the Government of Russia's attempts to interfere with
1853
1854our election. To the extent those allegations involved credible
1855
1856information that members of the Trump campaign might be actively
1857
1858colluding, I see that as a broad effort by the Government of Russia.
1859So I don't think you can tease it apart, sir, but it is inaccurate to
1860say that it just meant Mr. Trump."
1861
1862Given those two statements, would you agree with the
1863characterization that those two were incompatible statements?
1864
1865A So I think that we're trying to say the same thing. He
1866probably said it more artfully. But, again, because this text is
1867coming so close in time and it involved my both feeling about my personal
1868distaste for Donald Trump as a person, but also my now concern because
1869of the predication we had received which would open the investigation,
1870I think that what we are saying essentially is consistent.
1871
1872And ultimately, it's his -- you know, this is sort of -- whateve
1873I intended may not have been ultimately what he perceived. Soit's
1874hard to say that there is an absolute truth with respect to that -- that
18753 ke] (0 ae
1876
1877I guess the other thing I would say -- well, I guess that's
1878
1879 
1880
1881sufficient.
1882COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
1883
1884 
1885Q And, Ms. Page, I think in beginning that colloquy on Friday,
1886
1887you said you weren't certain. So that suggests to me that maybe you
1888
1889don't remember precisely what you intended.
1890
1891Is that correct?
1892
1893A Idonot. And I think I also said that -- I'm clearly
1894referring to an article or an op-ed that, I guess was about other GOP
1895leaders who weren't standing up to the President and my frustration
1896about that.
1897
1898So I don't know to the extent that that was also informing what
1899I was thinking about, but I have, as I sit here today, can't tell you
1900concretely because it was just a sort of flash in time.
1901
1902Q Understood. Thank you.
1903
1904And then one more thing. You were asked on Friday again about
1905the Christopher Steele dossier and how it came to the FBI.
1906
1907I believe you claimed that you were not really involved with how
1908the dossier came to the FBI so you weren't clear on its providence.
1909Is that correct?
1910
1911A No, that is not correct. I am very clear about its
1912providence.
1913
1914Q Oh, you're very clear about its providence?
1915
1916A How we received the reports from Christopher Steele, yes,
1917I am very clear about how we received those.
1918
1919Q Certainly. So are you also clear then as to whether Bruce
1920
1921Ohr gave those dossiers to the FBI?
1922
1923 
1924
1925A This is in the category of things that I can't answer.
1926 
1927What I can say is when we first received the set of reports that
1928
1929are commonly referred to as the dossier, that initial -- our having
1930
1931obtained those documents initially, did not come from Bruce Ohr. They
1932
1933came from Christopher Steele through his handler to the FBI.
1934Q Understood. Thank you.
1935BY MS. HARIHARAN:
1936
1937Q I just want to -- good morning.
1938
1939A Good morning. Please go ahead. I'm sorry.
1940
1941Q I just want to go back quickly to the discussion about the
1942differences between the DOJ and the FBI on compulsory process and just
1943general legal or investigative differences that may have existed during
1944the Midyear investigation.
1945
1946So generally speaking, when there were disagreements between the
1947FBI and DOJ on how to seek evidence, what was the DOJ's position, as
1948far as you can characterize? Like in the sense would the FBI generally
1949want to pursue a more aggressive stance and DOJ was more conservative,
1950and is that common in investigations overall?
1951
1952A Yes. That is true with respect to this investigation. I think
1953that even the IG found that the FBI consistently wanted to take more
1954aggressive steps in the Clinton investigation.
1955
1956It's hard to characterize, you know, two enormous institutions
1957of many tens of thousands of people monolithically. But certainly in
1958the counterintelligence realm, the Department tends to be quite
1959
1960cautious and quite conservative.
1961
1962 
1963
1964Q And in the case of the Midyear investigation, do you think
1965 
1966
1967COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
1968the career prosecutors that disagreed on pursuing a more aggressive
1969
1970stance, this was based on legitimate legal differences of opinion or
1971was it something on a -- was there a political bias involved or --
1972
1973A I'm not aware of any political bias.
1974
1975Q Inthe inspector general's report, on page 79, I'm just going
1976to quickly read the quote. Quote: "Despite the public perception
1977that the Midyear investigation did not use a grand jury and instead
1978relied exclusively on consent, we found that agents and prosecutors
1979did use grand jury subpoenas and other compulsory process to gain access
1980to documentary and digital evidence. According to the documents we
1981reviewed, at least 56 grand jury subpoenas were issued, 5 court orders
1982were obtained pursuant to 18 USC 27@3(d) orders, and 3 search warrants
1983were granted," end quote.
1984
1985Were you part of any of the decisions to issue one of the 56 grand
1986jury subpoenas?
1987
1988A I was not, no.
1989
1990Q Or the 2703(d) orders?
1991
1992A No.
1993
1994Q Were you part of any of the decisions to issue the search
1995warrants?
1996
1997A I don't think so.
1998
1999Q Generally speaking, can you speak to why the FBI advocated
2000for the use of compulsory process in this case?
2001
2002A I can't really --
2003
2004 
2005
2006Q Or before.
2007 
2008
2009COMMITTER SENSLTIVE
2010A Yeah, I can't answer that question in the abstract. So, I
2011mean, if there's a specific example you want me to speak to, I cantry,
2012but --
2013
2014Q So, again, it's just -- we're trying to understand what the
2015difference between DOJ's approach to the case versus the FBI's
2016approach. And so, again, in your experience, was the differences based
2017on legitimate legal arguments or a strategic argument?
2018
2019A I'm sure that's true, yes.
2020
2021BY MS. KIM:
2022
2023Q So let's take from the abstract to the specific. So I think you
2024were talking about the culling laptops and the server, the decision
2025whether to pursue those through compulsory process or to obtain those
2026through consent agreements.
2027
2028In your interactions with Department of Justice personnel, were
2029their arguments that those should be pursued through consent processes
2030governed by what you saw as differences of opinion from you that were
2031legitimate and grounded in legal justification?
2032
2033A Yeah, I would say so. We -- what I personally found
2034frustrating is the Department would sort of make a determination
2035
2036that -- part of the argument was that we would not be able to obtain
2037
2038the laptops pursuant to compulsory process, which I -- as to my own
2039
2040personal experience -- disagreed with. I thought that we would be able
2041to. Maybe there might be strategic reasons not to, there might be other
2042
2043reasons not to.
2044
2045 
2046
2047But I disagreed sort of foundationally that it would not be
2048COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
2049
2050 
2051available to us because we would not be able to make out the standard,
2052or to be able to pierce attorney-client privilege, or more likely, in
2053my view, there was a disagreement about whether it was -- the sorting
2054
2055activity conducted by Mills and Samuelson was opinion work product,
2056
2057which is quite protected under the law, versus some other privilege.
2058
2059And so the frustration was in their sort of unwillingness to
2060explain their reasoning. They sort of, for many -- for some
2061time -- simply stated, as a matter of course: We can't, and we won't
2062be able to.
2063
2064And it was my view that that was not the case. And I did my own
2065research with respect to that topic because I was frustrated. And so
2066we had sort of an ongoing back and forth about that.
2067
2068But, yes, it was grounded in, you know, legal disagreement
2069Venn hee a
2070
2071And was it the subject of rigorous and vigorous debate?
2072
2073SA
2074
2075Extensive debate where you were free to express your point
2076of view?
2077
2078A AAT
2079
2080Q And extensive debate where the DOJ did eventually express
2081its point of view about its strategic justifications?
2082
2083A NT
2084
2085Q And do you have any reason or evidence to believe that those
2086
2087strategic decisions were based on improper considerations, including
2088
2089 
2090
2091political bias?
2092 
2093
2094COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
2095A No, I do not. TI have no reason to believe that.
2096
2097Ms. Hariharan. Did any of the senior political leaders of the
2098DOJ intervene at all in the decision to seek or not seek compulsory
2099process?
2100
2101Ms. Page. With respect to that decision, yes.
2102
2103So this was very much a -- we were at very much a standstill for
2104a considerable amount of time. And it's my understanding -- I know
2105for sure that Mr. McCabe had multiple conversations with George Toscas
2106on the topic because we all, including up through the Director, just
2107agreed that we could not credibly end this investigation without having
2108attempted to obtain those laptops and search them.
2109
2110And we were sort of not making progress trying to explain or
2111
2112convince the Department prosecutors, the line prosecutors involved in
2113
2114the investigation, of this feeling. And even though we kept invoking
2115
2116the Director, and we would sort of say, like, we are not going to close
2117this thing until we have tried to get this, they didn't see it as useful.
2118
2119They didn't think it was going to change the outcome of the
2120investigation, which we agreed with. We didn't have a reason to think
2121it would change the outcome of the investigation.
2122
2123It wasn't about thinking that for sure there would be different
2124evidence in those laptops. It was about our credibility to be able
2125to say that we ran down every sort of necessary investigative lead.
2126
2127And so because we had sort of reached a stalemate a number of times
2128
2129on this discussion, I know that it was elevated to certainly the Deputy
2130
2131 
2132
2133Director and George Toscas.
2134 
2135If I'm not mistaken, I think that even the Director may have had
2136
2137a conversation with Sally Yates, the DAG, about it, but I'm not
2138positive. If it occurred it's in the IG report, but I don't recall
2139exactly.
2140
2141BY MS. KIM:
2142
2143Q So that call seems to be DOJ expressing at the highest -- or
2144excuse me -- the FBI expressing at its highest levels the decision to
2145pursue a certain investigative step and convincing the Department to
2146come along with the FBI's reasoning. Is that accurate?
2147
2148A Not its legal reasoning, but its strategic reasoning, yes.
2149
2150Q That's -- yes. Thank you.
2151
2152Are you aware of any instances where it went the other way, where
2153the FBI wanted to take strident action but a senior political official
2154at the DOJ had to talk the FBI down in the Clinton email case?
2155
2156Let me try to -- let me try -- you look puzzled, so I mean --
2157
2158Yeah, I --
2159
2160Let the record reflect you look puzzled.
2161
2162Ove
2163
2164Let my try to explain a little bit more clearly what I mean.
2165
2166I think the concern here is that there was a Democratically led
2167political DOJ in charge of an investigation where a prominent Democrat
2168was the subject and target.
2169
2170Are you aware of any instances where senior political leaders at
2171
2172the Department of Justice intervened to counsel or order the FBI to
2173
2174 
2175
2176not seek a compulsory process?
2177 
2178A No, not to my knowledge.
2179Q So you are not aware of Loretta Lynch or Sally Yates
2180intervening to stop the FBI?
2181A No, not to my knowledge.
2182BY MS. HARIHARAN:
2183Q Okay. So I just want to move on to just sort of general
2184
2185questions about the FBI'sinvestigative techniques. And I know some
2186
2187of these -- this was somewhat addressed earlier, but just to clarify
2188
2189a couple things.
2190
2191On May 18th, 2018, President Trump tweeted, quote: "Apparently
2192the DOJ put a spy in the Trump campaign. This has never been done
2193before. And by any means necessary, they're out to frame Donald Trump
2194
2195for crimes he didn't commit," end quote.
2196Are you aware of any information that would substantiate the
2197President's claims that the DOJ put a spy in the Trump campaign?
2198No.
2199Does the FBI place spies in U.S. political campaigns?
2200Not the current FBI.
2201Are you aware of any information that would substantiate the
2202President's claim that DOJ is out to frame him?
2203A No.
2204Q In your experience -- and this goes back a little bit to our
2205
2206discussion on Friday about contacts with human informants -- does the
2207
2208FBI use spies in any of its investigative techniques?
2209
2210 
2211
2212A We call them sources. They're not spies exactly, but --
2213 
2214Q Can you, as much as -- again, understanding you were not a
2215counterintelligence official -- can you explain for the record the
2216difference between a human informant as the FBI specifically uses that
2217term and sort of the layman term that is often used in the media of
2218a spy?
2219
2220A The spy is somebody acting on behalf of a foreign government
2221in order to collect intelligence against that government.
2222
2223So, you know, a spy is commonly, you know, discussed with respect
2224to like an individual who is acting on behalf of a foreign
2225government -- say, like Russia or China or, who knows, Iran -- and is
2226in the United States trying to collect information in order to advance
2227its country's goals.
2228
2229A confidential human source is somebody who has access to
2230
2231information which may be relevant to an FBI investigation or may, him
2232
2233or herself, have engaged in criminal activity and has agreed to
2234cooperate with the government and collect additional information with
2235respect to the criminal activity he or her was -- he or she was engaged
2236ae
2237
2238Q Have you been involved in any investigations where the FBI
2239did not follow the established procedures on the use of confidential
2240human informants?
2241
2242A Me personally? Not to my knowledge.
2243
2244Q Have you ever been involved in a DOJ or FBI investigatio
2245
2246conducted for political purposes?
2247
2248 
2249
2250yay Never.
2251 
2252Q Have you ever been involved in a DOJ or FBI investigation
2253that attempted to frame U.S. citizens for crimes they did not commit?
2254
2255ry No, ma'am.
2256
2257Q Have you been part of any investigation where the FBI or DOJ
2258used politically biased, unverified sources to obtain a FISA warrant?
2259
2260A No
2261
2262Q Are you aware of any instances where the FBI and DOJ
2263manufactured evidence in order to obtain a FISA warrant?
2264
2265A Never.
2266
2267Q Are you aware of the FISA court ever approving an FBI or DOJ
2268warrant that was not based on credible or sufficient evidence, in your
2269experience?
2270
2271A No, not to my knowledge.
2272
2273Q Are you aware of any attempts by the FBI or DOJ to
2274intentionally mislead FISA court judges in an application for a FISA
2275warrant by either omitting evidence or manufacturing evidence?
2276
2277AN No, ma'am.
2278
2279Q Are you aware of any instances at the FBI and DOJ of an
2280investigation failing to follow proper procedures to obtain a FISA
2281rel alar- lanes
2282
2283A No.
2284
2285Q I'm going to quote the President when I say this. On
2286
2287May 20th, 2018he tweeted: “I hereby demand and will do so officially
2288
2289tomorrow that the Department of Justice look into whether or not the
2290
2291 
2292
2293FBI/DOJ infiltrated or surveilled the Trump campaign for political
2294COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
2295
2296 
2297purposes and if any such demands or requests were made by people within
2298the Obama Administration!", exclamation point, end quote.
2299
2300Does the FBI conduct investigations to frame U.S. citizens for
2301crimes they did not commit?
2302
2303A No, ma'am.
2304
2305Q Then at a political rally on May 29th, 2018, the President
2306again stated, quote: "So how do you like the fact they had people
2307infiltrating our campaign?" end quote.
2308
2309Did the FBI or DOJ ever investigate the Trump campaign for, quote,
2310"political purposes"?
2311
2312A No.
2313
2314Q Did the FBI or DOJ ever, quote, "infiltrate or surveil," end
2315quote, the Trump campaign?
2316
2317A No.
2318
2319Q To your knowledge, did President Obama or anyone in his White
2320
2321House ever, quote, “demand or request," end quote, that the DOJ or FBI,
2322
2323again, quote, “infiltrate or surveil,” end quote, the Trump campaign
2324
2325for, quote, "political purposes"?
2326A No, ma‘am.
2327
2328Mr. Krishnamoorthi. I just have a couple of quick questions for
2329
2330First of all, I know that we covered this a little bit, I think,
2331on Friday, but can you talk a little bit about your role on the Clinton
2332
2333investigation? How did you view it? And what was kind of the
2334
2335 
2336
2337limitations on your authority?
2338 
2339
2340COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
2341Ms. Page. So, as I have tried to describe, I'm not on the team
2342with respect to -- so the team is comprised of the following: case
2343agents, like line agents who are doing sort of the day-to-day
2344investigative activity, line analysts engaged in the same activity,
2345a supervisor, forensic people, I think a forensic accountant, cyber
2346people, support staff, and then, up the chain, sort of more senior FBI
2347agents supervising the investigation.
2348
2349I am none of those people -- lawyers, of course -- I am none of
2350those people. My job was to support the Deputy Director in all the
2351activity that the Deputy Director supervised.
2352
2353So we're talking today just about the Clinton investigation and
2354
2355the Russia investigation, but, of course, I assisted the deputy with
2356
2357all of the responsibilities, save for limited ones like HR and budget
2358
2359and sort of personnel-type matters, all of the activities for which
2360he was responsible. So that would be any number of investigations at
2361Tame =) Oe (=
2362
2363And with each of those I played both sort of a sounding board-type
2364of role, to sort of discuss my opinion or his view as to what particular
2365step we should take or whether we should, you know, brief the White
2366House or Congress or X-activity or Y-activity.
2367
2368So at a very high-level kind of macro-decisionmaking on all manner
2369of activity, but also to stay kind of with my ear to the ground on the
2370topics that would sort of come before him.
2371
2372So, for example, if there was a meeting that was going to be held
2373
2374 
2375
2376about a particular cyber operation or some type of activity, I might
2377 
2378reach out to the program managers who were responsible for that activity
2379
2380in order to get a sense of what this is, why is it coming to the deputy,
2381
2382is there a conflict, is there a disagreement --
2383
2384Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Got it.
2385
2386Ms. Page. -- you know, was he going to be deciding something,
2387so that we had a little bit of preparedness for the topic that was coming
2388to him.
2389
2390Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Got it.
2391
2392So just so I understand it, basically you don't have any
2393supervisory role --
2394
2395Mr. Page. No, sir.
2396
2397Mr. Krishnamoorthi. -- with regards to this investigation?
2398You're not a member of the team on this investigation, correct?
2399
2400Ms. Page. That's correct.
2401
2402Mr. Krishnamoorthi. You don't have a supervisory role,
2403certainly.
2404
2405Ms. Page. I do not have a supervisory role or a decisionmaking
2406role.
2407
2408Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And what percentage of your overall time was
2409spent on this investigation?
2410
2411Ms. Page. Oh, my goodness.
2412
2413Me. Krishnamoorthi. If you just had toballpark it. Probably
2414a minimal amount, wouldn't you say?
2415
2416Ms. Page. No, it wasn't minimal, but it wasn't the majority
2417
2418 
2419
2420either. Gosh, I really -- I have -- I cannot speculate --
2421 
2422
2423COMMITTEBR SENSITIVE
2424Mr. Krishnamoorthi. So less than 5@ percent of your time.
2425
2426Ms. Page. Yes, that's fair.
2427
2428Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Okay. So let's say, let's say that you had
2429these political views expressed in your text messages -- and you can
2430see why people would be concerned about that. And let's say you wanted
2431to railroad this investigation a certain way.
2432
2433Ms. Page. The Clinton investigation.
2434
2435Mr. Krishnamoorthi. The Clinton investigation in a certain say,
2436
2437and you wanted your political views to actually translate into biased
2438
2439actions. It seems to me that you had no opportunity or ability to do
2440
2441that because you had no supervisory role on this investigation team,
2442you weren't a member of this team. Even if you wanted to, you'd have
2443to go through your Deputy Director McCabe to do anything in terms of
2444taking action. Is that right?
2445
2446Ms. Page. That's fair, sir. I guess --
2447
2448Mr. Krishnamoorthi. So -- go ahead.
2449
2450Ms. Page. I guess the other thing I would flag is that I think -- I
2451mean, obviously you, the public, many have tens of thousands of my
2452texts. I think there are, I don't know, maybe two or three total in
2453which there's anything favorable said about Hillary Clinton atall.
2454
2455And the note -- the fact that before July 28th when we received
2456the predicating information for the Russia investigation, the fact that
2457I didn't care for Donald Trump is not particularly relevant to me with
2458
2459respect to the investigation we were conducting onHillary Clinton.
2460
2461 
2462
2463The two of them had nothing to -- you know, my opinions on him
2464COMMITTER SENSITIVE
2465
2466 
2467had nothing to do with whether or not she in fact handled -- mishandled
2468classified information.
2469
2470You know, I don't -- I don't -- what's been frustrating and what
2471has sort of strained credulity to me is that the sort of pejorative
2472texts about Donald Trump that I make before July 28th are just my
2473feeling about him personally and don't really have any bearing with
2474respect to how I feel about Secretary Clinton.
2475
2476So it just -- anyway, it just strikes me as how I feel about Donald
2477Trump doesn't really have any bearing with respect to whether or not
2478Secretary Clinton mishandled information. And the reality is, as I've
2479sort of said, I wasn't particularly fond or favorable toward Secretary
2480Clinton.
2481
2482And during the course of the investigation, you know, as we've
2483discussed a number of times, both Pete and I were regularly the people
2484advocating for the most aggressive course of action with respect to
2485the Clinton investigation.
2486
2487Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And what would be, in your view, kind of the
2488best example that would show that you took that type of approach?
2489
2490Ms. Page. It was true certainly with respect to the laptops that
2491
2492we've discussed. I mean, we were -- we were -- sort of adamantly fought
2493
2494the need to get those laptops, which Secretary Clinton's people were
2495adamantly fighting us sort of not to obtain, and the Department did
2496not want us to obtain those.
2497
2498Let me -- I'll have to think about other examples, but there's,
2499
2500 
2501
2502I think, two or three that -- at least I discussed with the IG in the
2503COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
2504
2505 
2506past, that where we sort of disagreed with the Department. And itwas
2507Pete and I sort of advocating the more aggressive position against
2508Secretary Clinton.
2509Mr. Krishnamoorthi Gotit. Okay. If you guys want to take it.
2510Thank you.
2511Ms. Page. You're welcome.
2512BY MS. KIM:
2513
2514Q Ms. Page, Republicans have repeatedly raised questions about
2515
2516why the FBI did not provide the Trump campaign with a defensive briefing
2517
2518about Russians attempt to infiltrate the campaign.
2519
2520We understand from public reportings that senior officials from
2521the FBI gave a high-level counterintelligence briefing to the Trump
2522campaign after he became the presumptive Republican nominee in
2523July 2016.
2524
2525In that briefing we also know that FBI officials reportedly warned
2526the Trump campaign about potential threats from foreign spies and
2527instructed the Trump campaign to inform the FBI about any suspicious
2528overtures.
2529
2530Did you have any involvement in giving these briefings to the
2531Trump campaign?
2532
2533A Iwas not present for the briefings to the Trump campaign,
2534
2535Q Did you receive readouts from the briefings?
2536
2537A I did.
2538
2539 
2540
2541Q Is it true that senior FBI officials warned the Trump
2542 
2543campaign as early as July 2016 that Russians would try to infiltrate
2544the Trump campaign?
2545
2546A Idon't recall that specifically, but I don't have any reason
2547to disagree with you.
2548
2549Q Would the briefing have touched on how the campaign should
2550react to offers from foreign nations to interfere in our elections?
2551
2552A I don't think a briefing would have been that specific. I
2553think we would have -- as is the case in a typical defensive brief -- I
2554
2555think that we would have flagged if you encounter activity which you
2556
2557believe is suspicious, particularly from threat countries, that they
2558
2559should notify the FBI.
2560
2561Q To your knowledge, did the Trump campaign report any contacts
2562with foreign officials during this briefing?
2563
2564A I'm not sure.
2565
2566Q So are you aware of the Trump campaign reporting contacts
2567between George Papadopoulos and Russian officials?
2568
2569A Oh, no, I don't believe that occurred.
2570
2571Q Do you recall the Trump campaign reporting the June 2016
2572Trump Tower meeting with senior campaign officials including Donald
2573Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort?
2574
2575Mr. Bessee. So I will -- sorry -- I will instruct the witness
2576not to answer anything that goes into the special counsel's equities
2577and the ongoing criminal investigation. So that would impact that
2578
2579particular --
2580
2581 
2582
2583Ms. Kim. Thank you.
2584 
2585
2586COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
2587Ms. Page. Thank you. Sorry.
2588
2589Ms. Kim. Two weeks after this briefing, on August 3rd, 2016,
2590Donald Trump Jr. reportedly met at Trump Tower with an emissary who
2591told Donald Trump Jr. that the princes who led Saudi Arabia and the
2592United Emirates were eager to help his father win election as
2593President.
2594
2595To your knowledge, did Donald Trump Jr. report this offer from
2596the Saudis and the Emiratis to the FBI?
2597
2598Mr. Bessee. Again, anything that goes into the ongoing criminal
2599investigation or anything that impacts that, the witness will not
2600respond to -- will not be able to respond to those questions.
2601
2602Ms. Kim. Thank you.
2603
2604BY MS. KIM:
2605
2606Q Ms. Page, can you explain generally the national security
2607
2608implications for a political campaign concealing or failing to report
2609
2610foreign contacts of offers to interfere in our election?
2611
2612A Well, this is -- I'mnot sure it's a commonplace occurrence.
2613But speaking generally, an effort to affect an American election is
2614obviously a quite serious one, regardless of -- voting and the
2615democratic process is obviously sort of a foundational backbone to what
2616makes America America.
2617
2618So any effort by a foreign power to intercede or intervene in any
2619way is of grave concern. It would be even more so if it was in fact
2620
2621true that a political campaign was working with a foreign power in order
2622
2623 
2624
2625to affect an American election.
2626 
2627
2628COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
2629Q And again to your knowledge, a defensive briefing of this
2630nature would have involved general instruction to report outreach from
2631target foreign countries to the FBI?
2632
2633A I'm sorry, I don't -- I have to take issue with the nature
2634of your question.
2635
2636You're suggesting that a defensive briefing with respect to an
2637involvement or an intrusion into the American election may have taken
2638place and I don't think I have answered that question.
2639
2640What I have answered is that I am aware that a defensive briefing
2641with respect to foreign powers and what foreign powers may -- how
2642foreign powers may try to contact you -- collective -- your campaign
2643collectively, now that you are the presumptive candidate, and how you
2644should handle that.
2645
2646But I don't think I have answered a question with respect to a
2647defensive briefing about interference in an American election.
2648
2649Q That is fair. Thank you for clarifying.
2650
2651And in a general defensive briefing about general foreign
2652
2653threats, is there a general guidance given that foreign threats should
2654
2655be reported to the FBI?
