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1Quid Pro Quo? Corporate Returns to Campaign Contributions∗
2Anthony Fowler, University of Chicago Haritz Garro, Northwestern University Jo¨rg L. Spenkuch, Northwestern University
3January 2019
4Abstract Scholars, pundits, and political reformers have long worried that corporations distort public policy and subvert the will of the electorate by donating to politicians. Well-publicized anecdotes notwithstanding, whether and how much corporations actually benefit from supporting political candidates remains unknown. To systematically address this question, we utilize two complementary empirical approaches that isolate the monetary benefits a company derives from a favored candidate winning office. First, we use a regression discontinuity design exploiting close congressional, gubernatorial, and state legislative elections. Second, we leverage withincampaign changes in market beliefs about the outcomes of U.S. Senate races. We find no evidence that corporations benefit from electing candidates supported by their PACs, and we can statistically reject effect sizes greater than 0.3 percent of firm value. Our results suggest that corporate campaign contributions do not buy significant political favors—at least not on average.
5∗We thank Scott Ashworth, Michael Barber, Chris Berry, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Tim Feddersen, Pablo Montagnes, Nicola Persico, Koleman Strumpf, and conference participants at PECA and W-PECO for helpful comments and suggestions. Correspondance can be addressed to anthony.fowler@uchicago.edu [Fowler], haritzgarro@@u.northwestern.edu [Garro], or j-spenkuch@@kellogg.northwestern.edu [Spenkuch].
6In Citizens United v. FEC, U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens contends that
7“[c]orporations with a large war chest to deploy on electioneering may find democratically
8elected bodies becoming much more attuned to their interests” (2010, p. 65). Echoing this
9suspicion, legions of pundits and political reformers allege that corporate money corrupts
10politics. Corporate influence is, for instance, thought to alter election results in favor of
11pro-business candidates and away from the preferences of the public. In addition, corporate
12donations are often suspected to serve as a quid pro quo, affecting the policy choices of
13candidates, who, once elected, may feel indebted to their benefactors or hope to receive
14similar contributions in the future.
15While the predominant view on the role of corporations in the electoral process is one of dis
16tress and disapproval, scholars remain starkly divided on the question of how much influence
17firms are actually able to exert through their donations. One influential school of thought
18notes that corporate campaign contributions are far too small to be reasonably expected
19to buy political favors (Tullock 1972; Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000; Ansolabehere, de
20Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003). According to this view, firms do not derive meaningful ben
21efits from meddling in elections or else they would do more of it—at least as much as is
22allowed under the law. Others however, have presented evidence that special interests give
23strategically (see, e.g., Barber 2016; Fouirnaies and Hall 2014, 2018; Powell and Grimmer
242016), even buying access (Kalla and Broockman 2016). In the words of Powell and Grimmer
25(2016, pp. 985), “business PAC contributions are consistent with a spot-market for short
26term policy influence. [...] It appears that PACs and corporate interests use donations to
27solicit favors and to change policy.” In this alternative view, firms give for nefarious reasons.
28Yet, as the authors themselves acknowledge, the extant evidence creates only “an appearance
29of corruption—the key word being appearance” (p. 986). The extent to which corporations
30do, in fact, benefit from supporting political candidates remains unknown.
31In this paper, we contribute to the literature on money in politics by asking whether and
32how much firms gain when a candidate they supported wins office. After all, if campaign
331
34contributions do indeed buy influence, then corporations ought to profit from their political
35investments. To measure and monetize the benefits a company derives from its favored
36candidate holding office, we utilize stock prices, which reflect the best available information
37about a firm’s value, present and future. Thus, to the extent that corporations derive material
38advantages from contributing to political candidates, we expect these to manifest themselves
39in the value of the firm itself, i.e., its share price.
40Our analysis begins by identifying donations from the political action committees (PACs)
41of publicly traded companies to candidates running for Congress, governor, or state legisla
42tor between 1980 and 2010. Corporations almost never support more than one candidate in
43any given race, allowing us to easily determine firms’ preferred politicians. Causal inferences,
44however, are complicated by selection into “who gives to whom.” Firms that are ex ante more
45successful are more likely to support winners, meaning that a na¨ıve comparison of firms that
46gave to winning and losing candidates would produce spurious results. To account for se
47lection, we rely on two complementary empirical approaches. Our main analysis leverages
48the quasi-random outcomes of very close elections through a regression discontinuity (RD)
49design. Our second design uses within-campaign variation in market beliefs—as measured by
50betting odds—about the outcomes of U.S. Senate elections from 2004 to 2010. Identification
51comes from high-frequency changes in the probability that a corporation’s preferred candi
52date wins the race. Both research designs yield substantively identical results. An electoral
53victory of the supported candidate does not significantly benefit the typical firm.
54Our results are not easily attributable to low statistical power. Ex ante power analyses
55suggest that we would have reliably detected any effect greater than about a quarter of a
56percent. Ex post, our confidence intervals allow us to statistically reject any purported effect
57greater than 0.3 percent of firm value. In addition, we find no sign that a genuine effect is
58masked by heterogeneity. In fact, we detect little variation across offices, time periods, the
59size of firms, the size of donations, or economic sectors. If companies benefit from donating to
60political candidates, then these effects must be small on average, and they are not detectable
612
62even in the settings where we would most expect them.
63Since the corporations in our sample are extremely large relative to the typical donation,
64we cannot dismiss the possibility that campaign contributions are a worthwhile investment
65for the firm—albeit a modest one in absolute terms. We can rule out, however, that political
66donations are good investments for individual executives, and even the largest of our esti
67mates are too small to support the jeremiads of pundits and reformers. In sum, our results
68suggest that, on average, contributing firms “give a little and get a little,” as previously
69argued by Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003; p. 126).
