· 6 years ago · Apr 20, 2019, 02:10 AM
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8 U.S. Department of Justice At-1:effley Wet'k Pt'etlttet /I Ma:y CeHtttiH
9 Mat:ef'ittl Preteetetl UHtler Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) d. George Papadopoulos
10 Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of Clinton Emails ....................
11 ........................................................................... 86
12 e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign
13 .................................... 89 f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of "Dirt"
14 ........................................................... 93 g. Additional
15 George Papadopoulos Contact..
16 ..................................................... 94 3. Carter Page ........
17 ................................................................................
18 .................... 9 5 a. Background .........................................
19 ............................................................. 96 b. Origins of
20 and Early Campaign Work
21 ............................................................. 97 c. Carter
22 Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow
23 ........................................................ 98 d. Later Campaign
24 Work and Removal from the Campaign ............................. 102 4. Dimitri
25 Simes and the Center for the National Interest
26 ...................................... 103 a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with
27 the Trump Campaign ......................... 103 b. National Interest Hosts a
28 Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel ...................................
29 ................................................................................
30 .. 105 c. Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI
31 ....................................... 107 d. Jared Kushner' s Continuing
32 Contacts with Simes ......................................... 108 5. June 9,
33 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower ..................................... ,
34 ......................... 110 a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting
35 ....................................................................... 110 i.
36 Outreach to Donald Trump Jr
37 .................................................................. 110 ii.
38 Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign ...................................
39 114 b. TheEventsofJune9,2016
40 ............................................................................ 116
41 i. Arrangements for the Meeting
42 ................................................................ 116 ii. Conduct
43 of the Meeting
44 .......................................................................... 117
45 c. Post-June 9 Events ..........................................................
46 ............................... 120 6. Events at the Republican National
47 Convention .................................................. 123 a. Ambassador
48 Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the Week of the RNC
49 ..................................................................... 123 b.
50 Change to Republican Party Platform
51 ............................................................ 124 7. Post-
52 Convention Contacts with Kislyak ................................ :
53 ............................ 127 a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to
54 Breakfast at the Ambassador's Residence
55 .............................................................................
56 127 b. Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak ......
57 127 8. Paul Manafort ...........................................................
58 ........................................... 129 a. Paul Manafort' s Ties to
59 Russia and Ukraine .................................................. 131 lll
60
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66
67 U.S. Department of Justice Atten1e~? Werk Pred1:1et /,' Mtty Cefltaifl Material
68 Preteeted Uflder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 1. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work
69 ......................................................... 131 11. Political
70 Consulting Work
71 ..................................................................... 132 iii.
72 Konstantin Kilimnik
73 ..............................................................................
74 132 b. Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign
75 .............. 134 i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign
76 ......................................................... 134 ii. Paul
77 Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts ..........................................
78 135 iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik
79 in the United States
80 ................................................................ 138 c. Post-
81 Resignation Activities
82 ............................................................................ 141
83 B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts
84 .......................................................... 144 1. Immediate
85 Post-Election Activity
86 ....................................................................... 144 a.
87 Outreach from the Russian Government..
88 ...................................................... 145 b. High-Level
89 Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels ....... 146 2. Kirill
90 Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration ...... 147 a.
91 Background .....................................................................
92 ............................... 14 7 b. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts
93 With the Incoming Administration ...............................................
94 .............................................. 149 c. Erik Prince and Kirill
95 Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles ................................ 151 i. George
96 Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev .................
97 ................................................................................
98 151 11. The Seychelles Meetings
99 ........................................................................ 153
100 iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip .... 155
101 d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U
102 .S.-Russia Relations ...........................................................
103 ....................... 156 3. Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner
104 and Michael Flynn in Trump Tower Following the Election
105 ................................................................. 159 4. Jared
106 Kushner' s Meeting with Sergey Gorkov
107 ................................................... 161 5. Petr A ven' s
108 Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team ........................................
109 163 6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich
110 ............. 166 7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn
111 ................................................... 167 a. United Nations Vote
112 on Israeli Settlements ................................................... 167
113 b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia
114 ....................................................................... 168 V.
115 PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS
116 ........................................................................ 174 A.
117 Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign
118 ............................................... 174 IV
119
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126 U.S. Department of Justice l\.ttortte~? Work Pt'od1:1et // Mtty Cotttttitt
127 Mttterittl Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) of emails. One week later,
128 in the first week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a
129 foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the
130 Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous
131 release of information damaging to candidate Clinton. Throughout that period of
132 time and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two
133 Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian
134 government. No meeting took place. Summer 2016. Russian outreach to the Trump
135 Campaign continued into the summer of 2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the
136 presumptive Republican nominee for President. On June 9, 2016, for example, a
137 Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald Trump Jr., Jared
138 Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email proposing
139 the meeting had described as "official documents and information that would
140 incriminate Hillary." The materials were offered to Trump Jr. as "part of Russia
141 and its government's support for Mr. Trump." The written communications setting
142 up the meeting showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from
143 Russia that could assist candidate Trump's electoral prospects, but the Russian
144 lawyer's presentation did not provide such information. Days after the June 9
145 meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC announced that
146 Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to
147 opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents. In July 2016,
148 Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page traveled in his personal capacity to
149 Moscow and gave the keynote address at the New Economic School. Page had lived
150 and worked in Russia between 2003 and 2007. After returning to the United
151 States, Page became acquainted with at least two Russian intelligence officers,
152 one of whom was later charged in 2015 with conspiracy to act as an unregistered
153 agent of Russia. Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-
154 Russian foreign policy drew media attention. The Campaign then distanced itself
155 from Page and, by late September 2016, removed him from the Campaign. July 2016
156 was also the month WikiLeaks first released emails stolen by the GRU from the
157 DNC. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents
158 revealing information about the Clinton Campaign. Within days, there was public
159 reporting that U.S. intelligence agencies had "high confidence" that the Russian
160 government was.behind the theft of emails and documents from the DNC. And within
161 a week of the release, a foreign government informed the FBI about its May 2016
162 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the Russian government
163 could assist the Trump Campaign. On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign
164 government rep01ting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential
165 coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the
166 Trump Campaign. Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul
167 Manafort met in New York City with his long-time business associate Konstantin
168 Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. Kilimnik
169 requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine that
170 Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel's Office was a "backdoor" way for
171 Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would
172 require candidate Trump's assent to succeed (were he to be elected President).
173 They also discussed the status of the 6
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181 U.S. Department of Justice Atteffle'.} 'Nm?k P1:1edttet // May Cm~taitt Material
182 Preteetecl Uttcler Fed. R. C1:1im. P. 6(e) Trump Campaign and Manafort's
183 strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states. Months before that
184 meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik,
185 and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting.
186 Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump
187 speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered
188 damaging to his candidacy. Less than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second
189 release: thousands of John Podesta's emails that had been stolen by the GRU in
190 late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. government institutions were at the time
191 continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to
192 interfere in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department
193 of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
194 issued a joint public statement "that the Russian Government directed the recent
195 compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US
196 political organizations." Those "thefts" and the "disclosures" of the hacked
197 materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued,
198 "are intended to interfere with the US election process." Post-2016 Election.
199 Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government officials and
200 prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new
201 administration. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged
202 these efforts. The Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to
203 congratulate the President-Elect and to arrange a call with President Putin.
204 Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there. Kirill Dmitriev,
205 the chief executive officer of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, was among the
206 Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. In early
207 December, a business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of
208 the Trump Campaign and an associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon.
209 Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in January 2017 in the Seychelles and
210 discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same period, another business
211 associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served on
212 the Campaign or the Transition Team. Dmitriev and Kushner's friend collaborated
213 on a short written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which
214 Dmitriev implied had been cleared through Putin. The friend gave that proposal
215 to Kushner before the inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and
216 incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. On December 29, 2016, then-President
217 Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election.
218 Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian Ambassador
219 Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the
220 sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take
221 retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later,
222 President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. Putin)." The next
223 day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had
224 been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a
225 result of Flynn's request. * * * On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence
226 community briefed President-Elect Trump on a joint assessment-drafted and
227 coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and 7
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235 U.S. Department of Justice AttorAe:y? Work Proa1:1et // Miey CotttaiA Material
236 PFOteetea Uttaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Manafort lied to the Office and the grand
237 jury concerning his interactions and communications with Konstantin Kilimnik
238 about Trump Campaign polling data and a peace plan for Ukraine. * * * The Office
239 investigated several other events that have been publicly repot1ed to involve
240 potential Russia-related contacts. For example, the investigation established
241 that interactions between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and Trump Campaign
242 officials both at the candidate's April 2016 foreign policy speech in
243 Washington, D.C., and during the week of the Republican National Convention were
244 brief, public, and non-substantive. And the investigation did not establish that
245 one Campaign official's efforts to dilute a portion of the Republican Party
246 platform on providing assistance to Ukraine were undertaken at the behest of
247 candidate Trump or Russia. The investigation also did not establish that a
248 meeting between Kislyak and Sessions in September 2016 at Sessions's Senate
249 office included any more than a passing mention of the presidential campaign.
250 The investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony, or a
251 complete picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation.
252 Some individuals invoked their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
253 incrimination and were not, in the Office's judgment, appropriate candidates for
254 grants of immunity. The Office limited its pursuit of other witnesses and
255 information-such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be
256 members of the media-in light of internal Depa11ment of Justice policies. See,
257 e.g., Justice Manual?? 9-13.400, 13.410. Some of the information obtained via
258 court process, moreover, was presumptively covered by legal privilege and was
259 screened from investigators by a filter ( or "taint") team. Even when
260 individuals testified or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes provided
261 information that was false or incomplete, leading to some of the false-
262 statements charges described above. And the Office faced practical limits on its
263 ability to access relevant evidence as well-numerous witnesses and subjects
264 lived abroad, and documents were held outside the United States. Further, the
265 Office learned that some of the individuals we interviewed or whose conduct we
266 investigated-including some associated with the Trump Campaign---deleted
267 relevant communications or communicated during the relevant period using
268 applications that feature encryption or that do not provide for long-term
269 retention of data or communications records. In such cases, the Office was not
270 able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to contemporaneous
271 communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared
272 inconsistent with other known facts. Accordingly, while this report embodies
273 factual and legal determinations that the Office believes to be accurate and
274 complete to the greatest extent possible, given these identified gaps, the
275 Office cannot rule out the possibility that the unavailable information would
276 shed additional light on (or cast in a new light) the events described in the
277 report. 10
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285 U.S. Department of Justice Atten'ley Werk Predttet /,' Ma:,? Cet'itaifl:
286 Mct1:erial Preteeted Uneer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee) I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S
287 INVESTIGATION On May 17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein-then
288 serving as Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation following the
289 recusal of former Attorney General Jeff Sessions on March 2, 2016-appointed the
290 Special Counsel "to investigate Russian interference with the 2016 presidential
291 election and related matters." Office of the Deputy Att'y Gen., Order No.
292 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference
293 with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, May 17, 2017)
294 ("Appointment Order"). Relying on "the authority vested" in the Acting Attorney
295 General, "including 28 U.S.C. ?? 509, 510, and 515," the Acting Attorney General
296 ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel "in order to discharge [the Acting
297 Attorney General's] responsibility to provide supervision and management of the
298 Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the
299 Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election."
300 Appointment Order (introduction). "The Special Counsel," the Order stated, "is
301 authorized to conduct the investigation confirmed by then-FBI Director James B.
302 Corney in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
303 on March 20, 2017," including: ' (i) any links and/or coordination between the
304 Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President
305 Donald Trump; and (ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the
306 investigation; and (iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. ?
307 600.4(a). Appointment Order ,r (b). Section 600.4 affords the Special Counsel
308 "the authority to investigate and prosecute federal crimes committed in the
309 course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's
310 investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence,
311 and intimidation of witnesses." 28 C.F.R. ? 600.4(a). The authority to
312 investigate "any matters that arose ... directly from the investigation,"
313 Appointment Order ,r (b)(ii), covers similar crimes that may have occurred
314 during the course of the FBI's confirmed investigation before the Special
315 Counsel's appointment. "If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and
316 appropriate," the Order further provided, "the Special Counsel is authorized to
317 prosecute federal crimes arising from the investigation of these matters." Id.
318 ,r ( c ). Finally, the Acting Attorney General made applicable "Sections 600.4
319 through 600.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations." Id. ,r (d). The
320 Acting Attorney General further clarified the scope of the Special Counsel's
321 investigatory authority in two subsequent memoranda. A memorandum dated August
322 2, 2017, explained that the Appointment Order had been "worded categorically in
323 order to permit its public release without confirming specific investigations
324 involving specific individuals." It then confirmed that the Special Counsel had
325 been authorized since his appointment to investigate allegations that three
326 Trump campaign officials-Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and George
327 Papadopoulos-"committed a crime or crimes by colluding with Russian government
328 officials with respect to the Russian government's efforts to interfere with the
329 2016 presidential election." The memorandum also confirmed the Special Counsel's
330 authority to investigate certain other matters, including two additional sets of
331 allegations involving Manafort (crimes arising from payments he received from
332 the Ukrainian government and crimes arising from his receipt of loans 11
333
334RESULT: 7
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336PAGE: 19
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340 U.S. Department of Justice Att:ert1ey Werk Predttet: // Ma~? Cet'tl:aiA Material
341 Pret:eet:ed Ut1der Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) from a bank whose CEO was then
342 seeking a position in the Trump Administration); allegations that Papadopoulos
343 committed a crime or crimes by acting as an unregistered agent of the Israeli
344 government; and four sets of allegations involving Michael Flynn, the former
345 National Security Advisor to President Trump. On October 20, 2017, the Acting
346 Attorney General confirmed in a memorandum the Special Counsel's investigative
347 authority as to several individuals and entities. First, "as part of a full and
348 thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the
349 2016 presidential election," the Special Counsel was authorized to investigate
350 "the pertinent activities of Michael Cohen, Richard Gates, , Roger Stone, and I"
351 "Confirmation of the authorization to investigate such individuals," the
352 memorandum stressed, "does not suggest that the Special Counsel has made a
353 determination that any of them has committed a crime." Second, with respect to
354 Michael Cohen, the memorandum recognized the Special Counsel's authority to
355 investigate "leads relate[d] to Cohen's establishment and use of Essential
356 Consultants LLC to, inter alia, receive funds from Russian-backed entities."
357 Third, the memorandum memorialized the Special Counsel's authority to
358 investigate individuals and entities who were possibly engaged in "jointly
359 undertaken activity" with existing subjects of the investigation, including Paul
360 Manafort. Finally, the memorandum described an FBI investigation opened before
361 the Special Counsel's appointment into "allegations that [then-Attorney General
362 Jeff Sessions] made false statements to the United States Senate[,]" and
363 confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate that matter. The
364 Special Counsel structured the investigation in view of his power and authority
365 "to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States
366 Attorney." 28 C.F.R: ? 600.6. Like a U.S. Attorney's Office, the Special
367 Counsel's Office considered a range of classified and unclassified information
368 available to the FBI in the course of the Office's Russia investigation, and the
369 Office structured that work around evidence for possible use in prosecutions of
370 federal crimes (assuming that one or more crimes were identified that warranted
371 prosecution). There was substantial evidence immediately available to the
372 Special Counsel at the inception of the investigation in May 2017 because the
373 FBI had, by that time, already investigated Russian election interference for
374 nearly 10 months. The Special Counsel's Office exercised its judgment regarding
375 what to investigate and did not, for instance, investigate every public report
376 of a contact between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals and
377 entities. The Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination
378 between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump
379 Campaign. Certain proceedings associated with the Office's work remain ongoing.
380 After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office
381 has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to other components of
382 the Department of Justice and FBI. Appendix D lists those transfers. Two
383 district courts confirmed the breadth of the Special Counsel's authority to
384 investigate Russia election interference and links and/or coordination with the
385 Trump Campaign. See United States v. Manafort, 312 F. Supp. 3d 60, 79-83 (D.D.C.
386 2018); United States v. Manafort, 321 F. Supp. 3d 640, 650-655 (E.D. Va. 2018).
387 In the course of conducting that investigation, the Office periodically
388 identified evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of
389 the Special Counsel's authority established by the Acting Attorney General.
390 After consultation with 12
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394PAGE: 59
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398 U.S. Department of Justice Attertte,? Werk Proclttet // Mtt'' Cettttttft
399 Mttterittl Proteetecl UHcler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) b. Contacts with the
400 Campaign about WikiLeaks Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter On June
401 12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to "have emails relating to
402 Hillary Clinton which are pending publication,"194 but provided no additional
403 context. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . ... Harm to Ongoing.Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter
404 Gates recalled candidate Trump being generally frustrated that the Clinton
405 emails had not been found.196 , ! Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter
406 ?; 194 See Mahita Gajanan, Julian Assange Timed DNC Email Release for Democratic
407 Convention, Time (July 27, 2016) (qu.oting the June 12, 2016 television
408 interview). 195 In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
409 agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to
410 defraud and commit multiple offenses (i.e., tax fraud, failure to report foreign
411 bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal)
412 against the United States, as well as making false statements to our Office.
413 Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Richard W Gates III, l:
414 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 195 ("Gates Superseding Criminal
415 Information"); Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W Gates III, 1:
416 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 205 ("Gates Plea Agreement"). Gates has
417 provided information and in-comt testimony that the Office has deemed to be
418 reliable. 196 Gates I 0/25/18 302, at 1-2. 197 As explained further in Volume I,
419 Section IV.A.8, irifra, Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office.
420 We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer
421 sessions and before the grand jury. We have generally recounted his version of
422 events in this report only when his statements are sufficiently corroborated to
423 be trustworthy; to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may
424 themselves be of evidentiary value; or to provide Manafort's explanations for
425 certain events, even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation
426 was credible. His account appears here principally because it aligns with those
427 of other witnesses. 198 52
428
429RESULT: 9
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431PAGE: 73
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433TEXT:
434
435 U.S. Department of Justice Atlef'l'le;? Wef'k Pf'et.ittet // Mo; Cel'ltttift
436 Mttteriol Preteeted Uftt.ier Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT
437 LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN The Office identified multiple
438 contacts-"links," in the words of the Appointment between Trump Campaign
439 officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The Office
440 investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted
441 Russian interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election. In
442 particular, the investigation examined whether these contacts involved or
443 resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the Trump Campaign and Russia,
444 including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the Campaign in
445 exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future. Based on the
446 available information, the investigation did not establish such coordination.
447 This Section describes the principal links between the Trump Campaign and
448 individuals with ties to the Russian government, including some contacts with
449 Campaign officials or associates that have been publicly reported to involve
450 Russian contacts. Each subsection begins with an overview of the Russian contact
451 at issue and then describes in detail the relevant facts, which are generally
452 presented in chronological order, beginning with the early months of the
453 Campaign and extending through the post-election, transition period. A. Campaign
454 Period (September 2015 -November 8, 2016) Russian-government-connected
455 individuals and media entities began showing interest in Trump's campaign in the
456 months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015.288 Because Trump's status
457 as a public figure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior
458 business and entertainment dealings, this Office investigated whether a business
459 contact with Russia-linked individuals and entities during the campaign period-
460 the Trump Tower Moscow project, see Volume l, Section IV.A. I, infra-led to or
461 involved coordination of election assistance. Outreach from individuals with
462 ties to Russia continued in the spring and summer of 2016, when Trump was moving
463 toward-and eventually becoming-the Republican nominee for President. As set
464 forth below, the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period:
465 outreach to two of Trump's then-recently named foreign policy advisors,
466 including a representation that Russia had "dirt" on Clinton in the form of
467 thousands of emails (Volume I, Sections IV.A.2 & IV.A.3); dealings with a
468 D.C.-based think tank that specializes in Russia and has connections with its
469 government (Volume I, Section IV.A.4); a meeting at Trump Tower between the
470 Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was "part
471 of Russia and its government's support for [Trump]" (Volume I, Section IV.A.5);
472 events at the Republican National Convention (Volume I, Section IV.A.6); post-
473 Convention contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia's ambassador to
474 the United States (Volume I, Section IV.A.7); and contacts through campaign
475 chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for a Russian oligarch and a
476 pro-Russian political party in Ukraine (Volume I, Section IV.A.8). 288 For
477 example, on August 18, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet
478 newspaper Vzglyad, Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks
479 asking for a phone or in-person candidate interview. 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to
480 Hicks. One day earlier, the publication's founder (and former Russian
481 parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites-
482 Trump2016.ru and DonaldTrump2016.ru. No interview took place. 66
483
484RESULT: 10
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486PAGE: 96
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488TEXT:
489
490 U.S. Department ofJustice AtteFHe~? Werk PF0eh:1et // Mtt)' CeHtttifl MateFial
491 Preteetee Uneer Fee. R. CFil'l'l.. P. 6(e) meeting).463 During that meeting,
492 Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level Russian government
493 officials during his recent trip to Moscow. Mifsud also said that, on the trip,
494 he learned that the Russians had obtained "dirt" on candidate Hillary Clinton.
495 As Papadopoulos later stated to the FBI, Mifsud said that the "dirt" was in the
496 form of "emails of Clinton," and that they "have thousands of emails."464 On May
497 6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos suggested to a
498 representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received
499 indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign
500 through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary
501 Clinton.465 e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign While he was
502 discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials
503 with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised
504 of his efforts. On April 25, 2016, the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about
505 the emails, Papadopoulos wrote to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that
506 "[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by Putin for Mr. Trump to meet
507 him when he is ready," and that "[t]he advantage of being in London is that
508 these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in 'neutral' cities."466 On
509 April 27, 2016, after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second
510 message to Miller stating that "some interesting messages [were] coming in from
511 Moscow about a trip when the time is right."467 The same day, Papadopoulos sent
512 a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling Lewandowski that
513 Papadopoulos had "been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin
514 wanting to host [Trump] and the team when the time is right. "468 Papadopoulos'
515 s Russia-related communications with Campaign officials continued throughout the
516 spring and summer of 2016. On May 4, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an email
517 from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow, asking Lewandowski
518 whether that was "something we want to move forward with."469 The next day,
519 Papadopoulos forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top
520 of the email "Russia update."470 He included the same email in a May 21, 2016
521 message to senior Campaign official Paul Manafort, under the subject line
522 "Request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump," stating that "Russia has been eager to
523 meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me 463
524 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 14; 4/25/16 Text Messages, Mifsud &
525 Papadopoulos. 464 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense~ 14. 465 This information is
526 contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials.
527 iHferfflatiat1. is lu 111 eHfareefflefl.t seHsitive (LES) sHs f!'lttst be
528 trestes ueeersiHgly iH uHy e,cten1al sisseffliHstiatt. The foreign government
529 conveyed this information to the U.S. government on July 26, 2016, a few days
530 after WikiLeaks's release of Clinton-related emails. The FBI opened its
531 investigation of potential coordination between Russia and the Trump Campaign a
532 few days later based on the information. 466 4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S.
533 Miller (8: 12:44 p.m.). 467 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (6:55:58
534 p.m.). 468 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (7:15:14 p.m.). 469 5/4/16
535 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (8:14:49 a.m.). 470 5/5/16 Email,
536 Papadopoulos to Clovis (7:15:21 p.m.). 89
537
538RESULT: 11
539
540PAGE: 97
541
542TEXT:
543
544 U.S. Department of Justice Atlei-fle~? Werk Predttet // Mtty CetttaiR Material
545 Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) to discuss."471 Manafort forwarded the
546 message to another Campaign official, without including Papadopoulos, and
547 stated: "Let[']s discuss. We need someone to communicate that [Trump] is ? not
548 doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to
549 send any signal."472 On June 1, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email
550 chain with Lewandowski about a Russia visit, asking if Lewandowski "want[ ed] to
551 have a call about this topic" and whether "we were following up with it."473
552 After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to "connect with" Clovis because he was
553 "running point," Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that "the Russian MF A" was asking
554 him "if Mr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point."474
555 Papadopoulos wrote in an email that he "[w]anted to pass this info along to you
556 for you to decide what's best to do with it and what message I should send (or
557 to ignore)."475 After several email and Skype exchanges with Timofeev,476
558 Papadopoulos sent one more email to Lewandowski on June 19, 2016, Lewandowski's
559 last day as campaign manager.477 The email stated that "[t]he Russian ministry
560 of foreign affairs" had contacted him and asked whether, if Mr. Trump could not
561 travel to Russia, a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could attend
562 meetings.478 Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was "willing to make the trip
563 off the record if it's in the interest of Mr. Trump and the campaign to meet
564 specific people."479 Following Lewandowski's departure from the Campaign,
565 Papadopoulos communicated with Clovis and Walid Phares, another member of the
566 foreign policy advisory team, about an the-record meeting between the Campaign
567 and Russian government officials or with Papadopoulos's other Russia
568 connections, Mifsud and Timofeev.480 Papadopoulos also interacted 471 5/21/16
569 Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort (2:30: 14 p.m.). 472 Papadopoulos Statement of
570 Offense ,r 19 n.2. 473 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (3:08:18 p.m.).
571 474 6/1/16 Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos (3:20:03 p.m.); 6/1/16 Email,
572 Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.). 475 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis
573 (3:29:14 p.m.). Papadopoulos's email coincided in time with another message to
574 Clovis suggesting a Trump-Putin meeting. First, on May 15, 2016, David a distant
575 relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt-emailed Clovis about
576 a potential Campaign meeting with Berel Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia. The
577 email stated that Klein had contacted Lazar in February about a possible Trump-
578 Putin meeting and that Lazar was "a very close confidante of Putin."
579 DJTFP00011547 (5/15/16 Email, Klein to Clovis (5:45:24 p.m.)). The investigation
580 did not find evidence that Clovis responded to Klein's email or that any further
581 contacts of significance came out of Klein's subsequent meeting with Greenblatt
582 and Rabbi Lazar at Trump Tower. Klein 8/30/18 302, at 2. 476 Papadopoulos
583 Statement of Offense ,r 21 (a). 477 478 6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to
584 Lewandowski (1 :11 :11 p.m.). 479 6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:
585 11: 11 p.m.). 480 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 21; 7/14/16 Email,
586 Papadopoulos to Timofeev (11 :57:24 p.m.); 7/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to
587 Mifsud; 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (2:14:18 p.m.). 90
588
589RESULT: 12
590
591PAGE: 102
592
593TEXT:
594
595 U.S. Department of Justice Atteme,? 'i\'erk Prefittet // May Cefl.taifl Material
596 Preteetefi Unfier Fee. R. Criffl:. P. 6(e) outreach to Russian-Americans"
597 because "too many articles" had already portrayed the Campaign, then-campaign
598 chairman Paul Manafort, and candidate Trump as "being pro-Russian."508 On August
599 23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he
600 would "share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your
601 political work for the campaign."509 Papadopoulos claimed to have no
602 recollection of this matter.510 On November 9, 2016, shortly after the election,
603 Papadopoulos arranged to meet Millian in Chicago to discuss business
604 opportunities, including potential work with Russian "billionaires who are not
605 under sanctions."511 The meeting took place on November 14, 2016, at the Trump
606 Hotel and Tower in Chicago.512 According to Papadopoulos, the two men discussed
607 partnering on business deals, but Papadopoulos perceived that Millian's attitude
608 toward him changed when Papadopoulos stated that he was only pursuing private-
609 sector opportunities and was not interested in a job in the Administration.513
610 The two remained in contact, however, and had extended online discussions about
611 possible business opportunities in Russia.514 The two also arranged to meet at a
612 Washington, D.C. bar when both attended Trump's inauguration in late January
613 2017.515 3. Carter Page Carter Page worked for the Trump Campaign from January
614 2016 to September 2016. He was formally and publicly announced as a foreign
615 policy advisor by the candidate in March 2016.516 Page had lived and worked in
616 Russia, and he had been approached by Russian intelligence officers several
617 years before he volunteered for the Trump Campaign. During his time with the
618 Campaign, Page advocated pro-Russia foreign policy positions and traveled to
619 Moscow in his personal capacity. Russian intelligence officials had formed
620 relationships with Page in 2008 and 2013 and Russian officials may have focused
621 on Page in 2016 because of his affiliation with the Campaign. However, the
622 investigation did not establish that Page coordinated with the Russian
623 government in its efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election. 508
624 7 /31/16 Email, Denysyk to Papadopoulos (21 :54:52). 509 8/23/16 Facebook
625 Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (2:55:36 a.m.). 510 Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302,
626 at 2. 511 11/10/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (9:35:05 p.m.). 512
627 11/14/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (1 :32: 11 a.m.). 513
628 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 19. 514 E.g., 11/29/16 Facebook Messages,
629 Papadopoulos & Millian (5:09 -5:11 p.m.); 12/7/16 Facebook Message, Millian to
630 Papadopoulos (5:10:54 p.m.). 515 1/20/17 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos &
631 Millian (4:37-4:39 a.m.). 516 Page was interviewed b Counsel's appointment. 95
632
633RESULT: 13
634
635PAGE: 115
636
637TEXT:
638
639 U.S. Department of Justice Atterl'l:ey 'Nerk Precluet // Mtt:>' Cel'l:tail'I:
640 Material Preteetecl Uflcler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) policy speech.642 Khalilzad
641 also met with Sessions one-on-one separately from the,dinners.643 At the dinners
642 and in the meetings, the participants addressed U.S. relations with Russia,
643 including how U.S. relations with NATO and European countries affected U.S.