2656
2657A AT
2658
2659Q.=~Thank you.
2660
2661I think that leads us to -- leads us well to the question of why
2662the FBI, particularly the counterintelligence officials at the FBI who
2663
2664were working both on the Midyear investigation and on the Russia
2665
2666 
2667
2668collusion investigation, were prioritizing the Russia collusion
2669 
2670investigation in the September/October timeframe.
2671
2672The inspector general's report was not favorable to Mr. Strzok
2673in this regard. It characterized his prioritization of the Russia
2674collusion investigation as perhaps indicative of some kind of political
2675bias.
2676
2677I think you were there. You sawMr. Strzok's workload. And you
2678
2679ere intimately familiar with both investigations.
2680
2681Do you have a general response to that finding by the inspector
2682general?
2683
2684A Ido. I am honestly baffled that they would find such a
2685
2686thing. And I do believe that they did the best they could to conduct
2687
2688that investigation fairly. And I cannot understand, particularly in
2689
2690light of what I know I said to them, I cannot understand how they could
2691reach that conclusion.
2692
2693What we were dealing with at the outset was -- this is now, you
2694know, October. This is a month before the election. AndI can't speak
2695to whether we were any closer to determining whether there was in fact
2696collusion, because I'm precluded from doing so right now, but we are
2697still looking very seriously at whether our most threatening, most
2698hostile foreign power was engaged in -- was working with an American
2699political candidate or members of that candidate's team to affect the
2700outcome of an American election.
2701
2702It is an unheard-of investigation, in the first place, in the
2703
2704counterintelligence realm. Russians engage in all manner of nefarious
2705
2706 
2707
2708activity, but this was a new height in terms of brazenness -- if
2709 
2710true -- in terms of brazenness.
2711
2712And with respect to how threatening that would be -- again, if
2713it were true -- the notion that there might be more emails that have
2714not previously been seen that existed on Hillary Clinton's email server
2715just simply don't even enter into the realm of the same room of
2716seriousness.
2717
2718The Clinton investigation involved activities that had taken
2719place 3 years prior. It's anentirely historical investigation. Even
2720
2721if -- even if there had been dispositive evidence which revealed -- I
2722
2723don't know what -- even there, which would be a very serious allegation,
2724
2725in my assessment, and I think in the assessment of the
2726Counterintelligence Division, they still don't even come close to the
2727threat posed if Russia had co-opted a member of a political campaign.
2728
2729So that alone is really baffling to me, that they equated the sort
2730of two investigations.
2731
2732Furthermore -- and this is based on my own personal
2733knowledge -- almost as soon as we discovered that there may be these
2734additional emails, that was assigned to people who were not involved
2735in the Russia investigation.
2736
2737So it would not have been Pete's responsibility in the first place
2738to have engaged and conducted that investigation. He's the lead of
2739it. He's not the one who's going to go to New York. He's not the one
2740who's going to, like, do the forensics on it, like.
2741
2742And so it made, in my mind, perfect sense what he did, because
2743
2744 
2745
2746he called on people who had been on the Clinton investigation, who were
2747COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
2748
2749 
2750not on the Russia investigation, to follow up and find out what the
2751facts were, whether it was worth our while.
2752
2753Because I will say, it's not as though every time there was any
2754allegation that there might be a new email that lives, you know, in
2755Peoria, not every one of those was -- necessitated investigative
2756activity.
2757
2758The only reason that this one ultimately got our attention, and
2759this only occurred, to my recollection, later in October, is because
2760of the volume of the emails which potentially existed on Mr. Weiner's
2761laptop.
2762
2763At the time that we first got the information, I'm not aware of
2764
2765that having been told to us. I don't recall in late September, early
2766
2767October, when I first found out by the Weiner laptop, I don't recall
2768being told that it was, you know, tens of thousands of Hillary Clinton
2769and Huma emails.
2770
2771We knew that there were many tens of thousands, if not hundreds
2772of thousands of emails on Mr. Weiner's laptop, but it's not -- my
2773recollection is that it's not until later into October do we actually
2774learn that, no, no, these actually might be relevant and from a relevant
2775timeframe.
2776
2777Ms. Hariharan. Can you describe the extent of the overlap
2778between folks who were on the MYE team and folks who were on the
2779Trump-Russia team? Because, you know, it's reported as if they are
2780
2781the same.
2782
2783 
2784
2785Ms. Page. They are not the same. What is the same are the sort
2786 
2787of senior people. And that makes sense because there are fewer people
2788who are in a senior position who could supervise the investigation.
2789
2790So you have to understand, like, for example, in the
2791Counterintelligence Division, there are three DADs, there are three
2792deputy assistant directors, one of whom is analyst, so not an agent,
2793not somebody who you would expect to run an investigation, and then
2794there are two other ones. One was Pete and one -- I'm not sure when
2795it was filled, but was open for a short period of time.
2796
2797So with respect to the personnel writ large, almost everyone below
2798Pete and Jon Moffa in the Counterintelligence Division in terms of the
2799agents who were working on the Russia investigation, almost all of
2800them -- I think all of them, in fact -- are different from the
2801line-level agents and analysts who worked on the Clinton
2802investigation.
2803
2804And this was in part, too, because everybody was exhausted. We
2805had worked incredibly hard and as fast as we possibly could on the
2806Clinton investigation. And the truth of the matter was, those of us
2807who were on Clinton and who stayed over for Russia all just really
2808couldn't believe ourselves that we had to sort of gear up again, you
2809
2810know, 3 weeks after being finally done with Clinton and finally being
2811
2812able to get back to all of our day jobs, that we were sort of gearing
2813
2814back up again.
2815So it's only -- really it's the people that met with Jim Comey.
2816
2817Those are the only people that were really the same with respect to
2818
2819 
2820
2821both teams. So it's the same general counsel, the same deputy general
2822 
2823counsel, me, Mr. McCabe, Dave Bowdich.
2824
2825The EAD for National Security Branch changed, but that was just
2826because of regular personnel turnover. Bill Priestap was the same.
2827Pete was the same. Jon Moffa was the same.
2828
2829But other than that, all of the rest of the personnel were, to
2830the best of my knowledge -- there could have been one or two -- but
2831all of the rest of the personnel on the Clinton team and the Russia
2832team were different.
2833
2834BY MS. KIM:
2835
2836Q Was there anything about the timeframe in which the Weiner
2837
2838laptop was processed that seemed unusual to you? So that's to say,
2839
2840would it have been unusual for imaging and processing that kind of data
2841to take more than a few weeks?
2842
2843A No, it happens all the time. And especially with a laptop
2844that was as voluminous as Mr. Weiner's was, the forensic work and the
2845processing and the imaging regularly crashes and stops and has to be
2846done again.
2847
2848I don't know precisely how long it took, but the notion that it
2849took a week or 2 as being unusual -- particularly, because it was not
2850a priority the case for the New York field office -- I should -- let
2851me take that back.
2852
2853There was nothing about it that necessitated an exigency to the
2854New York field office. This was a potential child exploitation case
2855
2856but, again, I don't think that there was an allegation that there was
2857
2858 
2859
2860ongoing exploitation.
2861 
2862And so I don't know how the New York field office chose to
2863
2864prioritize it with respect to all of the other work that they were doing,
2865
2866but there's nothing about it, to me, that stands out as necessitating,
2867
2868you know, an emergency, you know, imaging.
2869
2870Q Did you personally observe any evidence suggesting that
2871Mr. Strzok was prioritizing the Russia investigation at the cost of
2872the Hillary Clinton email investigation reopening?
2873
2874A Well, I mean the answer is we were prioritizing the Russia
2875investigation because it was more important and more serious. But I
2876wouldn't say that it was a zero-sum issue because he didn't neglect
2877the Clinton investigation. He assigned it to the people who would
2878appropriately have to handle it.
2879
2880Q Yes. Are you aware of any evidence that Mr. Strzok or anyone on
2881the Midyear investigation team was trying to bury the existence of the
2882Weiner laptop or the data found therefrom?
2883
2884ry No, not at all.
2885
2886Ms. Hariharan. Are you aware of any evidence that Mr. Strzok
2887prioritized because of his political biases or was it because of just
2888how serious the Russia investigation and how grave a threat it was?
2889
2890Ms. Page. It's the latter. It's because the Russia
2891investigation was a serious threat to the national security. Whether
2892there are additional classified emails on a laptop that didn't belong
2893to Secretary Clinton just, in my view, did not rank in the same way.
2894
2895BY MS. KIM:
2896
2897 
2898
2899Q And I just want to be clear of the nomenclature. When we
2900COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
2901
2902 
2903talk about the Russia collusion investigation in this timeframe,
2904candidate Donald Trump is not the subject of that investigation. Is
2905that correct?
2906
2907A That's correct.
2908
2909Q I believe that's what Director Comey has publicly stated.
2910
2911LN
2912
2913So it was a very narrowly scoped, very discrete investigation,
2914
2915because we understood the gravity of what it was we were looking at,
2916
2917and we were not going to take a more extreme step than we felt we could
2918soeee a
2919
2920Ms. Kim. I think we're okay going off the record at this point
2921for a lunch break until 1:30.
2922
2923Thank you.
2924
2925 
2926
2927eae
2928 
2929
2930COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
2931Seto ee
2932Mr. Parmiter. Let's gobackontherecord. The time is 1:30 p.m.
2933BY MR. PARMITER:
2934Q And, Ms. Page, I just had a couple of followup questions from
2935things that were discussed in the first hour.
2936
2937You had mentioned that charges -- it had been determined that
2938
2939charges were not sustainable under 793()(1) in particular. I'm just
2940
2941curious whether there are elements of that statute that were not
2942satisfied in the case or was it just the gross negligence issue --
2943
2944A I think --
2945
2946¢) -- that led to that conclusion?
2947
2948A Sorry.
2949
2950I think that it was both. But honestly, I'm not positive as I
2951sit here today. Because if the statute is unconstitutional, it doesn't
2952matter if you have all the evidence in the world, you can't bring that
2953case.
2954
2955So I think that I have said -- and I think that the minority staff
2956read back to me -- a comment that it was both insufficient evidence
2957and unconstitutionally vague. And I guess I'm not certain about the
2958first point, about insufficient evidence, because it doesn't really
2959ultimately matter what the evidence shows if the statute is -- is not
2960constitutional.
2961
2962Q Okay. But, I mean, would you agree that, you know, the
2963
2964Secretary of State is someone who's lawfully entrusted with classified
2965
2966 
2967
2968information and that a private server is not the place -- if classified
2969COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
2970
2971 
2972information is stored on anything other than a classified server or
2973system, it would be out of its proper place?
2974
2975Ay That is correct, sir.
2976
2977Q Okay. To your knowledge and in your experience, did DOJ ever
2978inform you of any other statutes that are unconstitutionally vague?
2979
2980A In the history of my being at the FBI and DOJ?
2981
2982Q Do you recall any --
2983
2984A I'm not positive, to be honest with you. I mean, the truth
2985of the matter is the counterespionage section at the Department, as
2986I think I've said, is just conservative by nature and cautious by
2987nature, very much to the frustration of the FBI.
2988
2989And I've certainly been present with a number of meetings in which
2990
2991they didn't want to prosecute or they didn't want to bring charges on
2992
2993totally unrelated investigations, but didn't -- couldn't necessarily
2994articulate what was insufficient about the evidence or -- so, I mean,
2995this is -- I guess what I'm trying to say is this is a little -- it's
2996a somewhat institutional fact aswell. But whether other statutes were
2997vague, I just don't remember.
2998
2999Q = Okay.
3000
3001BY MR. SOMERS:
3002
3003Q Do you remember any discussion of whether the Logan Act could
3004oY =Mmeu aT] ar o4=10 ira
3005
3006A With respect to Secretary Clinton?
3007
3008Q with respect to anybody.
3009
3010 
3011
3012A On the Clinton investigation, I don't remember a discussion
3013 
3014of the Logan Act.
3015
3016Q On the Russia investigation?
3017
3018A TIamprivy to conversations about the Logan Act in the Russia
3019investigation.
3020
3021Q Was it allowed to be charged?
3022
3023A I don't think it's been charged.
3024
3025Q My question is whether -- you were told that the gross
3026negligence part of --
3027
3028Oh, I see what you're saying.
3029
3030-- 793 could not be charged. I'm asking whether you were
3031
3032SATs
3033-- that the Logan Act could or could not be charged.
3034So I -- okay, so let me see how I can answer this.
3035
3036There were discussions about the Logan Act with the Department
3037and similar concerns, not about the constitutionality of the statute,
3038but about the age and the lack of use of the Logan Act. I did
3039participate in conversations with the Department about it being an
3040untested statute and a very, very old one, and so there being
3041substantial litigation risk, not unlike, although this comparison was
3042
3043never made, but not unlike the gross negligence statute.
3044
3045This would -- this would be a -- a risk, a strategic and litigation
3046
3047risk, to charge a statute that had not sort of been well-tested.
3048
3049Q But the gross negligence part of 793, that was a clearly it
3050
3051 
3052
3053couldn't be charged versus a -- I think you just described it as a
3054 
3055litigation risk with respect to the Logan Act?
3056
3057A With respect to gross negligence, that is correct, sir. I'm
3058sorry, that it could not be charged or should not be charged, because
3059it was -- I think it’s both. It was not constitutional but also
3060untested, which goes to the question about its constitutionality, I
3061think. So I think they're somewhat intermingled, those two, with
3062respect to gross negligence.
3063
3064Mr. Parmiter. Mr. Meadows.
3065
3066Mr. Meadows. Thank you.
3067
3068Lisa, I'm going to go over a few text messages. None of them are
3069personal. And so I just want to really try to get some clarification
3070from you.
3071
3072I probably have read more text messages that have been published
3073
3074and nonpublished, and even on some of the redacted words that originally
3075
3076were redacted that you may be able to help me get a good understanding
3077
3078of what's there.
3079
3080So early on, in August -- well, first off, is there a difference,
3081from an FBI's perspective, of a confidential human source and a
3082confidential informant? Because I read the FBI manual, and it seems
3083like one gets treated one way and another gets -- but from your
3084perspective, they're one and the same?
3085
3086Ms. Page. I -- the term that we use for it is a confidential human
3087source. A more, I guess, layman term would be an informant. But to my
3088
3089knowledge there is no distinction with respect to the rules which
3090
3091 
3092
3093govern a source's activity. These are one and the same.
3094 
3095
3096COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
3097Mr. Meadows. Because one of the things I was reading indicated
3098that I guess when we have confidential human sources that we pay there's
3099a whole litany of things that the FBI and DOJ have to go through on
3100those confidential human sources that we actually pay.
3101
3102Are you aware of that?
3103
3104Ms. Page. Ithink there are -- I'mnot sure there -- I'mnot sure
3105
3106about that, sir. There are certainly rules with respect to paying a
3107
3108source, but the -- with respect to opening a source and how you handle
3109a source and the admonitions that you provide a source, those are the
3110same regardless of whether a source is paid or not.
3111
3112Mr. Meadows. Okay. Ina text message back and forth between you
3113and Peter Strzok shortly after he returned salar ee |
3114article that came out and it was “Inside the Failing Mission to Save
3115Donald Trump From Himself."
3116
3117And in the redacted portion, it says: But see, this article so
3118rings true that then I think that the confidential human source was
3119[redacted] is wrong is [redacted].
3120
3121Were you aware of any time where you felt like you questioned the
3122confidential human source, as this text would indicate?
3123
3124Ms. Page. Can you, do you mind, could you --
3125
3126Mr. Meadows. Yes. It would have been on the August 13th of 2016,
3127at 13:22:29, or 27, I guess. You're going back and forth talking about
3128302s with the State Department and --
3129
3130Ms. Page. So are we talking about Clinton then it sounds like?
3131
3132 
3133
3134August --
3135 
3136
3137COMMITTEB SENSITIVE
3138Mr. Meadows. Well, I don't -- the Clinton investigation would
3139ave been over with at that point.
3140
3141Ms. Page. That's true. I'm sorry, sir, the date again?
3142
3143Mr. Meadows. It would have been August 13th of 2016. It was
3144about 2 weeks after Russia opened.
3145
3146Ms. Page. Okay.
3147
3148Mr. Meadows. Russia opens. Peter Strzok travels
3149Peter Strzok . And you're going back and
3150forth, apparently mad because the State Department says, you know --
3151
3152Ms. Page. So we're talking about two different things. So the
3153
3154State -- let me just take a second and look at this.
3155
3156So there's no debate. So this is me. I'm sorry, so a couple
3157
3158texts up, this is Pete: Hey, read the email I just sent. I did not
3159include OPA or OCI in the distro. I'm responding, I don't know what
3160the email is, but: There's nodebate. I'm going to forward to Kortan.
3161God, it makes me want to tell State to go F it.
3162
3163So we're talking about Clinton now. And what I suspect we're
3164talking about is needing -- you know, there's still things that we need.
3165I don't know whether it's -- whether we're producing in FOIA or what
3166we're talking about. But there, I think --
3167
3168Mr. Meadows. Then you switch, I guess, to the confidential human
3169source.
3170
3171Ms. Page. Yes, I thinkthat's right. Sothen: Yep, you think
3172
3173we would have -- you think we should have commented if only to rebut
3174
3175 
3176
3177State's expectation of interagency coordination crap.
3178 
3179
3180COMMITTBER SENSITIVE
3181I think that there was like a press conference or something that
3182we were pissed about that State was essentially saying, like, maligning
3183the FBI. This is normal interagency, you know, kind of --
3184
3185Mr. Meadows. Right, right.
3186
3187Ms. Page. So the same thing with the next one.
3188
3189Mr. Meadows. So it is right after that where you talk about not
3190believing the confidential human source, or believing that --
3191
3192Ms. Page. Is that what that -- so I don't know what that --
3193
3194Mr. Meadows. Yeah. In the redacted, it says, I think -- and
3195I'll give you the redaction -- that » the other redacted
3196word.
3197
3198So I guess the question becomes is, at any point did you question
3199
3200area e alo a » as this text message
3201
3202would indicate?
3203
3204Ms. Page. So I think we're constantly questioning ourselves,
3205actually. I don't know --
3206
3207Mr. Meadows. This would have been very early on. So you'vehad
3208
3209» and almost immediately
3210
3211you're questioning whether
3212
3213Ms. Page. SoTI think that's exactly what you want us to be doing,
3214right? So I don't know what this article says and I don't know what
3215is prompting the thinking, but we constantly want to be testing our
3216own assumptions and testing
3217
3218Now, » with respect to
3219
3220 
3221
3222So it's not a matter of
3223 
3224right. That was sort of not in question with respect
3225
3226- Meadows. Just that they had made the wrong assumption.
3227. Page. Or that
3228» right? Are
3229or is the
3230. Meadows. So typically --
3231
3232. Page. That's the question that we're trying to answer. And
3233
3234. Meadows. Right. So there was some question back and forth
3235
3236Lad RM oka eater Mees) eae
3237
3238And in doing that, how do you
3239Py
3240Ms. Page. That's the investigation, sir. That's precisely what
3241the investigation was designed to do. And so the entire
3242objective -- and I really do hope to convince you guys that we did things
3243the way that the American people would want us to do them.
3244We get this predication that suggests
3245and we take these very discrete
3246steps to figure out is this true and, if so, who could be in a position
3247to have received this information.
3248And so -- but we're constantly challenging our own, assumptions.
3249
3250And so we're taking investigative steps in order to try to figure out,
3251
3252 
3253
3254ole ae
3255 
3256? A Russian can't just like [sound of knocking]
3257knock on the door of any old stranger and say, hi --
3258Mr. Meadows. Let's hope not.
3259Ms. Page. I would hope, right? That's unlikely to be
3260
3261productive. So you look to see are there
3262
3263And so, again, not knowing what I was thinking at the time or what
3264
3265the article says, it wouldn't strike me as inappropriate at all, in
3266
3267fact, quite the contrary. We are constantly, is this all just puffery
3268
3269or is this real?
3270
3271Mr. Meadows. So was this the only time that you feel like you
3272
3273? Was this a single time?
3274Ms. Page. I can't remember any other particular time, but I
3275didn't remember this one so --
3276Mr. Meadows But you're saying that it normally happens on a
3277pretty regular basis, so you go back and forth. So this would not be
3278
3279out of the norm to say, well,
3280
3281Ms. Page. That is the point of the investigation, to try to get
3282to the bottom of it, sir.
3283Mr. Meadows. So let me goa little bit further then. In looking
3284
3285at this review, very early on, without getting into the specifics of
3286
3287 
3288
3289the actual investigation, there were a number of briefings that were
3290 
3291
3292COMMITTBE SENSITIVE
3293occurring. How many Crossfire Hurricane briefings were you involved
3294mars
3295
3296Ms. Page. Briefings for whom, sir? I'm sorry.
3297
3298Mr. Meadows. Well, how many briefings were you involved with
3299that were outside the -- that had outside players beyond the FBI or
3300DOM rg
3301
3302Ms. Page. None.
3303
3304Mr. Meadows. All right. So there were never any briefings that
3305you attended where there was other intelligence officials part of the
3306briefing outside the FBI and DOJ?
3307
3308Ms. Page. Not about the Crossfire investigation, sir. So
3309there's two things operating at this time. I certainly participated
3310in preparation sessions for the Director when the Director would either
3311be going to the White House or maybe have a call --
3312
3313Mr. Meadows. Right. We've got that. I think we've talked
3314
3315about that before, because I think early on, August 5th, there's maybe
3316
3317the first original what we called at that time the Russia investigation
3318briefing that happened. Peter Strzok comes back Pater)
3319it just in time for you to have that. There's a briefing that occurs
3320on August 8th.
3321
3322And then there's a briefing with Denis McDonough at the White
3323House where Jonathan Moffa and others attended. Were you aware of
3324agar ers
3325
3326Ms. Page. I'm sure you're right. I was aware of the briefings
3327
3328 
3329
3330that were occurring at the White House. But those were not about the
3331 
3332
3333COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
3334Crossfire. To the best of my knowledge, those were not --
3335
3336Mr. Meadows. So they had nothing to do with any potential
3337collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign? That was never
3338mentioned?
3339
3340Ms. Page. Not tomy knowledge. It was always about the Russian
3341active measures effort.
3342
3343Mr. Meadows. All right. And so if that's, indeed, the case, at
3344some point it changed. At some point, there were other people outside
3345the FBI and DOJ that were involved with that. And so I'm going to direct
3346your attention a little bit later.
3347
3348Because on August the 25th, there's a text message going back and
3349forth where I think it talks about the fact, you know, what are you
3350doing after -- and it's redacted -- the MB brief. And it's August 25th
3351at 19:30:56.
3352
3353Ms. Page. I see that. But mine's redacted. What does itsay?
3354
3355Mr. Meadows. Yeah, yours is redacted. But it says: What are
3356
3357you doing after the | | brief? And so that | brief you're saying was
3358
3359an internal brief within the DOJ and FBI?
3360
3361Ms. Page. Oh, yes, within, to the best of my knowledge.
3362
3363Mr. Meadows. Because it's the same day that Director Brennan is
3364briefing Harry Reid, is why I ask. And so what you're saying is you
3365were unaware that Director Brennan was briefing Harry Reid that same
3366day?
3367
3368Ms. Page. I had no knowledge of that, no.
3369
3370 
3371
3372Mr. Meadows. Okay. Allright. Soif you're looking at a brief,
3373COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
3374
3375 
3376typically who would you brief?
3377
3378Ms. Page. So we had regular updates for the Director and the
3379Deputy Director. I'd say certainly every 2 weeks, but possibly even
3380more frequently. We had sort of standing sort of update meeting for
3381either the deputy --
3382
3383Mr. Meadows. Similar to you did during the MYE --
3384
3385Ms. Page. Correct.
3386
3387Mr. Meadows. -- and you're doing that now. And so you do those.
3388And those briefings were intended for the Director or the Deputy
3389Director to do what?
3390
3391Ms. Page. To stay abreast of what we had found to the extent
3392we -- it allowed for a regular tempo, so that if we had a question about
3393an investigative step or really just to sort of stay abreast of what
3394we were doing and what we were learning.
3395
3396Mr. Meadows So because of the critical nature, you know, as you
3397characterized it earlier, you believe that this was more important than
3398the MYE in terms of its potential.
3399
3400When you were doing those briefings with the Director and the
3401Deputy Director -- and the minority were talking about the defensive
3402
3403briefings -- to my knowledge, and it's been -- we've looked to try to
3404
3405find anything other than what I would say the normal defensive briefing
3406
3407that you do for candidates, where you say, by the way be careful, change
3408your passwords, you know, this is what you look for.
3409
3410Did any of that brief that you ever did for the Deputy Director
3411
3412 
3413
3414or Director end up in a detailed defensive briefing for at that point
3415 
3416candidate Trump?
3417
3418Ms. Page. I don't believe so.
3419
3420Mr. Meadows. Andif it were critical, especially in light of some
3421of the individuals and because Donald Trump was not a subject of your
3422
3423investigation, and you were taking it seriously, who would have made
3424
3425the decision not to do a defensive briefing, to say, "Hey, by the way,
3426
3427you may have someone that's really getting contacted by a foreign entity
3428and you may want to be aware of it"? Who would have made the decision
3429to either tell the candidate or not tell the candidate?
3430
3431Ms. Page. That's a good question. Idon't recall it ever coming
3432
3433Mr. Meadows. So you're telling me it never came up
3434to -- something this important, it never came up to tell the potential
3435candidate that they might have a problem with somebody talking to the
3436KU ESoB i aes
3437
3438Ms. Page. Sothat'sright, sir, but that's because we didn't know
3439what we had. So typically, when we have a defensive brief, we have
3440
3441pretty unassailable evidence.
3442
3443Mr. Meadows. Right, and I don't want you to.