70Some readers are likely to be surprised by the finding that companies do not derive signif
71icant benefits from a supported politician holding office. How can our results be so different
72from public perception and well-known journalistic accounts? One potential explanation is
73that our results are based on a broad sample of firms that supported many different politi
74cians. If scholars and pundits focus on a few extreme cases in which corporations appear to
75have benefited from political quid pro quos, they might conclude that the perverse conse
76quences of money in politics are severe, even if they are negligible on average. By conducting
77a large-scale study that aggregates over thousands of different firms and elections, our find
78ings speak to the typical effect of a supported candidate rising to office. To be clear, our
79contention is not that corporate money has no adverse effects; our point is that these effects
80appear to be small in most circumstances. Evidence on both averages and outliers is needed
81to sensibly discuss the consequences of corporate influence in American politics.
82Before proceeding, we should clarify what we mean by corporate campaign contributions.
83In all federal elections and in most state elections, corporations are prohibited from donating
84directly to political candidates. However, firms can set up and fund the operation of PACs,
85which, in turn, raise money from individuals—often managers and shareholders of the firm—
86and give it to candidates. We use the term corporate campaign contributions as shorthand
87for contributions from corporate PACs to political candidates and their campaigns.1 Since
881Naturally, individual managers can also donate directly to political candidates. Previous scholars have argued that money channeled to candidates through corporate PACs is used by companies to seek access
893
90Citizens United and SpeechNow v. FEC, corporations can draw on their treasuries to give
91unlimited amounts to independent expenditure-only committees, which in turn advocate for
92or against particular candidates. Although these independent committees are officially pro
93hibited from coordinating with campaigns, candidates are often alleged to solicit large sums
94for the groups that support them (Lee, Ferguson, and Earley 2014). On one hand, Citizens
95United makes the results of this paper all the more important because corporate election
96eering expenditures are at an all-time high. On the other hand, one might worry that recent
97changes in the political environment limit the generalizability of our results to the present
98era. Nonetheless, our limited data for the post–Citizens United period are consistent with
99our overall findings. Both before and after this landmark decision, an additional supported
100candidate winning office does not, on average, benefit the firm.
101Related Literature
102Political economists have extensively theorized about the role of corporate campaign contri
103butions in the policy-making process. Many models conceptualize elections as a competitive
104market for private benefits, whereby firms or other special interests can give money to curry
105favor with politicians (e.g., Baron 1989; Denzau and Munger 1986; Grossman and Helpman
1062001). Since elected officials have many levers through which to provide benefits to a firm,
107companies have an incentive to identify sympathetic politicians and increase their chances
108of being elected. A corporation might also use campaign contributions to ingratiate itself
109with a candidate who is likely to win anyway. Such a connection could be valuable because
110elected officials may propose grants and procurement contracts that can directly benefit the
111firm, change their roll-call vote on an important piece of legislation, alter the content of a bill
112through amendments or committee work, or pressure the bureaucracy to achieve favorable
113regulatory outcomes.
114(e.g., Fouirnaies and Hall 2014; Barber 2016), while individual contributions may be due to various other motivations, even when carried out by CEOs (Bonica 2016, Barber, Canes-Wrone, and Thrower 2017). We, therefore, rely on the contribution patterns of corporate PACs rather than individual donations to identify firms’ preferred candidates.
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116In light of these theoretical concerns, empiricists have actively looked for evidence on
117the perverse influence of political donations. The most common strategy involves regressing
118the roll-call votes of legislators on campaign contributions. One study, for instance, asks
119whether members of Congress who received contributions from dairy producers are more
120likely to vote in favor of a dairy subsidy (Welch 1982). Even if the correlations between
121campaign contributions and subsequent legislator behavior were clear cut, such regressions do
122not necessarily uncover causal relationships. If corporations support politicians who already
123agree with them, then campaign contributions and roll-call votes will be correlated regardless
124of whether the former have any impact on the latter. Consistent with this account, the
125estimated effects of corporate contributions on roll-call votes tend to shrink dramatically
126with the inclusion of district or member fixed effects (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and
127Snyder 2003; Wawro 2001). As a result, some dismiss the idea that campaign contributions
128affect legislators’ votes. Others, however, dispute their conclusions. Stratmann’s (2005) meta
129analysis of the literature, for instance, rejects the null hypothesis of no effect. Similarly,
130Roscoe and Jenkins (2005) claim that about one in three roll-call votes show influence of
131campaign contributions.
132Taking a contrarian stance, Tullock (1972), Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose (2000), and An
133solabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) note that there is not nearly as much corporate
134money in politics as one might expect if public policy were actually for sale. If dairy pro
135ducers could really generate a billion dollars in price supports through a million dollars in
136campaign contributions, why would the dairy industry not give more? And why can members
137of Congress be bought so cheaply? Since the vast majority of corporate interests give less
138than the statutory limit on campaign contributions, legal restrictions on political donations
139are unlikely to be the answer to this puzzle.
140Other scholars have looked beyond roll-call votes (e.g., Hall and Wayman 1990). Recently,
141Gordon and Hafer (2005) argue that firms contribute in order to signal their willingness to
142fight regulators and thereby achieve more favorable treatment from government agencies.
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144Gordon, Hafer, and Landa (2007) find that executives whose compensation is more closely
145tied to corporate earnings are more likely to contribute to political candidates, and they
146suggest that contributions are best understood as purchases of good will. Kalla and Broock
147man (2016) report that activists are more likely to secure a meeting with a senior staffer
148of a member of Congress when they reveal themselves to be donors rather than merely
149constituents.