644 policy toward Russia.644 But the discussions were not exclusively focused on
645 Russia.645 Khalilzad, for example, recalled discussing "nation-building" and
646 violent extremism with Sessions.646 In addition, Sessions asked Saunders ( of
647 CNI) to draft two memoranda not specific to Russia: one on Hillary Clinton's
648 foreign policy shortcomings and another on Egypt.647 d. Jared
649 Kushner's-Continuing Contacts with Simes Between the April 2016 speech at the
650 Mayflower Hotel and the presidential election, Jared Kushner had periodic
651 contacts with Simes.648 Those contacts consisted of both in-person meetings and
652 phone conversations, which concerned how to address issues relating to Russia in
653 the Campaign and how to move forward with the advisory group of foreign policy
654 experts that Simes had proposed.649 Simes recalled that he, not Kushner,
655 initiated all conversations about Russia, and that Kushner never asked him to
656 set up back-channel conversations with Russians.650 According to Simes, after
657 the Mayflower speech in late April, Simes raised the issue of Russian contacts
658 with Kushner, advised that it was bad optics for the Campaign to develop hidden
659 Russian contacts, and told Kushner both that the Campaign should not highlight
660 Russia as an issue and should handle any contacts with Russians with care.651
661 Kushner generally provided a similar account of his interactions with Simes.652
662 Among the Kushner-Simes meetings was one held on August 17, 2016, at Simes' s
663 request, in Kushner's New York office. The meeting was to address foreign policy
664 advice that CNI was providing and how to respond to the Clinton Campaign's
665 Russia-related attacks on candidate 642 Butt 2/9/18 302, at 9-10; Khalilzad
666 1/9/18 302, at 1-2, 5. 643 Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 5-6. 644 Simes 3/8/18 302,
667 at 31; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9-1 O; Khalilzad 1 /9/18 302, at 5. 645 Saunders
668 2/15/18 302, at 20. 646 Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 6. 647 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at
669 19-20. 648 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. 649 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. 650 Simes
670 3/8/18 302, at 27. 651 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. During this period of time, the
671 Campaign received a request for a higlevel Campaign official to meet with an
672 officer at a Russian state-owned bank "to discuss an offer [that officer] claims
673 to be canying from President Putin to meet with" candidate Trump. NOSC00005653
674 (5/17/16 Email, Dearborn to Kushner (8: 12 a.m.)). Copying Manafort and Gates,
675 Kushner responded, "Pass on this. A lot of people come claiming to carry
676 messages. Very few are able to verify. For now I think we decline such meetings.
677 Most likely these people go back home and claim they have special access to gain
678 importance for themselves. Be careful." NOSC00005653 (5/17/16 Email, Kushner to
679 Dearborn). 652 Kushner 4/11 /18 302, at 11-13. 108
680
681RESULT: 14
682
683PAGE: 116
684
685TEXT:
686
687 U.S. Department of Justice Att:ert1:ey '.?erk Predt:tet // Mtty CeHtttifl
688 Mttterittl Preteeted UAder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Trump.653 In advance of the
689 meeting, Simes sent Kushner a "Russia Policy Memo" laying out "what Mr. Trump
690 may want to say about Russia."654 In a cover email transmitting that memo and a
691 phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned "a well-documented story of
692 highly questionable connections between Bill Clinton" and the Russian
693 government, "parts of [which]" (according to Simes) had even been "discussed
694 with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and shared with the [Independent
695 Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency."655 Kushner forwarded the email
696 to senior Trump Campaign officials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick
697 Gates, with the note "suggestion only."656 Manafort subsequently forwarded the
698 email to his assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes.657 (Manafort was on
699 the verge of leaving the Campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with
700 Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only with Kushner). During the August 17
701 meeting, Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information that he had
702 romised.658 Simes told Kushner that, Simes claimed that he had received this
703 information from former CIA and Reagan White House official Fritz Ermarth, who
704 claimed to have learned it from U.S. intelligence sources, not from Russians.660
705 Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or
706 use to the Campaign because it was, in Simes's words, "old news."661 When
707 interviewed by the Office, Kushner stated that he believed that there was little
708 chance of something new being revealed about the Clintons given their long
709 career as public figures, and that he never received from Simes information that
710 could be "operationalized" for the Trump Campaign.662 Despite Kushner's 653
711 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27 /18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at
712 12; C00007269 (8/10/16 Meeting Invitation, Vargas to Simes et al.);
713 DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafmt (5:57:15 p.m.)). 654 C00007981-84
714 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)). The memorandum recommended
715 "downplaying Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time" and
716 suggested that "some tend to exaggerate Putin's flaws." The memorandum also
717 recommended approaching general related questions in the framework of "how to
718 work with Russia to advance important U.S. national interests" and that a Trump
719 Administration "not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy." The memorandum
720 did not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related
721 questions, including questions about Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea.
722 655 C00007981 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)). 656 DJTFP00023459
723 (8/10/16 Email, Kushner to S. Miller et al. (11 :30: 13 a.m.)). 657
724 DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 p.m.)). 658 Simes
725 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12. 659
726 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27 /l 8 302, at 6. 660 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30.
727 661 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6. 662 Kushner 4/11/18 302,
728 at 12. 109
729
730RESULT: 15
731
732PAGE: 117
733
734TEXT:
735
736 U.S. Department of Justice Attoraey Work Prodttet // Mtt; Coatttifl Mttterittl
737 Proteeted Uader Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) reaction, Simes believed that he
738 provided the same information at a small group meeting of foreign policy experts
739 that CNI organized for Sessions.663 5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower On
740 June 9, 2016, senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower
741 with a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about
742 Hillary Clinton from the Russian government. The meeting was proposed to Donald
743 Trump Jr. in an email from Robert Goldstone, at the request of his then-client
744 Emin Agalarov, the son of Russian real-estate developer Aras Agalarov. Goldstone
745 relayed to Trump Jr. that the "Crown prosecutor of Russia ... offered to provide
746 the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that would
747 incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as "part of Russia and its
748 government's support for Mr. Trump." Trump Jr. immediately responded that "if
749 it's what you say I love it," and arranged the meeting through a series of
750 emails and telephone calls. Trump Jr. invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort
751 and senior advisor Jared Kushner to attend the meeting, and both attended.
752 Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it occurred, and Michael
753 Cohen recalled that Trump Jr. may have told candidate Trump about an upcoming
754 meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton, without linking the
755 meeting to Russia. According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he
756 has no recollection of learning of the meeting at the time, and the Office found
757 no documentary evidence showing that he was made aware of the meeting--or its
758 Russian connection-before it occurred. The Russian attorney who spoke at the
759 meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, had previously worked for the Russian government
760 and maintained a relationship with that government throughout this period of
761 time. She claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were
762 provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats. Trump Jr. requested evidence to
763 support those claims, but Veselnitskaya did not provide such information. She
764 and her associates then turned to a critique of the origins of the Magnitsky
765 Act, a 2012 statute that imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian
766 officials and that resulted in a retaliatory ban on adoptions of Russian
767 children. Trump Jr. suggested that the issue could be revisited when and if
768 candidate Trump was elected. After the election, Veselnitskaya made additional
769 efforts to follow up on the meeting, but the Trump Transition Team did not
770 engage. a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr. Aras
771 Agalarov is a Russian real-estate developer with ties to Putin and other members
772 of the Russian government, including Russia's Prosecutor General, Yuri
773 Chaika.664 Aras Agalarov is the president of the Crocus Group, a Russian
774 enterprise that holds substantial Russian government construction contracts and
775 that-as discussed above, Volume I, Section IV.A.I, supra 663 Simes 3/8/18 302,
776 at 30. 664 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 4. 110
777
778RESULT: 16
779
780PAGE: 121
781
782TEXT:
783
784 U.S. Department of Justice Att6mey W6rk Pl'6dttet ,',' May CmttttiR Mfttet1ittl
785 Pt16teeted URdet1 Fed. R. Ct1im. P. 6(e) they could "speak now," and Goldstone
786 arranged a call between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov.689 On June 6 and June 7,
787 Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had multiple brief calls.690 Also on June 6, 2016,
788 Aras Agalarov called Ike Kaveladze and asked him to attend a meeting in New York
789 with the Trump Organization.691 Kaveladze is a Georgia-born, naturalized U.S.
790 citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to
791 Aras Agalarov.692 Kaveladze told the Office that, in a second phone call on June
792 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov asked Kaveladze ifhe knew anything about the Magnitsky
793 Act, and Aras sent him a short synopsis for the meeting and Veselnitskaya's
794 business card. According to Kaveladze, Aras Agalarov said the purpose of the
795 meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act, and he asked Kaveladze to translate.
796 693 ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign On June 7, Goldstone
797 emailed Trump Jr. and said that "Emin asked that I schedule a meeting with you
798 and [t]he Russian government attorney who is flying over from Moscow."694 Trump
799 Jr. replied that Manafort (identified as the "campaign boss"), Jared Kushner,
800 and Trump Jr. would likely attend.695 Go~d to learn that Trump Jr., Manafort,
801 and Kushner would attend.696 Kaveladze ---"puzzled" by the list of attendees and
802 that he checked with one of Emin Agalarov's assistants, Roman Beniaminov, who
803 said that the purpose of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey "negative
804 information on Hillary Clinton."697 Beniaminov, however, stated that he did not
805 recall having known or said that.698 Early on June 8, 2016 Kushner emailed his
806 assistant, asking her to discuss a 3 :00 p.m. 689 DJTJR00445 and Trump Jr.); 690
807 DJTJR00499 ); Call Records 693 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 6. 694 DJTJR00467
808 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trum Tweet; RG000068 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to
809 Trump Jr.); 695 DJTJR00469 (6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone);
810 @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11 :00) Tweet; RG000071 6/7/16 Email, Trum Jr. to
811 Goldstone); OSC-KAV _00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); 696 Goldstone
812 2/8/18 302, at 7; 697 KA V _00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze). 698
813 Beniaminov 1 /6/18 302, at 3. 114
814
815RESULT: 17
816
817PAGE: 122
818
819TEXT:
820
821 U.S. Department of Justice Atist1ney Wst1k Pred1:1et // Ma:y Csnta:in Ma:teria:l
822 Pt1steeted Undet1 Fed. R. Crim.. P. 6(e) meeting the following day with Trump
823 Jr.699 Later that day, Trump Jr. forwarded the entirety of his email
824 correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner,
825 under the subject line "FW: Russia -Clinton -private and confidential," adding a
826 note that the "[m]eeting got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices."70? Kushner then
827 sent his assistant a second email, informing her that the "[m]eeting with don jr
828 is 4pm now."701 Manafort responded, "See you then. P. "702 Rick Gates, who was
829 the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the Office that in
830 the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr. announced at a regular morning meeting of
831 senior campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative
832 information about the Clinton Foundation.703 Gates believed that Trump Jr. said
833 the information was coming from a group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced
834 to the group by a friend.704 Gates recalled that the meeting was attended by
835 Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and, joining late, Ivanka
836 Trump and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the
837 meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be careful.705
838 Hicks denied any knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017,706 and Kushner did
839 not recall if the planned June 9 meeting came up at all earlier that week.707
840 Michael Cohen recalled being in Donald J. Trump's office on June 6 or 7 when
841 Trump Jr. told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about
842 Clinton was going forward.708 Cohen did not recall Trump Jr. stating that the
843 meeting was connected to Russia.709 From the tenor of the conversation, Cohen
844 believed that Trump Jr. had previously discussed the meeting with his father,
845 although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation.710 In an interview
846 with the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Trump Jr. stated that he did not
847 inform his father about the 699 NOSC0000007-08 (6/8/18 Email, Kushner to
848 Vargas). 700 NOSC00000039-42 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort);
849 DJTJR00485 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort). 701 NOSC0000004
850 (6/8/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas). 702 6/8/16 Email, Manafo1t to Trump Jr. 703
851 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7; Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. Although the March l 302
852 refers to "June 19," that is likely a typographical error; external emails
853 indicate that a meeting with those participants occurred on June 6. See
854 NOSC00023603 (6/6/16 Email, Gates to Trump Jr. et al.). 704 Gates 1/30/18 302,
855 at 7. Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan, and public reporting
856 indicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in
857 Kyrgyzstan. See Neil MacFarquhar, A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on
858 Occasion. Was He a Conduit to Trump?, New York Times (July 16, 2017). 705 Gates
859 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. 706 Hicks 12/7117 302, at 6. 707 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 8.
860 708 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-6. 709 Cohen 8/7 /18 302, at 4-5. 71? Cohen 9/12/18
861 302, at 15-16. 115
862
863RESULT: 18
864
865PAGE: 123
866
867TEXT:
868
869 U.S. Department of Justice AMorAey Work Prod1:1et ,',' May CofttaiH Matet'ial
870 Protected Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) emails or the upcoming meeting.711
871 Similarly, neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone informing candidate
872 Trump of the meeting, including Trump Jr.712 President Trump has stated to this
873 Office, in written answers to questions, that he has "no recollection of
874 learning at the time" that his son, Manafort, or "Kushner was considering
875 participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative
876 information about Hillary Clinton."713 b. The Events of June 9, 2016 i.
877 Arrangements for the Meeting Veselnitskaya was in New York on June 9, 2016, for
878 appellate proceedings in the Prevezon civil forfeiture liti ation.714 That da ,
879 Veselnitskaya called Rinat Akhmetshin, a Soviet-born U.S. lobbyist, and when she
880 learned that he was in New York, invited him to lunch. Akhmetshin told the
881 Office that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnitsky Act and had worked
882 on the Prevezon litigation.716 Kaveladze and Anatoli Samochornov, a 711
883 Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 28-29,
884 84, 94-95 (Sept. 7, 2017). The Senate Judiciary Committee interview was not
885 under oath, but Trump Jr. was advised that it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. ? 1001
886 to make materially false statements in a congressional investigation. Id. at
887 10-11. 712 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 3-4; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 10. 713 Written
888 Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question I,
889 Patts (c)). We considered whether one sequence of events suggested that
890 candidate Trump had contemporaneous knowledge of the June 9 meeting. On June 7,
891 2016 Trump announced his intention to give "a major speech" "probably Monday of
892 next week"-which would have been June 13-about "all of the things that have
893 taken place with the Clintons." See, e.g., Phillip Bump, What we know about the
894 Trump Tower meeting, Washington Post (Aug. 7, 2018). Following the June 9
895 meeting, Trump changed the subject of his planned speech to national security.
896 But the Office did not find evidence that the original idea for the speech was
897 connected to the anticipated June 9 meeting or that the change of topic was
898 attributable to the failure of that meeting to produce concrete evidence about
899 Clinton. Other events, such as the Pulse nightclub shooting on June 12, could
900 well have caused the change. The President's written answers to our questions
901 state that the speech's focus was altered ''[i]n light of' the Pulse nightclub
902 shooting. See Written Responses, supra. As for the original topic of the June 13
903 speech, Trump has said that "he expected to give a speech referencing the
904 publicly available, negative inf01mation about the Clintons," and that the draft
905 of the speech prepared by Campaign staff"was based on publicly available
906 material, including, in particular, information from the book Clinton Cash by
907 Peter Schweizer." Written Responses, supra. In a later June 22 speech, Trump did
908 speak extensively about allegations that Clinton was corrupt, drawing from the
909 Clinton Cash book. See Full Transcript: Donald Trump NYC Speech on Stakes of the
910 Election, politico.com (June 22, 2016). 714 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya
911 Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017) at 41, 42; Alison
912 Frankel, How Did Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Get into US. for Trump Tower
913 Meeting? Reuters, (Nov. 6, 2017); Michael Kranish et al., Russian Lawyer who Met
914 with Trump Jr. Has Long History Fighting Sanctions, Washington Post (July 11,
915 2017); see OSC-KA VOOl 13 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); RG000073
916 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Lieberman 12/13/17 302, at 5; see also
917 Prevezon Holdings Order (Oct. 17, 2016). 715 116
918
919RESULT: 19
920
921PAGE: 124
922
923TEXT:
924
925 U.S. Department of Justice Attorttey 'Nork Proattet // Mtty Cotttttitt
926 Mttterittl Proteetea Uttaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Russian-born translator who
927 had assisted Veselnitska Prevezon case, also attended the lunch.717 meeting
928 asked Akhmetshin what she should tell him. According to several participants in
929 the lunch, Veselnitskaya showed Akhmetshin a document alleging financial
930 misconduct by Bill Browder and the Ziff brothers (Americans with business in
931 Russia , and those individuals subse uentl makin olitical donations to the
932 DNC.719 The group then went to Trump Tower for the meeting.721 ii. Conduct of
933 the Meeting Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner participated on the Trump side,
934 while Kaveladze, Samochomov, Akhmetshin, and Goldstone attended with
935 Veselnitskaya.722 The Office spoke to every participant except Veselnitska a and
936 Trum Jr., the latter of whom declined to be voluntaril interviewed b the Office
937 Goldstone recalled that Trump Jr. invited Veselnitskaya to begin but did not say
938 anything about the subject of the meeting.725 Participants agreed that
939 Veselnitskaya stated that the Ziff brothers had broken Russian laws and had
940 donated their profits to the DNC or the Clinton Campaign.726 She asserted that
941 the Ziff brothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering 717 Kaveladze
942 11/16/17 302, at 7; Samochornov 7 /13/17 302, at 2, 4; r subject matter of the
943 Trump Tower meeting coming up at lunch. Samochomov 7/12/17 302, at 4. In her
944 later Senate statement and interactions with the press, Veselnitskaya produced
945 what she claimed were the talking points that she brought to the June 9 meeting.
946 720 721 E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. 722 E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302,
947 at 4. 723 E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4; Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 9. 724
948 725 726 117
949
950RESULT: 20
951
952PAGE: 125
953
954TEXT:
955
956 U.S. Department of Justice A:tterfle)' Werle Pred1:1et // Ma, Ce,~taiR Material
957 Preteeted Ui,der Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) in both the United States and
958 Russia,727 728 According to Akhmetshin, Trump Jr. asked follow-up questions
959 about how the alleged payments could be tied specifically to the Clinton
960 Campaign, but Veselnitskaya indicated that she could not trace the money once it
961 entered the United States.729 Kaveladze similarly recalled that Trump Jr. asked
962 what they have on Clinton, and Kushner became aggravated and asked "[w]hat are
963 we doing here?"730 Akhmetshin then spoke about U.S. sanctions imposed under the
964 Magnitsky Act and Russia's response prohibiting U.S. adoption of Russian
965 children.731 Several participants recalled that Trump Jr. commented that Trump
966 is a private citizen, and there was nothing they could do at that time.732 Trump
967 Jr. also said that they could revisit the issue if and when they were in
968 government.733 Notes that Manafort took on his phone reflect the general flow of
969 the conversation, although not all of its details.734 At some point in the
970 meeting, Kushner sent an iMessage to Manafort stating "waste of time," followed
971 immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companies with
972 requests that 732 E.g., Akhmetshin 11/14/ l 7 302, at 12-13; 733 Akhmetshin
973 11/14/17 302, at 12-13; Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at 3. Trump Jr. confirmed this
974 in a statement he made in July 2017 after news of the June 2016 meeting broke.
975 Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee US. Senate
976 Washington DC, 115th Cong. 57 (Sept. 7, 2017). 734 Manafort's notes state: Bill
977 browder Offshore -Cyprus 133m shares Companies Not invest -loan Value in Cyprus
978 as inter Illici Active sponsors ofRNC Browder hired Joanna Glover Tied into
979 Cheney Russian adoption by American families PJM-SJC-00000001-02 (Notes Produced
980 to Senate Judiciary Committee). 118
981
982RESULT: 21
983
984PAGE: 126
985
986TEXT:
987
988 U.S. Department of Justice Atl:erfle)? Werk Predttet // Ma)' CefltatH Matet?ial
989 Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crhfl. P. 6(e) they call him to give him an excuse to
990 leave.735 Samochornov recalled that Kushner departed the meeting before it
991 concluded; Veselnitskaya recalled the same when interviewed by the press in July
992 2017.736 Veselnitskaya's press interviews and written statements to Congress
993 differ materially from other accounts. In a July 2017 press interview,
994 Veselnitskaya claimed that she has no connection to the Russian government and
995 had not referred to any derogatory information concerning the Clinton Campaign
996 when she met with Trump Campaign officials.737 Veselnitskaya's November 2017
997 written submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of
998 the June 9 meeting was not to connect with "the Trump Campaign" but rather to
999 have "a private meeting with Donald Trump Jr.-a friend of my good acquaintance's
1000 son on the matter of assisting me or my colleagues in informing the Congress
1001 members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and interference with the
1002 legislative activities of the US Congress."738 In other words, Veselnitskaya
1003 claimed her focus was on Congress and not the Campaign. No witness, however,
1004 recalled any reference to Congress during the meeting. Veselnitskaya also
1005 maintained that she "attended the meeting as a lawyer of Denis Katsyv," the
1006 pr,eviously mentioned owner of Prevezon Holdings, but she did not "introduce
1007 [her]self in this capacity."739 In a July 2017 television interview, Trump Jr.
1008 stated that while he had no way to gauge the reliability, credibility, or
1009 accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose of the meeting, if
1010 "someone has information on our opponent ... maybe this is something. I should
1011 hear them out."740 Trump Jr. fu1ther stated in September 2017 congressional
1012 testimony that he thought he should "listen to what Rob and his colleagues had
1013 to say."741 Depending on what, if any, information was provided, Trump Jr.
1014 stated he could then "consult with counsel to make an informed decision as to
1015 whether to give it any further consideration."742 735 NOSC00003992 (6/9/16 Text
1016 Message, Kushner to Manafort); Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 9; Vargas 4/4/18 302, at
1017 7; NOSC00000044 (6/9/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas); NOSC00000045 (6/9/16 Email,
1018 Kushner to Cain). 736 Samochornov 7 /12/17 302, at 4; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at
1019 9-10; see also Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee,
1020 115th Cong. 48-49 (Sept. 7, 2017). . 737 Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She
1021 Didn't Give Trump Jr. Info on Clinton, NBC News (July 11, 2017). 738 Testimony
1022 of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the
1023 Judiciary, 115th Cong. }O(Nov 20, 2017). 739 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya
1024 before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 21 (Nov.