3444
3445Ms. Page. No, no, no, I won't, but --
3446
3447Mr. Meadows. Because it's been characterized sometimes that I
3448do, and I don't want you to go into that. I guess --
3449
3450Ms. Page. No, but --
3451
3452 
3453
3454Mr. Meadows. So you're saying you didn't have aconclusion. You
3455 
3456didn't have a specific --
3457
3458Ms. Page. Right. So typically what would happen is if we had
3459much more unassailable evidence -- or much more frequently is you would
3460have an individual who was already known to the United States Government
3461as suspicious in some way and associated with a hostile foreign
3462government.
3463
3464So we already know that, you know, Joe is of a concern to us. Once
3465we see Joe starting to reach out to a Member of Congress or starting
3466to reach out to a candidate, you know, to the extent we know what Joe
3467is saying or what Joe might be doing, that's when we would probably
3468flag for that individual: You need to be aware that so-and-so may not
3469be what they seem.
3470
3471In this case, we don't know what we have. So it's not to say that
3472we never would have gotten to a place where we might have done that,
3473depending on how -- what the evidence demonstrated, but certainly at
3474this stage, but even later in the investigation, my personal view is
3475I don't think that it would have been appropriate to do.
3476
3477Mr. Meadows. So under your personal opinion, there was never
3478enough evidence to do a defensive briefing with specific targets? And
3479I don't want to put words in your mouth and I see you smiling, sol
3480don't -- but that's what I'm getting to.
3481
3482I mean, at some point you have to have enough "there" there, I
3483
3484guess, to quote someone else, to be able to suggest that there would
3485
3486be a defensive briefing, and you're saying that that defensive briefing
3487
3488 
3489
3490never took place because of a lack of specificity.
3491 
3492Ms. Page. No, notexactly, sir. You would want to know for sure
3493what you had in front of you.
3494
3495Mr. Meadows. So you wouldn't want to falsely accuse somebody?
3496
3497Ms. Page. You wouldn't want to -- well, you would want to
3498know -- you would want to be able to say: We believe that so-and-so
3499is, you know, an agent of a foreign power or we believe that so-and-so
3500may be working with, you know, a hostile foreign source.
3501
3502Mr. Meadows. And so that did not happen prior to November 8th
3503of 2016 at least, because you would have done a defensive briefing,
3504based on --
3505
3506Ms. Page. Not -- there's no -- no, sir. There's no
3507hard-and-fast rule. I don't -- I don't -- I don't want to leave the
3508impression that once you meet X criteria a defensive briefing occurs.
3509This is fluid and happens at the sort of discretion and judgment of
3510senior counterintelligence officials and, frankly, the deputy or the
3511Director himself with respect to certain high-level individuals.
3512
3513It's -- I'm -- I'm -- I'ma little constrained. I feel a little
3514constrained in terms of what I can say. Let's try to speak
3515hypothetically.
3516
3517One of two things might lead you not to conduct -- multiple things
3518might lead you not to conduct a defensive briefing. One of them might
3519YMC a kesh ti) ae -\eee (ae e
3520
3521Mr. Meadows. Which is what you said at least at this date, you
3522
3523had insufficient --
3524
3525 
3526
3527Ms. Page. Certainly in August, I would agree with that. A
3528 
3529couple weeks in, we don't know what we have. I think that that's fair.
3530
3531On the opposite spectrum, it might be inappropriate for
3532investigative reasons to provide a defensive brief.
3533
3534Mr. Meadows. But that would only be if Donald Trump was the
3535subject of your investigation.
3536
3537Ms. Page. No, sir.
3538
3539Mr. Meadows. I mean, at what point -- so I guess take it from
3540
3541my standpoint. As a Member of Congress, if I'm inadvertently having
3542
3543contact with somebody, of which I have contact with Russian diplomats
3544on a weekly basis many times, and I assume every one of them want to
3545do us harm. I mean, so --
3546
3547Ms. Page. You should, sir.
3548
3549Mr. Meadows. -- for the record --
3550
3551Ms. Page. I agree with you totally.
3552
3553Mr. Meadows. -- I want to make sure that I assume every one of
3554them wants to do harm to us.
3555
3556Ms. Page. Yes.
3557
3558Mr. Meadows. So in doing that, at what point would you reach out
3559and say, you know, Mark, by the way, you may want to be -- this -- I
3560ore
3561
3562Ms. Page. So the reason I am trying to tread lightly here is I
3563don't think that Donald Trump would need to be the subject of the
3564investigation in order for us to make a decision that a defensive
3565
3566briefing is not appropriate.
3567
3568 
3569
3570But there are certainly gradations shy of subject which, if
3571 
3572
3573COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
3574true -- and I'm not suggesting that they are true -- but if
3575
3576hypothetically, and I truly mean this in the hypothetical, if we thought
3577
3578that Donald Trump is not the subject, we're not suggesting that he's
3579the person in touch with Russia, but maybe the evidence suggests that
3580he knows that his people are in touch with Russia.
3581
3582Mr. Meadows. But to be clear for the record, there was no
3583evidence that suggested that.
3584
3585Ms. Page. I am not speaking with respect to the evidence at all.
3586
3587Mr. Meadows. I just want to make sure we're clear for the record.
3588
3589Ms. Page. I am making no statement with respect to the evidence
3590
3591I am speaking hypothetically.
3592
3593Mr. Meadows. So let me go back, because one thing gets really
3594concerning. So you give a brief on August the 25th. Director Brennan
3595is givingabrief. It's not aGang of Eight brief. It is a one-on-one,
3596from what we can tell, a one-on-one briefing with Harry Reid at that
3597point.
3598
3599And it becomes apparent, based on your text messages and based
3600on Director Comey's emails, that you all are aware that that
3601conversation took place.
3602
3603Were you aware that Director Brennan had a briefing with Harry
3604Reid and that you expected a letter from Harry Reid?
3605
3606Ms. Page. I take your word that I was.
3607
3608Mr. Meadows. Well, no, I don't want you to take my word.
3609
3610Ms. Page. Ijust don't -- I remember Harry Reid sending a letter,
3611
3612 
3613
3614like I remember that happening sometime during the course of this
3615 
3616investigation. But I do not have any recollection if I knew -- we had
3617regular Crossfire briefs of the entire team for the Director. Ido
3618not recall the Director telling us that Brennan was planning to brief
3619Harry Reid that day and --
3620
3621Mr. Meadows. No, no, I'm not saying that he knew that he was
3622planning to brief him, but that once he briefed him, because it appears
3623that certain elements of what is now referred to as the dossier were
3624communicated to Harry Reid, based on that letter, because --
3625
3626Ms. Page. I have no knowledge of that. We didn't have the
3627reports yet.
3628
3629Mr. Meadows. So -- and I know. According to other testimony,
3630apparently you didn't actually physically get the documents until
3631mid-September. Is that correct?
3632
3633Ms. Page. That is correct, sir.
3634
3635Mr. Meadows. So on August --
3636
3637Ms. Page. Not just physically. Even electronically, like --
3638
3639Mr. Meadows. So on August 3@th -- but you were aware of it prior
3640seat nes
3641
3642Ms. Page. No, sir. No, sir.
3643
3644Mr. Meadows. So what you're saying is, is that you had no
3645
3646knowledge of these potential unverified memos. prior to the middle part
3647
3648of September in your investigation?
3649Ms. Page. That is correct, sir.
3650
3651Mr. Meadows. Okay. So on August 30th, you and Peter are going
3652
3653 
3654
3655back and forth, and you go, "Here we go." If you'll look at 9:44:50
3656 
3657on August the 3@th, you go, "Here we go." And it's referencing "Harry
3658Reid Cites Evidence of Russian Tampering in the U.S. Vote and Seeks
3659aoe
3660
3661Now, what happens is, and what I guess gives me a little bit of
3662concern is, if you drop down, that if you drop down to the same day,
3663August 3@th, 9:45, it says: "The D" -- which I assume means
3664Director -- "said at the a.m. brief that Reid had called him and told
3665him that he would be sending the letter."
3666
3667Ms. Page. Okay.
3668
3669Mr. Meadows. So you get a brief that says, well, we got the
3670letter, but it's almost like it's a coordinated effort between Harry
3671Reid and the FBI Director, because obviously, he's briefing you.
3672
3673Ms. Page. I -- I don't see -- so, again, this is just my personal
3674experience. We just don't really deal with the Hill that much.
3675
3676Mr. Meadows. No, I know you don't, but --
3677
3678Ms. Page. No, no, no, but even the --
3679
3680Mr. Meadows. Sowhat you're saying is you don't recall ever being
3681briefed that a letter was coming from Harry Reid?
3682
3683Ms. Page. Not until -- this is the morning brief that this is
3684
3685a reference to, so I must have attended the morning brief. And so this
3686
3687is me just saying, yeah, the Director said we're going to be getting
3688
3689a letter. But no, I'm not aware -
3690Mr. Meadows. Well, indeed, you did get a letter that got
3691
3692published very quickly in The New York Times, and that was kind of the
3693
3694 
3695
3696start of much of that.
3697 
3698You know, here's the other concern, because I guess Peter Strzok
3699sends an email to Bill Priestap that same day, with you carbon copied,
3700and it says: "Unfortunately, this will politicize things but was
3701unavoidable, I suppose."
3702
3703So, I mean, obviously it's going back and forth.
3704
3705Ms. Page. So my view on that is exactly what the FBI always is,
3706which is, no offense, politicians are involved, right? Like --
3707
3708Mr. Meadows. None taken.
3709
3710Ms. Page. We want to do this in secret. We want to do this the
3711way we do it. I don't know what Harry Reid was told or why or what
3712
3713the purpose of Brennan -- you know, this is way out of my pay grade.
3714
3715But like that's not how we want to proceed. We do thingseffectively
3716
3717when they're in secret. And so I think that that, you know, it's
3718unavoidable, I guess, is, you know, well, these things happen, but not
3719eld meel am heel
3720
3721Mr. Meadows. Okay. So let's -- taking you at your word, then
3722I guess what concern I have is why would Director Brennan be aware of
3723things that the FBI was not aware of at this particular point when it
3724actually would potentially involve, according to Peter Strzok's word
3725on January 1@th of 2017, an unverified salacious set of memos?
3726
3727Ms. Page. So I don't understand why you're saying
3728this -- whatever is inthe -- whatever occurs between Brennan and Reid,
3729I don't understand what the relationship. to the dossier is. That's
3730
3731what I'm not following.
3732
3733 
3734
3735Mr. Meadows. So the dossier apparently was mentioned. In fact,
3736COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
3737
3738 
3739we have documents that would suggest that in that briefing the dossier
3740was mentioned to Harry Reid and then obviously we're going to have to
3741have conversations. Does that surprise you --
3742
3743Ms. Page. Totally surprises me.
3744
3745Mr. Meadows. -- that Director Brennan would be aware of --
3746
3747Ms. Page. Yes, sir. Because with all due honesty, if Director
3748
3749Brennan -- so we got that information
3750
3751Mr. Meadows. We do know there are multiple sources.
3752
3753Ms. Page. I do know that. I do know that the information
3754ultimately found its way lots of different places, certainly in October
3755of 2016. But if the CIA as early as August, in fact, had those same
3756
3757reports, I am not aware of -- I'mnot aware of that and
3758
3759Mr. Meadows. .So you say"our source." Is your source, is that
3760because he was working for you?
3761
3762Ms. Page. No, sir.
3763
3764Mr. Meadows. Well, I mean, how could he be -- is he exclusively
3765
3766your source?
3767Ms. Page. I don't know. If the CIA has -- had Mr. Steele open
3768as a source, I would not know that.
3769
3770Mr. Meadows. So if we're talking about sources and we're looking
3771
3772 
3773
3774at sources, were you aware at the point that there was ongoing
3775 
3776communication with other players, i.e., Fusion GPS and others, as it
3777relates to this confidential human source?
3778
3779Ms. Page. I didn't follow your question, sir. Are you asking
3780was I --
3781
3782Mr. Meadows. Were you aware that Christopher Steele had
3783conversations or multiple conversations with Fusion GPS and others
3784outside of just working special intel for you?
3785
3786Ms. Page. No, no, no. So let me try to be more clear.
3787
3788As of August of 2016, I don't know who Christopher Steele is. I
3789don't know that he's an FBI source. I don't know what he does. I have
3790never heard of him in all of my life. So let me just sort of be clear.
3791
3792When the FBI first receives the reports that are known as the
3793dossier from an FBI agent who is Christopher Steele's handler in
3794September of 2016 --
3795
3796Mr. Meadows. Right.
3797
3798Ms. Page. -- at that time, we do not know who -- we don't know
3799
3800why these reports have been generated. Wedon't know for what purpose.
3801
3802We don't know -- we know that this is a reliable source who has
3803previously reported onother things. We know who he -- I don't know
3804who he is personally. We know his history --
3805
3806Mr. Meadows. Right.
3807
3808Ms. Page. -- such that we know him to be reliable. And I think
3809we know that he's a former intel person.
3810
3811But we do not know, to the best of my recollection, why these
3812
3813 
3814
3815reports have been generated, what they're for, what they're -- why they
3816 
3817have sort of come to us, other than here's a reliable source and here
3818are some things that he has gathered.
3819
3820Certainly between --
3821
3822Mr. Meadows. So you don't know whether it's a coordinated effort
3823to get you those documents or not at that point in September?
3824
3825Ms. Page. Coordinated by whom, sir?
3826
3827Mr. Meadows. Anybody, other than a confidential human source
3828saying, “Listen, I’ve got reason to be concerned and bring it to you.”
3829
3830It could have been coordinated
3831by Fusion GPS. You don't know.
3832
3833Ms. Page. At the time that we received the documentation, no.
3834What we have is the preexisting relationship with the source and the
3835reliability of his prior reporting.
3836
3837Mr. Meadows. Okay. So on October 16th and 19th, there's a
3838couple of text messages. I want to read them to you, because it's
3839actually text messages between you -- you won't have them in your book.
3840
3841Ms. Page. Oh, okay.
3842
3843Mr. Meadows. Because I actually got these from a different
3844
3845source. And so I'm asking you to see if you remember those so you can
3846
3847help authentic them. But apparently it's a text message between you
3848
3849and Mr. McCabe.
3850Ms. Page. Okay.
3851Mr. Meadows. And it says: “Just called. Apparently the DAG
3852
3853now wants to be there and the White House wants DOJ to host. So we're
3854
3855 
3856
3857setting up atime now. We very much need to get Cohen's view" -- which
3858 
3859
3860COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
3861we believe is probably Deputy Director of the CIA Cohen, David
3862Cohen -- "before we meet with her" -- and by the “her,” I think it's
3863Sally Yates at that point, we're trying to put this all together.
3864"Better have him weigh in before this meeting. We need to speak with
3865one voice if that is, in fact, the case." That is October 14th.
3866
3867And then on October 19th, it says: "Hey, can you give me a call
3868when you get out. Meeting with the White House counsel is finally set
3869up and I want to talk about the timing things."
3870
3871Is that --
3872
3873Ms. Page. Are those about Russia?
3874
3875Mr. Meadows. That was my question.
3876
3877Ms. Page. Oh, I'm not sure, sir. I'm not certain that itis,
3878to be honest with you, but I'm not sure.
3879
3880Mr. Meadows. All right. Because it's just a couple of days
3881before the FISA application.
3882
3883Ms. Page. Oh. There would be no need to go to the White House
3884or give any sort of briefing about the FISA. So if that's the timing
3885concern, I don't think that it's related, would be my guess.
3886
3887Mr. Meadows. All right. So, as we look at this, one of the
3888concerns that I have is that there seemed to be a whole lot of chatter
3889
3890back and forth in terms of between the FBI and the DOJ being at odds
3891
3892in terms of -- and by "odds" what I mean is, you know, I guess pushing
3893
3894back against George Toscas and some of the others in terms of some o
3895
3896the opinions, based on text messages and emails.
3897
3898 
3899
3900Ms. Page. On Russia?
3901 
3902Mr. Meadows. On Russia.
3903Ms. Page. I don't know that I agree with that assessment. The
3904only source of frustration, really the only source of frustration that
3905
3906I can recall, at least in the time that I was most heavily involved
3907
3908in the Russia investigation -- so this is from August to really the
3909
3910end of the year, till December of 2016 -- was the sort of speed or lack
3911thereof with respect to getting the FISA initiated. I mean, thatwas
3912a source of frustration. But I don't recall other -- other
3913controversies or other disagreements or other issues.
3914
3915Mr. Meadows. Yeah, because I think -- and the reason why these
3916dates on the other text messages that I ask are critical, because
3917there's an email from Peter Strzok to you on October the 14th. And
3918that's where, you know, we've got to keep the pressure, hurry the F
3919up and --
3920
3921Ms. Page. Yeah, right. And that was definitely happening, but
3922the White House doesn't have anything to do with that.
3923
3924Mr. Meadows. And so the Stu, I haven't heard back from Stu, is
3925that Stu Evans who --
3926
3927Ms. Page. That is correct.
3928
3929Mr. Meadows. So why was there a push for a FISA warrant coming
3930from you guys and potentially less than expeditious on the -- I mean,
3931what's your perception of why that was? Obviously, it was important
3932
3933enough for Peter to send you an email.
3934
3935 
3936
3937Ms. Page. Well, we sent a lot of emails.
3938 
3939But separate from that, this again goes to kind of cultural
3940differences between us and DOJ. So DOJ is necessarily going to be a
3941little more handwringing and a little more apprehensive and a little
3942more cautious.
3943
3944Mr. Meadows. And why is that?
3945
3946Ms. Page. Just the institutional differences between us,
3947
3948honestly. I mean, we're the investigators, we're hard-charging.
3949
3950Mr. Meadows. The fact that they were opening up a FISA warrant
3951on a U.S. citizen that might be attached to a --
3952
3953Ms. Page. Well, almost all FISA warrants are on U.S. citizens.
3954
3955Mr. Meadows. That's correct, but that might -- you didn't let
3956me finish --
3957
3958Ms. Page. Oh, I'm sorry.
3959
3960Mr. Meadows. That might be attached to a Presidential campaign.
3961
3962Ms. Page. Well, he was no longer with the Presidential campaign.
3963But your point is taken. Certainly, this was one that, if leaked, was
3964going to get attention.
3965
3966And so I'm not necessarily even criticizing them for their
3967handwringing. I'm just saying we had an operational reason that we
3968wanted to get this thing up quickly with respect to the subject himself,
3969and the Department is always going to operate with less alacrity.
3970
3971Mr. Meadows So is Stu Evans, is that his primary
3972
3973responsibility, was processing FISAs?
3974
3975 
3976
3977Ms. Page. So he is the head of the Office of Intelligence. The
3978COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
3979
3980 
3981Office of Intelligence is the organization within the Department that
3982writes the FISAs, that takes them to court. So he is the -- he's a
3983DAAG, a deputy assistant Attorney General, and he is the person in
3984charge of the entire FISA process for the Department.
3985
3986Mr. Meadows. So I guess the question -- and this is my last
3987
3988series of questions -- I guess the question I would have then is, going
3989
3990back to August 10th, there's text messages back and forth between you
3991
3992and Peter that would say, I remember what it was, Toscas already told
3993Stu Evans everything. Sally called to set up a meeting. You already
3994knew about the campaign individual. So there's conversations
3995happening on August the 1@th already --
3996
3997Ms. Page. But that's not about a FISA. That's not about a FISA
3998at that point, I don't think.
3999
4000Mr. Meadows. But it was about the campaign, because it's
4001redacted.
4002
4003Ms. Page. Right.
4004
4005Mr. Meadows. I mean, it was redacted.
4006
4007Ms. Page. So what that reflects, because I remember that,
4008because we were -- we were so concerned about the fact that we were
4009opening this investigation and we were so concerned about leaks that
4010we were literally individually making decisions about who to tell and
4011who not to tell, because we were trying to keep it so closely held.
4012
4013We had told George Toscas, because he's sort of the senior-most
4014
4015career person in the National Security Division.
4016
4017 
4018
4019None of us had told Stu Evans, and I don't think any of us intended
4020COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
4021
4022 
4023
4024COMMITTERE SENSITIVE
4025to tell Stu Evans until which time we would actually need something
4026from him. And so that text is a reflection of frustration, that like,
4027great, George told Stu. That's not what we would have done, because
4028we were trying to keep it so close-hold.
4029
4030So I don't think it has anything to do with an actual FISA. It
4031was more that more people are learning about this investigation and
4032we are trying to keep it as tight as possible.
4033
4034Mr. Meadows. And so what you're saying is when the Director
4035briefed the White House 2 days prior to that, on August the 8th, or
4036prepared for it, actually briefed him on the 10th, that it had nothing
4037
4038to do with any campaign. Even though George Toscas and Stu Evans knew
4039
4040about it, it had -- I mean, there was no mention of this at all at any
4041
4042bem ore
4043
4044Ms. Page. Sir, I would be shocked. I would truly be stunned to
4045discover that the Director had briefed the President on the substance
4046of our investigation or even the existence of our investigation. I
4047would be -- I can't say it didn't happen, I wasn't there, but I would
4048be stunned to discover that. That is just not how we --
4049
4050Mr. Meadows. So when did it happen? Ultimately never?
4051
4052Ms. Page. I don't know. I honestly don't know. And to be
4053honest with you, I guess I should clarify.
4054
4055I think it's entirely possible that the Director himself never
4056briefed the White House about this. He just did not have that kind
4057
4058of -- not relationship, that's not the right word. That's just not
4059
4060 
4061
4062how he viewed us institutionally. I cannot speak to whether the
4063COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
4064
4065 
4066Department ever briefed the White House about it.
4067
4068Mr. Meadows. I'll yield to John.
4069
4070Mr. Ratcliffe. Ms. Page, I do want to follow this line of
4071questioning about the FISA application and try and determine when you
4072were first aware of or there was a discussion of a possibility ofa
4073FISA warrant in connection with the Trump-Russia matter from a timing
4074perspective. Do you recall?
4075
4076Ms. Page. Maybe a month before we got it, possibly. I'm not
4077elo kon mw AYLI
4078
4079Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. So the dates, the date of the FISA
4080
4081application, October 21st of 2016
4082
4083The reason I'm trying to find out is we know that the predicating
4084
4085information that opened it was July 31st. We Know on August 8th, we've
4086talked about the text message about stopping Donald Trump, a text
4087message that involved the lead investigative agent.
4088
4089So I'm wondering, do you know whether or not there had been any
4090discussion of a FISA applications by that time?
4091
4092Ms. Page. No way. You have to understand, sir, it takes a lot
4093to get a FISA.
4094
4095Mr. Ratcliffe. I know. I'm just trying -- I'm trying todive
4096in on where it is.
4097
4098So on -- we know that there was the first interview conducted,
4099based on your prior testimony, sometime before August 11th of 2016.
4100
4101Do you know if there was any discussion of a FISA application before
4102
4103 
4104
4105or after -- or before that?
4106 
4107Ms. Page. Not to my knowledge.
4108
4109Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. With respect to -- you talked earlier
4110about testing the information from confidential human sources. Ifa
4111confidential human source has a conversation with the subject of
4112
4113surveillance that would undermine the presence -- I mean, the premise
4114
4115that anyone associated with the Trump campaign either was colluding
4116
4117or would be willing to collude with the Russians, is that the type of
4118disclosure that would have to be made to the FISC?
4119
4120Ms. Page. No, sir. What do you mean? We don't have a --
4121
4122Mr. Ratcliffe. Do Brady/Giglio disclosure requirements apply to
4123the FISA court?
4124
4125Ms. Page. Oh, sorry. Yeah, sure. I mean, we have a duty of
4126candor to the court.
4127
4128Mr. Ratcliffe. Duty of candor.
4129
4130Ms. Page. So certainly to the extent we were to find reliable
4131information that we thought undermined a FISA application, we would
4132inform the court of that information.
4133
4134Mr. Ratcliffe. Supposed to inform the court?
4135
4136Ms. Page. To the best of my knowledge, sir, we would inform the
4137court.
4138
4139Mr. Ratcliffe. No, I'm just saying the obligation is -- you
4140can't speak to whether it was or it wasn't.
4141
4142Ms. Page. I don't know what you're talking about. I
4143
4144thought -- if --
4145
4146 
4147
4148Mr. Ratcliffe. I'm not getting into any of the specific content
4149 
4150of it. I just want to know --
4151
4152Ms. Page. If -- in all cases --
4153
4154Mr. Ratcliffe. If there is exculpatory or --
4155
4156Ms. Page. -- if the FBI discovers, you know, reliable
4157information which it believes to be exculpatory or somehow affect the
4158probable cause of the FISA warrant, I would expect that we would provide
4159that to the court, yes, sir.
4160
4161Mr. Ratcliffe. That's my question.
4162
4163Ms. Page. Yes.
4164
4165Mr. Ratcliffe. Because there would be an obligation to do that.
4166
4167Ms. Page. Ithink so. I'mnot nearly as well-versed in the FISA
4168rules. But I would just -- I would presume that we would, because
4169that's how we generally operate.
4170
4171Mr. Ratcliffe. And you know that Brady/Giglio disclosure
4172requirements would apply in the FISA court?
4173
4174Ms. Page. So Brady really doesn't -- I don't really want to be
4175so legalistic -- but Brady is aright of a criminal defendant. So what
4176
4177I'm saying is I have no idea if it is absolutely obligatory. What
4178
4179am saying is I believe that that is -- would be the practice of the
4180
4181Department and the FBI to be fully candid.
4182Mr. Ratcliffe. And should have been done if there was any
4183exculpatory information.
4184
4185Ms. Page. I think that that's what we would do. I believe so,
4186
4187 
4188
4189Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay, great.
4190 
4191On Friday, Congressman Jordan asked you about the trip that you
4192tele) 4 with Peter Strzok and three others.
4193I don't know if he asked you the purpose of that trip. Can you tell
4194us the purpose of the trip?
4195
4196Ms. Page. I cannot, sir.
4197
4198Mr. Ratcliffe. Why not?
4199
4200Ms. Page. On advice of FBI counsel, because it would get into
4201the investigative steps we took.