150Even if political donations do buy access, the ultimate consequences of such meetings
151remain unknown. If for-profit companies make campaign contributions to curry favor, and
152if these favors actually affect policy, then their value ought to be reflected in the financial
153worth of the firm. Thus, for publicly traded companies, we can utilize stock prices to gauge
154the pecuniary value of quid pro quos.
155Outside the U.S., politically connected firms trade at a premium relative to unconnected
156ones (Faccio 2006; Fisman 2001). Within the U.S., Do, Lee, and Nguyen (2015) report
157that corporations profit from having a director who went to school with a governor, and
158Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) find benefits from appointing former politicians and high
159ranking bureaucrats to the company’s board. Similarly, Brown and Huang (2017) argue that
160corporate executives’ meetings with key White House staff lead to positive abnormal returns.
161While political connections of this kind appear to be valuable—especially connections to the
162executive—it is a priori unclear whether campaign contributions can be used to forge similar
163bonds.
164There also exists a sizable literature on the impact of presidential elections on different
165sectors of the economy as well as the stock market as a whole (e.g., Snowberg, Wolfers,
166and Zitzewitz 2007a; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2016). Knight (2007), for instance, defines a
167group of politically sensitive firms and uses prediction market data to show that presidential
168policy platforms are capitalized into equity prices. Our second empirical approach mirrors
169this research design, but we find no evidence that the election of senators affects the firms
170that supported them. One likely explanation for the discrepancy is that the president wields
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172much more influence over policy than individual legislators.
173The studies most closely related to our own are Boas, Hidalgo, and Richardson (2014),
174and Akey (2015). Using a regression discontinuity design, Boas et al. show that public-works
175firms in Brazil receive more government contracts when their favored candidates rise to office.
176Akey (2015) analyzes thirteen close U.S. congressional races and reports that the stock price
177of a firm increases by about three percent when a candidate to which it contributed narrowly
178wins. However, in the appendix, we use the author’s own data to show that, given the small
179number of elections, his findings are highly sensitive specification. In particular, we show
180that the results reported in Akey (2015) are not robust—in terms of sign and magnitude—to
181using either reasonable alternative bandwidths or different-order polynomials in the running
182variable. In fact, eleven out of thirty-two combinations of bandwidth and polynomial yield
183negative point estimates. As a result, Akey’s estimates fail one of the standard robustness
184checks recommended by Lee and Lemieux (2010) (see the Online Appendix for additional
185detail).
186In sum, whether corporations benefit from making campaign contributions in a mature
187democracy like the U.S. remains unknown. Our subsequent analyses provide systematic evi
188dence on this question by drawing on data from thousands of closely contested elections for
189governor, Congress, and state legislatures.
190Why Give?
191There are at least six different reasons a corporation might contribute money to political
192campaigns, with each one corresponding to varying degrees of concern about the health of
193democracy.
194First, corporations might give with the goal of altering election outcomes. If one candidate
195is more likely to support policies that would benefit a firm, that company has an incentive
196to contribute in order to help the aligned candidate win. Many studies show that campaign
197spending can influence vote shares, although the substantive size of these effects is typically
198small (e.g., Green and Gerber 2015). Experimental evidence from get-out-the-vote studies
1997
200suggests that each additional vote costs between 100 and 200 dollars, so influencing the
201outcome of most large elections would be expensive. For example, consider the 2014 guber
202natorial election in Illinois, which, ex ante, was thought to be an extremely competitive race.
203Ultimately, Bruce Rauner (R) won by over 142,000 votes. Had special interests wanted to
204tip the scale in favor of Rauner’s opponent, Pat Quinn (D), they would have had to spend at
205least $14 million, even if there was no equilibrium response from contributors on the other
206side. Since most campaign contributions are three or four orders of magnitude smaller and
207go to candidates in less competitive races, one may question whether influencing election
208outcomes is firms’ primary motivation.
209Second, companies might give to influence the behavior of a candidate who would have
210been elected regardless of their help. Perhaps, once in office, elected officials offer quid pro
211quos to companies that supported them, or they might dole out favors in order to secure
212similar contributions in future campaigns. This mechanism appears to be the most prominent
213one in the academic literature as well as the one that especially troubles observers.
214Third, corporations might give with the goal of obtaining information from elected officials.
215Even if contributions affect neither elections nor public policy, they might create a connection
216between a firm and an official that benefits the company in other ways—say, by enabling it to
217better anticipate regulatory changes. Companies may be willing to pay for such information,
218even if they cannot directly affect policy choices.
219Fourth, corporations might give to sitting incumbents in order to change their behavior
220before the next election. This mechanism is consistent with the observation that firms tend to
221target aligned incumbents. However, the fact that most contributions come toward the end
222of an official’s term—when it is too late to enact meaningful policy change before the next
223election—casts doubt on such an explanation. Similarly, few corporations make contributions
224in support of incumbents that are expected to lose.
225Fifth, corporations might give to signal their type. In the model of Gordon and Hafer
226(2005), firms have an incentive to signal their willingness to fight regulation. In the model
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228of Schnakenberg and Turner (2016), corporations use campaign contributions to signal com
229pliance with the law and thereby reduce their chances of being audited.