1025 20, 2017). 2017). 740 Sean Hannity, Transcript-Donald Trump Jr, Fox News (July
1026 11, 2017). 741 Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee,
1027 115th Cong. 16 (Sept. 7, 2017). 742 Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate
1028 Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16-17 (Sept. 7, 119
1029
1030RESULT: 22
1031
1032PAGE: 132
1033
1034TEXT:
1035
1036 U.S. Department of Justice A:ttemey 'Nerk Pretittet // May Cetttaifl Material
1037 Prnteeteti UHtier Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) first meeting to propose amendments.7~0
1038 Although only delegates could participate in formal discussions and vote on the
1039 platform, the Trump Campaign could request changes, and members of the Trump
1040 Campaign attended committee meetings.791 John Mashburn, the Campaign's policy
1041 director, helped oversee the Campaign's involvement in the platform committee
1042 meetings.792 He told the Office that he directed Campaign staff at the
1043 Convention, including J.D. Gordon, to take a hands-off approach and only to
1044 challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump's wishes.793 On
1045 July 11, 2016, delegate Diana Denman submitted a proposed platform amendment
1046 that included provision of armed support for Ukraine.794 The amendment described
1047 Russia's "ongoing military aggression" in Ukraine and announced "supp01t" for
1048 "maintaining (and, if warranted, increasing) sanctions against Russia until
1049 Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully restored" and for
1050 "providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine's armed forces and greater
1051 coordination with NA TO on defense planning."795 Gordon reviewed the proposed
1052 platform changes, including Denman's.796 Gordon stated that he flagged this
1053 amendment because of Trump's stated position on Ukraine, which Gordon personally
1054 heard the candidate say at the March 31 foreign policy meeting-namely, that the
1055 Europeans should take primary responsibility for any assistance to Ukraine, that
1056 there should be improved U.S.-Russia relations, and that he did not want to
1057 start World War III over that region.797 Gordon told the Office that Trump's
1058 statements on the campaign trail following the March meeting underscored those
1059 positions to the point where Gordon felt obliged to object to the proposed
1060 platform change and seek its dilution.798 On July 11, 2016, at a meeting of the
1061 National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee, Denman offered her
1062 amendment.799 Gordon and another Campaign staffer, Matt Miller, approached a
1063 committee co-chair and asked him to table the amendment to permit further
1064 discussion.800 Gordon's concern with the amendment was the language about
1065 providing "lethal 790 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 1 0; Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1-2. 791
1066 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 10. 792 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at
1067 4; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 7-8. 793 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4; Gordon 8/29/17
1068 302, at 10. 794 DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22; Denman
1069 12/4/17 302, at 1; Denman 6/7 /17 302, at 2. 795 DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN
1070 000012, DENMAN 000021-22. 796 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10-11. 797 Gordon 8/29/17
1071 302, at 11; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11; Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 1-2, 5-6. 798
1072 Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 5-6. 799 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; see DENMAN 000014. 800
1073 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12;
1074 see Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2. 125
1075
1076RESULT: 23
1077
1078PAGE: 136
1079
1080TEXT:
1081
1082 U.S. Department of Justice Atterftey '+?erk Prndttet // Miey Cefttttift Material
1083 Preteeted Uftder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) or meet with Kislyak before the November
1084 2016 election.834 Sessions and Landrum recalled that, after the election, some
1085 efforts were made to arrange a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak.835
1086 According to Sessions, the request came through CNI and would have involved a
1087 meeting between Sessions and Kislyak, two other ambassadors, and the Governor of
1088 Alabama. 836 Sessions, however, was in New York on the day of the anticipated
1089 meeting and was unable to attend.837 The investigation did not identify evidence
1090 that the two men met at any point after their September 8 meeting. 8. Paul
1091 Manafort Paul Manafort served on the Trump Campaign, including a period as
1092 campaign chairman, from March to August 2016.838 Manafort had connections to
1093 Russia through his prior work for Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and later
1094 through his work for a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine. Manafort stayed in touch
1095 with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin Kilimnik, a
1096 longtime Manafort employee who previously ran Manafort's office in Kiev and who
1097 the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. Manafort instructed Rick
1098 Gates, his deputy on the Campaign and a longtime employee, 839 to provide
1099 Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign-including internal polling data,
1100 although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction. Manafort
1101 expected Kilimnik to share that information with others in Ukraine and with
1102 Deripaska. Gates periodically sent such polling data to Kilimnik during the
1103 campaign. 834 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5. 835 Sessions
1104 1/17 /l 8 302, at 23. 836 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. 837 Sessions 1/17/18 302,
1105 at 23. 838 On August 21, 2018, Manafo1t was convicted in the Eastern District of
1106 Virginia on eight tax, Foreign Bank Account Registration (FBAR), and bank fraud
1107 charges. On September 14, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty in the District of
1108 Columbia to (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to commit
1109 offenses against the United States (money laundering, tax fraud, FBAR, Foreign
1110 Agents Registration Act (FARA), and FARA false statements), and (2) conspiracy
1111 to obstruct justice (witness tampering). Manafort also admitted criminal conduct
1112 with which he had been charged in the Eastern District of Virginia, but as to
1113 which the jury hung. The conduct at issue in both cases involved Manafort's work
1114 in Ukraine and the money he earned for that work, as well as crimes after the
1115 Ukraine work ended. On March 7, 2019, Manafort was sentenced to 47 months of
1116 imprisonment in the Virginia prosecution. On March 13, the district court in
1117 D.C. sentenced Manafo1t to a total term of 73 months: 60 months on the Count 1
1118 conspiracy (with 30 of those months to run concurrent to the Virginia sentence),
1119 and 13 months on the Count 1 conspiracy, to be served consecutive to the other
1120 two sentences. The two sentences resulted in a total term of 90 months. 839 As
1121 noted in Volume I, Section III.D. l .b, supra, Gates pleaded guilty to two
1122 criminal charges in the District of Columbia, including making a false statement
1123 to the FBI, pursuant to a plea agreement. He has provided information and in-
1124 court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable. See also Transcript
1125 at 16, United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., l:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13,
1126 2019), Doc. 514 ("Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript") (court's explanation of reasons
1127 to credit Oates's statements in one instance). 129
1128
1129RESULT: 24
1130
1131PAGE: 137
1132
1133TEXT:
1134
1135 U.S. Department of Justice Atttm1ey Wark Pradttet /,' May Cal'l:taifl Matertal
1136 Prateetee Ul'l:eer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Manafort also twice met Kilimnik in the
1137 United States during the campaign period and conveyed campaign information. The
1138 second meeting took place on August 2, 2016, in New York City. Kilimnik
1139 requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from former Ukrainian
1140 President Viktor Y anukovych, who was then living in Russia. The message was
1141 about a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a
1142 "backdoor" means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine. Several months later,
1143 after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an email to Manafort expressing
1144 the view-which Manafort later said he shared-that the plan's success would
1145 require U.S. support to succeed: "all that is required to start the process is a
1146 very minor 'wink' ( or slight push) from [Donald Trump ]."840 The email also
1147 stated that if Manafort were designated as the U.S. representative and started
1148 the process, Yanukovych would ensure his reception in Russia "at the very top
1149 level." Manafort communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at
1150 least four occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August 2:
1151 December 2016 (the Kilimnik email described above); January 2017; February 2017;
1152 and again in the spring of 2018. The Office reviewed numerous Manafort email and
1153 text communications, and asked President Trump about the plan in written
1154 questions.841 The investigation did not uncover evidence ofManafort's passing
1155 along information about Ukrainian peace plans to the candidate or anyone else in
1156 the Campaign or the Administration. The Office was not, however, able to gain
1157 access to all of Manafort's electronic communications (in some instances,
1158 messages were sent using encryption applications). And while Manafort denied
1159 that he spoke to members of the Trump Campaign or the new Administration about
1160 the peace plan, he lied to the Office and the grand jury about the peace plan
1161 and his meetings with Kilimnik, and his unreliability on this subject was among
1162 the reasons that the district judge found that he breached his cooperation
1163 agreement. 842 The Office could not reliably determine Manafort's ur ose in
1164 sharin with Kilimnik during the campaign period. Manafort did not see a downside
1165 to sharing campaign information, and told Gates that his role in the Campaign
1166 would . . . .. . I I' ? . . ? Investigative Technique 841 According to the
1167 President's written answers, he does not remember Manafort communicating to him
1168 any particular positions that Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to
1169 support. Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 16-17
1170 (Response to Question IV, Part (d)). 842 Manafort made several false statements
1171 during debriefings. Based on that conduct, the Office determined that Manafort
1172 had breached his plea agreement and could not be a cooperating witness. The
1173 judge presiding in Manafort's D.C. criminal case found by a preponderance of the
1174 evidence that Manafort intentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI,
1175 the Office, and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications
1176 with Kilimnik (and concerning two other issues). Although the report refers at
1177 times to Manafort' s statements, it does so only when those statements are
1178 sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy, to identify issues on which
1179 Manafort's untruthful responses may themselves be of evidentiary value, or to
1180 provide Manafort's explanations for certain events, even when we were unable to
1181 determine whether that explanation was credible. 130
1182
1183RESULT: 25
1184
1185PAGE: 138
1186
1187TEXT:
1188
1189 U.S. Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Predttet // Mtt:,? CeAtttiH Mttterittl
1190 Prnteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) be "good for business" and potentially a
1191 way to be made whole for work he previously completed in the Ukraine. As to
1192 Deripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with him,
1193 Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a "disagreement"-a
1194 reference to one or more outstanding lawsuits. Because of questions about
1195 Manafort's credibility and our limited ability to gather evidence on what
1196 happened to the polling data after it was sent to Kilimnik, the Office could not
1197 assess what Kilimnik (or others he may have given it to) did with it. The Office
1198 did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort's sharing polling
1199 data and Russia's interference in the election, which had already been reported
1200 by U.S. media outlets at the time of the August 2 meeting. The investigation did
1201 not establish that Manafort otherwise coordinated with the Russian government on
1202 its election-interference efforts. a. Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine
1203 Manafort' s Russian contacts during the campaign and transition periods stem
1204 from his consulting work for Deripaska from approximately 2005 to 2009 and his
1205 separate political consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 2015, including
1206 through his company Dl\1P International LLC (DMI). Kilimnik worked for Manafort
1207 in Kiev during this entire period and continued to communicate with Manafort
1208 through at least June 2018. Kilimnik, who speaks and writes Ukrainian and
1209 Russian, facilitated many of Manafort's communications with Deripaska and
1210 Ukrainian oligarchs. i. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work In approximately 2005,
1211 Manafort began working for Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who has a global empire
1212 involving aluminum and power companies and who is closely aligned with Vladimir
1213 Putin.843 A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in
1214 2005 regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the
1215 Kremlin and the benefits that the work could confer on "the Putin
1216 Government."844 Gates described the work Manafort did for Deripaska as
1217 "political risk insurance," and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to
1218 install friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business
1219 interests.845 Manafort's company earned tens of millions of dollars from its
1220 work for Deripaska and was loaned millions of dollars by Deripaska as well.846
1221 In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market
1222 Partners L.P. ("Pericles"), an investment fund created by Manafort and former
1223 Manafort business partner Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was established to
1224 pursue investments in Eastern Europe.847 Deripaska was the sole investor.848
1225 Gates stated in interviews with the Office that the venture led 843 Pinchuk et
1226 al., Russian Tycoon Deripaska in Putin Delegation to China, Reuters (June 8,
1227 2018). 844 6/23/05 Memo, Manafort & Davis to Deripaska & Rothchild. 845 Gates
1228 2/2/18 302, at 7. 846 Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2-5; Manafort Income by Year,
1229 2005 -2015; Manafort Loans from Wire Transfers, 2005 -2015. 847 Gates 3/12/18
1230 302, at 5. 848 Manafort 12/16/15 Dep., at 157:8-11. 131
1231
1232RESULT: 26
1233
1234PAGE: 139
1235
1236TEXT:
1237
1238 U.S. Department of Justice Att6mey W6rk Prndttet // Miey Cmitaitt Material
1239 Preteeted Umier Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) to a deterioration of the relationship
1240 between Manafort and Deripaska.849 In pa1ticular, when the fund failed,
1241 litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued. Gates stated that, by 2009,
1242 Manafort's business relationship with Deripaska had "dried up."850 According to
1243 Gates, various interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past
1244 few years have involved trying to resolve the legal dispute. 851 As described
1245 below, in 2016, Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik, and others engaged in efforts to
1246 revive the Deripaska relationship and resolve the litigation. ii. Political
1247 Consulting Work Through Deripaska, Manafort was introduced to Rinat Akhmetov, a
1248 Ukrainian oligarch who hired Manafort as a political consultant.852 In 2005,
1249 Akhmetov hired Manafort to engage in political work supporting the Party of
1250 Regions,853 a political party in Ukraine that was generally understood to align
1251 with Russia. Manafort assisted the Party of Regions in regaining power, and its
1252 candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, won the presidency in 2010. Manafort became a
1253 close and trusted political advisor to Y anukovych during his time as President
1254 of Ukraine. Y anukovych served in that role until 2014, when he fled to Russia
1255 amidst popular protests.854 iii. Konstantin Kilimnik Kilimnik is a Russian
1256 national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine and was a longtime Manafort
1257 employee.855 Kilimnik had direct and close access to Yanukovych and his senior
1258 entourage, and he facilitated communications between Manafort and his clients,
1259 including Yanukovych and multiple Ukrainian oligarchs.856 Kilimnik also
1260 maintained a relationship with Deripaska's deputy, Viktor Boyarkin,857 a Russian
1261 national who previously served in the defense attache office of the Russian
1262 Embassy to the United States.858 849 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9. 850 Gates 2/2/18
1263 302, at 6. 851 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9-10. 852 Manafort 7 /30/14 302, at 1;
1264 Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2. 853 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5-6. 854 Gates 3/16/18
1265 302, at 1; Davis 2/8/18 302, at 9; Devine 7/6/18 302, at 2-3. 855 Patten 5/22/18
1266 302, at 5; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S.
1267 Department of State. 856 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8;
1268 Gates 1/31/18 302, at 4-5; Gates 1/30/18 302, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11. 857
1269 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8. 858 Boyarkin Visa Record,
1270 U.S. Department of State. 132
1271
1272RESULT: 27
1273
1274PAGE: 140
1275
1276TEXT:
1277
1278 U.S. Department of Justice Atlerney Werlt Predttet // Mtty Centttin Mttterittl
1279 Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Manafort told the Office that he did not
1280 believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian "spy."859 The FBI, however, assesses
1281 that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence.860 Several pieces of the
1282 Office's evidence-including witness interviews and emails obtained through
1283 authorized search warrants-support that assessment: ? Kilimnik was born on April
1284 27, 1970, in Dnipropetrovsk Ob last, then of the Soviet Union, and attended the
1285 Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until 1992.861 Sam
1286 Patten, a business partner to Kilimnik,862 stated that Kilimnik told him that he
1287 was a translator in the Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in
1288 the Russian armament industry selling arms and military equipment. 863 ? U.S.
1289 government visa records reveal that Kilimnik obtained a visa to travel to the
1290 United States with a Russian diplomatic passport in 1997. 864 ? Kilimnik worked
1291 for the International Republican Institute' s (IRI) Moscow office, where he did
1292 translation work and general office management from 1998 to 2005.865 While
1293 another official recalled the incident differently,866 one former associate of
1294 Kilimnik's at TRI told the FBI that Kilimnik was fired from his post because his
1295 links to Russian intelligence were too strong. The same individual stated that
1296 it was well known at IRI that Kilimnik had links to the Russian government.867 ?
1297 Jonathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI
1298 Consulting, worked with DMI on a public relations campaign for Yanukovych. After
1299 Hawker's work for DMI ended, Kilimnik contacted Hawker about working for a
1300 Russian 859 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5. 860 The Office has noted Kilimnik's
1301 assessed ties to Russian intelligence in public court filings. E.g., Gov't Opp.
1302 to Mot. to Modify, United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., 1 :17-cr-201 (D.D.C.
1303 Dec. 4, 2017), Doc. 73, at 2 ("Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify").
1304 861 12/17/16 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State. 862 In August 2018,
1305 Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating the Foreign
1306 Agents Registration Act, and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also
1307 misled and withheld documents from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
1308 in the course of its investigation of Russian election interference. Plea
1309 Agreement, United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1: 18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31,
1310 2018), Doc. 6; Statement of Offense, United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1:
1311 18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 7. 863 Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5-6. 864
1312 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State. 865 Nix 3/30/18 302, at
1313 1-2. 866 Nix 3/30/18 302, at 2. 867 Lenzi 1 /30/18 302, at 2. 133
1314
1315RESULT: 28
1316
1317PAGE: 141
1318
1319TEXT:
1320
1321 U.S. Department of Justice Attet'tle)' Werk Predttet /,' Mtty Cefl:tttil'l
1322 Mttterittl Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Ct'iffl. P. 6(e) government entity on a
1323 public-relations project that would promote, in Western and Ukrainian media,
1324 Russia's position on its 2014 invasion of Crimea. 868 ? Gates suspected that
1325 Kilimnik was a "spy," a view that he shared with Manafort, Hawker, and Alexander
1326 van der Zwaan,869 an attorney who had worked with DMI on a report for the
1327 Ukrainian Ministry of ForeignAffairs.870 Investigative Technique b. Contacts
1328 during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign i. Paul Manafort Joins the
1329 Campaign Manafort served on the Trump Campaign from late March to August 19,
1330 2016. On March 29, 2016, the Campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the
1331 Campaign's "Convention Manager."871 On May 19, 2016, Manafort was promoted to
1332 campaign chairman and chief strategist, and Gates, who had been assisting
1333 Manafort on the Campaign, was appointed deputy campaign chairman.872 Thomas
1334 Barrack and Roger Stone both recommended Manafort to candidate Trump. 873 In
1335 early 2016, at Manafort' s request, Barrack suggested to Trump that Mana fort
1336 join the Campaign to manage the Republican Convention.874 Stone had worked with
1337 Manafort from approximately 1980 until the mid-l 990s through various consulting
1338 and lobbying firms. Manafort met Trump in 1982 when Trump hired the Black,
1339 Manafort, Stone and Kelly lobbying firm.875 Over the years, Manafort saw Trump
1340 at political and social events in New York City and at Stone's wedding, and
1341 Trump requested VIP status at the 1988 and 1996 Republican conventions worked by
1342 Manafort.876 868 Hawker 1/9/18 302, at 13; 3/18/14 Email, Hawker & Tulukbaev.
1343 869 van der Zwaan pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of
1344 Columbia to making false statements to the Special Counsel's Office. Plea
1345 Agreement, United States v. Alex van der Zwaan, 1:18-cr-31 (D.D.C. Feb. 20,
1346 2018), Doc. 8. 870 Hawker 6/9/18 302, at 4; van der Zwaan 11/3/17 302, at 22.
1347 Manafort said in an interview that Gates had joked with Kilimnik about
1348 Kilimnik's going to meet with his KGB handler. Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 7. 871
1349 Press Release-DonaldJ. Trump Announces Campaign Convention Manager PaulJ.
1350 Manafort, The American Presidency Project -U.C. Santa Barbara (Mar. 29, 2016).
1351 872 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 8; Meghan Keneally, Timeline of Manafort 's role in
1352 the Trump Campaign, ABC News (Oct. 20, 2017). 873 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8;
1353 Manafort 9/1 1/18 302, at 1-2; Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3. 874 Barrack 12/12/17
1354 302, at 3; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8. 875 Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6. 876
1355 Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6. 134
1356
1357RESULT: 29
1358
1359PAGE: 142
1360
1361TEXT:
1362
1363 U.S. Department of Justice MterHe5 \Vefk Preclttet // P..4ey CetttoiH
1364 ~4ftteria:l Proteetecl Utteler Fet1. R. Crim. P. 6(e) According to Gates, in
1365 March 2016, Manafort traveled to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida to meet
1366 with Trump. Trump hired him at that time.877 Manafort agreed to work on the
1367 Campaign without pay. Manafort had no meaningful income at this point in time,
1368 but resuscitating his domestic political campaign career could be financially
1369 beneficial in the future. Gates reported that Manafort intended, if Trump won
1370 the Presidency, to remain outside the Administration and monetize his
1371 relationship with the Administration. 878 ii. Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period
1372 Contacts Immediately upon joining the Campaign, Manafort directed Gates to
1373 prepare for his review separate memoranda addressed to Deripaska, Akhmetov,
1374 Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Boris Kolesnikov,879 the last three being Ukrainian
1375 oligarchs who were senior Opposition Bloc officials. 880 The memoranda described
1376 Manafort' s appointment to the Trump Campaign and indicated his willingness to
1377 consult on Ukrainian politics in the future. On March 30, 2016, Gates emailed
1378 the memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort' s appointment to Kilimnik
1379 for translation and dissemination.881 Manafort later followed up with Kilimnik
1380 to ensure his messages had been delivered, emailing on April 11, 2016 to ask
1381 whether Kilimnik had shown "our friends" the media coverage of his new role.882
1382 Kilimnik replied, "Absolutely. Every article." Manafort further asked: "How do
1383 we use to get whole. Has Ovd [Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska] operation seen?"
1384 Kilimnik wrote back the same day, "Yes, I have been sending everything to Victor
1385 [Boyarkin, Deripaska's deputy], who has been forwarding the coverage directly to
1386 OVD."883 Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign
1387 would be "good for business" and increase the likelihood that Manafort would be
1388 paid the approximately $2 million he was owed for previous political consulting
1389 work in Ukraine.884 Gates also explained to the Office that Manafort thought his
1390 role on the Campaign could help "confirm" that Deripaska had dropped the
1391 Pericles lawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to
1392 Deripaska ( as 877 Gates 2/2/18 3 02, at IO. 878 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4. 879
1393 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11. "0 See Sharon LaFraniere, Manafort's Trial Isn't About
1394 Russia, but It Will Be in the Air, New York Times (July 30, 2018); Tierney
1395 Sneed, Prosecutors Believe Manafort Made $60 Million Consulting in Ukraine,
1396 Talking Points Memo (July 30, 2018); Mykola Vorobiov, How Pro-Russian Forces_
1397 Will Take Revenge on Ukraine, Atlantic Council (Sept. 23, 2018); Sergii
1398 Leshchenko, Ukraine's Oligarchs Are Still Calling the Shots, Foreign Policy
1399 (Aug. 14, 2014); Interfax-Ukraine, Kolesnikov: Inevitability of Punishment
1400 Needed for Real Fight Against Smuggling in Ukraine, Kyiv Post (June 23, 2018);
1401 Igor Kossov, Kyiv Hotel Industry Makes Room for New Entrants, Kyiv Post (Mar. 7,
1402 2019); Markian Kuzmowycz, How the Kremlin Can Win Ukraine's Elections, Atlantic
1403 Council (Nov. 19, 2018). The Opposition Bloc is a Ukraine political party that
1404 largely reconstituted the Party of Regions. 881 3/30/16 Email, Gates to
1405 Kilimnik. 882 4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik. 883 4/11/16 Email, Manafort &
1406 Kilimnik. 884 Gates 2/2/18 3 02, at 10. 135
1407
1408RESULT: 30
1409
1410PAGE: 143
1411
1412TEXT:
1413
1414 U.S. Department of Justice Attort'ley 'Nork Prodttet // Mf:l-)1 CoFttatFt
1415 Material Proteeted UFtder Fee. R. Crtffl. P. 6(e) discussed further below) so
1416 that Deripaska would not move forward with his lawsuit against Manafort.885
1417 Gates further stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the United States, that
1418 Deripaska could believe that having Manafort in a position inside the Campaign
1419 or Administration might be helpful to Deripaska, and that Manafort's
1420 relationship with Trump could help Deripaska in other ways as well. 886 Gates
1421 stated, however, that Manafort never told him anything specific about what, if
1422 anything, Manafort might be offering Deripaska. 887 Gates also reported that
1423 Manafort instructed him in April 2016 or early May 2016 to send Kilimnik
1424 Campaign internal polling data and other updates so that Kilimnik, in turn,
1425 could share it with Ukrainian oli archs.888 Gates understood that the
1426 information would also be shared with Deripaska . 889 Gates reported to the
1427 Office that he did not know why Manafort wanted him to send polling information,
1428 but Gates thought it was a way to showcase Manafort's work, and Manafort wanted
1429 to open doors to jobs after the Trump Campaign ended.890 Gates said that
1430 Manafort's instruction included sending internal polling data prepared for the
1431 Trump Campaign by pollster Tony Fabrizio.891 Fabrizio had worked with Manafort
1432 for years and was brought into the Campaign by Manafort. Gates stated that, in
1433 accordance with Manafort's instruction, he periodically sent Kilimnik polling
1434 data via WhatsApp; Gates then deleted the communications on a daily basis. 892
1435 Gates further told the Office that, after Manafort left the Campaign in mid-
1436 August, Gates sent Kilimnik polling data less frequently and that the data he
1437 sent was more publicly available information and less internal data. 893 with
1438 multiple emails that Kilimnik sent to U.S. associates and press contacts between
1439 late July and mid-August of 2016. Those emails referenced "internal polling,"
1440 described the status of the Trump Campaign and 885 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11;
1441 Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2. 886 Gates 2/2/18 3 02, at 12. 887 Gates
1442 2/2/18 302, at 12. 888 Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17; Gates 9/27 /18 302 (serial
1443 740), at 2. In a later interview with the Office, Gates stated that Manafmt
1444 directed him to send polling data to Kilimnik after a May 7, 2016 meeting
1445 between Manafmt and Kilimnik in New York, discussed in Volume I, Section
1446 IV.A.8.b.iii, infra. Gates 11/7/18 302, at 3. 889 Gates 9/27/18 302, Part II, at
1447 2; 890 Gates 2/12/18 302, at 10; Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17. 891 Gates 9/27/18 302
1448 (serial 740), at 2; Gates 2/7/18 302, at 15. 892 Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17. 893
1449 Gates 2/12/18 302, at 11-12. According to Gates, his access to internal polling
1450 data was more limited because Fabrizio was himself distanced from the Campaign
1451 at that point. 894 136
1452
1453RESULT: 31
1454
1455PAGE: 144
1456
1457TEXT:
1458
1459 U.S. Department of Justice AttofHey Wofk Pfotlttet // Mtty CoHtttiH Mttterittl
1460 Proteetetl UHtler Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) and assessed Trump's prospects for Gates
1461 to send Kilimnik internal data, The Office also obtained contemporaneous emails
1462 that shed light on the purpose of the communications with Deripaska and that are
1463 consistent with Gates's account. For example, in response to a July 7, 20 I 6,
1464 email from a Ukrainian reporter about Manafort' s failed backed investment,
1465 Manafort asked Kilimnik whether there had been any movement on "this issue with
1466 our friend."897 Gates stated that "our friend" likely referred to Deripaska,898
1467 and Manafort told the Office that the "issue" (and "our biggest interest," as
1468 stated below) was a solution to the Deripaska-Pericles issue.899 Kilimnik
1469 replied: I am carefully optimistic on the question of our biggest interest. Our
1470 friend [Boyarkin] said there is lately significantly more attention to the
1471 campaign in his boss' [Deripaska's] mind, and he will be most likely looking for
1472 ways to reach out to you pretty soon, understanding all the time sensitivity. I
1473 am more than sure that it will be resolved and we will get back to the original
1474 relationship with V. 's boss [Deripaska].900 Eight minutes later, Manafort
1475 replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin's "boss," a reference to Deripaska,
1476 "that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate."901 Manafort has alleged
1477 to the Office that he was willing to brief Deripaska only on public campaign
1478 matters and gave an example: why Trump selected Mike Pence as the Vice-
1479 Presidential running mate.902 Manafort said he never gave Deripaska a
1480 briefing.903 Manafort noted that if Trump won, Deripaska would want to use
1481 Manafort to advance whatever interests Deripaska had in the United States and
1482 elsewhere.904 895 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Dirkse; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to
1483 Schultz; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Marson; 7/27/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash;
1484 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Jackson; 8/18/16
1485 Email, Kilimnik to Mendoza-Wilson; 8/19/16 Email, Kilimnik to Patten. 896 897
1486 7/7/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik. 898 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 13. 899 Manafort
1487 9/11/18 302, at 6. 900 7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort. 901 7/8/16 Email,
1488 Kilimnik to Manafort; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 13. 902 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6.
1489 903 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6. 904 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6. 137
1490
1491RESULT: 32
1492
1493PAGE: 145
1494
1495TEXT:
1496
1497 U.S. Department of Justice AtierHe;? 'Nerk Pretittet // May CeHtaifl Material
1498 Preteeteti UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period
1499 Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik in the United States Manafort twice met with
1500 Kilimnik in person during the campaign period-once in May and again in August
1501 2016. The first meeting took place on May 7, 2016, in New York City.905 In the
1502 days leading to the meeting, Kilimnik had been working to gather information
1503 about the political situation in Ukraine. That included information gleaned from
1504 a trip that former Party of Regions official Yuriy Boyko had recently taken to
1505 Moscow-a trip that likely included meetings between Boyko and high-ranking
1506 Russian officials.906 Kilimnik then traveled to Washington, D.C. on or about May
1507 5, 2016; while in Washington, Kilimnik had pre-arranged meetings with State
1508 Department employees.907 Late on the evening of May 6, Gates arranged for
1509 Kilimnik to take a 3:00 a.m. train to meet Mana fort in New York for breakfast
1510 on May 7. 908 According to Manafort, during the meeting, he and Kilimnik talked
1511 about events in Ukraine, and Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump Campaign,
1512 expecting Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and
1513 elsewhere.909 Manafort stated that Opposition Bloc members recognized Manafort's
1514 position on the Campaign was an opportunity, but Kilimnik did not ask for
1515 anything.91? Kilimnik spoke about a plan of Boyko to boost election
1516 participation in the eastern zone of Ukraine, which was the base for the
1517 Opposition Bloc.911 Kilimnik returned to Washington, D.C. right after the
1518 meeting with Manafort. Manafort met with Kilimnik a second time at the Grand
1519 Havana Club in New York City on the evening of August 2, 2016. The events
1520 leading to the meeting are as follows. On July 28, 2016, Kilimnik flew from Kiev
1521 to Moscow.912 The next day, Kilimnik wrote to Manafort requesting that they
1522 meet, using coded language about a conversation he had that day.913 In an email
1523 with a subject line "Black Caviar," Kilimnik wrote: I met today with the guy who
1524 gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago. We spent about 5 hours
1525 talking about his story, and I have several important messages from him to you.
1526 He asked me to go and brief you on our conversation. I said I have to run it by
1527 you first, but in principle I am prepared to do it. ... It has to do about the
1528 future of his 905 Investigative Technique 906 4/26/16 Email, Kilimnik to
1529 Purcell, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 6-7; Gates
1530 11/7/18 302, at 3. 907 5/7/16 Email, Kilimnik to Charap & Kimmage; 5/7/16 Email,
1531 Kasanofto Kilimnik. 908 5/6/16 Email, Manafort to Gates; 5/6/16 Email, Gates to
1532 Kilimnik. 909 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1. 910 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1. 911
1533 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1. 912 7/25/16 Email, Kilimnik to katrin@yana.kiev.ua
1534 (2: 17:34 a.m.). 913 7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.111.). 138
1535
1536RESULT: 33
1537
1538PAGE: 146
1539
1540TEXT:
1541
1542 U.S. Department of Justice Attorttey Work Prodttet // Mtt, CoHtttiH Mttterittl
1543 Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) country, and is quite interesting.914
1544 Manafort identified "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" as
1545 Yanukovych. He explained that, in 2010, he and Y anukovych had lunch to
1546 celebrate the recent presidential election. Yanukovych gave Manafort a large jar
1547 of black caviar that was worth approximately $30,000 to $40,000.915 Manafort's
1548 identification ofYanukovych as "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar
1549 jar" is consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow-where Yanukovych resided-when
1550 Kilimnik wrote "I met today with~ a December 2016 email in which Kilimnik
1551 referred to Yanukovych as "BG,"-916 Manafort replied to Kilimnik's July 29
1552 email, "Tuesday [August 2] is best ... Tues or weds in NYC."917 Three days
1553 later, on July 31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow, and on that
1554 same day, wrote to Manafort that he needed "about 2 hours" for their meeting
1555 "because it is a long caviar story to tell."918 Kilimnik wrote that he would
1556 arrive at JFK on August 2 at 7:30 p.m., and he and Manafort agreed to a late
1557 dinner that night.919 Documentary evidence-including flight, phone, and hotel
1558 records, and the timing of text messages exchanged920-confirms the dinner took
1559 place as planned on August 2.921 As to the contents of the meeting itself, the
1560 accounts of Manafort and Gates-who arrived late to the dinner-differ in certain
1561 respects. But their versions of events, when assessed alongside available
1562 documentary evidence and what Kilimnik told business associate Sam Patten,
1563 indicate that at least three principal topics were discussed. First, Manafort
1564 and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in
1565 Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more industrialized eastern
1566 region ofDonbas,922 914 7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.m.). 915
1567 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 3. 916 7/29/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik; 917 7/29/16
1568 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik. 918 7/31/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik. 919
1569 7/31/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik. Investigative Technique 92? Kilimnik 8/2/16
1570 CBP Record; Call Records of Konstantin Kilimnik -; Call Records of Rick Gates ;
1571 8/2-3/16, Kilimnik Park Lane Hotel Receipt. 921 Deripaska' s private plane also
1572 flew to Teterboro Airport in New Jersey on the evening of August 2, 2016.