4202
4203Mr. Ratcliffe. Investigative steps related to the --
4204
4205Ms. Page. The Russia investigation.
4206
4207Mr. Ratcliffe. -- Russia investigation?
4208
4209Ms. Page. Yes, sir.
4210
4211Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Mr. Jordan also asked you about and you
4212reviewed with him the January 10 email that you were on with Mr. Strzok
4213talking about the different versions of the Steele dossier involving
4214David Corn and Glenn Simpson and others. Do you recall that?
4215
4216Ms. Page. I do, sir.
4217
4218Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. That was around the same time as the first
4219
4220of Jim Comey'’s now somewhat infamous memos of his conversations with
4221
4222both President-elect Trump and then President Trump. When did you
4223
4224first become aware of the Comey memos?
4225Ms. Page. I was aware of them as they were -- in real time. I
4226was aware of almost all of them in real time.
4227
4228Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. So you were aware of them before they
4229
4230 
4231
4232became leaked to The New York Times by Daniel Richman?
4233 
4234Ms. Page. Iwas awareofthem. Ireviewed most of them. Ican't
4235
4236say all. I reviewed most of them within a day or on the Pers day that
4237
4238they were created.
4239
4240Mr. Ratcliffe. Would Peter Strzok have been -- I'm. sorry.
4241Would -- well, let me ask that. Would Peter Strzok have been aware
4242of those?
4243
4244Ms. Page. No, sir.
4245
4246Mr. Ratcliffe. Would Andrew McCabe have been aware of those?
4247
4248Ms. Page. Yes, sir. Idon't know whether Peter Strzok was aware
4249of them or not. I did not provide them to him so --
4250
4251Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. But Andrew McCabe would have been?
4252
4253Ms. Page. Yes, sir.
4254
4255Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. And was that -- the fact that you would
4256have been aware of them, were there discussions about opening an
4257obstruction of justice case or any other case against Donald Trump prior
4258to the firing of Jim Comey on May 9th of 2017, as reflected in the Comey
4259memos?
4260
4261Ms. Bessee. Congressman, to the extent that goes into the
4262equities of the ongoing investigation that the special counsel is now
4263conducting, I will instruct the witness not to answer.
4264
4265Mr. Ratcliffe. Yeah, I don't want to go into what the special
4266counsel, whether or not they are going to do it, but I think it'sa
4267fair -- I think it's a very fair question, Cecilia, because the forme
4268
4269Director of the FBI has talked about it. He's talked about it a lot.
4270
4271 
4272
4273He's given interviews about it. He has gone on TV about it. He has
4274 
4275written books about it.
4276
4277And he has said explicitly publicly in a congressional hearing
4278that he wanted a special counsel to be appointed for that purpose, to
4279investigate Donald Trump for obstruction of justice.
4280
4281So I think asking her about it at this point is a very fair request.
4282
4283Ms. Bessee. To the extent that it doesn't go into what the
4284special counsel is looking at or their gathering of evidence, I
4285understand, Congressman, that former Director Comey has talked about
4286the memos and has talked about whether there should be an investigation.
4287So I just want --
4288
4289Mr. Ratcliffe. I don't want any of the details. I just want to
4290
4291know whether there was a discussion about the possibility of opening
4292
4293that prior to the firing of the Director.
4294
4295Ms. Page. Obstruction of justice was not a topic of conversation
4296during the timeframe you have described.
4297
4298Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Then
4299
4300Ms. Page. I think. One second, sir.
4301
4302[Discussion off the record. ]
4303
4304Ms. Page. Sir, I need to -- I need to take back my prior
4305statement.
4306
4307Mr. Ratcliffe. Which one?
4308
4309Ms. Page. Whatever the last thing I just saidwas. Sorry. That
4310there were no discussions of obstruction, yeah. That is -- I need to
4311
4312take that statement back.
4313
4314 
4315
4316Mr. Ratcliffe. So there were?
4317 
4318Ms. Page. Well, I think that I can't answer this question without
4319getting into matters which are substantively before the special counsel
4320at this time.
4321
4322Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, I think you've just answered it by not
4323answering it.
4324
4325Was Andy McCabe privy to those same conversations?
4326
4327Ms. Page. I can't answer this substantively, sir. I'm sorry.
4328
4329Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, were these related to some charges, whether
4330obstruction or other charges, potentially against Donald Trump?
4331
4332Ms. Page. I can't -- I can't answer that question, sir, without
4333getting into the substance of matters that are now before the special
4334counsel.
4335
4336Mr. Ratcliffe. Again, I think you're answering it by not
4337answering it.
4338
4339Did you have knowledge about Daniel Richman's special role for
4340Director Comey?
4341
4342Ms. Page. What do you mean, sir?
4343
4344Mr. Ratcliffe. Did you know that he -- or when, I guess, did you
4345
4346learn that he was the source through which Director Comey would
4347
4348communicate information to the press?
4349
4350Ms. Page. I learned that publicly, when it became publicly
4351
4352known.
4353Mr. Ratcliffe. But not before that?
4354
4355Ms. Page. I don't believe so.
4356
4357 
4358
4359Mr. Ratcliffe. Did you have interactions with Daniel Richman?
4360COMMITTERB SENSITIVE
4361
4362 
4363Ms. Page. I had one interaction with him, but with respect to
4364a going dark sort of broad legislative interest, but that's it. That
4365was many months prior.
4366
4367Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. So back to these Comey memos. You had
4368conversations about the Comey memos with Andy McCabe. Did you have
4369conversations about them with Jim Comey?
4370
4371Ms. Page. Ithinkonce. I think there was one time -- so, again,
4372I guess I should make -- be more clear. We didn't talk about the Comey
4373memos as a set, like the Comey memos. If Comey were to have a meeting
4374that concerned him, he might come back and inform, for example,
4375
4376Mr. McCabe about them.
4377
4378There was one time I believe in which I was part of a small group
4379in which he came back and reported back the details of a particular
4380meeting. Those ultimately made their way into the memos.
4381
4382So I was present for at least one, possibly more, I just don't
4383know for sure, readouts of a meeting that he would have just had with
4384the President, Donald Trump, and then subsequently read the memos that
4385he created about each of these meetings.
4386
4387Mr. Ratcliffe. What was it about Donald Trump that created a
4388practice that Director Comey told us didn't exist with President Obama?
4389
4390Ms. Page. I can't speak for Director Comey, sir.
4391
4392Mr. Ratcliffe. Did this process of the FBI Director sharing
4393
4394information with others in the FBI about his conversations, giving
4395
4396readouts of his conversations with the President, was that a standard
4397
4398 
4399
4400practice?
4401 
4402Ms. Page. That's not unusual, if there was a need to share what
4403had happened. He certainly did that with respect to President Obama
4404anon ae
4405
4406Mr. Ratcliffe. But never documented it in a memo form?
4407
4408Ms. Page. I think that's his representation.
4409
4410Mr. Ratcliffe. So you said --
4411
4412Ms. Page. But I think he also answered, at least in his open
4413testimony, that it was about the nature of the person. So I
4414can't -- that's -- those are his words, but I can't speak beyond that.
4415
4416Mr. Ratcliffe. I might come back to that, but I want to move on
4417to this now infamous tarmac meeting and at least get started in asking
4418you about that.
4419
4420To refresh your recollection from a timing standpoint, the
4421meeting occurred on June the 27th of 2016 between former President
4422Clinton and Loretta Lynch.
4423
4424I want to ask you about an email on June the 30th of 2016 that
4425Peter Strzok texted to you, if you'd look at that.
4426
4427Ms. Page. June 3@th, you said?
4428
4429Mr. Ratcliffe. June 30th. We're 3 days after the tarmac
4430meeting.
4431
4432Ms. Page. Okay.
4433
4434Mr. Ratcliffe. It says: Ohmy God, he -- I think speaking about
4435
4436Bill Priestap -- Oh, my God, he is spinning about the tarmac meeting.
4437
4438Viewed in conjunction with [redacted] wants to meet at 4, have us bring
4439
4440 
4441
4442lists of what we would do in ordinary circumstance, paren, easy,
4443COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
4444
4445 
4446referred to PC, and in this circumstance, paren, easy, referred to the
4447seventh floor.
4448
4449Do you see that?
4450
4451Ms. Page. I do.
4452
4453Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Let's -- first of all, is Bill, is that
4454Bill Priestap?
4455
4456Ms. Page. I'm sure it is, yes.
4457
4458Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Do you know what redacted is?
4459
4460Ms. Page. I don't.
4461
4462Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Do you know what PC is?
4463
4464Ms. Page. Public corruption --
4465
4466Mr. Ratcliffe. Public corruption.
4467
4468Ms. Page. -- is my guess.
4469
4470Mr. Ratcliffe. It's my guess, too. So --
4471
4472Ms. Page. I mean, this I think is sort of a snarky text, right?
4473So my guess is he's spinning in conjunction with the -- maybe that is
4474like the statement, because we know that we're -- we're planning to
4475do the -- public announcement is sort of imminent. I'mspeculating
4476there, because I have no idea what's under the redaction.
4477
4478But I think this is mostly us just being a little unkind with
4479respect to Bill Clinton -- Bill Clinton -- Bill Priestap, because
4480
4481he -- hewas aworrier. And soTI think that this is more snarky, right?
4482
4483There's nothing for us to do with respect to this.
4484
4485Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. But I'm trying to find out whether this
4486
4487 
4488
4489is a big deal or not. You know, the Attorney General referred to the
4490COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
4491
4492 
4493
4494COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
4495meeting as something she admitted cast a shadow over the integrity of
4496the Department. It's the reason for what you referred to earlier as
4497a quasi-recusal or halfway recusal. It is something that Director
4498Comey referred to as a game-changer and told the IG that it tipped the
4499scales with respect to holding a public announcement. It sounds like
4500Bill Priestap is spinning about it.
4501
4502Was it a big deal or not?
4503
4504Ms. Page. To be honest with you, sir, and I'm speaking for
4505myself, it was a boneheaded move, certainly. But I guess
4506investigatively, I don't see it as a particularly big deal, because
4507absolutely every single person on the Midyear investigation, both at
4508the FBI and the Department, had concluded that there was no prosecution
4509to be had here.
4510
4511So it's not as though the meeting with Bill Clinton, even no matter
4512
4513what was said, even taken in the worst possible light, the evidence
4514
4515is what the evidence is. So there's no way to have sort of changed
4516
4517ao
4518
4519Mr. Ratcliffe. Right.
4520
4521Ms. Page. So even if, in fact, everyone's worst possible
4522nightmare about what may have transpired on that plane is all true,
4523it still doesn't change whether there's a viable prosecution.
4524
4525Mr. Ratcliffe. Right.
4526
4527Ms. Page. So, again, inmy view, it's bad judgment and misguided,
4528
4529but not actually impactful of anything in particular.
4530
4531 
4532
4533Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. So I'm going to come back to this one,
4534COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
4535
4536 
4537because I think we're about out of time. But you just said, and you
4538
4539said this yesterday or on Friday, but that it was not a big deal.
4540Boneheaded but not a big deal investigatively, because every person
4541involved with the Midyear had concluded that she wasn't going tobe
4542charged. Is that right?
4543
4544Ms. Page. That's correct, sir.
4545
4546Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. So if I asked you the question, was the
4547decision made not to charge Hillary Clinton with the mishandling of
4548classified information before or after her July 2nd, 2016, interview,
4549the answer is what?
4550
4551Ms. Page. The answer is before her July 2nd interview we had not
4552seen evidence sufficient to charge her with a crime.
4553
4554Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay.
4555
4556Ms. Page. If something had changed in the July 2nd interview,
4557then that would have all changed things. But short of an admission
4558in that interview, there was nothing that any of us, whether at the
4559Department or the FBI, could have anticipated that would have changed
4560that conclusion, short of an admission or something happening --
4561
4562Mr. Ratcliffe. But your answer was before the decision had been
4563made before, that everyone had concluded.
4564
4565Ms. Page. Well, you're putting words in my mouth a little bit.
4566
4567Mr. Ratcliffe. These are your words.
4568
4569Ms. Page. No, I'm agreeing with -- what I'm saying is a decision
4570
4571isn't final until it's final. So there was no final decision before
4572
4573 
4574
4575July 2nd. But before July 2nd --
4576 
4577Ae Lae
4578Ms. Page. -- it was the consensus of the investigative team, both
4579at the Department and at the FBI, that there was not sufficient evidence
4580to charge her with a crime.
4581Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. So where we're going to leave off is that
4582
4583the decision had been made before, but the final, final decision was
4584
4585made after is what you're saying, to use your words.
4586
4587Ms. Page. The decision isn't final until it's final.
4588Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. We'll pick up with that when we come back.
4589
4590Thank you.
4591
4592 
4593
4594[Recess. |
4595Peo one
4596
4597Mr. Swalwell. Back on the record.
4598
4599Thank you, Ms. Page, again for spending the morning and afternoon
4600with us. I only have a few questions. Our counsel may have some, and
4601I understand Mr. Cummings might be coming in today.
4602
4603So, again, I first just want to say that, today, our President,
4604on foreign soil, insulted the men and women of the FBI. I'm sorry that
4605here in Congress that you're also seeing leaders of our country insult
4606the work that you do.
4607
4608But I do think there are some fair questions, and I want to get
4609just to some of those.
4610
4611Do you regret, like, some of the messages you sent or the way that
4612you framed some of those texts? And if you could just talk about that.
4613
4614Ms. Page. Ido. I think that this has been an incredibly
4615
4616humbling experience. Obviously, these were messages sent to somebody
4617
4618close to me whom I intended to be private, and I think that there are
4619few people on this planet who would want their private messages released
4620publicly, regardless of what they said.
4621
4622I think I'm entitled to the views that I'm entitled to, and I'm
4623entitled to express those views both publicly and privately. But I
4624would have made different decisions had I thought about what the
4625possible repercussions could have been.
4626
4627I can't do it over again. I can only learn from it.
4628
4629Mr. Swalwell. Did you ever -- were you ever part of a criminal
4630
4631 
4632
4633prosecution where you so detested the defendant because of what the
4634 
4635did or who they hurt and you had to set aside those feelings and just
4636stick to the four corners of the evidence?
4637
4638Ms. Page. So I actually spoke about this at length on Friday,
4639Mr. Swalwell. In fact, not just me but I think I can speak for many
4640people at the FBI and the Department that we often loathe the subject
4641of our investigations. And we generally do not look kindly on
4642criminals in general and reserve plenty of harsh language for the people
4643that we investigate.
4644
4645But we, regardless and in every instance, put our personal
4646feelings, both about them individually or the criminal activity that
4647they are accused of, we always put it aside and conduct investigations
4648independently and fairly.
4649
4650Mr. Swalwell. Did you ever have an investigation where you
4651received exculpatory evidence and, you know, you've got a bad guy and
4652you really want to make sure that justice is done and then you get the
4653evidence and you're like, crap, like, if I turn this over, it's going
4654to make the case harder, if I keep it and I don't tell anyone, we've
4655got a better chance of a conviction, but I know what it means if I don't
4656turn it over? Have you ever had to make those decisions as a
4657prosecutor?
4658
4659Ms. Page. So they're not usually quite as stark, but,
4660
4661absolutely, you often have information which could be exculpatory or
4662
4663certainly could just simply be damaging to your case, and it is your
4664
4665obligation as a prosecutor, it is your obligation to the fairness to
4666
4667 
4668
4669the defendant and the fairness in the system, to turn that information
4670 
4671
4672COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
4673So that is something that happens regularly, and it is a part of
4674
4675our being, it's a part of our identity and the roles that we abide by
4676
4677in order to --
4678
4679Mr. Swalwell. Regardless of how you feel about the defendant.
4680
4681Ms. Page. Of course.
4682
4683Mr. Swalwell. In the Clinton case, were you the sole lawyer
4684making decisions about the direction of the case?
4685
4686Ms. Page. I was not making decisions about the direction of the
4687case at all. I was a lawyer supporting the Deputy Director. We had
4688multiple lawyers in OGC who supported the investigation, and, of
4689course, it was run by prosecutors at the Department.
4690
4691Mr. Swalwell. How many lawyers could you estimate were involved
4692in the Clinton case --
4693
4694Ms. Page. So there were --
4695
4696Mr. Swalwell. -- on the -- on your side.
4697
4698Ms. Page. On the FBI side, there were two primary lawyers who
4699were involved. There was a lawyer who was involved on the filter team.
4700And then there were five prosecutors who had either regular or
4701semiregular involvement at the Department, and then their management.
4702
4703Mr. Swalwell. And on the decision to open the Russia
4704investigation, how many lawyers were involved in that decision?
4705
4706Ms. Page. The decision to open the investigation? I mean, the
4707
4708general counsel was involved, the deputy general counsel was involved.
4709
4710 
4711
4712At least, probably -- the decision to open? I'm not sure myself.
4713 
4714
4715COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
4716Mr. Swalwell. Is it fair to say you were not --
4717
4718Ms. Page. No, no.
4719
4720Mr. Swalwell. -- the person or lawyer that --
4721
4722Ms. Page. No.
4723
4724Mr. Swalwell. -- signed off?
4725
4726Ms. Page. I did not make any decisions with respect to opening
4727the Russia investigation.
4728
4729Mr. Swalwell. Can you speak to -- well, Bob Mueller. How long
4730did you work with Mr. Mueller?
4731
4732Ms. Page. So I went over for a 45-day detail.
4733
4734Mr. Swalwell. Oh, I just mean in your career.
4735
4736Ms. Page. Oh. So I didn't have -- I had limited interaction
4737with Mr. Mueller when he was the Director of the FBI.
4738
4739Mr. Swalwell. In your limited interaction and the discussion you
4740had with colleagues, can you speak to his character for truthfulness
4741and integrity?
4742
4743Ms. Page. He is unassailable on those grounds. He is an
4744
4745unbelievably upstanding, honest, rule-following, hard-charging,
4746
4747thoughtful, fair individual.
4748
4749Mr. Swalwell. And with respect to other lawyers and agents on
4750the special counsel's team, are those individuals that you had worked
4751with in some --
4752
4753Ms. Page. Yes.
4754
4755Mr. Swalwell. -- manner?
4756
4757 
4758
4759Ms. Page. Some of them, yes, sir.
4760 
4761Mr. Swalwell. And is there anyone on that team that you have
4762concerns about their integrity, their character for truthfulness?
4763
4764Ms. Page. No, sir. And, in fact, at least two of them I've
4765worked quite closely with, and I know both to be incredibly bright,
4766incredibly fair, honest, brilliant prosecutors.
4767
4768Mr. Swalwell. And did you observe during the time on the team
4769
4770any, you know, cafeteria talk, any prejudging of the direction of the
4771
4772Russia investigation?
4773
4774Ms. Page. No, sir.
4775
4776Mr. Swalwell. I don't have anything else. I'11 defer back to
4777counsel.
4778
4779Thank you, Ms. Page.
4780
4781Ms. Page. You're welcome.
4782
4783BY MS. KIM:
4784
4785Q Thank you, Ms. Page.
4786
4787I'd like to ask you about several FBI employees who are mentioned
4788in the inspector general's report. To the extent that it asks about
4789things of which you have no knowledge, please let me know.
4790
4791This, as you will see, will turn out to be a process of
4792elimination. To be totally candid with you, there is an individual,
4793Sally Moyer, whose name has been repeatedly brought up in connection
4794with these aliases. And I just want to confirm whether you can identify
4795Sally Moyer as any of the aliases named in the inspector general's
4796
4797report.
4798
4799 
4800
4801A I think you need to ask that question more specifically.
4802 
4803Q Yes. Exactly. And so I will attempt to do so.
4804
4805A Okay.
4806
4807Q The inspector general's report discussed instant messages
4808between two FBI agents, agent 1 and agent 5. The two were in a
4809preexisting romantic relationship.
4810
4811As I understand it, Sally Moyer is not an FBI agent. Is that
4812correct?
4813
4814A That is correct.
4815
4816Q So do you have any reason to believe that Sally Moyer is agent
48171 or agent 5?
4818
4819A I know who agent 1 and agent 5 are, and Sally Moyer is not
4820agent 1 or agent 5.
4821
4822‘0 iT] 0), anol 0
4823
4824The inspector general's report also discusses FBI attorney 2 as
4825an individual who sent instant messages of what the inspector general
4826called a political nature. That attorney, FBI attorney 2, is referred
4827to throughout with male pronouns.
4828
4829Do you know if the FBI attorney 2 is Sally Moyer?
4830
4831A TI also know who FBI Attorney General 2 is, and FBI attorney
48322 is not Sally Moyer.
4833
4834Q = Thank you.
4835
4836Ms. Shen. Okay, Ms. Page, I'm going to introduce a few text
4837
4838messages in which it appears that you and Mr. Strzok are discussing
4839
4840the Russians and, sort of, their attempts at espionage and just kind
4841
4842 
4843
4844of ask some of the context behind it.
4845 
4846[Page Exhibit No. 9
4847Was marked for identification. ]
4848BY MS. SHEN:
4849
4850Q So, for exhibit 9, I believe, if you can direct your
4851attention to the bottom of the page. So I'm looking at the
4852second-to-last text on July 18th at 10:54.
4853
4854Okay. So that text reads -- and I believe this text is sent from
4855you --
4856
4857Oh, no, I don't think so.
4858
4859Oh, I'm sorry. The first text is --
4860
4861V7]
4862
4863Sorry. The first text is sent by Mr. Strzok, and it reads:
4864And fuck the cheating motherfucking Russians. Bastards. I hate them.
4865
4866sorry. I'm sorry.
4867
4868in response, you write: I'm sorry. Me too.
4869
4870. Page, do you recall sending that text?
4871The “me too"? Yeah.
4872
4873The "me too," yes. And do you recall under what
4874
4875circumstances that exchange was sent? Was there any particular
4876
4877context or issue that it was responding to?
4878
4879A I honestly don't remember. But I do always hate the
4880
4881Russians, so --
4882Qs Okay.
4883
4884Has Mr. Strzok ever communicated to you in other instances his
4885
4886 
4887
4888hatred for the Russians?
4889 
4890A Uh-huh, yes. I mean, most everybody who works
4891counterintelligence at the FBI has pretty strong feelings about the
4892Russian Federation. So this is not an unusually held view.
4893
4894Q Okay. So, generally speaking, at the FBI, you've heard
4895other instances across the agency where agents or officials have
4896expressed their hatred for the Russians as well?
4897
4898A Russia poses the most severe existential threat to Western
4899democracy in the world. So for those of us who care about democracy
4900and for those of us who think America is great, we have pretty strong
4901feelings about the Russians.
4902
4903Q Okay. Thank you.
4904
4905[Page Exhibit No. 10
4906Was marked for identification. ]
4907BY MS. SHEN:
4908Q I'd now like to introduce another text message from
4909
4910July 31st, 2016, as exhibit 10. And if you can direct your attention
4911
4912to the top of the page this time -- I'm sorry, let me correct that.
4913
4914The first text message would be July 30th, 2016.
4915Uh-huh.
4916So I believe that first text message is from you, correct?
4917That's right, yes.
4918So a portion redacted. So ends the sentence: Hate them.
4919I think they're probably the worst. Very little I find redeeming about
4920
4921this even in history. <A couple of good writers and artists I guess.
4922
4923 
4924
4925And then redaction.
4926 
4927In response to that, Mr. Strzok responds, with a redaction:
4928Fucking conniving, cheating savages at statecraft, athletics, you name
4929it. I'm glad on I'm Team USA.
4930
4931Okay. Ms. Page, do you recall writing those texts?
4932
4933A Ido.
4934
4935Q Okay. And do you recall any particular context those texts
4936were made around?
4937
4938A TI don't.
4939
4940Q So --
4941
4942A I mean, this is -- we've just opened -- or, you know, we're
4943
4944about to open the Russia investigation, so it is very much, you know,
4945
4946on the forefront of all of our minds. So it would not surprise me if
4947a
4948
4949it's a reflection of that. But, as I said, this is an enduring
4950sentiment for people who are in the intelligence community.
4951
4952Q Well, in the intelligence community, I imagine there
4953are -- you know, there are countries other than Russia who engage in
4954espionage efforts. And so --
4955
4956A There are countries other than Russia who engage in espionage
4957efforts, but there are probably no other countries who are more
4958singularly focused on the destruction of Western ideals around the
4959world.
4960
4961So it's true, other countries engage in espionage, and other
4962countries steal, and other countries lie. But I wouldn't say that
4963
4964other countries do it the way that Russia does it and have as a goal,
4965
4966 
4967
4968sort of, creating fractions within the Western alliance in order to,
4969 
4970you know, ascend to dominance the way that Russia does.
4971
4972Q So would it be fair to say that Russia's espionage efforts
4973are just far more of a threat to the U.S. national security than some
4974other countries’ espionage efforts?
4975
4976A They are one of our most pernicious and dangerous threats.
4977
4978Q = Okay.
4979
4980In Mr. Strzok's text, he refers to them as, quote, "cheating."
4981We're in an unclassified setting, so I wouldn't want to go there, but
4982can you describe some examples of what he may be referring to or just
4983generally what Russia has done to be cheating?
4984
4985A Well, I mean, look at the doping scandals in the Olympic
4986Committee stuff. Look at the effort to get the World Cup in Russia
4987that was just recently completed. I mean, they cheat.
4988
4989Q And in terms of statecraft, again, in unclassified setting,
4990
4991are there certain examples of Russian statecraft that you find, you
4992
4993know, particularly egregious?
4994
4995A I mean, not beyond what I've already, sort of, attempted to
4996describe.
4997
4998Q And then the last comment, Mr. Strzok, he says: I'm glad I'm
4999on Team USA.
5000
5001Would you agree that, for example, investigating the Russians for
5002their attempts to interfere with the U.S. election would be an example
5003of being on Team USA?
5004
5005A Right. I mean, this is just being proud about being
5006
5007 
5008
5009Americans. Right? We want to spread American values and American
5010 
5011
5012COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
5013democracy around the world, and we think that we live in the best country
5014in the world. And so this is simply a statement of pride and one that
5015is in contrast to the way that the Russian Federation operates.