230Sixth and last, corporations might give for consumption purposes without receiving any
231tangible benefits in return. This is the preferred explanation of Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo,
232and Snyder (2003) for individual contributions, and it is plausible the same argument applies
233to corporations. That is, individual managers may personally know candidates running for
234office, enjoy attending glamorous fundraisers, or derive utility from supporting their preferred
235candidates. Agency problems within large firms might allow the same executives to (mis)use
236some of the company’s resources for political purposes. Given that the typical donation is
237minuscule relative to the operating budgets of even medium-sized corporations, and as evi
238denced by the mixed results in the academic literature, it would be difficult for shareholders
239to determine whether campaign contributions are, in fact, a good investment.
240To the extent that any of these mechanisms operate, our subsequent research designs
241estimate the combined impact of the first three. Put differently, the benefits a company
242derives from a supported candidate winning the election include the value of having someone
243hold office who would intrinsically pursue policies that benefit the firm, the value of any
244political quid pro quos, as well as the value of insider information. If any of these mechanisms
245are substantively important, the successful election of a favored candidate should increase a
246firm’s stock price.
247The last three mechanisms are not reflected in our estimates. The fourth mechanism pro
248duces immediate benefits, which do not directly depend on electoral outcomes. In the signal
249ing theories, the value of campaign contributions is independent of election results. In fact,
250to signal their type, companies might rationally support the candidate who is ex post worse.
251And again, in the consumption account, who wins is irrelevant to the firm because there are
252no meaningful direct effects.
253Our impression is that most of the worry about corporate influence in politics is due to
254the first two possibilities, i.e., its effects on election results and political quid pro quos.
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256Since our empirical tests capture most of what observers find concerning about corporate
257contributions, our results directly contribute to the current normative debates about money
258in politics.
259Data and Research Design
260Our regression discontinuity (RD) analysis relies on general election results for the U.S.
261Senate, U.S. House, governor, and state legislatures from 1980 to 2010.2 Information on
262campaign contributions over this period comes from the Database on Ideology, Money in
263Politics, and Elections (Bonica 2013). We identify corporate PACs in these data, match
264them to their publicly traded parent companies, and aggregate all contributions (within a
265particular election cycle) from the same corporation to the candidates in these elections
266(see Appendix for details). Supplemental data on firm size, profitability, sector, etc. come
267from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database. Our final data set includes 2,939 corporations
268and 164,525 firm–candidate–election pairings—our unit of observation—across 16 two-year
269election cycles with 18,907 individual races.3
270In our data, the median (mean) firm spends about $4,000 ($24,000) per cycle and supports
2714 (21) candidates. A small number of companies, however, spend as much $1.5 million and
272contribute to nearly 1,000 candidates. As we show in the appendix, corporate contributions
273skew toward Republicans but not dramatically so. Corporate PACs support Democratic
274candidates in about 40 percent of the firm-elections, and Republicans in the remaining 60
275percent. Important for our purposes, most but by no means all donations go to ex post
276winners.” As we show in the Appendix, corporate contributions skew toward Republicans but
277not dramatically so. Corporate PACs support Democratic candidates in about 40 percent of
278the firm-elections, and Republicans in the remaining 60 percent. Important for our purposes,
2792These data were kindly provided by Jim Snyder and represent an extended version of the data set used in Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002). 3As we explain in the Appendix, we restrict our sample to firm–election pairs in which more than 90% of the contributions from a particular company went to one candidate. As a consequence, we discard 1.98% of observations.
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281most but by no means all donations go to ex post winners.4
282To construct our outcome variable, we use daily stock returns from the Center for Research
283in Security Prices. Following standard practice in the finance literature, we rely on the market
284model to compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each firm (e.g., Campbell, Lo,
285and MacKinlay 1996). Intuitively, CARs adjust stock returns for the performance of the
286entire stock market over the same period. More precisely, the daily abnormal return of firm i on day t is defined as ARi,t = ri,t − ˆ αi − ˆ βimt, where ri,t denotes the realized return of the company’s stock on day t, and mt is the market return on the same day. ˆ βi and
287ˆ αi, respectively, denote the sensitivity of the firm’s stock to overall market movements and
288its usual risk-return performance.5 Residualizing stock returns in this fashion yields more
289precise estimates by accounting for market-wide forces that are out of companies’ control
290as well as the fact that some firms are more responsive to overall market conditions than
291others. With the definition of ARi,t in hand, the cumulative abnormal return of a firm over a period of multiple consecutive days is given by CARi(t1,t2) = (Qt2 t=t1[1 + ARi,t])−1. For our main analyses, we calculate CARs from the day before the election to the day after, i.e., CAR(−1,1), but we also test for longer-term effects. Reassuringly, sensible alternative ways of constructing our outcome variable result in qualitatively equivalent conclusions. In
292particular, we obtain nearly identical point estimates if we use simple, unadjusted returns
293instead (see Appendix).
294Our goal is to estimate the effect of electing a supported candidate on a firm’s value. To do
295so, we would like to approximate the following hypothetical experiment. Suppose campaigns
296proceed as usual, but election results are secretly determined by a coin flip.6 If who wins the
2974For additional descriptive facts, see Appendix A. 5Following Acemoglu et al. (2016), we use a window from 230 to 30 trading days before the election to estimate ˆ βi and ˆ αi. Note, the efficient markets hypothesis implies that ˆ αi should be equal to zero. In our sample, enforcing this theoretical restriction produces a slightly tighter distribution of CARs and subsequently more precise estimates. The substantive difference, however, is negligible, which is why we have opted for the approach that more closely mirrors standard practice in the finance literature. In the Appendix, we also replicate our results using the Fama-French three-factor model instead of the CAPM to calculate abnormal returns. 6The coin flip must be secret because candidates and firms need to behave normally, believing that their campaign efforts influence election results.