1573 According to Customs and Border Protection records, the only passengers on the
1574 plane were Deripaska's wife, daughter, mother, and father-in-law, and separate
1575 records obtained by our Office confirm that Kilimnik flew on a commercial flight
1576 to New York. 922 The Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics, which are located
1577 in the Donbas region of Ukraine, declared themselves independent in response to
1578 the popular unrest in 2014 that removed President Yanukovych from power. Pro-
1579 Russian Ukrainian militia forces, with backing from the Russian military, have
1580 occupied the region since 2014. Under the Yanukovych-backed plan, Russia would
1581 assist in withdrawing the military, and Donbas would become an autonomous region
1582 within Ukraine with its own 139
1583
1584RESULT: 34
1585
1586PAGE: 147
1587
1588TEXT:
1589
1590 U.S. Department of Justice Attomey Work Pt1oduet // Mtty Cottt:ttttt Mttt:erittl
1591 Pfet:eet:ed Uttdet' Fed. R. Ct'iffl. P. 6(e) and having Yanukovych, the
1592 Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to head that republic.923 That plan,
1593 Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a "backdoor" means for Russia to
1594 control eastern Ukraine.924 Manafort initially said that, if he had not cut off
1595 the discussion, Kilimnik would have asked Manafort in the August 2 meeting to
1596 convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace plan, and Yanukovych would have
1597 expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and Ukraine to support the
1598 plan.925 Manafort also initially told the Office that he had said to Kilimnik
1599 that the plan was crazy, that the discussion ended, and that he did not recall
1600 Kilimnik askin Manafort to reconsider the Ian after their Au ust 2 meetin .926
1601 Manafort said that he reacted negatively to Yanukovych sending-years later-an
1602 "urgent" request when Yanukovych needed him.927 When confronted with an email
1603 written by Kilimnik on or about December 8, 2016, however, Manafort acknowledged
1604 Kilimnik raised the peace plan again in that email.928 Manafort ultimately
1605 acknowled ed Kilimnik also raised the eace Ian in ~ary 2017 meetings with
1606 Manafort .......... 929 Second, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the state of the
1607 Trump Campaign and Manafort's plan to win the election.930 That briefing
1608 encompassed the Campaign's messaging and its internal polling data. According to
1609 Gates, it also included discussion of "battleground" states, which Manafort
1610 identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.931 Manafort did
1611 not refer ex licit! to "battle round" states in his tellin of the Au ust 2
1612 discussion, prime minister. The plan emphasized that Yanukovych would be an
1613 ideal candidate to bring peace to the region as prime minister of the republic,
1614 and facilitate the reintegration of the re~aine with the support of the U.S. and
1615 Russian presidents. As noted above, according to the written documentation
1616 describin the Ian, for the lan to work, both U.S. and Russian support were
1617 necessary. 925 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 4. 926 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4. 927
1618 302, at 4. 928 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4; 2/21/18 Email, Manafort, Ward, &
1619 Fabrizio, at 3-5. Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/12/18 Investigative
1620 Technique 929 Documentary evidence confirms the peace-plan discus~ions in 2018.
1621 2/19/18 Email, Fabrizio to Ward (forwarding email from Manafort); 2/21/18 Email,
1622 Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio. 930 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5. 931 Gates 1/30/18
1623 302, at 3, 5. 932 140
1624
1625RESULT: 35
1626
1627PAGE: 148
1628
1629TEXT:
1630
1631 U.S. Department of Justice Attoft'le'.y" Wofk Prodttet // Mfl')1 Cotttaitt
1632 Material Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Third, according to Gates and
1633 what Kilimnik told Patten, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed two sets of financial
1634 disputes related to Mana fort's previous work in the region. Those consisted of
1635 the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the Opposition Bloc owed to
1636 Manafort for his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to
1637 obtain payment.933 After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both. stated that they
1638 left separately from Kilimnik because they knew the media was tracking Manafort
1639 and wanted to avoid media reporting on his connections to Kilimnik.934 c. Post-
1640 Resignation Activities Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August
1641 2016, approximately two weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst
1642 negative media reporting about his political consulting work for the pro-Russian
1643 Party of Regions in Ukraine. Despite his resignation, Manafort continued to
1644 offer advice to various Campaign officials through the November election.
1645 Manafort told Gates that he still spoke with Kushner, Bannon, and candidate
1646 Trump,935 and some of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails.
1647 For example, on October 21, 2016, Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a
1648 strategy memorandum proposing that the Campaign make the case against Clinton
1649 "as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment" and that "Wikileaks
1650 provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible way
1651 -by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members."936
1652 Later, in a November 5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled "Securing the Victory,"
1653 Manafort stated that he was "really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday
1654 and focusing on preserving the victory," and that he was concerned the Clinton
1655 Campaign would respond to a loss by "mov[ing] immediately to discredit the
1656 [Trump] victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-fraud, including the claim that
1657 the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the
1658 results."937 Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Manafort told the
1659 Office that, in the wake of Trump's victory, he was not interested in an
1660 Administration job. Manafort instead preferred to stay on the "outside," and
1661 monetize his campaign position to generate business given his familiarity and
1662 relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration.938 Manafort appeared to
1663 follow that plan, as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan,
1664 and China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entaii.939
1665 Manafort' s activities in early 2017 included meetings relating to Ukraine and
1666 Russia. The 933 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 2-4; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 7. 934 Gates
1667 1/30/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5. 935 Gates 2/12/18 302, at 12. 936
1668 NOSC000215 l 7-20 (10/21/16 Email, Manafo11 to Kushner). 937 NOSC00021573-75
1669 (11/5/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner). 938 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1, 4-5; Gates
1670 1/30/18 302, at 4. 939 Manafo11 9/12/18 302, at 1. 141
1671
1672RESULT: 36
1673
1674PAGE: 149
1675
1676TEXT:
1677
1678 U.S. Department of Justice Atterney Werk Predttet // May Centain Material
1679 Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) first meeting, which took place in Madrid,
1680 Spain in January 2017, was with Georgiy Oganov. Oganov, who had previously
1681 worked at the Russian Embassy in the United States, was a senior executive at a
1682 Deripaska company and was believed to report directly to Deripaska.940 Manafort
1683 initially denied attending the meeting. When he later acknowledged it, he
1684 claimed that the meeting had been arranged by his lawyers and concerned only the
1685 Pericles lawsuit.941 Other evidence, however, provides reason to doubt
1686 Manafort's statement that the sole topic of the meeting was the Pericles
1687 lawsuit. In particular, text messages to Manafort from a number associated with
1688 Kilimnik suggest that Kilimnik and Boyarkin-not Manafort's counsel-had arranged
1689 the meeting between Manafort and Oganov.942 Kilimnik's message states that the
1690 meeting was supposed to be "not about money or Pericles" but instead "about
1691 recreating [the] old friendship"-ostensibly between Manafort and Deripaska-"and
1692 talking about global politics."943 Manafort also replied by text that he
1693 "need[s] this finished before Jan. 20,"944 which appears to be a reference to
1694 resolving Pericles before the inauguration. On January 15, 2017, three days
1695 after his return from Madrid, Manafort emailed K.T. McFarland, who was at that
1696 time designated to be Deputy National Security Advisor and was formally
1697 appointed to that position on January 20, 2017.945 Manafort's January 15 email
1698 to McFarland stated: "I have some important information I want to share that I
1699 picked up on my travels over the last month."946 Manafort told the Office that
1700 the email referred to an issue regarding Cuba, not Russia or Ukraine, and
1701 Manafort had traveled to Cuba in the past month.947 Either way, McFarland-who
1702 was advised by Flynn not to respond to the Manafort appears not to have
1703 responded to Manafort. 948 Manafort told the Office that around the time of the
1704 Presidential Inauguration in January, he met with Kilimnik and Ukrainian
1705 oligarch Serhiy Lyovochkin at the Westin Hotel in Alexandria, Virginia.949
1706 During this meeting, Kilimnik again discussed the Y anukovych peace plan that he
1707 had broached at the August 2 meeting and in a detailed December 8, 2016 message
1708 found in Kilimnik' s DMP email account.950 In that December 8 email, which
1709 Manafort 94? Kalashnikova 5/17/18 302, at 4; Gary Lee, Soviet Embassy's Identity
1710 Crisis, Washington Post (Dec. 20, 1991); Georgy S. Oganov Executive Profile &
1711 Biography, Bloomberg (Mar. 12, 2019). 941 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7. 942 Text
1712 Message, Manafort & Kilimnik. 943 Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik; Manafort
1713 9/12/18 302, at 5. 944 Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik. 945 1/15/17 Email,
1714 Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn. 946 1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn.
1715 947 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7. 948 1 /15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, &
1716 Flynn; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18-19. 949 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7;
1717 Manafort 9/21/18 302, at 3; 1/19/17 & 1/22/17 Kilimnik CBP Records, Jan. 19 and
1718 22, 2017; 2016-17 Text Messages, Kilimnik & Patten, at 1-2. 950 Investigative
1719 Technique 142
1720
1721RESULT: 37
1722
1723PAGE: 150
1724
1725TEXT:
1726
1727 U.S. Department of Justice At:1:1.'lrttey ',l/1.'lrk Prl.'ldttet /,' Ma;?
1728 C8tttaitt Material Prl.'lteeted Uttder Fed. R. Ct?iffl. P. 6(e) acknowledged
1729 having read,951 Kilimnik wrote, "[a]ll that is required to stait the process is
1730 a very minor 'wink' (or slight push) from DT"-an apparent reference to
1731 President-elect Trump-"and a decision to authorize you to be a 'special
1732 representative' and manage this process." Kilimnik assured Manafort, with that
1733 authority, he "could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia [Y
1734 anukovych] guarantees your reception at the very top level," and that "DT could
1735 have peace in Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration."952 On
1736 February 26, 2017, Manafort met Kilimnik in Madrid, where Kilimnik had flown
1737 from Moscow.956 In his first two interviews with the Office, Manafort denied
1738 meeting with Kilimnik on his Madrid trip and then-after being confronted with
1739 documentary evidence that Kilimnik was in Madrid at the same time as him-
1740 recognized that he met him in Madrid. Manafort said that Kilimnik had updated
1741 him on a criminal investigation into so-called "black ledger" payments to
1742 Manafort that was bein conducted b Ukraine's National Anti-Corru tion Bureau.957
1743 Manafort remained in contact with Kilimnik throughout 2017 and into the spring
1744 of 2018. 951 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6; 952 Investigative Technique 956 2/21
1745 /17 Email, Zatynaiko to Kilimnik. 957 Manafort 9/13/18 302, at I. 958 In
1746 resolving whether Manafort breached his cooperation plea agreement by lying to
1747 the Office, the district court found that Manafort lied about, among other
1748 things, his contacts with Kilimnik regarding the peace plan, including the
1749 meeting in Madrid. Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript, at 29-31, 40. 143
1750
1751RESULT: 38
1752
1753PAGE: 151
1754
1755TEXT:
1756
1757 U.S. Department of Justice Att:orttey Work Prot:l:ttet // May CoHtaifl Material
1758 Proteetet:l: UAt:l:er Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Those contacts included matters
1759 pertaining to the criminal charges brought by the Office,959 and the Ukraine
1760 peace plan. In early 2018, Manafort retained his longtime polling firm to craft
1761 a draft poll in Ukraine, sent the pollsters a three-page primer on the plan sent
1762 by Kilimnik, and worked with Kilimnik to formulate the polling questions.960 The
1763 primer sent to the pollsters specifically called for the United States and
1764 President Trump to support the Autonomous Republic of Donbas with Yanukovych as
1765 Prime Minister,961 and a series of questions in the draft poll asked for
1766 opinions on Yanukovych's role in resolving the conflict in Donbas.962 (The poll
1767 was not solely about Donbas; it also sought participants' views on leaders apart
1768 from Yanukovych as they pertained to the 2019 Ukraine presidential election.)
1769 The Office has not uncovered evidence that Manafort brought the Ukraine peace
1770 plan to the attention of the Trump Campaign or the Trump Administration.
1771 Kilimnik continued his efforts to promote the peace plan to the Executive Branch
1772 (e.g., U.S. Department of State) into the summer of 2018.963 B. Post-Election
1773 and Transition-Period Contacts Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016.
1774 Beginning immediately after the election, individuals connected to the Russian
1775 government started contacting officials on the Trump Campaign and Transition
1776 Team through multiple channels-sometimes through Russian Ambassador Kislyak and
1777 at other times through individuals who sought reliable contacts through U.S.
1778 persons not formally tied to the Campaign or Transition Team. The most senior
1779 levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts. The investigation did
1780 not establish that these efforts reflected or constituted coordination between
1781 the Trump Campaign and Russia in its interference activities. 1. Immediate Post-
1782 Election Activity As soon as news broke that Trump had been elected President,
1783 Russian government officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to
1784 make inroads into the new Administration. They appeared not to have preexisting
1785 contacts and struggled to connect with senior officials around the President-
1786 Elect. As explained below, those efforts entailed both official contact through
1787 the Russian Embassy in the United States and outreaches-sanctioned at high
1788 levels of the Russian government-through business rather than political
1789 contacts. 959 Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify, at 2; Superseding
1790 Indictment ,r,r 48-51, United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., 1: 17-cr-201
1791 (D.D.C. June 8, 2018), Doc. 318. 960 2/12/18 Email, Fabrizio to Manafort & Ward;
1792 2/16/18 Email, Fabrizio to Manafort; 2/19/18 Email, Fabrizio to Ward; 2/21/18
1793 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio. 961 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward &
1794 Fabrizio (7:16:49 a.m.) (attachment). 962 3/9/18 Email, Ward to Manafort &
1795 Fabrizio (attachment). 144
1796
1797RESULT: 39
1798
1799PAGE: 173
1800
1801TEXT:
1802
1803 U.S. Department of Justice Attorney 1Nork Prodttet // May Contain Material
1804 Proteeted Unael' Fea. R. Cri:ffl. P. 6(e) According to A ven, the official
1805 showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear to care.1I94 6.
1806 Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich In December
1807 2016, more than two months after he was removed from the Trump Campaign, former
1808 Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Pa e a ain visited Moscow in an attem t
1809 to ursue business o ortunities.II95 According to Konstantin Kilimnik, Paul
1810 Manafort' s associate, Page also gave some individuals in Russia the impression
1811 that he had maintained his connections to President-Elect Trump. In a December
1812 8, 2016 email intended for Manafort, Kilimnik wrote, "Carter Page is in Moscow
1813 today, sending messages he is authorized to talk to Russia on behalf of DT on a
1814 range of issues of mutual interest, including Ukraine."1197 On December 9, 2016,
1815 Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and Andrej Krickovic.I198
1816 Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town and to
1817 invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and Dvorkovich came to
1818 the restaurant for a few minutes to meet with Page.1I99 Dvorkovich congratulated
1819 Page on Trump's election and expressed interest in starting a dialogue between
1820 the United States and Russia.1200 Dvorkovich asked Page if he could facilitate
1821 connecting Dvorkovich with individuals involved in the transition to be in a
1822 discussion of future coo eration.1201 1194 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8; 1195 Page
1823 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; Among other meetings, Page contacted
1824 Andrey Baranov, head of investor relations at Rosneft,~ the sale of Rosneft and
1825 meetings Baranov had attended with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin. ----1197
1826 Investigative Technique 1198 Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 8.
1827 1199 Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; 1200 Page 3/16/17 302, at
1828 3; 1202 1203 166
1829
1830RESULT: 40
1831
1832PAGE: 187
1833
1834TEXT:
1835
1836 U.S. Department of Justice Atterney Werk Predttet // May CeHtain Material
1837 Preteeted Under Fee. R:. Criffl. P. 6(e) C. Russian Government Outreach and
1838 Contacts As explained in Section IV above, the Office's investigation uncovered
1839 evidence of numerous links (i.e., contacts) between Trump Campaign officials and
1840 individuals having or claiming to have ties to the Russian government. The
1841 Office evaluated the contacts under several sets of federal laws, including
1842 conspiracy laws and statutes governing foreign agents who operate in the United
1843 States. After considering the available evidence, the Office did not pursue
1844 charges under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in Section
1845 IV above-with the exception of FARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard
1846 Gates based on their activities on behalf of Ukraine. One of the interactions
1847 between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated the June 9, 2016 meeting
1848 between high-ranking campaign officials and Russians promising derogatory
1849 information on Hillary Clinton-implicates an additional body of law:
1850 campaignfinance statutes. Schemes involving the solicitation or receipt of
1851 assistance from foreign sources raise difficult statutory and constitutional
1852 questions. As ex lained below, the Office evaluated those questions in
1853 connection with the June 9 meeting The Office ultimately concluded that, even if
1854 the principal legal questions were resolved favorably to the government, a
1855 prosecution would encounter difficulties proving that Campaign officials or
1856 individuals connected to the Campaign willfully violated the law. Finally,
1857 although the evidence of contacts between Campaign officials and
1858 Russiaaffiliated individuals may not have been sufficient to establish or
1859 sustain criminal charges, several U.S. persons connected to the Campaign made
1860 false statements about those contacts and took other steps to obstruct the
1861 Office's investigation and those of Congress. This Office has therefore charged
1862 some of those individuals with making false statements and obstructing justice.
1863 1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion As an initial matter, this
1864 Office evaluated potentially criminal conduct that involved the collective
1865 action of multiple individuals not under the rubric of "collusion," but through
1866 the lens of conspiracy law. In so doing, the Office recognized that the word
1867 "collud[ e ]" appears in the Acting Attorney General's August 2, 2017
1868 memorandum; it has frequently been invoked in public reporting; and it is
1869 sometimes referenced in antitrust law, see, e.g., Brooke Group v. Brown &
1870 Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). But collusion is not a
1871 specific offense or theory of liability found in the U.S. Code; nor is it a term
1872 of art in federal criminal law. To the contrary, even as defined in legal
1873 dictionaries, collusion is largely synonymous with conspiracy as that crime is
1874 set forth in the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. ? 371. See
1875 Black's Law Dictionary 321 (10th ed. 2014) (collusion is "[a]n agreement to
1876 defraud another or to do or obtain something forbidden by law"); 1 Alexander
1877 Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 311 (1871) ("An agreement between two or
1878 more persons to defraud another by the forms of law, or to employ such forms as
1879 means of accomplishing some unlawful object."); 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary 352
1880 180
1881
1882RESULT: 41
1883
1884PAGE: 189
1885
1886TEXT:
1887
1888 U.S. Department of Justice Aft:emey Werk Predt1et // Mity Cetttaitt Material
1889 Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) The crime defined by Section 951 is
1890 complete upon knowingly acting in the United States as an unregistered foreign-
1891 government agent. 18 U.S.C. ? 95l(a). The statute does not require willfulness,
1892 and knowledge of the notification requirement is not an element of the offense.
1893 United States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 998-99 (11th Cir. 2008); Duran, 596 F.3d
1894 at 1291-94; Dumeisi, 424 F.3d at 581. The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)
1895 generally makes it illegal to act as an agent of a foreign principal by engaging
1896 in certain (largely political) activities in the United States without
1897 registering with the Attorney General. 22 U.S.C. ?? 611-621. The triggering
1898 agency relationship must be with a foreign principal or "a person any of whose
1899 activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled,
1900 financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal." 22
1901 U.S.C. ? 61 l(c)(l). That includes a foreign government or political party and
1902 various foreign individuals and entities. 22 U.S.C. ? 611(6). A covered
1903 relationship exists if a person "acts as an agent, representative, employee, or
1904 servant" or "in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the [foreign
1905 principal's] direction or control." 22 U.S.C. ? 61 l(c)(l). It is sufficient if
1906 the person "agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds
1907 himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent
1908 of a foreign principal." 22 U.S.C. ? 61 l(c)(2). The triggering activity is that
1909 the agent "directly or through any other person" in the United States (1)
1910 engages in "political activities for or in the interests of [the] foreign
1911 principal," which includes attempts to influence federal officials or the
1912 public; (2) acts as "public relations counsel, publicity agent, information-
1913 service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign
1914 principal"; (3) "solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions,
1915 loans, money, or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign
1916 principal"; or ( 4) "represents the interests of such foreign principal" before
1917 any federal agency or official. 22 U .S.C. ? 611 ( c )(1 ). It is a crime to
1918 engage in a"[ w ]illful violation of any provision of the Act or any regulation
1919 thereunder." 22 U.S.C. ? 618(a)(l). It is also a crime willfully to make false
1920 statements or omissions of material facts in FARA registration statements or
1921 supplements. 22 U.S.C. ? 618(a)(2). Most violations have a maximum penalty of
1922 five years of imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 22 U.S.C. ? 618. b. Application
1923 The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that Paul Manafort's and Richard
1924 Oates's pre-campaign work for the government of Ukraine violated FARA. Manafort
1925 and Gates were charged for that conduct and admitted to it when they pleaded
1926 guilty to superseding criminal informations in the District of Columbia
1927 prosecution.1280 The evidence underlying those charges is not addressed in this
1928 report because it was discussed in public court documents and in a separate 1280
1929 Gates Superseding Criminal Information; Waiver of Indictment, United States v.
1930 Richard W Gates III, 1: 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 203; Waiver of
1931 Trial by Jury, United States v. Richard W Gates III, l:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.
1932 23, 2018), Doc. 204; Gates Plea Agreement; Statement of Offense, United States
1933 v. Richard W Gates III, l:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 206; Plea
1934 Agreement, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1 :17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept.
1935 14, 2018), Doc. 422; Statement of Offense, United States v. Paul J. Manafort,
1936 Jr., 1: l 7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 423. 182
1937
1938RESULT: 42
1939
1940PAGE: 190
1941
1942TEXT:
1943
1944 U.S. Department of Justice AtterRe:,? Werk Predttet // Mtt:,? CeRtttiR
1945 Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Criffl. P. e(e) prosecution memorandum
1946 submitted to the Acting Attorney General before the original indictment in that
1947 case. In addition, the investigation produced evidence of FARA violations
1948 involving Michael Flynn. Those potential violations, however, concerned a
1949 country other than Russia (i.e., Turkey) and were resolved when Flynn admitted
1950 to the underlying facts in the Statement of Offense that accompanied his guilty
1951 plea to a false-statements charge. Statement of Offense, United States v.
1952 Michael T Flynn, No. l:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 4 ("Flynn Statement
1953 of Offense").1281 The investigation did not, however, yield evidence sufficient
1954 to sustain any charge that any individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign
1955 acted as an agent of a foreign principal within the meaning of FARA or, in terms
1956 of Section 951, subject to the direction or control of the government of Russia,
1957 or any official thereof. In particular, the Office did not find evidence likely
1958 to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Campaign officials such as Paul
1959 Manafort, George Papadopoulos, and Carter Page acted as agents of the Russian
1960 overnrnent-or at its direction control, or re uest-durin the relevant time
1961 eriod.1282 As a result, the Office did not charge any other Trump Campaign
1962 official with violating FARA or Section 951, or attempting or conspiring to do
1963 so, based on contacts with the Russian government or a Russian principal.
1964 Finally, the Office investigated whether one of the above campaign advisors-
1965 George Papadopoulos-acted as an agent of, or at the direction and control of,
1966 the government of Israel. While the investigation revealed significant ties
1967 between Papadopoulos and Israel (and search warrants were obtained in part on
1968 that basis), the Office ultimately determined that the evidence was not
1969 sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction under FARA or Section 951. 3.
1970 Campaign Finance Several areas of the Office's investigation involved efforts or
1971 offers by foreign nationals to provide negative information about candidate
1972 Clinton to the Trump Campaign or to distribute that information to the public,
1973 to the anticipated benefit of the Campaign. As explained below, the Office
1974 considered whether two of those efforts in particular-the June 9, 2016 meeting
1975 at Trump 1282 On four occasions, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
1976 (FISC) issued warrants based on a finding of probable cause to believe that Page
1977 was an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. ?? 1801 (b ), 1805(a)(2)(A). The
1978 FISC's probable-cause finding was based on a different (and lower) standard than
1979 the one governing the Office's decision whether to bring charges against Page,
1980 which is whether admissible evidence would likely be sufficient to prove beyond
1981 a reasonable doubt that Page acted as an agent of the Russian Federation during
1982 the period at issue. Cf United States v. Cardoza, 713 F.3d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir.
1983 2013) ( explaining that probable cause requires only "a fair probability," and
1984 not "certainty, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or proof by a preponderance
1985 of the evidence"). 183
1986
1987RESULT: 43
1988
1989PAGE: 192
1990
1991TEXT:
1992
1993 U.S. Department of Justice JMeme)? Werk Predttet ,',' May Cefltatfl Material
1994 Preteeted Uflcler Fecl. R. Crtffl. P. 6(e) outside of the U.S. who are not legal
1995 permanent residents, and certain non-U.S. entities located outside of the U.S. ?
1996 A and willful[]" violation involving an aggregate of $25,000 or more in a
1997 calendar year is a felony. 52 U.S.C. ? 30109(d)(l)(A)(i); see Bluman, 800 F.
1998 Supp. 2d at 292 (noting that a willful violation will require some "proof of the
1999 defendant's knowledge of the law"); United States v. Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d
2000 573, 577 (E.D. Va. 2013) (applying willfulness standard drawn from Bryan v.
2001 United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998)); see also Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1,
2002 19 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en bane) (same). A "knowing[] and willful[]" violation
2003 involving an aggregate of $2,000 or more in a calendar year, but less than
2004 $25,000, is a misdemeanor. 52 U.S.C. ? 30109(d)(l)(A)(ii). b. Application to
2005 June 9 Trump Tower Meeting The Office considered whether to charge Trump
2006 Campaign officials with crimes in connection with the June 9 meeting described
2007 in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra. The Office concluded that, in light of the
2008 government's substantial burden of proof on issues of intent ("knowing" and
2009 "willful"), and the difficulty of establishing the value of the offered
2010 information, criminal charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that
2011 "the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a
2012 conviction." Justice Manual? 9-27.220. In brief, the key facts are that, on June
2013 3, 2016, Robert Goldstone emailed Donald Trump Jr., to pass along from Emin and
2014 Aras Agalarov an "offer" from Russia's "Crown prosecutor" to "the Trump
2015 campaign" of "official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary
2016 and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to [Trump Jr.'s] father."
2017 The email described this as "very high level and sensitive information" that is
2018 "part of Russia and its government's support to Mr. Trump-helped along by Aras
2019 and Emin." Trump Jr. responded: "if it's what you say I love it especially later
2020 in the summer." Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had follow-up conversations and,
2021 within days, scheduled a meeting with Russian representatives that was attended
2022 by Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner. The communications setting up the meeting
2023 and the attendance by high-level Campaign representatives support an inference
2024 that the Campaign anticipated receiving derogatory documents and information
2025 from official Russian sources that could assist candidate Trump's electoral
2026 prospects. This series of events could implicate the federal election-law ban on
2027 contributions and donations by foreign nationals, 52 U.S.C. ? 3012 l(a)(l )(A).
2028 Specifically, Goldstone passed along an offer purportedly from a Russian
2029 government official to provide "official documents and information" to the Trump
2030 Campaign for the purposes of influencing the presidential election. Trump Jr.
2031 appears to have accepted that offer and to have arranged a meeting to receive
2032 those materials. Documentary evidence in the form of email chains supports the
2033 inference that Kushner and Mana fort were aware of that purpose and attended the
2034 June 9 meeting anticipating the receipt of helpful information to the Campaign
2035 from Russian sources. The Office considered whether this evidence would
2036 establish a conspiracy to violate the foreign contributions ban, in violation of
2037 18 U.S.C. ? 371; the solicitation of an illegal foreignsource contribution; or
2038 the acceptance or receipt of "an express or implied promise to make a 185
2039
2040RESULT: 44
2041
2042PAGE: 195
2043
2044TEXT:
2045
2046 U.S. Department of Justice Attorney Work Prod1:1et // Ma,? Cmnain Material
2047 Proteeted Under Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) did not believe his response to the
2048 offer and the June 9 meeting itself violated the law. Given his less direct
2049 involvement in arranging the June 9 meeting, Kushner could likely mount a
2050 similar defense. And, while Manafort is experienced with political campaigns,
2051 the Office has not developed evidence showing that he had relevant knowledge of
2052 these legal issues. iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information The Office
2053 would also encounter difficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the value
2054 of the promised documents and information exceeds the $2,000 threshold for a
2055 criminal violation, as well as the $25,000 threshold for felony punishment. See
2056 52 U.S.C. ? 30109(d)(l). The type of evidence commonly used to establish the
2057 value of non-monetary contributions-such as pricing the contribution on a
2058 commercial market or determining the upstream acquisition cost or the cost of
2059 distribution-would likely be unavailable or ineffective in this factual setting.
2060 Although damaging opposition research is surely valuable to a campaign, it
2061 appears that the information ultimately delivered in the meeting was not
2062 valuable. And while value in a conspiracy may well be measured by what the
2063 participants expected to receive at the time of the agreement, see, e.g., United
2064 States v. Tombrello, 666 F.2d 485,489 (11th Cir. 1982), Goldstone's description
2065 of the offered material here was quite general. His suggestion of the
2066 information's value-i.e., that it would "incriminate Hillary" and "would be very
2067 useful to [Trump Jr.'s] father"-was specific and may have been understood as
2068 being of uncertain worth or reliability, given Goldstone's lack of direct access
2069 to the original source. The uncertainty over what would be delivered could be
2070 reflected in Trump Jr.'s response ("if it's what you say I love it") (emphasis
2071 added). Accordingly, taking into account the high burden to establish a culpable
2072 mental state in a campaign-finance prosecution and the difficulty in
2073 establishing the required valuation, the Office decided not to pursue criminal
2074 campaign-finance charges against Trump Jr. or other campaign officials for the
2075 events culminating in the June 9 meeting. c. Application to Harm to Ongoing
2076 Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 188
2077
2078RESULT: 45
2079
2080PAGE: 210
2081
2082TEXT:
2083
2084 U.S. Department of Justice At:t:ol'tte~? Wol'k Pl'oe:lttet // May Cotttaitt
2085 Material Pl'oteeteti Utte:le!' Fee:I. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) I. The President Orders
2086 McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel ............
2087 ................................................................................