5016
5017Q So, last Friday, the special counsel's investigation, it
5018became public that they indicted 12 members of the Russian military
5019intelligence, the GRU. Are you familiar with the report?
5020
5021A I read about it, yes.
5022
5023Q Okay. The GRU, they are Russian military intelligence,
5024which means President Putin would be in charge of them. Is that
5025correct?
5026
5027A That's my understanding.
5028
5029Q And so any attempts that the Russian military intelligence
5030would have of interfering with the U.S. Presidential election,
5031President Putin would be aware of that. Do you believe that to be true?
5032
5033A Ask me that question again, please.
5034
5035Q Okay. Sorry. I'11 rephrase. Would President Viadimir
5036Putin be aware of any attempts the GRU had in interfering with the U.S.
5037
5038Presidential election?
5039
5040A I'm -- President Putin is the President of his eames
5041
5042certainly is in charge of his intelligence apparatus.
5043ee Van
5044I don't want to answer that question with more specificity.
5045Fair enough. I think the point I'm just --
5046
50470) ean
5048
5049 
5050
5051-~- getting at is that, as the President of Russia, he would
5052 
5053
5054COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
5055be the head of the Russian military intelligence.
5056
5057A I would agree with that.
5058
5059Q Okay.
5060
5061So, actually, just earlier today, reports have come out from
5062President Trump's meeting, summit with President Putin, and I'm just
5063going to read to you from a Washington Post article from 12:49 p.m.
5064today.
5065
5066So the title of the article is "Putin Again Denies Russian
5067Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election. Trump Calls Probe a Disaster
5068for Our Country."
5069
5070So thearticle reads: After Putin said his government played no
5071role in trying to sabotage the U.S. election, Trump offered no pushback
5072and went on to condemn the Justice Department's investigation of
5073Russian interference as, quote, a disaster for our country.
5074
5075Ms. Page, do you believe that the Justice Department's
5076investigation of Russian interference is a disaster for our country?
5077
5078EN I do not.
5079
5080Qs Okay.
5081
5082So it goes on to say: Putin insisted publicly that the, quote,
5083
5084Russian state has never interfered and is not going to interfere in
5085
5086internal American affairs, unquote. And Trump declined to dispute
5087
5088these assertions, instead saying that Putin, quote, has an interesting
5089idea, unquote, about the issue of interference.
5090
5091Now, Ms. Page, it is my understanding that the U.S. intelligence
5092
5093 
5094
5095community unanimously concluded that the Russian state did attempt to
5096 
5097interfere in the U.S. 2016 Presidential election. Is that also your
5098understanding?
5099
5100A Yes, it is.
5101
5102Q Okay. And, Ms. Page, are you inclined to believe Putin's
5103denial that Russia ever interfered, or are you inclined to believe in
5104the U.S. intelligence community's assessment?
5105
5106A Asapart of the -- as a former part of the U.S. intelligence
5107community, I will go with the intelligence community assessment.
5108
5109Q Okay. Thank you.
5110
5111Later in the article, it also says: Trump says that he holds,
5112quote, both countries responsible, unquote, for the frayed relations
5113between the two nations and attacked Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller
5114III's investigation.
5115
5116Ms. Page, do you believe that the United States is responsible
5117for the frayed relations between the United States and Russia?
5118
5119A Well, we're responsible to the extent we're not going to
5120
5121accept their meddling in a U.S. election. I suppose so.
5122
5123Q Okay. Well, would you blame Robert Mueller's investigation
5124
5125for frayed relations with Russia?
5126
5127A No.
5128
5129Q Okay.
5130
5131And this is the last one, I promise. The article also goes on
5132to say: In response to the questions, Trump said that both countries
5133
5134were to blame for the deterioration of relations. Quote, I do feel
5135
5136 
5137
5138that we have both made mistakes. He added that, quote, there was no
5139 
5140collusion, unquote, between his campaign and Russia, and he lamented
5141that the special counsel's investigation into the matter has had an
5142impact on U.S.-Russian relations. Quote, I think the probe has been
5143a disaster for our country, unquote. He said, quote, it's ridiculous,
5144what's going on with the probe, unquote.
5145
5146Ms. Page, are you aware of anything ridiculous going on in Special
5147Counsel Mueller'’s probe?
5148
5149ee ee
5150
5151Q Okay. Thank you. I think that's all I have.
5152
5153BY MS. KIM:
5154
5155Q I think this might be the last tranche of questions I have
5156
5157for you, Ms. Page. I'd like to ask you about Director Comey.
5158
5159You spoke earlier in general terms about Special Counsel Mueller.
5160Can you explain to me how long you worked in proximity with Director
5161Comey?
5162
5163A So it would cover the span of time that I worked for Deputy
5164Director McCabe. So, prior to February 2016, I certainly had
5165interactions withMr. Comey, but, once I started working for Mr. McCabe
5166in the context of Mr. McCabe being Deputy Director, my interactions
5167with Mr. Comey became far more frequent.
5168
5169Q And can you describe for me Mr. Comey's general character
5170and honesty as you understood them?
5171
5172A He is a man of enormous integrity. I ama better lawyer and
5173
5174a better person for having, sort of, learned from his examples. He
5175
5176 
5177
5178is obviously an extraordinary communicator, but he's also just a very
5179 
5180good person and is thoughtful about how to approach problems and is
5181a man of unassailable integrity, in my view.
5182
5183Q To your knowledge, has Director Comey ever lied to you?
5184
5185A No.
5186
5187Q Are you personally aware of any instances where Director
5188Comey was shown to have lied or been knowingly untruthful?
5189
5190A Never.
5191
5192Q Overall, do you have any reason to doubt the accuracy of
5193Director Comey's oral or written representations of the facts from when
5194he was the FBI Director?
5195
5196A No, not at all.
5197
5198Q Have you followed the recent press coverage of Director
5199
5200Comey's public descriptions of his meetings with President Trump?
5201
5202A AAs
5203
5204Q And you said you had -- usually you had -- you have firsthand
5205knowledge of Director Comey's memoranda that he kept to document those
5206meetings. Is that correct?
5207
5208A So I either in one or two instances was present for his
5209initial retelling of the meeting, and in most other instances I was
5210provided with his memo to review in real-time, like, shortly after his
5211production of those memos.
5212
5213Q Have you noted any discrepancies between Director Comey's
5214contemporaneous recollections of the facts on one hand and his public
5215
5216representation of those facts on the other hand?
5217
5218 
5219
5220yay No.
5221 
5222Q Are you generally familiar with Director Comey's testimony
5223to the Senate Intelligence Committee about his interactions with
5224President Trump?
5225
5226ray I am.
5227
5228Q Do you have any reason to believe that Director Comey did
5229not -- I'msorry, let me put that in the affirmative. Do you believe
5230that Director Comey accurately shared with Senate Intelligence
5231Committee his memory of his interactions with President Trump?
5232
5233A Absolutely, yes.
5234
5235Q I imagine you are fairly familiar with the inspector
5236general's report. Is that correct?
5237
5238EN I have not read it all. I hope to never do so. But I am
5239familiar with parts of it, yes.
5240
5241Q On June 16th, President Trump tweeted: The IG report
5242totally destroys James Comey and all of his minions, including the great
5243lovers Peter Strzok and Lisa Page, who started the disgraceful witch
5244hunt against so many innocent people. It will go down as a dark and
5245
5246dangerous period in American history.
5247
5248To your knowledge, did the inspector general's report contain any
5249
5250information discrediting the special counsel's probe?
5251
5252A No.
5253
5254Q And are you aware of the inspector general's report
5255destroying anything about Director Comey's ability to testify as a
5256
5257witness in the special counsel's probe?
5258
5259 
5260
5261yay No.
5262COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
5263
5264 
5265Ms. Kim. I think that ends our questioning for this round.
5266aM ir-lal ama ycol0
5267
5268[Recess. ]
5269
5270Mr. Ratcliffe. All right. Back on the record.
5271
5272So, Ms. Page, when we left off, I was asking you -- well, I asked
5273you a question based on the answer that you'd given, and I asked you
5274whether a decision had been made to charge Hillary Clinton -- not to
5275charge Hillary Clinton before or after her July 2nd, 2016, interview.
5276
5277And your first answer was before. You said something to the effect
5278
5279of, because every person -- I'm paraphrasing -- because virtually
5280
5281every person on the Midyear Exam team had concluded that she wasn't
5282going to be charged.
5283
5284Na Te i wat =1 0 tt
5285
5286[Phone ringing. ]
5287
5288Mr. Meadows. You can tell a lot about a man by his ringtone.
5289
5290Ms. Page. Will it say "boing, boing" on the transcript?
5291
5292Mr. Ratcliffe. But then, in fairness to you, Ms. Page, you
5293qualified that a little bit and said, well, a final-final decision was
5294made after. I want to give you a chance to be clear.
5295
5296Ms. Page. So the word -- and I don't mean to be overly lawyerly,
5297but it comes naturally, so forgive me. The word "decision" suggests
5298the finality. And my only point is that before the July 2nd interview
5299the uniform view was that there was not sufficient evidence to bring
5300
5301any charges against Hillary Clinton.That's not a final decision,
5302
5303 
5304
5305because it's not a final decision. But to that point, there was
5306COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
5307
5308 
5309insufficient evidence to charge her with any crime. And that was
5310uniformly agreed to by both the FBI individuals involved and the DOJ
5311individuals involved.
5312
5313But that, certainly, in the event, unlikely was our estimation,
5314
5315but in the event that there was some admission or some other revelation
5316
5317which changed our assessment, we were all open to that possibility.
5318
5319Mr. Ratcliffe. Right. But you talked about -- you started your
5320answer before about, "to be candid,” and I think that's an important
5321word, because "candor" has a specific meaning when you're talking about
5322an FBI agent, right? Candor and lack of candor?
5323
5324Ms. Page. Everybody at the Department has an obligation to
5325candor, yes.
5326
5327Mr. Ratcliffe. Right. And you gave a very long explanation for,
5328you know, the decision and before, and you made reference to the
5329discussions. We know this went all the way back to a memo -- at least,
5330a memo drafted by Director Comey on May the 2nd of 2016. And there
5331were multiple drafts and a lot of conversation. All of that, right?
5332
5333Ms. Page. That's correct.
5334
5335Mr. Ratcliffe. What is a lack of candor for -- what does that
5336mean in the context of anyone associated with the FBI when they're
5337talking to an investigator?
5338
5339Ms. Page. That they're being untruthful?
5340
5341Mr. Ratcliffe. A lack of candor?
5342
5343Ms. Page. Yeah. A lack of candor means that they're being
5344
5345 
5346
5347untruthful.
5348 
5349Mr. Ratcliffe. Oh, untruthful. I thought you said being
5350sare an ee ae
5351
5352Ms. Page. Oh, no. Sorry.
5353
5354Mr. Ratcliffe. I'm sorry. I misheard you.
5355
5356Ms. Page. That's okay. That's okay. Yeah.
5357
5358Mr. Ratcliffe. Or that they're leaving out material facts,
5359right? Only telling part of the story?
5360
5361Ms. Page. Sure. Yes.
5362
5363Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Okay.
5364
5365The reason I ask is I asked that same question that I asked of
5366you, that you gave a very long explanation, went into great detail about
5367a great many factors that impacted it, I asked that same question to
5368Director Comey under oath, did you make the decision before or after,
5369and his answer was after.
5370
5371He didn't explain it at all. He didn't qualify it at all. He
5372
5373didn't give any context to it. He didn't discuss number of decisions.
5374
5375He didn't say, well, we made it after but everyone had concluded long
5376
5377before.
5378
5379Do you have any reason to give me any explanation or justification
5380for why Director Comey wouldn't have given that information to
5381congressional investigators or while under oath to Members of Congress?
5382
5383Ms. Page. I don't know, sir.
5384
5385Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay.
5386
5387Ms. Page. I can't answer that.
5388
5389 
5390
5391Mr. Ratcliffe. We were talking about the tarmac meeting, as
5392COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
5393
5394 
5395well. And I was asking you about this email on June the 30th of 2016
5396that related to Bill Priestap. And you gave me the context that it
5397was, to use your words, of being a little bit unkind.
5398
5399But I did want to ask, the reference to what we would do in ordinary
5400circumstance, in parentheses Peter Strzok says, "Easy, refer to PC,”
5401which you and I both think is “public corruption." Was he making a
5402joke there? I'm just trying to find out --
5403
5404Ms. Page. Yeah. Imean, I think that you have to take this whole
5405text in the, sort of, somewhat snarky tone in which it's intended.
5406Because there's nothing to do, right? Like, as I sort of described
5407
5408already, the investigation is what the investigation is. It is
5409
5410virtually over. We have seen what the evidence fails to, sort of,
5411
5412demonstrate.
5413
5414And so I think, as I said -- and I'mcertainly not, sort of, proud
5415of this, but I think that it's more a reflection of, "Oh, gosh, he's
5416worrying again" --
5417
5418Mr. Ratcliffe. Right.
5419
5420Ms. Page. -- and this is, sort of, not a basis to be worried
5421about. And so I think that's why you have the, like --
5422
5423Mr. Ratcliffe. Right. And all --
5424
5425Ms. Page. -- flippant responses at the end.
5426
5427Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. And all of that is somewhat reinforced by
5428the text message that we've talked about before that you sent the next
5429
5430day on July 1st about: She's not exactly a profile in courage because
5431
5432 
5433
5434she knows that Hillary Clinton is not going to be charged.
5435 
5436
5437COMMITTBE SENSITIVE
5438Ms. Page. Right. I think they're of a kind.
5439
5440Mr. Ratcliffe. Yeah.
5441
5442But, nevertheless, this tarmac meeting, obviously it generated
5443alot of attention. And, again, the reason that the Director said that
5444he did the unprecedented step of acting as investigator and prosecutor
5445on July the 5th and, she said, cast a shadow.
5446
5447The day after you sent the profile-in-courage text message was
5448July 2nd, which was the interview of Hillary Clinton, correct?
5449
5450Ms. Page. This says the ist here, but I take you at --
5451
5452Mr. Ratcliffe. Yeah, I think --
5453
5454Ms. Page. -- that you have -- you know, I know some of them are
5455in UTC and some of them aren't, so I -- yeah.
5456
5457Mr. Ratcliffe. I'll represent to you that it occurred on
5458Saturday, July the 2nd of 2016.
5459
5460Ms. Page. Okay.
5461
5462Mr. Ratcliffe. And I've only got one copy of this, but I've got
5463
5464a document I want to show you and just -- it's essentially, I think
5465
5466you'd call it an LHM, or a letterhead memorandum, which is a summary
5467
5468of -- supposed to be a summary of the interview based on the 302s of
5469the people that were in the room.
5470
5471Ms. Page. It's asummary of, sort of, the investigation, of, sort
5472of, all the investigative steps and what we found.
5473
5474Mr. Ratcliffe. Yeah. But specifically in connection with her
5475
5476interview on July the 2nd of 2016.
5477
5478 
5479
5480Ms. Page. Okay.
5481 
5482
5483COMMITTBE SENSITIVE
5484Mr. Ratcliffe. Yeah. Well, I mean, you look at -- did you play
5485a role in preparing that?
5486
5487Ms. Page. I --
5488
5489Mr. Ratcliffe. Because there were some text messages, I thought,
5490where you --
5491
5492Ms. Page. Yeah. So I did not play a role in preparing it. We
5493went through, like, 52 billion drafts of this thing, like, from"a"
5494to "the" to, you know, like, all kinds of changes, because we wanted
5495
5496to be as perfect as we could get it. SoJI am certain I am ona jillion
5497
5498drafts as well. I am not positive I ever read the entire thing. I
5499
5500started to a couple of times, but other things --
5501
5502Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Well, I went through it, and I read it a
5503couple times, and I'll represent to you that the word "tarmac" doesn't
5504appear in there or "Loretta Lynch" doesn't appear in there. And I --
5505
5506Ms. Page. That makes sense to me.
5507
5508Mr. Ratcliffe. It does?
5509
5510Ms. Page. That's not -- yes. So, Imean, I believe you. Ihave
5511no way to disagree with you. But those were not investigative steps.
5512This was not designed to, sort of, be every single thing that happened
5513during the course of the Clinton email investigation. This is designed
5514to be an assessment of what the FBI did and what the FBI found. And
5515the tarmac incident doesn't really play a role with respect to those
5516two things.
5517
5518Mr. Ratcliffe. So -- and that's your opinion. You're entitled
5519
5520 
5521
5522to it. I just want to be clear, though. So, if a meeting took place
5523 
55245 days before the interview that everyone in the country is talking
5525
5526about, in terms of it being inappropriate, casting a shadow, calling
5527
5528for a quasi-recusal, that involves the husband of the subject of the
5529investigation and the boss of five people from the Department of Justice
5530that are in the room, you think it's not unusual that someone wouldn't
5531ask a question of the subject of the investigation about that meeting
5532that had occurred 5 days before in public view?
5533
5534Ms. Page. Well, so that's not what you asked me. You asked me
5535why it wasn't in here. And so that's, sort of, my reflection of why
5536that statement isn't in here.
5537
5538With respect to why they didn't ask her -- you're asking why the
5539prosecutors didn't ask her a question in the interview? I can't answer
5540that except that Mr. -- it kind of goes to the point I was making
5541earlier. If we were close to charging her and then suddenly this tarmac
5542meeting happens and now we are not going to charge her, then I agree
5543with you, and then we have a serious controversy on our hands.
5544
5545But I guess I just don't -- I fully understand and remember and
5546appreciate the firestormit created. I completely agree with you on
5547that. But if there was @.@ percent evidence the day before the tarmac
5548meeting and there's @.@ percent evidence the day after the tarmac
5549meeting, it doesn't change anything. It's a terrible optic, but it
5550doesn't change the outcome of the investigation.
5551
5552So I was not a part of a decision to ask or not ask. I didn't
5553
5554review the outlines with respect to whether to ask or not ask. Idon't
5555
5556 
5557
5558know who made the decision whether to ask or not ask. I'm just saying,
5559 
5560in my opinion, it's not that weird to me. I'm not sure what you would
5561
5562get out of that question.
5563
5564Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, I guess --
5565
5566Ms. Page. Because there still wasn't sufficient evidence to
5567charge her.
5568
5569Mr. Ratcliffe. -- what you'd get -- if the stated premise that
5570everyone seems to have given is that she's not going to be charged unless
5571she lies in her interview, she can't lie if she isn't asked the
5572questions.
5573
5574Ms. Page. But she wasn't at this meeting. Her husband was.
5575
5576Mr. Ratcliffe. I --
5577
5578Ms. Page. Right? So what is --
5579
5580Mr. Ratcliffe. I guess you could confirm that if you asked her,
5581just like you could confirm what they talked about and whether or not
5582there was any number of discussions.
5583
5584Anyway, you're entitled to your opinion. I just wanted to ask
5585you about it because I'd seen something in these text messages that
5586indicate that you were involved in this.
5587
5588And do you recall some text messages with Agent Strzok about some
5589of the 302s being inflammatory and not letting Congress have those?
5590
5591Ms. Page. Yes.
5592
5593Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. What do you recall about that?
5594
5595Ms. Page. So that was when we were starting our production of
5596
5597the materials that Congress had requested. Soit's not so much -- and,
5598
5599 
5600
5601ultimately, they were all turned over anyway. They were emails which
5602 
5603were -- or emails, excuse me. They were 302s which were -- didn't
5604ultimately speak to any of the evidence that we found. They were
5605inflammatory, they were certainly
5606
5607Mr. Ratcliffe. What do you recall about them? How were they
5608inflammatory? Because I don't know that they have been turned over.
5609
5610Ms. Page. So one is the quid pro quo. I mean, that we've
5611gone -- that's gone, sort of, to the end of the Earth, the Brian -- what
5612was his last name? McCauley maybe?
5613
5614So this was the claim -- sorry. I haven't thought about this in
5615awhile, so I don't want to get this wrong. So this was the claim that,
5616very early in the Clinton -- in the -- shortly after opening the
5617investigation -- no. Sorry. Beforethat. Sorry, let me think about
5618this for a second.
5619
5620When the State Department was first, I think, complying with
5621
5622either their FOIA or something and had first determined that there may
5623
5624be classified information among the emails which had been collected,
5625there was an allegation that Patrick Kennedy, who was then the Under
5626Secretary for Management, I think, at the State Department, had reached
5627out to Brian McCauley, I think is his last name -- but I could be getting
5628it wrong -- who was an executive in our International Operations
5629
5630Division, and had essentially -- the allegation was that if McCauley
5631could get the classification of this particular document changed, that
5632the FBI could get the legat spots that they wanted at certain embassies
5633
5634or something like that. I don't -- I might be getting some of thi
5635
5636 
5637
5638wrong.
5639COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
5640
5641 
5642And so that had been investigated. I think both individuals had
5643been interviewed by the FBI. The classification of the document never
5644changed. The legat spots were never granted. And so it was sort of
5645EM
5646
5647So the point was we were trying to prioritize the 302s and the
5648documents which actually went to the underlying decision not to
5649prosecute. Those werenot those. And so, in terms of having limited
5650resources and trying to prioritize the things which would be most
5651salient to Congress' review of our investigation, the McCauley
5652stuff -- there was something else; I can't remember now what it is.
5653But the, sort of, sideshow things that didn't actually affect what the
5654outcome was or what the evidence was in the investigation were, sort
5655
5656of, deprioritized.
5657
5658So, I mean, that's all that's meant to reflect, ultimately. It's
5659
5660obviously a text message, so it doesn't have all of that context and
5661
5662 
5663
5664background, but that's what that's a reflection of.
5665 
5666eee ee
5667
5668Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. I want to go back the Comey memos that we
5669were talking about. And you were relating sort of the process that
5670you and Andy McCabe and others, apparently, would have a conversation
5671with Director Comey about the material and what became his memos as
5672FT ar -t- 160] 6 a
5673
5674Did I miss anyone besides you and Andy McCabe?
5675
5676Ms. Page. It's a very small number.
5677
5678Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Who else can you think of?
5679
5680Ms. Page. I think the Director's testimony was Jim
5681Rybicki -- and this is from memory, so it's in some hearing transcript
5682somewhere -- Jim Rybicki, Mr. McCabe, Mr. Ghattas, maybe Mr. Bowdich,
5683and myself.
5684
5685There may have been one or two other times in which one or two
5686other people may have been aware of a particular -- hearing a readout
5687of a particular memo -- I'm sorry; let me correct one thing. The one
5688exception to the list I just provided was that Mr. Comey did brief his
5689senior Crossfire Hurricane team of the meeting in early January when
5690
5691he's there with Clapper and Brennan and the rest of the -- Admiral
5692
5693Rogers, and the head of the -- the leaders of the intelligence community
5694
5695briefing him on the intelligence community's assessment of the Russian
5696interference and the Russia active measures report.
5697The memo that he drafted following that meeting, in which he
5698
5699also -- is that public? -- let me stop there -- the memo that he drafted,
5700
5701 
5702
5703he did brief the sort of senior Crossfire team of the events.
5704 
5705
5706COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
5707We had talked about it in advance of that meeting, and he gave
5708a readout of, you know, a debrief following that meeting. So that's
5709the only exception in terms of the Comey memos that had a more expanded
5710personnel list, to my knowledge.
5711
5712Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. And so was the discussion -- before you
5713had talked about, and you said, when, you know, when we talk about
5714concerns that the Director had -- were those concerns about the topics
5715that the President was talking about, or were they concerns about the
5716President?
5717
5718Ms. Page. I don't know what you'retalking about. I'm sorry.
5719What do you mean? What concerns I had?
5720
5721Mr. Ratcliffe. Giving the answer, you said he would bring us
5722together to talk about -- from his meetings with the
5723President -- concerns that came about.
5724
5725And I'm wondering were they concerns about topics that the
5726President was talking about, or was the concern the President?
5727
5728Ms. Page. Well, I only recall being -- I think I was only present
5729
5730for one -- other than the January one about the ICA, I think I was only
5731
5732present for one meeting in which he kind of had described what had just
5733transpired. I don't remember which one that was of the memos that I've
5734read and was privy to. I just don't remember which particular one I
5735was present for. I just remember being present for one of them.
5736
5737Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Well, do you remember I asked you before
5738
5739about an obstruction of justice as a topic, and you gave an answer,
5740
5741 
5742
5743and then you came back and said: I need to take my answer back.
5744COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
5745
5746 
5747Ms. Page. That answer back, yeah.
5748
5749Mr. Ratcliffe. But generally talked about certain matters, I
5750guess. Let me ask you this: I asked you the other day about a text
5751message that Peter Strzok sent you the day that Jim Comey got fired
5752where he said: And we need to open the case we've been waiting on now
5753while Andy is acting.
5754
5755And you explained: It didn't have anything to do with when Andy
5756was acting, but the case we were waiting on.
5757
5758Is that the same information that's reflected in some of the Comey
5759
5760memos ?18Usc924c@@
5761
5762Ms. Page. Just a moment, please.
5763[Discussion off the record. ]
5764Ms. Page. Mr. Ratcliffe, I'm sure this is going to be an
5765
5766unsatisfying answer, but I have reviewed all the Comey memos, as I said,
5767
5768I have read most of themin real time, at the time that they were written.
5769
5770I don't have any basis to disagree with the claims made in the Comey
5771memos, but with respect to what steps we may or may not have taken,
5772based either on those claims or following the Director's firing, on
5773advice of FBI counsel, I can't answer that at this time.
5774
5775Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Your inability to answer tells me a lot.
5776And what it tells me is inconsistent. And what I'm trying to get at,
5777it is inconsistent with what Jim Comey has admitted that he told the
5778President, I think, that he wasn't under investigation during that
5779timeframe.
5780
5781NY A0l =
5782
5783 
5784Ms. Page. That is not inconsistent, sir.