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299election is random, then we can estimate the effect of a firm’s supported candidate (rather
300than her opponent) rising to office by simply comparing the mean stock return of firms that
301support winners with that of companies that support losers. Since such an experiment is not
302feasible, we attempt to replicate it as closely as possible by focusing on close elections in a
303regression discontinuity (RD) framework.
304We implement our RD design by estimating the following equation:
305(1) CAR(−1,1)i,j,t = βV ictoryi,j,t + γXi,j,t + λXi,j,tV ictoryi,j,t + i,j,t,
306where V ictoryi,j,t is an indicator variable for whether firm i’s preferred candidate won election
307j, and Xi,j,t denotes the candidate’s vote margin. The coefficient of interest is β. Because
308many corporations given to multiple candidates in the same electoral cycle, β should be
309interpreted as the return to the firm from one additional supported candidate rising to
310office.
311We cluster standard errors by election cycle to allow for almost arbitrary forms of correla
312tion in the residuals across firms and elections. For our main results, we restrict attention to
313elections in which the two-party vote share fell between .45 and .55, and we present robust
314ness checks to demonstrate that our conclusions are insensitive to alternative bandwidths.7
315Our primary specification uses CARs from the day before the election to the day after
316in order to maximize statistical precision. A drawback of this strategy is that it relies on
317the market to quickly internalize the effect of election results on the value of firms—even
318before the newly elected officials take office. There is an enormous literature on the efficiency
319of financial markets, which typically concludes that markets are close to efficient but not
320perfectly so (see, e.g., Fama 1970; Shiller 1981). We are hesitant to take a strong stand on
3217We settled on our RD specification after conducting ex ante power simulations. In each simulation, we randomly select a new date for each election year to serve as a placebo Election Day. Taking election outcomes, the pattern of corporate contributions, as well as actual stock returns around the placebo date as given, we add in a hypothetical treatment effect of a known magnitude and implement our empirical strategy. The simulations suggest that if the true effect is 0, then our empirical strategy will only reject the null about 5 percent of the time. If, however, the true effect is at least 0.25 percent, then we would reject the null about 93 percent of the time (see Appendix).
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323how fast the market can internalize the impact of election results. Instead, we present a range
324of specifications, allowing for longer lags until prices accurately reflect all effects of elections.
325In particular, we present results for as much as 100 trading days after Election Day, when
326the winners have taken office and begun enacting their policy agendas. Although increasing
327standard errors make quantitative comparisons speculative, if anything, these specifications
328suggest that firms benefit even less from their preferred candidate’s electoral triumph than
329implied by our main results.
330Our RD design serves several purposes. First, it directly addresses selection into who gives
331to whom. If the results of very close races are, indeed, quasi-random, then firms supporting
332the candidate who, ex post, barely won are, in expectation, identical to companies donating
333to the candidate who barely lost. Second, our research design ensures that the market is
334surprised by the outcomes that drive our inferences. For elections that are easily predictable,
335stock prices will already reflect the value of any potential quid pro quo before Election
336Day. Returns realized on or after Election Day would, therefore, be uninformative about the
337benefits accruing to the firm. In very close elections, however, both candidates should have an
338ex ante realistic chance of winning, which implies that the market receives new information
339when the votes are tallied.8
340Our RD results are, of course, local to close elections. That is, we estimate the monetary
341value of the benefits accruing to a firm when its supported candidate narrowly wins rather
342than narrowly loses. If we are interested in the mechanism whereby firms benefit from cam
343paign contributions by changing the result of an election, then this is exactly the quantity
3448One potential concern with our approach is that market participants may not have the opportunity to incorporate the effects of political contributions into their valuations of firms if they are unaware of who gave to whom. Fortunately for our purposes, PAC contributions are public record, and due to FEC reporting requirements, any contributions made by mid-October of the election year are publicly disclosed before Election Day. Traders can, therefore, know which firms gave to which candidates, and they can use this information if they deem it valuable. Another potential concern is that close elections are subject to recounts and court cases, meaning that there is lingering uncertainty about the outcome even after Election Day, which, in turn, would attenuate our estimates. Although recounts and court cases do occur, it is extremely rare for the initial vote tally to be reversed. Hence, the amount of residual uncertainty is likely small. Furthermore, this concern becomes less relevant as we examine longer time horizons, or when we conduct a donut RD design that ignores the closest of elections, which are the most likely to be affected by recounts and legal skirmishes.
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346of interest. After all, close races are the ones in which firms could potentially affect the out
347come. If, however, we are more interested in the quid pro quo or informational mechanisms,
348then our approach has both advantages and drawbacks. On one hand, the most powerful
349politicians might be electorally safe, which could give them more leeway to hand out favors
350relative to their counterparts who live under electoral threat. On the other hand, politicians
351may be more willing to engage in quid pro quos precisely when their (re)election prospects
352are uncertain—simply because campaign contributions are more valuable when the race is
353expected to be close. Although we believe there are good theoretical reasons to be interested
354in close races, we freely acknowledge that our RD results may not extrapolate to contri
355butions to, say, members of the leadership, committee chairs, or other especially influential
356incumbents, all of whom are unlikely to be involved in tight reelection battles.
357RD Results
358In the Appendix, we discuss and present several descriptive facts that help to motivate
359our empirical approach. First, elections that were ex post close were not ex ante predictable,
360meaning that the market received genuinely new information on Election Day. Second, almost
361no corporations give to both candidates in a given race. This means that we can easily identify
362a corporation’s supported candidate in virtually every election in which they contribute.
363Third, although most firms give to winners, bigger firms especially give to winners. As a
364result, a na¨ıve, cross-sectional study might significantly overestimate the effects of corporate
365campaign contributions.