2088 .............. 113 1. .The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the
2089 Special Counsel... .......... 113 2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute
2090 the Press Reports ..................... 114 J. The President's Conduct Towards
2091 Flynn, Manafort,litlllll ????? ........................... 120 1. Conduct
2092 Directed at Michael Flynn
2093 .................................................................... 120 2.
2094 Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort
2095 ..................................................................... 122 3.
2096 Harm to Ongoing Matter ????????????????????????????????????
2097 ................................... 128 K. The President's Conduct Involving
2098 Michael Cohen .................................................. 134 l.
2099 Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow Project
2100 ................................................................................
2101 .................. 134 2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a "Party Line"
2102 Distancing Candidate Trump From Russia .........................................
2103 ................................................... 138 3. Cohen Submits False
2104 Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump Tower Moscow Project in Accordance
2105 with the Party Line ............................... 139 4. The President Sends
2106 Messages of Support to Cohen .......................................... 144 5.
2107 The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Government. .....
2108 ................................................................................
2109 ................... 148 L. Overarching Factual Issues ..........................
2110 .............................................................. 156 III. LEGAL
2111 DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To THE PRESIDENT
2112 ................................................................................
2113 ............................................ 159 A. Statutory Defenses to the
2114 Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions to the Conduct Under
2115 Investigation
2116 ........................................................................... 160
2117 1. The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive Acts ..
2118 ................................................................................
2119 ................................ 160 2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad
2120 Reading of Section 1512( c )(2) .................. 162 3. The Legislative
2121 History of Section 1512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing Its Text. .............
2122 ................................................................................
2123 ................. 164 4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not
2124 Suggest That Section 1512( c )(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this
2125 Investigation .......................... 165 5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might
2126 Apply to the Conduct in this Investigation .....................................
2127 ................................................................... 167 B.
2128 Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to
2129 Presidential Conduct ...........................................................
2130 ....................................... 168 1. The Requirement of a Clear
2131 Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential Conduct Does Not Limit the
2132 Obstruction Statutes ............................................. 169 iii
2133
2134RESULT: 46
2135
2136PAGE: 217
2137
2138TEXT:
2139
2140 U.S. Department of Justice Attot1Aey Wot1k Protittet // Muy CoHtuiA Muteriul
2141 Proteeteti UAtiet' Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) have the Special Counsel removed in
2142 June 2017 and that McGahn had threatened to resign rather than carry out the
2143 order. The President reacted to the news stories by directing White House
2144 officials to tell McGahn to dispute the story and create a record stating he had
2145 not been ordered to have the Special Counsel removed. McGahn told those
2146 officials that the media reports were accurate in stating that the President had
2147 directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed. The President then met with
2148 McGahn in the Oval Office and again pressured him to deny the reports. In the
2149 same meeting, the President also asked McGahn why he had told the Special
2150 Counsel about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel and why
2151 McGahn took notes of his conversations with the President. McGahn refused to
2152 back away from what he remembered happening and perceived the President to be
2153 testing his mettle. Conduct towards Flynn, Manafort,~. After Flynn withdrew from
2154 a joint defense agreement with the President and began cooperating with the
2155 government, the President's personal counsel left a message for Flynn's
2156 attorneys reminding them of the President's warm feelings towards Flynn, which
2157 he said "still remains," and asking for a "heads up" if Flynn knew "information
2158 that implicates the President." When Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could
2159 no longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, the
2160 President's personal counsel said he would make sure that the President knew
2161 that Flynn's actions reflected "hostility" towards the President. During
2162 Manafort's prosecution and when the jury in his criminal. trial was
2163 deliberating, the President praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was
2164 being treated unfairly, and declined to rule out a pardon. After Manafort was
2165 convicted, the President called Manafort "a brave man" for refusin to "break"
2166 and said that "fli in " "almost ou ht to be Conduct involving Michael Cohen. The
2167 President's conduct towards Michael Cohen, a former Trump Organization
2168 executive, changed from praise for Cohen when he falsely minimized the
2169 President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project, to castigation of
2170 Cohen when he became a cooperating witness. From September 2015 to June 2016,
2171 Cohen had pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump
2172 Organization and had briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times,
2173 including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal.
2174 In 2017, Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project, including
2175 stating that he had only briefed Trump on the project three times and never
2176 discussed travel to Russia with him, in an effort to adhere to a "party line"
2177 that Cohen said was developed to minimize the President's connections to Russia.
2178 While preparing for his congressional testimony, Cohen had extensive discussions
2179 with the President's personal counsel, who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen
2180 should "stay on message" and not contradict the President. After the FBI
2181 searched Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the President publicly asserted
2182 that Cohen would not "flip," contacted him directly to tell him to "stay
2183 strong," and privately passed messages of support to him. Cohen also discussed
2184 pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on
2185 message he would be taken care of. But after Cohen began cooperating with the
2186 government in the summer of 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called
2187 him a "rat," and suggested that his family members had committed crimes. 6
2188
2189RESULT: 47
2190
2191PAGE: 227
2192
2193TEXT:
2194
2195 U.S. Department of Justice Attorfte~? Work Proattet // May CoHtaiH Material
2196 Pt1oteetea Uftaer Fee. R. Ct1im. P. 6(e) 1. Press Reports Allege Links Between
2197 the Trump Campaign and Russia On June 16, 2015, Donald J. Trump declared his
2198 intent to seek nomination as the Republican candidate for President.9 By early
2199 2016, he distinguished himself among Republican candidates by speaking of closer
2200 ties with Russia, 10 saying he would get along well with Russian President
2201 Vladimir Putin, 11 questioning whether the NATO alliance was obsolete, 12 and
2202 praising Putin as a "strong leader."13 The press reported that Russian political
2203 analysts and commentators perceived Trump as favorable.to Russia.14 Beginning in
2204 February 2016 and continuing through the summer, the media reported that several
2205 Trump campaign advisors appeared to have ties to Russia. For example, the press
2206 reported that campaign advisor Michael Flynn was seated next to Vladimir Putin
2207 at an RT gala in Moscow in December 2015 and that Flynn had appeared regularly
2208 on RT as an analyst.15 The press also reported that foreign policy advisor
2209 Carter Page had ties to a Russian state-run gas company, 16 and that campaign
2210 chairman Paul Manafort had done work for the "Russian-backed former Ukrainian
2211 president Viktor Yanukovych."17 In addition, the press raised questions during
2212 the Republican 9 @realDonaldTrump 6/16/15 (11 :57 a.m. ET) Tweet. 10 See, e.g.,
2213 Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec. 20, 2015) (Trump: "I
2214 think it would be a positive thing if Russia and the United States actually got
2215 along"); Presidential Candidate Donald Trump News Conference, Hanahan, South
2216 Carolina, C-SPAN (Feb. 15, 2016) ("You want to make a good deal for the country,
2217 you want to deal with Russia."). 11 See, e.g., Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN
2218 (July 8, 2015) ("I think I get along with [Putin] fine."); Andrew Rafferty,
2219 Trump Says He Would "Get Along Very Well" With Putin, NBC (July 30, 2015).
2220 (quoting Trump as saying, "I think I would get along very well with Vladimir
2221 Putin."). 12 See, e.g.,@realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16 (7:47 a.m. ET);
2222 @realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16 (7:59 a.m. ET). 13 See, e.g., Meet the Press
2223 Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec. 20, 2015) ("[Putin] is a strong
2224 leader. What am I gonna say, he's a weak leader? He's making mincemeat out of
2225 our President."); Donald Trump Campaign Rally in Vandalia, Ohio, C-SPAN (Mar.
2226 12, 2016) ("I said [Putin] was a strong leader, which he is. I mean, he might be
2227 bad, he might be good. But he's a strong leader."). 14 See, e.g., Andrew Osborn,
2228 From Russia with love: why the Kremlin backs Trump, Reuters (Mar. 24, 2016);
2229 Robert Zubrin, Trump: The Kremlin's Candidate, National Review (Apr. 4, 2016).
2230 15 See, e.g., Mark Hosenball & Steve Holland, Trump being advised by ex-US.
2231 Lieutenant General who favors closer Russia ties, Reuters (Feb. 26, 2016); Tom
2232 Hamburger et al., Inside Trump's financial ties to Russia and his unusual
2233 flattery of Vladimir Putin, Washington Post (June 17, 2016). Certain matters
2234 pertaining to Flynn are described in Volume I, Section TV.B.7, supra. 16 See,
2235 e.g., Zachary Mider, Trump's New Russia Advisor Has Deep Ties to Kremlin's
2236 Gazprom, Bloomberg (Mar. 30, 2016); Julia Iofee, Who is Carter Page?, Politico
2237 (Sep. 23, 2016). Certain matters pertaining to Page are described in Volume l,
2238 Section IV.A.3, supra. 17 Tracy Wilkinson, In a shift, Republican platform
2239 doesn't call for arming Ukraine against Russia, spurring outrage, Los Angeles
2240 Times (July 21, 2016); Josh Ragin, Trump campaign guts GOP 's aRussia stance on
2241 Ukraine, Washington Post (July 18, 2016). 16
2242
2243RESULT: 48
2244
2245PAGE: 229
2246
2247TEXT:
2248
2249 U.S. Department of Justice Attef'Re~? Wef'k Pl'etittet // May CeRtaiR Material
2250 Preteetetl UReef" Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) and Harm to Ongoing Matter 26 oke to
2251 Trump~;;;;~;~;~;;~;.,;~; ; Manafort recalled that Trump responded that Manafort
2252 should keep Trump u~ty campaign manager Rick Gates said that Man~ssure about
2253 -information and that Manafort instructed Gates~ status updates on u com in
2254 releases.28 Around the same time Gates was with Trump on a trip to an airport ,
2255 and shortly after the call ended, Trum2 told Gates that more releases of
2256 damaging information would be coming.29 i:?jih??l?Uf?MhflrlfDiM -were discussed
2257 within the Campaign,3? and in the summer of 2016, the Campaign was planning a
2258 communications strategy based on the possible release of Clinton emails by
2259 WikiLeaks.31 3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking
2260 to Aid Candidate Trump In the days that followed WikiLeaks's July 22, 2016
2261 release of hacked DNC emails, the Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions
2262 that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump. On July 26, 2016, Trump tweeted
2263 that it was "[c]razy" to suggest that Russia was "dealing with Trump"32 and that
2264 "[f]or the record," he had "ZERO investments in Russia."33 In a press conference
2265 the next day, July 27, 2016, Trump characterized "this whole thing with Russia"
2266 as "a total deflection" and stated that it was "farfetched" and "ridiculous."34
2267 Trump said that the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven,
2268 but stated that it would give him "no pause" if Russia had Clinton's emails.35
2269 Trump added, "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000
2270 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded President's
2271 activities, and his own criminal conduct, is descriped in Volume II, Section
2272 ILK, infra, and in Volume I, Section IV.A. I, supra. 26 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8.
2273 27 . As explained in footnote 197 of Volume I, Section III.D. l.b, supra, this
2274 Office has included Manafort's account of these events because it aligns with
2275 those of other witnesses and is corroborated to that extent. 28 Gates l 0/25/18
2276 302, at 4. 29 Gates I 0/25/ 18 302, at 4. 30 Bannon 1/18/ l 9 3 02, at 3.
2277 31Gates4/11/18302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18302, at2(messa~ formed in
2278 June/Jul timeframe based on claims b Assan eon June 12, 2016, ----. ).
2279 32@rea!DonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:47 p.m. ET) Tweet. 33 @realDonaldTrump 7/26/16
2280 (6:50 p.m. ET) Tweet. 34 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-S PAN
2281 (July 27, 2016). 35 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July
2282 27, 2016). 18
2283
2284RESULT: 49
2285
2286PAGE: 231
2287
2288TEXT:
2289
2290 U.S. Department of Justice AttorHey Work Protittet // Ma,.? CotttaiH Material
2291 Proteeteti UHaer Fee. R. Griff!. P. 6(e) advisors had developed a "party line"
2292 that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections to Russia.45 In
2293 addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump Campaign reacted to
2294 reports of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign by seeking to
2295 distance itself from Russian contacts. For example, in August 2016, foreign
2296 policy advisor J.D. Gordon declined an invitation to Russian Ambassador Sergey
2297 Kislyak's residence because the timing was "not optimal" in view of media
2298 reports about Russian interference.46 On August 19, 2016, Manafort was asked to
2299 resign amid media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political
2300 party in Ukraine and links to Russian business.47 And when the media published
2301 stories about Page's connections to Russia in September 2016, Trump Campaign
2302 officials terminated Page's association with the Campaign and told the press
2303 that he had played "no role" in the Campaign.48 On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks
2304 released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian intelligence agency from
2305 Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta.49 The same day, the federal government
2306 announced that "the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of
2307 e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political
2308 organizations."50 The government statement directly linked Russian hacking to
2309 the releases on WikiLeaks, with the goal of interfering with the presidential
2310 election, and concluded "that only Russia's senior-most officials could have
2311 authorized these activities" based on their "scope and sensitivity."51 On
2312 October 11, 2016, Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating
2313 Russia's hacking and said that candidate Trump might have known in advance that
2314 the hacked emails were going to be released.52 Vice Presidential Candidate Mike
2315 Pence was asked whether the Trump 45 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at I; Cohen 9/18/18
2316 302, at 3-5. The formation of the "party line" is described in greater detail in
2317 Volume II, Section Il.K, infra. 46 DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to
2318 Pchelyakov) (stating that "[t]hese days are not optimal for us, as we are busily
2319 knocking down a stream of false media stories"). The invitation and Gordon's
2320 response are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.7.a, supra. 47 See, e.g., Amber
2321 Phillips, Paul Manafort's complicated ties to Ukraine, explained, Washington
2322 Post (Aug. 19, 2016) ("There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with
2323 investigations into [Manafort's] ties to a pro-Russian political party in
2324 Ukraine."); Tom Winter & Ken Dilanian, Donald Trump Aide Paul Manafort
2325 Scrutinized for Russian Business Ties, NBC (Aug. 18, 2016). Relevant events
2326 involving Manafort are discussed in Volume 1, Section IV.A.8, supra. 48 Michael
2327 Isikoff, U.S. intel officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin,
2328 Yahoo News (Sep. 23, 2016); see, e.g., 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon;
2329 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon & S. Miller; Page 3/16/17 302, at 2. 49
2330 @WikiLeaks 10/7/16 (4:32 p.m. ET) Tweet. 50 Joint Statement from the Department
2331 Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on
2332 Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). 51 Joint Statement from the Department Of
2333 Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on
2334 Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). 52 John Wagner & Anne Gearan, Clinton
2335 campaign chairman ties email hack to Russians, suggests Trump had early warning,
2336 Washington Post (Oct. 11, 2016). 20
2337
2338RESULT: 50
2339
2340PAGE: 263
2341
2342TEXT:
2343
2344 U.S. Department of Justice Attorfl:e,.? Work Protittet // Ma,.? Cofl:taifl:
2345 Material Proteetee Ufl:eer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) General to find out whether
2346 the White House or the President was being investigated, although it is not
2347 clear whether the President knew at that time of the FBI's recent request
2348 concerning Flynn.306 2. FBI Director Corney Publicly Confirms the Existence of
2349 the Russia Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI On March 9, 2017, Corney
2350 briefed the "Gang of Eight" congressional leaders about the FBI's investigation
2351 of Russian interference, including an identification of the principal U.S.
2352 subjects of the investigation.307 Although it is unclear whether the President
2353 knew of that briefing at the time, notes taken by Annie Donaldson, then McGahn'
2354 s chief of staff, on March 12, 2017, state, "POTUS in panic/chaos ... Need
2355 binders to put in front of POTUS. (1) All things related to Russia."308 The week
2356 after Corney's briefing, the White House Counsel's Office was in contact with
2357 SSCI Chairman Senator Richard Burr about the Russia investigations and appears
2358 to have received information about the status of the FBI investigation.309 On
2359 March 20, 2017, Corney was scheduled to testify before HPSCI.310 In advance of
2360 Corney's testimony, congressional officials made clear that they wanted Corney
2361 to provide information about the ongoing FBI investigation.311 Dana Boente, who
2362 at that time was the Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation,
2363 authorized Corney to confirm the existence of the Russia investigation and
2364 agreed that Corney should decline to comment on whether any particular
2365 individuals, including the President, were being investigated.312 306 Donaldson
2366 11/6/17 302, at 14; see SC_ AD_ 000168 (Donaldson 3/6/17 Notes) ("POTUS wants to
2367 call Dana [then the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related
2368 investigations]/ Is investigation I No/ We know something on Flynn/ GSA got
2369 contacted by FBI/ There's something hot"). 307 Corney 11/15/17 302, at 13-14;
2370 SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et al.). 308 SC_AD
2371 _00188 (Donaldson 3/12/18 Notes). Donaldson said she was not part of the
2372 conversation that led to these notes, and must have been told about it from
2373 others. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 13. 309 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14-15. On
2374 March 16, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was briefed by Senator Burr on
2375 the existence of "4-5 targets." Donaldson 11 /6/17 302, at 15. The "targets"
2376 were identified in notes taken by Donaldson as "Flynn (FBI was ~ooking for phone
2377 records"; "Comey~Manafort (Ukr + Russia, not campaign)";~ "Carter Page ($
2378 game)"; and "Greek Guy" (potentially referring to George Papadopoulos, later
2379 charged with violating 18 U.S.C. ? 1001 for lying to the FBI). SC_AD_00l98
2380 (Donaldson 3/16/17 Notes). Donaldson and McGahn both said they believed these
2381 were targets ofSSCI. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 4.
2382 But SSCI does not fotmally investigate individuals as "targets"; the notes on
2383 their face reference the FBI, the Department of Justice, and Corney; and the
2384 notes track the background materials prepared by the FBI for Corney's briefing
2385 to the Gang of8 on March 9. See SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar
2386 to Page et al.); see also Donaldson 11 /6/17 302, at 15 (Donaldson could not
2387 rule out that Burr had told McGahn those individuals were the FBI's targets).
2388 310 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select
2389 Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017). 311 Corney 11/15/17 302,
2390 at 16; McCabe 8/17/17, at 15; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at I. 312 Boente 1/31/18 302,
2391 at 5; Corney I I /15/17 302, at 16-17. 52
2392
2393RESULT: 51
2394
2395PAGE: 303
2396
2397TEXT:
2398
2399 U.S. Department of Justice AttarAey Wark Pt?asttet // May CaHtttiH Material
2400 Prateetes UAser Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) The President said that if Sessions
2401 delivered that statement he would be the "most popular guy in the country."611
2402 Lewandowski told the President he understood what the President wanted Sessions
2403 to do.612 Lewandowski wanted to pass the message to Sessions in person rather
2404 than over the phone.613 He did not want to meet at the Department of Justice
2405 because he did not want a public log of his visit and did not want Sessions to
2406 have an advantage over him by meeting on what Lewandowski described as
2407 Sessions's turf.614 Lewandowski called Sessions and arranged a meeting for the
2408 following evening at Lewandowski's office, but Sessions had to cancel due to a
2409 last minute conflict.615 Shortly thereafter, Lewandowski left Washington, D.C.,
2410 without having had an opportunity to meet with Sessions to convey the
2411 President's message.616 Lewandowski stored the notes in a safe at his home,
2412 which he stated was his standard procedure with sensitive items.617 2. The
2413 President Follows Up with Lewandowski Following his June meeting with the
2414 President, Lewandowski contacted Rick Dearborn, then a senior White House
2415 official, and asked if Dearborn could pass a message to Sessions.618 Dearborn
2416 agreed without knowing what the message was, and Lewandowski later confirmed
2417 that Dearborn would meet with Sessions for dinner in late July and could deliver
2418 the message then.619 Lewandowski recalled thinking that the President had asked
2419 him to pass the message because the President knew Lewandowski could be trusted,
2420 but Lewandowski believed Dearborn would be a better messenger because he had a
2421 longstanding relationship with Sessions and because Dearborn was in the
2422 government while Lewandowski was not.620 On July 19, 2017, the President again
2423 met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office.621 In the preceding days, as
2424 described in Volume IT, Section ILG, infra, emails and other information about
2425 the June 9, 2016 meeting between several Russians and Donald Trump Jr., Jared
2426 Kushner, and Paul Manafort had been publicly disclosed. In the July 19 meeting
2427 with Lewandowski, the 611 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3; Lewandowski 6/19/17
2428 Notes, at 4. 612 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3. 613 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at
2429 3-4. 614 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. 615 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. 616
2430 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. 617 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. 618 Lewandowski
2431 4/6/18 302, at 4; see Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3. 619 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at
2432 4-5. 620 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4, 6. 621 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5;
2433 SCR029b_000002-03 (6/5/18 Additional Response to Special Counsel Request for
2434 Certain Visitor Log Information). 92
2435
2436RESULT: 52
2437
2438PAGE: 310
2439
2440TEXT:
2441
2442 U.S. Department of Justice AM:eri,e,? Werk Prm:ittet // Ma,? Cei,taii, Material
2443 Preteeteti Ui,tier Feti. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) the campaign arranging a meeting
2444 between Donald Trump Jr., Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and a Russian
2445 attorney.663 As described in Volume I, Section TV.A.5, supra, the emails stated
2446 that the "Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia" had offered "to provide the Trump
2447 campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate
2448 Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as part of "Russia and its government's
2449 support for Mr. Trump."664 Trump Jr. responded, "[I]f it's what you say I love
2450 it,"665 and he, Kushner, and Manafort met with the Russian attorney and several
2451 other Russian individuals at Trump Tower on June 9, 2016.666 At the meeting, the
2452 Russian attorney claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia
2453 were provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats, and the Russian attorney
2454 then spoke about the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 U.S. statute that imposed financial
2455 and travel sanctions on Russian officials and that had resulted in a retaliatory
2456 ban in Russia on U.S. adoptions of Russian children.667 According to written
2457 answers submitted by the President in response to questions from this Office,
2458 the President had no recollection of learning of the meeting or the emails
2459 setting it up at the time the meeting occurred or at any other time before the
2460 election.668 The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request from
2461 SSCI that called for the production of various information, including, "[a] list
2462 and a description of all meetings" between any "individual affiliated with the
2463 Trump campaign" and "any individual formally or informally affiliated with the
2464 Russian government or Russian business interests which took place between June
2465 16, 2015, and 12 pm on January 20, 2017," and associated records.669 Trump
2466 Organization attorneys became aware of the June 9 meeting no later than the
2467 first week of June 2017, when they began interviewing the meeting participants,
2468 and the Trump Organization attorneys provided the emails setting up the meeting
2469 to the President's personal counsel.670 Mark Corallo, who had been hired as a
2470 spokesman for the President's personal legal team, recalled that he learned
2471 about the June 9 meeting around June 21 or 22, 201 7. 671 Priebus recalled
2472 learning about the June 9 meeting from Fox News host Sean Hannity in late June
2473 2017.672 Priebus notified one 663 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at
2474 2. 664 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17
2475 (11:01 a.m. ET) Tweet. 665 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone);
2476 @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (l 1:01 a.m. ET) Tweet. 666 Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at
2477 4. 667 See Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra (describing meeting in detail). 668
2478 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question
2479 I, Parts (a) through (c)). The President declined to answer questions about his
2480 knowledge of the June 9 meeting or other events after the election. 669 DJTFP
2481 _SCO _pDF _00000001-02 (5/17/17 Letter, SSCI to Donald J. Trump for President,
2482 Inc.). 670 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 12; 6/2/17 and 6/5/17 Emails, Goldstone &
2483 Garten; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 3; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. 671 Corallo 2/15/18
2484 302, at 3. 672 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7. 99
2485
2486RESULT: 53
2487
2488PAGE: 311
2489
2490TEXT:
2491
2492 U.S. Department of Justice At:temey Werle Predttet // Mt1)' Cettttlitt
2493 Mt1terit1l PreteeteEI UrtEier Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) of the President's
2494 personal attorneys, who told Priebus he was already working on it.673 By late
2495 June, several advisors recalled receiving media inquiries that could relate to
2496 the June 9 meeting.674 2. The President Directs Communications Staff Not to
2497 Publicly Disclose Information About the June 9 Meeting Communications advisors
2498 Hope Hicks and Josh Raffel recalled discussing with Jared Kushner and Ivanka
2499 Trump that the emails were damaging and would inevitably be leaked.675 Hicks and
2500 Raffel advised that the best strategy was to proactively release the emails to
2501 the press.676 On or about June 22, 2017, Hicks attended a meeting in the White
2502 House residence with the President, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump.677 According to
2503 Hicks, Kushner said that he wanted to fill the President in on something that
2504 had been discovered in the documents he was to provide to the congressional
2505 committees involving a meeting with him, Manafort, and Trump Jr.678 Kushner
2506 brought a folder of documents to the meeting and tried to show them to the
2507 President, but the President stopped Kushner and said he did not want to know
2508 about it, shutting the conversation down.679 On June 28, 2017, Hicks viewed the
2509 emails at Kushner's attorney's office.680 She recalled being shocked by the
2510 emails because they looked "really bad."681 The next day, Hicks spoke privately
2511 with the President to mention her concern about the emails, which she understood
2512 were soon going to be shared with Congress.682 The President seemed upset
2513 because too many people knew about the emails and he told Hicks that just one
2514 lawyer should deal with the matter.683 The President indicated that he did not
2515 think the emails would leak, but said they would leak if everyone had access to
2516 them.684 673 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7. 674 Corallo 2/ 15/ 18 3 02, at 3; Hicks
2517 12/7/ 17 302, at 8; Raffel 2/8/ l 8 302, at 3. 675 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2-3;
2518 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. 676 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2-3, 5; Hicks 3/13/ l 8 302,
2519 at 2; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. 677 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6-7; Hicks 3/13/18 302,
2520 at I. 678 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1. 679 Hicks 12/7/17
2521 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at I. Counsel for Ivanka Trump provided an
2522 attorney proffer that is consistent with Hicks's account and with the other
2523 events involving lvanka Trump set forth in this section of the report. Kushner
2524 said that he did not recall talking to the President at this time about the June
2525 9 meeting or the underlying emails. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 30. 680 Hicks
2526 3/13/18 302, at 1-2. 681 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. 682 Hicks I 2/7117 3 02, at 8.
2527 683 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. 684 Hicks 12/7 /l 7 302,
2528 at 8. 100
2529
2530RESULT: 54
2531
2532PAGE: 331
2533
2534TEXT:
2535
2536 U.S. Department of Justice Attertte)? Werk Pretittet // Ma.)? Cettta.itt
2537 Ma.teria.1 Preteeteti Utttier Feti. R. Crim. P. 6(e) time to issue a correction
2538 for a news story-indicates the President was not focused solely on a press
2539 strategy, but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any
2540 proceedings arising from it. c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that in
2541 repeatedly urging McGahn to dispute that he was ordered to have the Special
2542 Counsel terminated, the President acted for the purpose of influencing McGahn 's
2543 account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President's
2544 conduct towards the investigation. Several facts support that conclusion. The
2545 President made repeated attempts to get McGahn to change his story. As described
2546 above, by the time of the last attempt, the evidence suggests that the President
2547 had been told on multiple occasions that McGahn believed the President had
2548 ordered him to have the Special Counsel terminated. McGahn interpreted his
2549 encounter with the President in the Oval Office as an attempt to test his mettle
2550 and see how committed he was to his memory of what had occurred. The President
2551 had already laid the groundwork for pressing McGahn to alter his account by
2552 telling Porter that it might be necessary to fire McGahn if he did not deny the
2553 story, and Porter relayed that statement to McGahn. Additional evidence of the
2554 President's intent may be gleaned from the fact that his counsel was
2555 sufficiently alarmed by the prospect of the President's meeting with McGahn that
2556 he called McGahn's counsel and said that McGahn could not resign no matter what
2557 happened in the Oval Office that day. The President's counsel was well aware
2558 ofMcGahn's resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account of events
2559 despite the President's request. Finally, as noted above, the President brought
2560 up the Special Counsel investigation in his Oval Office meeting with McGahn and
2561 criticized him for telling this Office about the June 17, 2017 events. The
2562 President's statements reflect his understanding-and his displeasure-that those
2563 events would be part of an obstruction-of-justice inquiry. J. The President's
2564 Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, Overview In addition to the interactions with
2565 McGahn described above, the President has taken other actions directed at
2566 possible witnesses in the Special Counsel's investigation, including Flynn,
2567 Manafort, %?as described in the next section, Cohen. When Flynn withdrew from a
2568 joint defense agreement with the President, the President's personal counsel
2569 stated that Flynn's actions would be viewed as reflecting "hostility" towards
2570 the President. During Manafort's prosecution and while the jury was
2571 deliberating, the President repeatedly stated that Manafott was bein treated
2572 unfair! and made it known that Mana fort could receive a ardon. Evidence I .