5785
5786Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. So he wasn't under investigation, but
5787that doesn't mean there was a discussion going on about potential crimes
5788involving the FBI Director's senior leadership team. That's what
5789you're telling us?
5790
5791Ms. Page. Iamnot telling youthat. But the statement, if taken
5792as a hypothetical, somebody could not be under investigation, but there
5793still could be discussions about potential criminal activity, and that
5794is totally consistent with FBI policies and would not be unusual with
5795respect to any investigation.
5796
5797Mr. Ratcliffe. Except the unusual part about memorializing it
5798
5799in memos that hadn't been done with other Presidents, right?
5800
5801Ms. Page. I don't know what you're asking me. I'msorry. How
5802do you -- what?
5803
5804Mr. Meadows. Well, let me follow up, if you don't mind.
5805
5806Are you aware of any other time that Director Comey memorialized
5807conversations with President Obama?
5808
5809Ms. Page. I think he has testified that he did not do that.
5810That's correct.
5811
5812Mr. Meadows. Okay. And so did you not find it unique that he
5813would be memorializing these conversations, and they weren't in
5814totality of the all the conversations you had, but he memorialized these
5815particular conversations. Did you not find that unique?
5816
5817Ms. Page. I think that he did memorialize all of his
5818
5819 
5820COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
5821
5822 
5823Mr. Meadows. President-elect.
5824
5825Ms. Page. President-elect or President Trump. I think that's
5826been his testimony. I wouldn't have known that he did or didn't do
5827it beforehand, to be honest with you. So I don't know that I can answer
5828your question.
5829
5830Mr. Ratcliffe. Did Director Comey have any conversations with
5831you about the purpose behind him creating these memos?
5832
5833Ms. Page. No.
5834
5835Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Did Andy McCabe create any memos?
5836
5837Ms. Page. Yes.
5838
5839Mr. Ratcliffe. Tell us about those.
5840
5841Ms. Page. I can't do that, sir.
5842
5843Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Without -- I'm going to respect -- try and
5844respect as much of this as I can, but given the fact that you've
5845acknowledged that there were memos or at least a memo, I want to find
5846out as much as I can about the timing and the circumstances of it, even
5847if you won't disclose the content of it.
5848
5849So, first of all, let me ask you, are you aware of the content
5850of the memo or memos?
5851
5852Ms. Page. I am.
5853
5854Mr. Ratcliffe. Were you involved in the preparation of the memo
5855ol amm ii fekae
5856
5857Ms. Page. I reviewed some of them, probably not all, but some
5858
5859of them, mostly for like spelling and typographical things before he
5860
5861 
5862
5863finalized them.
5864 
5865Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. You say "them," so there were multiple
5866memos. Do you know approximately how many memos?
5867
5868Ms. Page. Let's be more specific about memos with whom, if we
5869could.
5870
5871Mr. Ratcliffe. Memos with respect to President Trump.
5872
5873. Page. Just meetings with President Trump?
5874
5875Mr. Ratcliffe. Just what?
5876
5877Ms. Page. Just meetings with President Trump?
5878
5879Mr. Ratcliffe. Meetings, conversations, interactions,
5880communications.
5881
5882Ms. Page. With the President?
5883
5884Mr. atcliff With President Trump?
5885
5886Ms. Page. There's avery small number. I'mnot certain, but one
5887or two. I'm not certain.
5888
5889Mr. Ratcliffe. And can you tell me anything about the timing of
5890those memos? When they were created and the circumstances under which
5891they were created, without getting into the content?
5892
5893Ms. Page. With respect to those one or two, to the best of my
5894recollection, he would have created them shortly in time following
5895whatever interaction he may have had.
5896
5897Mr. Ratcliffe. And was it his interaction necessarily or could
5898
5899it have been memos about -- I'm trying to find out, again, the timing
5900
5901of this. Is this sort of related to the firing of Jim Comey or othe
5902
5903AV -T an cis
5904
5905 
5906
5907Ms. Page. I'm sorry. Ask me that question again.
5908 
5909Mr. Ratcliffe. I'm just trying to determine the context of now
5910
5911what I'm going to refer to as the McCabe memos and when they were created
5912
5913and what the circumstances of the McCabe memos were.
5914
5915So can you give me a -- when was the first McCabe memo created,
5916if you can give me the general timeframe and the circumstances under
5917which it was created.
5918
5919Ms. Page. Ihonestly, I could not guess at adate. Idonot think
5920that the Deputy Director had any interactions with the President of
5921the United States until after he became the Acting Director.
5922
5923‘Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay.
5924
5925Ms. Page. But that is my -- I am-speculating about that, as I
5926sit here today.
5927
5928Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. You're not certain about that.
5929
5930Do you know whether or not there were any McCabe memos during the
5931Obama Administration?
5932
5933Ms. Page. Not to my knowledge -- I'm sorry. Memorializing
5934interaction with President Obama?
5935
5936Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
5937
5938Ms. Page. No, not to my knowledge.
5939
5940Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. What's your understanding of why Deputy
5941Director or Acting Director McCabe generated a memo or memos
5942memorializing his interactions with President Trump?
5943
5944Ms. Page. I'mnot really crazy about speaking for them. I would
5945
5946say, in general, that an FBI agent memorializes the substance of a
5947
5948 
5949
5950conversation when he thinks there is a reason to memorialize it, whether
5951COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
5952
5953 
5954
5955COMMITTER SENSITIVE
5956it is the substance, whether it is the circumstances of the meeting,
5957
5958whether it is the nature of the interaction.
5959
5960We write something down when it seems worth writing down.
5961
5962Mr. Ratcliffe. Were the McCabe memos ever disclosed outside the
5963FBI, to your knowledge?
5964
5965Ms. Page. Not outside the Department, to my knowledge.
5966
5967Mr. Ratcliffe. Would the special counsel have access to the
5968McCabe memos?
5969
5970Ms. Page. I -- yes.
5971
5972Mr. Ratcliffe. Would the McCabe memos be relevant to the matters
5973that the special counsel is investigating?
5974
5975Ms. Page. Yes.
5976
5977Mr. Ratcliffe. You mentioned that there were other memos
5978that -- I'mnot sure I understood. These ones that we're talking about
5979related to his interactions with the President, but you intimated that
5980there were other McCabe memos that were responsive to my first
5981overarching question.
5982
5983Can you tell me what those memos relate to? How you would
5984characterize those?
5985
5986Ms. Page. Mr. McCabe memorialized certain interactions with
5987either White House personnel or others when there was something
5988noteworthy to memorialize, sir.
5989
5990Mr. Ratcliffe. Did either Deputy Director McCabe or Acting
5991
5992Director McCabe, whatever capacity, did he discuss the memos, to your
5993
5994 
5995
5996knowledge with Jim Comey?
5997COMMITTER SENSITIVE
5998
5999 
6000Ms. Page. Certainly, the ones that were written before the
6001Director was fired, I would expect so. He would not have discussed
6002them, any memos that he drafted after the Director was fired because
6003the Director was no longer a government employee.
6004
6005Mr. Ratcliffe. Based on public reports, Acting Director McCabe
6006interviewed with President Trump for the position of Director of the
6007FBI on or about May 18th of 2017.
6008
6009Do you know if -- first of all, do you know if Acting Director
6010McCabe discussed the McCabe memos or the Comey memos or disclosed the
6011existence of either to President Trump in that interview?
6012
6013Ms. Page. I, I don't think -- I don't know.
6014
6015Mr. Ratcliffe. Did you have a conversation with Acting Director
6016McCabe about his interview with the President?
6017
6018Ms. Page. I did.
6019
6020Mr. Ratcliffe. His interview for the position of FBI Director?
6021
6022Ms. Page. Yes.
6023
6024Mr. Ratcliffe. What generally did he relate to you about the
6025interview that you may recall?
6026
6027Ms. Page. I'msorry, sir. I'm not going to go into the details
6028of those conversations at this time.
6029
6030Mr. Ratcliffe. For what stated reason?
6031
6032Ms. Page. Because I have no idea what among the memos that
6033
6034Mr. McCabe drafted is of investigative utility or not to the special
6035
6036counsel, and so because I have no knowledge of that, I can’t start
6037
6038 
6039
6040parsing some parts of the content and -- versus others.
6041 
6042Mr. Baker. When Mr. McCabe was just regular Deputy Director, did
6043he ever keep any memos from conversations or interactions he had with
6044Director Comey?
6045
6046Ms. Page. He did not keep memos, but he obviously took notes,
6047you know, during the course of his duties.
6048
6049Mr. Baker. Okay.
6050
6051Mr. Meadows. Let me, Lisa, may I do a followup from previously?
6052
6053When we talked about the dossier's existence came into your
6054knowledge in mid-September, it's, I think, been reported, but also
6055during testimony, that there was a number of different versions of
6056different memos, I guess, that became aware -- that the FBI became aware
6057of. Is that correct?
6058
6059Ms. Page. Not memos but of the reports that are called the
6060dossier.
6061
6062Mr. Meadows. Yeah.
6063
6064. Page. Yeah, I'm --
6065
6066Mr. Meadows. Yeah, I'm not following up on his.
6067
6068Ms. Page. Okay.
6069
6070Mr. Meadows. But as we now know is the dossier because it had
6071a number of different reports there.
6072
6073Ms. Page. My understanding is that, if there are -- I'm going
6074
6075to make this up -- if there are 2@ reports that the FBI received from
6076
6077Christopher Steele, I've completely made that number up --
6078
6079Mr. Meadows. Right.
6080
6081 
6082
6083Ms. Page. -- I'm just using it for example's sake.
6084 
6085If there are 28 reports that the FBI received from Christopher
6086Steele at various times and from various individuals, people, other
6087government employees, wherever, the FBI has received certain subsets
6088of that 20.
6089
6090So, from one person, we might have received 11; from another
6091person, we might have received 14. I'm -- again, I'm just doing this
6092for example's sake -- but, yes, it is my understanding that the FBI
6093has received from various sources -- not confidential human
6094sources -- but from various places --
6095
6096Mr. Meadows. Right.
6097
6098Ms. Page. -- varied subsets of the, quote-unquote, "dossier."
6099
6100Mr. Meadows. So, when that happened, and we started to look at
6101
6102that, and obviously, you've got mid-September through the third week
6103
6104in October when a FISA application is actually issued on Carter Page,
6105
6106did you receive multiple sources between the mid-September, or were
6107the multiple sources after the original FISA application?
6108
6109Ms. Page. I think after.
6110
6111Mr. Meadows. Okay. So did you communicate that or was that
6112outlined in the followup FISA applications that you might have gotten
6113additional --
6114
6115Ms. Page. I'm not sure -- that's my point -- I'm not sure any
6116were additional.
6117
6118Mr. Meadows Right, but as a subset, but they were different.
6119
6120So, I mean -- here is --
6121
6122 
6123
6124Ms. Page. No, that's --
6125 
6126
6127COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
6128Mr. Meadows. So what you're saying is they were all consistent;
6129it just was part it --
6130
6131Ms. Page. Duplicative. Right so --
6132
6133Mr. Meadows. Let's say there were 16 different items, you might
6134have gotten 11 from this source and 10 from this, but they were all
6135consistent is what you're saying?
6136
6137Ms. Page. That's my recollection, yes.
6138
6139Mr. Meadows. All right.
6140
6141Ms. Page. So it's not as though, if we had 20, and Joe Smith
6142provided us with 11, all 11 were within the 20 we had. It is not as
6143though one of them was new to us out of the original 20. That's my --
6144
6145Mr. Meadows. Right.
6146
6147Ms. Page. I guess I should hedge this, though, because I'm not
6148
6149looking at any of these. That's my understanding based on what had
6150
6151been briefed to Director Comey or otherwise. I never looked at any
6152
6153of the nonofficial sources--
6154
6155Mr. Meadows. Right.
6156
6157Ms. Page. -- of the dossier.
6158
6159We got the set of the reports that we got from Christopher Steele,
6160our confidential human source. That was sort of the authoritative set
6161that we cared about.
6162
6163To the extent we got chunks or subsets from other people, we
6164collected them, but --
6165
6166Mr. Meadows. At what point did you start to get concerned that
6167
6168 
6169
6170there may be some potential credibility issues as it relates to who
6171 
6172may have paid for the work? Did you ever?
6173
6174Ms. Page. Me -
6175
6176Mr. Meadows I mean, because we know that, on January 10th of
61772017, they were still, according to Peter Strzok's email to you and
6178others, that they were unverified still at that particular point.
6179
6180Ms. Page. So, let's -- let -- there's a lot --
6181
6182Mr. Meadows. January 1@th.
6183
6184Ms. Page. There's a lot packed inthere, though. So, to your
6185first question, when did I get concerned?
6186
6187I'm not sure that I ever actually had a concern. And the reason
6188is that, with respect to the -- certainly the first FISA -- I think
6189we had an understanding that Steele had first been engaged by a
6190Republican opposition but by -- I'm not going to be able to describe
6191it better, and I hope I'm not --
6192
6193Mr. Meadows. Somebody opposite of Trump.
6194
6195Ms. Page. Exactly. By a Republican who is seeking opposition
6196research. Andthen, after that person had dropped out -- I didn't know
6197who -- but after that had sort of fallen away, that the engagement
6198continued for the Democrats.
6199
6200So that was sort of awash, as far as I'mconcerned. There wasn't,
6201in my view, a political motive that affected the --
6202
6203Mr. Meadows No, the one political narrative is that they were
6204
6205all against Donald Trump. That would be the consistent theme there.
6206
6207Ms. Page. Right.
6208
6209 
6210
6211Mr. Meadows. Whether it was for Marco Rubio or Ted Cruz,
6212 
6213
6214COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
6215were all consistently against Donald Trump.
6216
6217Ms. Page. That's right. But because of the person that
6218Christopher Steele was and the -- both his --
6219
6220Mr. Meadows. Because he was credible from before when you worked
6221rea
6222
6223Ms. Page. Exactly. And this was not a source of consternation,
6224ae Ae
6225
6226Mr. Meadows. So let me drill down. And specifically, Mike
6227Kortan and media contacts, potential media contacts, at what point did
6228that become a concern as it relates to Christopher Steele and some of
6229the communication that was not just a couple? It seemed to be
6230widespread.
6231
6232Ms. Page. Right. So we were very concerned about the existence
6233
6234and the content of Steele's reporting leaking. We were very concerned
6235
6236oreo nam
6237
6238Mr. Meadows In fact, did you not verify that he had leaked? I
6239mean, today, if you were to --
6240
6241Ms. Page. Let me -- hold on. I'm sorry. One second.
6242
6243Mr. Meadows. Go ahead. Sorry.
6244
6245Ms. Page. No, no. At some point, December-ish, I think,
6246maybe -- well, maybe earlier than that, maybe November. Mike Kortan,
6247the head of our Public Affairs Office, does start to inform the team
6248that there are more outlets asking him about this.
6249
6250Do you have it?
6251
6252 
6253
6254What is it?
6255COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
6256
6257 
6258
6259COMMITTEE SENSLTIVE
6260Have you heard of this?
6261
6262Because the existence of these reports is starting to sort of
6263
6264circulate in Washington circles. And I remember the team discussing,
6265
6266as a collective sort of saying, like, how our singular focus was to
6267not confirm that we had them because then we knew that the press couldn't
6268necessarily report on the substance of the allegations because they
6269were so inflammatory.
6270
6271Mr. Meadows’ Right.
6272
6273Ms. Page. But if they wanted to report in a way that would be
6274less inflammatory, they could simply say: The FBI has reports that
6275say blahbadee, blahbadee, blah.
6276
6277So our single focus was to make sure they could not do that.
6278
6279And with some regularity Kortan would inform us that this news
6280outlet or that news outlet had asked him: Do you have these? Do you
6281know about them?
6282
6283And we just had a resolute "no comment" because we did not want
6284to allow the opportunity that we did have these to even allow that to
6285be the news story.
6286
628710 ail
6288
6289Mr. Meadows. So was Mike Kortan's acknowledgment that this
6290potentially could have been happening with Christopher Steele, was that
6291part of the decision to not reimburse Christopher Steele, as has been
6292reported, or pay him for part of the work as a confidential human source?
6293
6294Ms. Page. I don't know what you'retalking about. I'm sorry.
6295
6296 
6297
6298Mike -- so Christopher Steele was never -- he came to us and gave us
6299 
6300this information. We didn't, we didn't --
6301
6302Mr. Meadows. So there was never an indication to reimburse him
6303for his expenses or anything else.
6304
6305Ms. Page. No, no, we reimbursed him for his --
6306
6307Mr. Meadows. Pay him for his time?
6308
6309Ms. Page. -- his travel expenses.
6310
6311Mr. Meadows. Pay him for his time?
6312
6313Ms. Page. No, not to my knowledge.
6314
6315Mr. Meadows. I can see my colleague from Texas getting anxious,
6316so I'm going to yield back.
6317
6318Ms. Page. Iwas going to say one other thing. One of the other
6319things you said sort of unverified, salacious. And so that's true,
6320and I can't get into sort of the substance of what we did, but
6321
6322immediately, I mean as soon as we received the reporting from Steele
6323
6324in mid-September, we set about trying to prove or disprove every single
6325
6326factual statement in the dossier.
6327
6328And so, and we had line level analysts who are super experts on
6329Russia, try to pick apart each statement and either try to prove its
6330veracity or prove its inaccuracy. And to the best of my knowledge,
6331we were never able to disprove any statement in it. So we were never
6332able to say: There's a claim about X, and that is untrue.
6333
6334There are some statements for which we have never been able to
6335confirm or deny its veracity. But there are no statements contained
6336
6337in the -- at least at the last time that the review is done, which is
6338
6339 
6340
6341now many months ago -- that we were able to demonstrate or show were
6342 
6343demonstrably false.
6344
6345Mr. Ratcliffe. Ms. Page, are you talking about the Woods file?
6346
6347Ms. Page. No. The Woods file is a document that accompanies a
6348FISA, which provides the basis for each statement contained therein.
6349
6350Mr. Ratcliffe. Right. I've seen it.
6351
6352Ms. Page. Okay.
6353
6354Mr. Ratcliffe. But I --
6355
6356Ms. Page. I'm not talking about the Woods file. I'm talking
6357about a separate effort that was undertaken in order to try to verify
6358for investigative purposes, not for purposes of the FISA, but a separate
6359effort undertaken to try to validate the allegations contained within
6360the Steele reporting.
6361
6362Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. So what would that, what was the
6363name -- maybe I missed it. What was the name of that document?
6364
6365Ms. Page. There's no name.
6366
6367Mr. Ratcliffe. If I were trying to locate that or ask for it to
6368be produced, what would I be asking for?
6369
6370Ms. Page. I mean, the efforts to validate the Steele reporting?
6371
6372I don't know. It's not like a document. I mean, it is not a --
6373
6374Mr. Meadows. I guess what he's saying is we have not seen these
6375
6376documents yet. We've made multiple requests. So I guess how can you
6377help us home in on where those requests may or may not be?
6378Mr. Ratcliffe. And the reason I mentioned the Woods file is
6379
6380because I have seen the Woods file because I've wanted --
6381
6382 
6383
6384Ms. Page. The Woods file is different.
6385 
6386Mr. Ratcliffe. And I understand that, but I thought maybe you
6387
6388were talking about it without naming it. So, if there's another
6389document out there that attempts to do something similar, it sounds
6390ah Ce
6391
6392Ms. Page. No, I don't -- it is not that similar. Every single
6393FISA that goes to the FISC has a Woods file.
6394
6395Mr. Ratcliffe. Right.
6396
6397Ms. Page. No matter the topic, no matter the subject, no matter
6398the threat.
6399
6400The Woods file is part of the FISA process which is designed to
6401demonstrate that we have done due diligence with respect to the facts
6402supporting the FISA application. This is a sort of separate effort
6403that investigative team undertook.
6404
6405Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Ms. Page, I have to -- I've had a chance
6406to ask you questions over the last Friday and again today. I know I've
6407asked you some tough questions, but I want to get on the record, have
6408I been discourteous to you at all?
6409
6410Ms. Page. No, sir.
6411
6412Mr. Ratcliffe. Have I given you the full opportunity to answer
6413or explain your answers?
6414
6415Ms. Page. Yes, sir.
6416
6417Mr. Ratcliffe. And have I generally been fair in my questioning?
6418
6419Ms. Page. Yes.
6420
6421Mr. Ratcliffe. Believe it or not, I'm asking that -- believe it
6422
6423 
6424
6425or not some folks might misrepresent how we conduct ourselves in here,
6426 
6427
6428COMMITTER SENSITIVE
6429and I want to get that on the record.
6430
6431So I thank you for your time.
6432
6433Mr. Meadows. And I'm -- the gentleman from Boston has a couple
6434of questions for me, and you'll tell by his accent very quickly.
6435
6436Mr. Brebbia. Hi. I'm Sean Brebbia, Oversight and Government
6437Reform, Majority.
6438
6439Ms. Page. Sean?
6440
6441Mr. Brebbia. Brebbia. B-R-E-B-B-I-A.
6442
6443BY MR. BREBBIA:
6444Q I show you an email between you and Peter Strzok from
6445
6446October 18, 2016.
6447
6448A I just want to take a second to start from the beginning and
6449
6450look at it.
6451
6452Q Sure. Please do.
6453
6454A Okay.
6455
6456Q Just beginning very basically, can you tell us a little bit
6457about what's being discussed here? The subject is
6458
6459A  AmTI allowed to -- I'm sorry. One second, please.
6460
6461Ms. Bessee. May we confer?
6462
6463Mr. Brebbia. Sure.
6464
6465[Discussion off the record. ]
6466
6467Ms. Page. So I don't -- I can't -- I believe that I can answer
6468the question. I don't believe I can answer the question in an
6469
6470unclassified setting.
6471
6472 
6473
6474Mr. Brebbia. Okay.
6475 
6476Mr. Somers. But you could answer the question in a classified
64771=3 nN aoa
6478Ms. Page. Yes.
6479Mr. Brebbia. And FBI.
6480BY MR. BREBBIA:
6481Q Okay. Couple more. In this email, there's mention of
6482
6483"they" editinga document. Subject of the email is "Re
6484
6485SMA CLM MRRP BROMRO TM || MN Z-MrliN
6486
6487involvement with preparing that document?
6488
6489A There's no way I can answer that. I can't answer that it
6490in this. I'm sorry.
6491
6492Q How about anyone at the White House? Anyone at the White
6493House have involvement in drafting that document?
6494
6495A I can say, generally, I am not aware of the White House
6496ever -- in my personal knowledge, I've never been a part of any FISA
6497in which the White House has been involved?
6498
6499Q And how about knowledge? Is there at the White
6500House -- anyone in the White House have knowledge of that document?
6501
6502A Not to my knowledge.
6503
6504Q It probably makes more sense to take this up in classified
6505{oy malas
6506
6507A I think so, sir.
6508
6509Mr. Parmiter. Could I ask just a couple of followup questions
6510
6511to some of the things you talked about with Mr. Ratcliffe?
6512
6513 
6514
6515You referred to a separate effort that was not the Woods file to
6516 
6517validate allegations in the Steele reporting. I'm just kind of curious
6518as to the timeframe.
6519
6520When did that sort of separate effort begin to corroborate the
6521Steele reporting, and when did it end?
6522
6523Ms. Page. It began immediately upon receiving the Steele
6524reporting. And I do not know when it ended.
6525
6526BY MR. BAKER:
6527
6528Q And what steps were taken to validate or refute any of the
6529points made in the document?
6530
6531A I can't go into more detail about the specific efforts that
6532were taken, other than that herculean efforts were taken to try to prove
6533and -- or disprove or corroborate in any way the statements contained
6534in the Steele reporting.
6535
6536Q Okay. Let's take the Steele reporting out of it.
6537
6538If you were trying to validate points made in information given
6539
6540from another source, would it be fair to say one of the techniques to
6541
6542validate or disprove would be to task other sources?
6543
6544A
6545
6546 
6547
6548Q So would you do everything and anything that's authorized,
6549 
6550
6551COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
6552but that could include tasking other human sources to --
6553A Well, yes I guess it could, but think about really what you're
6554saying. If I have a document that says, "On January 25th of 2013, Joe
6555
6556Smith and Sally Jones were at a restaurant,"
6557
6558MM that's a historical event.
6559
6560Q But if you have a source that owned the restaurant. I mean,
6561you could have a source that --
6562
6563A If you
6564
6565And then you would get whatever answer then, certainly.
6566But more likely, I mean, so maybe you would
6567. I mean , I'm making this
6568up, obviously, but the more expeditious and likely investigative
6569
6570steps would be to look at what is
6571
6572Q Okay.
6573A And that would at least make that statement more likely to
6574be true or less likely to be true, depending on what you find.
6575Q Okay. Thank you.
6576BY MR. BREITENBACH:
6577Q You had indicated on Friday that there was an investigator
6578
6579who had been brought over to the Special Counsel's Office prior to
6580
6581 
6582
6583Mr. Strzok being employed, but that that person was not a good fit?
6584OMMITTEE SENSITIVE
6585
6586 
6587
6588COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
6589That's correct.
6590
6591Who was that person?
6592
65930]
6594pay I think his name was John Brown.
65950]
6596
6597And why do you think that the special counsel deemed
6598im -- Mr. John Brown, you said?
6599A I think that's his name, yeah.
6600Q Why do you think the special counsel deemed him not to be
6601a good fit?
6602A You would have to ask the special counsel.
6603Q So you're not aware of why he might have been removed --
6604
6605I'm not going to speculate.
6606
6607-- from the team?
6608
6609No.
6610
6611Why did you leave the Special Counsel's Office?
6612
6613I talked about this at length on Friday. When Mr. Mueller
6614first asked me to join, I was quite hesitant todo so. It had been
6615an incredibly intense 2 years, and I have very young children at home.
6616And I wanted to be a better parent to them. And so I originally
6617demurred, and Mr. McCabe encouraged me to go and help out. And soas
6618a sort of compromise position, I talked with Mr. Mueller about coming
6619over for 45 days to sort of help them stand up their effort and that
6620we would sort of reassess at the end of those 45 days.