366Also in the Appendix, we present several tests assessing the validity of the continuity
367assumption necessary for our RD design. Even though corporations are overall more likely
368to contribute to winners—as mentioned above—there is little to no evidence to suggest that
369firms are systematically favoring bare winners over bare losers. Furthermore, we implement
370several placebo tests using pretreatment covariates as outcome variables. There appears to
371be no imbalance in cumulative abnormal returns leading up to Election Day, incumbency
372status of the supported candidate, or overall firm performance. There is, however, a difference
37314
374in the number of other candidates that the firm supported, although this difference is not
375statistically significant when we correct for multiple-hypothesis testing.
376Figure 1 presents our main result focusing on abnormal stock returns right around Election
377Day. For illustrative purposes, we average CARs across all observations within one-quarter
378percentage-point-wide bins of the vote share, and we display fitted values based on the regression model in equation (1). The size of the estimated discontinuity is −.0006, which implies that a firm’s value decreases by approximately 0.06 percent in response to a supported
379politician winning office. Given that the 95% confidence interval associated with our point estimate ranges from −.0044 to .0032, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the true effect equals zero. We can, however, statistically reject any purported impact greater than
380about 0.3 percent.
381To interpret this finding, consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculations. The
382median firm in our data is valued at about $1 billion. Taking the upper end of the 95%
383confidence interval at face value, this would mean that the median contributing firm is
384about three million dollars more valuable as a result of its favored candidate winning. While
385this may seem like an insignificant amount relative to the size of the company, it comes
386at a low cost. The median firm spends only $4,000 on campaign donations per cycle and
387supports three winners.9 Hence, there is a clear rationale for companies to contribute to
388political candidates from their own treasuries.
389This does not mean, however, that a company’s executives or shareholders have an eco
390nomic incentive to give, and most PAC contributions are ultimately financed by individual
391managers. According to the best estimates in the literature, CEOs personally receive about
392$1 for every $100,000 of firm value that they create (see Murphy 1999). Thus, executives
393within the company would value the same benefits at only $30.
3949Calculating the exact return is challenging because corporations typically spend a lot more money on electioneering beyond their direct contributions to candidates. For example, companies make independent expenditures, contribute to party committees, and sometimes try to mobilize and persuade their employees (see, e.g., Bombardini and Trebbi 2011). Many companies also donate to lawmakers’ pet charities (Bertrand et al. 2018).
39515
396Based on these calculations, we cannot dismiss the possibility that small donations are
397a good investment for firms. Publicly traded companies are so large and the absolute size
398of most contributions is so small that it is difficult to envision a research design that could
399statistically rule out this possibility. We can, however, statistically reject the possibility that,
400on average, individual executives and managers benefit from their political donations through
401stock-price effects on their compensation. More importantly, the evidence does not suggest
402that, once elected, the average supported candidate engages in substantively meaningful quid
403pro quos.
404As discussed, for our main RD analysis we rely on a bandwidth of .05. In Figure 2, we
405present estimates and confidence intervals for alternative choices ranging from .005 to .3. All
406of our RD estimates are substantively small—some negative—and for larger bandwidths we
407can statistically reject even medium-sized effects. In Table 1, we present robustness checks
408for alternative regression models, including higher-order polynomials in the running variable,
409and race fixed effects. Reassuringly, we obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.
410Relying on our preferred specification in equation (1), Figure 3 presents estimates for longer
411time horizons. Even if financial markets are not perfectly efficient and cannot internalize the
412effects of close elections immediately, at some point we would expect the impact of election
413outcomes to be fully reflected in stock prices. We, therefore, present RD estimates for CARs
414ranging from the day after the election up to 100 trading days afterward—when the electoral
415winners have taken office and begun implementing their policy agendas. Our estimates are
416never statistically distinguishable from zero, and after about 40 trading days they actually
417become negative. Thus, regardless of the time horizon, there is no indication that firms
418benefit from their preferred candidate being elected.
419We also explore the possibility of heterogeneous effects. To this end, Table 2 presents RD
420results for different subsamples. The first row shows our baseline estimate from Figure 1.
421The second row estimates the same regression model on a donut sample, i.e., a sample from
422which we removed all elections decided by less than 0.2 percentage points. These are the
42316
424races for which one might be worried about sorting, fraud, or legal challenges, all of which
425may lead to nonrandom outcomes. Excluding these races has virtually no impact on the RD
426estimate.
427Next, we present results separately by office. A priori, one might have expected the largest
428impact for governors. After all, governors are politically important and operate as inde
429pendent executives rather than one of many members of a legislature. While actual point
430estimate for governors is positive, it is substantively small and insignificant. In fact, and there
431is no statistically significant evidence of a positive effect for any of the offices we consider.
432In addition, we study cases in which corporations donated relatively large sums. Even in
433races where a firm gave more than $2,500—roughly the 90th percentile of donations—we
434obtain a small negative and statistically insignificant point estimate. If there were political
435quid pro quos, say in the form of a single grant or procurement project, we would expect to
436find a greater effect on firm value for small rather than large, diversified companies. We test
437this prediction by splitting our data according to firms’ market capitalization. Again, it is
438not possible to reject the null of no quid pro quos. The same holds true when we separately
439analyze different economic sectors and when we consider elections before and after Citizens
440United. Although the sample size for the latter period is small, there is no evidence of an
441effect in either era.
442Table 2 further examines heterogeneity across the number of other winners that a firm
443supported in the same election cycle. If there are diminishing marginal returns to politi
444cal connections, an electoral victory should be most valuable when the company did not
445contribute to other elected officials. However, even in these cases, the RD estimate is small
446and statistically insignificant. Moreover, our results do not depend on the overall number of
447candidates that the firm supported, suggesting that the sample imbalance with respect to
448this variable is inconsequential.