2573 Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn As previously noted, see Volume II, Section
2574 11.B, supra, the President asked for Flynn's resignation on February 13, 2017.
2575 Following Flynn's resignation, the President made positive public comments about
2576 Flynn, describing him as a "wonderful man," "a fine person," and a "very 120
2577
2578RESULT: 55
2579
2580PAGE: 333
2581
2582TEXT:
2583
2584 U.S. Department of Justice AM:erAe~? \llerk Preattet // May CeAtaiA Material
2585 Preteetea UAaer Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e) hostility towards the President and that
2586 he planned to inform his client of that interpretation.839 Flynn's attorneys
2587 understood that statement to be an attempt to make them reconsider their
2588 position because the President's personal counsel believed that Flynn would be
2589 disturbed to know that such a message would be conveyed to the President.840 On
2590 December 1, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements pursuant to a
2591 cooperation agreement.841 The next day, the President told the press that he was
2592 not concerned about what Flynn might tell the Special Counsel.842 In response to
2593 a question about whether the President still stood behind Flynn, the President
2594 responded, "We'll see what happens."843 Over the next several days, the
2595 President made public statements expressing sympathy for Flynn and indicating he
2596 had not been treated fairly.844 On December 15, 2017, the President responded to
2597 a press inquiry about whether he was considering a pardon for Flynn by saying,
2598 "I don't want to talk about pardons for Michael Flynn yet. We'll see what
2599 happens. Let's see. I can say this: When you look at what's gone on with the FBI
2600 and with the Justice Department, people are very, very angry."845 2. Conduct
2601 Directed at Paul Manafort On October 27, 2017, a grand jury in the District of
2602 Columbia indicted Manafort and former deputy campaign manager Richard Gates on
2603 multiple felony counts, and on February 22, 2018, a grand jury in the Eastern
2604 District of Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony 839
2605 Counsel for Flynn 3/1 / 18 302, at 2. Because of attorney-client privilege
2606 issues, we did not seek to interview the President's personal counsel about the
2607 extent to which he discussed his statements to Flynn's attorneys with the
2608 President. 84? Counsel for Flynn 3/ 1 /18 302, at 2. 841 Information, United
2609 States v. Michael T Flynn, 1: 17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 1; Plea
2610 Agreement, United States v. Michael T Flynn, 1: 17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. I, 2017),
2611 Doc. 3. 842 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guilty
2612 Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2, 2017). 843 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and
2613 Michael Flynn's Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2, 2017). 844 See @realDonaldTrump
2614 12/2/17 (9:06 p.m. ET) Tweet ("So General Flynn lies to the FBI and his life is
2615 destroyed, while Crooked Hillary Clinton, on that now famous FBl holiday
2616 'interrogation' with no swearing in and no recording, lies many times ... and
2617 nothing happens to her? Rigged system, or just a double standard?"); President
2618 Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Dec. 4, 2017) ("Well, I feel badly for General
2619 Flynn. I feel very badly. He's led a very strong life. And I feel very badly.").
2620 845 President Trump White House Departure, C-SPAN (Dec. 15, 2017). 122
2621
2622RESULT: 56
2623
2624PAGE: 334
2625
2626TEXT:
2627
2628 U.S. Department of Justice A~OfAC)' Work Proauct // Mti:~? CoAtfl:iA
2629 Mti:tcriti:I Proteetea UAaCI' Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) counts.846 The charges in
2630 both cases alleged criminal conduct by Manafort that began as early as 2005 and
2631 continued through 2018.847 In January 2018, Manafort told Gates that he had
2632 talked to the President's personal counsel and they were "going to take care of
2633 us."848 Mana fort told Gates it was stupid to plead, saying that he had been in
2634 touch with the President's personal counsel and repeating that they should "sit
2635 tight" and "we'll be taken care of."849 Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone
2636 mentioned pardons and Manafort said no one used that word.850 As the proceedings
2637 against Manafort progressed in court, the President told Porter that he never
2638 liked Manafort and that Manafort did not know what he was doing on the
2639 campaign.851 The President discussed with aides whether and in what way Manafort
2640 might be cooperating with the Special Counsel's investigation, and whether
2641 Manafort knew any information that would be harmful to the President.852 In
2642 public, the President made statements criticizing the prosecution and suggesting
2643 that Manafort was being treated unfairly. On June I 5, 2018, before a scheduled
2644 court hearing that day on whether Manafort's bail should be revoked based on new
2645 charges that Manafort had tampered with witnesses while out on bail, the
2646 President told the press, "T feel badly about a lot of them 846 Indictment,
2647 United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III, I: 17-cr-201
2648 (D.D.C. Oct, 27, 2017), Doc. 13 ("Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment");
2649 Indictment, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III, I:
2650 l 8-cr-83 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2018), Doc. 9 ("Manafort and Gates E.D. Va.
2651 Indictment") 847 Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment; Manafort and Gates E.D.
2652 Va. Indictment. 848 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. In February 2018, Gates pleaded
2653 guilty, pursuant to a cooperation plea agreement, to a superseding criminal
2654 information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses
2655 (i.e., tax fraud, failure to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an
2656 unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as
2657 making false statements to our Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United
2658 States v. Richard W. Gates III, 1: I 7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 195;
2659 Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W. Gates III, l: I 7-cr-201 (D.D.C.
2660 Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 205. Gates has provided information and in-court testimony
2661 that the Office has deemed to be reliable. 849 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. 850
2662 Gates 4/ 18/ 18 302, at 4. Manafort told this Office that he never told Gates
2663 that he had talked to the President's personal counsel or suggested that they
2664 would be taken care of. Manafort also said he hoped for a pardon but never
2665 discussed one with the President, although he noticed the President's public
2666 comments about pardons. Manafort 10/1/18 302, at 11. As explained in Volume I,
2667 Section IV.A.8, supra, Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office.
2668 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia determined that he breached
2669 the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the grand jury.
2670 Order, United States v. Manafort, l: l 7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc.
2671 503. 851 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 11. Priebus recalled that the President never
2672 really liked Manafort. See Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 11. Hicks said that candidate
2673 Trump trusted Manafort's judgment while he worked on the Campaign, but she also
2674 once heard Trump tell Gates to keep an eye on Manafort. Hicks 3/13/18 302, at
2675 16. 852 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 11; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 14. 123
2676
2677RESULT: 57
2678
2679PAGE: 335
2680
2681TEXT:
2682
2683 U.S. Department of Justice Attorfl:ey 'Nork Proclttet // Ma)'" Cofl:taifl:
2684 Material Proteetecl Ufl:cler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) because I think a lot of
2685 it is very unfair. I mean, I look at some of them where they go back 12 years.
2686 Like Manafort has nothing to do with our campaign. But I feel so-I tell you, I
2687 feel a little badly about it. They went back 12 years to get things that he did
2688 12 years ago? ... I feel badly for some people, because they've gone back 12
2689 years to find things about somebody, and I don't think it's right."853 In
2690 response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort or
2691 other individuals involved in the Special Counsel's investigation, the President
2692 said, "I don't want to talk about that. No, I don't want to talk about that. ...
2693 But look, I do want to see people treated fairly. That's what it's all about."
2694 854 Hours later, Manafort's bail was revoked and the President tweeted, "Wow,
2695 what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort, who has represented Ronald Reagan, Bob
2696 Dole and many other top political people and campaigns. Didn't know Manafort was
2697 the head of the Mob. What about Corney and Crooked Hillary and all the others?
2698 Very unfair!"855 Immediately following the revocation ofManafort's bail, the
2699 President's personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, gave a series of interviews in
2700 which he raised the possibility of a pardon for Manafort. Giuliani told the New
2701 York Daily News that "[w]hen the whole thing is over, things might get cleaned
2702 up with some presidential pardons."856 Giuliani also said in an interview that,
2703 although the President should not pardon anyone while the Special Counsel's
2704 investigation was ongoing, "when the investigation is concluded, he's kind of on
2705 his own, right?"857 In a CNN interview two days later, Giuliani said, "I guess I
2706 should clarify this once and for all. . . . The president has issued no pardons
2707 in this investigation. The president is not going to issue pardons in this
2708 investigation .... When it's over, hey, he's the president of the United States.
2709 He retains his pardon power. Nobody is taking that away from him."858 Giuliani
2710 rejected the suggestion that his and the President's comments could signal to
2711 defendants that they should not cooperate in a criminal prosecution because a
2712 pardon might follow, saying the comments were "certainly not intended that
2713 way."859 Giuliani said the comments only acknowledged that an individual
2714 involved in the investigation would not be "excluded from [ a pardon], if in
2715 fact the president and his advisors ... come to the conclusion that you have
2716 been treated unfairly."860 Giuliani observed that pardons were not unusual in
2717 political investigations but said, "That doesn't mean they're going to happen
2718 853 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018). 854
2719 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018). 855
2720 @rea!DonaldTrump 6/ 15/ 18 ( 1 :41 p.m. ET) Tweet. 856 Chris Sommerfeldt, Rudy
2721 Giuliani says Mueller probe 'might get cleaned up' with 'presidential pardons'
2722 in light of Paul Manafort going to jail, New York Daily News (June 15, 2018).
2723 857 Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Orders Paul Manafort Jailed Before Trial, Citing
2724 New Obstruction Charges, New York Times (June 15, 2018) (quoting Giuliani). 858
2725 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018); see Karoun
2726 Demitjian, Giuliani suggests Trump may pardon Manafort after Mueller's probe,
2727 Washington Post (June 17, 2018). 859 State of the Union with Jake Tapper
2728 Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). 860 State of the Union with Jake Tapper
2729 Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). 124
2730
2731RESULT: 58
2732
2733PAGE: 336
2734
2735TEXT:
2736
2737 U.S. Department of Justice Attorf!e::,? '.Vork Proe1:1et // May Cof!taifl
2738 Material Proteetee Urtt:ler Fet:I. R. Crim. P. 6(e) here. Doesn't mean that
2739 anybody should rely on it. ... Big signal is, nobody has been pardoned yet.
2740 ,,s61 On July 31, 2018, Manafort's criminal trial began in the Eastern District
2741 of Virginia, generating substantial news coverage.862 The next day, the
2742 President tweeted, "This is a terrible situation and Attorney General Jeff
2743 Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now, before it continues to
2744 stain our country any further. Bob Mueller is totally conflicted, and his 17
2745 Angry Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USA!"863 Minutes
2746 later, the President tweeted, "Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole
2747 and many other highly prominent and respected political leaders. He worked for
2748 me for a very short time. Why didn't government tell me that he was under
2749 investigation. These old charges have nothing to do with Collusion-a Hoax!"864
2750 Later in the day, the President tweeted, "Looking back on history, who was
2751 treated worse, Alfonse Capone, legendary mob boss, killer and 'Public Enemy
2752 Number One,' or Paul Manafort, political operative & Reagan/Dole darling, now
2753 serving solitary confinement-although convicted of nothing? Where is the Russian
2754 Collusion?"865 The President's tweets about the Manafort trial were widely
2755 covered by the press.866 When asked about the President's tweets, Sanders told
2756 the press, "Certainly, the President's been clear. He thinks Paul Manafort's
2757 been treated unfairly."867 On August 16, 2018, the Manafort case was submitted
2758 to the jury and deliberations began. At that time, Giuliani had recently
2759 suggested to reporters that the Special Counsel investigation needed to be "done
2760 in the next two or three weeks,"868 and media stories reported that a Manafort
2761 acquittal would add to criticism that the Special Counsel investigation was not
2762 worth the time and expense, whereas a conviction could show that ending the
2763 investigation would be premature.869 861 State of the Union with Jake Tapper
2764 Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). 862 See, e.g., Katelyn Polantz, Takeaways from
2765 day one of the Paul Manafort trial, CNN (July 31, 2018); Frank Bruni, Paul
2766 Manafort 's Trial Is Donald Trump's, Too, New York Times Opinion (July 31,
2767 2018); Rachel Weiner et al., Paul Manafort trial Day 2: Witnesses describe
2768 extravagant clothing purchases, home remodels, lavish cars paid with wire
2769 transfers, Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018). 863 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24
2770 a.m. ET) Tweet. Later that day, when Sanders was asked about the President's
2771 tweet, she told reporters, "It's not an order. It's the President's opinion."
2772 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018). 864
2773 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:34 a.m. ET) Tweet. 865 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (11
2774 :35 a.m. ET) Tweet. 866 See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump calls Manafort
2775 prosecution "a hoax," says Sessions should stop Mueller investigation "right
2776 now", Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018); Louis Nelson, Trump claims Manafort case
2777 has "nothing to do with collusion", Politico (Aug. I. 2018). 867 Sarah Sanders,
2778 White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018). 868 Chris Strohm & Shannon
2779 Pettypiece, Mueller Probe Doesn't Need to Shut Down Before Midterms, Officials
2780 Say, Bloomberg (Aug. 15, 2018). 869 See, e.g., Katelyn Polantz et al., Manafort
2781 jury ends first day of deliberations without a verdict, CNN (Aug. 16, 2018);
2782 David Voreacos, What Mueller's Manafort Case Means for the Trump Battle to 125
2783
2784RESULT: 59
2785
2786PAGE: 337
2787
2788TEXT:
2789
2790 U.S. Department of Justice Att0rl'\e~ W0rlt Pr0tlttet // May CeAtaiA Material
2791 Prnteetetl UAtler Fetl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) On August 17, 2018, as jury
2792 deliberations continued, the President commented on the trial from the South
2793 Lawn of the White House. In an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted
2794 approximately five minutes, the President twice called the Special Counsel's
2795 investigation a "rigged witch hunt."870 When asked whether he would pardon
2796 Manafort if he was convicted, the President said, "I don't talk about that now.
2797 I don't talk about that."871 The President then added, without being asked a
2798 further question, "I think the whole Manafort trial is very sad when you look at
2799 what's going on there. I think it's a very sad day for our country. He worked
2800 for me for a very short period of time. But you know what, he happens to be a
2801 very good person. And l think it's very sad what they've done to Paul
2802 Manafort."872 The President did not take further questions.873 In response to
2803 the President's statements, Manafort's attorney said, "Mr. Manafort really
2804 appreciates the support of President Trump."874 On August 21, 2018, the jury
2805 found Manafort guilty on eight felony counts. Also on August 21, Michael Cohen
2806 pleaded guilty to eight offenses, including a campaign-finance violation that he
2807 said had occurred "in coordination with, and at the direction of, a candidate
2808 for federal offtce."875 The President reacted to Manafort's convictions that day
2809 by telling reporters, "Paul Manafort's a good man" and "it's a very sad thing
2810 that happened."876 The President described the Special Counsel's investigation
2811 as "a witch hunt that ends in disgrace."877 The next day, the President tweeted,
2812 "I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. 'Justice' took a
2813 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him
2814 and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to 'break'-make up stories in order to get
2815 a 'deal.' Such respect for a brave man!"878 In a Fox News interview on August
2816 22, 2018, the President said: "[Cohen] makes a better deal when he uses me, like
2817 everybody else. And one of the reasons l respect Paul Manafort so much is he
2818 went through that trial-you know they make up stories. People make up stories.
2819 This Come, Bloomberg (Aug. 2, 2018); Gabby Morrongiello, What a guilty verdict
2820 for Manafort would mean for Trump and Mueller, Washington Examiner (Aug. 18,
2821 2018). 870 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN
2822 (Aug. 17, 2018). 871 President Trump Rem,irks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe,
2823 C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). 872 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller
2824 Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). 873 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and
2825 Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). 874 Trump calls Manafort "very good
2826 person," All In with Chris Hayes (Aug. 17, 2018) (transcript); Manafort lawyer:
2827 We appreciate Trump 's support, CNN (Aug. 17, 2018) (https://www
2828 .cnn.com/videos/poli tics/2018/08/ 17 /paul-manafort-attorney-trump-j Uiy-del i
2829 schneider-lead-vpx .cnn ). 875 Transcript at 23, United States v. Michael Cohen,
2830 l: 18-cr-602 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018), Doc. 7 (Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript). 876
2831 President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, C-SPAN (Aug. 21, 2018). 877 President
2832 Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, C-SPA N (Aug. 21, 2018). 878 @realDonaldTrump
2833 8/22/18 (9:21 a.m. ET) Tweet. 126
2834
2835RESULT: 60
2836
2837PAGE: 338
2838
2839TEXT:
2840
2841 U.S. Department of Justice AHerfle~' Werk Preclttet // May Cefltaifl Material
2842 Preteetecl Uflcler Fecl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) whole thing about flipping, they call
2843 it, T know all about flipping."879 The President said that flipping was "not
2844 fair" and "almost ought to be outlawed."880 ln response to a question about
2845 whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President said, "T have
2846 great respect for what he's done, in terms of what he's gone through .... He
2847 worked for many, many people many, many years, and T would say what he did, some
2848 of the charges they threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in
2849 Washington probably does."881 Giuliani told journalists that the President
2850 "really thinks Manafort has been horribly treated" and that he and the President
2851 had discussed the political fallout if the President pardoned Manafort.882 The
2852 next day, Giuliani told the Washington Post that the President had asked his
2853 lawyers for advice on the possibility of a pardon for Manafort and other aides,
2854 and had been counseled against considering a pardon until the investigation
2855 concluded.883 On September 14, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty to charges in the
2856 District of Columbia and signed a plea agreement that required him to cooperate
2857 with investigators.884 Giuliani was reported to have publicly said that Manafort
2858 remained in a joint defense agreement with the President following Manafort's
2859 guilty plea and agreement to cooperate, and that Manafort's attorneys regularly
2860 briefed the President's lawyers on the topics discussed and the information
2861 Manafort had provided in interviews with the Special Counsel's Office.885 On
2862 November 26, 2018, the Special Counsel's Office disclosed in a public court
2863 filing that Manafort had breached his plea agreement by lying about multiple
2864 subjects.886 The next day, Giuliani said that the President had been "upset for
2865 weeks" about what he considered to be "the un-American, horrible treatment of
2866 879 Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23,
2867 2018) (recorded the previous day). 88? Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with
2868 President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded the previous day). 881 Fox &
2869 Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018)
2870 (recorded the previous day). . 882 Maggie Haberman & Katie Rogers, "How Did We
2871 End Up Here?" Trump Wonders as the White House Soldiers On, New York Times (Aug.
2872 22, 2018). 883 Carol D. Leonnig & Josh Dawsey, Trump recently sought his
2873 lawyers' advice on possibility of pardoning Manafort, Giuliani says, Washington
2874 Post (Aug. 23, 2018). 884 Plea Agreement, United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr.,
2875 l:l7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 422. 885 Karen Freifeld & Nathan
2876 Layne, Trump lawyer: Manafort said nothing damaging in Mueller interviews,
2877 Reuters (Oct. 22, 2018); Michael S. Schmidt et al., Mana/art's Lawyer Said to
2878 Brief Trump Attorneys on What He Told Mueller, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2018);
2879 Dana Bash, Mana/art team briefed Giuliani on Mueller meetings, CNN, Posted
2880 11/28/18, available at https:/ /www.cnn.com/videos/pol iti cs/2018/ 11
2881 /28/manafort-lawyers-keeping-trump-lawyers-gi ul ianiupdated-mueller-probe-bash-
2882 sot-nr-vpx.cnn; see Sean Hannity, Interview with Rudy Giuliani, Fox News (Sept.
2883 14, 2018) (Giuliani: "[T]here was a quote put out by a source close to Manafort
2884 that the plea agreement has, and cooperation agreement has, nothing to do with
2885 the Trump campaign .... Now, I know that because 1 've been privy to a lot of
2886 facts I can't repeat."). 886 Joint Status Report, United States v. Paul J
2887 Mana/art, Jr., (D.D.C Nov. 26, 2018), Doc. 455. 127
2888
2889RESULT: 61
2890
2891PAGE: 339
2892
2893TEXT:
2894
2895 U.S. Department of Justice Atterttey Werk Pl'ea1:1et // May CentaiH Material
2896 Preteetea Uttaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Manafort."887 In an interview on November
2897 28, 2018, the President suggested that it was "very brave" that Manafort did not
2898 "flip": If you told the truth, you go to jail. You know this flipping stuff is
2899 terrible. You flip and you lie and you get-the prosecutors will tell you 99
2900 percent of the time they can get people to flip. It's rare that they can't. But
2901 I had three people: Manafort, Corsi-I don't know Corsi, but he refuses to say
2902 what they demanded.888 Manafort, Corsi . It's actually very brave.889 Tn
2903 response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President
2904 said, "It was never discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. Why would I
2905 take it off the table?"890 3. Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm
2906 to Ongoing Matter :?? Harm to Ongoing Matter aHarm to Ongoing Matter IIIHarm to
2907 Ongoing Matter 887 Stephen Collinson, Trump appears consumed by Mueller
2908 investigation as details emerge, CNN (Nov. 29, 2018). 888 "Corsi" is a reference
2909 to Jerome Corsi, who was involved in efforts to coordinate with WikiLeaks and
2910 Assange, and who stated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea offer
2911 fro~'s Office because he was "not going to sign a lie." Sara Murray & Eli
2912 Watkins,~ says he won't agree to plea deal, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018). 889 Marisa
2913 Schultz & Nikki Schwab, Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says
2914 pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018).
2915 That same day, the President tweeted: "While the disgusting Fake News is doing
2916 everything within their power not to report it that way, at least 3 major
2917 players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang ofDems is viciously telling
2918 witnesses to lie about facts & they will get relief. This is our Joseph McCarthy
2919 Era!" @rea!DonaldTrump 11/28/18 (8:39 a.m. ET) Tweet. 890 Marisa Schultz & Nikki
2920 Schwab, New York Post Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says
2921 pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018).
2922 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to
2923 Ongoing Matter 128
2924
2925RESULT: 62
2926
2927PAGE: 342
2928
2929TEXT:
2930
2931 U.S. Department of Justice Atte,rRe:,? \1/e,rk Pfe,Eiuet // Ma:y Ce,l'!ta:il'I
2932 Ma:teria:I PFoteeteEI UREief' FeEI. R. C!'im. P. 6(e) Analysis In analyzing the
2933 President's conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, litlllll, the following evidence is
2934 relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: a. Obstructive act. The
2935 President's actions towards witnesses in the Special Counsel's investigation
2936 would qualify as obstructive if they had the natural tendency to prevent
2937 particular witnesses from testifying truthfully, or otherwise would have the
2938 probable effect of influencing, delaying, or preventing their testimony to law
2939 enforcement. With regard to Flynn, the President sent private and public
2940 messages to Flynn encouraging him to stay strong and conveying that the
2941 President still cared about him before he began to cooperate with the
2942 government. When Flynn's attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense agreement
2943 with the President, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the
2944 government, the President's personal counsel initially reminded Flynn's counsel
2945 of the President's warm feelings towards Flynn and said "that still remains."
2946 But when Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could no longer share information
2947 under a joint defense agreement, the President's personal counsel stated that
2948 the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn's hostility towards the
2949 President. That sequence of events could have had the potential to affect
2950 Flynn's decision to cooperate, as well as the extent of that cooperation.
2951 Because of privilege issues, however, we could not determine whether the
2952 President was personally involved in or knew about the specific message his
2953 counsel delivered to Flynn's counsel. With respect to Manafort, there is
2954 evidence that the President's actions had the potential to influence Manafort's
2955 decision whether to cooperate with the government. The President and his
2956 personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a
2957 possibility for Mana fort, while also making it clear that the President did not
2958 want Manafort to "flip" and cooperate with the government. On June 15, 2018, the
2959 day the judge presiding over Manafort's D.C. case was considering whether to
2960 revoke his bail, the President said that he "felt badly" for Manafort and
2961 stated, "I think a lot of it is very unfair." And when asked about a pardon for
2962 Manafort, the President said, "I do want to see people treated fairly. That's
2963 what it's all about." Later that day, after Manafort's bail was revoked, t.he
2964 President called it a "tough sentence" that was "Very unfair!" Two days later,
2965 the President's personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the Special
2966 Counsel's investigation could receive a pardon "if in fact the [P]resident and
2967 his advisors ... come to the conclusion that you have been treated
2968 unfairly"-using language that paralleled how the President had already described
2969 the treatment ofManafort. Those statements, combined with the President's
2970 commendation ofManafort for being a "brave man" who "refused to 'break',"
2971 suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Mana fort continued not
2972 to cooperate with the government. And while Manafort eventually pleaded guilty
2973 pursuant to a cooperation agreement, he was found to have violated the agreement
2974 by lying to investigators. The President's public statements during the Manafort
2975 trial, including during jury deliberations, also had the potential to influence
2976 the trial jury. On the second day of trial, for example, the President called
2977 the prosecution a "terrible situation" and a "hoax" that "continues to stain our
2978 country" and referred to Manafort as a "Reagan/Dole darling" who was "serving
2979 solitary confinement" even though he was "convicted of nothing." Those
2980 statements were widely picked up by the press. While jurors were instructed not
2981 to watch or read news stories about the case and 131
2982
2983RESULT: 63
2984
2985PAGE: 343
2986
2987TEXT:
2988
2989 U.S. Department of Justice Al:t:erHc,? Werk Preauet // May CeHtaiH Material
2990 Preteetea UHaer Fea. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) are presumed to follow those
2991 instructions, the President's statements during the trial generated substantial
2992 media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to see the
2993 statements or learned about them from others. And the President's statements
2994 during jury deliberations that Manafort "happens to be a very good person" and
2995 that "it's very sad what they've done to Paul Mana fort" had the potential to
2996 influence jurors who learned of the statements, which the President made just as
2997 jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort. b. Nexus to an
2998 official proceeding. The President's actions towards Flynn, Manafort, --appear
2999 to have been connected to pending or ~d official proceedings involving each
3000 individual. The President's conduct towards Flynn~ principally occurred when
3001 both were under criminal investigation by the Special Counsel's Office and press
3002 reports speculated about whether they would cooperate with the Special Counsel's
3003 investigation. And the President's conduct towards Manafort was directly
3004 connected to the official proceedings involving him. The President made
3005 statements about Manafort and the charges against him during Manafort's criminal
3006 trial. And the President's comments about the prospect of Manafort "flipping"
3007 occurred when it was clear the Special Counsel continued to oversee grand jury
3008 proceedings. c. Intent. Evidence concerning the President's intent related to
3009 Flynn as a potential witness is inconclusive. As previously noted, because of
3010 privilege issues we do not have evidence establishing whether the President knew
3011 about or was involved in his counsel's communications with Flynn's counsel
3012 stating that Flynn's decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement and
3013 cooperate with the government would be viewed as reflecting "hostility" towards
3014 the President. And regardless of what the President's personal counsel
3015 communicated, the President continued to express sympathy for Flynn after he
3016 pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, stating that Flynn had "led
3017 a very strong life" and the President "fe[lt] very badly" about what had
3018 happened to him. Evidence concerning the President's conduct towards Manafort
3019 indicates that the President intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate
3020 with the government. Before Manafort was convicted, the President repeatedly
3021 stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly. One day after Manafort was
3022 convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a lengthy prison term,
3023 the President said that Manafort was "a brave man" for refusing to "break" and
3024 that "flipping" "almost ought to be outlawed." At the same time, although the
3025 President had privately told aides he did not like Manafort, he publicly called
3026 Mana fort "a good man" and said he had a "wonderful family." And when the
3027 President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the
3028 President did not respond directly and instead said he had "great respect for
3029 what [Manafort]'s done, in terms of what he's gone through." The President added
3030 that "some of the charges they threw against him, every consultant, every
3031 lobbyist in Washington probably does." In light of the President's counsel's
3032 previous statements that the investigations "might get cleaned up with some
3033 presidential pardons" and that a pardon would be possible if the President
3034 "come[s] to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly," the evidence
3035 supports the inference that the 132
3036
3037RESULT: 64
3038
3039PAGE: 344
3040
3041TEXT:
3042
3043 U.S. Department of Justice AttarRe,? Wark Prad:ttet // Mtt,. CaRtttiR Mttterittl
3044 Prateeted: URd:er Fed:. R. Crim. P. 6(e) President intended Manafort to believe
3045 that he could receive a pardon, which would make cooperation with the government
3046 as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary. We also examined the
3047 evidence of the President's intent in making public statements about Manafort at
3048 the beginning of his trial and when the jury was deliberating. Some evidence
3049 supports a conclusion that the President intended, at least in part, to
3050 influence the jury. The trial generated widespread publicity, and as the jury
3051 began to deliberate, commentators suggested that an acquittal would add to
3052 pressure to end the Special Counsel's investigation. By publicly stating on the
3053 second day of deliberations that Manafort "happens to be a very good person" and
3054 that "it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort" right after calling the
3055 Special Counsel's investigation a "rigged witch hunt," the President's
3056 statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to engender
3057 sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a factfinder could infer that the
3058 President intended that result. But there are alternative explanations for the
3059 President's comments, including that he genuinely felt sorry for Manafort or
3060 that his goal was not to influence the jury but to influence public opinion. The
3061 President's comments also could have been intended to continue sending a message
3062 to Manafort that a pardon was possible. As described above, the President made
3063 his comments about Manafort being "a very good person" immediately after
3064 declining to answer a question about whether he would pardon Manafort. 133
3065
3066RESULT: 65
3067
3068PAGE: 359
3069
3070TEXT:
3071
3072 U.S. Department of Justice Atteme) '.llerk Pretittet // May Cen:taifl Material
3073 Preteetee Uf!tier Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) On April 24, 2018, the President
3074 responded to a reporter's inquiry whether he would consider a pardon for Cohen
3075 with, "Stupid question."1035 On June 8, 2018, the President said he "hadn't even
3076 thought about" pardons for Manafort or Cohen, and continued, "It's far too early
3077 to be thinking about that. They haven't been convicted of anything. There's
3078 nothing to pardon."1036 And on June 15, 2018, the President expressed sympathy
3079 for Cohen, Manafort, and Flynn in a press interview and said, "I feel badly
3080 about a lot of them, because I think a lot of it is very unfair."1037 5. The
3081 President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Government On July 2,
3082 2018, ABC News reported based on an "exclusive" interview with Cohen that Cohen
3083 "strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate with special counsel Robert
3084 Mueller and federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York--even if
3085 that puts President Trump in jeopardy."1038 That week, the media repotted that
3086 Cohen had added an attorney to his legal team who previously had worked as a
3087 legal advisor to President Bill Clinton.1039 Beginning on July 20, 2018, the
3088 media reported on the existence of a recording Cohen had made of a conversation
3089 he had with candidate Trump about a payment made to a second woman who said she
3090 had had an affair with Trump.1040 On July 21, 2018, the President responded:
3091 "Inconceivable that the government would break into a lawyer's office (early in
3092 the almost unheard of. Even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a
3093 client-totally unheard of & perhaps illegal. The good news is that your favorite
3094 President did nothing wrong!"1041 On July 27, 2018, after the media reported
3095 that Cohen was willing to inform investigators that Donald Trump Jr. told his
3096 father about the June 9, 2016 meeting to get "dirt" on Hillary Clinton, 1042 the
3097 President tweeted: "[S]o the Fake News doesn't waste my time with dumb
3098 questions, NO, I did NOT know of the meeting with my son, Don jr. Sounds to me
3099 like someone is trying to make up 1035 Remarks by President Trump and President
3100 Macron of France Before Restricted Bil.ateral Meeting, The White House (Apr. 24,
3101 2018). 1036 President Donald Trump Holds Media Availability Before Departing for
3102 the G-7 Summit, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (June 8, 2018). 1037 Remarks by
3103 President Trump in Press Gaggle, The White House (June 15, 2018). 1038
3104 EXCLUSIVE: Michael Cohen says family and country, not President Trump, is his
3105 'first loyalty', ABC (July 2, 2018). Cohen said in the interview, "To be crystal
3106 clear, my wife, my daughter and my son, and this country have my first loyalty."