6621
6622And, ultimately, I knew -- I know what a Bob Mueller operation
6623
6624looks like, and I know the intensity and the rigor and the incredibly
6625
6626 
6627
6628hard work that is required. And I was just ready to sort of makea
6629 
6630change in my personal life. And so I left after the 45 days and
6631returned to the FBI.
6632
6633Q Okay. And also in your testimony on Friday, you had that
6634indicated -- you had made some statement indicating that we had access
6635to all of your emails, texts, communications?
6636
6637A  Imean, this is my presumption. There's not a whole lot of
6638secrets out there left on me.
6639
6640Q Are you aware whether there was any preservation order ever
6641issued with respect to any of your communications?
6642
6643A Preservation by whom and for what?
6644
6645Q That's what I'm asking. Maybe from Special Counsel's
6646
6647Office, the FBI, by --
6648
6649A I mean the FBI, to the best of my knowledge, preserves
6650everything. And I'm certain there have been preservation orders that
6651the FBI has sort of announced, but I'm not even there anymore. So I
6652don't have access to any of the stuff before you in the first place.
6653
6654Q We understand you communicated through other devices, other
6655accounts, including iMessage and Gmail. Has there been any effort to
6656access any of those communications?
6657
6658A Well, I don't have any iMessages. We communicated using our
6659personal devices for personal purposes. We very infrequently used
6660those devices for work purposes. And --
6661
6662Q I'm sorry. I missed that.
6663
6664A We very infrequently used our personal devices for work
6665
6666 
6667 
6668Q Have you turned over those messages that were work-related?
6669
6670A There are no work-related messages in my personal accounts.
6671
6672Q But you indicated you “infrequently,” meaning, at some
6673point, you did communicate regarding work-related purposes over
6674personal devices?
6675
6676A I am sure that I have. I never retained those. And unless
6677
6678they were a record requiring, you know, sending it back through the
6679
6680FBI system, there's no need to retain those.
6681
6682Q And neither the FBI nor the special counsel has ever
6683attempted or requested your communications over personal devices or
6684personal accounts?
6685
6686A One moment, please.
6687
6688[Discussion off the record. ]
6689
6690Ms. Page. So there is -- my understanding is that there is some
6691FOIA litigation, either at the Department or the FBI for which my
6692personal accounts -- I'm sorry -- for which work-related material on
6693my personal accounts have been requested to be preserved, but I do not
6694have any such material to preserve.
6695
6696BY MR. BREITENBACH:
6697
6698Q You indicated previously that the importance that you placed
6699on the Russia investigation over the Clinton email investigation in
6700terms of the effect you believed it might have on national security.
6701
6702Are you aware whether there was ever any similar targeting of the
6703
6704Hillary Clinton campaign by any foreign intelligence service?
6705
6706 
6707
6708A No, not that I'm aware. And just to be clear about your
6709 
6710 
6711question, that answer was given with respect to, once we were in October
6712and we had the sort of ongoing Russia investigation and we had rail
6713potential additional emails that may have existed on the Weiner laptop.
6714
6715So I just want to make sure we're talking about -- it's not as
6716though, other than in that one particular month, the two investigations
6717never overlapped such that we had to do a Sedan NT -aeel a balancing of the
6718two investigations.
6719
6720Q Serving as counsel to Mr. McCabe, the number two at the FBI, is
6721that the kind of information that you might learn of with respect to
6722whether another.
6723
6724A If there had been a serious attempt by a foreign power to -- oN
6725a threatening foreign power to work with members of the Clinton
6726Campaign, I would have expected to know about it, yes.
6727
6728Q Okay. Thank you.
6729
6730BY MR. SOMERS:
6731
6732Q You mentioned the name John Brown a few minutes ago. Can
6733
6734you just clarify where he is, what his job is?
6735
6736I have no idea what his ob is ane onan alo)
6737
6738No. Was at the time. Sorry.
6739
6740So, when the special counsel first stood up and they were
6741looking to staff that effort, they -- the FBI, I think, originally
6742wanted to put somebody other than Pete on it so that Pete could kind
6743
6744Of go back to his day job, as I think I described in some depth on Friday.
6745
6746And so the person that Lael ane] ane an wR sought to fill the kind
6747
6748 
6749
6750of lead FBI role on the special counsel was an individual named John
6751Q National Security Division? Counterintelligence?
6752
6753A I think a Cyber SAC.
6754
6755 
6756
6757Mr. Somers. I think we're out of time for this round.
6758CA ee
6759Ms. Kim. We're back on the record. It is 4:07.
6760BY MS. KIM.
6761
6762Q Ms. Page, the email that you discussed with the majority
6763about the has been used as an exhibit for a news article
6764that came out on July 6th, 2018, from The Hill entitled "Memos Detail
6765FBI's Hurry the F Up to Probe Trump Campaign." Are you familiar with
6766that article?
6767
6768A I'm sorry, can you step just a little bit further from the
6769mike? It's a little bit -- yeah.
6770
6771Q Does this help?
6772
6773A Yeah. Sorry. So say that all over again, please.
6774
6775Q Yes. The email that you reviewed with the
6776
6777majority was used in an article from The Hill by opinion contributor
6778
6779John Solomon about how the FBI allegedly kept hurry the F up pressure
6780
6781on the Trump campaign probe. Are you familiar with that article?
6782
6783A Iam familiar with that article, yes.
6784
6785Q The thesis question from that article, third paragraph o
6786that article I'll read to youis: The question that lingers unanswered
6787is, did those sentiments, meaning anti-Trump sentiments, affect
6788official actions?
6789
6790Oa
6791
6792Q So, insofar as you can tell us in an unclassified setting,
6793
6794did the process reflect any political biases or other
6795
6796 
6797
6798improper motives?
6799 
6800A No. As I -- as I think I discussed earlier -- I probably
6801shouldn't have discussed earlier in that setting. Okay, never mind.
6802
6803No, there were no -- no political interest or bias which affected
6804the Carter Page FISA.
6805
6806Q Did it reflect any undue haste on the part of the FBI in an
6807attempt to try to stop Donald Trump from becoming elected President?
6808
6809A No, not at all.
6810
6811BY MS. HARIHARAN:
6812
6813Q Also a part of the article is they cite Peter Strzok's
6814testimony from when he met with us in the transcribed interview where
6815he said, quote, in response to Mr. Gowdy's question of whether he was
6816involved in the preparation of the affidavit in support of that FISA,
6817he said, quote: "I can tell you that I was aware of the FISA
6818application, but I did not participate in its preparation."
6819
6820And then, when asked again, he wrote -- excuse me, he said: I
6821did not provide information. I did speak with people who were
6822preparing it.
6823
6824So, referring back to the emails that the majority showed you,
6825was that Peter Strzok acting in his capacity as a supervisor for those
6826responsible for the FISA application?
6827
6828A That's correct. So speaking more generally, a person in a
6829
6830DAD role does not have any role in the FISA process. It's a very sort
6831
6832of regimented process that goes back and forth from the Department to
6833
6834the FBI. At no time does a DAD need to approve it or read it or write
6835
6836 
6837
6838it or provide intelligence toward it.
6839 
6840
6841COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
6842To the extent Pete was involved, it was because he was -- to the
6843extent Pete was knowledgeable that it was happening, it's because he
6844was in charge of the Crossfire investigation. But he -- that's
6845consistent with my understanding and recollection. He did not have
6846a role in the drafting or the sort of approval of the FISA.
6847
6848Q So just to be clear, he was not one of the individuals
6849involved in sort of the preparation of the factual --
6850
6851A That's correct.
6852
6853Q Okay. And then, to the best of your knowledge, then was his
6854testimony accurate?
6855
6856A That's correct, yes.
6857
6858Q Thank you.
6859
6860Mr. Cohen. Ms. Page, I'm sorry, I've missed your testimony on
6861Friday and this morning, so there might be things that are repetitious.
6862I believe I'mcorrect that you've said that even if people had political
6863perspectives, and some people were anti-Hillary and some people thought
6864
6865Bernie was beyond the burn, et cetera, that none of those biases
6866
6867affected any of the actions of Mr. Strzok or of you or anybody else
6868
6869within the Mueller special counsel investigation.
6870
6871Ms. Page. That's correct, sir.
6872
6873Mr. Cohen. Anything in the FISA applications that you know o
6874that was not dealt with according to procedures and --
6875
6876Ms. Page. No, sir.
6877
6878Mr. Cohen. No nefarious activity?
6879
6880 
6881
6882Ms. re, No, sir.
6883 
6884
6885COMMITTER SENSITIVE
6886Mr. Cohen. And wasn't there some information that if you went
6887too far in giving the court -- the court was given information, I
6888
6889believe, about the fact that somebody might have paid for the dossier,
6890
6891but that if they went too far, they might be outing sources or going
6892
6893beyond what is legitimate activity?
6894
6895Ms. Page. Sir, I'm not sure I can answer that question in
6896this setting.
6897
6898Mr. Cohen. And I'm not sure if I asked it right.
6899
6900Ms. Page. No, I understand your question. I'm just not
6901sure -- I'mreally not sure what's been classified and -- what remains
6902classified and what's been declassified. So I'm not -- I'm not
6903comfortable answering that in this setting.
6904
6905Mr. Cohen. And then you were asked about Mr. McCabe's memos and
6906Mr. Comey's and the fact that he made some notes about his conversations
6907with President Trump, and to the best of your knowledge he didn't do
6908this with any other Presidents. Is that correct?
6909
6910Ms. Page. I think that's been his testimony, yes, sir.
6911
6912Mr. Cohen. Do you think in your history as an attorney, your
6913knowledge as a human being, that the degree of the -- the reputation
6914a person has for truth and veracity might have something to do with
6915the likelihood of somebody making a memo about their conversation with
6916seats
6917
6918Ms. Page. I agree with you, sir.
6919
6920Mr. Cohen. So he wouldn't -- if he had talked to Abraham Lincoln,
6921
6922 
6923
6924he wouldn't have had to make a memo, honest Abe.
6925 
6926How long were you involved with the FBI?
6927
6928Ms. Page. I was -- I worked at the FBI for about 6 years.
6929
6930Mr. Cohen. And this was -- how many years were you there during
6931Comey's directorship?
6932
6933Ms. Page. For all ofhis directorship. So for the 3-1/2 years
6934
6935that Director Comey was there, I was also an employee.
6936
6937Mr. Cohen. And were you there after he was fired too?
6938
6939Ms. Page. I was.
6940
6941Mr. Cohen. Would you say the morale at the FBI went up or down
6942after he left?
6943
6944Ms. Page. We were devastated by his firing, sir.
6945
6946Mr. Cohen. He was generally respected by members of the FBI?
6947
6948Ms. Page. He was respected and well-liked, and people believed
6949in his vision for the FBI.
6950
6951Mr. Cohen. You were never there during the time Mueller was
6952there, were you?
6953
6954Ms. Page. I was for about the first year, year and a half of
6955Mr. Mueller's tenure.
6956
6957Mr. Cohen. Do you know what his reputation is among members of
6958the Bureau for honesty and for diligence and for, you know, hard work
6959and caring about America?
6960
6961Ms. Page. He -- his reputation for all of those things is strong.
6962He is regarded as very demanding, but also completely honest, you know,
6963
6964with integrity that is really unparalleled.
6965
6966 
6967
6968Mr. Cohen And a lot of the work that Peter Strzok had done at
6969OMMITTEE SENSITIVE
6970
6971 
6972the FBI, particularly back in 2010, when he outed I think it was as
6973many as 1@ Russian spies, was a lot of his work centered in
6974counterintelligence on Russia?
6975
6976Ms. Page. His entire career has been in the Counterintelligence
6977Division. So his full 2@ years at the FBI has been almost exclusively
6978doing either counterintelligence or espionage cases, right. So
6979counterintelligence is our effort to counter foreign adversaries here
6980collecting against us. Espionage cases involve U.S. persons who have
6981decided to turn --
6982
6983Mr. Cohen. Join another team.
6984
6985Ms. Page. -- and work for a foreign power.
6986
6987Mr. Cohen. Yeah. Maybe go and sit next to Putin and say nice
6988things to him, that kind of stuff.
6989
6990Would you say that if he had a driving force in his life and
6991something that he was most concerned about that it was protecting
6992
6993America and our country from Russian influence?
6994
6995nice Page. That is -- he is a patriot, first and foremost, and
6996
6997he has devoted his entire life to defending the national security of
6998the United States. And Russia poses probably the most pernicious
6999threat to Western ideals and Western democracy. So, yes.
7000
7001Mr. Cohen. I don't think I have anything else. Thank you. And
7002I'm not going to offer you -- suggest you should get a Purple Heart
7003even though I'll probably be described as sexist for not doing it.
7004
7005Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
7006
7007 
7008
7009Ms. Page, I thank you for being here. And I know it's not the
7010 
7011most pleasant moment in your life.
7012During his testimony the other day, Agent Strzok said something
7013
7014to this effect: That while he may have had his own personal opinions
7015
7016about Hillary Clinton and even his own opinions about Donald Trump,
7017
7018that it did not impact his -- the investigation. In other words, when
7019he was deliberating with his colleagues, it did not affect that.
7020
7021Do you believe that?
7022
7023Ms. Page. Yes, sir.
7024
7025Mr. Cummings. And why do you say that?
7026
7027Ms. Page. Because I was present for all of the investigative
7028steps and for the decisionmaking that occurred on both investigations.
7029And so I know the discussions that went on around them. I know the
7030reasons behind the steps that we took.
7031
7032Certainly, with respect to the Clinton investigation, there was
7033not a single investigative step at all, under any circumstances, other
7034than the July 5th statement made by the Director, that wasn't done
7035either in conjunction with or at the direction of the Justice
7036Department.
7037
7038So there is no room for bias, to the extent it even exists in the
7039first place, to have influenced official acts, because every single
7040act was taken in coordination with a half dozen to a dozen or more
7041people.
7042
7043Me. Cummings. Can you understand -- and I asked the same
7044
7045question of Mr. Strzok, Agent Strzok. And I practiced law many years.
7046
7047 
7048
7049But can you understand why people might think when they read the texts
7050 
7051that it would be almost impossible not to interject that, those
7052thoughts, into the discussion?
7053
7054Ms. Page. I do understand that, sir. But I do think that we do
7055not give up our right to have a view as to who is most qualified to
7056be President of the United States simply because we work for the FBI
7057or even because we are working on an investigation involving oneor
7058the other of them.
7059
7060And these were our personal views. They were views, particularly
7061before July 28th, which entirely reflected our view of the dignity
7062befitting the White House, of the decorum and the way one holds one's
7063self. I don't see how that is relevant at all to whether Hillary
7064Clinton mishandled classified information 3 years prior.
7065
7066And after July 28th, we were now concerned about whether there
7067was a foreign adversary trying to work with a Presidential campaign.
7068And so I think that the concern there is both understandable and
7069recognizable.
7070
7071I guess the other thing I would say, sir, is that -- and I've said
7072this a number of times in response to other questions -- we don't often
7073
7074like the people we investigate. And that is true whether we are
7075
7076investigating a pedophile or a fraudster or a terrorist or a drug
7077
7078dealer. We don't like criminals. We don't like people who we think
7079are criminals.
7080And that does not ever under any circumstances pervade the
7081
7082activity that an FBI agent or an FBI lawyer or a DOJ prosecutor engage
7083
7084 
7085
7086in. We are not driven by political motivations. We are driven bya
7087 
7088search for the truth. This is who we are as FBI employees. It is
7089absolutely what pervades our every decisionmaking.
7090And if at any opportunity we saw somebody acting in a different
7091way, we would not tolerate it. It's just not the way we operate.
7092Mr. Cummings. You said something a moment ago in I think it was
7093
7094answering one of Congressman Cohen's questions, and I don't remember
7095
7096the exact words. I tried to jot it down. But you were talking about
7097
7098Russia and the threat of Russia. I forget the words you used. You
7099said Russia was the greatest -- can you elaborate on that, please?
7100
7101Ms. Page. So it is my personal view that Russia poses probably
7102the most -- the greatest threat certainly to Western ideals of any of
7103our foreign adversaries. And we have vast foreign adversaries. But
7104even the threats that are posed by China or by Iran or North Korea or
7105others doesn't speak to sort of the core of Western democracy, right?
7106
7107You have -- you have -- in the Russian Federation and in President
7108Putin himself, you have an individual whose aim is to disrupt the
7109Western alliance and whose aim is to make Western democracy more
7110fractious and in order to weaken our ability, America's ability and
7111the West's ability, to spread our democratic ideals. I mean, that's
7112the goal, is to make us less of a moral authority to spread democratic
7113ee WRU a
7114
7115And I happen to think that this is the best country on the planet
7116and that our values are universal values that can and should be spread
7117
7118across the globe. And that is not a view that is shared by Russia.
7119
7120 
7121
7122And so every effort to sow discord, to make us fractious, to har
7123 
7124the Western and American way of life is awin for the Russian Federation.
7125It is a win for President Putin.
7126
7127So it is my opinion -- I am certainly not the world expert on
7128it -- but it is my opinion that with respect to Western ideals and who
7129it is and what it is we stand for as Americans, Russia poses the most
7130dangerous threat to that way of life.
7131
7132Mr. Cummings. Are you aware of any FBI investigations motivated
7133by political bias?
7134
7135Ms. Page. Never, sir. No.
7136
7137. Cummings. You never saw signs of that when you were there?
7138
7139Ms. Page. No.
7140
7141Mr. Cummings. Are you aware of any Justice Department
7142investigations motivated by political bias?
7143
7144Ms. Page. Not that I'm aware of, no.
7145
7146Ms. Page. On February 2nd, 2018, President Trump tweeted, and
7147I quote: "The top leadership and investigators of the FBI and the
7148Justice Department have politicized the sacred investigative process
7149
7150in favor of Democrats against Republicans, something which would have
7151
7152been unthinkable just a short time ago. Rank and file are great
7153
7154people," end of quote.
7155
7156Do you agree that, quote, "the top leadership and investigators
7157of the FBI and the Justice Department have politicized the sacred
7158investigative process in favor of Democrats and against Republicans,"
7159
7160and can you explain why you feel whatever you feel?
7161
7162 
7163
7164Ms. Page. No, sir, that's not been my experience. My experience
7165 
7166is as I've described it, which is that every person to a person, there
7167are 36,500 of us, and we all care about doing things the right way.
7168
7169That is the reason that we have the authority that we have as the
7170FBI to show up at your door in the middle of the night and to knock
7171
7172on it and to hope that you open. And the reason that we are able to
7173
7174do that is because we have a reputation for honesty and integrity.
7175
7176And if we cannot continue to do that, if people question our
7177motives and people question why we are showing up at their door in the
7178middle of the night, we are all unquestionably less safe because of
7179ao
7180
7181Mr. Cummings. Tell me, why did you become an FBI agent?
7182
7183Ms. Page. So I've been a lawyer, sir, for the last 12 years. I
7184am one of those nerdy kids who at 14 knew I wanted to be a lawyer, knew
7185I wanted to serve -- be a public servant. I went to a public school
7186for law school in order to have less debt and lived at home so that
7187I could not sort of take the route of a private sector job, because
7188I have always wanted to serve my country.
7189
7190Mr. Cummings. I take it this has been avery painful experience.
7191
7192Ms. Page. It has, sir.
7193
7194Mr. Cummings. Do you want me to pause for a minute?
7195
7196Ms. Page. I'm fine.
7197
7198Mr. Cummings. Throughout your career at the FBI and DOJ, are you
7199aware of any instances of the FBI and the Justice Department conducting
7200
7201investigations in favor of any party and against another?
7202
7203 
7204
7205Ms. Page. No, sir.
7206 
7207Mr. Cummings. On May 22nd, 2018, Republican Members of Congress
7208
7209introduced House Resolution 967. In that, they were requesting that
7210
7211the Attorney General appoint a second special counsel to investigate
7212misconduct at DOJ and the FBI.
7213
7214At the bottom of the first page, the resolution asserts the
7215following: "Whereas, there is an urgent need for the appointment of
7216a second special counsel in light of evidence that raises critical
7217concerns about decisions, activities, and inherent bias displayed at
7218the highest levels of the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau
7219of Investigation regarding FISA abuse, how and why the Hillary Clinton
7220email probe ended, and how and why the Donald Trump-Russia probe began, "
7221end of quote.
7222
7223Ms. Page, do you think that there was inherent bias at the highest
7224levels of DOJ and FBI regarding FISA abuse?
7225
7226Ms. Page. No, sir, there has not been.
7227
7228Mr. Cummings. Is there any evidence of inherent bias displayed
7229at the highest levels of DOJ and the FBI regarding how and why the
7230Hillary Clinton email probe ended?
7231
7232Ms. Page. No, sir.
7233
7234Mr. Cummings. Is there any evidence of inherent bias displayed
7235at the highest levels of the DOJ and the FBI against Donald Trump as
7236part of the Trump-Russia probe?
7237
7238Ms. Page. Sir, no. The actions that we took in that
7239
7240investigation, at least in the time that I've been present for it, are
7241
7242 
7243
7244exactly what you want the FBI to do when confronted with the risk that
7245 
7246a member of a Presidential campaign may be working in coordination with
7247Lae lome de Soe |
7248
7249There is no -- at the outset of an investigation, we cannot tell
7250you definitively what is happening.
7251
7252But the notion that we should not have opened the investigation,
7253that we should not have looked into whether or not this is a truthful
7254
7255or accurate allegation is just mind-boggling to me. It is precisely
7256
7257what you want your FBI to do, investigate counterintelligence threats
7258
7259to this Nation.
7260
7261It doesn't mean that anybody has done anything wrong, not at the
7262outset. It means that we need to look. And that's what we did.
7263
7264Mr. Cummings. Are you aware of any actions ever taken to damage
7265the Trump campaign at the highest levels of the Department of Justice
7266or the FBI?
7267
7268Ms. Page. No, sir.
7269
7270Mr. Cummings. Are you aware of any actions ever taken to
7271personally target Donald Trump at the highest levels of the Department
7272of Justice or the FBI?
7273
7274Ms. Page. No.
7275
7276Mr. Cummings. Is there any evidence that any FBI or Department
7277of Justice official took any actions biased in favor of Clinton or
7278biased against Trump?
7279
7280Ms. Page. No, sir.
7281
7282Mr. Cummings. Not James Comey?
7283
7284 
7285
7286Ms. Page. No
7287 
7288vlan Vato lat=1\ mmol = ]el es
7289
7290oe
7291
7292la Peter Strzok?
7293
7294Ne
7295
7296lan Loretta Lynch?
7297
7298No that I'm aware of.
7299
7300ae Sally Yates?
7301
7302Ms. Page. Again, same answer.
7303
7304Mr. Cummings. I'm sorry?
7305
7306Ms. Page. Same answer.
7307
7308Mr. Cummings. Rod Rosenstein?
7309
7310Ms. Page. No.
7311
7312Mr. Cummings. And Robert Mueller?
7313
7314Ms. Page. No, sir.
7315
7316Mr. Cummings. Is there any evidence that President Obama ordered
7317any investigative activity that was biased in favor of Clinton or biased
7318against Trump?
7319
7320Ms. Page. No, sir.
7321
7322Mr. Cummings. Is there any evidence that President Obama ordered
7323a wiretap of Donald Trump or the Trump campaign?
7324
7325Ms. Page. There is no evidence of that at all, sir.
7326
7327Mr. Cummings. None?
7328
7329Ms. Page. None.
7330
7331Mr. Cummings. I take it there was some time spent trying to
7332
7333 
7334
7335figure out whether there was truth to that.
7336COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
7337
7338 
7339Ms. Page. At the Department, certainly, yes, sir.
7340
7341Mr. Cummings. On December 3rd, 2017, the President tweeted,
7342quote: "After years of Comey with the phony and dishonest Clinton
7343investigation and more running the FBI, its reputation is in tatters,
7344worst in history, but fear not, we will bring it back to greatness,"
7345end of quote.
7346
7347Let me ask you something. I want to go back to something that
7348Congressman Cohen asked you. He asked you about a certain period
7349where -- and he was asking you about the morale. And you said -- and
7350
7351I'm not -- I don't remember the exact words. But can you describe,
7352
7353you know, when you -- I'm sure you all saw these tweets. And when you
7354
7355get things like that, read stuff like that, how do you think it affected
7356the morale?
7357
7358Ms. Page. Iwill just say, sir, that that is not consistent with
7359my feeling about Director Comey or anybody that I know or that I've
7360spoken to about how we held Director Comey. He was widely liked. He
7361was respected. I don't know whether he would want to work with me ever
7362again, but I would work for him anywhere he went any time in my life.
7363He is a man of extraordinary intelligence and integrity, and it was
7364a total pleasure to learn from him.
7365
7366Mr. Cummings. Do you agree with the President's statement that
7367the FBI's reputation is in tatters and is the worst -- is the worst
7368Wee ola as
7369
7370Ms. Page. Well, it is now.
7371
7372 
7373
7374Mr. Cummings. And why do you say that?
7375 
7376Ms. Page. Because we continue to be a political punching bag.
7377Because some private texts about our personal opinions continue to be
7378used to -- as a broad brush to describe the entire activity of 36,500
7379individuals. Because we have been caught up in a place that we never
7380could have possibly imagined, because all of us did the job that was
7381asked of us.
7382
7383Mr. Cummings. Is that painful?
7384
7385Ms. Page. It's horrendous, sir.
7386
7387Mr. Cummings. Does it make your job harder to do?
7388
7389Ms. Page. Yes, it does.
7390
7391Mr. Cummings. How so?
7392
7393Ms. Page. Well, it's the very point that Iwas making. If we
7394cannot be trusted to call on you, if we cannot be trusted to protect
7395confidential human sources, then we need to get out of the law
7396enforcement business. Because if we cannot be trusted to keep secrets,
7397
7398if we cannot be trusted to -- to believe that what we do we do for the
7399
7400right reasons, then we have a very big problem in this country.