449Since one might suspect that corporations giving to candidates on both sides of the aisle
450are especially access-oriented, we separately analyze firms that donated primarily to Repub
45117
452licans, Democrats, or both. Our results, however, yield no evidence of effects for any of these
453subgroups. One may also expect that quid pro quos are more likely to arise when only a few
454firms contribute to a candidate’s campaign. Yet, we detect no meaningful variation across
455the number of firms supporting the winner. Lastly, for the legislative settings in our sample,
456we might expect greater effects when a company’s favored legislator belongs to the majority
457party and thus stands a greater chance of influencing policy. But again, neither majority
458nor minority-party winners have a meaningful impact on firm value.
459Broadly summarizing, our RD results imply that, on average, firms do not derive signifi
460cant benefits from the electoral victory of a supported candidate. In addition, we find little
461evidence of heterogeneity in effect size. Even in settings that are a priori most likely to yield
462evidence of political quid pro quos, there appear to be none.
463Alternative Research Design
464To ameliorate potential concerns with our RD analysis, we implement an alternative research
465design that relies on a different source of variation and, therefore, on a different set of iden
466tifying assumptions. Since both empirical approaches produce similar results, we conclude
467that our substantive results are neither driven by the assumptions underlying our RD design
468nor the unrepresentativeness of very close elections.
469Our alternative approach uses within-campaign variation in market beliefs—as measured
470by betting odds—about the outcomes of U.S. Senate elections from 2004 to 2010. Instead
471of comparing returns across firms that contributed to different candidates, this approach
472holds firm–candidate pairs fixed. Identification comes from high-frequency changes in the
473probability that a corporation’s preferred candidate ends up winning the race.
474The sample for this analysis consists of 3,371 firm–candidate pairs across 120 Senate races
475that were listed on Intrade. As explained in the Appendix, the betting price provides the
476market’s implied belief about the probability that a particular candidate will win (Wolfers
477and Zitzewitz 2004). For each firm–election, we focus on betting prices and stock returns in
478the 40 trading days leading up to Election Day. Restricting attention to a short period before
47918
480the election ensures that the vast majority of corporations have already distributed their
481contributions. Furthermore, this is a period of intense campaigning, with often-significant
482swings in polls.
483The within-campaign approach complements our RD design in a number ways. First, since
484it conditions on “who gave to whom,” the resulting estimates are not subject to the concern
485that firms contributing to winners may be systematically different from those supporting
486losers. Second, our within-campaign design leverages additional, high-frequency variation,
487resulting in more statistical power for any given election. Thus, if one is especially interested
488in recent Senate races, then this alternative approach yields more informative results than the
489RD estimates. Third, this design draws on all elections for which market beliefs fluctuated
490over the final weeks of the campaign. Since this is even the case for races involving prominent
491party figures, powerful committee members, and other influential incumbents, the evidence
492is not limited to candidates who are electorally vulnerable. In sum, a within-campaign design
493helps to address reservations about the internal and external validity of our RD results.
494An important limitation of the within-campaign approach is that rich betting market data
495are only available for a subsample of elections. Additionally, this design relies heavily on
496market efficiency. For our inferences to be valid, financial markets must accurately respond
497to high-frequency changes in candidates’ electoral prospects, and betting markets have to
498be efficient enough for these changes to be incorporated into odds. Since betting markets
499are thinner than financial markets, the latter assumption may be problematic. If variation in
500betting prices is due to noise rather than genuine information, then our subsequent estimates
501would be attenuated. To speak to this issue, the Appendix presents a case study of the 2006
502Senate race in Virginia. At least within this particular setting, bettors are quite responsive to
503new information. In particular, most of the meaningful changes in betting odds are explained
504by gaffes, campaign events, and new polls. We also note that restricting attention to the most
505liquid and, therefore, least noisy contracts on Intrade has virtually no impact on the results
506below.
50719
508To implement the within-campaign design, we estimate the following equation:
509(2) ARi,∆t = α + β∆Pr(FavoredCandidate)i,j,∆t + i,j,∆t,
510where ∆Pr(FavoredCandidate)i,j,∆t is the change in the perceived winning probability of
511company i’s preferred candidate in election j over time period ∆t, and ARi,∆t denotes the
512firm’s abnormal return over the same time frame. The parameter of interest is β. It measures
513the increase in market value that would result from an electoral victory of the firm’s favored
514candidate, relative to a counterfactual loss.
515By regressing returns (i.e., changes in stock prices) on changes in the electoral prospects
516of candidates, the regression model in equation (2) is akin to a first-differences design and
517therefore holds all firm- and election-specific factors constant.10 Since we work with abnormal
518rather than unadjusted returns, our results also control for overall market conditions.
519The crucial assumption for estimates based on (2) to be unbiased is that changes in beliefs
520about the electoral prospects of a particular candidate are uncorrelated with changes in other,
521unobserved factors determining the value of the firms that contributed to her campaign. This
522assumption would be violated if, for instance, corporate scandals had spillover effects on the
523supported politicians, or if financially troubled companies could withdraw earlier donations.