3107 1039 See e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Michael Cohen hires Clinton scandal veteran
3108 Lanny Davis, Politico (July 5, 2018). 1040 See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al.,
3109 Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model, New York
3110 Times (July 20, 2018). 1041 @r~alDonaldTrump 7/21/18 (8:10 a.m. ET) Tweet. 1042
3111 See, e.g., Jim Sciutto, Cuomo Prime Time Transcript, CNN (July 26, 2018). 148
3112
3113RESULT: 66
3114
3115PAGE: 360
3116
3117TEXT:
3118
3119 U.S. Department of Justice ,r\M;e,rHe,? '.Ve,rk Pre,ettet // Ma,? Cm1:taiH
3120 Material Pre,teetea UHaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) stories in order to get
3121 himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?). He even retained Bill and
3122 Crooked Hillary's lawyer. Gee, I wonder if they helped him make the choice!"1043
3123 On August 21, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to
3124 eight felony charges, including two counts of campaign-finance violations based
3125 on the payments he had made during the final weeks of the campaign to women who
3126 said they had affairs with the President.1044 During the plea hearing, Cohen
3127 stated that he had worked "at the direction of' the candidate in making those
3128 payments.1045 The next day, the President contrasted Cohen's cooperation with
3129 Manafort's refusal to cooperate, tweeting, "I feel very badly for Paul Manafort
3130 and his wonderful family. 'Justice' took a 12 year old tax case, among other
3131 things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused
3132 to 'break'-make up stories in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for a brave
3133 man!"1046 On September 17, 2018, this Office submitted written questions to the
3134 President that included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow project and
3135 attached Cohen's written statement to Congress and the Letter of Intent signed
3136 by the President.1047 Among other issues, the questions asked the President to
3137 describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with Cohen about the
3138 project, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether the
3139 President "at any time direct[ ed] or suggest[ ed] that discussions about the
3140 Trump Moscow project should cease," or whether the President was "informed at
3141 any time that the project had been abandoned."1048 On November 20, 2018, the
3142 President submitted written responses that did not answer those questions about
3143 Trump Tower Moscow directly and did not provide any information about the timing
3144 of the candidate's discussions with Cohen about the project or whether he
3145 participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer
3146 pursued.1049 Instead, the President's answers stated in relevant part: I had few
3147 conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall; they were brief, and
3148 they were not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and I do not
3149 recall any discussion of travel to Russia in connection with it. I do not
3150 remember discussing it with 1043 @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:26 a.m. ET) Tweet;
3151 @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:38 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:56
3152 a.m. ET) Tweet. At the time of these tweets, the press had reported that Cohen's
3153 financial interests in taxi cab medallions were being scrutinized by
3154 investigators. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump
3155 Discussing Payment to Playboy Model, New York Times (July 20, 2018). 1044 Cohen
3156 Information. 1045 Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript, at 23. 1046 @realDonaldTrurnp
3157 8/22/18 (9:21 a.m. ET) Tweet. 1047 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to
3158 President's Personal Counsel (attaching written questions for the President,
3159 with attachments). 1048 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's
3160 Personal Counsel (attaching written questions for the President), Question III,
3161 Parts (a) through (g). 1049 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20,
3162 2018). 149
3163
3164RESULT: 67
3165
3166PAGE: 367
3167
3168TEXT:
3169
3170 U.S. Department of Justice Attoff\e)" Wodc Pfoelttet // Mtt)" CoHtttiA Materittl
3171 Proteeteel UHeer Feel. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 111. The President's concern about
3172 Cohen cooperating may have been directed at the Southern District of New York
3173 investigation into other aspects of the President's dealings with Cohen rather
3174 than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow. There also is some evidence that
3175 the President's concern about Cohen cooperating was based on the President's
3176 stated belief that Cohen would provide false testimony against the President in
3177 an attempt to obtain a lesser sentence for his unrelated criminal conduct. The
3178 President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen, refused to "break" and "make up
3179 stories in order to get a 'deal."' And after Cohen pleaded guilty to making
3180 false statements to Congress, the President said, "what [Cohen]'s trying to do
3181 is get a reduced sentence. So he's lying about a project that everybody knew
3182 about." But the President also appeared to defend the underlying conduct,
3183 saying, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't matter because I was allowed to
3184 do whatever I wanted during the campaign." As described above, there is evidence
3185 that the President knew that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump
3186 Tower Moscow project and that Cohen did so to protect the President and minimize
3187 the President's connections to Russia during the campaign. iv. Finally, the
3188 President's statements insinuating that members of Cohen's family committed
3189 crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as an
3190 effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the
3191 President by Cohen or others. It is possible that the President believes, as
3192 reflected in his tweets, that Cohen "ma[d]e[] up stories" in order to get a deal
3193 for himself and "get his wife and father-in-law ... off Scott Free." It also is
3194 possible that the President's mention of Cohen's wife and father-in-law were not
3195 intended to affect Cohen as a witness but rather were part of a public-relations
3196 strategy aimed at discrediting Cohen and deflecting attention away from the
3197 President on Cohen-related matters. But the President's suggestion that Cohen's
3198 family members committed crimes happened more than once, including just before
3199 Cohen was sentenced (at the same time as the President stated that Cohen
3200 "should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence") and again just
3201 before Cohen was scheduled to testify before Congress. The timing of the
3202 statements supports an inference that they were intended at least in part to
3203 discourage Cohen from further cooperation. L. Overarching Factual Issues
3204 Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or
3205 declination decision, the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant
3206 to analysis of the facts concerning the President's course of conduct. 1. Three
3207 features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland
3208 obstructionjustice prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice. First, the
3209 conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate
3210 the President's constitutional authority and raises garden-variety obstruction-
3211 of-justice issues. Other events we investigated, however, drew upon the
3212 President's Article II authority, which raised constitutional issues that we
3213 address in Volume II, Section III.B, infra. A factual analysis of that conduct
3214 would have to take into account both that the President's acts were facially
3215 lawful and that his position as head of the Executive Branch provides him with
3216 unique and powerful means of influencing official proceedings, subordinate
3217 officers, and potential witnesses. 156
3218
3219RESULT: 68
3220
3221PAGE: 400
3222
3223TEXT:
3224
3225 U.S. Department of Justice At:t:orflc)' Work Proauet II Ma)' CoHtaifl Material
3226 Protcetca UHElcr Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(c) APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY The following
3227 glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities
3228 referenced in the two volumes of this report. It is not intended to be
3229 comprehensive and is intended only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of
3230 the report. Agalarov, Aras Agalarov, Emin Akhmetov, Rinat Akhmetshin, Rinat
3231 Aslanov, Dzheykhun (Jay) Assange, Julian Aven, Petr Bannon, Stephen (Steve)
3232 Baranov, Andrey Berkowitz, A vi Boente, Dana Bogacheva, Anna Bossert, Thomas
3233 (Tom) Referenced Persons Russian real-estate developer ( owner of the Crocus
3234 Group); met Donald Trump in connection with the Miss Universe pageant and helped
3235 arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya
3236 and Trump Campaign officials. Performer, executive vice president of Crocus
3237 Group, and son of Aras Agalarov; helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at
3238 Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. Former
3239 member in the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to conduct work for
3240 Ukrainian political pai1y, the Party of Regions. U.S. lobbyist and associate of
3241 Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
3242 between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. Head of U.S. department of
3243 the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an "active measures" social media
3244 campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Founder of
3245 WikiLeaks, which in 2016 posted on the internet documents stolen from entities
3246 and individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party. Chairman of the board of
3247 Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the Presidential Transition Team in
3248 connection with anticipated post-election sanctions. White House chief
3249 strategist and senior counselor to President Trump (Jan. 2017-Aug.2017); chief
3250 executive of the Trump Campaign. Director of investor relations at Russian
3251 state-owned oil company, Rosneft, and associate of Carter Page. Assistant to
3252 Jared Kushner. Acting Attorney General (Jan. 2017 -Feb. 2017); Acting Deputy
3253 Attorney General (Feb. 2017 -Apr. 2017). Internet Research Agency employee who
3254 worked on "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016
3255 U.S. presidential election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses
3256 in 2014. Former homeland security advisor to the President who also served as a
3257 senior official on the Presidential Transition Team. B-1
3258
3259RESULT: 69
3260
3261PAGE: 402
3262
3263TEXT:
3264
3265 U.S. Department of Justice Attorfte)' '.\'erk Product// Ma)' Co1,tai1, Material
3266 Protected U1,der Fed. R. Criltl.. P. 6(e) Conway, Kellyanne Counselor to
3267 President Trump and manager of the Trump Campaign. Corallo, Mark Spokesman for
3268 President Trump's personal legal team (June 2017 -July 2017). Corsi, Jerome
3269 Costello, Robert Credico, Randolph (Randy) Davis, Richard (Rick) Jr. Dearborn,
3270 Rick Dempsey, Michael Denman, Diana Deripaska, Oleg Dhillon, Uttam Dmitriev, Ki
3271 rill Donaldson, Annie Dvorkovich, Arkady Dvoskin, Evgeney Eisenberg, John
3272 Erchova, Lana (a/k/a Lana Alexander) Attorney who represented he had a close
3273 relationship with Rudolph Giuliani, the President's personal counsel. Radio talk
3274 show host who interviewed Julian Assange in 2016. Partner with Pegasus
3275 Sustainable Century Merchant Bank, business partner of Paul Manafort, and co-
3276 founder of the Davis Manafort lobbying firm. Former White House deputy chief of
3277 staff for policy who previously served as chief of staff to Senator Jeff
3278 Sessions. Office of Director of National Intelligence official who recalled
3279 discussions with Dan Coats after Coats's meeting with President Trump on March
3280 22, 2017. Delegate to 2016 Republican National Convention who proposed a
3281 platform plank amendment that included armed support for Ukraine. Russian
3282 businessman with ties to Vladimir Putin who hired Paul Manafort for consulting
3283 work between 2005 and 2009. Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office (Jan.
3284 2017-June 2018). Head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDlF); met with
3285 Erik Prince in the Seychelles in January 2017 and, separately, drafted a Russia
3286 reconciliation plan with Rick Gerson. Chief of staff to White House Counsel
3287 Donald McGahn (Jan.2017 -Dec. 2018). Deputy prime minister of the Russian
3288 Federation and chairman of the board of directors of the New Economic School in
3289 Moscow. He met with Carter Page twice in 2016. Executive of Gen bank in Crimea
3290 and associate of Felix Sater. Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office and
3291 legal counsel for the National Security Council. Ex-wife of Dmitry Klokov who
3292 emailed Ivanka Trump to introduce Klokov to the Trump Campaign in the fall of
3293 2015. B-3
3294
3295RESULT: 70
3296
3297PAGE: 403
3298
3299TEXT:
3300
3301 U.S. Department of Justice Attort1e:,? Work Pl'oEluet // Ma:,? Cot1tain Material
3302 ProteeteEI Ut1tler Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Fabrizio, Anthony (Tony) Fishbein,
3303 Jason Flynn, Michael G. (a/k/a Michael Flynn Jr.) Flynn, Michael T. Foresman,
3304 Robert (Bob) Futerfas, Alan Garten, Alan Gates, Richard (Rick) III Gerson,
3305 Richard (Rick) Gistaro, Edward Glassner, Michael Goldstone, Robert Gordon,
3306 Jeffrey (J.D.) Gorkov, Sergey Graff, Rhona Partner at the research and
3307 consulting firm Fabrizio, Lee & Associates. He was a pollster for the Trump
3308 Campaign and worked with Paul Manafort on Ukraine-related polling after the
3309 election. Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent
3310 WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump.org on September 20,
3311 2016. Son of Michael T. Flynn, National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017-Feb. 13,
3312 2017). National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 -Feb. 13, 2017), Director of the
3313 Defense Intelligence Agency (July 2012-Aug.7, 2014), and Trump Campaign advisor.
3314 He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about communications with Ambassador
3315 Sergey Kislyak in December 2016. Investment banker who sought meetings with the
3316 Trump Campaign in spring 2016 to discuss Russian foreign policy, and after the
3317 election met with Michael Flynn. Outside counsel for the Trump Organization and
3318 subsequently personal counsel for Donald Trump Jr. General counsel of the Trump
3319 Organization. Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural
3320 Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort. He pleaded
3321 guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate U.S. laws, as well
3322 as making false statements to the FBI. New York hedge fund manager and associate
3323 of Jared Kushner. During the transition period, he worked with Kirill Dmitriev
3324 on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia. Deputy
3325 Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration. Political
3326 director of the Trump Campaign who helped introduce George Papadopoulos to
3327 others in the Trump Campaign. Publicist for Emin Agalarov who contacted Donald
3328 Trump Jr. to arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia
3329 Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. National security advisor to the
3330 Trump Campaign involved in changes to the Republican party platform and who
3331 communicated with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at the Republican National
3332 Convention. Chairman of Vnesheconombank (VEB), a Russian state-owned bank, who
3333 met with Jared Kushner during the transition period. Senior vice-president and
3334 executive assistant to Donald J. Trump at the Trump Organization. B-4
3335
3336RESULT: 71
3337
3338PAGE: 404
3339
3340TEXT:
3341
3342 U.S. Department of Justice /\Horney \l/01?k Prodttet // May Cot?taitt Material
3343 Prntectcd Uttdcr Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c) Hawker, Jonathan Heilbrunn, Jacob Hicks,
3344 Hope Holt, Lester Hunt, Jody Ivanov, Igor Ivanov, Sergei Kasowitz, Marc Katsyv,
3345 Denis Katsyv, Peter Kaveladze, IrakJi (Ike) Kaverzina, Irina Kelly, John
3346 Khalilzad, Zalmay Kilimnik, Konstantin Kislyak, Sergey Klimentov, Denis Harm to
3347 Ongoing Matter Public relations consultant at FTI Consulting; worked with Davis
3348 Manafort International LLC on public relations campaign in Ukraine. Editor of
3349 the National Interest, the periodical that officially hosted candidate Trump's
3350 April 2016 foreign policy speech. White House communications director (Aug. 2017
3351 -Mar. 2018) and press secretary for the Trump Campaign. NBC News anchor who
3352 interviewed President Trump on May 11, 2017. Chief of staff to Attorney General
3353 Jeff Sessions (Feb. 2017 -Oct. 2017). President of the Russian International
3354 Affairs Council and former Russian foreign minister. Ivan Timofeev told George
3355 Papadopoulos that Ivanov advised on arranging a "Moscow visit" for the Trump
3356 Campaign. Special representative of Vladimir Putin, former Russian deputy prime
3357 minister, and former FSB deputy director. In January 2016, Michael Cohen emailed
3358 the Kremlin requesting to speak to Ivanov. President Trump's personal counsel
3359 (May 2017 -July 2017). Son of Peter Katsyv; owner of Russian company Prevezon
3360 Holdings Ltd. and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya. Russian businessman and
3361 father of Denis Katsyv. Harm to Ongoing Matter Vice president at Crocus Group
3362 and Aras Agalarov's deputy in the United States. He participated in the June 9,
3363 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign
3364 officials. Employee of the internet Research Agency, which engaged in an "active
3365 measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential
3366 election. White House chief of staff (July 2017 -Jan.2019). U.S. special
3367 representative to Afghanistan and former U.S. ambassador. He met with Senator
3368 Jeff Sessions during foreign policy dinners put together through the Center for
3369 the National Interest. Russian-Ukrainian political consultant and long-time
3370 employee of Paul Manafort assessed by the FBI to have ties to Russian
3371 intelligence. Former Russian ambassador to the United States and current Russian
3372 senator from Mordovia. Employee of the New Economic School who informed high-
3373 ranking Russian government officials of Carter Page's July 2016 visit to Moscow.
3374 B-5
3375
3376RESULT: 72
3377
3378PAGE: 406
3379
3380TEXT:
3381
3382 U.S. Department of Justice AUor1rn)1 Work Prodttet // May Cm1taitt Material
3383 Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Malloch, Theodore (Ted) Manafort, Paul
3384 Jr. Mashburn, John McCabe, Andrew McCord, Mary McFarland, Kathleen (K.T.)
3385 McGahn, Donald (Don) Medvedcv, Dmitry Melnik, Yuriy Mifsud, Joseph Miller, Matt
3386 Miller, Stephen Millian, Sergei Mnuchin, Steven Miiller-Maguhn, Andrew Nader,
3387 George Netyksho, Viktor the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial and travel
3388 sanctions on Russian officials. Chief executive officer of Global Fiduciary
3389 Governance and the Roosevelt Group. He was a London-based associate of Jerome
3390 Corsi. Trump campaign member (March 2016-Aug. 2016) and chairman and chief
3391 strategist (May 2016 -Aug. 2016). Trump administration official and former
3392 policy director to the Trump Campaign. Acting director of the FBI (May 2017
3393 -Aug. 2017); deputy director of the FBI (Feb. 2016 -Jan. 2018). Acting Assistant
3394 Attorney General (Oct. 2016-May 2017). Deputy White House National Security
3395 Advisor (Jan. 2017-May 2017). White House Counsel (Jan. 2017 -Oct. 2018). Prime
3396 Minister of Russia. Spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C.,
3397 who connected with George Papadopoulos on social media. Maltese national and
3398 former London-based professor who, immediately after returning from Moscow in
3399 April 2016, told George Papadopoulos that the Russians had "dirt" in the form of
3400 thousands of Clinton emails. Trump Campaign staff member who was present at the
3401 meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee in July 2016.
3402 Senior advisor to the President. Founder of the Russian American Chamber of
3403 Commerce who met with George Papadopoulos during the campaign. Secretary of the
3404 Treasury. Harm to Ongoing Matter Member of hacker association Chaos Computer
3405 Club and associate of Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks. Advisor to the
3406 United Arab Emirates's Crown Prince who arranged a meeting between Kirill
3407 Dmitriev and Erik Prince during the transition period. Russian military officer
3408 in command of a unit involved in Russian hacand-release operations to interfere
3409 in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. B-7
3410
3411RESULT: 73
3412
3413PAGE: 407
3414
3415TEXT:
3416
3417 U.S. Department of Justice Att:erne)" Werle Prnelttet // Ma)' CeRtaiR Material
3418 Prnteeteel UReief Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Oganov, Georgiy Oknyansky, Henry (a/k/a
3419 Henry Greenberg) Page, Carter Papadopoulos, George Parscale, Bradley Patten,
3420 William (Sam) Jr. Peskov, Dmitry Phares, Walid Pinedo, Richard Podesta, John Jr.
3421 Podobnyy, Victor Poliakova, Elena Polonskaya, Olga Pompeo, Michael Porter,
3422 Robert Priebus, Reince Advisor to Oleg Deripaska and a board member of
3423 investment company Basic Element. He met with Paul Manafort in Spain in early
3424 2017. Florida-based Russian individual who claimed to have derogatory
3425 information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. He met with Roger Stone in May 2016.
3426 Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who advocated Russian views and
3427 made July 2016 and December 2016 visits to Moscow. Foreign policy advisor to the
3428 Trump Campaign who received information from Joseph Mifsud that Russians had
3429 "dirt" in the form of thousands of Clinton emails. He pleaded guilty to lying to
3430 the FBI about his contact with Mifsud. Digital media director for the 2016 Trump
3431 Campaign. Lobbyist and business partner of Konstantin Kilimnik. Deputy chief of
3432 staff of and press secretary for the Russian presidential administration.
3433 Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and co-secretary general of the
3434 Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism (TAG). U.S. person who
3435 pleaded guilty to a single-count information of identity fraud. Clinton campaign
3436 chairman whose email account was hacked by the GRU. WikiLeaks released his
3437 stolen emails during the 2016 campaign. Russian intelligence officer who
3438 interacted with Carter Page while operating inside the United States; later
3439 charged in 2015 with conspiring to act as an unregistered agent of Russia.
3440 Personal assistant to Dmitry Peskov who responded to Michael Cohen's outreach
3441 about the Trump Tower Moscow project in January 2016. Russian national
3442 introduced to George Papadopoulos by Joseph Mifsud as an individual with
3443 connections to Vladimir Putin. U.S. Secretary of State; director of the Central
3444 Intelligence Agency (Jan. 2017-Apr. 2018). White House staff secretary (Jan.
3445 2017 -Feb. 2018). White House chief of staff (Jan. 2017 -July 2017); chair of
3446 the Republican National Committee (Jan. 2011-Jan. 2017). Prigozhin, Yevgeniy
3447 Head of Russian companies Concord-Catering and Concord Management and
3448 Consulting; supported and financed the Internet Research Agency, which engaged
3449 in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
3450 presidential election. B-8
3451
3452RESULT: 74
3453
3454PAGE: 409
3455
3456TEXT:
3457
3458 U.S. Depa11ment of Justice Atterne)1 Werlt Predttet // May Ce11tB:i11 Material
3459 Preteeted U11der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Smith, Peter Spicer, Sean Stone, Roger
3460 Tillerson, Rex Timofeev, Ivan Trump, Donald Jr. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka
3461 Ushakov, Yuri Viktorovich Vaino, Anton Van der Zwaan, Alexander Vargas,
3462 Catherine Vasilchenko, Gleb Veselnitskaya, Natalia Weber, Shlomo Investment
3463 banker active in Republican politics who sought to obtain Hillary Clinton emails
3464 during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period. White House press secretary
3465 and communications director (Jan. 2017 -July 2017). U.S. Secretary of State
3466 (Feb. 2017-Mar. 2018). Director of programs at the Russian International Affairs
3467 Council and program director of the Valdai Discussion Club who communicated in
3468 2016 with George Papadopoulos, attempting to arrange a meeting between the
3469 Russian government and the Trump Campaign. President Trump's son; trustee and
3470 executive vice president of the Trump Organization; helped arrange and attended
3471 the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump
3472 Campaign officials. President Trump's son; trustee and executive vice president
3473 of the Trump Organization. President Trump's daughter; advisor to the President
3474 and former executive vice president of the Trump Organization. Aide to Vladimir
3475 Putin and former Russian ambassador to the United States; identified to the
3476 Presidential Transition Team as the proposed channel to the Russian government.
3477 Chief of staff to Russian president Vladimir Putin. Former attorney at Skadden,
3478 Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP; worked with Paul Manafort and Rick Gates.
3479 Executive assistant to Jared Kushner. Internet Research Agency employee who
3480 engaged in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016
3481 U.S. presidential election. Russian attorney who advocated for the repeal of the
3482 Magnitsky Act and was the principal speaker at the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump
3483 Tower with Trump Campaign officials. Rector of the New Economic School (NES) in
3484 Moscow who invited Carter Page to speak at NES commencement in July 2016.
3485 Yanukovych, Viktor Former president of Ukraine who had worked with Paul
3486 Manafort. B-10
3487
3488RESULT: 75
3489
3490PAGE: 411
3491
3492TEXT:
3493
3494 U.S. Department of Justice Attorne)" Wol'lt Predttet // Mey Cofltttifl Meteriel
3495 Proteeted U1~der Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) Guccifer 2.0 I.C. Expert Investment
3496 Company Internet Research Agency (IRA) KLS Research LLC Kremlin LetterOne Link
3497 Campus University London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP) Main
3498 Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) New Economic School in
3499 Moscow (NES) Opposition Bloc Party of Regions Pericles Emerging Market Partners
3500 LLP Prevezon Holdings Ltd. Roscongress Foundation Rosneft Russian Direct
3501 Investment Fund Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released
3502 stolen documents during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period. Russian
3503 real-estate and development corporation that signed a letter of intent with a
3504 Trump Organization subsidiary to develop a Trump Moscow property. Russian entity
3505 based in Saint Petersburg and funded by Concord that engaged in an "active
3506 measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 20 I 6 V,S. presidential
3507 election. Business established by an associate of and at the direction of Peter
3508 Smith to further Smith's search for Hillary Clinton emails. Official residence
3509 of the president of the Russian Federation; it is used colloquially to refer to
3510 the office of the president or the Russian government. Company that includes
3511 Petr Aven and Richard Burt as board members. During a board meeting in December
3512 2016, Aven asked for Burt's help to make contact with the Presidential
3513 Transition Team. University in Rome, Italy, where George Papadopoulos was
3514 introduced to Joseph Mifsud. International law advisory organization in London
3515 that employed Joseph Mifsud and George Papadopoulos. Russian Federation's
3516 military intelligence agency. Moscow-based school that invited Carter Page to
3517 speak at its July 2016 commencement ceremony. Ukrainian political party that
3518 incorporated members of the defunct Party of Regions. Ukrainian political party
3519 of former President Yanukovych. It was generally understood to align with
3520 Russian policies. Company registered in the Cayman Islands by Paul Manafort and
3521 his business partner Rick Davis. Oleg Deripaska invested in the fund. Russian
3522 company that was a defendant in a U.S. civil action alleging the laundering of
3523 proceeds from fraud exposed by Sergei Magnitsky. Russian entity that organized
3524 the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Russian state-owned oil and
3525 energy company. Sovereign wealth fund established by the Russian Government in
3526 2011 and headed by Kirill Dmitriev. B-12
3527
3528RESULT: 76
3529
3530PAGE: 418
3531
3532TEXT:
3533
3534 U.S. Department of Justice AttorHey Work Proettet // May CeHtaiH Mat:erial
3535 Proteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) WRITTEN QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED UNDER
3536 OATH BY PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP I. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower a. When
3537 did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was
3538 considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially
3539 negative information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the
3540 information from and the substance of the discussion. b. Attached to this
3541 document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between, among
3542 others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the emails reflected
3543 in Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other communications with Rob Goldstone and
3544 Emin Agalarov between June 3, 2016, and June 9, 2016. i. Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or
3545 anyone else tell you about or show you any of these communications? If yes,
3546 describe who discussed the communications with you, when, and the substance of
3547 the discussion(s). ii. When did you first see or learn about all or any part of
3548 the emails reflected in Exhibit A? iii. When did you first learn that the
3549 proposed meeting involved or was described as being part of Russia and its
3550 government's support for your candidacy? iv. Did you suggest to or direct anyone
3551 not to discuss or release publicly all or any portion of the emails reflected in
3552 Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you communicated with, when, the substance of
3553 the communication(s), and why you took that action. c. On June 9, 2016, Donald
3554 Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a meeting at Trump Tower
3555 with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer, Natalia Veselnitskaya (the
3556 11June 9 meeting"). i. Other than as set forth in your answers to I.a and l.b,
3557 what, if anything, were you told about the possibility of this meeting taking
3558 place, or the scheduling of such a meeting? Describe who you discussed this
3559 with, when, and what you were informed about the meeting. ii. When did you learn
3560 that some of the individuals attending the June 9 meeting were Russian or had
3561 any affiliation with any part of the Russian government? Describe who you
3562 learned this information from and the substance of the discussion(s). iii. What
3563 were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting? Describe each
3564 conversation in which you were told about what was discussed at the meeting, who
3565 the conversation was with, when it occurred, and the substance of the statements
3566 they made about the meeting. C-3
3567
3568RESULT: 77
3569
3570PAGE: 419
3571
3572TEXT:
3573
3574 U.S. Department of Justice Attort'iey Work Proattet // Ma)'' Cotttaitt Material
3575 Proteetea Uttaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting
3576 was about, in whole or in part, adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes,
3577 describe who you had that discussion with, when, and the substance of the
3578 discussion. d. For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what
3579 portion of each day were you in Trump Tower? i. Did you speak or meet with
3580 Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016? If yes, did
3581 any portion of any of those conversations or meetings include any reference to
3582 any aspect of the June 9 meeting? If yes, describe who you spoke with and the
3583 substance of the conversation. e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly
3584 with any member or representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If
3585 yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the communication.