7401
7402Mr. Cummings. Do you agree with the President's
7403characterization that the Clinton investigation was, quote, "phony and
7404(oh) glo) ato 3 eg
7405
7406Ms. Page. I would welcome the President to point out what we
7407should have done differently in that investigation, what the evidence
7408would have shown, how we would have prosecuted beyond a reasonable
7409
7410doubt, given the evidencebefore us. I would welcome aconversation
7411
7412 
7413
7414with President Trump about that.
7415 
7416IT am really tired of hearing all of the things that we should have
7417done with nobody actually demonstrating to me why that would have
7418resulted in a different conclusion with respect to the prosecution of
7419Mrs. Clinton.
7420
7421Mr. Cummings. In your opinion, what kind of impact do statements
7422like this have on the morale --
7423
7424Ms. Page. They're demoralizing.
7425
7426Mr. Cummings. -- of the rank and file?
7427
7428Ms. Page. They're demoralizing, sir.
7429
7430Mr. Cummings. And what is the impact of statements like these
7431on the public's confidence in the FBI and how does that impact our
7432national security?
7433
7434Ms. Page. I'mnot sure I can expand on that further than I already
7435have, sir.
7436
7437Mr. Cummings. Let mesay this. I don't have anything else, but
7438again, I think I just want to defend the truth. And -- were you about
7439to say something?
7440
7441Ms. Page. I was going to say, so dol, sir.
7442
7443Mr. Cummings. And Ibelieve that. I believe that. And Ithink
7444what I've been trying to get to is the bottom line.
7445
7446You know, when I listen to some of the questioning, I try to figure
7447
7448out where are we going with all of this. And it seems to me when you
7449
7450told me and this body, this group of people, about your feelings with
7451
7452regard to Russia, it makes it even more urgent that we get to the bottom
7453
7454 
7455
7456line or we won't have a democracy.
7457 
7458
7459COMMITTRE SENSITIVE
7460And I want to thank you for your service. Going through difficult
7461
7462times is difficult, but in the end I think if you survive it you come
7463
7464out a stronger person.
7465
7466Ms. Page. Let's hope so.
7467
7468Mr. Cummings. And I want to -- I do thank you for your service
7469and thank you for your testimony.
7470
7471Ms. Page. Thank you.
7472
7473Mr. Cummings. All right.
7474
7475ieee
7476
7477Mr. Parmiter. Let's go back on the record. It's 4:43 p.m.
7478
7479BY MR. PARMITER:
7480
7481Q Ms. Page, I appreciate you bearing with us. It's been a long
7482day. We just have a couple more questions to ask.
7483
7484A No problem.
7485
7486Q Are you aware whether during the investigation, the MYE
7487investigation, there was any evidence that Secretary Clinton or someone
7488on her behalf had transmitted classified material other than by email?
7489
7490How do you mean?
7491
7492For example --
7493
7494Like a text or something or --
7495-- by fax.
7496
7497Oh..
7498
7499Or, you know, either Ms. Clinton herself or someone on her
7500
7501 
7502
7503I don't know. I'm sorry.
7504 
7505Q So you wouldn't know whether or not she directed someone to
7506do so?
7507
7508A None of this is ringing a bell. I'm not saying that someone
7509wouldn't have that information. I just -- none of this sounds familiar
7510to me.
7511
7512Q Okay. Are you generally familiar with something called the
7513President's Daily Brief?
7514
7515Ay sr
7516
7517Q And is that document generally classified?
7518
7519fi It is.
7520
7521Q At what level is it classified?
7522A
7523
7524It depends on the reporting contained therein, but it is
7525certainly a highly restricted document that, broadly speaking, is
7526classified at the TS level.
7527
7528Q And would be inappropriate to transmit via fax or
7529unclassified email or to anybody who is not otherwise authorized to
7530view it, correct?
7531
7532A It could -- it could go over secure fax. It would depend
7533on what system you were talking about. But in general, yes.
7534
7535Q Okay. Let me ask you a couple of followup questions also
7536about meetings that were held at the Bureau regarding the Midyear Exam
7537after the case had wrapped.
7538
7539Did you attend any meetings at the FBI in 2018 regarding the
7540
7541Midyear Exam investigation?
7542
7543 
7544
7545A In all of 2018? Oh, yeah, all the time. Yes. Oh, 2018?
7546COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
7547
7548 
7549Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry. No, I don't think so. No.
7550
7551Q When did you leave the Bureau? Do you recall the date?
7552
7553A May 4th of this year.
7554
7555Q So I'm not going to -- I'm just going to show you an email
7556that has been produced by the Bureau.
7557
7558A Oh, oh, oh, oh. I'm sorry. Yes. So this I can explain.
7559Sorry. Oh, no, what is this? So -- sorry.
7560
7561When you talked about meetings at -- at FBI, I'm thinking about
7562meetings with the Director about the investigation. I sort of managed
7563or sort of ran point, coordinated, I don't know what the right word
7564is, an effort to try to stay on top, however unsuccessfully, of all
7565of the various -- oh, wait. I am gone at this point. Sorry. That's
7566weird.
7567
7568Q Right. So this email, just for the record, is a May 17th,
75692018, email to a number of folks at the Bureau, including, well, you,
7570even though you had left by this time, correct?
7571
7572A Right. So my guess is that somebody just
7573cancelled the -- let me take a step back.
7574
7575For some period of time, although I was not involved in this after
7576
7577probably May of 2017, for some period of time starting in maybe the
7578
7579winter of 2016 through probably May of 2017, I tried to assist with
7580the coordination within the Office of Congressional Affairs to sort
7581of stay on top of the myriad requests coming from all the different
7582
7583committees for documents and for letters and sort of the congressional
7584
7585 
7586
7587ponse and all of that.
7588 
7589And so I wasn't in charge of any of it. I just tried to convene
7590a meeting weekly so as to try to not let disparate -- the disparate
7591people who were responsible for, well, this person's responsible for
7592this portfolio and this one has HPSCI and this one has HOGR and this
7593one, right, so that we were all talking with one voice, we all knew
7594what requests had come in, the responses were consistent, right, we
7595were producing the right stuff to the right committees.
7596
7597So for a period of time, like I said, probably from Decemberish
7598
7599through May 2017, I sort of led that effort. That's what this
7600
7601-- I think there was a sort of standing Midyear meeting that was
7602
7603Mata. ae
7604
7605I don't know whether this is -- whether this reflects that, to
7606be honest with you. I just don't know. It seems like it. It's the
7607right personnel who would have been involved in that.
7608
7609But by the date of this email, which is May 17th, 2018, I was not
7610an FBI employee.
7611
7612Q Okay. Well, would you say that this is canceling a meeting
7613<1 an Rh
7614
7615A That's what it might be, yeah. So --
7616
7617Q And to your knowledge --
7618
7619A And maybe it happened automatically. Like when they
7620
7621disabled my account, right, after leaving, it's possible that -- yeah,
7622
7623but this would have -- exactly.
7624
7625So the message contained here could have been whatever the last
7626
7627 
7628
7629time I sent a cancellation. You know, sometimes Outlook saves that
7630 
7631last message, because obviously there's no way for me to have typed
7632
7633this when I'm no longer an employee.
7634
7635Q Correct. So -- but, as far as you recall, had any meetings
7636of this MYE followup team taken place in 2018?
7637
7638A No, not tomy knowledge. The effort has now been -- after
7639I left for special counsel, I never picked it back up. And so, to the
7640best of my knowledge, it was people in OCA who have been responsible
7641for convening meetings for congressional response, to the extent ones
7642are happening. I just don't know. I don't have knowledge of it
7643anymore.
7644
7645Q Okay. And that would have been when you left for special
7646counsel in May of 2017?
7647
7648A Correct. Correct. I never took -- my point is when I came
7649back from special counsel, I never took it back up.
7650
7651Mr. Somers. Since we're at the close of the interview, just to
7652completely switch subjects possibly.
7653
7654Mr. Meadows. Before you close out, Lisa, you have mentioned that
7655you worked for Andy McCabe. You were probably the closest individual,
7656professionally speaking, that he interacted with. Is that correct?
7657
7658Ms. Page. Certainly -- maybe one or two people might be equally
7659close. But yes, I would say we were quite close professionally.
7660
7661Mr. Meadows. So one of the things that I guess that I'm trying
7662to put my arms around is, you know, as you hear different things
7663
7664communicated by different people, and we've had the opportunity to
7665
7666 
7667
7668interview Mr. McCabe previously, but it appears that he, you know, lied
7669 
7670to the FBI, lied to the IG, was caught in that, admitted it, and then
7671kind of walked it back as it related to, you know, just some of the
7672story of sharing with The Wall Street Journal, some of the conversation
7673with Matt Axelrod.
7674
7675How do you -- I mean, would you characterize that as something
7676that you saw typically over your professional career?
7677
7678Ms. Page. I am constrained in what I can answer in light of other
7679ongoing investigations, but I can say that I have never seen Andy lie,
7680ever, under any circumstances. I have never seen Andy do anything
7681other than make the right decision and often the hard decision, even
7682when it has been personally unpopular or professionally unpopular.
7683
7684I have consistently seen him make hard decisions because they were
7685the right thing to do. I have consistently seen him be the fly in the
7686ointment in the NSC under President Obama or in this administration
7687
7688because it was the right thing to do.
7689
7690The findings of the inspector general are entirely inconsistent
7691
7692with the man I know and have worked very closely with for the last 4
7693years of my career. And I cannot -- I simply don't agree with those
7694conclusions, sir.
7695
7696Mr. Meadows. So -- and I thought that that's where you would go.
7697And I guess my question is as it relates to some of the factual things
7698that have now at least come out and been reported.
7699
7700So do you see this as more of and at odds with Director Comey and
7701
7702Andy McCabe? I mean, where is the conflict? Because, I mean, both of
7703
7704 
7705
7706them can't be telling the truth. And obviously memos that you were
7707 
7708talking about earlier tangentially may or may not relate.
7709
7710Ms. Page. So TIreally -- I really can't answer substantively,
7711because it's the subject of other ongoing activity.
7712
7713Mr. Meadows. Sowould it be fair to characterize that you believe
7714someone else is not telling the truth?
7715
7716Ms. Page. No. Iactually -- I am -- you'll be surprised to know
7717that I develop strong feelings about things. And I am actually quite
7718confident, although I've spoken to neither Mr. McCabe nor Mr. Comey
7719
7720about this, I have a strong feeling that I understand where the
7721
7722disconnect happened with respect to what Director Comey thought they
7723
7724were talking about and with respect to what Mr. McCabe was talking
7725about.
7726
7727Mr. Meadows. So you think it may be just a big misunderstanding?
7728
7729Ms. Page. Ido, sir. I do.
7730
7731Mr. Meadows. It's apretty big one and youmight -- and sol guess
7732where does -- you know, I mentioned earlier Mike Kortan. Where does
7733he come into all this? Because all of a sudden --
7734
7735Ms. Page. Yeah.
7736
7737Mr. Meadows. And what is troubling with me is knowing that there
7738are a number of unauthorized disclosures that happened --
7739
7740Ms. Page. I disagree.
7741
7742Mr. Meadows. Holdon. That happened in Congress and happens at
7743times in other agencies.
7744
7745Knowing that, as we've been involved in this, that the FBI or
7746
7747 
7748
7749pecifically DOJ has done a very good job of putting a narrative out
7750 
7751there that sometimes is not based on truth, I guess the question I have
7752
7753is, what role did Mike Kortan, Director Comey, Andy McCabe play in the
7754
7755matter that we have where we have to question a high-ranking FBI
7756official that has now retired?
7757
7758Ms. Page. Yes. I really want to answer that question, because
7759it is as good one. Give me a moment, please.
7760
7761[Discussion off the record. ]
7762
7763Ms. Page. Mr. Meadows, I agree with you that it is curious that
7764there is no reference in the IG report at all to Mr. Kortan,
7765particularly in light of what I reported, which is that both
7766interactions with the reporter were done with Mr. Kortan, in
7767coordination with Mr. Kortan and with Mr. Kortan at my side. Sol
7768cannot explain why there is no -- there is no reference to Mr. Kortan
7769in any testimony, if he did give any, in the IG report.
7770
7771Mr. Meadows. So would it be prudent for this committee to have
7772Mr. Kortan come and testify to perhaps add some clarity in terms of
7773what he said, didn't say?
7774
7775Ms. Page. I think that the U.S. Attorney's Office is probably
7776adequately equipped to answer that question sufficiently, sir.
7777
7778Mr. Meadows. All right.
7779
7780Ms. Page. Particularly, honestly, it's so tangential to --
7781
7782Mr. Meadows. The core issue.
7783
7784Ms. Page. Right.
7785
7786Mr. Meadows. Okay. So there seemed to be great
7787
7788 
7789
7790consternation -- and that's me characterizing -- the decision to
7791 
7792recuse himself, Mr. McCabe's decision to recuse himself in the final
7793
7794days of, I guess, when we reopened the MYE. It was apparent that he
7795
7796did not necessarily agree with that decision to recuse. Would you
7797
7798yoda eT ee
7799
7800Ms. Page. I would agree with that, and I agreed with him. I did
7801not think there was a basis to recuse.
7802
7803Mr. Meadows. So was it that he was encouraged to recuse because
7804of the appearance? Or why do you think he was encouraged to recuse
7805himself? I mean, I've read a lot of back-and-forth as it relates to
7806that, and it's still an unanswered question for me.
7807
7808Ms. Page. I know the IG report has an entire chapter on this.
7809I haven't read it. That was ultimately what Director Comey asked him
7810to do, and so --
7811
7812Mr. Meadows. But I guess did Director Comey ever tell him or you
7813why he asked him to recuse himself?
7814
7815Ms. Page. I have never spoken to Director Comey about it. He
7816did -- Director Comey did speak to Mr. McCabe about it, obviously,
7817because he instructed him ultimately to -- or asked that he
7818ultimately -- Director Comey asked that Andy ultimately recuse. And
7819I believe it's based on a sort of appearance, but I just -- I simply
7820think that was misguided and ill-timed.
7821
7822Mr. Meadows. So the reason why I ask is because you have -- now
7823you have an Andy McCabe that recused himself, you have an Andy McCabe
7824
7825that's been accused of lying several times to different people within
7826
7827 
7828
7829the Department. And what you're saying, that those are two unrelated
7830 
7831AVC -2 anaes
7832
7833Ms. Page. Oh, wholly, yes.
7834
7835Mr. Meadows. And so one is perception; the other is perhaps more
7836a direct action of Mr. McCabe?
7837
7838Ms. Page. I guess so, yeah.
7839
7840Mr. Meadows. All right. Yield back.
7841
7842And for the record, I want to thank you for being cooperative.
7843I want to thank you for doing the very best to answer as many questions
7844as possible. And I think I speak on behalf of the entire committee,
7845that your willingness to share transparently has served you well and
7846has certainly served this country well.
7847
7848Ms. Page. Thank you, sir.
7849
7850BY MR. BAKER:
7851
7852Q Did you say Mr. Kortan was present at your side when you were
7853
7854having discussions with The Wall Street Journal?
7855Correct.
7856And Mr. Kortan's position at the FBI was what?
7857He was the head of our Public Affairs.
7858He's an assistant director of the Public Affairs Office?
7859Correct.
7860Q So did you, by the fact he was present, believe that this
7861was an authorized and approved --
7862A It was an authorized. This is why -- we didn't get to it,
7863
7864but it was 10@ percent an authorized disclosure. I mean, the whole
7865
7866 
7867
7868premise behind the IG report in the first place I take issue with,
7869 
7870because I was authorized by Deputy Director McCabe and by Mike Kortan
7871to engage with the reporter on this topic.
7872
7873And so, you know, the IG has come up with a different conclusion
7874with respect to McCabe's inherent authority to authorize it in the first
7875place, but I simply disagree with that.
7876
7877Q So you believed it was authorized?
7878
7879A Yes. It was authorized, as far as I'm concerned.
7880
7881Q You indicated in a previous round when there was a discussion
7882about McCabe memos that Deputy Director McCabe had made some memos of
7883his own. I had asked whether he had ever made any memos regarding his
7884conversations or interactions with Director Comey, and you said, well,
7885he took notes.
7886
7887I was referring to any kind of documentation he made for proof
7888or clarity later on as to what he was told, not just taskings.
7889
7890A Got it. No, I am not aware of him ever having taken a memo
7891
7892as you have just described it with respect to his engagement with
7893
7894Director Comey. I just wanted to clarify that like every single day
7895
7896he likely was taking notes with respect to his interactions with
7897Director Comey in the course of his official duties.
7898
7899Q And did you have conversations with Mr. McCabe that made you
7900believe that he thought Director Comey instructed him or wanted him
7901to have these conversations with The Wall Street Journal, even though
7902there weren't memos to that effect or notes to that effect?
7903
7904A I'm sorry, ask me that question one more time.
7905
7906 
7907
7908Q Did you ever have a conversation with Mr. McCabe about the
7909 
7910hole Wall Street Journal issue regarding whether the Director knew
7911about it?
7912
7913A Oh, no, we did not have any conversations about that. But
7914the Director need not have known about it. The deputy had his own
7915inherent authority to engage with the media.
7916
7917So it's not something -- my point is, it's not something he
7918necessarily would have needed to seek the Director's authority or
7919approval for.
7920
7921Okay. Is Mr. Kortan still employed with the FBI?
7922No, he's not.
7923
7924And do you know why he left?
7925
7926Because he was long eligible to retire.
7927
7928So he just retired?
7929
7930SAT
7931
7932Okay. One final question on an unrelated topic.
7933
7934You had indicated your role as an assistant to Mr. McCabe was to
7935go to different meetings and sort of bridge back what had happened in
7936these meetings or something like that.
7937
7938A Yeah.
7939
7940Q Are you aware of any meetings or did you hear discussion about
7941
7942the sophistication level of Secretary Clinton as it related to handling
7943
7944of classified information or emails and communications in general, that
7945she either was or was not sophisticated, and that would have been part
7946
7947of the discussion regarding charging?
7948
7949 
7950
7951A I -- I'm not sure if I can tie it to your last statement.
7952 
7953
7954COMMITTEE SENSITIV
7955It's possible. ButIwas apart of -- Iwas apart of the sort of general
7956
7957briefings that the Director or the Deputy Director had as we gathered
7958
7959more evidence in the Clinton investigation.
7960
7961And I don't remember whether it came out of Secretary Clinton's
7962interview or interviews with some of her senior staff or both.
7963
7964But yes, we did come to learn that Secretary Clinton was not
7965particularly sophisticated when it came to technology and the use of
7966computers. I mean, she was not a sophisticated cyber user.
7967
7968Q Was there ever any evidence or any dissent in opposition to
7969that view?
7970
7971A Oh, not to my knowledge, no.
7972
7973Q You had mentioned earlier that Mr. Priestap --
7974
7975Mr. Somers. Can I ask one question?
7976
7977Mr. Baker. Sure.
7978
7979BY MR. SOMERS:
7980
7981Q What about her sophistication in terms of knowledge of
7982classification and what classified documents looked like?
7983
7984A She had that knowledge. Yeah. I don't --
7985
7986Q Well, because in her -- the 302 of her interview, for
7987instance, she says that she did not -- wasn't aware of what the C in
7988parentheses at the beginning of a paragraph meant.
7989
7990A Yeah. I mean, that's not -- that doesn't shock me. I mean,
7991without the -- without the rest of the sort of header and footer and
7992
7993cover page.
7994
7995 
7996
7997Should she have? Yeah, probably. But like on a single line
7998 
7999randomly in the middle of an email, I don't find that terribly offensive
8000to my sensibilities, but --
8001
8002Q I'm just bringing that out as an example of whether -- what
8003you saw as her level of understanding of markings on documents and
8004saan ayaa
8005
8006A No, I think she -- I have no personal knowledge of this, but
8007given her history in government and her position, I would expect her
8008to have had, you know, some sophistication with respect to
8009classification.
8010
8011Mr. Parmiter. On what did you base the conclusion that she was
8012not particularly technologically sophisticated?
8013
8014Ms. Page. I think both based on her statements about her
8015understanding on how a server works and my understanding -- and I never
8016read her 302, but my understanding is -- at least I don't think I
8017did -- is based on what was briefed to the deputy and the Director,
8018was like as technical questions were asked of her, she lacked the
8019ability to answer them, as well as other people who were interviewed
8020sort of had consistent statements with respect to her technical
8021sophistication.
8022
8023BY MR. BAKER:
8024
8025Q Are defensive briefings just for Members of Congress, or
8026
8027would Cabinet secretaries also get them if they were potentially
8028
8029targeted?
8030
8031A Oh, certainly. I mean, any -- a defensive briefing would
8032
8033 
8034
8035go to any person in a position to have sensitive national secrets and/or
8036 
8037interactions or exposure with people from foreign countries.
8038
8039Q Do you know if Secretary Clinton had any in her role as
8040Secretary of State?
8041
8042A Defensive briefings?
8043
8044Q si
8045
8046A I have no idea, sir.
8047
8048Q Is it likely that she could have?
8049A
8050
8051Entirely plausible, sir. But it would -- again, like
8052there's a difference between a general CI brief, which is you're
8053traveling to this country, beware of these things, versus, you know,
8054we understand that Joe Smith has reached out to you to schedule a
8055meeting, you should be aware that intelligence suggests that Joe Smith
8056is blah, blah, blah.
8057
805810] SO --
8059
8060A That's -- the latter is a defensive briefing.
8061
8062Q Sure. In addition to the specifics of who might be trying to
8063do something to you as the Congressperson or the Cabinet member, is
8064there a boilerplate that would almost go with any defensive briefing as
8065to the how a hostile actor might try to exploit your position, exploit a
8066meeting?
8067
8068A I would expect so, but I don't have personal knowledge of
8069
8070Q Would you guess if there was that part of that would be that
8071
8072email communications and communications in general and weaknesses i
8073
8074 
8075
8076networks would be an area for exploitation?
8077 
8078
8079COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
8080A I'm not really sure. You know, that might go to a broader CI
8081
8082briefing, a broader counterintelligence briefing, a warning about
8083
8084spear phishing, a warning about, you know, how cyber networks might
8085be compromised.
8086
8087But in a defensive briefing, to the best of my knowledge, ina
8088defensive briefing it is usually much more specific and pointed
8089information that we have.
8090
8091So general CI brief, sure, you might talk about how different
8092foreign actors use different tools or vectors to do their work. But
8093if you were conducting a defensive briefing, in my view, it's more
8094likely that it would be specific and sort of narrowly described to the
8095specific threat or risk that you're briefing on.
8096
8097Q So you don't know if someone who received a lot of defensive
8098briefings would have their sophistication of weaknesses in email and
8099servers enhanced by being told such a thing in defensive briefings?
8100
8101A No, I don't know. I don't know.
8102
8103Q Finally, you'd mentioned earlier that Mr. Priestap was -- AD
8104Priestap was kind of a worrier. What was his relationship with
8105Mr. Strzok? I know he would be Mr. Strzok's boss at the time that he's
8106saat
8107
8108A Yes. They were very close.
8109
8110Q Very close.
8111
8112A They -- professionally. I mean, they both had a lot of
8113
8114respect for each other. Both have had long careers in the
8115
8116 
8117
8118Counterintelligence Division. And so both respect each other's
8119 
8120instincts and knowledge and experience working CI targets.
8121had a very strong professional relationship.
8122
8123So no work tensions or --
8124
8125No, sir.
8126
8127-- issues about decisions made?
8128
8129No, no. No, sir.
8130
8131Okay, thank you.
8132
8133. Somers. I'd like to ask you about an email chain. There's
8134only one email on the chain in particular, but you can take a look at
8135that document. I'm mostly interested in the email from Peter Strzok
8136to you at 7:10 p.m.
8137
8138Ms. Page. One second.
8139
8140Mr. Somers. That email says: Weneed all of their names to scrub
8141and we should give them ours for the same purpose.
8142
8143My first question is, who is "their" and "them," to your
8144knowledge?
8145
8146Ms. Jeffress. It's a long article. Do you know which part of
8147the article this relates to?
8148
8149Mr. Somers. I don't know which part of the article in particular
8150
8151it relates to. I'm just looking at the email from Strzok to Ms. Page,
8152
8153and it looks like --
8154Ms. Page. I don't --
8155
8156Mr. Somers. -- she understood at the time, at least, what that
8157
8158 
8159
8160Ms. Page. I'm not sure. I'm sorry.
8161 
8162 
8163
8164Mr. Somers. Okay. What about "scrub"?
8165 
8166[5:13 p.m. ]
8167
8168Ms. Page. I don't know what we're referring to, but that's
8169usually a "let's see if we have any information in our holdings relating
8170to these individuals." But I don't know which individuals we're
8171talking about here.
8172
8173BY MR. SOMERS:
8174
8175Q Well, I took "their" and "them" -- one question on
8176this -- "their" and "them" to mean another agency and not -- I took
8177it to be a list of their names. Could that -- not the people in the
8178article, not names of people in the article. I took it to be an agency
8179or a subagency.
8180
8181A Oh, I don't -- I would have taken it to mean something in
8182the article, but I don't -- I don't remember this particular email as
8183I sit here today.
8184
8185Q If you look up to the second email from the top: That's what
8186Bill said. I suggested we need to exchange our entire list.
8187
8188A I'm not positive, sir. I'm sorry.
8189
8190Q Okay. All right.
8191
8192Mr. Somers. I think that's all we have for this. Allright. So
8193
8194I think that will conclude our interview. And I want to thank you again
8195
8196for appearing both on Friday and again today. And that'll close the
8197
8198interview.
8199
8200Ms. Page. Thank you.
8201
8202 
8203
8204Whereupon, at 5:14 p.m., the interview was concluded. ]
8205COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
8206
8207 
8208Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee
8209
8210I have read the foregoing pages, which contain the correct
8211
8212 
8213
8214transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.
8215