524Table 3 presents the results from estimating equation (2) by ordinary least squares. Columns
525(1)–(3) use daily observations, while columns (4)–(6) rely on weekly data. For the latter anal
526ysis, the dependent variable is the CAR from Friday to Friday, and the independent variable
527is the change in the betting market probability over the same period. If one is concerned that
52810To see why the model in (2) conditions on who gives to whom, consider the data generating process
529log(stockprice)i,t = µi,t + βPr(FavoredCandidate)i,j,t + i,j,t,
530where µi,t is a firm–candidate specific factor that is priced into the company’s stock. Taking the difference between time t and t0 gives
531Ri,∆t = β∆Pr(FavoredCandidate)i,j,∆t + ∆i,j,∆t,
532with Ri,∆t denoting the stock’s return. Above, we rely on abnormal rather than simple returns to also account for overall market conditions.
53320
534daily fluctuations in betting odds are noisy and only weakly related to changes in election
535fundamentals, then the weekly analysis will be more informative.
536Our most inclusive regression models in columns (3) and (6) also include firm–election fixed
537effects. We, therefore, not only condition on “who gives to whom,” but we also implicitly
538account for linear time trends in the electoral prospects of candidates and the performance
539of individual stocks. Identification in these specifications comes from temporary fluctuations
540around the respective trends. Arguably, the models in columns (3) and (6) rely on weaker
541identifying assumptions, but they require more faith in market efficiency.
542Regardless of specification, all point estimates in Table 3 are statistically indistinguishable
543from zero. The coefficients in columns (4)–(6) even have the “wrong” sign. In sum, the
544evidence from this alternative research design is fully consistent with our RD estimates.
545Discussion
546In this paper, we provide systematic evidence on the impact of money in politics by studying
547corporate campaign contributions in over 18,000 elections for governor, Congress, and state
548legislature across three decades. Our research designs isolate the present value of the benefits
549a company derives if its favored candidate wins rather than loses the race. Surprisingly, we
550find no evidence that campaign contributions produce significant benefits for the firm, at
551least not on average. Our estimates are precise enough to statistically reject meaningfully
552large effect sizes as well as the possibility that campaign contributions are a good investment
553for individual executives.
554We should emphasize that our results only speak to the impact of one additional supported
555candidate winning office. Previous research has convincingly shown that partisan majorities
556in Congress impact firm values through their (anticipated) effects on policy (see, e.g., Jay
557achandran 2006; Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2007b). Our results are not at odds with
558this finding. The policy-making process is complicated, and electing one additional favored
559candidate may not be enough to shift the overall balance of power in a democracy with many
560checks and balances. In this sense, legislative systems with diffuse powers protect against
56121
562the influence of special interests.
563We should also emphasize that our findings complement rather than contradict the extant
564literature on the value of political connections. Previous work, for instance, demonstrates
565that political connections are quite valuable for firms in less-developed countries (e.g., Fisman
5662001; Faccio 2006; Boas and Hidalgo 2014). Even in a mature democracy like the U.S.,
567ties between corporations and important members of the executive branch appear to yield
568nontrivial benefits (Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2009; Do, Lee, and Nguyen 2015; Brown and
569Huang 2017), especially in times of crisis (Acemoglu et al. 2016). Our results differ, at least
570in part, because we study connections between firms and a much broader set of politicians,
571who are, on average, less powerful. Notably, our results are silent on whether companies
572profit from ingratiating themselves with members of the federal executive.
573Taken together, the extant evidence suggests that context matters a great deal—not all
574connections between firms and candidates are created equal. Taking both our findings as
575well as those in the literature at face value, corporate campaign contributions may be cause
576for concern in (only) a limited number of circumstances. Delineating the conditions under
577which corporate electioneering is and is not damaging to the democratic process remains an
578important question for future work.11 For example, based on our RD results it appears that
579special interests are not particularly effective at influencing electorally constrained politicians
580through PAC donations. In any case, we need more information on the entire distribution
581of effects—be they good, bad, or null—in order to properly evaluate the overall impact of
582money in politics.
583In addition, our null findings raise an interesting puzzle. Scholars have argued that special
584interests give strategically (Barber 2016; Fouirnaies and Hall 2014, 2018; Powell and Grim
585mer 2016), even buying access (Kalla and Broockman 2016). Yet, we find no evidence that
586contributions actually benefit the average firm. Is access not valuable? In order for contri
58711Fouirnaies and Fowler (2018) take a first step in this direction by studying the influence of the insurance industry in U.S. state politics. Although this industry is a big player in state politics, and despite the fact that it is heavily regulated on the state level, Fouirnaies and Fowler find no evidence that the ability to make corporate campaign contributions benefits insurance companies.
58822
589butions to consistently affect firm value through this channel, campaign contributions need
590to buy access, access has to change the behavior of elected officials, that behavior has to
591translate into policy, which in turn must help firms. Determining why, or at which point,
592this causal chain breaks down is also a fruitful question for future research.
593If corporations do not meaningfully profit from one additional favored candidate winning
594office, why do they nonetheless contribute to so many political campaigns? Our results help
595to narrow down the set of possibilities. First, as in the signaling theories of Gordon and Hafer
596(2005) and Schnakenberg and Turner (2016), the benefits that accrue to the company may
597not depend on who wins the election. Second, companies might “give a little and get a little”
598(Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; p. 126). That is, the true benefits to the
599firm may be so small that they are not statistically detectable. Third, individual managers
600may derive consumption value from donating, and agency problems within the company may
601prevent shareholders from effectively monitoring the use of these funds.
602The last explanation is consistent with Bonica’s (2016) argument that even CEOs and
603other corporate elites donate largely for ideological reasons. Still, even spending driven by
604consumption motives may alter election results in favor of the preferences of a small class
605of individuals; and our analysis is silent on the number of races that might have seen a
606different winner in the absence of such contributions. If the political leanings of high-ranking
607executives are not representative of the electorate as a whole, this might be reason enough
608to worry about giving by corporations and other wealthy donors.
60923
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