3586 f. Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort,
3587 or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family,
3588 Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that
3589 took place after June 9, 2016 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by
3590 Russia to assist the campaign? If yes, describe who you learned this information
3591 from, when, and the substance of what you learned. g. On June 7, 2016, you gave
3592 a speech in which you said, in part, "I am going to give a major speech on
3593 probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things
3594 that have taken place with the Clintons." i. Why did you make that statement?
3595 ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons? iii.
3596 What did you believe the source(s) of that information would be? iv. Did you
3597 expect any of the information to have come from the June 9 meeting? v. Did
3598 anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to? If so, who? vi. Why did
3599 you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7, 2016? h. Did any
3600 person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the
3601 Russian government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary
3602 Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you were
3603 informed, and the content of such discussion(s). i. Did any person or entity
3604 inform you during the campaign that any foreign government or foreign leader,
3605 other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided, wished to provide, or offered
3606 to provide tangible support to your campaign, including by way of offering to
3607 provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If C-4
3608
3609RESULT: 78
3610
3611PAGE: 420
3612
3613TEXT:
3614
3615 U.S. Department of Justice Attel'fl:e~? '.\'e,rk Preclttet // Ma)' CeAtaiA
3616 Material Pre,teetecl UAcler Fecl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) II. yes, describe the
3617 source{s) of the information, when you were informed, and the content of such
3618 discussion(s). Russian Hacking/ Russian Efforts Using Social Media / Wikileaks
3619 a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had
3620 penetrated the computer network of the Democratic National Committee {DNC) and
3621 that Russian intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to
3622 June 14, 2016, were you provided any information about any potential or actual
3623 hacking of the computer systems or email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic
3624 Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton,
3625 or individuals associated with the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who
3626 provided this information, when, and the substance of the information. b. On
3627 July 22, 2016, Wikileaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by
3628 Democratic party officials. i. Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you
3629 aware from any source that Wikileaks, Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or
3630 potentially had possession of or planned to release emails or information that
3631 could help your campaign or hurt the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who you
3632 discussed this issue with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). ii.
3633 After the release of emails by Wikileaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that
3634 Wikileaks possessed or might possess additional information that could be
3635 released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information,
3636 when, and what you were told. c. Are you aware of any communications during the
3637 campaign, directly or indirectly, between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul
3638 Manafort, or Rick Gates and {a) Wikileaks, {b) Julian Assange, (c) other
3639 representatives of Wikileaks, {d) Guccifer 2.0, (e) representatives of Guccifer
3640 2.0, or {f) representatives of DCLeaks? If yes, describe who provided you with
3641 this information, when you learned of the communications, and what you know
3642 about those communications. d. On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press
3643 conference: "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000
3644 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our
3645 press." i. Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any other
3646 country, entity, or individual? ii. In advance of making that statement, what
3647 discussions, if any, did you have with anyone else about the substance of the
3648 statement? iii. Were you told at any time before or after you made that
3649 statement that Russia was attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or
3650 email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign? If yes, describe who provided
3651 this information, when, and what you were told. C-5
3652
3653RESULT: 79
3654
3655PAGE: 423
3656
3657TEXT:
3658
3659 U.S. Department of Justice Atleme~? Werk Pretlttet // May Ce!ltttill Material
3660 Preteetee U!leer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(c) IV. Contacts with Russia and Russia-
3661 Related Issues During the Campaign a. Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become
3662 aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the Ukrainian government? If yes, describe
3663 who you learned this information from, when, and the substance of what you were
3664 told. Did Mr. Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or Russian governments
3665 play any role in your decision to have him join your campaign? If yes, describe
3666 that role. b. Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the
3667 progress of your campaign to Oleg Deripaska? If yes, describe who you learned
3668 this information from, when, the substance of what you were told, what you
3669 understood the purpose was of sharing such information with Mr. Deripaska, and
3670 how you responded to learning this information. c. Were you aware of whether
3671 Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your campaign sent or directed
3672 others to send internal Trump campaign information to any person located in
3673 Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or Russian governments? If
3674 yes, identify who provided you with this information, when, the substance of the
3675 discussion(s), what you understood the purpose was of sharing the internal
3676 campaign information, and how you responded to learning this information. d. Did
3677 Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly, any positions Ukraine
3678 or Russia would want the U.S. to support? If yes, describe when he communicated
3679 those positions to you and the substance of those communications. e. During the
3680 campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with you or
3681 senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had conversations with
3682 on this topic, when, and what you were told. f. What role, if any, did you have
3683 in changing the Republican Party platform regarding arming Ukraine during the
3684 Republican National Convention? Prior to the convention, what information did
3685 you have about this platform provision? After the platform provision was
3686 changed, who told you about the change, when did they tell you, what were you
3687 told about why it was changed, and who was involved? g. On July 27, 2016, in
3688 response to a question about whether you would recognize Crimea as Russian
3689 territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: "We'll be looking at that.
3690 Yeah, we'll be looking." Did you intend to communicate by that statement or at
3691 any other time during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and/or
3692 recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected? C-8
3693
3694RESULT: 80
3695
3696PAGE: 426
3697
3698TEXT:
3699
3700 U.S. Department of Justice AMenwy Werk Preattet // Ma:,? Contain Mate1?ial
3701 Preteetea Unaer Feel. R. Ct1ittt. P. 6(e) I. a. b. RESPONSES OF PRESIDENT DONALD
3702 J. TRUMP June 9. 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower When did you first learn that
3703 Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was considering participating
3704 in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about
3705 Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the information from and the substance
3706 of the discussion. Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails
3707 from June 2016 between, among others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In
3708 addition to the emails reflected in. Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other
3709 communications with Rob Goldstone and ?min Agalarov between )une 3, 2016, and
3710 June 9, 2016. i. Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you
3711 any of these communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications
3712 with you, when, and the substance of the discussion(s), 11. When did you first
3713 see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? iii.
3714 When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved cir was described as
3715 being part of Russia and its government's support for your candidacy? 1v. Did
3716 you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any
3717 portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you
3718 communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and why you took
3719 that action. c. On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared
3720 Kushner attended a meeting at Trump Tower with several individuals, including a
3721 Russian lawyer, Natalia Yeselnitskaya (the "June 9 meeting"). i. Other than as
3722 set fotth in your answers to I.a and l.b, what, if anything, were you told about
3723 the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the scheduling of such a
3724 meeting? Describe who you discussed this with, when, and what you were informed
3725 about the meeting. ii. When did you learn that some of the individuals attending
3726 the June 9 meeting were Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the
3727 Russian government? Describe who you learned this information from and the
3728 substance of the discussion(s). 6 C-11
3729
3730RESULT: 81
3731
3732PAGE: 427
3733
3734TEXT:
3735
3736 U.S. Department of Justice Atte,n1ey 'Nork Prne1:1et // M1t:,? Ce,Ht1tiH
3737 M1tteri1tl Pre,teetee UHeer Fee. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) iii. What were you told
3738 about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting? Describe each conversation in
3739 which you were told about whal was discussed at lhe meeting, who the
3740 conversation was with, when it occurred, and the substance of the statements
3741 lhey made about the meeting. iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was
3742 about, in whole or in part, adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe
3743 who you had that discussion with, when, and the substance of the discussion. d.
3744 For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion of each day
3745 were you in Trump Tower? 1. Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul
3746 Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016? If yes, did any portion of any of
3747 those conversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect of the June
3748 9 meeting? If yes, describe who you spoke with and the substance of the
3749 conversation. e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or
3750 representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who
3751 you spoke with, when, and the substance of the communication. f. Did you learn
3752 of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manaforl, or Jared Kushner
3753 and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Natalia Veselnitskaya,
3754 Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took place after June 9,
3755 20 l 6 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist the
3756 campaign? If yes. describe who you learned this information from, when, and the
3757 substance of what you learned. g. On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which
3758 you said, in part,'?[ am going to give a major speech on probably Monday of next
3759 week and we're going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place
3760 with the Clintons.'' 1. Why did you make that statement? ii. What information
3761 did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons? 111. What did you believe
3762 the source(s) of that information would be? iv. Did you expect any of the
3763 information to have come from the June 9 meeting? v. Did anyone help draft the
3764 speech that you were referring to? If so, who? vt. Why did you ultimately not
3765 give the speech you referenced on June 7, 2016? h. Did any person or entity
3766 inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian 7 C-12
3767
3768RESULT: 82
3769
3770PAGE: 428
3771
3772TEXT:
3773
3774 U.S. Department of Justice AtteirRey \Ve,rk Preifittet // MB:)' CeiRtB:iR
3775 MateriB:I Pre,teetefi Uttfier Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) government supported your
3776 candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the
3777 source(s) of the information. when you were informed, and the content of such
3778 discussion(s). 1. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that
3779 any foreign government or foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin,
3780 had provided, wished to provide, or offered to provide tangible support to your
3781 campaign, including by way of offering to provide negative information on
3782 Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you
3783 were informed, and the content of such discussion(s). Response to Question l,
3784 Parts (a) through (c) I have no recollection of learning at the time that Donald
3785 Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was considering participating in a
3786 meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary
3787 Clinton. Nor do I recall learning during the campaign that the June 9, 2016
3788 meeting had taken place, that the referenced emails existed. or that Donald J.
3789 Trump, Jr., had other communications with Emin Agalarov or Robert Goldstone
3790 between June 3, 2016 and June 9, 2016. Response to Question I, Part {d) I have
3791 no independent recollection of what portion of these four days in June of2016 I
3792 spent in Trump Tower. This was one of many busy months during a fast-paced
3793 campaign, as the primary season was ending and we were preparing for the general
3794 election campaign. I am now aware that my Campaign's calendar indicates that I
3795 was in New York City from June 6 -9, 2016. Calendars kept in my Trump Tower
3796 office reflect that I had various calls and meetings scheduled for each of these
3797 days. While those calls and meetings may or may not actually have taken place,
3798 they do indicate that I was in Trump Tower during a portion of each of these
3799 working days, and I have no reason to doubt that I was. When I was in New York
3800 City, I stayed at my Trump Tower apartment. My Trump Organization desk calendar
3801 also reflects that I was outside Trump Tower during portions of these days. The
3802 June 7, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to leave Trump Tower in the
3803 early evening for Westchester where I gave remarks after winning the California,
3804 New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota Republican primaries held that
3805 day. The June 8, 2016 calendar indicates a scheduled departure in late afternoon
3806 to attend a ceremony at my son's school. The June 9, 2016 calendar indicates I
3807 was scheduled to attend midday meetings and a fundraising luncheon at the Four
3808 Seasons Hotel. At this point, I do not remember on what dales these events
3809 occurred, but I do not currently have a reason to doubt that they took place as
3810 scheduled on my calendar. Widely available media reports, including television
3811 footage, also shed light on my activities during these days. For example, I am
3812 aware that my June 7, 2016 victory remarks at the Trump 8 C-13
3813
3814RESULT: 83
3815
3816PAGE: 429
3817
3818TEXT:
3819
3820 U.S. Department ofJustice AMerRe)? '.\'erk Preclttet // Ma)' Cm~tttil'l
3821 Mtttel'ittl Preteetecl Uftcler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) National Golf Club in
3822 Briarcliff Manor, New York, were recorded and published by the media. 1 remember
3823 winning those primaries and generally recall delivering remarks that evening. At
3824 this point in time, I do not remember whether I spoke or met with Donald Trump,
3825 Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016. My desk calendar indicates
3826 I was scheduled to meet with Paul Manafort on the morning of June 9, but I do
3827 not recall if that meeting took place. It was more than two years ago, at a time
3828 when I had many calls and interactions daily. ? Response to Question I, Part (e)
3829 I have no independent recollection of any communications I had with the Agalarov
3830 family or anyone r understood to be a representative of the Agalarov family
3831 after June 3, 2016 and before the end of the campaign. While preparing to
3832 respond to these questions, I have become aware of written communications with
3833 the Agalarovs during the campaign that were sent, received, and largely authored
3834 by my staff and which I understand have already been produced to you. In
3835 general, the documents include congratulatory letters on my campaign victories,
3836 emails about a painting Emin and Aras Agalarov arranged to have delivered to
3837 Trump Tower as a birthday present, and emails regarding delivery of a book
3838 written by Aras Agalarov. The documents reflect that the deliveries were
3839 screened by the Secret Service. Response to Question I, Part (t) I do not recall
3840 being aware during the campaign of communications between Donald Trump, Jr.,
3841 Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov
3842 family, Robert Goldstone, Natalia Yeselnitskaya (whose name I was not familiar
3843 with), or anyone I understood to be a Russian official. Response to Question I,
3844 Part (g) In remarks I delivered the night I won the California, New Jersey, New
3845 Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota Republican primaries, I said, "I am going to
3846 give a major speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be
3847 discussing all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons." In
3848 general, l expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available,
3849 negative information about the Clintons, including, for example, Mrs. Clinton's
3850 failed policies, the Clintons' use of the State Department to further their
3851 interests and the interests of the Clinton Foundation, Mrs. Clinton's improper
3852 use of a private server for State Department business, the destruction of 33,000
3853 emails on that server, and Mrs. Clinton's temperamental unsuitability for the
3854 office of President. In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I
3855 have become aware that the Campaign documents already produced to you reflect
3856 the drafting, evolution, and sources of information for the speech I expected to
3857 give "probably" on the Monday fol lowing my June 7, 2016 comments. These
3858 documents generally show that the text of the speech was initially drafted by
3859 Campaign staff 9 C-14
3860
3861RESULT: 84
3862
3863PAGE: 431
3864
3865TEXT:
3866
3867 U.S. Department of Justice Atterfte~? \l/erk Proa1:1et // May Ce11tai11 Material
3868 Proteetea U11aer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) b. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released
3869 nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by Democratic party officials. 1. Prior to
3870 the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that WikiLeaks,
3871 Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had possession of or
3872 planned to release emails or information that could help your campaign or hurt
3873 the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who you discussed this issue with, when,
3874 and the substance of the discussion(s). 11. After the release of emails by
3875 WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that WikiLeaks possessed or might
3876 possess additional information that could be released during the campaign? If
3877 yes, describe who provided this information, when, and what you were told. c.
3878 Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly,
3879 between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and (a)
3880 WikiLeaks, (b) Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Gucci
3881 fer 2.0, (e) representatives of Gucci fer 2.0, or (f) representatives of
3882 DCLeaks? If yes, describe who provided you with this information, when you
3883 learned of the communications, and what you know about those communications. d.
3884 On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: "Russia, if you're
3885 listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I
3886 think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press." 1. Why did you make
3887 that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, entity, or individual?
3888 ii. In advance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have
3889 with anyone else about the substance of the statement? iii. Were you told at any
3890 time before or after you made that statement that Russia was attempting to
3891 infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her
3892 campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and what you
3893 were told. e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta
3894 were released by WikiLeaks. i. Where were you on October 7, 20 I 6? ii. Were you
3895 told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7 release that
3896 WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes,
3897 describe who told you this, when, and what you were told. 11 C-16
3898
3899RESULT: 85
3900
3901PAGE: 435
3902
3903TEXT:
3904
3905 U.S. Depa11rnent of Justice A1:ten~ey Werk Prea1:iet // May Cefltttifl Material
3906 Prnteetea Uf1ae1? Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e) should cease, or were you informed at
3907 any time that the project had been abandoned? If yes, describe who you spoke
3908 with, when, the substance of the discussion(s), and why that decision was made.
3909 f. Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided
3910 publicly or in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual
3911 investments or business deals the Trump Organization had in Russia, including
3912 the Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the
3913 substance of the discussion(s). g. Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you
3914 or the Trump Organization have any other prospective or actual business
3915 interests, investments, or arrangements with Russia or any Russian interest or
3916 Russian individual during the campaign? If yes, describe the business interests,
3917 investments, or arrangements. Response to Question III, Parts (a) through (g)
3918 Sometime in 2015, Michael Cohen suggested to me the possibility of a Trump
3919 Organization project in Moscow. As I recall, Mr. Cohen described this as a
3920 proposed project of a general type we have done in the past in a variety of
3921 locations. I signed the non-binding Letter of Intent attached to your questions
3922 as Exhibit B which required no equity or expenditure on our end and was
3923 consistent with our ongoing efforts to expand into significant markets around
3924 the world. I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall,
3925 they were brief, and they were not memorable. I was not enthused about the
3926 proposal, and 1 do not recall any discussion of travel to Russia in connection
3927 with it. I do not remember discussing it with anyone else at the Trump
3928 Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware at the time
3929 of any communications between Mr. Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian
3930 government official regarding the Letter of Intent. In the course of preparing
3931 to respond to your questions, I have become aware that Mr. Cohen sent an email
3932 regarding the Letter of Intent to "Mr. Peskov" at a general, public email
3933 account, which should show there was no meaningful relationship with people in
3934 power in Russia. I understand those documents already have been provided to you.
3935 I vaguely remember press inquiries and media reporting during the campaign about
3936 whether the Trump Organization had business dealings in Russia. I may have
3937 spoken with campaign staff or Trump Organization employees regarding responses
3938 to requests for information, but 1 have no current recollection of any
3939 particular conversation, with whom L may have spoken, when, or the substance of
3940 any conversation. As I recall, neither I nor the Trump Organization had any
3941 projects or proposed projects in Russia during the campaign other than the
3942 Letter of Tntent. IV. a. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During
3943 the Campaign Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort
3944 had ties to the Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this
3945 information from, when, and the substance of what you were told. Did Mr.
3946 Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or 15 C-20
3947
3948RESULT: 86
3949
3950PAGE: 436
3951
3952TEXT:
3953
3954 U.S. Department of Justice AtternC)" Werk Pretlttct // May Contain Material
3955 Pretcctctl Untlcr Fctl. R. Cri1t1. P. 6(c) Russian governments play any role in
3956 your decision to have him join your campaign? If yes, describe that role. b.
3957 Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your
3958 campaign to Oleg Deripaska? lf yes, describe who you learned this information
3959 from, when, the substance of what you were told, what you understood the purpose
3960 was of sharing such information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you responded to
3961 learning this information. c. Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone
3962 else associated with your campaign sent or directed others to send internal
3963 Trump campaign information to any person located in Ukraine or Russia or
3964 associated with the Ukrainian or Russian governments? If yes, identify who
3965 provided you with this information, when, the substance of the discussion(s),
3966 what you understood the purpose was of sharing the internal campaign
3967 information, and how you responded to learning this information. d. Did Paul
3968 Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly. any positions Ukraine or
3969 Russia would want the U.S. to support? If yes, describe when he communicated
3970 those positions to you and the substance of those communications. e. During the
3971 campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with you or
3972 senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had conversations with
3973 on this topic, when, and what you were told. f. What role, if any, did you have
3974 in changing the Republican Party platform regarding arming Ukraine during the
3975 Republican National Convention? Prior to the convention, what information did
3976 you have about this platform provision? After the platform provision was
3977 changed, who told you about the change, when did they tell you, what were you
3978 told about why it was changed, and who was involved? g. On July 27, 2016, in
3979 response to a question about whether you would recognize Crimea as Russian
3980 territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: "We'll be looking at that.
3981 Yeah, we'll be looking." Did you intend to communicate by that statement or at
3982 any other time during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and/or
3983 recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected? 1. What
3984 consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing Russia's
3985 annexation of Crimea if you were elected? Describe who you spoke with about this
3986 topic, when, the substance of the discussion(s). Response to Question IV, Parts
3987 (a) through (d) Mr. Manafort was hired primarily because of his delegate work
3988 for prior presidential candidates, including Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, George
3989 H.W. Bush, and Bob Dole. I knew that Mr. Manafort had done international
3990 consulting work and, at some time before Mr. Manafort left the 16 C-21
3991
3992RESULT: 87
3993
3994PAGE: 437
3995
3996TEXT:
3997
3998 U.S. Department of Justice Attertte:,? Werk Preettet // Ma:,? Cetttaitt Material
3999 Prnteetee Uttee1? Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) campaign, I learned that he was somehow
4000 involved with individuals concerning Ukraine, but I do not remember the
4001 specifics of what I knew at the time. l had no knowledge of Mr. Manafort
4002 offering briefings on the progress of my campaign to an individual named Oleg
4003 Deripaska, nor do I remember being aware of Mr. Manafort or anyone else
4004 associated with my campaign sending or directing others to send internal Trump
4005 Campaign information to anyone I knew to be in Ukraine or Russia at the time or
4006 to anyone I understood to be a Ukrainian or Russian government employee or
4007 official. I do not remember Mr. Manafort communicating to me any particular
4008 positions Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support. Response to
4009 Question IV, Part (e) I do not recall being told during the campaign of efforts
4010 by Russian officials to meet with me or with senior members of my campaign. In
4011 the process of preparing to respond to these questions, I became aware that on
4012 March 17, 2016, my assistant at the Trump Organization, Rhona Graff, received an
4013 email from a Sergei Prikhodko, who identified himself as Deputy Prime Minister
4014 of the Russian Federation, Foundation Roscongress, inviting me to participate in
4015 the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum to be held in June 2016. The
4016 documents show that Ms. Graff prepared for my signature a brief response
4017 declining the invitation. I understand these documents already have been
4018 produced to you. Response to Question IV, Part (t) I have no recollection of the
4019 details of what, when, or from what source I first learned about the change to
4020 the platform amendment regarding arming Ukraine, but I generally recall learning
4021 of the issue as pa1t of media reporting. I do not recall being involved in
4022 changing the language to the amendment. Response to Question IV, Part (g) My
4023 statement did not communicate any position. V. Contacts with Russia and Russia-
4024 Related Issues During the Transition a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess
4025 Championship gala oo November JO, 2016? If yes, who asked you to attend, when
4026 were you asked, and what were you told about about [sic] why your presence was
4027 requested? 1. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any
4028 interactions you had with any Russians or representatives of the Russian
4029 government at the event. 17 C-22
4030
4031RESULT: 88
4032
4033PAGE: 443
4034
4035TEXT:
4036
4037 U.S. Department of Justice At'lertle)' '.\'erk Preauet // Ma)'' CeAtaiA Material
4038 Preteetea UAaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 3. United States v. Richard Gates U.S.
4039 Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (Awaiting sentencing) 4. United
4040 States v. Internet Research Agency, et al. (Russian Social Media Campaign) U.S.
4041 Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia National Security Division (Post-
4042 indictment, pre-arrest & pre-trial 1) 5. United States v. Konstantin Kilimnik
4043 U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (Post-indictment, pre-
4044 arrest) 6. United States v. Paul Manafort U.S. Attorney's Office for the
4045 District of Columbia U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia
4046 (Post-conviction) 7. United States v. Viktor Netyksho, et al. (Russian Hacking
4047 Operations) U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania
4048 National Security Division (Post-indictment, pre-arrest) 8. United States v.
4049 William Samuel Patten U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
4050 (Awaiting sentencing) The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel
4051 to investigate aspects of Patten's conduct that related to another matter that
4052 was under investigation by the Office. The investigation uncovered evidence of a
4053 crime; the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia handled the
4054 prosecution of Patten. 9. Harm to Ongoing Matter (Investigation ongoing) The
4055 Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among
4056 other things, crime or crimes arising out of payments Paul Manafort received
4057 from the Ukrainian government before and during the tenure of President Viktor
4058 Yanukovych. See August 2, 2017 Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S.
4059 Mueller, Ill. The Acting Attorney General 1 One defendant, Concord Management &
4060 Consulting LLC, appeared through counsel and is in trial litigation. D-2
4061
4062RESULT: 89
4063
4064PAGE: 444
4065
4066TEXT:
4067
4068 U.S. Department of Justice Attorney Work Pree1:1et // May ContaiH Material
4069 Preteetee Uneer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) , ! Harm to Ongoing Matter On October
4070 27, 2017, Paul Manafort and Richard Gates were charged in the District of
4071 Columbia with various crimes (including FARA) in connection with work they
4072 performed for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. On February 22, 2018,
4073 Manafort and Gates were charged in the Eastern District of Virginia with various
4074 other crimes in connection with the payments they received for work performed
4075 for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. During the course of its , the
4076 Special Counsel's Office developed substantial evidence with respect to
4077 individuals and enti ies that wer On February 23, 2018, Gates pleaded guilty in
4078 the District of Columbia to a object conspiracy and to making false statements;
4079 the remaining charges against Gates were dismissed.3 Thereafter, in consultation
4080 with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special Counsel's Office
4081 closed the and referred them 1if?rn? for further investigation as it deemed
4082 appropriate. The Office based its decision to close those matters on its
4083 mandate, the indictments.ofManafort, Gates's plea, and its determination as to
4084 how best to allocate its resources, among other reasons; At Harm to Ongoing
4085 Matter the investigation of those closed matters. 10. United States v. Roger
4086 Stone 1 I. US. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (Awaiting trial)
4087 Harm to Ongoing Matter (Investigation ongoing) B. Referrals d During the course
4088 of the investigation, the Office periodically identified evidence of potential
4089 criminal activity _that was outside the scope of the Special Counsel's
4090 jurisdiction established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with
4091 the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to
4092 appropriate law enforcement authorities, principally other components of the
4093 Department of Justice and the FBI. Those referrals, listed 3 Manafort was
4094 ultimately convicted at trial in the Eastern District of Virginia and pleaded
4095 guilty in the District of Columbia. See Vol. I, Section IV.A.8. The trial and
4096 plea happened after the transfer decision described here. D-3
4097
4098RESULT: 90
4099
4100PAGE: 445
4101
4102TEXT:
4103
4104 U.S. Department of Justice Att:orHe~? Work Proattet // Mtty CoHtttiH Mutefittl
4105 Pfoteetea UHaef Fee. R. Cfiffl. P. G(e) alphabetically by subject, are
4106 summarized below. 2. Michael Cohen During the course of the investigation, the
4107 Special Counsel's Office uncovered evidence of potential wire fraud and FECA
4108 violations pertaining to Michael Cohen. That evidence was referred to the U.S.
4109 Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the FBI's New York
4110 Field Office. 4. lirllllll 5. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP During
4111 the course of the FARA investigation of Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, the
4112 Special Counsel's Office uncovered evidence of potential FARA violations
4113 pertaining to Gregory Craig, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Skadden),
4114 and their work on behalf of the government of Ukraine. After consultation with
4115 the NSD, the evidence regarding Craig was referred to NSD, and NSD elected to
4116 partne_r with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
4117 and the FBI's New York Field Office. NSD later elected to partner on the Craig
4118 matter with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. NSD
4119 retained and handled issues relating to Skadden itself. 6. Harm to Ongoing
4120 Matter 0-4